GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY:

(Statement by the Prime Minister): 1.48 pm

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: Mr Speaker, Sir, Mas Selamat's escape has raised the question of the Government's response when major lapses occur, not just the specific actions we take, but also the broader issue of Government responsibility and accountability. This is a question which many Singaporeans have raised, and which Ms Sylvia Lim has asked in a Parliamentary question. DPM Wong Kan Seng explained at length yesterday what the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has done in the case of Mas Selamat. Let me now present the Government's overall approach, and then give my views on the Mas Selamat case.

The Government's aim is to try our best to do things right the first time. This means planning well ahead for the future, anticipating problems, preparing for contingencies, and so avoiding major lapses as far as possible. We put the best people we can find in charge at every level in Government and the public service, and hold them responsible for delivering performance and results.

But despite our best efforts, we know that things do go wrong from time to time. Officers are human, and will make mistakes. Plans go wrong in implementation, the unexpected catches us by surprise, and organisations get set in their ways and fail to anticipate problems. To achieve one overriding goal, we often accept trade-offs and compromises for other desired results and then fall short. As our systems and challenges become more complex, inevitably from time to time there will be bad outcomes, and occasionally even serious lapses.

If and when something goes wrong, we have to deal with it decisively and effectively. Our first priority is to respond to the immediate crisis, and then to identify the shortcomings and put them right. We must also take steps to ensure that the problem does not recur. This means not just quick fixes, but also where necessary fundamental changes to systems and organisations to address deeper problems revealed by the lapse.

But, at the same time, we should not over-react to one bad incident. If we go overboard in trying to solve one problem, the chances are we will inadvertently commit other mistakes which we will regret later. For example, encumbering an organisation with unwieldy rules and processes may look good on paper, but in practice will simply generate a false sense of security, while hindering the organisation from functioning efficiently and achieve its goals.

Besides corrective measures, we will give as full a public accounting as possible, especially if it is a major lapse. Singaporeans need to know what went wrong, and what the Government will do to fix things.

Having done all that, we have to establish who specifically are responsible for the lapse, and what disciplinary actions should be taken. Several questions will have to be addressed:

(a) Was it a correct decision which turned out badly, because of external factors that could not have been foreseen?

(b) Was it an honest mistake, something that happened despite the best efforts of the officers involved?

(c) Was there negligence or incompetence on the part of the officers?

(d) Was there criminal misconduct?

(e) Was the cause localised mistakes by a few persons, or was it deeper: wrong institutional mindsets, or systemic weaknesses in the organisation?

These issues have to be investigated by departmental inquiries, committees of inquiry, or commissions of inquiry, or (where there is possibly criminal misconduct) by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Based on the findings, we will then allocate responsibility impartially and objectively. We will not just blame the officers directly involved. Those with supervisory oversight, or who are responsible for flawed systems, will also be held to account.

The Minister is ultimately accountable for the policies and operations of his Ministry. But this does not mean that if a lapse occurs down the line somewhere, every level in the chain of command, up to and including the Minister, should automatically be punished or removed. Based on the facts, we have to decide who fell short in performing his duties, and what is the appropriate disciplinary action for each officer involved. We also have to follow due process, giving officers the chance to defend themselves. Otherwise we will demoralise the organisation and discourage officers from taking initiatives or responsibility, for fear of being punished for making mistakes.

This same principle of responsibility and accountability also applies to Ministers. It is the Prime Minister's duty to decide how each Minister has performed in his portfolio. Hence when a lapse happens, I will ask the same questions of the Minister - how is he involved in the matter? Has he been incompetent or negligent? Most serious of all, is there a question of integrity? If so, he has to go, even if the actual incident is minor. I will also ask: is the Minister able to put things right, or does the situation call for a new pair of hands, not encumbered by what went before, to take charge and make a fresh start? Of course, the Prime Minister himself is accountable too, to Parliament and ultimately to the electorate.

However, we should not encourage a culture where officials and Ministers resign routinely whenever something goes wrong on their watch, regardless of whether or not they are actually to blame. That would be the easy way out. It may temporarily appease an angry public, but it will not fundamentally solve the problem.

The basic issue is whether the person is culpable. If so, we must act against him, no matter how senior his position. But if he is not at fault, then we must have the moral courage to state so, and support him. This way, everybody within the organisation can be confident that when something goes wrong, they will not be sacrificed for political expediency.

This is what the Government has done in the Mas Selamat incident. When Mas Selamat escaped, MHA's immediate response was to try to track him down. The Ministry alerted the public within hours. DPM Wong updated Parliament the very next day, and apologised for the lapse. He also convened a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to find out the reasons Mas Selamat was able to escape. In parallel, CID launched an investigation.

The COI submitted its findings six weeks after the event, that means, two weeks ago. The COI has done a thorough investigation, and reported its findings and recommendations. CID has also completed its investigation and found no evidence of collusion. Nevertheless, arising from the COI findings, MHA, the Ministry, has decided to replace the officers at the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC) responsible for Mas Selamat's escape, and to take disciplinary action against them, including not just the junior officers but also the supervisory and management levels.

The Cabinet has been briefed on this. I have gone through the COI full report myself, and discussed the matter carefully with DPM Wong and the other Cabinet Ministers. I am satisfied that the Ministry has taken the correct remedial and disciplinary action, and that the Minister and top management were not to blame for what has happened. DPM Wong Kan Seng, as the Minister, and the Director of ISD both continue to have my full confidence.

We must admit our mistakes openly and honestly, put them right, and act against those who have been culpable. But the last thing we need is a witch-hunt which would damage and demoralise our intelligence and security agencies.

Could Mas Selamat's escape have been prevented? Of course. It should never have happened. The COI has listed out the specific lapses: the toilet window unbarred, the guards allowing Mas Selamat out of their line of sight, the weaknesses in the fencing, and the unclear lines of command over security. But the basic problem was the mindset of those running the Whitley Road Detention Centre. Because ISD's focus was on gathering intelligence and rehabilitating detainees, the Detention Centre regime and physical security were different from Changi Prison. And because past detainees like the Communist sympathisers were not likely to try to escape, and there had never been an escape from ISD detention, even when Mas Selamat failed to emerge from the toilet, the guards thought that he might have collapsed inside the toilet, rather than that he might have run away! They waited for him. ISD knew that Mas Selamat was a high risk detainee, and the Superintendent of the Detention Centre had warned his staff to watch him closely, but unfortunately the Superintendent and his staff still let their guard down, and allowed complacency to set in.

The MHA Minister and Director ISD will now have to rectify all the operational weaknesses identified by the COI, and correct the underlying mindsets which led to these specific lapses.

But let us see things in perspective. ISD is our lead agency fighting against terrorism. It has done sterling work keeping Singapore safe. ISD has won international respect for its vigilance and competence in detecting and detaining the JI terrorists before they could set off truck bombs in Singapore and destroy lives and property. Many security agencies from the US and Europe have come to compare experiences with ISD and study our methods to combat Islamist terrorism. These agencies have been especially impressed by our success in winning the support of our Muslim community for the war against terrorism, and by the religious rehabilitation efforts of our ulamas to try to guide the detainees back onto the right path. These achievements are the result of years of patient effort. They reflect the professional competence of the leadership of the ISD and the senior officers of MHA working under DPM Wong Kan Seng and the Director of ISD. And that is why I have confidence in them.

ISD officers understand more than anyone else the seriousness of Mas Selamat's escape, and its implications for Singapore's security. They will recover from this setback, press on with their mission, and rebuild public confidence in them. I ask Singaporeans to continue giving them your full support, as you have done in the hunt for Mas Selamat.

Mr Speaker, Sir, we demand high standards of integrity and performance from every public servant, every MP and office-holder. We assess them rigorously and objectively, and apply disciplinary rules fairly and impartially to all of them. This is what Singaporeans expect from their Government. And this is what we have delivered and will continue to strive to achieve.

This trust between the Government and the people is crucial. Hence, we have always been honest and forthright with Singaporeans when something goes wrong. We will learn from the escape of Mas Selamat and recover from it. Let us pull together, grow from this experience, and emerge stronger from this.

Ms Sylvia Lim (Non-Constituency Member): Sir, I would like to thank the Prime Minister for his Statement. A few clarifications for the PM. First, could the PM clarify what, in his view, is the oversight role of the MHA vis-a-vis the ISD? Is it a hands-off approach leaving everything to the Director ISD? Or should the Ministry actually monitor some annual data from the Ministry? For example, we were told yesterday that there were no regular audits done at the Whitley Road Detention Centre. Should MHA have a system in place to pick up such systemic problems?

Second clarification, Sir, is with respect to the inquiries that are held after lapses in Government function. In this case, the inquiry was held under the Prisons Act and, as we know from the legislation, the Committee would report its findings to the Minister and it is a closed door affair. Sir, of course, when the incident first happened, we do not know the cause of the lapse – whether it is actually a policy matter or whether it is simply an operational matter. And, in the interest of having a rigorous regime of inquiry, would it not have been more prudent to have a presidential inquiry where the President would be the gatekeeper of the information rather than the Minister whose department is being investigated?

Third clarification is that Minister Mentor made some remarks around March and April saying that the Government is not to be blamed for this incident and that it is the people's complacency that has led to this. Is this also the Prime Minister's view and the Cabinet's view that the Government should not be blamed for this incident?

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: Mr Speaker, Sir, first of all, what is MHA's oversight role over ISD? ISD is an organisation which is subordinate to MHA, reports to MHA and is accountable to MHA for its performance. ISD's role is not primarily to be a jailor. That is the Prison Department's role. ISD's role is internal security, that means, identifying threats, pre-empting them, neutralising them. One of its responsibilities is to hold the detainees when people are detained under the Internal Security Act. This is done in the Whitley Road Detention Centre, under a Superintendent. MHA monitors ISD by tracking whether Singapore stays safe. Do threats get caught in time? Do we know what is going on? Are we able to react? There is no 100% guarantee that we would be there all the time. As Prof. Jayakumar mentioned in his speech about 10 days ago, we have to be lucky every time, but the enemy only has to be lucky once. Our job is to make sure that we stay safe and that we do not just depend on luck, but on capability, dedication skill and focus on dealing with the threats, and that is what ISD has to do.

Inquiry under the Prisons Act – would it have been better to have a presidential inquiry? Whatever level I put, I think the same question can be asked, why not raise it higher? In this case, one person has escaped, he is an important detainee no doubt, the Prisons Act, a Committee of Inquiry commissioned by the Minister, I think, is adequate. It has to be conducted in private, in camera, not in public, because of the contents of the hearings, of what is being investigated. But, finally, the substance has to be reported and the Minister is here to explain what happened and to answer questions. He spent one hour explaining yesterday. He spent two hours answering questions yesterday. The Member had ample opportunities to ask questions. If she had some more questions, we could have continued longer. So I think that we got it at the right level, and the Committee did a good job. And there has not been any suggestion from any Member in this House that the Committee was less than thorough or less than candid.

Thirdly, I do not remember the specific quote from Minister Mentor that the Government is not to blame, that it is a matter of complacency. Anything which happens on the Government's watch, the Government is responsible. What the Government does about this and what the Cabinet and the Prime Minister do about this depends on what happened and what we assessed after investigating the facts – what went wrong and who was handling it, who was responsible, who was directly responsible, who was supervising, because this was in his charge and he should have done something about it. I have explained my philosophy. The buck has to stop somewhere. If you take this to a logical conclusion, it should go all the way up to the Prime Minister and every time something happens in the Government, you change the Prime Minister. I do not think that is how this Government works. That is not how other governments work. There are some countries when things go wrong down the line, Ministers routinely fall on the sword, or CEOs in the private sector. It is part of their culture. But then what happens is that, instead of getting the problem solved, the ceremonial change of guard is seen as the solution of the problem. So the fundamentals do not get altered, after some time, the problem pops up again, you change Ministers again or change the government again. I do not think that is the way we want to do things. We want to get to the root of the matter to solve it properly. The person who did what he should not have done or did not do what he should have done, if he was negligent, complacent, did not measure up, he has to move. But the people who run the system and who have done a good job, I think we need to depend on them and we need to back them.

I said just now that the Europeans and the Americans have a high opinion of our Intelligence Services. It is not just hearsay or reporting of what the experts say. I have met them. I have talked to them. They briefed me, they explained to me their problems. I explained to them how we have dealt with our situation and they looked at me and said, "We envy you." Because of what we have been able to do, dealing with the threat, because of what we have been able to do, reaching out to the community and keeping the community on our side while excising the cancer cells. Because we have been able to get the religious leaders also on our side and to step forward and volunteer their services in the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), to try and set the detainees right who have wrong ideas and also to manage the families, so that the families get looked after and do not get wrong ideas and, yet, stand tall in the community and be seen to be standing up for the community, and not be just doing the bidding of the Government. That does not happen by chance. That is the quiet work of ISD or MHA or the Government, and I think we should give them a lot of credit for that. So we say that this is a mishap, but there is a context. And you have to take disciplinary action but you have to be fair and just, and do it in perspective. That is the reason.

Ms Eunice Elizabeth Olsen (Nominated Member): Sir, I would like to thank the Prime Minister for his Statement and I would like to ask from a big picture point of view, who would have been responsible for assessing if the surge from six detainees in the 1990s to 41 after the JI arrest was too big for the WRDC facility. Also, who decided to extend its lease which then required renovation works that altered the security eco system? Who would have approved the funding for such works? Is it fair to expect that someone should have asked if the works would have altered the WRDC security eco system? And, finally, might we be risking more complacency by drawing the line for responsibility just short of those who ought to come up with the important questions?

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: I do not know which officials specifically were responsible for each of these detailed decisions. I assume that this would be done inside ISD. And I am sure it must have been discussed at many levels because to think about renovating the Detention Centre, to upgrade it and to think of moving it, these are not decisions which can be just done at the lowest level. Whether they were the right decisions to renovate and upgrade, yes. Was it implemented perfectly, obviously, not. There was a flaw in the implementation, in the grille, in the fence and in the way the routine got set and the mindset did not get changed. These will now have to be put right. Will everybody who was involved in the renovation have to be deemed culpable? I do not think that is wise. Will we be complacent because we have to draw the line somewhere? I do not think so. I think that we are taking it seriously and those who deserved to be reprimanded or punished or removed will be reprimanded or punished or removed. Those who do not, will not.

Mr Low Thia Khiang (Hougang): Sir, two clarifications. Was this the result of what MM has said that Singaporeans are being complacent and expecting too much from the Government? Certainly, I would like to ask the Prime Minister whether he sees fit for his Government to apologise to Singaporeans over the lapses and resulting in the escape of Mas Selamat.

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: I think this is not an exercise in spreading adjectives around. The complacency was in the Whitley Road Detention Centre. I think it is true that Singaporeans have very high expectations of the Government and, therefore, whenever there is a lapse, they take it very seriously. In other countries, things regularly go wrong. In Singapore, things do not go wrong, and we make sure things work. When something messes up, we take it seriously, the public takes it seriously. That is a fact.

And that is not a bad thing. But we must also understand that, when we look at the problems which come up.

Apologising? That was the first thing which Mr Wong Kan Seng did as Deputy Prime Minister in Parliament, the day after this occurred, and I think that is adequate. I would say that when the Deputy Prime Minister speaks, he speaks on behalf of the Government.

Mr Inderjit Singh (Ang Mo Kio): Sir, I have a broader issue related to complacency in Government.

First of all, I would like to say that we have not lost confidence in the DPM and also ISD. I think they have done a good job. They have a good track record. So, that is not the issue here. But we also need to send signals correctly, not just to Singaporeans but to the civil servants and every one else in Government, that when they make a mistake, they need to be appropriately punished for it. We have adopted a reward system that matches that of the private sector where we pay everyone as high as possible. Therefore, people should expect that when they make a mistake, they will be appropriately punished. I am not suggesting that we punish the Deputy Prime Minister.

But I think the signal that we send is very important, not just for this incident but also for past incidents, eg, the Nicoll Highway incident, the two ships that collided in the sea, etc. What did we do? How were the people on the Navy ship that collided with another ship some years ago punished? What happened to the people in charge? These signals are important so that, first of all, Singaporeans know. Secondly, in the civil service, if I am a civil servant, I know that if I make a mistake, I would be punished for it, and therefore I need to maintain high standards.

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: I do not think there is any doubt that civil servants know that if they make a mistake, they will have to face the music. Whether it is a small mistake or a big mistake, if you are responsible, you have to answer for it. I think, in each case, the right action is taken. Sometimes, if it is in court, everybody knows. Sometimes, if it is disciplinary, departmental, it may or may not be publicised. There may be reasons why you may not want names named, but actions have to be taken.

I would remind the Members, however, that we must not get into a witch-hunting mode, that we must make sure that when a mistake happens, you get to the bottom of the matter before you decide to punish people. Because if you generate a culture where nobody wants to make mistakes and you are afraid to do something for fear of making mistakes, that, as Dr Goh Keng Swee used to say, would be the biggest mistake of all. Not of the officers, but of us setting the rules and the culture which lead to that happening. So, when something happens, you may be angry about it, but you have to stand back, count to 10, assess objectively and fairly, and then decide who deserves what. Was this something which he did wrong, which he should have known was wrong? Was it an honest mistake? He tried his best but he made an error because he was human, or was it a calculated risk carefully considered, decided to take, threw the dice, unfortunately, it turned out a one instead of a six?

So, I think that we have to keep it in perspective. The point is well taken that there is no iron rice bowl in the civil service. I think every civil servant is extremely conscious of that. We have gone that way and the quality of the civil service, I think Members will agree, has improved, and we have to keep it like that.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, does the Prime Minister agree that this is not a question of a witch-hunt as to who should be directly responsible? It is a question of accountability of the Government and at what level and what responsibility a Minister should take. I think we will remember that, when we debated the Ministers' salaries in this House, we were talking about pitching the Ministers' pay to the corporate world or the private sector. But in the corporate world, when something goes wrong, heads roll, and it includes the CEO, whereas here, when something goes wrong, we are talking about honest mistakes. So, I think a lot of people, including myself, cannot reconcile the principle on which the Government applied in looking at the salaries of the Ministers, pitching them to the corporate world vis-a-vis when it comes to accountability and responsibility. Would the Prime Minister clarify?

Mr Lee Hsien Loong: I thought the Member would eventually come to this question.

I have explained where lines have to be drawn. Even the Member has not suggested that I should resign because I appointed Mr Wong Kan Seng, and Mr Wong Kan Seng was a Minister, and a soldier under him let this happen. A line has to be drawn somewhere. We have to see this in perspective. Even in the private sector, you have to see things in perspective. A company turns turtle, the CEO leaves. Problems happen in the company, CEOs have to stay to sort them out. Companies which change CEOs every two months or every two years do not prosper. So I have to make a judgment who is responsible at what level, and I have discussed this with the DPM, and I agree with his judgment and I have confidence in him.

The DPM was here, the Member yesterday had full opportunity to question him. If there are any questions which he found unsatisfactorily answered, he could have pursued the matter. If there are any questions which showed that the DPM was not up to this, that he was to blame, he gave the wrong instructions, he told people not to grille up the window, he suggested that we did not need so much fencing and therefore this happened, he should have raised it. Nothing happened. Today, the Member comes around and throws a general cloud and says, "You are well paid, you should resign." Let me ask the Member whether he thinks the DPM ought to resign because of this. No answer. So, I think that settles the point.