Emergency Response to MRT Disruption along North East Line in June 2013

Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Minister for Transport regarding the service disruption between Woodleigh and Punggol MRT stations of the North East Line on 19 June 2013 (a) whether the response to the incident by the public transport operator, SBS Transit, and Government agencies is adequate and meets the standards expected; and (b) whether the Government can be more proactive in assisting public transport operators to put in place effective incident management plans.

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: LTA and SBS Transit (SBST) are still investigating the cause of the train fault that disrupted services on the North East Line on 19 June 2013.

Preliminary investigations show that when the train fault occurred at about 6.15 pm, SBST attempted to recover train operations by pushing the faulty train to Hougang station and allow passengers to alight there before withdrawing the train from service. This is the normal procedure, when the safety of passengers is not compromised and lighting and air-conditioning in the train are still functioning. Passengers will then avoid having to detrain in the tunnel and walk along the tracks to the nearest station. However, in this instance, the rescue train and the faulty train could not be coupled, and the push-out operation was not successful. SBST then decided to commence detrainment. Throughout the process, SBST staff were on hand to provide assistance to the detrained passengers.

At the same time, SBST activated bus bridging services and allowed free boarding on regular bus services for commuters at other affected North East Line stations. Short loop train services were also maintained between HarbourFront and Woodleigh stations. At bus bridging points, LTA and Police officers were deployed for traffic and crowd control. SBST put up signages and made public announcements in trains and at stations to update commuters on the disruption and the alternate services available.

Nevertheless, as I had noted in my immediate response to the incident that evening, SBST's management of the incident could have been better. Many commuters have given feedback that more information could have been made available in a timely manner. Many affected commuters also had difficulty boarding buses at Woodleigh and Serangoon stations, due mainly to the heavy commuting traffic during the evening peak period which delayed bus arrivals.

I take a very serious view of how this incident was managed. When LTA put in place stricter requirements for incident response following the Committee of Inquiry's recommendations last year, the intent was to avoid subjecting passengers to great discomfort during train disruptions. In this incident, the required timing to commence detrainment was not met 2 . LTA is investigating the circumstances for the delay in detrainment, and will continue to work with both operators to improve incident management. Since last year, the public transport operators have refined their incident management plans and processes. LTA, in turn, has updated the Codes of Practices on incident management to include lessons learnt from past incidents, and conducts random surprise audits at train stations to ensure that operators are adequately prepared to deal with disruptions and are familiar with the execution of their incident management plans.

In addition, LTA regularly conducts table-top and ground deployment exercises with both operators to enhance their preparedness and capabilities in handling disruptions. LTA shares lessons learnt from these exercises as well as from past incidents and audits with both SMRT and SBST. I have emphasised to LTA that it must continue to work closely with them to continuously improve their incident management.

Note(s) to Question No(s) 26:

2 Under the revised Code of Practice for incident response following the Committee of Inquiry's recommendations last year, operators are required to commence detrainment within 30 minutes of a train being stalled, taking into account various considerations, such as the safety and health of passengers on board, whether in-train lighting and ventilation are properly functioning, and the time taken to move the stalled train to the nearest station for passengers to alight. For this 19 June NEL incident, SBST took more than 60 minutes to commence train-to-track detrainment at around 7.30 pm, from the time the train stalled in the tunnel at around 6.15 pm.