PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Parliament of Singapore · 27 August 2008

Official Report, 27 August 2008, Vol 84, Issue 19 · Open in the reader (summaries, search, filters)

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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:

(Motion):

Prof. Thio Li-ann (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move,

That this House affirms the importance of representative democracy and calls on the Government to fine-tune the electoral system by introducing amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act such that (a) a writ for by-election shall be issued in the event (i) a Member of a Group Representation Constituency (GRC) belonging to a minority community within the terms of section 8A(1) of the Act vacates his or her seat for any reason; (ii) half or more of the Members elected on a group basis in relation to a GRC vacate their seats for any reason; or (iii) a Member of a single member constituency vacates his or her seat for any reason; and (b) all by-elections shall be called within three months from the date of vacancy unless the parliamentary term is due to expire within six months from the date of vacancy.

Sir, I am recently come out of Africa where I attended a conference on

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"Constitutional Democracy in Africa in the 21st century". The Kenyan President and Prime Minister graced the opening ceremony. Aside from the spirited dancing and ululating by a native choir, I was struck by the lyrics of the official conference theme song. Voices rose and filled the towering Kenyatta International Conference Centre, singing for "prosperity, peace and unity", the goal of many former colonies in Africa and Asia, an aspiration not always realised.

The chorus arrested my attention, as it spoke to the very heart of today's motion which addresses the law governing by-elections in Singapore. The choir chimed repeatedly, "We must, we must, embrace democracy and the rule of law." Charming lyrics I thought, perhaps the Government can commission a national song along these lines celebrating shared political values.

Sir, the theory and practice of democracy in Singapore will shape how we think through the question of what type of rules should regulate by-elections.

Today, democracy has the quality of an almost sacred creed whose central tenet is that government authority is based on the will of the people, as article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares. Elections as a method for choosing government are a sacred ritual although democracy is not exhausted by elections; the participation of citizens in public policy-making in between elections is also an important democratic indicator.

Democracy as ideology is easy enough to grasp although it does not prescribe a uniform 'off the rack' solution in terms of implementation; the institutional expression of democracy must be tailor-made to suit the relevant local conditions of a

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country; you must put on the trousers that fit you.

However, there are universal core democratic principles like popular accountability, effective representation and legitimacy, which we should take to heart. For example, when we tailor-make a suit, we should ask: who wears the suit? In a democracy, this must be the people, as the ultimate source of political authority. The People's representatives derive their authority and legitimacy from voters and are accountable to them.

However, democracy is not a panacea for all social ills or a blueprint for surefire economic success. Economic development is not born of pretty speeches. This needs both principles of good government as well as good governors. Providentially, Singapore has enjoyed good governance.

On 12th September 1965, when newborn Singapore was barely out of her swaddling clothes, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said: "Over 100 years ago, this was a mud-flat, swamp. Today, this is a modern city. Ten years from now, this will be a metropolis. Never fear." Sir, he made good on this prophetic promise; this Government has delivered the socio-economic goods. We, the Beneficiaries, are grateful.

Law and the finest constitutional devices that mind of man can conceive of and hand of man can create have their limits. We cannot legislate honest, capable governors into existence. As a political system, democracy alone cannot engender social resilience and economic success. It is not an ultimate value. Indeed, Winston Churchill famously quipped, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others."

However, democracy is better than autocracy, where the people cannot remove a despotic, corrupt and inefficient government. A functioning democracy

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has "the capacity for self-correction". Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies said: "In a democracy, the rulers can be dismissed by the ruled without bloodshed."

Despite its occidental roots, we value the role democracy plays in good government; article 2 of the ASEAN Charter espouses the promotion of human rights, social justice, rule of law, good governance and "the principles of democracy and constitutional government". The 1991 shared values White Paper states that "not everything Asian is good, just as not everything Western is bad"; among the "Western" values Singapore adopted are "parliamentary democracy and the rule of law".

This approach to foreign models is sensible – they may provide useful models to emulate or to reject. We must be discerning: what counts is not the origins of an idea but its merits. As first Prime Minister Lee observed when debating the NCMP scheme in 1984, the Chinese Emperor’s mandate to rule did not rest on the "counting of heads" but "on the chopping of heads". Thankfully, we have disavowed this cultural model.

From this Republic's inception, democracy was endorsed as a principle of government, a safeguard against communism. Our Constitution today, based on the Westminster model of parliamentary government, is a foreign export with home-grown modifications, such as multi-member constituencies and unelected, non-partisan MPs.

Sir, this motion draws attention to when by-elections must be held, to fill vacant parliamentary seats between general elections.

Historically speaking, Singapore used to have a by-elections clause in its Constitution, the genesis of which dates back to the time we were part of the

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Malaysian Federation. The Malaysian government required that the federal constitutional clause on by-elections be incorporated into the Singapore State Constitution, to harmonise Singapore law with that of the other federal states. Singapore protested, to no avail.

After our traumatic exodus from the Federation, Parliament amended the Constitution, revoked the Malaysian provision on by-elections and reverted back to the previous state of affairs under the 1958 State Constitution which "did not contain an injunction of holding a by-election within three months". Prime Minister Lee then stated that given Singapore's experience of elections and government, the limitation imposed by the Malaysian clause should no longer apply.

Undoubtedly, this view was shaped by the PAP government's tenuous hold on power then. In 1961-1962, the PAP only had a majority of one in the legislative assembly; in 1962-1963, one PAP member died, resulting in a tie between 25 PAP and 25 Opposition assemblymen. In such situations, by-election results can determine the fortunes of a political party, for good or ill.

Sir, under the current legal framework – there is no constitutional or statutory requirement to call by-elections within a specified time period, or at all, when a parliamentary seat of any elected MP is vacated. The regulating statute, the Parliamentary Elections Act (or PEA) was adopted pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Constitution. Section 24(1) of the PEA provides that the President shall issue writs of election, when he thinks it "expedient". In actual fact, following Westminster convention which Article 21(1) of the Constitution codifies, the President is acting on the advice of Cabinet in this matter.

Thus, the Cabinet alone decides whether to call or not to call a by-election.

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If desired, the Cabinet can keep a vacant seat vacant until the next General Elections. This is clear law.

The motion, then, is not about the correct interpretation of the law. The law is clear – but we should not succumb to bare legalism and stop here. Rather, this motion calls for a reexamination of the content of the law, to see if any legal gaps need filling or to explore ways of strengthening existing processes to better vindicate the practice of representative democracy.

Comparatively, parliamentary systems have adopted various approaches towards regulating by-elections. Some constitutions require by-elections to be held within a specified time period after a parliamentary seat is determined vacated. This may range from six months (Canada) to four months (Antigua) to three months (Zambia and Gambia) to two months (Kenya and Malaysia) to 21 days (New Zealand).

Other Constitutions like the Bahamas do not specify time limits but call for election writs be issued "as soon as is practicable". Expediency alone cannot excuse the failure to hold by-elections.

Elsewhere, a political convention drawn from past practice provides guidance in the absence of legal rules. In the United Kingdom, a writ of election will usually be executed within three months. In the Australian Commonwealth, the guiding principle is that by-elections should be held "as early as possible", so electors are not left without representation any longer than necessary.

Sir, there is no discernible consistent convention from an examination of Singapore practice. The last by-election was called in 1992 for Marine Parade and the ostensible reason was to bring in new

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talent. Varied reasons for not calling by-elections included the promise to call early general elections, the need to focus on economic recovery, or to await pending laws on town councils.

Sir, I believe Mr Chiam See Tong in 1986 argued that by-elections should be held before a reasonable time had elapsed; the ministerial reply was that this was a question of government discretion.

Should principle or convenience determine whether and when by-elections are called?

Sir, the question before us is whether the calling of by-elections should be governed by a rules-based regime, or left to unconditioned discretion. Should we continue to confide absolute discretion to our political leaders, trusting in their perspicacity, their sagacity? Would it be unwise to trust in the audacity of hoping politicians will resist political temptations and that fair play will triumph? I fear it may, I fear it might, I hope we can put things to right. I think the best legal tool, is to adopt a clear rule.

Sir, in urging the Parliamentary Elections Act be amended to provide a time-frame for calling by-elections, I am not calling for an absence of discretion but the regulation of discretion, consistent with a rule of law based state. Absolute discretion too easily degenerates into arbitrary abuse without oversight. The rule of law is served where there are known precise rules able to guide future conduct. A political party able to unilaterally decide when to have an election is advantaged; clear rules help level the electoral playing field.

In suggesting that by-elections be called within three months, Singapore would be following best practices, to ensure citizens do not have to wait too long to choose their representatives. However, if a seat becomes vacant when

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general elections are due within six months, the recommendation is that no by-election need be called, to avoid having two elections within a short time period.

In our legal system, the rule of law is pivotal to sustaining a sound commercial environment. It seems incongruent not to have a precise rule regulating the calling of by-elections which can shape the composition of this very House, within a fixed period, to promote certainty. It may be expedient not to have such a requirement, but does this not allow pragmatism to trump principle, just once too often? Our Court of Appeal in defining the rule of law declared that "all power has legal limits". Time limits are a form of legal limits.

Some argue that by-elections are a waste of time and cost, a distraction or luxury we can ill afford; in multi-member constituencies especially, other team members can stand in or 'cover' for their erstwhile colleague. However, in single member wards, a glaring gap is evident when a parliamentary seat is vacated. Without by-elections, electors are left without representation in Parliament. This is undesirable.

In addition, we are thankfully not a poor country. I do not think cost can be said to be an issue, as far poorer countries regularly hold by-elections.

Sir, it is important for Parliament, in debating by-elections legislation, to examine the spirit behind the law, otherwise we might miss the wood for the trees if the purpose of rules are glossed over. As Russian Nobel Prize laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated in his 1978 address at Harvard University: "A society which is based on the letter of the law and never reaches any higher is taking very scarce advantage of the high level of human possibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a

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beneficial influence on society." Thus, legalism begets "an atmosphere of moral mediocrity, paralysing man's noblest impulses”.

In other words, law and justice have to be in conversation with each other, because, alone, one may be too harsh; and the other, too redolent of utopian naivete.

I note that Mr Charles Chong, in an interview with Today , considered it "worthwhile" to go through the arguments again, since many had forgotten them or a younger generation would be unfamiliar with reasons given sometime in the last century.

However, I hope this debate transcends the mere rehearsal of old arguments.

Sir, Thomas Jefferson once stated that each generation should have a "revolution", not in the sense of a violent break from the past, as we may understand it, but a thoughtful recurrence to fundamental principles of government, to ratify what is good and to modify what needs change. In this spirit, I hope the Government will seriously, rather than summarily, revisit the issues raised in this motion.

Sir, I am sensible of the irony of having two unelected MPs sponsor a motion concerning elected MPs, as public interest over by-elections has been sparked following the loss of a Jurong GRC MP last month.

Politically speaking, what can be more fundamental to democracy than ensuring effective representation? Dr Loo and I believe the law regulating by-elections is important to Singaporeans and that this national issue should be debated before this august Chamber, this August. After all, elections have come to symbolise "democracy" and voting is the periodic exercise of that slice of sovereignty a citizen wields, to remind governors they

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hold power on trust and to dissuade authoritarian hubris.

It is appropriate for non-partisan MPs to bring this motion, as a partisan MP wanting to debate by-elections law might be accused of political opportunism. This matter should transcend party politics.

In some jurisdictions, winning a by-election can be the first step in the long march to high political office; in others, losing a by-election in a safe seat can trigger off a motion of no confidence in the government.

There is no such risk in Singapore today, given the Government's strong electoral mandate. As general elections are far off, the matter can be discussed with sober rationality, with a view to the long-term good rather than short-term partisan gain.

Sir, while elections are free, we eventually pay in the results. As by-elections differ from general elections in having little influence on general governance, voters may feel freer to vote against the ruling government and to give the incumbent a bloody nose for whatever political reasons. However, a bloody nose is not a broken back.

If the government lost a by-election today, its formal status would not be affected. However, the second psychological effect of the government losing a GRC might parallel the significance of Mr J B Jeyaretnam winning the 1981 Anson by-election and breaching the PAP's parliamentary monopoly. Many a keyboard would be furiously pounded in speculating about future voting trends.

Critics have argued that the GRC scheme and expanding team sizes are a strategy to "fix" the opposition unable to muster sufficient troops to contest GRC

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wards. In October 1996, then Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong responded by pointing out that GRCs were "objectively", even "scientifically neutral". The issue was who could produce a better team, whether for singles or doubles badminton. Should an opposition party win a GRC, whether in a general or by-election, it would prove Mr Goh's thesis that the GRC scheme is neutral and, indeed, a double-edged sword as six seats may be lost in one fell swoop.

Voters may either punish or reward the party in power in by-elections, which is their prerogative. They should be trusted to vote responsibly, as befits a maturing democracy. We need to look at the principle of the thing, which is that it would be undemocratic to deny voters their voice through their representative in Parliament. Why not allow a team of sitting MPs to replenish their numbers and, also, to earn a mid-term mandate?

Even if the Government loses a by-election, this is not a total loss; by-elections are a good barometer for grassroots sentiment and can be a wake-up call, an important feedback mechanism; but unlike the meet-the-people sessions or REACH, by-elections pack a punch in calling MPs to account. This strengthens representative democracy. The Government can take responsive steps to "sweeten" the ground before general elections. It is healthy to have a variety of channels, including by-elections, for the accurate communication of local public opinion.

Sir, let me turn to the three situations the motion identifies and explain the logic behind why by-elections should be called in these instances.

First, in relation to Single Member Constituencies, or SMCs. In times past, the electoral system was exclusively based on SMCs, contested on a first-past-the-post system. When GRCs were

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introduced in 1988, only 50% of the total number of MPs could come from GRC wards. There were 42 SMCs to ensure that opposition parties unable to field multi-racial teams would not be shut out from electoral contests. In 1988, there were 13 three-member GRC teams, yielding 39 MPs. In 1991, the law reduced the number of SMCs to 21 and, today, the Parliamentary Elections Act only requires a minimum of eight SMC seats to ensure SMCs do not go the way of the dinosaur.

Voters pick candidates whom they feel can represent their interests. If a SMC seat is vacated – it leaves that ward without representation. There is no one to "take over" the MP's functions, not only as representative of constituents but as town council Chairman, I believe. This is a clear lacuna in the law.

If a PAP MP from a SMC vacates his seat, perhaps the PAP MP in the neighbouring ward can take over his functions, so, no need to call by-elections, if practicalities are our sole consideration. However, this would not be the case for Hougang or Potong Pasir. Should an opposition ward suddenly find itself without its MP, the law does not require the Government to call by-elections until the next general elections. As a matter of basic fairness, the law should not favour one political reality. It should provide for all contingencies, to ensure that voters in a ward do not suffer "MP-lessness" by being denied parliamentary representation.

In proportional representation or "party list" systems, by-elections are redundant as the next person on the "list" sharing the same party affiliation as the vacating MP becomes the new MP. But this is not our system. Formally, we vote for the person, not the party. Therefore, the PEA should be amended to require holding by-elections within three months after a SMC seat is vacated. This is fair to both sides and promotes certainty.

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The second situation relates to Multi-Member Constituencies, or GRCs, which are contested as teams, even though team members act individually and do not vote as a bloc within Parliament. Of course, MPs are subject to party discipline via the Whip.

The motion recommends that where half or more of GRC MPs vacate their seats, by-elections should be called within three months.

In explaining why no by-election was to be held in Jalan Besar in 1999, the official reply was that it was not a legal requirement to hold a by-election when one team member resigns. The rationale was that this was to be fair to other MPs in the GRC, to prevent them from being held to ransom by an MP who might threaten to resign for whatever reason. Should such a situation arise, this would denote a breakdown in party discipline. A maverick MP faces the sanction of being dropped from the team come the next elections, which promotes fidelity to the party. Nonetheless, if a GRC team MP threatens to resign his seat, let him. By-elections will allow that team to replace that MP with a team player.

Some may argue that as a "package deal", GRC MPs stand together and should fall together as a team. Thus, when a GRC loses one or more members, a by-election should be called; since a GRC MP enjoys the security in numbers when contesting elections as a team, he should take the risk of losing his seat when the team is no more.

A practical counter-reason may be that a six-man GRC can still function minus a member. The voters elected that team, minus one, and that team can still function by the remaining members taking on a heavier load.

However, when does a team stop being a team? When does teamwork

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become unacceptably impaired owing to reduced numbers? If you went to see a Beatles concert, it might be bearable if Ringo was missing from the line-up, but would it be the Beatles if John or Paul were absent? One of my favourite rock groups is the Bangles, the female version of the Beatles. I had occasion to see them in concert down under but only three of the original four Bangles were touring, three out of four were good, but four out of four would have been excellent.

Since service excellence is a Singapore aspiration, voters from a GRC ward should be served by a fully-staffed rather than short-handed team. This is an important consideration as the reason for increasing GRC team sizes from three to four and later six. This has nothing to do with the constitutional reason of guaranteeing minority representation. Instead, it was argued that flexibility was needed to deal with GRCs with growing populations; the intent was to keep the GRC intact rather than breaking it up into smaller wards, while allowing it to be adequately serviced by an additional MP and, also, to reap greater economies of scale in town council management.

The size of a constituency is proportional to the MP's ability to effectively represent his constituents; size matters, geography and demography count. If a GRC becomes too large, an MP or group of MPs may not be able to effectively represent and administer it.

In a nutshell, expanding GRC team sizes was rationalised on the basis that more MPs were needed to serve larger wards with greater number of constituents, to ensure optimal service and sufficient human resources. If you need larger teams to run larger GRCs, it is inconsistent not to require by-elections within a set period where a vacancy depletes team strength.

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When a GRC team loses a member, the current practice is for the remaining GRC MPs to cover the duties of their former colleague. This increases their burden. The preference is for stability, rather than holding by-elections, to give voters a chance to exercise their democratic rights, to reaffirm the incumbent team, or to choose another one; at any rate, not holding by-elections may compromise the right of GRC residents to be represented by a full slate of MPs.

Sir, from my short sojourn in Parliament, I have come to better appreciate what hard work it is to be an MP; elected MPs have to tend to their constituents' concerns, tussle the bureaucrats, scrutinise the Bills, sit on the Committees, attend public functions; this involves a great sacrifice of time, effort and privacy. Diligent MPs embody the finest ideals of public service.

MPs have punishing schedules. Although the Constitution provides for unelected NCMPs and NMPs, the primacy of the elected MP remains. They play an important role beyond just making up the numbers to form the Government. Real power resides in elected MPs, unlike unelected MPs. Elected MPs have the power to vote on the Supply Bills or motions of no confidence which can end a government. In 1997, when the Government decided to terminate legislative assistant allowances for NMPs and NCMPs, the reason was, I quote, "because their duties are not as heavy and onerous as those of an elected MP. They have no constituencies to look after and they do not represent any constituent."

Given the onerous burden of MPs and the importance of their constitutional role, do we really want them to take on more work and add to their many serious responsibilities? Five MPs may be able to carry the work of six, but there will be a

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strain rather than peak performance; I do not doubt their dedication, but we are all mortal and finite beings, and fatigue will set in at some stage. I am sure we all agree that Singapore citizens deserve the best of their representatives, with a full house and all hands on deck.

Furthermore, what if more than one GRC MP vacates his seat? Life is a fragile thing, no one knows for sure how many days we have left; what if there is a tragic plane crash or something and our six-member GRC loses two, three, up to five members within a short timeframe? Under current law, no GRC by-elections may be called unless all members vacate their seat.

Technically, could this not encompass a situation where a six-person GRC is manned only by one or two MPs, without legal need to call a by-election? If the last man standing does not resign, a by-election writ cannot be issued. Something is awry. This cannot be the original intent, or is it?

The current system is unbalanced because the primary reason for not mandating by-elections when a GRC team is minus one, or minus some, is that GRC members should not be held hostage when a dissenting member in their ranks threatens to vacate his seat and provoke a by-election. This only looks at the perspective of GRC MPs in one particular situation.

Let me offer another problematic hypothetical: let us say, an opposition party wins a GRC and then loses a team member. What if that opposition party wants a by-election because it desires to have a full team of MPs to serve constituents

and to occupy their parliamentary seats but the Government declines to call one? Should they have absolute power in this case?

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Further, the failure to call by-elections when a GRC team loses a member may be to discount the wishes of the electorate to live in a ward serviced by a full team of MPs, even if the remaining MPs willingly shoulder the additional workload.

What if a GRC team wins marginally, performs badly and then some team members quit? Having a by-election requirement is one way of giving the people the opportunity to oust an incompetent team, rather than suffer them until general elections.

To be fair rather than expedient, law must consider and address these hypothetical issues on a principled basis.

The current rationale for not holding by-elections within definite time periods when a GRC team loses a member, caters to the concern of GRC MPs not to lose their seats. This is lop-sided. A more balanced approach would consider both the concerns of MPs and voters. After all, voters in electing GRC teams forgo some degree of choice as they might like five out of six MPs while disliking one who fails to represent their views. However, they cannot pick and choose, as it is a set menu rather than a la carte . So, it is a question of give and take, and both sides should share the load.

Rather than the "all stand together all fall together" approach to GRCs and by-elections, a more calibrated approach is proposed. By-elections should be called within three months only when half or more GRC MPs vacate their seats, that is, two for a four-man team, and three for a five- and six-man team.

The working assumption is that a team at half-strength cannot adequately manage a GRC, which hurts the voters’ interests. To prevent voter alienation, they are given some say in having a new, full GRC team. As Thomas Jefferson

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noted, “The government is the strongest of which every man feels himself a part.” By-elections can strengthen a sense of stake-holding in matters of government.

The third situation is where the GRC team MP who vacates his parliamentary seat happens to be the designated minority MP. Sir, if by-elections are not held within a time certain, or not at all, which is now legally permissible, this would defeat the constitutional purpose for having GRCs in the first place.

Article 39A(1) of the Constitution states that the GRC scheme was designed “to ensure the representation in Parliament” of members of the minority communities. No specific numbers are stipulated, but section 8(3) of the Parliamentary Elections Act provides for approximate race ratios reflecting the factual sizes of minority communities, ie, 60% of the number of minority GRC MPs must be persons belonging to the Malay community while the remaining 40% must belong to "the Indian or other minority communities."

Gandhi once said, "A country should be judged on the basis of how it treats its minorities." Sir, Article 152 of the Constitution identifies "racial and religious minorities" as those groups which the Government is obliged to care for, in addition to recognising the indigenous status of Malays. Singapore has adopted an interesting approach to protecting minorities who, by dint of their numbers, might find themselves perpetually in a numerical minority and shut off from the corridors of power and representation.

Sir, I have just completed a book project celebrating 40 Years of the Singapore Constitution and sent off a manuscript entitled The Evolution of a Revolution to my publishers in England. In my research, I was struck by how

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solicitous we have been over the question of minorities since Independence. Indeed, in the throes of young nationhood, the Prime Minister considered it important enough in December 1965 to appoint Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin to head a constitutional commission. This was tasked with addressing long-standing minority concerns and to consider "how the rights of the racial, linguistic and religious minorities can be adequately safeguarded in the Constitution".

The Commission’s philosophical approach towards minorities stands in stark contrast with the rationale underlying the GRC scheme which marks a paradigm shift, a "sea-change into something rich and strange". Philosophy is not the exclusive language of the Ivory Tower as ideas have consequences and philosophy shapes both law and politics. Philosophy has a more practical dialect and, in Singapore then, the philosophy towards minorities actually paralleled the prevalent approach in international human rights law in the 1960s.

This focused on the rights of individuals and not group rights, as there was a fear that groups would start demanding greater rights and autonomy and threaten state unity. The memory of Hitler inciting the German minority in North Czechoslovakia to claim maltreatment before the League of Nations, allowing Hitler to sweep in as saviour of oppressed Germans abroad, was still fresh.

When the late Minister for Foreign Affairs S Rajaratnam debated the Commission report in this House in March 1967, he spoke from the stream of this philosophy: that if the rights of all individuals are protected, the rights of all members of minority groups would be protected, ergo, the interests of minority groups would be secured, without needing minority rights. This was influenced by the melting pot theory, that

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different races would eventually assimilate and adopt a homogenous civic identity as citizens united by shared political ideals, rather than divided by primordial blood-ties of race or language.

Mr Rajaratnam noted that the Commission made "very little reference" to specific minorities' questions. Indeed, the bulk of the 86 paragraphs in the 37-page Report related to the fundamental freedoms of citizens in general. He endorsed the Commission’s view that "in a democracy, there can be no distinction between majority rights and minority rights", only the "equality of rights, the same rights for all". He thought it was "short-sighted and suicidal" for minorities to clamour for special rights as majorities might make similar claims. Minorities should "stop thinking of themselves as minorities" and "stop acting politically as minorities". Success would be achieved when "a minority is no longer conscious of the fact that it is a minority".

The only minority-specific proposal the Government adopted then was the Presidential Council of Minority Rights which was supposed to vet legislation to prevent differentiating measures. This mainly provided psychological assurance that no group was excluded from the top institutions of power.

The Government then specifically rejected early proposals for the legislative representation of minorities. These included schemes to allow minorities to directly elect minority representatives to a second chamber and proportional representation. The fear was that these schemes would accentuate communalism by promoting race-based voting and would produce weak coalition governments. In a proportional representation system, race-based groups were almost certain to get some seats in Parliament, if indeed race-based voting was in fact practised.

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The Government preferred to stick with the first-past-the-post system organised around Single Member Constituencies. The key point was that race was not to be a factor which shaped the law governing elections. The electoral system would be "non-racial" or colour-blind. Race accentuates division and thus was to be muted to advance the goal of fashioning society on the basis of a multi-racial, secular state where none could say " satu bangsa, satu bahasa, satu ugama. "

Times have changed. The GRC scheme makes "race" an explicit component in the architectural design of the electoral system. Minorities do not merely want equal treatment or to be assimilated into mainstream society; they want their distinct identity protected. The task became to allow them space to live separate lives while sharing in the common life of the nation.

As mindsets shifted in late-1980 Singapore, similar rumblings were apparent on the international scene in the post-Berlin Wall era, when the end of the Cold War inaugurated the flurry of many small hot wars. Cautionary tales were drawn from the phenomenon of “balkanisation”, postmodern tribalism and resurgent ethnic conflict. Ethnicity could no longer be ignored, and the new imperative was to protect not only individuals rights but the rights of ethnic groups by adopting special measures for their distinct needs.

Democracy is often equated with majority rule, but Singapore has moved away from an unqualified majoritarian democracy based on the first-past-the-post system of legislative representation: this is the “winner takes it all the loser has to fall” model: it is simple and it is plain, why should we complain?

Well, because the idea of democracy as majority rule is a “counting heads” model which is a limited decision-making

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model. For example, moral questions cannot be solved by mathematics. In addition, if majorities oppress minorities, social conflict beckons. That is why Constitutions place certain things like entrenched individual rights beyond the reach of majority will.

Our Constitution was amended to guarantee minority legislative representation, to ensure all colours of the CMIO rainbow were present in Parliament. This appreciates that democracy must be something more than two wolves and one lamb voting on what to have for dinner even though government authority depends on retaining the confidence of the majority of MPs. The GRC scheme would give racial minorities access to political influence, which the Westminster model of “one man one vote” did not.

The thinking behind the GRC scheme was that race played a part in politics and affected voter preference, that younger voters were unaware of the need “to return a racially balanced slate of candidates”.

The GRC scheme would correct minority under-representation through constitutionally entrenching the right for all communities to always be represented in Parliament. To run GRC teams, political parties have to practise a moderate multi-racial brand of politics.

Race thus became an overt factor in structuring the electoral process, to ensure a multi-racial Parliament. One can agree that the principle of minority protection to guarantee minority MPs is essential, while differing over the best means of implementing the principle.

I might add that, as a doctoral student at Cambridge, I spent many wearying hours huddled over dusty legal tomes with

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a comforting chocolate croissant and instant Nescafe coffee mix, studying how minorities were protected, from the Middle Ages to our Modern Age. I am happy to report that schemes protecting the rights of minorities to participate effectively in public life and in national and local decision-making accord with best international practices, as set out in the 1992 UN Declaration on the Right of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.

Nonetheless, the GRC scheme further complicates the idea of representative democracy in Singapore. Who does an MP represent? This is no longer self-evident.

Traditionally, one would assume that an MP represents his constituency. However, this is not entirely accurate, given the loyalty MPs owe to their political parties. The ruling party's view of representation is that an MP is no mere delegate who simply mouths his constituents’ views. An MP is chosen for his "mature judgment" and "enlightened conscience." This view is commonly associated with Edmund Burke, the great British MP and philosopher. He considered that while an MP should serve with "industry" and exercise personal "judgment", that MP should maintain the "closest correspondence" with his constituents and give their concerns close attention. Prime Minister Lee apparently is of the same mind as Burke. In 2001, he described the Singapore brand of democracy as one "in which the people elect the Government and the Government ... governs as it judges wise and best" and stands up to defend its judgment.

An elected MP has to represent his constituents in tending to municipal affairs; as an MP of Singapore, he must be concerned with national affairs; as a party member, he must toe the party line. Now, if this MP happens to be the minority MP, he has to carry the concerns

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of his particular minority community as well. All these have to be balanced.

Through the GRC scheme, what is made clear is that the voice of the minority representative should always be present at the parliamentary table, together with opposition and non-partisan voices in the form of the NCMP and NMP scheme. Representation in Singapore entails not ignoring minority concerns.

Sir, the GRC scheme actually derogates from Article 12 of the Constitution which safeguards equality under the law. Section 42(1) of the PEA maintains the form of "one man one vote" while section 42(1A) states that a voter in a GRC “shall have one vote and may vote for any one group of candidates…”.

While voters in GRCs and SMCs each get one vote, these differ in voting strength. The weight of your one vote depends on where you live, as your vote may potentially help elect one, four, five or six MPs. This is a form of discrimination based on geographical residence. Clearly, the disparity in individual voting power raises Article 12 equal protection concerns.

The GRC scheme is, thus, prima facie unconstitutional. Indeed, its drafters recognised this by appending a notwithstanding clause embodied in Article 39A(3). This provides that even if the GRC scheme violates Article 12, it is exempt from its application and immunised from judicial challenge. A potentially unconstitutional scheme is thus rendered constitutional. Is this justifiable?

Sir, equality is not an absolute value. All constitutional lawyers worth their salt know that, aside from the freedom of conscience, no liberty is absolute and can be qualified by compelling reasons. Indeed, Article 12(3) provides that the equality clause is restricted as it does not invalidate personal and religious laws.

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It could be argued that the GRC, by providing for minority MPs, is a fulfilment of the Government's obligation under Article 152

to constantly care for the interests of racial and religious minorities. Because the GRC scheme under Article 39A serves a purpose under Article 152, read harmoniously, the GRC scheme in so far as it is tailored to serve the goal of minority representation is a justified exception to Article 12.

The importance of the constitutional purpose of the GRC scheme is underscored by the fact that it is immunised from constitutional challenges by a notwithstanding clause, and there are only two notwithstanding clauses in the Constitution – the other one is found in Article 149(3) which exempts security laws like the ISA from a slew of fundamental constitutional liberties. And notwithstanding clauses should be rare, as they render constitutional provisions, which are presumptively the supreme law of the land, inoperative in specified instances.

Given that the GRC scheme as a mechanism for guaranteeing minority representation is important enough to justify derogating from a fundamental liberty, how can there be no legal requirement to call a by-election to ensure that minorities in Parliament are at their maximum strength, where a minority GRC MP vacates his seat?

Thus, the PEA should be amended to require by-elections when the GRC minority MP vacates his parliamentary seat. This is to ensure that the constitutional purpose, the raison d'etre for having GRCs, is not thwarted.

It has been said before that the GRC scheme does not require a fixed number of minority MPs – this is too imprecise an arrangement. For example, if there are 20 minority MPs and some of these seats

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later became vacant, what quantitative threshold must be crossed before the situation becomes unacceptable? Say, if 25% of minority MP seats become vacated, leaving only 15 from the original 20. These things should not be left unspecified; the rule of law would be strengthened by specific legal rules.

In addition, there is a related issue of the Constitution not specifying the number of minority MPs. If GRC team sizes keep ballooning upwards, from the prototypical three to the current ceiling of six, the net number of minority candidates that must be fielded falls. Something needs to be done to deal with this contingency. The law needs to be tightened up.

Sir, the legal regulations by which we choose and legitimate our rulers is an issue of national importance, raised by Singaporeans, for Singaporeans to debate.

We are a pragmatic, efficient and rational people, fluent in the language of "deliverables" and "KPIs"; but we are not devoid of soul nor higher ideals; "democracy" is not a foreign tongue to us in a cosmopolitan world.

It is healthy to interrogate rationales for laws and processes at regular intervals, to test their cogency. This is part and parcel of authentic intellectual pluralism or viewpoint diversity and reflects the opening up of political space in Singapore, in the literal 'can hold demonstrations at Speakers' Corner' sense and a metaphorical 'dare to disagree' with political orthodoxy sense. Today's heresy can become tomorrow's orthodoxy.

The Government holds no monopoly on wisdom while keeping its hand firmly on the rudder, it has shown a willingness to consult, hear and assess views and

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even slaughter sacred cows, if necessary.

With filled rice bowls, and a Government ever-solicitous of our rice stockpile, the concern of citizens has shifted from needs to wants, from the tangible to intangible values. This situates today's motion of how to consolidate representative democracy in Singapore, by ensuring there are no gaps in representation, no democratic deficit.

Democracy is not a mere institutional form, its success is predicated on a state of mind. Ideals, like constitutional democracy, must be written on the heart of governors and governed, if they are not to be paper tigers or parchment barriers. The reason and conscience of citizens need to be engaged on matters of state. We all hold shares in Singapore Incorporated and want it to do well and succeed but we also want the freedom to debate what success is, beyond economic indicators. All the more, as Singapore opens up, we should not abandon our bearings but be anchored by fundamental values of integrity, civility and decency as seek to realise the ideals of constitutional democracy and human rights.

I hope the subject of the motion will not receive the "if it ain't broke, why fix it" response. Quite apart from the issue of who decides what is broken, I might say, if you can upgrade, if you have the will and wherewithal, why ever not?

If there is a flaw in the institutional design, swift correction will inspire confidence in the responsive and responsible quality of government. We want not just a serviceable electoral system but one that resonates with our innate sense of justice.

If this House decides that these proposed amendments are worth legislating, this would place the issue of by-elections beyond the shifting sands of political discretion upon solid rock of

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legally conditioned discretion. Politics is about power, Law tames power.

Nothing can be achieved without people and nothing endures without institutions: good people and good institutions complement each other in building a constitutional state where a basic value is to remind those holding political power that they are public servants, not overlords.

As the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being, as Solzhenitsyn observed, we sometimes need rules to restrain our self-interest and worst excesses. Sir, I hope this House will support this motion.

Question proposed.

3.52 pm

Dr Loo Choon Yong (Nominated Member): Sir, I rise in support of the motion standing in Prof. Thio's name.

The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) was introduced by the Government in 1988 to ensure that we have Members of Parliament from the minority communities – Malays, Indians and other communities. This is one fine example of Singapore successfully modifying the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy to specially cater to our multi-racial society. It is also an example of a majority community on its own, accommodating the minority communities, to ensure that they are represented in Parliament. Such a spirit of accommodation has done much to reassure minority communities that they have a place in Singapore's mainstream and they are truly part of us.

In 1988, when moving the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill in this House, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong said, "The main argument for returning MPs on a team

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basis throughout Singapore is that it entrenches multi-racial politics in every constituency. It leaves no room for communal politics." Sir, the Senior Minister's words quoted above ring true today, 20 years after he said it. I strongly support this policy of entrenching multi-racial politics in every constituency.

Sir, the recent vacancy in the Jurong GRC stimulated some discussion amongst Singaporeans. Some feel that a by-election should be called for, others disagree. Sir, the Parliamentary Elections Act, (PEA) section 24 (2A) requires a writ for election to be issued only when all the members for that constituency have vacated their seats. There is, therefore, no legal necessity for the Government to call a by-election, as the other four members have not vacated their seats.

Sir, this recent event has caused some Singaporeans to ask if there is a lacuna in our laws. Would the situation in Jurong GRC be different if the member vacating the seat were to be the designated minority member? If the GRC system is to "entrench multi-racial politics at every constituency" and to ensure the minority communities in every constituency are represented in this House, then surely we should not leave minority communities unrepresented in this House for too long.

Whilst it may be argued that when an MP from a majority community vacates his seat, his colleagues could cover his duties, and continue to represent the voters from the majority community, it is clearly not the same when a minority community member vacates his seat. In this situation, the very foundation of the GRC system is severely shakened. The raison d'etre of the GRC, that of ensuring minority representation in Parliament, is nullified when the minority Member of Parliament vacates the seat.

Sir, I therefore submit that, in this regard, the existing provisions in the

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Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA) relating to GRC by-elections are weak and ambiguous and need to be amended to ensure Singapore's intention to "entrench multi-racialism in every constituency" is safeguarded. I therefore support the motion because it will ensure that when an MP from a minority community vacates his seat in a GRC, a by-election has to be called, so that the minority community can continue to be represented in this House.

Further, in summing up the 1988 debate on the GRC proposal, Senior Minister Goh referred to an article, "Federalism in Switzerland" by Vernon Bogdanor, and said "The change to our Constitution and Parliamentary Elections Act to provide for election of MPs on a team basis is putting into place an institutional mechanism to ensure a multi-racial society. It is a formal institutional arrangement but for us to succeed, we must have the same spirit as the Swiss to search for consensus, to work through informal as much as formal arrangements, to make every citizen whichever community he belongs to, feel that he is a Singaporean". Yes, the spirit behind the formal words in the Constitution and Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA) must be considered and given adequate weight. I would urge this House to support the motion so as to preserve the original intent of the GRC scheme and the spirit behind it.

Sir, I also support the motion calling for a by-election in GRC when half or more of MPs from any GRC vacate their seats. The present position is that a by-election needs to be called only when all the MPs vacate their seats. Some people may not see a need for a by-election when vacancies arise in GRCs as they say the remaining MPs can cover each other's duties. Sir, I believe a distinction has to be made between an MP being the advocate

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of his constituents when it comes to "municipal issues" such as appeal on HDB housing matters, assisting with jobs, etc, as opposed to the MP being the constituents' representative in this House, to debate on policies and to pass necessary laws and to supply money appropriately for Government to function.

Sir, I strongly believe that these representational responsibilities cannot be delegated. In short, every voter is entitled to be represented in this House. This is our "one man, one vote" system. His vote must count and it must not count for less.

Sir, it is here that I have difficulty with the existing provisions in the Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA). Under the existing laws, the Government does not have to call a by-election even if four out of five of the Jurong GRC members were to vacate their seats for whatever reasons. Heaven forbid, we are not wishing that. And it is believed that one lone GRC member is deemed sufficient to represent the whole GRC, an electorate of about 116,676 voters who have previously been represented by five Members of Parliament.

Sir, it is in this context that the motion proposes that when half or more of GRC members vacate their seats in Parliament, a by-election should be called. The reasons for calling a by-election are, first, to ensure that voters in that GRC are adequately and fairly represented in Parliament and, secondly, a new full team with or without any MP from the previous team, seeks a fresh mandate from voters in that GRC.

Sir, the desire and aspirations of people to be adequately represented in this House should not be underestimated and we should uphold that principle and not allow consideration of convenience or costs to prevent voters from being adequately represented. Further, when half or more of the MPs vacate their seats

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at a GRC, I believe the remaining half or less of the MPs have lost their moral authority to represent that GRC. I, therefore, support the motion which also calls for a by-election in such a circumstance.

I am aware that some have called for a by-election in a GRC when any MP vacates his seat, even if he were to be from a majority community. There is some justification for this point of view. However, from a practical point of view, I would be quite happy at this moment to see a by-election called when half or more of the MPs in a GRC vacate their seats. Hence, my support for the motion.

Sir, I believe the provision for the issue of writ for by-election in the event of a Single Member Constituency (SMC) is in place and it has been included in this motion for completeness sake.

Sir, I now come to the timing for by-elections. Currently, as we all know, there is no provision with regard to the time frame within which a writ for a by-election has to be issued. I think this is quite unsatisfactory. Sir, I support the motion in proposing that all by-elections be called within three months from the date of vacancy, unless the parliamentary term is due to expire within six months from the date of vacancy. When a parliamentary seat falls vacant, the voters in that SMC and/or GRC are deprived of their representation in this House, until the vacancy is filled. The longer the vacancy remains unfilled, the greater the inequality to these voters. Their votes then count for less.

Sir, I believe it is in our own common interest to ensure that we have clear, unambiguous and transparent rules and law for by-elections. When an ambiguity or lacuna is revealed, we should take steps to rectify it. Leaving the timing of by-election vague and ambiguous is not a

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good practice, and certainly not what people would call “best practice”. The PEA is silent on the timing of by-elections and we should therefore amend it to give greater certainty, clarity and transparency.

Sir, I also believe that it is best to settle these constitutional and election law issues when there is no urgency. Discussions and debates at such times are likely to be calm, rational and reasoned even though the subject matter may be somewhat sensitive. We just celebrated our 43rd National Day. We have been building our social and political institutions in Singapore. I am very glad and proud that one of those cherished institutions is that of our multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. We accept our differences and we accommodate each other. Hence, in this spirit we should reassure our fellow Singaporeans from minority communities that when a lacuna is revealed, we will take the appropriate steps to ensure the intent behind the GRC system is observed and their representation in this House is preserved. We should likewise reassure all our GRC voters that when half or more of their MPs vacate their seats, their votes will be sought again for a full team of GRC MPs and that no citizen will be left unrepresented in this House for too long.

Sir, it is well-known that all governments frown upon by-elections as they are psephologically disadvantaged. But because our Constitution and Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA) ought to serve the larger interests of Singapore and all Singaporeans, I appeal to the Government to rise to the occasion and support this motion to refine our by-election laws. As it is a matter of great importance for all Singaporeans, may I also humbly call on the Government to lift the Whip and allow its members to vote according to their conscience on this motion. Let us remind ourselves that we have all taken the oath when we entered this House to "preserve, protect and

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defend the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore".

4.04 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Non-Constituency Member): Sir, the motion filed by the two Nominated Members calls for the election system to be fine-tuned. We in the Workers' Party are unable to support the motion for the simple reason that we have never accepted the GRC system and the motion attempts to entrench it. The motion is also flawed in some respects.

First, it attempts to refine the GRC system by providing that the moment a minority Member has left the GRC, a by-election for the GRC will be called. We do not see the justification for the departure of any single Member, including the minority Member, to trigger a by-election in the whole GRC. In our view, this is a disproportionate outcome.

Elections are won or lost by GRC teams, not on the merit of the minority Member alone. Each voter votes for the GRC team for different reasons – some may well vote because of the minority Member but others may do so because of the team leader or anchor Minister or because of some other MP.

In 1999, one of the Members in Jalan Besar GRC, Mr Choo Wee Khiang, resigned his seat due to a criminal conviction. The House then debated the issue of whether to call a by-election in Jalan Besar GRC. Then leader of the House, Mr Wong Kan Seng, spoke generally about why one Member's departure should not trigger a by-election in a GRC. He said, and I quote, "the legislated intent was not to allow any particular MPs so elected as part of a group of MPs for the GRC to hold the rest to ransom, to resignation or otherwise. The thinking then was that all the other

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MPs should not be forced to vacate their seats on account of one MP vacating his seat for whatever reason; death, resignation, or whatever". This highlights one of the main weaknesses of the GRCs, that a team member's non cooperation could sound the political death knell for the rest. This is unjustifiable.

Next, the motion goes on to propose that one half or more of the members of the GRC team have departed, a by-election in the GRC should be called as well. To propose this means that we are prepared to accept the situation where one or even two members in a GRC have left, no by-election needs to be called. The reality is that the moment even one member of the team leaves, the issue of the constituents being under represented immediately arises. To say that constituency work can be covered even by non-MPs is a dubious assertion as the residents will feel shortchanged. What about the parliamentary work? Can this be covered? Each MP is restricted to five parliamentary questions per sitting and can make only one speech in each debate. Just doing simple mathematics, the number of Parliamentary questions and speeches that can be made by the GRC team will be diminished the moment any MP vacates his seat. If GRC sizes are increased in the future, this motion will envisage three, four or even more vacancies before a by-election in a GRC is called. The under-representation of the constituents will become even more indefensible.

Third, the motion asked the House to introduce amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act such that a writ of by-election shall be called in the event that a Member of a Single Member Constituency vacates his or her seat for any reason. There is actually no need for the House to do this. This is already provided for under the Constitution and the Parliamentary Elections Act. Article 49 of the Constitution already states that

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whenever the seat of an elected Member has become vacant for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled by election in a manner provided by law, meaning that it should be done. The Parliamentary Elections Act itself, section 24, further provides that the President shall issue a writ of election "to supply vacancies caused by death, resignation, or otherwise." There can be no argument that when an MP in an SMC vacates his seat, there is no vacancy. The issue is really with the timing of the by-election, which I shall return to later.

Sir, indeed the motion shows that the GRC system is a system which does not promote representative democracy. The attempts in the motion to cure the problems with GRCs do not address the fundamental problem of the GRC that it dilutes the voter's voice. Instead of making a clear choice of which person they want to represent them, they are asked to pick a team of people and the outcome of their vote will depend on the aggregate outcome of voting in other constituencies. At the practical level, it also increases the bar for those who intend to contest, increasing the likelihood of walkovers.

What Mr Wong Kan Seng had said in 1999 about one member holding the rest to ransom also applies at the nomination stage when candidates are putting themselves up for election. GRC team members can hold the others to ransom as the whole team must stand to qualify as candidates, in the correct racial mix.

In view of all these objections to the original motion, I would like to propose that the motion be amended such as to call on the Government to introduce amendments to the Constitution to abolish GRCs and to revert to a system of single member seats and to set a three-month time limit for all by-elections to be called.

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Mr Speaker: May I have a copy of the amendment?

Ms Sylvia Lim: Yes, Sir. I believe a written copy has been given to the Clerk.

Mr Speaker: The amendment seems to be in order. Are copies made available to all Members?

Ms Sylvia Lim: Could I request the Clerk to circulate it to Members? [ Copy of amendment to motion circulated to hon. Members. ]

Mr Speaker: Would you like to move your amendment, Ms Lim?

Ms Sylvia Lim: Sir, I beg to move,

That the words in the motion from "fine-tune the electoral system" to "by-elections shall be called" in the last sentence be deleted, and the following words be inserted in their place:

(a) introduce amendments to the Constitution to abolish Group Representation Constituencies and revert to a system of Single Member Constituencies", and;

(b) introduce amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act such that a writ for by-election shall be issued in the event a Member vacates his or her seat for any reason."

Sir, the proposed amended motion has also been put down for the convenience of Members on paper.

Mr Speaker: Have you finished your speech?

Ms Sylvia Lim: Sir, I will now speak on the amended motion.

Why abolish GRCs after 20 years? To answer this, we should trace history and how we have evolved. We should then ask: are GRCs good for the people or good for the PAP?

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In 1988, GRCs were introduced as three-Member teams. Then Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, told Parliament that the GRCs would ensure minority representation. Just two years later, in 1990, GRC size was increased from three Members to four, the reason being population growth within three-Member GRCs. In 1996, GRCs were increased from four Members to five or six Members. We were told that this was to provide the critical masses of residents needed for the Community Development Councils or CDCs to work, but these arguments are clearly red herrings. As then Deputy Prime Minister Goh had already said in 1988, even if all seats were run as single seats, MPs could still group together after the elections for economies of scale. The reasons given by the PAP also do not explain why, coincidentally, GRCs which were nearly won by the Workers' Party, such as Eunos GRC and Cheng San GRC, disappeared in the following elections.

In 2006, some light was shed as to how the PAP benefited from GRCs. Senior Minister Goh spoke of the PAP's recruitment challenge, and he said, and I quote, "without some assurance of a good chance of winning, at least, their first election, many able and successful young Singaporeans may not risk their careers to join politics." Interesting. Are we to infer that the PAP candidates these days are not what they used to be? On a separate note, Minister Mentor also made comments that the Health Minister should be ready to lead his own GRC team after being under his wing in Tanjong Pagar GRC for four years. So, it seems that the GRC is a useful recruitment and training tool for the ruling party.

Has the GRC strengthened or weakened politicians' mandate? Back in 1998, Dr Ahmad Mattar already hit the nail on the head. His views were quoted in

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Parliament as follows and I quote, "as a Malay, I do not think I would like to contest in any elections when my victory is guaranteed, not because I am a strong candidate but because I have a so-called strong twin brother to lean on".

How do voters feel about GRCs? The Government might want to do a big national survey to find out. It is not uncommon for Singaporeans to become residents of different GRCs in successive elections without moving house at all. The jokes about boundaries are endless, with the residents of Serangoon asking for their Marine Parade seaview and Tanjong Pagar GRC now fronting MacRitchie Reservoir.

In my view, there has clearly been political degeneration as a result of the GRCs. To arrest this, the amended motion calls for the Government to amend the Constitution to abolish GRCs and revert to a system of single seats where each candidate is judged on his or her own merits.

Can this be done? Of course. The Electoral Boundaries Committee will give effect to any changes to the system that are made.

How do we ensure minority representation then, some might ask. Singapore's history has shown that, in the past, minority candidates stood and won single seats. PAP MPs, such as Mr Dhanabalan, Mr Rajaratnam, Mr Sidek Saniff, Mr Zulkifli Mohamad, had done so; so have Opposition leaders, like Mr Jeyaretnam in Anson, a predominantly Chinese constituency. This was so even in the 1984 general election. Are we now saying that Singapore has regressed as a society? Or is the PAP now saying that they have less confidence in their current minority Ministers, MPs or new candidates winning on their own?

Finally, I move to the issue of time limit for by-elections under the system of single seats. Even though the obligation

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is already there, as I said earlier, the issue lies in the lack of a definite deadline by which a by-election must be called after a vacancy arises. This has led to long and unjustified delays in holding by-elections. For instance, in 1986, when MP for Anson, Mr Jeyaretnam, was disqualified from office, no by-election was held in Anson for two years until the 1988 general election. This loophole should be plugged.

This is not a new issue for this House. It came up nine years ago when the Workers' Party filed a motion to debate whether a by-election should be held in Jalan Besar GRC. The ruling party was not willing then to write in a time limit. Even if a law sets no time limit for something to be done, the usual interpretation is that it should be done within a reasonable time. In this case, a few months, not years. In the circumstances, we support explicitly providing a three-month deadline, which is the same period as in the earlier Malaysian legislation. The amended motion reflects this.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take the break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 4.40 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.18 pm until 4.40 pm .

Sitting resumed at 4.40 pm

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]:

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: Debate resumed.

The Leader of the House (Mr Mah Bow Tan): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to point out to Members of the House, under Standing Order 37(1), it says that, "Unless Standing Orders otherwise

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provide, when any motion is under consideration in Parliament, or in a Committee thereof, an amendment may be proposed to the motion if it is relevant thereto." Sir, I would like to emphasise the words "if it is relevant thereto".

Mr Speaker, Sir, I submit that the amendment that has been proposed by the Non-Constituency MP, as distributed to the House just now, is not relevant to the original motion. The original motion is talking about by-elections and the circumstances under which by-elections should be held, including the timing of such a by-election. Whereas the amended motion seeks to talk about GRCs, especially the abolition of GRCs and reverting to a system of Single Member Constituencies. Sir, this is an entirely different matter. If the Member would like to debate the issue of GRC, then I would suggest that the Member file another motion on this topic so that the House can have a full debate on GRCs. But, as it stands at the moment, the amendment, as distributed, is not relevant to the original motion and therefore should not be accepted.

Mr Speaker: I have occasion to again read the amendment and Standing Order and I agree with the Leader of the House that the main motion is on by-elections and in the event of vacancies arising out of certain circumstances. The amendment, as I read it again, is not relevant to the main motion as required under Standing Order 37(1). That being the case, the original Question is again before the House and, as it stands, under the name of the Nominated Member of Parliament. Whether the Member wants to pursue the subject, as suggested by the Leader, ie, to come up again with a motion on some other occasion, it is up to her. But, as of now, I think the amendment falls, and, therefore, I will proceed with the main motion now.

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4.42 pm

Mr Hri Kumar Nair: Sir, thank you for the opportunity for allowing me to take part in this debate. I rise to oppose the motion. I will put my points shortly and simply, because when one cuts through the arguments and rhetoric, the issue before us is really a simple one.

When I first read the motion, I found myself thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of its various specific proposals. But I was putting the cart before the horse. This motion purports to advance its proposals on the basis that they affirm the importance of "representative democracy". But what is "representative democracy"? To my knowledge, there is no universally accepted practice, and I did not hear any being advanced by the hon. Members proposing the motion. In my view, that is the most fundamental question to ask.

Webster's defines the term as: "a type of democracy in which the citizens delegate authority to elected representatives". As far as I know, all types of democracies around the world purport to do just that in one way or another. But the laws and rules by which these democracies are practised are not identical. This includes the manner and process by which their officials come into office.

So, in the United States, for example, which is often cited as the poster boy for a modern democracy, the President is not elected by the highest number of individual votes, but the highest number of electoral votes. Each of the US States is assigned a different number of electoral votes. So a person can be the President of the United States, the most powerful man in the country and arguably the world, even if more people and more states vote for his opponent. In the year 2000, Al Gore received half a million

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votes more, but still lost. The President’s Cabinet members are also not elected, but are selected by him. Theirs is a form of representative democracy which is somewhat alien to us and maybe unusual to most Singaporeans.

But the purpose of my speech is not to do a survey of how different countries implement their concept of a "representative democracy". Nor is it to suggest that one form is superior to another. I cite the American example to illustrate one point, that we cannot blindly transpose rules set by others to our country and our circumstances. It is for Singaporeans to determine what works best for us, and I do not think Prof. Thio disagrees with that.

Our concern should really be whether our rules reflect the fundamental principles of democracy: free and fair elections, and where our citizens can genuinely feel that their interests are being adequately represented, and their needs taken care of, on the ground and in this House.

And we have adapted our system of representative democracy to meet our unique circumstances. There is no better example of this than the formation of GRCs, which is unprecedented around the world. It was our way of dealing with the fact that ours is not a homogenous society, and to ensure that there is a place in our country for all, regardless of race, language or religion. I was not in this House when that landmark piece of legislation was debated but, reading the transcripts now, I was struck by the uncertainty expressed by some Members as to whether having GRCs was the right way to go. Today, I believe most Singaporeans would agree that it was the right thing to do.

That is why I was puzzled by some of the specific proposals in the motion before this House.

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First, the proposal that a by-election be called if the minority candidate in the GRC vacates his seat. With respect, this misunderstands the reasons for having GRCs in the first place. I can do no better than to quote excerpts of the speech of Senior Minister Goh, then the Deputy Prime Minister, when he moved the Second Reading of the Bill introducing GRCs. He said this:

"This Bill, the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill, and the one following it, the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, will together secure the long-term political stability of Singapore in two ways: first, by ensuring that Parliament will always be multi-racial and representative of our society, and second, by encouraging the practice of multi-racial politics by all political parties."

"This Bill also has a larger objective beyond merely guaranteeing that Parliament would always be multi-racial in character. It makes it necessary for all political parties to adopt a multi-racial approach in their competition for seats in Parliament if they hope to form the Government. Constituencies to be contested by multi-racial teams of candidates will require political parties and their candidates to take a moderate, multi-racial approach when campaigning instead of a communal or racially extreme approach."

So there can be no doubt that GRCs were introduced to ensure minority representation in Parliament, not in the GRC, and to ensure that political parties do not run on platforms which will undermine our multi-racial society.

When a GRC team is elected, the entire team is expected to serve and represent the needs of the entire GRC, and not just the racial group they belong to. In addition, the minority Member serves a national role of representing in this House the minority group he belongs to. But that is no different from the Chinese Members of this House who

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serve a similar national role for their race as well. Therefore, for the purposes of determining whether a by-election should be called when a GRC seat is made vacant, there is really no basis to draw a distinction between the minority Members and other Members. It is unnecessary to have a rule mandating a by-election simply because the minority Member vacates his seat. His constituency role will be fulfilled by his colleagues, and his national role by the other Members of his race in Parliament.

In any event, it is just plain wrong that the vacation of the minority seat should cause all the other Members of the GRC to lose their seats as well. One of the concerns raised, when the introduction of GRCs was first debated, was that it will relegate minority Members to second class. This proposal swings the other way, by elevating the minority Member, by giving him extraordinary powers, including the power to force a by-election. In other words, who calls the by-election? Is it the PM or the MP? With this motion, the power to call a by-election is placed in the hands of one MP, whether in the GRC or SMC. I do not understand our laws to confer such privileges to any single Member, whether minority or otherwise, whether in the GRC or SMC. Nor do I believe that such powers should be conferred.

Sir, in the course of her speech, Prof. Thio raised a number of extreme examples. I will deal with just one. She cited the example of an Opposition GRC where one Member vacates, and she says that there needs to be a by-election so as to enable the Opposition party to fill up that seat in Parliament. That, Sir, is flawed, because it asks the wrong question. The right question is: how do the remaining Members of that GRC, Opposition or otherwise, think it is best to serve their constituents? They can do one of two things. They can continue and serve their constituents to the best of

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their ability, or they can all resign and force the Prime Minister to decide whether he wants to call a by-election or not. And if he does not choose to call a by-election, then the Opposition MPs can no doubt go to the elections and complain to the voters as to why they did not deliver their promises. The voter will then decide whether that is a good excuse or not. Ultimately, it is for the Opposition party or any party to make a political judgment on that question. They do not need rules to dictate what they should do and not do. That is what politics is about. No one said it was easy.

Sir, the Government would, of course, have to address a situation where all or most of the minority Members vacate their seats. It is difficult to imagine how such a scenario may occur. If by accident, then we may have to change the feng shui of this House. If by design, then I suspect by-elections may be the least of our worries. Since this is not a situation contemplated in the motion, I need not say much more about it.

That brings me to another assumption this motion appears to be premised on, ie, that where a Member vacates his seat, whether in a GRC or SMC, the residents of the relevant division or constituency will not be served on the ground or represented in Parliament. But that is not the reality of politics in Singapore. It is not in the interest of any party, whether ruling or Opposition, to neglect the voters in any of their divisions. There are no free rides. Voters will expect the MPs of the party to stand in for their colleagues and take over their duties. The position is even clearer in GRCs, where the whole team is responsible for the entire GRC and not just the division they stand in.

To respond to Dr Loo, the people's vote will not count any less. They will have their representation in Parliament.

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The reality of the matter is that, if that team of MPs fails to deliver or the voters feel that their needs have not been adequately taken care of, the party will face the consequences at the next elections. That, in all democracies, is the real remedy, the ultimate check and balance. It, therefore, does not matter whether one Member or the majority of Members vacate a GRC, or even if the SMC Member leaves, the reality of the politics is the same.

In this regard, may I remind this House of what Senior Minister Goh said when moving the GRC Bill in 1988:

"The issue before us is not GRCs per se . It is whether we should entrench in our Constitution the right for all communities – Chinese, Malay, Indians and Others – to be always represented in Parliament. The GRC is only a means to an end. It is the best means we can think of. It is democratic. You retain the right to elect the government you want. You still have your one vote. You still choose the MPs you want to represent you except, in the case of the GRCs, you elect a group of three MPs. All three MPs in the group will serve you, and not just one of them. Whichever group of MPs you vote in, whether it is the PAP’s or the Opposition party’s, the result is a multi-racial Parliament; always. Your democratic right remains intact. Singapore’s future is safeguarded."

That statement holds just as true today as it did 20 years ago.

Therefore, to compel by-elections every time there is a vacancy does not necessarily advance "representative democracy". Indeed, the motion recognises that. It proposes that a by-election only be held if the vacancy occurs when there is at least six months left of the Parliamentary term. This recognises another reality of elections, ie, that they are expensive, both in direct terms and in lost opportunities, and undeniably

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disruptive. They tie up the resources of the state: the police, the schools, the civil servants. Businesses are disrupted. People have to take time off to vote. These matters cannot be ignored. And it is not an issue of whether Singapore is rich or poor, or whether we can afford such expenses. All these must be taken into account. There obviously has to be a balancing exercise.

The motion purports to achieve that balance by prescribing the six-month timeframe. But this does not make sense.

Firstly, why six months? It appears to be a completely arbitrary figure.

Secondly, it is simply not practical. The motion mandates that the by-election be called within three months from the date of vacancy. Taking into account the time to complete the election process, that would mean that the new Member may only have about two months before he has to stand for elections again. That is clearly not enough time for him to do anything meaningful, and we would have had a by-election simply for the sake of having one or, as Prof. Thio says, simply for the reason of giving the Government a bloody nose. It is a waste of time and money, and it does not advance representative democracy.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the motion presumes that every Parliament will complete its full term. But that again ignores the reality. Elections can be called at any time, and the Prime Minister is not compelled to wait for the full term of Parliament to expire, and often it does not.

Lest anyone should think that what we do in Singapore is at odds with all democracies around the world, that is not the case. In the United Kingdom, for example, there are no prescribed time limits for a by-election to be called in the event of a vacancy. The three months

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Prof. Thio refers to is only a convention. It is not prescribed law. In other words, the UK Prime Minister may call a by-election whenever he wishes. It is certainly not the extreme position advanced in the motion. And allow me to read to you an excerpt from the information posted on the website of the UK Parliament on vacancies. It says this:

"While a vacancy exists, constituency matters are handled by a Member of Parliament of the same party in a neighbouring constituency. When a new Member has been elected, all outstanding matters are passed to him."

So we do not do things different here. Neither are we doing something extraordinary. We are not dealing with The Beatles or The Bangles. We are not even dealing with Earth, Wind and Fire.

It is, therefore, only sensible that we keep things flexible. Let the Prime Minister be the Prime Minister. Let him do his job and make the decisions. There is no need to tie his hands. As I have said, it is not the case that the ruling party, whichever it may be, can act with impunity and ignore the needs and wants of its voters. It will ultimately have to account for its decisions at the next elections. And, "If the voters do not find in favour of the ruling party, they will dismiss the rulers without bloodshed", quoting again from Karl Popper.

At the end of the day, we have to decide what is most important to Singaporeans and for Singapore. The underlying premise of the motion is the assumption that there is a direct relationship between the number of elections and the strength of the democracy. That is a fallacy. You can have as many elections as you want but, if the candidates are dishonest or the voters intimidated, if there is no secrecy in the voting process or integrity in the counting process, then elections are

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simply a song and dance, a device to disguise the lack of democracy, instead of being its symbol. There are too many examples of this around the world. Singapore, thankfully, is not one of them.

Singaporeans know the difference between substance and form. They are less concerned with dusty law books and chocolate croissants. What we want and what they want are honest, dedicated MPs and Ministers, and an effective Government, which will listen to our people, make decisions for the benefit of Singapore and, ultimately, to deliver on the ground and in this House. On that score, this motion does nothing to advance our common cause.

I oppose the motion.

4.58 pm

Mdm Halimah Yacob: Mr Speaker, Sir, the motion that we are debating today proposed by Prof. Thio Li-ann is not new. This House had debated this issue exhaustively in 1999 when Mr Choo Wee Kiang vacated his seat in the Jalan Besar GRC. Even the suggestion of a three-month time limit for the calling of a by-election is not new. MP Chiam See Tong first mooted it in the 1999 debate.

Sir, as I sat listening to the speeches of the various MPs who spoke before me, in particular, Prof. Thio, Dr Loo and Ms Sylvia Lim, I would like to say that there are basically two areas which they had raised. With regard to the general principles and issues, I think my colleague Mr Hri Kumar has already touched on them. But these are two other issues which they mentioned.

The first point that the three of them raised is whether the interests and welfare of the residents will be taken care of if a Member in the GRC vacates his

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seat. The second issue which they raised is whether or not the GRC is necessary. In one particular speech, it was even questioned whether it is constitutional, and also the issue whether or not the minority MPs are able to stand on their own and they do not need the crutch or the assistance of a GRC. Sir, I will come to those two points that have been raised by the three speakers that I have mentioned in the course of my speech.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the late Dr Ong Chit Chung served as an MP in Bukit Batok for 20 years. His death was sudden and came as a great shock to all of us. Because of his demise, our GRC now has one MP less. From a five-member GRC, we are now down to a four-member GRC. But when we were elected at the last GE, we made a promise and a commitment to all the residents of Jurong GRC. We promised to serve our residents wholeheartedly, to serve them well and never to let them down. Although we are down by one MP, we will keep this promise, even if it means that each one of us has to shoulder heavier responsibilities. What is of paramount importance to us are our residents’ welfare and their interests. In this, we are indeed most fortunate that we have the strong support and backing of the grassroots leaders from Bukit Batok. They are experienced leaders with a strong network among the residents. They understand that we are doing our best to help our residents and have strongly supported us.

On the question raised by the three MPs as to whether or not we are able to take care of the residents' needs now that we have one seat vacant in Jurong GRC, I want to assure this House that we had wasted no time in addressing our residents' needs. Immediately after Dr Ong's demise, we met all the grassroots leaders of Bukit Batok, a few hundred of them. We explained to them how we intend to take care of Bukit Batok and we also wanted to hear their concerns and

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views. We suggested to them that we would divide among us the responsibility of acting as advisors to the CCC and CCMC and 10 RCs. This arrangement will continue for a period of six months before we review it. We would also take turns to run the weekly meet-the-people sessions. Between us, all the work in Bukit Batok would be effectively covered. The grassroots leaders gave their strong support. Those who spoke expressed their confidence in our leadership and they were happy that they have four MPs to take care of them. They promised to work closely with us and to give us their strong support.

Since then, the four of us have attended more than 15 activities at Bukit Batok and handled five meet-the-people sessions. Last Thursday, Sir, I went on a house visit in Bukit Batok, which was followed by a supper meeting with some residents at the RC Centre. I must say that I was really touched by the warm reception that I received from the residents in Bukit Batok. They raised the usual local or municipal issues but none raised any concern or discomfort at the existing arrangement that we had worked out. To me, the response of the grassroots leaders and the residents whom I had met is a great assurance. It is a clear indication of the trust that they have in us. They gave us a strong mandate at the last GE, and they knew that we would honour and respect that mandate even after the demise of one MP. Above all, they are confident that their interest and welfare will be taken care of. In fact, Sir, I must share with this House that all the residents that I had met, all the grassroots leaders that we had interactions with, none had raised the issue of needing a by-election in order to provide for the needs and to take care of the interest of the residents.

Mr Speaker, Sir, even as we debate this motion, I urge this House not to lose sight of this very important element. At the end of the day, parliamentary

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democracy is not just a process, slogans, words and empty promises. It is about serving people. It is about improving people's lives. It is about achieving outcomes. The people in Jurong GRC gave us their strong support, they trust us, they have confidence in us and we intend to keep that trust and to do all that is within our power to live up to that expectation.

We do not believe for one moment, Sir, that when one or more MPs vacate their seats, voters have no representative. I think this is also the crux of the argument raised by Dr Loo, Prof. Thio and Ms Sylvia Lim. The voters in Jurong GRC had voted us as a team, team Jurong GRC, and not as specific individuals. We were elected to serve the needs of all the residents. Even if one or more members of the team are not around, the remaining members of the team continue to represent all the voters and residents of the GRC. It is baseless to suggest that since the mandate was given to a team to act as representatives of the residents in Parliament, the absence of one or more would mean that the rest of us have lost our electoral mandate and have to resign.

For ease of administration, each MP takes care of one area within the GRC but, at the strategic level, planning on major policy issues is done as a GRC to ensure that there is consistency of service to all residents. At the operational level, too, MPs in the GRC attend each other's functions and cover for each other during periods of absence. So, the GRC is not just a collection of constituencies that continue to operate as single constituencies, but it is a team concept where a team of MPs takes care of all the needs of the residents. This is the mandate given to us – to serve all the residents in the whole GRC and as a team and the sad loss of one of our members does not diminish the fact that we are acting as a team serving all the residents of Jurong GRC.

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Let me now touch on another point raised by Prof. Thio and I think, in some respects, also mentioned by Ms Sylvia Lim. Prof. Thio also wants the law changed so that when a minority candidate vacates his seat for whatever reasons, then all the other MPs should vacate their seats too and a by-election held to elect a new team. If we accept this proposal, Sir, it will undermine and weaken the GRC concept. Let me explain why. Prof. Thio's proposal would mean that minority candidates would wield considerable power and has great sway over the fate of the GRC. If, for whatever reason, the minority candidate resigns, then all the other MPs in the GRC would have to resign too. This would put the minority candidate in exactly the same position that the 1988 amendment wanted to avoid, ie, allowing one MP to hold the entire team to ransom. This is clearly not the intent or purpose of the GRC concept and is counter productive for minority candidates as there would be a lot of resentment at giving them so much power to undermine the whole GRC.

Sir, if we can recall, in 1988 when the Parliamentary Elections Act was amended, a Select Committee was set up to receive representations from the members of the public. The Malay and Indian representors strongly supported the GRC concept. The Chinese representors also supported the GRC concept but had some reservations. Mr Goh Chok Tong, who was then the First Deputy Prime Minister made this observation at the time when he moved the motion to amend in the Third Reading in Parliament, and this is what he said –

"The GRC proposal which requires some MPs to stand as a team, effectively distributes power between leaders of the various communities. In fact, it favours the minorities. Chinese representors pointed out that Chinese candidates cannot stand in a GRC on their

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own. On the other hand, the Malays or Indians or members of other minority communities can stand on their own in the GRC. This is like handing a veto to the minority candidates."

What Prof. Thio's motion is proposing will result in exactly that outcome – handing the veto power to a minority candidate, which is not the intention of Parliament, neither is it desirable as it will breed a lot of resentment against the minority candidates. The GRC is a team concept which is meant to address the problem of a multi-racial society where race, language or religion can become major dividing lines and can be capitalised for political mileage to support or to vote against a particular candidate.

As I sat listening to the debate and the various speeches made, I feel that we may have to anchor ourselves in reality. We are living in a world where issues of race, language and religion continue to have a bearing and an impact, and we are not living in a utopia. This is the reality of the world today and the reality did not strike me as much as when I spoke to one person in the ILO. As part of my work in the ILO, I come across a lot of refugees – some are refugees from political persecution (based on their own description and admission), some are refugees because of persecution based on race, and, some, persecution based on religion.

But the most poignant one that I remember was a man from Rwanda. He fled from Rwanda because of persecution. He belonged to the Tutsis race and he was being persecuted. The thing that struck me was that this Rwandan man did not belong to a different race, they all belonged to one race but they happened to belong to different tribes and that became the big point of contention and that became the element for persecution against members of his tribal group. So even talking to him was a very painful exercise, he was not able to recount everything but he said that he was very

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happy to get out of Rwanda. So, that brings me to the reality. The reality is that issues of race, language and religion continue to dog us and if we go about undermining, weakening and attacking the GRC concept, I am afraid that we may potentially unleash all these forces that we may not even be able to see what would be the consequences.

The GRC concept is meant to prevent deep cleavages and polarisations in our society, which could disadvantage minority communities in political representation. But it is quite a different point to argue that a minority, once elected, would now have a strong veto power that can at any time cause a by-election in the GRC. Sir, it does not mean that if there were no minority representation in a GRC, there would be no minority representation in Parliament. The minority communities will continue to have their interest well taken care of as there are other minority MPs in the House.

At the same time, in a GRC, the MPs attend each other's functions and activities. I attend the temple functions, the seventh lunar month functions, of which there were plenty these last few days and nights, and the other MPs in the GRC also attend the mosque functions. They help to raise funds for the mosque and they attend all the other Muslim functions. We cross culture, we cross religion, because we respect our residents' culture and different religions, and that is what the whole concept of the GRC is all about – that we are able to support each other. I think that is also the essence of a multi-racial and multi-cultural society. So I disagree very much with the idea that we should dismantle the GRC concept which gives a different kind of messaging that is counter-productive and not helpful to the minorities. In fact, I think the presence of the GRC constantly reminds us of the need to take into consideration the needs of the minority

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communities. It also prevents us from having to go back to our very basic instincts of depending on race, religion and language in order to garner support for our own position to win votes in an election.

Sir, for all those reasons, I do not agree with this motion. I oppose the motion. Let me also cite to Members the small conversation I had with some of the grassroots leaders in Bukit Batok. I have been speaking with a few groups of them. Some of them are the RC leaders in the RCs that I am taking care of and I ask each group: is having a by-election a priority or a main concern for you and the residents that you interact with? The answer that they gave is that a by-election is not the main concern and priority as far as they are concerned. Their primary concern is that the interest and welfare of the residents should be taken care of, and their interest and welfare is well taken of.

There were some suggestions that perhaps because there are so many residents and only four MPs, some of their interest and welfare will be overlooked. I do not think that is a depiction of the reality. In fact, I think all the four MPs are more than able to take care of their needs, whether it is on town council matters, whether it is on housing matters, or whether it is on other matters. So, I think as far as the Jurong GRC residents are concerned, the level of service to them is completely not affected and, at the end of the day, I must say that should be the core of parliamentary democracy. When we talk about parliamentary democracy, what should be the main consideration is not whether or not we have a by-election but the main consideration should be: are we able to take care and provide for the needs of the people? We are all elected to serve the people and that should be the main and primary consideration.

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Sir, for that reason, I oppose the motion.

Mr Siew Kum Hong (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to participate in this debate. I rise in support of the motion.

This motion was filed by Prof. Thio and Dr Loo in the wake of the passing away of Dr Ong Chit Chung, an elected Member of Jurong GRC. The Government has indicated that it will not be calling for a by-election in Jurong GRC. Instead, the other elected Members in the GRC will take turns to cover the duties of Dr Ong. This was the same approach taken in 1993 when Dr Tay Eng Soon, then an elected Member for Eunos GRC, passed away and in 1999 when Mr Choo Wee Kiang of Jalan Besar GRC resigned.

Sir, the motion has three parts. Firstly, it calls upon this House to affirm the importance of representative democracy. Secondly, it proposes a fine-tuning of the electorial system to provide for by-elections in certain circumstances. Finally, it calls for all by-elections to be called within three months of the date of vacancy, unless general elections are imminent.

Sir, the first part of the motion on the importance of representative democracy must surely be beyond doubt and beyond debate. We are a parliamentary democracy and the elected Members of this House represent the people. The people have voted the Government into power and that is where the Government draws its legitimacy from.

That is the source of the Government's right to rule.

I cannot imagine any Member disputing or disagreeing with the importance of representative democracy as a principle. And I cannot imagine any Member not agreeing with this first part

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of the motion. Indeed, any elected Member who is reluctant to affirm the importance of representative democracy should consider whether he or she should continue as a Member of this House.

I will now touch briefly on the third part of the motion. As I cannot do better than the learned Prof. Thio, I would simply say that I fully endorse her speech on this aspect. The Nominated Member has described to this House the different approaches of a number of countries. With such a divergence of practice, the proposed three-month time-frame seems to be eminently reasonable, especially when the motion also envisages the need for an exception where general elections are imminent. So, I also support this third part of the motion. Mr Hri Kumar points to the UK and says that the three-month timeline cited by Prof. Thio is only a convention. As Mr Hri Kumar no doubt knows, the UK does not have a codified written constitution and Westminster conventions are regarded as being as good as law.

I now move on to the second part of the motion which, in my view, represents the meat of the motion. This second part asks this House to call on the Government to fine-tune the electoral system by introducing amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act requiring a by-election in certain stipulated circumstances. These circumstances are: where a Member of a GRC belonging to a minority community within the terms of section 8A(1) of the Parliamentary Elections Act vacates his or her seat for any reason; where half or more of the elected Members of a GRC vacate their seats for any reason; or where the elected Member of a single member constituency vacates his or her seat for any reason. Sir, my own view is a little different. I firmly believe that a by-election should be called, whenever there is any vacancy in a GRC, not just when the vacancy is left by the minority Member or when half or more

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of the elected Members vacate their seats, I would, therefore, argue that a by-election should be called in Jurong GRC as a result of the vacancy caused by the passing away of Dr Ong Chit Chung.

It does seem from the previous speakers' speeches that I may be alone in this House in this regard, and I also recognise that this specific point of whether there should be a by-election where there is a single vacancy in a GRC has been debated in this House in the past. Nevertheless, I ask for the indulgence of this House while I spend a few minutes on what I call the "3 Ps" – Principle, Practicality and the People.

Sir, the starting point must surely be the principle of representative democracy, as recognised in the first part of the motion. This principle is the first "P". I think Mr Hri Kumar said that there is no universal definition for this, but I disagree. I see this very simply. In Singapore, the people elect their representatives to Parliament. Where the seat in a single member constituency is vacated for any reason, the people cease to be represented. To avoid this situation, a by-election should be called. The logic is simple and clear for single member constituencies. And I think there should be no dispute or disagreement insofar as the motion calls for a writ for by-election to be issued in the event of a vacancy in a single member constituency for any reason. The situation is muddied somewhat by the GRC scheme because there would remain other elected Members for that GRC, and that is really the nub of the issue here.

As I have said, elected Members have the legitimacy of the people's endorsement of representing the will of the people. The mandate from the people is fundamental to a functioning democracy. So, when the electors in a GRC elect a team of candidates, what is the mandate being given?

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Sir, I was a voter in Ang Mo Kio GRC in the 2006 General Elections. I was voting for a team of candidates in a GRC. To my mind, the mandate that I was giving to the team I voted for was for the team as a whole. I think that the mandate for the team of candidates as elected by the voters to represent the GRC in Parliament and if the composition of the team changes for any reason, then it, by definition, becomes a different team. It ceases to be the team elected by the voters. In that situation, surely a fresh mandate from the voters is necessary.

Jurong GRC was uncontested in the 2006 General Elections and so the team entered Parliament by way of a walkover. But this does not change the fact that the team today is different from the team that was nominated and had entered Parliament in 2006. So, on principle, the first team, I would say that by-election is required in Jurong GRC. I think that the principle of representative democracy should, in and of itself, settle the issue, but some have cited reasons based on practicality in arguing against having a by-election. In the first place, I do not think that practical considerations should ever be allowed to trump a principle that is so fundamental to the concept of democracy. But even if we are to accept that this second "P" of practicality is relevant to the discussion, to my mind, it also points in favour of a by-election.

The first reason that some may cite to justify not calling for a by-election is that the law does not require it. Prof. Thio has spoken on what the law is and she has done so far more ably than I ever could. But I do not believe that this House should feel bound by what the law today says. This House makes law for Singapore, it would be odd, no, it would be nothing less then sheer abdication of constitutional responsibility for this House to say that it is bound by existing law and to stop there. Instead of considering what the law should say and then changing the

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law to say that, the law should reflect correct principle and we should not distort principle to accommodate existing law or contort our thinking to justify incorrect law. If the law is unclear or just plain wrong, then this House is duty-bound to clarify or correct it, instead of hiding behind such an unclear or wrongful law and perpetuating an undesirable state of affairs. So, I will not place much weight on the fact that the existing law does not require a by-election.

Another reason that has been cited is that a by-election would distract Singaporeans from the pressing issues posed by a slowing economy and rising inflation. This was also the reason cited when Dr Tay Eng Soon passed away in 1993. Sir, surely this argument cannot stand. It implies that voting and elections are luxuries, that there are really just so much fun and games to be left for good times and inappropriate and unnecessary in bad times. It suggests that the right of voters to be represented by the team that they have elected is in reality a privilege and not an entitlement. It means that the principle of representative democracy is not fundamental to our society and can be waived by the Government of the day when deem inexpedient. I think that cannot be right. Either a by-election is necessary or it is not. Either the people have a right to be represented by the team they have elected and, hence, the right to select a fresh team if the elected team changes or they do not. Either the principle of representative democracy is important or it is not. The prevailing economic conditions should have no role to play in this and certainly should not be allowed to trump these considerations.

A third reason that is often cited is that the remaining Members in the GRC can cover the duties of the Member who has vacated his or her seat and so voters are none the worse off. And we have just

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heard from Mdm Halimah who has spoken on what has been done in Jurong GRC in this regard. Sir, I think this argument belittles the contributions of elected Members, exactly as Prof. Thio had said. Ever since my own appointment as a Nominated Member, I have come to appreciate greatly the heavy duties and burdens of elected Members. I, as an unelected Member of this House, am utterly dismayed by the suggestion that it is perfectly all right for the remaining Members in the GRC to cover the duties of a member who has vacated his or her seat and that nobody should think twice about it. It trivialises and downplays the contributions of elected Members in the way that I think is unfair and unjustified. Do the elected Members of this House really stand for this view? What are they saying about what they do? So, I do not accept this argument either and I urge my elected colleagues not to accept it either. I, therefore, echo the call of Dr Loo for the Whip to be lifted so that the elected Members can vote freely on this.

Furthermore, as Prof. Thio and Dr Loo have said, how can parliamentary duties be covered by other Members? Are those who rely on this argument saying that all elected GRC Members in this House are interchangeable? Instead, I would argue that practicality demands a by-election and certainly in Jurong GRC. Of the four remaining Members today, two are full Cabinet Ministers, one is a Senior Minister of State in two Ministries and the fourth is a veteran backbencher with numerous appointments. It is a question mark whether they can adequately discharge their duties in connection with the vacated seat. Even trying to do so will impose a tremendous burden on them. Just as an example, do we really want to risk overburdening the Minister for Finance in these trying economic times? Surely it would be more practical to call for a by-election to ensure a full complement of elected Members in Jurong GRC.

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Sir, my third "P" refers to the people. Much has been said about the question of whether a by-election is required in Jurong GRC, in the press, on the Internet and in this House today. But what do the people themselves think? Mdm Halimah, who is from Jurong GRC, has talked about the MPs' discussions with the grassroots leaders in Jurong GRC, but the grassroots leaders are not the people.

The Singapore blog site "The Online Citizen" decided to find out what the people thought from the people directly. It conducted a street poll last Saturday to find out whether Singaporeans, and in particular residents of Jurong GRC, think there should be a by-election. I was one of the volunteers who helped conduct the poll. As I understand it, the results were published a short while ago today. The question asked was a simple one: "Dr Ong Chit Chung passed away recently, do you think that there should be a by-election in Jurong GRC?" A total of 478 Singapore citizens were polled, of which 312 were residents in Jurong GRC and 166 were non-residents. Of these 478 residents, 122 or 25.5% did not know. Of the remainder, 214 respondents or 60.1% of respondents who had an opinion either way felt that a by-election should be held in Jurong GRC. 142 respondents or 39.9% of respondents who had an opinion disagreed. So much for Singaporeans as a whole. What about Jurong GRC residents? Of the 312 residents polled, 85 or 27.2% did not know whether a by-election should be held. 129 residents or 56.8% of residents who had an opinion thought that a by-election should be held, while 98 residents or 43.2% of residents who had an opinion did not think so. This was a street poll, it was anonymous, it was random and it does not purport to be statistically valid or representative of Singaporeans of any group. But I think the results are, nevertheless, very interesting and very instructive. Putting aside all those respondents who did not have an opinion

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– and I must say that this was a disturbingly high number – the majority of Singaporeans and the majority of Jurong GRC residents felt that a by-election should be held. Even including those respondents who did not have an opinion, it is quite clear that more Singaporeans and more Jurong GRC residents wanted a by-election than those who did not.

Sir, we are here today to debate the nature of democracy in Singapore. Democracy is about the people, about how they have the power. Well, Singaporeans have spoken, the people have spoken, their voice rings loud and clear, and they want a by-election. So, on principle, on practicality, and on the basis of the voice of the people, based on these three "Ps", I believe that a by-election should be held for a GRC whenever there is even a single vacancy, regardless of whether it is the minority Member or not. Be that as it may, the issue of whether a by-election should be called when there is a single vacancy in the GRC has been debated before and I do not expect the Government to change its position today. The motion before this House today also advocates a different position. Nevertheless, I support the motion. My position is more expansive than this motion and so my position encompasses this motion. There is no inconsistency. Just as I believe that there should be a by-election when there is a single vacancy in a GRC, I also believe that there should be a by-election when there is a single vacancy in a GRC caused by the minority Member vacating his or her seat. And I also believe that there should be a by-election when half or more of the Members in the GRC vacate their seats. I see the motion as a positive movement in the right direction and so I am comfortable supporting it. To me, this motion is fundamentally about setting in place the right principles for calling by-elections when there are vacancies in the GRC instead of leaving it to the discretion of the Government of the day. The motion

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goes about this in a deliberate and measured manner. It calls for a by-election when it is the minority Member who vacates his or her seat. It calls for a by-election when half or more of the Members in a GRC vacate their seats, both propositions are eminently reasonable.

It is important to lay these foundations now so that we do not scramble or leave things to discretion if and when the situation envisaged in the second part of the motion arises. We profess to be a forward-looking State. Well, this is too important an issue to not look forward on. We should set the policy now so that we have a consistent approach to such situation moving forward. When the day comes we will know what to do and nothing is left to discretion or to chance.

Prof. Thio has outlined an explanation grounded in logic and in law for why a by-election is required when a minority Member in a GRC vacates his or her seat. That must surely be so, given that the fundamental justification and purpose of GRCs is to ensure some minimum amount of

minority representation in Parliament.

I disagree with Mr Hri Kumar's comments on this. I cannot see how any other position can be sustainable as it would severely undercut and undermine the foundation of the GRC scheme.

Ms Sylvia Lim, Mdm Halimah and Mr Hri Kumar had spoken about the potential for a single member in a GRC team to hold the rest of the team or even the Government to ransom. My short response to that is that the political parties have to select their candidates carefully. Extending that argument further, a group of elected Members can get together and blackmail their party. Where do we stop? Party discipline is a

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mechanism to address this issue, not an imperfect law.

Similarly, where half or more of the elected members for a GRC vacate their seats for any reason, then, surely, there can be no doubt that it is no longer the team that electors have voted for and, surely, it cannot be argued that the remaining members can perform the duties of the other members who have vacated their seats. It would stretch reasons and credulity to argue that a by-election is not necessary even if half or more of the elected Members for a GRC have vacated their seats.

Sir, this motion presents an opportunity for this House to advance the call of representative democracy in Singapore. I myself support the motion even if it does not go as far as I would like it.

Sir, with that, I support the motion.

5.31 pm

The Prime Minister (Mr Lee Hsien Loong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to oppose the motion.

The issue of when to call a by-election has been discussed in this House several times over the years. Opposition MPs have raised it, including Mr Chiam. Each time, the Government has given a full explanation. Nevertheless, I am grateful to Prof. Thio Li-ann for having raised it again and giving the House a chance to debate it afresh with a fresh team of MPs, and giving me a chance to explain comprehensively the Government's position on this matter.

Let me first state the legal position, which is not in doubt and not in dispute. Under the Constitution, the Government shall call a by-election when a seat falls vacant. When does a seat fall vacant? In a Single Member Constituency, when the

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MP vacates his office; for example when he dies or resigns. In a GRC, when all the MPs in the GRC team vacate office.

But the timing of the by-election is the prerogative of the Prime Minister. He has full discretion, and he is not obliged to call a by-election within any fixed timeframe. Within a GRC, under the Parliamentary Elections Act, it is explicitly stated that no by-election shall be called unless all members vacate their seats. And if one member from a GRC dies or resigns, or even two, or three, or four members, in a GRC which still has members left, legally no question of a by-election arises at all, not even if the member is the minority member in that GRC. And, therefore, what we have been doing – the Government’s practice in dealing with vacancies – is completely in accordance with the law.

I cite the law not to argue that, therefore, that is what we should do, but because the law has a reason for it, and it embodies the wisdom and experience of the way Singapore has worked and been governed over half a century. So, therefore, changes, once we have settled the arrangements, should not be lightly made. Not never, but only very carefully and with very cautious deliberations of why it was done this way, and what has changed.

I am here not to argue constitutional niceties with a constitutional expert like Thio Li-ann or legal refinements with so many other eminent legal minds in this House, but to set out the political realities of what works for Singapore and how Singapore has to operate in order that this Government will function well for Singaporeans.

We have talked a lot about representative democracy. It is a buzzword. It even makes its way into song choruses. But what does it mean, and

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what does it mean for us? So let me explain why our system of parliamentary elections works this way. It works this way, not by chance, but by deliberate design, because of our experience operating this system of government, and refining and improving it, and adapting it to our circumstances over many, many years.

What are elections for? As Hri Kumar pointed out, the elections are to choose democratic representatives of the people to form a government. There are two limbs to that – to elect the democratic representatives and then to form a government.

There are two different philosophies of elections, depending on where you put the weight on these two limbs. The first alternative puts the emphasis on choosing candidates to become MPs as the fundamental element of the whole scheme. In other words, the MPs are the atoms and the rest are constructs built around the MPs. Voters choose an MP as their representative in their constituency, and then MPs come together and exercise their judgement and form the government. It is what Prof. Thio Li-ann called Edmund Burke's model.

Usually, the MPs belong to political parties, and they submit to party discipline, which is from the Party Whip. But once they have been elected into the House, that submission is voluntary. And they can change parties without penalty – they can change sides but still keep their seats; they can cross over from one side to the other, cross back. It happens from time to time in the British Parliament. Winston Churchill famously did it twice. It has happened in our Legislative Assembly too, before we joined Malaysia.

In this model, if the MPs collectively withdraw support from the Government and decide to regroup to form a totally

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new government with a totally different line-up, it is their prerogative. They do not have to go back to the electorate; they do not have to call new general elections; they do not have to go back to voters for a fresh mandate. So it is parliamentary representative democracy but the voter does not have the final say. The MPs have the final say. And because the MP is the fundamental element of the whole system, if an MP dies or resigns, one fundamental element is taken out, he has to be replaced, so a by-election has to be held promptly without delay. Countries like Britain have adopted this model.

There is a second way we could realise a parliamentary democracy, a second philosophy by which we design the system. And that is to put the emphasis on choosing political parties to form the government and to have political parties as the fundamental element in the system.

Parties will field candidates to contest in general elections. They have to be high quality people – with integrity, ability, commitment, drive – all the attributes which we look for in an ideal candidate. But the candidate is not on his own. He carries the banner of the party. When he files his nomination papers, he attaches a symbol – "this is the symbol under which I fight" – and the symbol appears on the ballot paper. And he identifies himself for the party's manifesto, the programmes and the promises that the party makes.

This is quite different from what happens, say, in Britain where candidates stand under their own

names. No party symbol appears next to the name on the ballot paper because you are electing the person, and once he is in, he exercises judgement on your behalf. It is his responsibility to think for you, not to do for you. Whereas in Singapore, when the

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MP represents a party and is elected on a party platform, once he is elected, he is morally obliged to support the party he fought under.

You can have independent candidates, and every election we have a few, but the electorate know that they have no party to form a government or to help them look after their constituents. They think of people who show up on bicycles or wear slippers, and usually, independent candidates do very badly.

In this scheme, if voters in the general election support the party and vote its candidates in, and they form a majority in Parliament, then that party with a majority in Parliament forms the government. And that party has a mandate, not only because it so happens that this specific group of MPs, at this moment, supports it, but because it stood in a general election and the voters gave it the mandate, and indirectly, through the MP, voted for this party to form the government of the country, and to govern the country until the next general elections are called. Therefore, the emphasis in this system is on the ruling Party delivering on its programmes and promises. Therefore, in this system, if the MP changes sides or is expelled from his party, he loses his seat because he no longer represents the party under whose banner he campaigned, under whose symbol he was voted.

Similarly, by the same argument, if a seat falls vacant mid-term, then the Prime Minister has full discretion as to when he wants to call the election. The vacancy does not affect the mandate of the Government, nor its ability to deliver on its programmes or promises. And this mandate continues until the next general election is called, when the incumbent team will render account to the electorate. In extremis , even if the MP vacating his seat results in the government losing a majority in the

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House, which can happen, that still does not mean the government stops being the government. The Government continues to govern as long as it retains the confidence of the House, as long as there is no motion of no-confidence which is passed against it and which turfs it out of office.

So this is the second model. It is not Edmund Burke's model. Prof. Thio said that I supported Edmund Burke's model. But ours is different, and is based on this second model. It is designed to do two important things. One, encourage voters to think very carefully when they are voting during general elections, because you are not only voting for your representative in the constituency, you are voting for the government in the country. So, please think carefully which party you want to form the government, and not just whom you want to be your MP. Two, it is also designed to maximise the chances of a stable, effective government in between general elections. Because with this system, with the political party given the mandate and in charge, whichever party wins he gets a clear five-year term mandate to govern and produce results. And it has the time to re-frame the policies for the country to meet changed regional requirements, changed international circumstances, changed social and economic circumstances within the country. It has the mandate, it has the time, it has the flexibility, it has the responsibility and it renders account at the next general election.

And this is what is fundamental in our system of parliamentary government and parliamentary representation, contrary to what Prof. Thio Li-ann said, or Ms Sylvia Lim or Mr Siew Kum Hong maintained.

We chose this model deliberately. If you study the legislative history of how we came to have this scheme, if you study the parliamentary records, if you

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study the political history of Singapore, you will know why it is designed this way. Before we entered Malaysia in 1963, there were no deadlines for by-elections to be held under our Constitution for the self-governing state of Singapore. In Malaysia, we had to amend our Constitution to introduce the deadlines because the central government said we had to follow Malaysian practice. The rest of Malaysia has it, Singapore must have it too.

But, after Separation, we re-amended the Constitution to restore the status quo . And in moving the amendment

to the Constitution, the first set of amendments when we constituted our new Constitution after Independence, on 22nd December 1965, MM Lee, who was then PM, explained fully and he said:

"Article 7 revokes a clause which was introduced into the State Constitution of Singapore when it entered Malaysia. Members in this House will know that there was no such injunction of holding a by-election within three months in our previous Constitution. We resisted this particular condition being imposed upon the State Constitution at the time we entered Malaysia, but our representations were not accepted because Malaysia insisted on uniformity of our laws with the other States in the Federation and with the Federal Constitution itself. Since we are no longer a part of the Federal whole, for reasons which we find valid and valuable as a result of our own experience of elections and of government in Singapore, we have decided that this limitation should no longer apply."

So "reasons which we find valid and valuable", and which I believe are still valid and valuable. What were these reasons? The Government in 1965 had learnt from the invaluable experience of the tumultuous years before independence, which Prof. Thio alluded to just now, ie, the instability in the Legislative Assembly during the David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock years before 1959; the

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tussles during the first PAP Government – first, when Mr Ong Eng Guan and two other Legislative Assemblymen crossed over and formed their own opposition party, and then 13 more Assemblymen broke off and formed Barisan Sosialis and stayed in the House, leaving the House 26 to 25, and then one PAP Minister Mr Ahmad Ibrahim died, making it 25 to 25. So, no government majority, the House equally divided, and a hair-raising period, because every time the Barisan Sosialis moved a motion of no-confidence, there was great excitement and the Strangers' Gallery and the Press Gallery were packed with strangers and the media. It was a spectator blood sport. It was not like today.

Therefore, when Singapore became independent, MM restored the law, so that if any MP resigns or is expelled from his party, he has to recontest his seat and by-elections need not be held within any fixed time. The result? Less buying and intimidation of MPs to switch sides. You cannot be bought because, if you switch sides, you are useless. I cannot be intimidated, because there is no point your threatening me. If you beat me up and I oblige you, I will lose my seat. The result? The party that wins the majority at the general elections has the mandate to govern for the full term, and MPs cannot force by-elections at random mid-term, distracting the country from other more pressing concerns. Therefore, we have stability. The public and the media are deprived of drama and suspense because stable government does not make for exciting news. But Singaporeans are better off without the excitement of these heart-stopping events. This is a system which serves Singapore well, whichever party is in government.

These are examples from Singapore half a century ago, but if you look around you more recently, it is not hard to find more recent examples.

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Let us take India, which recently held a crucial vote of confidence on the Congress government. It was over a very important matter – India's nuclear deal with the US – which was the result of very hard bargaining. The government could not get it through, they had to have a vote of confidence in the House. It went on for days. Ministers at international conferences had to come back to vote and go back overseas for the conference while the rest of the world waited for them to come back and participate. Eventually, the Congress government won the vote, which is good. But there was a widespread perception, widely reported in the Indian and international media, that many MPs' votes had to be bought. How were they bought? Two ways. Either policy compromises in other areas, for example, naming a particular airport after an MP's father, or outright cash payment. Many Indian political commentators claim to have tape evidence and, if you watch TV, you will see MPs who came to the House and brought suitcases full of cash to show how they had been offered this cash in order to change sides.

Why could this happen? Because MPs can change sides freely and parties cannot control their MPs. So, the elected government is unable to get its policies through. And you have political theatre.

Take the current situation in Malaysia. I am not passing any judgment on the merits of the political contenders or positions. I am not suggesting that Singapore’s system of government and parliamentary democracy would be better for Malaysia. They are a different society. But look at what is happening in Malaysia. MPs can change sides without resigning and, if they resign, they can force by-elections within three months. That is why Permatang Pauh held a by-election yesterday, after the general election was held on 8th March this year. That is how Mr Anwar Ibrahim is able to try to persuade MPs to cross over from the

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Barisan Nasional to the Pakatan Rakyat, because you can cross over without having to resign seats. So I am not commenting on the merits of their position, but I am saying that, for Singapore, there is no doubt that our system has served us well. It has delivered a strong effective government, one that focuses on delivering results for our people and achieving the best for our country.

GRCs, which, according to Mr Siew Kum Hong, are the meat of the Motion, do not affect this political philosophy, ie, this emphasis on the party as the key element of our system of parliamentary democracy. Because even if all six members of a GRC resigned – minority, non-minority, the whole lot – it is no different from six single members resigning from six SMCs. It does not change the principle that, as long as the Government has the confidence of the Members of the House, it continues to govern. So, too, if a minority member resigns. The arguments have been rehearsed. SM Goh, who was then 1DPM, had explained them back in 1988. Other Members – Mr Hri Kumar, Mdm Halimah Yacob – have explained why it is not and was never the intention of the GRC system to give a single member in a GRC this whip hand to coerce the other Members to come around to his position. The GRCs are meant to ensure a multi-racial Parliament. How do they do this? By requiring multi-racial teams of candidates in a prescribed minimum number of GRCs during the general elections. What is this minimum number? Currently, 14. How many minority MPs do we have in Parliament today? 23. So, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to lose a minority member from a GRC, the question of falling below the absolute minimum does not arise by a wide margin. Therefore, the law says that a by-election shall not be called in a GRC unless all the members of that GRC vacate their seats.

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Vacant seats, in terms of practical problems, these are not insurmountable, whether a neighbour can look after it or whether the other members in the GRC can look after it. I thank Mr Siew Kum Hong for his high assessment of the responsibilities and burdens of being an elected MP. I hope this will not deter him from one day trying to be one. But elected MPs will take this in their stride, and this is part of the arrangement which is known to the candidates and the electorate when the general election is held. If something should happen to one of us, the rest of us, we press forward. That is how the system works. We are doing this now in Jurong GRC, as Mdm Halimah has explained. In fact, quite frankly, this is another merit of the GRC system, another argument why the GRC system is a good system for Singapore.

Within the SMC, a neighbour will take care of the ward. We have done this before in GRCs as well as SMCs, for example, in Eunos GRC when Dr Tay Eng Soon died, and in Toa Payoh GRC when Mr Ong Teng Cheong became President. It is the party's duty to look after its constituents until such time as an election is called. This is how our system works, and this is the basis on which voters elect their MPs.

I think Singaporeans understand this. They know that when they vote, they are not just voting for the men or women. They are voting for the party – the logo, the symbol, the team that that MP belongs to. And I would say that this is true not only of the PAP but of the Opposition parties too. Because if you look at the most recent general election in 2006, voters clearly voted along party political lines. That is why, if you look at the Opposition parties, there is a clear ranking: Workers' Party got about 35% of the vote wherever they stood, the SDA got about 30% of the vote wherever they stood, the SDP got about 25% of the vote wherever they stood. Because the

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party symbol was what the voters were looking at. So, even unknown faces fielded by the Workers' Party received 35% of the vote, not because they had had full disclosure and had been fully transparent and open and be scrutinised. But despite being totally unknown faces, they collected 35%. Why? Because the voters knew Mr Low Thia Khiang and they gave him some credit for his performance in Parliament and for what he and the Workers' Party stood for. This is how the system is meant to work.

The PAP Government has called by-elections in the past. The Prime Minister of the day has a discretion to decide when he wants to call or whether he wants to call, based on many factors, depending on the economic situation, or the current priorities for the country, or political considerations, eg, the need for leadership self-renewal, political succession. In just the same way, the Prime Minister has the discretion when he wishes to call general elections, so long as he does so before five years are up. It is different from the American system where every four years, the second Tuesday in November, elections have to be called. But in our system, we have the discretion when to call a general election and by-elections, and not hold them on a fixed timetable or date.

We have called by-elections even when there had been no vacancies. For example, in 1992, we called a by-election in Marine Parade GRC. All the MPs in the GRC resigned and we brought in one new candidate, then Rear-Admiral Teo Chee Hean. And from time to time, I would expect that we will need to call by-elections again, though not right now. For Jurong GRC, there is no requirement to call a by-election at all. But I am mindful that Jurong GRC is one MP short. If for any reason I decide to call a by-election during this Parliament, Jurong is

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certainly one possibility which I will consider and, if I need to do that, I can get all the MPs in the GRC team in Jurong to resign and stand again.

The MPs, Prof. Thio Li-ann, Mr Siew Kum Hong too, raised many theoretical contingencies, situations which could happen which they would like us to provide for in the Constitution or in the Parliamentary Elections Act. Many contingencies are theoretically possible. We cannot cover all of them pre-emptively with provisions in our Constitution and laws, but, as problems emerge and as we consider that they are important ones, we will address them progressively, keeping in mind the longer term direction in which we would like our political system to evolve.

Prof. Thio argued that laws tame power, therefore discretion ought to be circumscribed by legislation. In theory, yes. But, in practice, look at how constitutional systems have functioned all over the world and ask yourselves whether you can easily find other constitutional systems in Asia or in Africa, which Prof. Thio visited, which have worked better than the Singapore system, however perfect and ideal and comprehensive the safeguards provided for in their Constitutions. Pakistan has had many Constitutions. Thailand has had many Constitutions. The Philippines has the most comprehensive Constitution. All of the American constitutional safeguards, plus-plus. Do we prefer to be operating like them?

Very few Third World democracies have worked. Ours has, by adapting our system to our society and evolving in a radically different direction from the standard Western liberal democracy model. So the Western liberal democracies look at us, they are very unhappy because they cannot say that we are completely an autocracy, because there are elections, there is popular support,

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there is Parliament, and the system works and is clean.

On the other hand, we are different from the systems which they are comfortable with and used to, like their own home arrangements. And so there is cognitive dissonance. How is it this model works even though it is not our model? Hence, I think we get slightly more than our proportionate share of flak in the international media. But it is just one of those things, our karma, which we live with.

This is how we have developed our system. We have factored in the fault lines and other weaknesses in our society so that we can elect a stable and good Government, a Government which has the time not only to set the right policies but to implement them and to be judged on the outcomes. And progressively we have made changes to the system over the years to achieve this. We introduced GRCs which have proven their worth. If Ms Sylvia Lim moves her motion one day, we will have a fuller debate on them. It is not bad, because it is the 20th anniversary, a good occasion for a debate.

We introduced NCMPs to ensure a minimum number of opposition MPs, which is also not bad because otherwise, Ms Sylvia Lim would not be in this House.

We introduced NMPs to raise the level of debate and promote diversity of views. I think it has worked because, with the NMP scheme, we have had two NMPs raise a serious motion and make two good speeches. We disagree with them, but I think they have raised the standard of debate in this House.

So we will continue to evolve our system in order to make it work better for Singapore. Feeling our way across the river stone by stone, always.

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But, finally, no laws, no Constitution, no safeguards can protect us against venal leaders or fractured societies. If you elect somebody who is dishonest or a crook or flawed, or if you have a fracture in your society and it is unable to come together and form a consensus as to what is good for the society as a whole and which direction the country needs to go in, and you are split fundamentally, so that whichever party is in, the party which is out campaigns until the party which is in is kicked out, even if you are the minority, then, musical chairs continue just the same but with different actors.

If you have that, you are finished whatever the laws and Constitution. So better vote for reliable leaders, and keep society united. Each time you vote, think that you are voting not just for a person, not just for an MP, but for the next government. And I would enjoin opposition MPs also to remember this, because in the heat of the elections, they often forget this and they tell people: never mind, you have got the PAP Government, vote for anybody, I am all right. I think that is a very dangerous and an irresponsible line to take.

Ours is a system which has benefited Singapore. Last week, the Straits Times reproduced a commentary in the China Times . China Times is a Taiwanese newspaper. Taiwan has a rambunctious democracy – many, many elections, constantly compaigning, highly participatory, highly representative, not always perfectly functioning. And their thoughtful people look at the world and ask themselves what should they do. China Times published an article called the "Paradox of democracy" by a commentator, Liang Tung-Ping. Lianhe Zaobao and the Straits Times both reproduced it. I think it is worth sharing with Members.

The writer compared the performance of ASEAN countries with one another and he said in his first paragraph:

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"There are 10 countries in ASEAN. Those that advertise themselves as democracies do not seem to have performed well and these include the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand."

He then goes on to explain country by country why each of these countries has problems. Take the Philippines. Mrs Arroyo, he says (this is his view):

"is as stable as a rock not because she has few opponents, but because after 20 years of ineffective democracy, Filipinos have lost faith in their country and have developed an abhorrence of their politicians and of political rights. Despondent and having lost all hope of change, they just want to run away."

"Thailand is another country in the region that claims to be a democracy but since adopting constitutional monarchy, it has changed premiers so often and so quickly, none was able to complete a full term."

I think he forgot Mr Thaksin who completed a full term but ran into other difficulties. Then he talks about Indonesia, and then he says:

"Interestingly, the top performer in the region is Singapore, a country constantly flogged by Western human rights groups and media as undemocratic."

So we must never blindly follow others. We must think through our problems properly, and work out our solutions adapted to our own circumstances.

How do we judge if our system is right for Singapore? Not by comparing it with Western models or some idealised norms or model of representative democracy. It is quite fun to quote Thomas Jefferson, Mahatma Gandhi, or Solzhenitsyn, or UN declarations. It is even more interesting to quote the chorus of the theme song of the

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conference on Constitutional Democracy in Africa in the 21st Century.

In Kenya, which has just had general elections, the result was that the winner had to give up the place and become the Prime Minister so that the President can carry on. A new post was created. Why? Because of the fracture between the Kikuyus and the Luos and that is how they see the world, and that is why it does not work. So even when they see other Kenyans overseas like Mr Barack Obama, they ask themselves: is he Kikuyu or Luo? How do you make a government or a country work in that situation?

So, finally, the acid test is what works for Singapore and what improves the lives of Singaporeans. The proposal from Prof. Thio and Dr Loo fails this test and, therefore, should be rejected. [ Applause .]

Source: Singapore Parliament Official Report (Hansard) for 27 August 2008. Republished on SGParliament.