Disruption of MRT Train Services on 15 and 17 December 2011

The Minister for Transport (Mr Lui Tuck Yew): Mr Speaker, Sir, Members have raised concerns and queries regarding the two service disruptions on the North-South Line (NSL) that took place on 15 and 17 December 2011. I know that the two incidents were extremely disruptive and could have been better managed. I know it caused a significant amount of uncertainty, frustration and distress to commuters, and especially the passengers that were in the stalled trains because they were placed in the position of great duress. And I fully understand that for the disruption to have happened on 15 December, to be followed in short order by another disruption on 17 December, was clearly unacceptable to Singaporeans. Let me start by providing to this House a brief account of the facts of the case as we know them today, while we leave the Committee of Inquiry (COI) to do its work in the coming months. I will also update this House on some of the preliminary lessons learnt and the potential weaknesses that have been identified in our current framework as we make every effort to put things right and to restore confidence in the MRT system.

On the evening of 15 December, an estimated 127,000 commuters were affected by a major disruption to service along the North-South Line from Marina Bay station to Braddell station. Four trains stalled, one between City Hall and Dhoby Ghaut stations, one between Somerset and Orchard stations, one at Braddell station, and one just before Braddell station. The trains stalled because of misalignment between the trains' current collector shoes and the power rail that is commonly referred to as the "third" rail. The trains draw locomotive power from the third rail through the train current collector shoes. Due to the misalignment, the trains were unable to draw power and stalled.

Two days later, a second service disruption took place on the North-South Line on the morning of 17 December. Once again it caused distress and inconvenience, this time to about 94,000 commuters. Five trains stalled, one each at City Hall, Dhoby Ghaut, Ang Mo Kio, and Bishan stations, and one more along the stretch just before Somerset station. The cause for this second disruption was apparently similar to the earlier disruption: misalignment between the stalled trains' current collector shoes and the third rail.

Following the second incident, a complete check was conducted for the entire North-South-East West Line (NSEWL) and its operating fleet of trains. LTA and SMRT wanted to do everything possible to ensure that services would not be disrupted again. LTA and SMRT mobilised their technical and engineering staff to work through the night of 17 December, and SMRT was able to fully resume service around noon on Sunday, 18 December.

As a result of the checks, LTA and SMRT found 21 dislodged or missing claws. These claws secure the third rail to the support brackets, and when a few consecutive claws are dislodged, this may cause the third rail to sag. It becomes misaligned with the collector shoes on the trains passing these sections and it will damage or break off the collector shoes. This was likely the immediate cause of the incidents on both 15 and 17 December. However, many questions remain unanswered: Why did the claws dislodge? Why did it happen on such a scale and only along certain stretches of our trains on those two days? And why, after apparently fixing the problem on 15 December on the affected stretches, did train services run smoothly on 16 December, only to have the problem re-surface on 17 December in a different location? These are among the questions that the COI has to look into.

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We suspected excessive vibrations from the running of the trains could be a factor for the claws to be dislodged. Therefore, as a precautionary measure, LTA directed SMRT to impose a speed restriction of 40 kph, instead of the usual 80 kph, on trains running along the floating slab tracks. The floating slab tracks, or what are known as FSTs, are large concrete structures that are supported on bearings. They are designed to absorb vibrations from passing trains so that the surrounding buildings are not affected. Most of the damaged claws were found along the FST sections. SMRT also further secured the claws with cable ties after consulting the manufacturer.

The staff of SMRT and LTA have worked extremely hard to deal with the disruptions and to stabilise the situation. They did so under significant time pressure and stress. And I know that Singaporeans would want to join me in expressing our sincere appreciation to them for their hard work. Let me also thank commuters who displayed tolerance and understanding, coping with the slightly degraded service levels by starting their journeys a little earlier and taking things in their stride. As of today, all but one of the damaged trains have re-entered service, and SMRT is running more trains than before the incidents, because some of the 17 new trains that were recently delivered have entered service. The speed restriction is still in place on the FST stretches of the NSEWL and this has extended journeys by about two minutes. Since the two incidents, SMRT has taken steps to secure all the claws along the NSEWL, both underground and aboveground, with cable-ties, as an interim measure to prevent claws from being dislodged while they work on a permanent solution. SMRT has also stepped up inspections, including daily checks on the third rail throughout the network, concentrating particularly along the FST sections, to ensure that any signs of recurrence are picked up early and rectified. The condition of the train collector shoes is also checked daily during operational hours for any early sign of damage or abnormality, and also at the end of revenue service when the trains return to the depots to ensure the integrity of the system.

Since excessive vibration was identified as a possible contributing factor, as an added precaution, SMRT went further to check other vulnerable structures in the tunnel that could be affected by extensive vibrations. They therefore engaged a Professional Engineer to inspect and confirm the infrastructure integrity of the tunnel fixtures and mountings, and I understand that no abnormalities were found after these inspections.

The incidents of 15 and 17 December affected more than 200,000 commuters. They suffered great frustration, inconvenience and distress. The execution of Emergency preparedness plans, especially for the first incident, ought to be significantly improved. SMRT could have better handled the evacuation of passengers in the stalled trains to reduce the sense of distress, and could have provided clearer and timelier information and instructions to the public, instead of leaving commuters confused and apprehensive in already disordered circumstances. That the two incidents have the same proximate cause and happened two days apart raises concerns about possible systemic shortcomings. I assure this House that the Government takes a very serious view of the incidents and the potential safety risk that this could pose to commuters, to passengers, which is why I convened a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the incidents.

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The Committee comprises three capable and experienced members, chosen for their legal, operational and technical expertise. Under its terms of reference, the COI will conduct an independent investigation into both technical and non-technical aspects of the incidents on 15 and 17 December. The Committee will investigate the sequence of events leading to the disruptions as well as establish the technical, systematic and other causes that may have contributed to the disruptions. Based on these findings, it will make recommendations to minimise the recurrence of similar incidents as well as to improve the management of such incidents. A full report of the proceedings, findings and recommendations will be submitted upon completion of the investigation, and it will be made public. And I hope that this addresses Mr Cedric Foo's and Ms Sylvia Lim's questions on the composition and the terms of reference for the COI.

Some have also asked if the Committee should look into other service disruptions on other MRT lines. The extent and severity of the service disruptions on 15 and 17 December, and the potential safety risks that they posed are what warrant an independent inquiry into the causes of these two disruptions. The COI should focus on investigating the core issues related to the 15 and 17 December incidents, report on its findings and make their recommendations accordingly. However, if there are any previous incidents or events which are relevant or have contributed to the incidents of 15 and 17 December, the COI has the latitude and indeed the obligation to consider them. The Chairman of the COI, Mr Tan Siong Thye, has already stated that the Committee will take a comprehensive and systems approach in its inquiry to thoroughly understand all the underlying causes, both technical and non-technical, that could have contributed to the problem. Er Dr Lee Bee Wah has asked about the reasons for the recent breakdowns. I urge Members to be patient and to give the COI time to conduct this investigation thoroughly because it is premature at this stage to draw definitive conclusions on the underlying reasons for these two MRT breakdowns at this stage. We should also avoid speculating on the reasons, as I think this will undermine the focus of the COI in dispassionately and objectively getting to the bottom of the issues.

Ms Sylvia Lim has also asked how the Committee will conduct its hearings. The hearings will be held in public, and interested parties and witnesses have been invited to contact the Committee's Secretary. The Committee will have its own independent investigation team to enable it to carry out primary fact-finding. This will allow it to do a totally independent investigation, without relying on LTA and SMRT's ongoing investigations. The Committee will also have the power to procure and receive evidence as it thinks necessary or desirable, and examine all such persons as witnesses in order to fulfil its terms of reference.

Apart from the COI's investigation, the LTA and SMRT have also started their own separate internal investigations. This is to be expected. Both parties clearly have the duty and responsibility to find out what went wrong, especially for those areas that they are accountable for, and to do so as quickly as possible. The SMRT, as a public transport operator, must ensure that it is able to operate a safe and reliable train service while LTA, as the regulator, is responsible for identifying any shortcomings on the part of the operator that may have led to the service disruption and will also have to see if there are useful lessons from these incidents to strengthen its own regulatory role. The COI, on the other hand, is an independent party appointed by MOT and will also look into the larger systems issues beyond that which SMRT and LTA will cover in their respective probes.

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I would like to give a quick update to this House on the ongoing investigation efforts. As vibrations within the train system appears to be a key issue contributing to the incidents in question, SMRT engaged an overseas consultant to conduct a series of preliminary vibration testing on 22 December. This was primarily a scoping exercise, to provide data on the dynamic properties of the various track and train components. The results will enable the experts to develop a proper proposal for the conduct of a series of more detailed tests that will be carried out in the coming weeks. After that, the data will need to be analysed and interpreted and they may have to carry out further tests if necessary. As some of these activities must be carried out on the actual tracks and tunnels, the various investigating bodies will need to work through how best to do this while SMRT continues to operate the MRT services.

There have been questions raised about whether our MRT system has been strained by the increase in ridership over the last few years with trains becoming more crowded. Because the operators have injected an additional 2,000 weekly trips since 2008 to cater to the higher ridership, some have speculated that the higher intensity usage of our system may have resulted in the breakdowns. I would like to assure the House of the following: First, the additional trips added did not exceed the safe operating parameters of the system. Second, LTA requires the operators to keep strictly to the maintenance regime prescribed by the manufacturers. I will say a little more about this later.

But, first, I want to respond to the question posed by Mr Gan Thiam Poh on whether the two-minute intervals are the minimum and safest margin for MRT trains to run during peak hours. The present signalling system on the NSEWL is designed to safely allow for minimum headways of 120 seconds. It is therefore technically feasible and safe for the operator to run trains at two-minute intervals during peak hours. The additional trips that SMRT has been putting on are only for the periods where the train intervals were longer than two minutes previously. Where trains were already running at two-minute intervals, no further trips were added.

3.15 pm

The signalling system is designed to disallow trains from coming too close to the next train. And this is also the reason why, as we come closer to running at the minimum two-minute headways, that we see more occasions where trains have to stop mid-way between stations for a while before re-starting. This is because the train ahead that has stopped at the station is sometimes delayed from moving off on time because some commuters, for example, have tried to embark while the doors are closing.

Members have raised concerns about the adequacy of the current maintenance regime. Indeed, a strong maintenance regime must be in place to ensure that the system is safe and reliable. Under the SMRT's current maintenance regime, the company has been performing maintenance works and inspections based on the schedules recommended by the manufacturers. Notwithstanding this, the quality and adequacy of the maintenance regime, be it for preventive or corrective maintenance, are areas that will be closely scrutinised by the COI as well as the internal investigation teams set up by both SMRT and LTA.

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Ms Foo Mee Har asked how the SMRT is held accountable for the maintenance of the rail system. The LTA, as a regulator, requires the operators to comply with their Operating Performance Standards, or what is known as the OPS. The OPS mandates the minimum service adequacy that the operators must fulfil. If found in breach of the OPS, the operators can be penalised up to $1 million per incident, taking into account the severity of the incident. Besides the OPS, the operators are required to submit their two-year maintenance plans to LTA for review, and LTA may ask the operators to adjust or to improve on the plans as necessary. But I should also point out that, even in the absence of the OPS, it would still be in the operators' interest to maintain the RTS system well as this would extend the operational life of the assets.

Mr Gerald Giam has asked if LTA has to date exercised its power to impose conditions relating to the appointment, re-appointment or removal of MRT operators' CEO, Chairman or any of its Directors, and about the criteria that LTA uses to decide when to impose such conditions. Decisions relating to the changes of these key appointments in the company are initiated by the company or, in the case of the Chairman and Directors, by the shareholders, and they cannot be unilaterally imposed by LTA. However, under LTA's current licences, operators must seek LTA's approval for the appointment, re-appointment or removal of any Director or the Chairman of its Board of Directors. While LTA has veto powers over the appointment of the operators' Board, these are generally intended to be used as a last resort against clearly unsuitable nominees and, to date, LTA has not found it necessary to exercise this veto power.

One of the questions that needs to be answered is whether the regulatory regime is sufficiently robust. Together with the COI's more holistic findings, the Government will thoroughly review the regulatory and penalty framework and its oversight over the operators' maintenance regimes to strengthen it where necessary.

We move on to emergency preparedness. Several Members, including Ms Foo Mee Har, Mr Gan Thiam Poh, Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, Mr Low Thia Khiang and Ms Irene Ng, have asked about the readiness of our system to respond to an emergency. Er Dr Lee Bee Wah has also asked specifically about the role of the SCDF in such incidents, and if the incidents have impacted the Government's planning for a terror attack on the train system. Let me say at the onset that these disruptions exposed gaps in emergency preparedness and crisis response, and we need to do much better.

The current processes require that the operators work with LTA to come up with plans that will be activated based on various plausible scenarios. The operators are required to have a Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP) that is activated in the event of a train service disruption. Under the RIMP, the operators are responsible to provide timely information and regular updates to the public and passengers, maintain train services where possible, carry out recovery of service and provide alternative services to stations that may be affected by the service disruption, including the timely activation of bus bridging services. The operators are also expected to have clear procedures for handling passengers in affected trains, including the "detrainment" of commuters onto the MRT tracks and the relevant safety precautions that have to put in place in such instances, such as turning off the electric power to relevant sections of the third rail to ensure commuter safety, and so on.

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The LTA regularly reviews the operators' RIMP, and works with them on improvements to service recovery and incident management measures. Table-top exercises are conducted to check the crisis management procedures. And prior to the opening of a new line or section of a line, LTA requires the operator to carry out a full-scale exercise involving first responders like SCDF and SPF to ensure that coordination between the operator and first responders is smooth. The operator is required to validate the SOPs during these exercises, so that adjustments can be made if necessary. Where possible, grassroots organisations and school pupils are invited to participate in such exercises to improve the emergency readiness of residents.

I would like to assure the House that a whole-of-Government approach is adopted with regard to commuter safety on our public transport system, and the Police and SCDF are activated during major service disruptions. During the recent incidents, the Police officers were promptly deployed to assist SMRT on various fronts, and SCDF officers were also deployed to help those in distress for the incident on 15 December. Aside from LTA-led safety exercises, the PTOs also participate in security exercises that are led by MHA at the national level. So in 2006, Exercise Northstar V was carried out with the public transport operators. The exercise simulated multiple terror attacks in train stations and tested out contingency plans and coordination among various stakeholders from the public, private and people sectors. Shortcomings in areas like incident management, crowd control and casualty evacuation were identified, and follow-up actions were taken to address these. More recently in 2009, as part of Exercise Northstar VII, a swarm attack by gunmen was also simulated at Raffles Place MRT station. Apart from conducting emergency preparedness exercises, the Public Transport Security Command, or what is known as TransCom, that was formed in August 2009 under the Singapore Police Force (SPF), provides dedicated resources to enhance the safety and security of the MRT and bus systems.

There are, nevertheless, limitations to such simulated exercises since these are often pre-planned and scripted with volunteers from grassroots organisations and schools as willing and psychologically prepared participants. The most realistic exercise would be an unannounced major simulated disruption that involves actual commuters during peak hours, but such exercises would significantly inconvenience many commuters. But there is much more that LTA and the operators can do to increase the realism and the effectiveness of the exercises that they do and to extract greater value from these exercises to improve the SOPs and communications plans to the commuters and the public. Future exercises would therefore be conducted using more challenging scenarios to test the readiness of the operators and improve the multi-agency coordination needed to enhance emergency preparedness and crisis response. And I believe that this is something that the COI will be looking into as well.

Members may also like to know that we have taken some immediate measures to improve existing procedures. Even as the COI looks into these two incidents, I would like to assure the House that improvement measures have been initiated so that we are better prepared for a major train service disruption. I will speak about three areas in particular, with regard to communication with commuters, bus bridging and coordination between Government agencies and the operators in the event of a service disruption.

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First, measures have been put in place to improve communication to in-train commuters and the general public in the event of a service breakdown. Changes have been implemented to enable the SMRT Operations Control Centre (OCC) to broadcast directly to the passengers on a stalled train. This will provide those most affected by any disruption with more timely and accurate updates. The LTA is also working with the operators on having emergency announcements made in other languages, besides English, in the event of a service disruption. The SMRT has also improved its detrainment procedures so that the decision to detrain can be taken more quickly, and it will reduce the time that commuters are cooped up in a stalled train. After the first incident, SMRT has also set up a Twitter account to provide more timely information on service delays. And in addition to just using traditional media, LTA and the operators are also exploring the use of mass SMS broadcasts to alert commuters to service disruptions.

The second area is on bus bridging. It has been observed that the activation of bus bridging services sometimes took too long, and encountered various execution and logistical problems. Since the incidents, LTA has further reviewed SMRT and SBST's bus bridging plans to ensure that bus routing and passenger boarding and alighting points are updated, logical and sufficient to cater to the volume of passengers expected. On the ground, this would include the improvement of signage for evacuation routes and bus bridging points. In addition, pre-prepared instructions to drivers have been reviewed to ensure that they are clear and easily understood. And as an added assurance, SMRT will deploy an officer with every bus convoy whose drivers may be unfamiliar with the route to guide them along.

As the regulator, LTA is also working with both SMRT and SBST to improve contingency plans for train service disruptions, including a more integrated and holistic approach to incident management and service recovery. For example, instead of relying only on bridging shuttle bus services which could take some time to activate, LTA is working with SMRT to allow for free travel on its bus services that serve SMRT stations where train services are disrupted, and they will explore extending this arrangement across both operators, so that affected commuters can continue their journeys on either operators' bus services for free regardless of which line is disrupted.

Thirdly, coordination among operators and agencies has been further enhanced. We have streamlined the communications protocol so that LTA, SPF and SCDF can be alerted more quickly, especially if assistance is required by the operator. In addition, SCDF, LTA and the Police are already reviewing and refining response protocols and emergency procedures together with the operators.

Finally, let me assure this House again that the safety of commuters is paramount. The rail system is the backbone of our public transport system. It carries millions of commuters each day, and its safety and reliability must be ensured. We have taken a number of immediate measures after the two disruptions and we will continue to improve the MRT system to regain the confidence and trust of commuters. While we know that the claws were dislodged, we do not yet know why this happened. The COI will get to the bottom of this matter, we will get the problems fixed, we will improve the overall resilience and robustness of our public transport system and we will enhance our incident management capabilities. I seek Members' and the public's understanding and patience in the meantime. Thank you.

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Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take the break now. Members may seek their clarifications after the break. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 3.55 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.35 pm until 3.55 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.55 pm.

[ Mr Speaker in the Chair]

DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN SERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011

Debate resumed

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng (Pioneer): Sir, I want to thank the Minister for his very long and indeed comprehensive statement regarding the questions that I and several of our Members have raised. I have some supplementary questions and clarifications.

First, whether the role of the regulator should be one of the terms of reference for the Committee of Inquiry (COI). Because if the COI is convened by the Minister for Transport and LTA comes under his purview, where does the role of the regulator come into play when the COI examines it and how independent would that assessment be? Secondly, how long will the COI take by the Minister's estimation and what does he think is a reasonable period for robust but timely inquiry results to be presented to this House?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, I thank Mr Foo for his supplementary questions and clarifications. First of all, I believe that the COI, and I am confident that the COI, would do a very thorough job of this to look into not only the causes – both technical and non-technical – that relate to the disruptions, but also all other aspects that may allow us to do a much better job of maintaining the system as well as responding to such incidents. And certainly, I would expect that they would take a look at the role of the regulator and, if they have opinions on the matter as to how the regulator can do a better job, as I have mentioned in the Statement that I have given earlier, I would expect the COI to put this forward in the recommendations.

The COI is not dependent on LTA or SMRT for the investigation. It has its own independent investigation arms, and that is why while it takes the reports from both the internal investigations conducted by SMRT and LTA into consideration, it can go well beyond this and, in fact, it is, I am sure, going to direct its own independent investigation to look deeper into certain areas.

Secondly, on how long the COI and what is the reasonable period: I would rather not speculate on that at this point in time. But what we do expect, of course, is that at the end of it all it will be a very, very thorough study with the appropriate recommendations into the issues and how to prevent it from happening again, and what are the improvements that we need to make. And we ought to give them the time that is needed in order for them to do a very thorough job of this, which is why it is important that the operators, together with the regulator, even at this point in time, put into place certain improvements where it can – where they already know that there are certain weaknesses from observations arising from how these two incidents were managed. If there are improvements that ought to be made, well, we should not wait for the COI to finish its work. We ought to put them into practice, refine them if necessary and find other areas that we ought to further improve on.

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3.59 pm

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong: Sir, there is a concern that SMRT might have been focusing more on maximising its profits by growing its retail business rather than on improving its performance, maintenance and service standards of the rail system, and that this emphasis has contributed to the recent lapses.

I have three supplementary questions. First, what measures are the Minister introducing to ensure that the public interest is always placed above that of commercial gain? Second, the Minister mentioned about reviewing the penalty framework. Can the Minister tell us whether heavy fines will be meted out as a punitive measure for the disruptions – large enough for the SMRT to feel the pinch – and the penalty framework reviewed so that the fines would be more effective as a deterrent? And my third point: can the Minister assure us that the new CEO of SMRT will have the requisite qualifications and experience in transport management to deliver a public transport system that Singaporeans can rely on and be confident of?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank Ms Ng for her very probing questions. I think it would probably be remiss of me to affirm the Member's statement that they focus more on commercial rather than on maintenance. I have no basis for supporting such a hypothesis. What we do know is that they are required to maintain the trains and the systems in accordance with what the manufacturer recommends. And based on their own experience operating the trains and systems, to add on to what the manufacturer has recommended as well as to draw lessons from other regimes – best practices that other operators may be practising – in order to strengthen what they do here in Singapore.

On top of that, LTA exercises oversight on this, so there is the Operating Performance Standards (OPS) that the LTA imposes on the operators of this system. This is the very minimum standard that they must meet, and it covers a variety of different areas including service availability, on-time performance, and so on and so forth. But there is also a part that is devoted to maintenance and safety, and the maintenance plans are put to LTA for their review and if LTA deems that there is more that needs to be done, then LTA will work together with the operator on these specific areas.

On heavy fines, I would not like to speculate at this point of time what the fines should be for these two incidents because, obviously, it needs to be properly investigated and we need to, first of all, understand the underlying causes and what are some of the contributory areas that may have resulted into the two severe incidents.

The last non security-related incident was in January 2008 where one of the locomotives stalled on the tracks and it disrupted operations, I believe, for about seven hours. The fine, then, the largest in history so far, was above $300,000. So we would take some of that into consideration as well – past performances and relative benchmarks, such as the one that I have just mentioned, and depending on the findings of the COI, we will then determine the penalty accordingly.

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I would also like to add that this does not come out of commuters' fares because there is always the concern that the greater the penalty you impose on the operator, the more of it is passed on to the commuters. The fare formula, as we are aware, does not quite operate that way. The fare formula really is a combination of the inflation as well as the CPI as well as the wage growth, the average of that with a productivity dividend of 1.5% that we extract from the operators. And that is the basis for which the PTC would subsequently determine the fare formula for the following year. So penalties and fines and all that have no bearing on the setting of fares for the years to come. I want to assure Members of that as well.

The final point on the new CEO. I think it is a matter that is best left to the Board to work on. I know that they have one of the Directors with very strong engineering experience from Shell, Mr Tan Ek Kia, stepping in on an interim basis at this point in time while the search for a CEO is going on. We ought to give SMRT the time and space to do a proper search for the next CEO.

4.06 pm

Er Dr Lee Bee Wah (Nee Soon): Sir, I would like to ask three supplementary questions to the Minister. I think this whole spate of breakdowns not only revealed the gaps in an emergency preparedness and crisis response, it also reveals the seriousness in the lack of maintenance. I think a lot of people are thinking that our train system is breaking down part by part. I would like to ask the Minister: are you happy with the maintenance budget that is set aside by the PTO in this case, SMRT? Question two: is LTA looking into any worst case possible? I was told that the first batch of trains arrived in Singapore 24 years ago – 66 of them – have already outlived their lifespan. And in those trains, there are a lot of electronic parts which are all obsolete and it could be a time bomb. I hope that LTA will look into this very seriously. And the third question is: it looks like we cannot just depend on the train system. Is LTA looking into parallel bus systems?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, to answer this set of questions, I should bring my file to share some data with Members. Let me deal with the maintenance issues. You see, we do not determine the maintenance budgets. We look at what is the outcome and if we are satisfied with the outcome. I asked for some data on the number of incidents and I would just confine it to giving Members some data on the North-South-East-West line. I do not want to put it into the Statement because, as Mr Foo said, it is already long enough. So I thought I would just share it with you here.

You see, LTA tracks the number of breakdowns above a 10-minute delay for peak hours; above 15 minutes for off-peak. They also, of course, have data going down to five-minute and two-minute disruptions. The data is for 2007 until November 2011. I do not have the full year's data but, essentially, this is it. It is on incidents per 100,000 kilometres (km) because obviously, if you have a longer network, you are running more trains, you have to expect that there would be more breakdowns. Hence, over the years, we have indeed been running more trips. We have indeed been extending our networks so you would expect that there are also more disruptions. Hence, the right thing to do and is indeed the norm for operators in other regimes to normalise this to 100,000 km.

Broadly, what it shows is that actually, in terms of the severe incidents above 30-minute disruptions, that has come down in absolute number of disruptions from seven in 2007 to two in 2011. Obviously, this is prior to the two incidents. In terms of incidents per 100,000 km, that has come down from 0.05 to 0.03. Part of the reason why it has come down is because we had, in the earlier years, a number of track intrusions. The track intrusions actually disrupted the smooth running of the trains quite a bit. We see a similar pattern of decreasing number of incidents reported and monitored by the LTA, the track intrusions. For incidents that caused greater than 10-minute delay, there is also a decrease from 30 in 2007, it went up to 37 in 2008 and thereafter, it came down – last year, it was 21 until November. And likewise, measured across per 100,000 km, it came down. Where there are slight increases in the trend of disruptions are those that are of five-minute delay – so five to 10 minutes – that has gone up. Absolute numbers – in 2007, it was 213 incidents; and 2011, for the eleven months, it was about 271 incidents. So we are really roughly talking about almost an incident a day for that kind of disruption. And measured against per 100,000 km, it had also gone up from 1.65 to 1.8 – and these are for more than five minutes.

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LTA is looking into this together the operators to try and understand whether there are some underlying causes that affect the trains causing delays of more than five minutes and to see whether we can improve the maintenance regime or whatever may be the cause of this.

On old trains, I would like to correct that misimpression because what happens is that, I believe after every 15 years, the trains undergo a service life extension programme. It is not quite a mid-life upgrade because we know of other regimes where they have gone through two such extensions. So our trains have gone through a service life extension programme where, basically, they do what is necessary in order to continue to keep the trains running at a very performance level.

The third thing is on parallel buses versus trains. Today, we have two parallel bus services, one operated by SBST, the other operated by SMRT. I know there have been calls for more of these parallel bus services and indeed, we are thinking what more can be done, particularly when we are able to bring in more buses into the system. But I would say that actually, if you look at the use of these two services, it has been disappointing because people tend to gravitate towards the trains rather than to the buses for a variety of reasons. It is just that it is less consistent and less reliable in terms of the kind of timings that you would expect. The most telling was on Sunday morning. Remember we had that disruption on Saturday. At the end of the operating hours on Saturday, we shut down the system for an extended maintenance and checks. We only fully resumed service on Sunday, 18 December by about noon. The bus bridging service dragged on to about two o'clock. It was free. So there was free bus bridging parallel to the MRT lines on a Sunday mid-day versus paid train services. As soon as the trains were running, everybody shifted to the trains. So we continued running the buses but you could see the behaviourial patterns.

I would say that, while we want to look into how we can provide more parallel services particularly during the peak hours, I am mindful that based on the two services that we run today, it really has pretty low ridership. They have not been successful and the experience on Sunday showing demand between paid MRT services and free bus bridging services was also quite telling.

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4.12 pm

Mr Low Thia Khiang (Aljunied): Sir, I noted the Minister's admission that there is a gap in emergency response and would look into it. I am happy to note that. There are some clarifications I would like to seek. First of all, what is the role of Government in an emergency situation involving public service such as SMRT which is essentially a private company? Secondly, who should assess and determine whether a particular situation like service disruption on 15 December is indeed an emergency situation whereby the SOP involving such a situation is activated? Thirdly, whether the operator, in this case, SMRT, by creating a situation due to whatever situation that they have inside, has caused the Government agencies to provide the service which cost Government expenditure? And whether this company which is a private company, answerable to shareholders, should be made to pay for the services provided by the Government?

Sir, in the Minister's Statement, he mentioned that 17 new trains have been put into service. I would like to know where these train cars come from. Who are the manufacturers and whether or not these new train cars may indeed cause excessive vibrations which are probably causing the problems that we face today?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Mr Speaker, Sir, let me thank the Member for some very good questions. On the way of the Government in emergency situations, let us stick to transport-related incidents. If they are security-related, for example, if it is a terrorist incident and so on, then it comes under the charge of the Police Force. For disruptions of the nature that we encountered on 15 and 17 December, it comes under the responsibility of the operator who is the domain owner of the situation. But it does not mean that they handle these themselves because there is, as I have said, a Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP) where they are required to assess, decide on "detrainment" procedures, communications and so on, and also assess whether there is a necessity to call for additional help. So, in this case, the Police as well as the SCDF were activated. Upon activation, if I can recall correctly, the Police arrived at Somerset Station within about 20 minutes or so. The SCDF arrived at Somerset Station – because that was where the call came from, where it all started – within about 12 minutes. And thereafter, the Government agencies actually put in more resources, including activating their personnel for crowd control as the crowd that needed bus bridging services grew greater.

Whether they should pay for services by the Government: I think this is a completely different issue altogether and I think it is not appropriate for me to say that as a result of this incident, we establish a new precedent where any private company that draws on Government services in an emergency must be required to pay for it. I think where private entities, commercial bodies draw on Government resources, for example, if they were to require us to help them to do a study as they expand overseas or whatever, they pay. They pay the full cost plus a little bit more. That is already a given.

But where it is emergency services where you activate the ambulance, the Police or the fire brigade, I am not so sure that that ought to be the principle that we adopt.

On the 17 new trains, these are Kawasaki trains that were assembled in China and delivered to us. The first five of the 22 actually came in May, and 17 were delivered, I believe, from October/November onwards. We have been accepting them into service. Hence, that was also the reason why despite the loss of that one train – which we were not yet able to complete the repairs – SMRT was actually able to introduce more trains to run the system.

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Did they cause excessive vibrations? We do not know. It is something that we would need to get to the root of it. There are four classes of trains now in the system. We bought them at different times. The latest two generations were from Kawasaki. These trains are about five tonnes heavier than the other trains; and each train is about 220-plus tonnes, so the new ones are five tonnes heavier each. If you say that you run it at full load, I do not know, maybe 1,400 or 1,500 passengers at about 65 kg each, that would be about another 100 tonnes. So, the difference is about five tonnes over, maybe, 320 tonnes. Did they contribute, and to what degree did they contribute, to the excessive vibrations? We do not know yet. We have asked this question. The academics have told us that vibration is, as they always say, quite complicated. It is speed, it is mass. It is whether there are floating slab tracks or concrete tracks. Is it round the curves or straight? So there is a variety of different possible factors that they need to input into the so-called "equation", which is why SMRT brought an expert in to do a scoping exercise, to come up with a detailed plan to measure the different trains, different speeds, different places. We will, then, analyse the results, and we will know better thereafter.

4.16 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: I thank the Minister for his statement. I have one supplementary question. Why is the COI that he appointed only going to cover the disruptions on 15 and 17 December? As the Minister has said earlier, there were actually 269 other disruptions or instances lasting more than five minutes that happened last year. By limiting the inquiry to just the incidents on 15 and 17 December, is the Government omitting the major problems – whether systematic or otherwise – that may have been the cause of the other incidents?

I understand that LTA would be investigating the other incidents, as the Minister mentioned just now. But is it not necessary to have an independent panel or committee to be investigating these as well?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Convening the COI is a serious matter. The last time the transport arena had to convene a COI was back in April 2004 during the Nicoll Highway incident. You know that when you bring the COI together, it is really to take a very, very careful detailed look at very serious disruptions.

The "ordinary" disruptions − if I can call them that, that is, the 5-minute, 10-minute or 30-minute disruptions – I think you would leave it to both the operator as well as LTA to investigate thoroughly and to draw lessons as to whether there are systemic causes, what are the issues involved as well as to make the improvements needed. I did also say in the Statement that the COI could and should look at other factors that may have contributed to what happened on 15 and 17 December.

My personal belief is that before any significant incident happens, there is possibly a series of little incidents that if we had been monitoring these carefully over time, taking the lessons learned, doing the necessary improvements and changes, may have prevented them. I speak from experience because, having served 20 years in the Navy, I know that that is so when we track it back. So while the COI focuses on what happened on 15 and 17 December, both from the technical and non-technical aspects, and if it deems it necessary, for example, it would look at the issue of the claws – how many claws were dislodged in the past, what did you do with regard to such claws, and so on and so forth. It need not be constrained as to what actually happened and the approximate causes for the 15 and 17 December. If it deems it necessary, it can go beyond that to look at the events as well as the other factors. It is actually quite a broad scope. But I would also add that I think it is not possible nor is it necessary for us to convene a COI for every five-minute disruption to the train system.

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4.19 pm

Ms Tin Pei Ling (Marine Parade): I thank the Minister for the very comprehensive Statement. I also find it very assuring that the Government is looking very seriously into the possibilities of terror attacks and therefore planning for such emergencies. But, frankly, I am also a little disappointed that the SMRT, since this is under its purview, has not been able to anticipate or prepare for emergency scenarios like those that had happened in December, since those would have been the more likely scenarios, especially in terms of train operations, and we see it everywhere in other countries as well.

I felt that in the Minister's Statement, the emphasis on having a robust maintenance could not have been more important and more emphasised, and therefore it brings me to ask this question: whether the Ministry will consider requiring service and technical audits on a regular or half-yearly basis? If so, would the Ministry consider publishing such results so that public confidence could be restored? This would be a suggestion that I hope the Ministry could perhaps consider, in addition to the investigation and reports that the COI would be putting together. I think, in one night, if 61 rail defects and 13 faulty trains were uncovered, this could not have happened overnight. If we could put in such measures on a more regular basis, perhaps such disruptions could be better mitigated.

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Thank you for the suggestion. I really do not want to speculate at this point as to what were the underlying causes. We know that the claws dislodged. The question we need to ask is: Could it have been picked up? Could something have been done about it before the two incidents happened? Would a more stringent regulatory and audit regime have helped? These are areas that we do not quite know at this point in time, and I dare say that I would not want to add to the speculation, but I would allow the COI to do its job. If the COI deems that we really need to strengthen the regulatory and audit regime, and for LTA to pay more attention to these areas, we would certainly want to take that on board.

4.22 pm

Mr Yaw Shin Leong: Sir, I thank the Minister for the statement. I just have one clarification. Why do the MRT train windows not have emergency ventilation panels built in, so that commuters can manually open them in the event of an emergency like this one, or, say, if there is a chemical attack on the trains? The Hong Kong MTR has such panels in every train window which can be pulled open easily in the event of an emergency. Should this not have been part of the design specification of the trains? Is LTA intending to make this feature a requirement in all future train deliveries, including the 17 Kawasaki trains? And will it modify existing trains to implement this feature?

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Mr Lui Tuck Yew: I thank Mr Yaw for that question. What we have today is emergency power supply on board that will allow the emergency systems not the full system, but emergency lighting, ventilation and so on – for up to 45 minutes. These are tested regularly − I have checked with them − and they should last for up to 45 minutes. His point about whether we should have windows that can be opened in the event of a chemical attack and so on, I hesitate to say "yes" because sometimes that can actually be more dangerous than it would otherwise be if you have them closed. Because in a chemical attack, the chemical agents are actually outside in the tunnels or whatever it is. You would want to try and keep the train cars sealed for as long as possible.

I am not an expert in this matter as to whether you would want to have the windows open where people under all circumstances would be prepared to just pull open the windows, when sometimes it may be actually a greater danger to them. So, where necessary, I would want to take a much more careful look at this. But whether the emergency power supply of 45 minutes is doing what it is supposed to do, and whether it is sufficient, I would want to take a more careful look into that.

4.24 pm

Dr Janil Puthucheary (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to ask the Minister two questions. Given that our rail network is probably increasing in length and almost certainly in complexity, the absolute number of disruptions may increase even as the relative number reduces. Does LTA audit variance from the various emergency plans that the operators put up, such as the RIMP that he described? If not, why not? If so, would they consider using variance from the proposed plans as part of a performance indicator? So, between the regulator and the operator, if they come up with an emergency preparedness plan, does LTA investigate whether the plan that was proposed and was approved, is actually the plan that was carried out in an emergency situation? And if not, why was that not measured? If it is measured, could that variance from the plan be used as the performance indicator to incentivise the operator to put up realistic plans and carry out those plans properly?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Mr Speaker, let me thank Dr Janil for a very good question. Yes, indeed, we do audit the variance. So, whether it is in terms of timings for the activation of the different protocols – activation, indeed, of the RIMP itself – whether the bus-bridging service is activated in a sufficiently timely manner, the number of buses and so on, it is certainly so. It is the outcomes and whether the operators are able to meet the outcomes expected of them.

4.26 pm

Dr Lim Wee Kiak (Nee Soon): Sir, I would like to ask the Minister about benchmarking ourselves against other countries' MRT system, like Hong Kong MTR, as well as the Tokyo system versus New York and London systems. What are their breakdown rates like compared to ours?

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The second question I would like to ask is this: during the PTC reviews, whenever the public transport operator requests for a fare increase, are these breakdown rates computed into the formula? This means that if there are more breakdowns, why do we let them have a chance to have a fare increase? Commuters have been complaining that while fares go up, the quality of service may not measure up.

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: I thank the Member for that question. I actually do not have the detailed data for some of these other regimes. I know that in terms of availability as well as service standards, we are generally comparable if not better than many of them. We have a little bit more data on fares, but since that is not question that the Member raised, I would not want to share that data right now. But indeed we do try and get as much information as possible, as well as the problems they are encountering and sharing the problems that we encounter to try, overall, for everyone to have a more robust operating regime.

On fare formula: the fare formula is due for review in 2012 for implementation in 2013. I do not want to speculate at this point in time whether and how the fare formula for the coming years may change. You know what the fare formula entails today. When we assemble the team to let them take a review of the fare formula, they will have sufficient room to consider then all the necessary factors that may have to go into the new fare formula.

4.28 pm

Er Dr Lee Bee Wah: Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. The Minister mentioned earlier about the first batch of train being sent for service life extension. May I ask Minister what is that? What is being done to the train and is this a common practice? How long is the extension of the life span of the train? Why is it that it is not replaced by new trains? And if it is replaced by a new train, how much will it cost SMRT? Does SMRT have sufficient funds to replace new trains?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Well, I do not have all the details as to exactly what they do. I do know that, for example in London, I was told that trains have gone into the third cycle of extension. So, roughly about average 15 years after you take over the trains, you do a major improvement to them and then the trains come out. Through the course of the 15 years, you continue to improve on the trains. These are smaller maintenance regimes. Every 15 years you take the trains in for an extended period of time and we do what is necessary.

Why not replace them with new trains? We have added 22 new trains just over the course of this year. There is another lot of new trains coming in, in 2014. I cannot recall the number but together, what we are getting this year plus the new trains in 2014, would be about 25% of the total capacity for the Compass lines.

My philosophy, and I think it is a philosophy that we all share, is we need to be prudent in the use of funds, because at the end of the day, who will ultimately bear the costs, even if it is paid for by the Government? Ultimately, it goes back to the taxpayers. Whether they pay for it through taxes, whether it is done through fares, we want to be as fiscally prudent as we possibly can. We build what needs to be built. Certainly, $60 billion over 10 years, is already a lot of money to build the new lines, the Downtown Lines, the Thomson Line and so on. New trains are being added to the North-East line, to the Circle Line as well as – where Mr Liang Eng Hwa's constituency is – Bukit Panjang LRT.

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So, there is significant expenditure. It is important for us even while we spend billions of dollars to also be counting the millions of dollars that each new train would cost. If we can continue to prolong the life of each train without making it unsafe or degrading its performance, then I think it is important for us to do so.

4.31 pm

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef: Two issues, Sir. One, can I ask the Minister for his definition of train intrusions because I am not very clear on what that term actually means? Secondly, it is pertaining to the gaps in the emergency preparedness. I know that we conduct exercises every year, almost. One example is the North-Star exercise where multi-agencies are involved. The basic fundamental that we practise during these exercises are crowd-control, evacuations and how to handle emergencies, including emergency communications. So, to say that there are lapses in such fundamental issues gives me certain concerns. I wonder whether we should tailor future exercises accordingly; both in simulated, as well as the Minister mentioned, unsimulated situations. Also, perhaps, as he mentioned, we should use volunteers, NSmen, school students and grassroots leaders as "casualties" in such exercises. Perhaps we could consider opening these up to Singaporeans to volunteer so that they actually get the real feel and they know exactly what to do in emergency situations.

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: On intrusions: they are not "train intrusions", they are "track intrusions". "Train intrusions", I think, would refer to the graffiti and all. I was talking about track intrusions and they would disrupt services for perhaps more than 30 minutes while we carry out the evacuation. There are the voluntary and the involuntary track intrusions, which is why we build the half-height platform doors along the main lines.

On training exercises, I fully appreciate the point that Member Dr Fatimah has raised and I share the disappointment that, despite table-top exercises and full troop exercises, the execution of the emergency plans leaves much to be desired. My take is this: there is a difference when you do pre-planned and scripted exercises, where the participants are psychologically prepared and they know what is going to come next. And you assemble, often is the case, the most prepared team to take part in the exercise. Yes, it helps when the officers step through the procedures and sometimes you find shortcomings in the procedures. But in terms of the realism, it is not there. In terms of actually testing whoever ought to be tested, you may not be testing the right people. Therefore, the most realistic exercises ought to be the unannounced, unscripted ones, where you allow a certain degree of free play, which means that if you really want that degree of realism, you ought to be conducting exercises on one or a few of your trains during, say, a Friday evening peak hour. But the inconvenience to commuters would be unimaginable. It would be on a scale or close to the scale of the disruptions that we saw on 15 and 17 December. I do not suggest that we go in that direction. I merely said that we ought to improve on the way we conduct our exercises today to inject a greater degree of realism so that people are, to some extent, caught off guard. So, you are able to really assess how prepared they are and how quickly they can respond to it. We will have to think through how this is best done, but I do not think it is possible to spring such surprises on Singaporeans without any proper announcement.

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With regard to opening up spots for such exercises to all Singaporeans, it is certainly something that we will consider so that it is not only the grassroots nor only school students that would be involved, but whoever who would like to participate and get a sense of what is required and be more prepared to respond to an emergency, is something that we can consider.

4.35 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): I would like to thank the Minister for his reply. Incidents do happen and I am glad the Minister has proceeded to give a lengthy response to this House. I am concerned about the public's cynicism about exercises like the North-Star series. To renew public's confidence, can I request the Minister to consider getting the regulator, in this case LTA, to underwrite and approve all safety and communication-related SOPs implemented by the operator in future, as it does appear to be the case that this was where the SMRT's response was indeed very woeful? This is also short of springing surprises on Singaporeans with unannounced exercises which I do not think is realistic.

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, I thank the Member for understanding that it is not quite possible to do exercises in that manner. Today, the role of the regulator with regard to the operator's plans, for example, their Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP), is that the operator submits this plan to the LTA for review. It is not a formal approval but they sit together, they run through the plans, they make sure that actually the parameters are set up quite clearly and then, as Dr Janil had asked earlier, we would hold them to it so that when there is a need to operationalise or to execute such plans, we are able to assess the variants and whether they have conformed to the plans. This takes place not only for incidents but also for their safety and maintenance plans as well.

4.37 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Sir, for any incident or accident, we should be more concerned about human safety. Can Minister assure the House that the operator will ensure that the accident that happened in China, where there was a collision, will never happen in our train system, even if our signalling system has failed?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, I think the Member will appreciate and understand that it is never possible to give an iron-clad guarantee on such matters, but let me assure him that we looked very carefully at what happened in China. We wanted to do everything possible to make sure that the signalling equipment in Singapore will, as best as we can do so, not be subject to what happened there.

On signalling: indeed sometimes we hear of signalling faults being announced during a distruption. There are two types of signalling faults. One is on board the train and the other one is track-side. When you have an on board the train signalling fault, the train cannot carry on its operations. It has to be either pushed or hauled to the depot or to a siding. When you have a track side signalling fault, the trains can continue to operate but in manual mode. And in manual mode, the driver takes over control of the trains, and of course, we reduce the speed of the train and the speed instead of at 80km/hour, you will run it to as slow as 15km/hour and you would extend the headways between the trains. So, it is a degraded service. So, for track side signalling faults, you can continue with some degraded mode of operation, but if it is a train signalling fault, you would have to pull that train out before you can resume service. Or you can put the train to the side before you can resume service.

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The point about commuter safety is one that we take absolutely seriously. And so, in the Operating Performance Standards (OPS), we allow certain disruptions, certain breakdowns and all, but no fires on board, no fatalities. Those are very, very stringently spelt out. And I assure you, I assure the House and the public, that out of all this investigations, out of the work that the COI is going to do and the recommendations that they would put forward that we would take on board. We will continue to improve on what we have – just as we have made some immediate improvements. We will continue on them and help the public restore and regain confidence in the MRT system.

4.40 pm

Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap (Aljunied): Sir, I would like to ask the Minister, regarding the driverless trains on the Circle Line, what is the Standard Operating Procedure for responding to train emergencies? A least now, for the NEL, there is still a staff member on each train so he or she could take control of the emergency situation. But for the City Line, they do not have any, I believe, operator so what should the SOP be?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Mr Speaker, let me thank the Member for a very good question. The driverless trains are designed so that in the event of an emergency, as much as possible, they would be able to coast to the next station. So that is how the parameters are designed and that is how the emergency power is designed. We have people at every station and so, in the event that there is a need to, they would have people from the stations come to provide support to the trains.

4.41 pm

Mrs Lina Chiam: Thank you, Sir. At the time of the disruption of the MRT trains, passengers left the trains and walked through tunnels along the railway tracks to reach their destinations. May I clarify with the Minister whether the railway tracks were electrified? And if they were electrified, did they pose a danger to these commuters? Secondly, will the Committee assure that the next CEO that will be appointed will not be holding numerous portfolios as this will deter the work efficiency? Can the Minister clarify?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: On detrainment between stations, this is not the first choice. The first choice is actually to bring a stalled train into a station. So you either have another train to pull it or push it so that the passengers can actually disembark from the train at the station. That is always the preferred mode of evacuating passengers. Hence, when you take a decision to detrain them and have them walk along the tracks, it will take a certain amount of time before that decision is made because you would want to avoid exposing passengers to such conditions.

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Secondly, there is a very strict safety protocol that you have to follow before such passengers are allowed onto the tracks. One of the steps is to make sure that the electricity supply is shut off, the third rail is de-energised – just to mention some considerations – before the passengers are allowed to detrain and walk on the tracks.

I am not so sure I follow the Member's point about CEOs holding numerous portfolios, but that is something that is best determined by the Boards who are responsible for appointing such CEOs as well as for their overall performance.

4.43 pm

Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng: Thank you, Sir. I also thank the Minister for a very comprehensive statement. I would like to ask the Minister for the background leading to the resignation of SMRT's CEO, Ms Saw. May I find out if the resignation should happen after the completion of the investigation by the COI, or at least until the next CEO is identified and there is a proper handover? Or is this just a populist decision to placate the public by whomever who makes the decision? And whether the resignation of the CEO right now is truly a better solution for the operator?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Let me again thank the Member for the supplementary question. It is a good question to ask, except that I do not have the answer because this is not something that is determined by MOT or even LTA. As I have mentioned in my reply just now, the operator runs its appointments of Chairman, Directors and so on past the LTA, but we have never vetoed any such appointments. Certainly, the performance of the CEO is something that the Board decides on. Whether she resigns now or why she has to resign and so on, that is an internal SMRT matter.

I know as much as what I have read in the press, which is that she was already contemplating and there was some discussion about her leaving the company because she has already done nine years. 2012 would have been her tenth year and that is a pretty long time in one particular organisation. So even prior to the incidents, there was already some ongoing discussion. What I do know is that while having no executive role in the organisation, she will stay on until the investigations are completed so that she is able to provide her perspectives and inputs to the investigations both within the SMRT as well as by the COI.

4.46 pm

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, it was good to hear the Minister reiterating that commuter safety is of paramount importance for the COI to look into. I would also like to ask the Minister if he agrees that the independence of the COI is also equally important so that the public's confidence in the findings of the COI, when they are presented to the House, is not undermined. Would the Minister share with us his thinking behind the choice of the Chairman in the Chief District Judge? He is a learned judge. Is he very senior? Why did the Minister agree with that selection and the selection of the members within his Committee?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: I want to thank the Member for that supplementary question. I have absolutely no doubt that the COI is an independent one. It is set up that way. They will have an independent investigation body. MHA has agreed that the CID will be their investigation arm, not because we consider that there is a criminal liability or such like. It is just that the CID has very good investigative skills. They are totally separate from the parties that are involved in the incidents, and they will be the primary investigation arm for the COI.

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Why these three gentlemen? Mr Tan Siong Thye is the Chief District Judge of the Subordinate Courts, the No. 1, the best man. The Inquiries Act stated that one member must be legally trained. I consulted and took views from different people. He was at the top of the list – absolutely no question whatsoever about his capabilities, integrity, etc. The fact that he is a public transport commuter and has been so regularly over the last 10 years was a real bonus. It was not a key consideration. To me, it was a bonus. Having interacted with him, I have absolute trust in his ability to get to the bottom of the issues.

Professor Lim Mong King, very learned. Expertise, of course, he is an engineer. He was Dean of the Engineering School, Deputy President of NTU, so he is a very respected, learned gentleman. He has got expertise in vibration. He has done work on this, and this is an area that we are, of course, very much interested in. He has also had the benefit of sitting on a couple of COIs in the past dealing with shipyard fires. We thought that that was going to be useful because he would understand what really needs to be done to get to the bottom of it.

Mr Soh Wai Wah, now Director of Prisons, was for many years in the Police Force as their Operations Head, the G3 of the Police Force. He was involved in planning many big events, including crisis management, dealing with incidents, etc. Prior to that, he was also involved in incidents like the Hotel New World collapse, etc.

So my feel is that we were looking for different expertise: legal, engineering and technical, as well as operational expertise. We wanted people who really have a great deal of experience and have much to contribute to the COI, able to work well as a team. After we have decided on Chairman Tan Siong Thye, I discussed with him the other two members to make sure that he was comfortable working together as a team because they will all have to support one another and cover the areas together. That was how it was assembled. Why did we choose those people that we did? There were, of course, a number of other prominent names that we considered. Some of them whom we looked at are already doing work with SMRT, LTA, MOT, and so we had to not allow some of these very capable individuals to be part of the COI. Professor Lim Mong King, equally capable, fortunately was not doing work for us at this point in time. Hence, the independence of the individuals of the team was considered as well.

4.51 pm

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong: Sir, I am surprised that the Minister does not have details of the rate of disruptions of the train systems in other developed cities. This question is actually also in my PQ in the Order Paper. Without this data, how can the Minister and MOT, as regulator, determine what is the acceptable level of disruptions in Singapore?

Can I also ask the Minister what would he consider as an acceptable level of train disruptions in Singapore? Related to this is the question of managing the expectations of commuters. As other Members have mentioned, incidents do happen, and for some of us who have travelled abroad – for instance, I have travelled in the Tube in London – train disruptions are not irregular. They are pretty common, but the commuters take it in their stride perhaps because they are quite used to such disruptions, or perhaps their alternative arrangements are adequate, or perhaps because of their culture. But in Singapore, can I ask the Minister how he assesses the response of the commuters in such emergencies, and whether he could set a certain benchmark that is tagged to the train systems of developed cities on what is the acceptable rate of train disruptions?

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Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, I should, of course, get back to the Member on the details of the numbers in terms of disruptions. What we measure is service availability, that is, the ability of the operator to meet what he sets out to do in the schedule. The standard that we set for ourselves is 98%. The standard that is achieved by the operators is 99.9%-plus. When we look at this indicator, it is comparable and is actually slightly better than what we see in other regimes, including Hong Kong and so on.

As for the UK system, I do not think it is fair for me to comment on their rate of disruptions. It is more anecdotal. I do not have the figures at hand. The UK system is somewhat different from ours. Transport for London is publicly owned. Their fare system again is different from ours. It is more expensive. How they set it is sort of CPI plus 2%, which is the fare increase that they allowed for the last few years and going forward. The advantage of the London system, if you ask me, is that while I do not know of them providing bus bridging services in the event of a disruption, what happens is that the network is very dense because they have had more than a hundred years to build this up. Hence, if you have the Circle Line or the Jubilee Line being disrupted, the commuters would just move on and walk 500-700 metres to the next station, do a bypass and find an alternative way to get to their destination.

The fact that disruptions, as the Member puts it in her own words, "happen so often", and whether this has conditioned their commuters, I would rather that this not be the case in Singapore. I would rather it be that disruptions are somewhat rare and that commuters express a certain amount of unhappiness even as they do understand that it would not be possible for it to run at 100% all the time, every day, across the entire year because no amount of expenditure or redundancy is going to give you 100%. I think commuters in Singapore understand this. What they need is for more timely and accurate information to be given to them so that they can say, "All right, let me try and do something else. Let me not go to the station, let me take a bus or walk somewhere else and take the Circle Line instead of the Compass lines." We need to make that available to our commuters.

I would rather ours be a situation where the disruptions, particularly the major disruptions that will require us to close stretches of the line, are so rare that when it happens it causes a great amount of unhappiness. And we ought to take these matters seriously, get to the root of it and minimise it as much as possible so that we continue to keep our standards high.

4.56 pm

Dr Intan Azura Mokhtar (Ang Mo Kio): I thank the Minister for taking the time to patiently answer all the questions. Are there external operators or contractors who carry out maintenance works on trains and tracks other than SMRT personnel, in order to provide that additional layer of checks and balances? Would the Ministry consider getting other private train operators to manage our train system in the light of numerous train disruptions under the SMRT?

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Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Sir, I thank the Member for the two supplementary questions. Certainly, there are external personnel because I have seen them myself. I was down there on Boxing Day at about 3.30 in the morning, just to get a feel of what it is that they do and to talk to their people. Certainly, they bring in people from outside of SMRT to help them in some of the work, especially the heavy lifting. But they assured me that the man in charge of the entire team is from the SMRT and he is responsible for making sure that the track is ready for works to take place, that the works are done according to what is required, that they clear up and prepare the tracks for operations when they resume. So, yes, certainly so, but they are under the charge of SMRT personnel.

Today, we are moving to a new rail financing framework. The Downtown Line that we put up for tender last year was the first of these lines under this framework and it was a competitive bid between SMRT and SBST – just the two of them. This is the first time that is happening. At another occasion, I will speak more on it and reiterate the rationale as well as the benefits of why we are doing this. In time to come, gradually, all the new lines and even the existing lines will come under this competitive bidding framework by the operators. I do not preclude the possibility that one day, when we are a lot more familiar and comfortable with this new framework that we will open it up to other operators who are suitably qualified and experienced to participate in such tenders.

Mr Speaker: One last question by Mr Desmond Lee.

Mr Desmond Lee: Thank you, Mr Speaker. As I spoke to community leaders, grassroots leaders and residents about the SMRT incident to get their views of what happened, they compared SMRT's and the public's response to this incident with the response they see in other countries. When the earthquakes struck Japan, every child knows where to duck, where to hide. When a gas attack threatens countries in the Middle East, they know when they don their gas masks and they take it very seriously. The concern they raised was whether the public service operators' responsiveness or lack thereof in this incident might be perhaps symptomatic of the seriousness with which we in Singapore take rehearsals and drills to prepare for emergencies. Take, for example, fire drills that we undertake in buildings, how often do we go for coffee breaks, just before the alarm is raised –

Mr Speaker: Mr Lee, can you please ask your question?

Mr Desmond Lee: Can I ask the Minister what wider lessons we can draw from this incident so that, in future, we are not just better prepared for public transport disruptions but better prepared for all emergencies that we may face?

Mr Lui Tuck Yew: Mr Speaker, that is a very difficult last question to deal with, but I think it is a very pertinent one. I am not so sure that I have all the answers to what the Member has just raised because he has raised very important points about how we can be better prepared, especially psychologically, as a people. In total defence, psychological defence is one of the key pillars. We are of a different mindset if we know that we are always exposed to such natural disasters or man-made incidents. Perhaps, because it is something unusual, something that we are not accustomed to, sometimes, our responses may not be as instinctive and as appropriate as it might otherwise be.

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Hence, because it is not instinctive, all the more reason we need to have as realistic exercises as possible, involve as many people as we can and try and then use them as multipliers to reach out to as many others as we possibly can. So that they understand that in an emergency, it actually takes a certain amount of preparedness – physical, psychological and emotional – in order to best respond to it and be able to preserve life and limb.

It is not easy to deal with it because, as the Member has pointed out himself, for fire drills, how seriously do we take it? I think the military in particular tries to inculcate this because if you do not respond properly, it could be your life. And so they do a good job of it. I certainly know that happens within the two years of National Service, and thereafter, you try to make sure that when your NSmen come back, they get a dose of it. Hopefully, this carries them through over time. But there is also a need to look at it not only from the individual response but from the collective response because, sometimes, if you have one person breaking out in panic, it just stymies everybody into a stampede. So you need to have leaders, you need to have people who are able to remain calm themselves and who are, in that sense, catalyst for calmness in chaotic situations. And then, to be able to identify these people, give them some amount of training, even recognition and, hopefully, they are in the right place, at the right time, to be able to influence crowd behaviour. I think that is also another factor that we may well have to consider going forward.