IMPACT OF WIKILEAKS REVELATIONS
Parliament of Singapore · 10 January 2011
Official Report, 10 January 2011, Vol 87, Issue 13 · Open in the reader (summaries, search, filters)
IMPACT OF WIKILEAKS REVELATIONS:
(Home Affairs perspective): 5.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether
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there are plans to implement any new measures to prevent classified information or communications from falling into unauthorised hands, following the WikiLeaks incident; and (b) what is the Ministry's assessment of our current information security policies and tools used in the Civil Service.
The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Sir, in Singapore, we have clear policies and measures to prevent security breaches in the handling of official secrets or classified information. There are also clear laws on the penalties which apply, should there be a breach.
Every officer undergoes security clearance before being employed by the public service. He is also informed that access to classified information is granted on a need-to-know basis. He is required to comply with the security requirements spelt out in the Government Instruction Manuals, and to sign the undertaking to safeguard official information under the Official Secrets Act.
Government agencies are also responsible for implementing measures to ensure strict user access control for all systems. For example, only official authorised systems, secured with appropriate encryption and authentication mechanisms, may be used to transmit and store classified information. Agencies are also required to conduct periodic checks and audits to ensure compliance with the security requirements.
Permanent Secretaries of Ministries and Heads of Government Departments and Statutory Boards are responsible not only for ensuring that their officers comply with the security requirements, but also for setting the right tone in their respective organisations.
But even with comprehensive measures in place, protection of classified
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information ultimately depends on each public officer observing the rules.
Our Government is an e-Government. It cannot function without empowering our public servants and disseminating confidential information to them. The efficient functioning of our Government has to be based on mutual trust and honour, backed up by a clear legal framework. Trust and honour can of course be breached. As the WikiLeaks incident shows, even one officer, in that instance a junior officer in the US Army, can cause significant leak of official data with far-reaching consequences.
Should there be any leak, the Government will act firmly. All cases will be investigated. Officers responsible for leakage of data will be charged. Furthermore, the OSA allows prosecution not only of public officers responsible for the leaks, but also anyone else (whether or not a public servant) who receives the information or had any role in the leak. The Government has consistently taken this approach, and has on occasions charged private citizens for their roles in leakage of Government data.
In the US, the Shield Bill has been introduced in response to the WikiLeaks disclosure. It seeks to tighten up on leaks and the publication of such leaks. The Shield Bill proposes to apply to all, including non-government employees. Opponents of the Shield Bill argue that while it is illegal for government officials to leak information, it should nevertheless not be unlawful for the media and others to publish such information, that is, too bad if the government cannot prevent the information from leaking in the first place. For example, Professor Stone, a distinguished legal scholar in this field, took that position in an opinion published in the International Herald Tribune on 5th January 2011.
In such a framework, confidential information will become the object of a
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cat and mouse game. If some government employee breaches the rules, and gets the information to the private sector, then tough luck to the government! This approach has been justified on the basis that it is in the public interest not to restrict free flow of information.
Our approach is totally different. If recipients of official information who are not themselves public servants cannot be prosecuted or prevented from publishing it, it would create an unacceptable situation where people outside the Government would have every incentive to obtain confidential information from public servants in every way possible. And public servants would constantly be weighing the benefits to themselves of releasing the confidential information against the likelihood of getting caught and punished. Meanwhile, the broader public interest will suffer.
We believe that everyone involved in a leak of information, whether in Government or outside, should be dealt with firmly. We do not intend to encourage cat and mouse games. Public interest in free flow of information cannot justify the abuse of confidential information.
Some countries have allowed their secrecy rules to be weakened in the belief that it is supposedly in the interest of freedom of information. We do not subscribe to such a belief. We fully intend to uphold confidentiality of official information, so that the Government can function properly. It is impossible to conduct diplomacy, develop policy or negotiate issues if everything said or written in the process will become public because officials will no longer commit their true thoughts and reasons in writing for fear of leaks. The end result, ironically, would be less transparency and less accountability.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad (Hong Kah): Thank you for the Minister's reply. I think it is
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important that the public is also given the confidence that all the information pertaining to public information and private data is kept confidential. Could I ask the Minister if there are any changes to any policies and procedures within our Government, since the WikiLeaks incident?
Mr Shanmugam: We had and will continue to have comprehensive policies in place, including directions and Government Instruction Manuals, and the very comprehensive green book as setting out what should and should not be done, which covers general situations. Bearing in mind – the Member will know – the WikiLeaks incident was caused by an officer abusing his position, and with no clear legal framework on what can and cannot be published when such leaks occur.
We have the legal framework. Nevertheless, we do not sit back. Members might know that an organisation was set up for IT security and launched by Ministry of Home Affairs. That organisation looks at the entire Government sector, constantly reviewing the procedures and reminding officers and all Government public servants on the importance of safeguarding information. But, ultimately, we do not take anything for granted. The way that the leaks happened has meant that there has been continuing review after that as well. But at the end of the day, thousands of public servants get access to information and that is why I emphasised that it does depend on people observing the rules and being honourable. When they do not, we will act firmly.
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Source: Singapore Parliament Official Report (Hansard) for 10 January 2011. Republished on SGParliament.