COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY FINDINGS ON MAS SELAMAT KASTARI'S ESCAPE

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY FINDINGS ON MAS SELAMAT KASTARI'S ESCAPE:

(Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs):

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Mr Speaker, Sir, on Wednesday 27th February 2008, ISA detainee Mas Selamat bin Kastari escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC). A day after his escape, I apologised in this House for what had happened, and promised that in due course I would give a full account of his escape. At that point, the full facts had yet to be fully established. I repeated this assurance a fortnight later, telling Singaporeans that after the Committee of Inquiry (COI) completed its work, I would give a full account of how Mas Selamat escaped and what would be done to prevent another escape.

The Committee of Inquiry

Mr Speaker, Sir, I convened a COI on 1st March 2008 under the Prisons Act so as to objectively establish the facts of what happened. I appointed Mr Goh Joon Seng as Chairman of the COI. Mr Goh is a retired High Court Judge and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and the Chairman of the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony. The other two members are Mr Tee Tua Ba and Dr Choong May Ling. Mr Tee is a retired Commissioner of Police and currently non-resident Ambassador to the United Arab

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Emirates. Dr Choong is a senior Administrative Officer and the Deputy Secretary (Security) at the Ministry of Home Affairs.

I tasked the COI to determine the full facts relating to Mas Selamat's escape. It was also to examine if there were lapses in the WRDC's custodial system, the physical security and procedures, and recommend improvements to ensure that a similar incident does not recur.

The COI conducted its inquiry proceedings at WRDC itself so that the members could re-visit the site whenever they needed to. The COI could also hear testimonies from as many staff of the WRDC as the COI deemed necessary. In all, the COI recorded statements from 41 individuals and heard testimony from 36. The COI also arranged for re-enactments of the possible ways that Mas Selamat could have escaped.

I had directed that the COI was to be given full access to all information and to WRDC, including full access to highly classified and sensitive information on operational systems and processes as well as access to interview the Internal Security Department (or ISD) intelligence and field personnel whose identities need to be protected given the nature of their jobs. I had explained that this inquiry could not be held in public. Its very purpose was a thorough examination of a sensitive installation – the WRDC, including its detention, security and investigation and intelligence gathering functions, which are all inter-related. It needed to directly examine officers, including those holding classified appointments. Exposing these details in public would compromise the persons and processes involved in our security and intelligence operations and put these operations at risk. Holding the inquiry out of public view enabled the COI to have the full and unfettered access needed to fulfil their mission and establish the facts.

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The COI has completed its inquiry and submitted its findings and recommendations to me on 10th April 2008. I met the COI members and asked them if they were satisfied that they had been given full access and cooperation to carry out their inquiry. The Chairman personally assured me that this had been the case. The COI has been candid in its report, and has held nothing back in its conclusions and recommendations.

I have read the COI's report closely. I agree with the COI's findings and accept all its recommendations, which I will talk about later. Given its details and observations on the various operational processes in the WRDC, I am satisfied that indeed the members of the COI have done a thorough job.

I have briefed the Prime Minister and Cabinet on the findings of the COI. Because many sensitive details cannot be disclosed for obvious reasons, including the identity of the ISD and other security personnel as well as the precise work they do, the Cabinet agreed that it is not possible to release the entire report without harming national interest and endangering the men and women who serve the nation. We had also considered releasing the COI's report with the sensitive parts blacked out, but that was not feasible as the details are extensive. It would not only make understanding the report difficult, but also fuel the distraction of baseless speculation. However, we are very conscious that Members of this House and the public have a keen and valid interest in the findings of the COI. Hence, the Government has decided to release the Executive Summary of the COI report to show that the COI had carefully considered all the issues.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I will begin with a detailed account, based on the COI report of how Mas Selamat escaped, followed by the COI's findings on the factors that led to his escape, and its recommenda-

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tions. I will also inform the House about the actions that I will take. In the process, I will answer the questions raised by Dr Teo Ho Pin, Mdm Ho Geok Choo, Mr Chiam See Tong and Mr Low Thia Khiang. Of course, Members too can ask me more questions later on.

Mas Selamat Kastari's escape from WRDC

Sir, on 27th February 2008, Mas Selamat was scheduled to meet his wife and children during his weekly family visit scheduled between 4.00 pm and 4.30 pm that day. Family visits to sustain the detainee's bonds with his wife, children and other family members are an important part of the rehabilitation programme for detainees. The family visit was to be held in the Family Visitation Block. This is a building which was retrofitted to serve this function and is located in a separate part of the WRDC from where the detainees' cells are housed in the Cell Block. The Cell Block, of course, by design, has the tightest level of security.

Mas Selamat was escorted by two Gurkha guards and a Special Duty Operative. The Gurkha Contingent (GC) guards the detention centre and ensures the secure custody of the detainees. Special Duty Operatives are ISD junior officers whose duty is to make administrative arrangements for family visits, which include supervising the movement of detainees from the cell to the family visit room. The day-to-day administration and operations of WRDC come under the charge of the Superintendent of the WRDC. He is a senior officer holding the rank equivalent to a Superintendent of Police or Lieutenant Colonel in the SAF.

At approximately 3.30 pm, the Special Duty Operative requested the Guard Commander to take Mas Selamat out of his individual cell for his family visit. At

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about 3.35 pm, two guards were assigned to escort Mas Selamat.

Mas Selamat was first escorted from the Cell Block to a locker room in the Locker Block to change into civilian clothes. At each family visit, the detainee's family can bring civilian clothing for the detainee to wear at the next family visit. Inside this locker room are several columns of lockers. Each locker contains a personal clothing bag that belongs to each detainee. The WRDC Administration has custody of the keys to the locker.

While inside the locker room, Mas Selamat asked the guard for a curtain so that he could change behind it. There was no curtain. Mas Selamat then stood behind a column of lockers to change and was out of sight of the guard.

After changing, Mas Selamat emerged wearing a light yellow baju kurong and greenish-grey pants, and was escorted by the two guards and the Special Duty Operative to the Family Visitation Block. At about 3.54 pm, the four of them, that is, the two guards, Special Duty Operative and Mas Selamat, arrived at the Family Visitation Block. [ A photo of the family visitation room was shown on the screen .] Mas Selamat used the toilet located next to the family visitation room to shave and comb his hair before meeting his family members. This toilet he used is intended for use by the WRDC staff and the detainees' family visitors. However, for practical convenience, detainees also use this toilet when proceeding for family visits. [ What was shown on the screen was a sketch of the toilet and the wash basin as well as the urinal .]

One guard stood outside the toilet, while the other followed Mas Selamat into the toilet. After Mas Selamat had finished shaving, he entered a urinal cubicle and closed the cubicle door. [ A photo of the

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urinal cubicle was shown on the screen. ] The guard who followed Mas Selamat into the toilet stood outside the closed door of the urinal cubicle. Mas Selamat then flipped his pants over the ledge above the urinal cubicle door. The guard heard the sound of water from a running tap inside the urinal cubicle. After a few minutes, the guard felt that Mas Selamat was taking too long. He alerted the other guard standing outside the toilet, who then turned to the Special Duty Operative who was outside the toilet.

The Special Duty Operative, who is female, subsequently asked Mas Selamat's male Assistant Case Officer to check on Mas Selamat as he was in a male toilet. When the Assistant Case Officer kicked open the door of the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat was not inside. The ventilation window pane located above the urinal cubicle had been swung open. [ A photo showing the urinal cubicle ventilation window with pane open was shown on the screen .] An immediate alert was raised to the GC Guard Room in the WRDC that Mas Selamat had escaped. In all, the COI found that Mas Selamat had about 11 minutes between the time he was brought to the toilet at 3.54 pm and 4.05 pm when the alert was raised. Within that timeframe, he took time to shave, then entered the urinal cubicle, turned on the tap and flipped his pants over the concrete ledge above the urinal cubicle door and made his escape.

Mas Selamat climbed through the toilet ventilation window and out of the Family Visitation Block. [ A photo showing the external wall and window at the rear of the Family Visitation Room was shown on the screen. ] The ventilation window turned out to be not properly secured. I will give more details about this later on.

Sir, the COI finds no conclusive evidence of the exact escape route he took after this point. The COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have climbed

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onto the roof of an enclosed staircase and walkway at the section where the perimeter fencing converges with this enclosed staircase and walkway. This point is adjacent to the Family Visitation Block, and about 20 metres away from the toilet window. [ A photo showing where the perimeter fencing converges with the enclosed staircase and walkway was shown on the screen. ] Mas Selamat could have jumped over the perimeter fence and out of WRDC. The COI observed that the light yellow baju kurong which Mas Selamat was wearing was found in the forested area outside the perimeter fence near this spot. [ A photo of where the baju kurong was found, and the cover of trees and vegetation was shown on the screen. ] However, the COI also notes that pinpointing a specific escape route would be speculative, given the many possibilities and the lack of conclusive evidence on this issue.

The COI believes that Mas Selamat had planned his escape over time and he had seized the opportunity presented by the confluence of various factors to escape on 27th February 2008. The COI believes that the routine use of the toilet in the Family Visitation Block would have provided Mas Selamat with the opportunity to plan his escape. Prior to his escape, during previous family visits, Mas Selamat had partially closed the urinal cubicle door on some occasions, and then completely closed the urinal cubicle door on subsequent occasions. On 5th February 2008, he closed the urinal cubicle door completely and turned on the water tap.

The COI believes that these actions by Mas Selamat could have been done to test how the guards would react. This could also have helped him to prepare for his actual escape attempt. This planning had not been noted by the guards, possibly because the guards are frequently rotated to avoid over familiarisation or fraternisation with the detainees.

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Factors leading to Mas Selamat's escape

Let me now deal with the factors that enabled Mas Selamat to escape. Having heard and considered the evidence from witnesses and the re-enactments, the COI believes that Mas Selamat was able to escape because of a confluence of three factors:

(1) The ventilation window through which Mas Selamat had escaped, was not properly secured. It was not grilled;

(2) The guards had not stopped Mas Selamat from closing the urinal cubicle door and, as a result, lost line of sight of the detainee. And when Mas Selamat took too long in the urinal cubicle, the guards had not acted quickly enough; and

(3) The convergence of the perimeter fencing with the enclosed staircase and walkway at the back of the Family Visitation Block was a physical weakness that Mas Selamat probably exploited to get out of WRDC.

Let me now say more about each of these three factors.

The ventilation window was not grilled

Mr Speaker, Sir, Mas Selamat was able to climb through the ventilation window because there were no grilles over the ventilation window. The COI learnt that the WRDC Administration had in fact intended to grille all windows in the Family Visitation Block when it began planning for the renovations of WRDC in 2004. These renovations were to upgrade the facilities to address the growing requirements of WRDC and its detainees. ISD had instructed the vendor to install grilles for all windows. But when the renovation works were carried out in 2007, this toilet ventilation window was

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not grilled up. This arose due to a difference in understanding between ISD and the vendor over exactly which windows were to be secured with grilles.

Nevertheless, a WRDC staff did a walkabout to review the status of renovations some time between April and May 2007 and he detected the ventilation window without grilles. He alerted the Superintendent of WRDC to this weakness. Instead of having it grilled, the Superintendent instructed that the handle of the ventilation window be sawn off as a security measure to make the window more secure. [ A photo of the ventilation window sawn off was shown on the screen. ] He thought that this would be adequate as he had assumed that the guards would always have sight of the detainees. This is a bad judgment on the part of the Superintendent.

In my view, Sir, the security weakness of this window is the single most crucial factor which enabled Mas Selamat to escape. This is because the movement of the detainee from his cell to the Family Visitation Block is always under tight escort and entry into the Block is through a sealed passageway. The omission to fully secure this ventilation window in the Family Visitation Block toilet routinely used by detainees was a glaring weakness which should have been rectified properly by grilling it up, and not dealt with in an ad hoc manner by sawing off the window handle.

The guards failed in their duties

The guard who escorted Mas Selamat while he was using this toilet did not stop Mas Selamat from closing the urinal cubicle door. This allowed Mas Selamat to get out of his line of sight. The guard had assumed that the urinal cubicle was a secure facility and that Mas Selamat could not escape from it. This assumption was wrong.

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When this guard felt that Mas Selamat had taken too long in the toilet, he referred the matter to his fellow guard instead of taking immediate action to check on Mas Selamat. This officer in turn asked the Special Duty Operative. Finally, it was the Assistant Case Officer who kicked open the urinal cubicle door. If the guard had acted immediately to check on Mas Selamat in the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat might have been stopped or, at least, his escape would have been discovered earlier.

In my view, these factors, taken together, form the second most critical security failure which enabled Mas Selamat to escape.

Weaknesses in physical security

Once Mas Selamat got out of the ventilation window, he was able to get over the double perimeter fencing of the WRDC. The COI could not determine exactly how he did this. Of the different possible scenarios, the COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have exploited a weakness in a section of the perimeter fencing at the back of the Family Visitation Block. This was a section where the roof of an enclosed staircase and walkway converges with the perimeter fencing. The COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have climbed onto this roof and, from there, jumped over the perimeter fencing and out of WRDC.

Sir, we do not know if this scenario is correct. But regardless whether it was exploited by Mas Selamat to make his escape, the failure of the WRDC staff to detect this particular weakness in the fence-line in past security reviews is a failing.

The COI notes that the CCTV coverage of the area was in the midst of being upgraded to add motion-detectors. This was part of a major CCTV security surveillance system upgrade for the whole

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complex. At the time of the escape, there were two CCTV cameras mounted at the location where Mas Selamat climbed out of the Family Visitation Block. However, these cameras were not commissioned yet as they were part of the CCTV system upgrading, and the system was still in its testing and validation stage. As such, at the time of the incident, there was no recording or active monitoring of these cameras. This is very unfortunate because, if there had been operational cameras in the right places to record the escape, then we could have an idea as to how he got out of the WRDC.

The post-incident response

The COI also examined the immediate post-escape response by ISD, GC guards and the Police and found them to be sufficiently prompt. On discovering Mas Selamat's escape, ISD immediately locked down Whitley Road Complex which WRDC is part of. The inner and outer gates of the Whitley Road Complex compound were closed and thorough checks were conducted on all vehicles leaving the compound. The guards on duty in the Whitley Road Complex were activated and a cordon along Onraet Road was set up about five minutes after the discovery of Mas Selamat's escape. Road blocks were set up by the ISD officers and GC guards in the immediate vicinity, eg, Mount Pleasant Road, at around 4.20 pm. Senior officers from the GC Headquarters, which was alerted of the escape at 4.10 pm, arrived at the Whitley Road Complex within 20 minutes of being notified, at about 4.30 pm. GC Trackers next arrived at about 4.35 pm and started an intensive search of the wooded areas in the vicinity of the Whitley Road Complex.

Police and ISD officers also conducted intensive and systematic searches of the Whitley Road Complex and its immediate vicinity. The search area that was cordoned off at about 4.40 pm was considerable and is equivalent to the size

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of almost 44 soccer fields. It covered the Whitley Road Complex, the former Police Academy and the surrounding compounds, as well as the wooded areas around Onraet Road, Mount Pleasant Road and Thomson Road. It was not a straightforward search. The Whitley Road Complex itself is segregated into several clusters of low-rise buildings. The former Police Academy and the surrounding compounds comprise a number of vacant buildings. [ A map of the area searched and a photo of some of the vacant buildings searched were shown on the screen .]

A CID team of investigators was also deployed at the scene at the WRDC to interview persons and conduct forensics examination. Their role was to determine if there had been any collusion by any WRDC insider. I will talk more about this later on.

Beyond these immediate measures taken at the Whitley Road Complex by the GC guards, ISD officers and the Police, MHA also promptly mounted a comprehensive operational response to the escape. In the first few hours, the immediate priority was to mobilise all our Home Team resources to capture Mas Selamat. Counter Terrorism Units deployed at the checkpoints were alerted at 4.30 pm. This was followed shortly by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority raising activity to a high-level alert among all personnel and conducting 100% checks to tighten security at our land, sea and air checkpoints. This was at about 5.15 pm. The SAF units were activated to support the extensive search operations by about 8.00 pm the same evening.

Police and ISD officers on the ground were tasked to pick up any leads on Mas Selamat. Ground intelligence units were activated and immediately spread out to

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collect any pertinent information on Mas Selamat. This was critical as ISD could not be sure, in the immediate moments after Mas Selamat's escape, whether he had outside help.

Sir, since 1st April 2008, after conducting a systematic sweep through the forested areas, the security agencies have moved into a more targeted phase of the search. This is guided by what was learnt during the earlier extensive sweeps and also from specific intelligence picked up in the course of these earlier operations. These efforts will continue to be multi-pronged. Apart from such searches, we are maintaining tight border controls and round-the-clock surveillance of coastal and forested areas. In parallel, intelligence-led operations are actively ongoing. Community vigilance efforts will also continue. Since Mas Selamat's escape, about 1,500 calls have been received by 999. The Police followed up on all these leads, especially reports of possible sightings of Mas Selamat by the public.

Mr Low had asked about the estimated cost of the manhunt. To-date, these operations are covered by my Ministry's and the Ministry of Defence's existing operating resources, and we have not asked for additional funds. We have worked within the framework of our contingency plans and re-deployed current manpower and resources in a targeted manner. This also ensures that our continuing operations are sustainable over a protracted period of time without undermining the other functions of the Home Team and the Singapore Armed Forces.

The COI's recommendations

Mr Speaker, Sir, the COI's assessment is that the WRDC's custodial protocols and procedures over the handling of detainees are generally sound. For instance, detainees are secured in

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individual cells to prevent them from communicating with one another. Different blocks are linked via enclosed walkways to prevent detainees from familiarising themselves with the layout of the WRDC. When a detainee moves within the WRDC compound, he is escorted by at least two guards and his movements are logged. The lapses which occurred were in breach of established procedures and protocols.

Nevertheless,

the COI observed some weaknesses in operationalising the WRDC's systems and processes and has made specific recommendations.

Let me now highlight the key recommendations of the COI, all of which I have accepted, as I have said earlier.

Centralise command and control

The COI observed that the framework of security at WRDC was based on shared responsibility. What does this mean? ISD was responsible for the physical security infrastructure and the GC guards were responsible for the safe and secure custody of the detainees, security of the inner perimeter fence and Cell Block and the deployment of sentries at strategic locations within WRDC. This "dual" or "parallel" system of security by ISD's WRDC staff and the GC guards runs the risk of each party being blind-sided by each other. For instance, the Superintendent thought that the ventilation window at the toilet was secure enough just by sawing off the handle, partly because he had assumed that the guards would have line of sight of the detainee at all times. On the other hand, the guards were confident that they had the detainees under close supervision even without line of sight because they had assumed the toilet facilities to be properly secure. To avoid such ambiguity and misunderstanding, the COI recommends that as the WRDC is an ISD facility, ISD should assume overall command and control of

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all aspects of WRDC operations, including its security.

Enhance communication and coordination

The COI recommends better coordination and communication among the three functional groups operating within WRDC, namely, the WRDC Administration which is responsible for the general management of WRDC and the custody of detainees; the GC guards who are responsible for guarding WRDC and for escorting detainees within and outside WRDC; and thirdly, the Operations Group which is in charge of investigations. The COI recommends that a formal system of feedback be established to ensure that all parties have a common understanding of instructions, and issues and problems are raised in a timely fashion.

Conduct regular ground exercises and security audits

The COI also recommends that ISD conducts regular exercises for front-line officers and institutes a system of regular security audits of WRDC. This will enhance coordination at the working level as well as raise preparedness for any contingency. The regular security audits will also ensure compliance with procedures and rules as well as periodically review the security of WRDC holistically.

Design and build a new detention facility in Changi Prison

A key recommendation of the COI is that a new Detention Centre be built and located in Changi Prison. I have asked my staff to work out a detailed implementation plan and schedule for this recommendation which requires careful planning and execution. I see much merit in it. Let me explain why.

One of the things that struck me in the COI findings was the recognition that the WRDC is a complex multi-functional

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facility. WRDC is not a prison per se, like those under the Prisons Department. It is a holding centre which supports the investigation and intelligence collection and analysis related to an on-going security operation. Rehabilitation, whether religious or secular, is above all to serve a practical national security interest – to neutralise the security threat that the detainee poses to society. WRDC is therefore a purpose-built facility to serve a number of concurrent purposes. It has to balance the need between a hardened physical facility on the one hand, and flexibility to support operational and intelligence activities on the other.

Prior to the JI arrests and the detentions in 2001, the number of detainees was quite small. In the whole decade of the 1990s, only six persons were detained, in total, over different periods. Since 2001, the sudden surge in the number of JI detainees has undoubtedly strained the human and operating capacity of WRDC. At its peak, the WRDC had to hold 41 detainees.

Sir, in 1995, ISD had considered the idea of shifting the detention centre to Changi Prison as the lease of the WRDC site was running out. Plans were in fact drawn up, pending a decision whether the lease would be renewed. Eventually in 2003, the lease was extended by 20 years. Because of the increase in JI detainees and the overriding need to handle them effectively, ISD decided to keep to the existing WRDC and to embark instead on a renovation and re-development programme for WRDC.

In 2002, ISD carried out some minor works as a stop-gap measure to accommodate the expanding requirements. These minor works included converting the officers' quarters into offices and subsequently into a Family Visitation Block. This block was originally outside

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the WRDC itself. The WRDC compound was then enlarged and the enlarged WRDC incorporated the Family Visitation Block. The enlarged WRDC covers an area of 2.2 hectares or the size of three football fields. With the extension of the lease and the overriding need to effectively handle the larger number of JI detainees, ISD began to develop a major renovation and re-development plan for WRDC in late 2004. Renovation works finally started in early 2007.

Sir, in my view, such periodic renovation and improvement works over time altered the security eco-system of WRDC. Like all security agencies, ISD operates in a compartmentalised manner. While this is a strength in safeguarding secrets on a "need to know" basis for an intelligence agency, it also makes a shared facility like the WRDC vulnerable to blind spots when issues falling between the different functional groups at the Centre are missed.

The COI's recommendation to shift the detention centre to the Changi Prison Complex will, among other things, ensure that security and prison operating standards of the detention centre are always pegged and tied to best practices. At the same time, ISD can tap the Prison's medical and food logistics for its detainees. However – and let me emphasise this – careful thought must be given to how to operationalise this plan to ensure that it meets ISD's needs and, at the same time, not undermine Prison's operating regime. Among other things, we definitely do not want to expose the prison inmate population to "contamination" by extremist detainees. This had been the bad experience in many countries where prisons have been one of the most fertile sources of new terrorist recruits.

I have tasked Director ISD and Director Prisons to co-chair a team to study the implementation details for a new purpose-

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built detention facility within Changi Prison. They should re-visit the current approach and the overall tone of the detention centre and affirm or adjust accordingly, to make it a facility relevant to the complex challenges of a new security landscape.

Meanwhile, I have asked Director ISD to revise the protocols for the escort and detention of detainees at WRDC in consultation with Director Prisons. Director Prisons will also conduct an independent audit annually to check that these revised protocols are strictly adhered to, and report his findings to me.

Establishing liability, accountability and follow-up actions

Determining if there was collusion by officers in WRDC

One question which needed to be answered clearly when the escape occurred is whether this was an inside job. Was Mas Selamat assisted by anyone inside WRDC to escape? Determining this is critical because if there were such collusion, then its continuance undetected would lead to more escapes.

In the course of its inquiry, the COI found no evidence of connivance, collusion or assistance given to Mas Selamat, on the part of any individual. The COI observed that no one individual had full control to bring about the confluence of the material factors at the time of Mas Selamat's escape, as I have explained earlier.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) also launched an independent investigation on the day of the escape to establish if there was criminal liability on anyone's part. The CID investigation has been completed with extensive interviews and forensic examination of the site. Polygraph tests were also administered to some witnesses to support investigation.

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The CID has found no evidence to suggest collusion on the part of any ISD officers, WRDC staff or guards involved.

The CID submitted its investigation papers to the Attorney-General's Chambers to determine if any offences have been committed. I am informed that the Attorney-General has considered the investigation papers and concluded that there is no basis to lay criminal charges against any individual. However, this does not mean that no departmental disciplinary action will be taken against the officers accountable for the lapse. I will say more on this later.

ISD also immediately launched its own investigation to establish if Mas Selamat received any assistance to aid his escape. This included scrutiny and review of all the past family visits of Mas Selamat and his contact with any staff. ISD's investigation has not found any evidence to suggest collusion on the part of ISD officers or guards at WRDC in assisting Mas Selamat to escape.

ISD also examined whether Mas Selamat could have been assisted by anyone outside WRDC. ISD's assessment on the basis of the investigation and available intelligence is "No". Could he have secured help after his escape? While there is no intelligence to confirm this, the possibility cannot be dismissed and is indeed a scenario pursued by ISD even now.

Complacency creeping in over time

In my view, while the COI and the CID investigations found no malice or criminal liability on the part of any officer implicated in Mas Selamat's escape, there is no avoiding the fact that the escape would not have happened but for the security and operational lapses identified by the COI. Mas Selamat was able to exploit these weaknesses when the opportunity arose. A window that should

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have been grilled but was not; guards who should have maintained line of sight of the detainee

under their escort, and who should have immediately checked why the detainee took so long in the urinal cubicle, but did not; physical security weaknesses that were not plugged – these all point to a slackening in the internal vigilance and supervision. Complacency for whatever reason, be it fatigue given the protracted security operations by ISD since 2001 or routinisation over time, had crept into the operating culture at the WRDC.

That no detainee had escaped from WRDC before may have been one reason why an escape was unimaginable in the minds of those who run WRDC. Even when the guards and the Special Duty Operative became concerned over the time Mas Selamat was taking in the toilet, they did not think that he might have escaped.

One question that some have asked is – why was Mas Selamat not held in Changi Prison instead? It is a fair question. On hindsight, Mas Selamat could have been held in Changi Prison as it would have been neater and certainly less problematic. After all, ISD does transfer the more difficult and hostile detainees to the Changi Prison. But in Mas Selamat's case, he was not hostile although he was not cooperative. And so long as there was hope to extract useful intelligence from him, ISD preferred to hold him in the WRDC. The potential intelligence value from such a detainee to the on-going counter-terrorism investigation is significant.

Taking corrective action

Sir, what has happened is a costly and painful wake-up call. Director ISD met me and told me that he accepted responsibility for what has happened and

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apologised. Having known him for many years, and worked with him, I told him that I have full confidence in him and he must carry on. His first priority is to find Mas Selamat and take immediate action to prevent another escape. I also consulted the Prime Minister who agreed with me.

I have instructed Director ISD to follow up immediately on all the recommendations of the COI. I know that following the escape, immediate action was taken to strengthen security at WRDC. For example, the toilet window has been sealed. Other actions such as raising the height of the perimeter fencing are in progress and should be completed by May 2008.

In addition, Director ISD will seek Director Prisons' endorsement on the revised protocols for the escort and detention of detainees at WRDC. Director Prisons will also conduct an annual audit independently to check that these revised protocols are strictly adhered to, and report his findings to me.

Enforcing discipline and disciplinary action

I have directed the Commissioner of Police and Director ISD to investigate the operational lapses related to the escape and to ascertain accountabilities, taking into account the findings of the COI and the CID reports. Officers who are responsible for Mas Selamat's escape will be disciplined and penalised. In this connection, I have asked Director ISD to examine the roles not only of the WRDC junior officers but also to go up the chain of command and include the supervisory and management levels of WRDC as well. There is a proper process for disciplinary action under civil service or Police Force rules and this must take its course.

I have also instructed the Commissioner of Police and Director ISD to replace all the officers at WRDC

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responsible for Mas Selamat's escape as identified in the COI report.

Closing remarks

Sir, I have spoken to the ISD and GC officers. I can see that they feel the disappointment most acutely because they have fallen short of the high standards that Singaporeans have come to expect from them. This security lapse in WRDC came as a rude and painful shock to them; all the more when the mistakes have turned out to be so simple as to appear silly and incredible.

I can appreciate this sentiment because this was what I felt on 27th February. I was shocked and disappointed when first informed of Mas Selamat's escape on 27th February via an SMS message on my phone. At that moment, I was in this House in the midst of answering questions on the Prime Minister's Office's Committee of Supply.

There is no doubt that Mas Selamat's escape is a major setback for ISD and for MHA. It is a dark stain on the record of successes which ISD has achieved in the fight against terrorism. Sir, it was ISD which uncovered the clandestine Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network and its links to the Al Qaeda in 2001. Before that, nobody had heard of the terrorist organisation. Singaporeans were saved from an otherwise catastrophic attack planned for early 2002 when ISD disrupted the JI operational cells collaborating with Al Qaeda operative, Mansour Jabarah and the JI bomb maker, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi. These two individuals were later arrested by foreign governments. ISD's intelligence has also significantly supported the investigation into the Al Qaeda and the JI networks in the region as well as other parts of the world. Even now, no doubt with morale sorely affected, the ISD and its officers continue to also

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pursue every lead and intelligence to further their counter-terrorism operations which have kept us safe.

Do not misunderstand me. I mention these facts not to absolve or to excuse ISD from the responsibility for its officers' mistakes or lapses. I mention these facts because we need to be fair and balanced in our judgment and not "throw the baby out with the bath water." Yes, this episode of Mas Selamat's escape is a bad mistake and officers who did not carry out their duties as required will be held accountable. But ISD, the organisation and the many dedicated and committed officers who continue to serve in it, are resolved to pick themselves up, recover their spirits and move forward relentlessly in their national mission. We must support them in this.

ISD's contribution in countering terrorism and keeping Singapore safe is crucial. Indeed, all the Home Team agencies have played and will continue to play a vital role in the security of Singapore.

Sir, before I end, let me thank the Singapore Armed Forces for deploying their resources and men in the hunt for Mas Selamat. Much credit is to be given to both the active and operationally ready NSmen in the SAF and the Home Team for their commitment and efforts over the last seven weeks in the search for Mas Selamat.

I also want to thank the many Singaporeans who have actively put their minds to the problem, to share their ideas and help us. I know that they were equally disappointed over this security lapse but they stepped forward to work with the Government to address the immediate challenge.

Of course, there were also Singaporeans who wrote to me or blogged on

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the Internet expressing anger and, in some cases, abuse. Others thought that the whole episode made good creative material for cynical humour. I understand their frustration. This incident should not have happened. But since it did happen, my first priority had to be to establish the full facts of what and how it happened and, at the same time, galvanise and focus the energies of the Home Team and its partners, including the community, to tackle the situation at hand.

I am deeply grateful for the way Singaporeans have rallied behind our efforts even as they rightly expect a proper accounting. This is why I have given Members and the public a full account of what happened, what we will do to fix the problem, and how we will ensure that the same problem does not happen again in future.

Sir, the fight against terrorism is on-going. Today, for the second time, that fight includes the search for Mas Selamat. And just as we had found him the last time, even when he thought himself safe hiding among JI friends, outside Singapore, so we will eventually again track him down, arrest him and detain him.

I will now answer questions from Members. Please do not be afraid to ask, and I will answer them to the best of my ability, so long as it does not compromise the sensitive operations that we are doing in the WRDC.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take the break now. But before you leave, the copies of the Executive Summary can be collected at the door as you exit. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 4.20 pm.

_Sitting accordingly suspended at
4.00 pm until 4.20 pm. _

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Sitting resumed at 4.20 pm

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[Mr Speaker in the Chair]:

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY FINDINGS ON MAS SELAMAT KASTARI'S ESCAPE: Debate resumed.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, I would like to know whether the Ministry of Home Affairs conducts regular audits or security review on physical security and operational procedures in Whitley Road Detention Centre prior to the escape of Mas Selamat.

Secondly, I would like to ask whether the findings of the COI in which we have practically known nothing very much, except that Mas Selamat has escaped through the toilet window, reflect the complacency of his Ministry as well.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, of course, the WRDC should have done regular audits. This was not done in the regular way. What they did were security audits when they did their renovations. And despite that, this kind of failing, for example, in the fencing and covered walkway, was not detected. But it does not mean to say that there is no procedure established to deal with detainees. There are a number of procedures. In fact, the WRDC as well as the GC guards have their respective procedures. For example, when the detainees are in the Cell Block, they are under guard, and they are being watched by a significant number of guards inside the Cell Block. The ratio of the guards is more than that in the prison. When detainees are taken out of the Cell Block and go to other blocks, and most of those movements are in passageways that are enclosed, they are also blindfolded. This is to keep them from familiarising themselves with the surroundings.

Even when they get to the Family Visitation Block, they are also blindfolded.

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And it is also through an enclosed passageway before they get into the Family Visitation Block. Of course, there are some open areas between the Family Visitation Block and the other blocks which are not covered. But then they are completely blindfolded and they are under the tight security of two Gurkha guards. These are just examples. Every movement from the time they leave the Cell Block is logged in a book by the guard. So there are established procedures. The only thing that ought to have been done better is a regular system check and a regular audit. As I said in my statement, this will now be carried out on a regular basis and every year, the Director of Prisons will do an independent audit of this.

Mr Low also asked after he left through the window, we do not seem to know where he was and how he left. The COI could not find the specific escape route through which he has left. Neither could the CID conclusively be able to determine how he got over the fence.

Dr Teo Ho Pin (Bukit Panjang): Sir, the COI's findings have actually identified some security lapses in a few areas. One, I think, is the design of the security facilities, the family visitation centre and also the surrounding. I was just wondering when was this facility actually converted into a family visitation centre and whether there was a security design audit done before it was authorised to use as a family visitation centre. Also, there are lapses in the custodial protocol. I was just wondering, for example, what kind of training and SOPs are actually in place to ensure that there is always a line of sight between the guards and the detainees. Of course, in this case, the design of the urinal cubicle with a folding door is a wrong design for sure because not many places have folding doors for urinal cubicles. The third area is whether there is an alert protocol where any guard who detects anything wrong, there is an immediate alert system, like through a

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whistle system, that will help to alert the rest of the guards so that they can be on alert to prevent the escape.

Sir, there are also some queries by the public with regard to the independence of the COI panel. Some mentioned that two of the members actually had or have some association with the Ministry. So, how can the Minister ensure that the investigation is fair and balanced, and is also in the interest of the country?

The third question which I would like to ask is this. The Mas Selamat escape has actually affected congestion at our land checkpoints. What are the measures we have in place so far to ease the congestion and whether there are measures to prevent further congestion, especially if there is illegal or unauthorised exit of our goods and human out of Singapore?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I have explained clearly how and when the Family Visitation Block came about. In the early years when we built that complex, there was no Family Visitation Block. That block was used as officers' quarters, because officers needed to work late and stay overnight, some quarters were therefore provided for the senior officers. Later on, when ISD ran short of space and when the number of detainees actually went down over the years, ISD did not need the officers to stay on the site. But because of the pressure of office space, that block was converted into an office for the officers. When we had the JI arrests, and because of the sudden increase in numbers and ISD needed family visitation rooms for the families to cope with the increased number of JI detainees, the office of the block on the ground floor was converted into a Family Visitation Block.

There are established protocols on custody. I have explained this earlier. When the detainees are first detained,

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they are handcuffed. Over time, when they show cooperation and when their attitude changes, the Case Officer will recommend to his Superintendent to have the handcuffs removed when they are inside WRDC. So, in the case of Mas Selamat, he was handcuffed for several months – I am told it was about seven to eight months. Sometime around September 2006 – he was detained in February 2006 – the Case Officer recommended to his Superintendent to have the handcuffs removed. But whenever he moves out of the Cell Block to other areas within that whole complex, he was always under the escort of two guards. The guards are well trained to deal with situations when detainees attempt to escape. Of course, they are not specifically trained for working inside the WRCD, but they are trained in the general duties as for all Gurkha guards.

They were also told in their SOPs that they must keep the detainee under constant supervision. This was what the guard thought he was doing. By allowing the detainee into the urinal cubicle, he had thought that the site was well secured physically, not knowing that the window was not grilled. But his instruction was to keep the detainee under constant supervision. Now, of course, with this bad experience, it is no longer just a question of keeping the detainee under constant supervision, but also to maintain line of sight wherever the detainee is. So, the detainee will not be allowed to leave the line of sight of the guard.

Why indeed do we have a door in the urinal cubicle? In fact, many would notice that most urinal cubicles do not have doors. We got to see the context of this place. This is a Family Visitation Block and the toilets are used not purely by detainees. They are used by people who work there as well as the family members who visit the detainees. And because of the structure, as you have seen it on the

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sketch just now, when they did the renovation, they decided to provide a door for some privacy of the people using it. Of course, it turned out to be not a good decision, particularly when detainees use that. Even if they use it, they should not be allowed to close the door.

As to whether there is an alert or alarm system whenever an escape like that took place, yes, indeed there is an established system also. Even then, for the guard, the OIC who was in charge and on duty on that day, after being told, he decided to go and check for himself what was the situation, and it took him only very few seconds to get to the place because the Guard Room was not too far from it.

On the independence of the Committee members, the Government does not pick anyone just to be Committee members to satisfy its own purpose. In fact, the Government does not set up a Committee of Inquiry just for the case of public presentation. A Committee of Inquiry is for very serious purposes, ie, to determine the cause of any serious problem, find out what has happened and determine who caused it and make recommendations, and the Government takes such a Committee very seriously.

So when the Government appoints people to serve in the committees, the basic and most important factor must be the integrity of the people who serve in it, and I have no doubt about the integrity of the people who serve in it.

Mr Goh Joon Seng is a former High Court Judge. He is now a Member of the Council of Presidential Advisers. He is also the Chairman of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony. He has spent time assessing people and making decisions on cases that came before him when he was a Judge, and I have no doubt about the seriousness in which he went about doing his job as the Chairman. I have no doubt about his integrity.

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Mr Tee Tua Ba and Dr Choong May Ling are people with years of public service. They would not be where they are today if they are not people with high integrity. Mr Tee Tua Ba has served the public service well in his 30-over years of career as a senior Police Officer in various positions, the last position being the Commissioner of Police (CP). He was also the Director of Prisons and now, he is the Non-Resident Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Before being a CP, he was also the Director of Prisons. So he understood the whole structure of security and the safe custody for inmates very well. Dr Choong May Ling is a senior Administrative Officer. She was a doctor but gave up practice and joined the Administrative Service, and she had been posted to many Ministries. After her posting in the Ministry of Home Affairs, she will be posted again to another Ministry. And, again, our public service officers are people with integrity. But for these two, one because of the deep experience he had acquired over his professional life, I think his experience is highly valuable in this role as a member of the COI. Similarly, for Dr Choong May Ling, her understanding of the functioning of Government is very important, and for Mr Goh Joon Seng, having had a distinguished career in law and in the Judiciary, and now in his current positions. These are the people who will serve the Committee of Inquiry well and get to the bottom of things and then put up their reports completely objectively and impartially. And, as I have mentioned, they were given full access to all the highly classified information and the people who work in the WRDC, including the ISD officers.

On the congestion at the Checkpoint, yes, initially, when we put up the heightened security measures. ICA called it Operational Tidal Gate to prevent Mas Selamat from getting out of the country. I think there is no two ways about it because if we do not do that, all our

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efforts in finding him in Singapore will be wasted. So the first thing ICA did was to lock down our border and check everyone who wanted to get out of Singapore either through land checkpoint, by air or by sea. And, progressively, ICA have also used technology to help them in their work. As a result, everyone leaving Singapore and passing through the immigration officer will have to have his fingerprint scanned, just to be absolutely sure that the person cannot disguise himself and leave Singapore unnoticed. Similarly, for goods vehicles, lorries, trucks, or whatever. There are many hiding places in these vehicles as you have seen in smuggling cases that tried to come into Singapore. Therefore, every vehicle must be thoroughly checked.

In the first two to three weeks, of course, there was congestion. But ICA learned from the experience and they adapted and innovated, and they even made special measures such as for school buses that need to bring students into Singapore, they created a special access so that children going to school would not be delayed in attending the classes. For the long queues of vehicles, unfortunately, we could not do much about it. This is because, while our ICA works 24 hours, round the clock, in the case of the Malaysian customs, they stop work between 11 pm and 6 am. So there would be no customs clearance. Even if the lorries and trucks want to leave Singapore and get into Malaysia, they could not because, between 11.00 pm and 6.00 am, there would be no Malaysian customs checking them. So the Malaysian lorry drivers had asked ICA to take it up with the Malaysian government, which MHA did, through the Foreign Ministry, and they said they would consider this request. But in the early days, when ICA took it up with their counterparts, they did provide some parking places to enable more vehicles to be left overnight at the Johore customs area for checking the following morning.

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I have looked at the data. The first three weeks were not very good in that we saw the commuters and vehicular traffic went down by about 7% or 8% and, in some instances, 10%. By the fourth or fifth week, the number of vehicles and people, including motor cycles, trucks, buses, etc, reduced only by about 3% to 5%. Now, it is in the eighth week already. I am told that the number of vehicles coming into Singapore is already back to the day before Mas Selamat's escape. So, have we affected the businesses by stopping the vehicles from coming in? Yes, initially, we did. We sought the understanding of our merchants and businesses and they knew that we had to take very stringent measures to prevent him from escaping. But, now, we have tried our best and, as a result, the traffic situation has gone back to normal. But, despite that, let me say that, from time to time, there will be congestion because the traffic volume has actually gone up very significantly over the years. Last year, I am told that about 110 million people got in and out of our checkpoints. And I think this is probably one of the busiest land checkpoints in the world.

Therefore, while Singaporeans face the inconvenience of being checked thoroughly, I hope they understand why we have to do that and we also hope that when they travel, they should try not to go during the peak period. And when they go, please present the correct documents. Even during this period, we see people trying to leave Singapore with the passport of a relative, instead of their own. So when that happens, then invariably, the check will be delayed and the person will be turned around and, as a result, other people will be held up. So I think all of us must play our part and ICA will do its best to ensure that we can facilitate the flow of traffic, people, vehicles, etc, through our checkpoints.

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Dr Lily Neo (Jalan Besar): Two questions, Sir. May I ask DPM on the statements made to say that Mas Selamat was still in Singapore, how confident was he when he made that statement and whether that statement is still applicable today? My next question is: if Mas Selamat is not caught, what kind of revenge attack can we expect from him, especially if he has escaped to the neighbouring country? Is there any way of guarding us from him or at least minimising his impact on us?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: I have always asked our security agencies for their assessment of whether Mas Selamat is still in Singapore and, based on the best available information that they have, they think he is still in Singapore. ISD has also been in contact with their counterparts in the region and ISD is in constant touch to find out whether their counterparts have any new information concerning Mas Selamat. The information from our counterparts so far is that they have no intelligence on Mas Selamat's whereabouts in their own country, which means that they do not have information that Mas Selamat has entered their country. Throughout the search in the last seven weeks or so, there was some information that led to our security agencies believing that he is in Singapore. I am not at liberty to tell Members exactly what these intelligence tips are because our agencies need to protect the information so that they can go about their job to find the person. And I can assure Members that every available means of collecting information on Mas Selamat has been deployed.

Dr Neo asked what happens if Mas Selamat managed to escape from Singapore and whether that would pose a greater risk to us by launching revenge attack. He would, because he is a terrorist who wants to strike us even way back in 2001 or before that when he had plans to

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crash a plane into our Changi Airport. That is why we consider him to be a key figure in the terrorist network. If he could leave Singapore and connect back with his JI friends outside, they could launch some plans to attack Singapore. And that brings me to the point, which I have made all the time, that Singapore is a prime target with or without Mas Selamat. That is because Singapore was the one that exposed the JI network. We are such a developed place in the region that if anyone can plant a bomb in Singapore and have it exploded in Singapore, then they would signal to the world that they have hit a prime target. Therefore, in all our measures, we have to make sure that our first line of defence, which is the checkpoints, must be well secured and people coming in must be thoroughly checked. So, to the best of our ability, we will try to prevent such people from coming in.

Mdm Ho Geok Choo: Sir, I want to thank the Minister for the report. I suppose at this point, Singaporeans cannot expect to cover all their questions, and I would like to urge Singaporeans to move on. Sir, I would like to, however, make one suggestion and ask three supplementary questions. One is that, further to acknowledging the NSmen,

in the interest of boosting morale, would the Government consider a national appreciation programme that gives all servicemen who have contributed in the search for Mas Selamat a symbol of the nation's appreciation, be it in the form of a full-page advertisement in the paper, a small pay bonus or a minted token of their participation in the search?

My questions are:

(1) Also, in light of the fact that many of those who are searching for Mas Selamat are in their late teens or early 20s, what measures are being taken to ensure that they are not harmed by Mas Selamat or his accomplices, if there are

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any, in the event that he is apprehended? I would like to ask the Minister whether the Government is satisfied with the way it had communicated information to the public and, if not, are there ways in which this communication could be improved in the event of a similar crisis.

(2) What are the measures being taken to help Mas Selamat's family re-integrate into the community after this episode?

(3) Going forward, what kind of risk management process and procedures would be installed as a check-and-balance for the SOPs that have been put in place, as recommended by the COI?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I will leave it to the others to think about the kind of appreciation programme, but as far as the Home Team and the SAF are concerned, we are doing our job. For those who help us, particularly young people, in fact, for any Singaporean who is going to help us, I think the right thing to do is always to be vigilant, not to confront a criminal or would-be criminal, but alert the police to any sighting that he may have come across.

Is MHA or are we satisfied with the communication process? Of course, we cannot be satisfied. We can always improve. For example, some have asked why has it taken four hours to tell the public that Mas Selamat has escaped. As I have explained, the first few hours were critical in making sure that all our operational units are out to look for the man, and to make sure that all our border security is tightened up, whether it is by ICA, the Police or the Coast Guard, and to make sure that the standard procedures in dealing with a situation like that are followed closely.

This is important because we must decide what is the immediate priority. The immediate priority is to find the person to the best of our ability. Unless Mas

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Selamat is assessed to be dangerous and this immediately puts Singapore at risk because he could lay his hands on any explosive material, then informing the public would be a matter of course. But we need to do the first thing first. In the case of Mas Selamat, the assessment is that he would not be of immediate danger to Singapore because it would not be possible or likely for him to be able to plan an attack against us soon after the escape. That is why communication with the public was not the first item that the agencies had. But they did it in time and it took about four hours. Could we have shortened the process? Yes, I would acknowledge that. It is a valid point and we will study this and see how to make further improvements.

On the management of Mas Selamat's family, even before this, there was already a programme to manage the families of detainees, and not just for Mas Selamat. There are officers whose job is to look after the family, to make sure that their children have the opportunity to attend school without being harassed by their neighbours and to ensure that they have the means to attend school when their father is not working. We also got the community to help out these detainees' families. So everything possible to ensure that the family remains intact and the family's difficulties were resolved in some way or another is carried out.

On risk management and checking, yes, of course, that will always have to be done. Every SOP that we have, we must continue to review them all the time to make sure that these remain relevant to the situation at hand. In this particular instance which led to Mas Selamat's escape, unfortunately, those who were in charge – not that there were no SOPs, there were – simply did not follow and they deviated from the SOP.

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Mr Inderjit Singh (Ang Mo Kio): Sir, I have two issues.

(1) At which point do we consider a terrorist a criminal? Do we want him to kill someone first before we treat him as a criminal? I feel that we need to have a shift in thinking about how we treat some of these terrorists with regard to the custody of all of them. The US has got the Guantanamo Bay prison facility. I do not think we need to go that far. Changi Prison is probably good enough. But maybe we are a bit too lenient in treating some of these terrorists.

(2) Mistakes do happen and I do not want to pick on how he escaped. But I feel that the communication that happened after that, not just the four hours but even beyond that. The public was told about what Mas Selamat wore about five days later, and a few days later, they were told about his limp which was not exactly a limp. This is something that most of us did not expect from such an organisation like ISD. This is an organisation we all respected. We thought that it was one of the best in Singapore. But I felt that the way things were handled subsequently, the communication was poorly handled, and this is something that we did not expect.

Finally, some of the events that happened, not just in terms of the custody, but also in terms of operating procedures, can I ask who audits ISD? Do they audit themselves and, therefore, we create the weaknesses within the system?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, ISA detainees are not the same as those inmates in the prison. For the inmates in the prison, there is a judicial process when they get charged in court for an offence, and when the court decides to impose an imprisonment sentence, that person will go to the prison, serve the time that the court has imposed, and then he will be discharged from the prison. From time to time, some

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of them may be re-admitted to prison for committing offences.

For ISA detainees, they do not go through the normal court process where they are charged and imprisoned in the Whitley Road Detention Centre. They are in the Whitley Road Centre for preventive detention. In other words, detainees are kept there because we want to prevent them from causing harm to our national security. That is the purpose of the Whitley Road Detention Centre. Over time, the kind of detainees that were kept in the Whitley Road Detention Centre changed and, of course, those who were there ought to have taken note of it and also do something different.

The key to preventive detention, apart from preventing a person from doing harm, is also to get information from that detainee so that, with that information, it will help to prevent a terrorist attack. If others need information or, if there are other cases that are being investigated, either by ISD or by other agencies, they will then be able to extract more information from the detainees who would be available immediately because they are in the WRDC.

So, the regime in the Whitley Road Detention Centre is different from that of the Changi Prison. To the extent that we want to detain them, we also need their cooperation to provide information. The moment we put a terrorist in the Changi Prison, that is it. I do not think we are going to get any new information from him. But that person, in his mind and to his knowledge, has a lot of information to share. Therefore, the significance of keeping him in the Whitley Road Detention Centre where he can be immediately available to answer questions by the case officer will be very important. I am told that this is like a ticking-bomb situation – something is still going on and you need information immediately, the detainees are available straightaway for questioning. So

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we must understand the make-up of the centre and the difference between Whitley Road Detention Centre and the prison setting.

On communication about information regarding Mas Selamat, the point that they were very cautious in releasing information is that they wanted to be very accurate about the information. If they do not have the information clearly in their minds or on records, then putting out information as they think they see will simply be more problematic. It is a balance between speed in telling the public about what he was wearing, or whether he was limping or not and so on, and that information needs to be accurate. It is no point just putting out information when it is not accurate. For example, the clothes he was wearing, even in the early days, it was not easy to determine exactly what he would be wearing before he has left the Whitley Road Detention Centre. Could he have changed into other sets of clothes? Even if we know for sure that he was wearing a particular set of clothes, that also would not be easy to determine because, if he had access to other clothings, he would have changed what he was wearing and, that information, if provided by the police regarding what he was wearing while inside, would simply point the people in the wrong direction.

So, the Police and ISD have to weigh all these. But because of the demand by and interest of the public to know exactly what he was wearing, that the ISD and Police finally put out the basic information. Even then, there was caution to take that information, to make sure that people do not just think that because that is the information given and, therefore, they should be looking out for a person wearing that set of clothes.

Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo (East Coast): Mr Speaker, Sir, with regard to the lapses that were shared in the report of the COI,

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I think many will agree that they seem pretty fundamental. So, what confidence is there that there are no further lapses existing and how can we be sure that this is not systemic of the operations and procedures in WRDC?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: First, I would like to say, as I have said earlier, that there are SOPs in place for those who are guarding detainees. Unfortunately, those involved on that day did not follow those procedures. They breached the procedures. As a result, the escape happened. So, as far as processes and systems are in place, there are, except that those who were supposed to implement them did not follow closely.

Following this escape, and having noted the lapses, for example, the window was not grilled, action to seal has been taken. In other words, the window has been sealed. But to ensure that this does not take place through a lapse of another kind of

toilet window, for example, WRDC has now implemented a procedure where the detainees will not be allowed to shower in the toilet outside the cell block. So that will prevent them from getting out, going into another room and escape. And all toilet windows have been sealed and the perimeter fencing and the place where the staircase and walkway converged with the fencing, all those issues will also be dealt with and it is already in progress.

Can I guarantee Members that there will be no lapses in future? Well, let me say that in all human systems, when they are operated by human beings, I think they can only be as good as the people you put in. We can have all the systems in place but if the people do not follow them, I think one day something may happen.

But from what has happened so far arising from the Mas Selamat's case, all

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those lapses that have been discovered have been dealt with and therefore it is not likely that the same lapses will occur. There will be constant supervision, there will be checks, there will be audits. It is a question raised earlier on, I think, by Mr Inderjit.

Audits will be in place and not just by ISD but also by the Prisons Department. Every year, they will do a regular audit of the place and I am sure for the senior management in the ISD, they will also do regular audits by a separate group of people outside the Whitley Road Detention Centre but part of the ISD setup.

Mr Chiam See Tong (Potong Pasir): Sir, I would like to ask the Minister whether tracker dogs were used to hunt the escaped terrorist. If so, was it successful?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: The moment the escape happened, the first thing that was done by the Whitley Road Detention Centre guards was to have a guard turnout, stand to, and they turned up quickly went outside the fence of Whitley Road Detention Centre and did a thorough search. There were ISD officers and over time there were also police officers.

I am told that when there are such movements and plenty of people in the search area, it will not be of value to deploy the tracker dogs because the tracker dogs simply cannot operate with so many human beings around and having trampled over the place. It is just simply impossible for the dogs to work. But in other areas, tracker dogs have been in place. For example, not far from the Whitley Road area, tracker dogs were in place and ready to be deployed.

In fact, I said earlier that at 4.35 pm, the Gurkha trackers – these are special people trained to track the jungle and forest – were already on the ground operating in the terrain which is wooded,

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uneven and it is difficult to manoeuvre, and they were in place at 4.35 pm.

Mdm Halimah Yacob: Sir, it is actually quite shocking to hear from the COI report that due to minor human errors and also small lapses a well-known terrorist like Mas Selamat could escape. But I think there is at the same time, a good thing coming out of this incident. The lesson learnt is that we just cannot be complacent. Whether it is security agencies or Singaporeans, we need to be vigilant all the time.

I have three questions to ask the Deputy Prime Minister.

First, I would like to ask about the behaviour of the Gurkha guard which seems to me a little bit puzzling. He did not seem to exercise initiative and had to wait for someone to instruct him. I hope this is not reflective of how all our Gurkha guards will behave in Singapore bearing in mind that they guard very critical areas of security here.

My second question is with regard to investor confidence. Because Singapore has been very well-known and well regarded for security standards, how has this affected us, particularly in terms of investor confidence in us and our security capabilities?

My third question is to ask DPM about what happened after the escape. Can the DPM please update us as to the efforts taken up to now, a lapse of almost two months, to track Mas Selamat?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, the guards in the WRDC were told not to communicate unnecessarily with the detainees and if they were to communicate, it has to be done through the WRDC staff. That is to prevent any miscommunication between them. Even though the GC guards speak English, sometimes there could be misunderstanding.

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In this instance where guards escort detainees, they were told not to over familiarise and fraternalise with detainees. So there are good reasons why guards do not talk to detainees. Of course, what the guard did not do in this instance - and it is part of his duty because his duty is to secure the escort of a detainee from one place to another - was, even after having noted that Mas Selamat had taken some time in the toilet, he did not get into the toilet himself to check. He should have. He should have gone in but instead he just asked his fellow guard outside who called on the SDO who then called on the Assistant Case Officer. Our guards are well trained but they also have to operate within certain procedures. So in this instance they thought that they did the right thing which, unfortunately, turned out to be wrong.

On investor confidence and the regard for our security, I think Mr Lim Hng Kiang this morning answered the question raised by Mr Low Thia Khiang regarding investor confidence and I will just try to paraphrase him as best as I could. EDB has not received any information that there is a loss of investor confidence as a result of this. In fact, I am told that somebody who has now made his home here commented to her that really situations like this happen in many countries and in most countries, it is just one of the things that has happened. What struck him was that in Singapore we took it so seriously. I think that is something for us. That people do regard Singapore to be safe and people do know that we are serious when there is a problem and they know too that we will take action to fix the problem. This gives this new resident feel confident.

What are the efforts so far? In the first part of the operation, our police and other security agencies, including SAF, went about their searches according to the leads that they have. Following that,

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they did a systematic extensive search of the forest based on the information that we have collected and they swept through all the forested areas. In the process they found more than 100 illegal immigrants in the forested areas and on 9th April they found a body and that person, who has now been identified, was last seen by his landlord a month before his body was discovered. It just goes to show that we have done as much as we could in searching.

But I am also reminded of another occasion. In 2004, Members may recall, there were three robbers who escaped from our neighbouring country and they went to Pulau Tekong. The SAF and the police mounted an extensive search of the forest in Pulau Tekong and that senior officer who was in charge of the operation told me that it is not easy to track through the forest to look for people because there could be many hiding places, thick undergrowth and holes. So if the person hides himself well, even if the person is just a few feet away from the search party, he could not be found by the search party. Eventually the three robbers, one of them was armed with a gun, were only found when they left the parts which are forested. That was how they were found.

So when the security agencies did the search, they also have to be mindful that within the forested areas – those of us who have done National Service would know what it was like – there are thick vegetation, uneven ground, tall trees and lots of leaves and branches and therefore it could be possible for a person to hide there for a long time. And from information given by some of the illegal immigrants, they have been living there for more than a year. They could survive with the water that can be found in the forest. There were nuts and berries. There were also illegal farms in the

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forested area. So it is not an easy task but despite that, I think our SAF and the Home Team have done their best in searching the forest. But that is not to say that we have now stopped searching. There are other ways of doing the search and I am not at liberty to tell Members what has been set in place in the forest.

And now in this phase of operation, it is a more targeted approach based on information and intelligence and based on calls by the public who said that they have met or saw somebody that may look like Mas Selamat. But for the whole of the coastal areas around Singapore, we have the coast guards and we have various sentries and observation posts to look out for people who may want to leave Singapore by sea. All those things are in place.

Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): I have three questions.

First, how long will it be before a new purpose-built detention centre is completed or the centre co-locates within the Changi cluster?

Second, in the meantime, how will MHA step up incarceration standards within Whitley Road Detention Centre without compromising the disarming environment needed for the investigative and/or intelligence gathering role at the Centre?

And thirdly, Sir, what is being done to assist and strengthen ISD and ISD officers to break the fatigue or routinisation which may have resulted in the lapses?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, it will be a while before the new detention centre can be built. It is not just simply awarding the contract and therefore we can get it done straightaway. The relocation of this detention centre needs to be carefully thought out and planned such that within that site, ISD can continue to manage a

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detention centre for the purpose that it needs and yet, at the same time, be able to enhance the security based on the best standard provided by the Prisons. Therefore, it would be some years before we can build a new centre. I cannot for now say when that exactly will be, but I have asked both the Prisons Department and ISD, and overseen by MHA HQ, to develop this plan.

How will we step up the incarcerating standards without compromising the current way that detainees are dealt with? For one, detainees who are moving around in the Whitley Road Detention Centre will be handcuffed. When they are out of the Centre, leg-cuffs will also be applied on them.

The physical security of the place will also be improved. The fencing of the Whitley Road Detention Centre will be raised and Prisons Department's assistance will be sought to ensure that the place is secure enough. The guards will no longer be allowed to leave the line of sight from the detainees. They will have to keep the detainee under constant line of sight.

Therefore, we believe that implementing these measures will help us to minimise the chance of a detainee escaping. In fact, I do not think it will be possible for one to escape without slackening in the standard and therefore audits will also be in place, and we will continue to make sure that the system runs well.

ISD officers are used to working in very trying conditions. In this WRDC, unfortunately, complacency has set in over time and therefore ISD needs to review the way it runs its operations, including the people who run it, and therefore those who were involved or responsible for the escape of Mas Selamat will be removed from their positions and we will put new people in charge.

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Ms Sylvia Lim (Non-Constituency Member): Sir, five clarifications for the DPM.

First is, how satisfied is he of the thoroughness of the search after Mas Selamat's escape? For example, I was told by some people living in the vicinity of the Whitley Road Detention Centre that the army came to their double-storey homes to do a search, but only the lower floor was searched and the upper floor was not searched.

Secondly, Sir, coming back to the communication of the information to the public after the escape, earlier, DPM mentioned that they wanted to be sure of the accuracy of information before release to the public about his attire and so on. Why did it then take 19 days for the police to tell the public that Mas Selamat has a mole under his eye? Could they not verify that information at an earlier time?

Thirdly, Sir, Singapore is not large and it has already been eight weeks since the escape. Does the Minister not find it disappointing that we have not been able to find Mas Selamat so far and is it not understandable that Singaporeans themselves lose confidence in the capability of our security forces?

Sir, fourthly, the Executive Summary report and the earlier speech made by the Minister mentioned the fact that the SDO who was accompanying Mas Selamat together with the Gurkhas was a lady officer and in the DPM's narration of the facts, it appeared that there was a little bit of time loss when the SDO went to search for the Assistant Case Officer to come and respond to the case. I noted that the COI did not make any recommendation about whether it would be more advisable to match gender with the inmate. Was this the cause of some loss of time and would the DPM care to comment on this?

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And last of all, Sir, there is a rumour that there is an ISD officer who has gone missing. I wonder whether DPM can comment on whether there is any truth in this rumour at all.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I cannot comment on the rumour that Ms Sylvia Lim just raised because, after all, it is just a rumour.

How satisfied is MHA or the police with the search process? I will leave the professionals to do the job and I suppose they being the experts in this area and the ones who do such searches, I would expect them to have the ability to determine whether that search on the ground floor is adequate or not. I would not be able to comment on this specifically. But clearly for the Home Team, from the results that the Police Force have produced so far in keeping Singapore safe with the low crime rates that we have seen over the years and declining over the years too, and the quickness in their going about in solving a crime when they can find the lead, I think that speaks for the professionalism of the Force. Of course, that does not mean that every officer is of the same standard. As in any organisation, there will be people who do very well and there will be people who do not, and that is the limitation of any human organisation.

Why did it take so long to communicate certain information? As I said, information has to be accurately confirmed before it is told to the public. Why was the part about the mole not communicated to the public till after 19 days? Frankly, if you ask me, and if you look at the poster, it is not so easy to detect a mole unless you look closely at every part of the face. But for that officer who saw it, he must have thought over it and decided to give the information. But

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unless you come into close face-to-face contact with the person, it may not be so easy to notice a small mole.

Why do we have female Special Duty Operatives? We have male and female working in every government department. In the Whitley Road Detention Centre, family members visit detainees in the Centre and, as in any organisation, we do not just keep strictly to only one gender and, in this instance, the SDO's job is administrative. The guarding is to be done by the guards and therefore we do have female SDOs and we have guards who are there and each of them has separate functions.

Mr Seng Han Thong (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, many of our grassroots leaders have informed me that they have bad experience visiting the heritage centre there. It is quite difficult and troublesome for them to go in. They said that if we can have the same kind of check, they cannot imagine that Mas Selamat can just come out this way. They pointed out that even their 3, 4, 5-room flats have grilles and they cannot imagine that the prison window do not have grilles. HDB flats have grilles to prevent people from coming in. So this kind of answer, as the Minister says, is silly that we do not install grilles. We have been assured that all these facilities will be enhanced.

The point is whether we also look into another aspect, as MM pointed out, that "You thought you want to size me up, I will size you up." So, especially the lower grade officers, having been trained to size people up, they would not be conditioned over a period of time that they would let down their guard.

ISD has been held in high respect, not only from within but without Singapore. Now that this has happened, and we know the truth of it, how can we restore the public confidence in ISD?

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Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, as I have explained, the reason why the WRDC did not grill up that window is really something that should not have happened. It is a very basic thing for a security facility. Unfortunately, it is a lesson learnt too late, but now they have fixed that problem.

Did the SDO, who is a very junior officer, size up Mas Selamat or is Mas Selamat able to size up the others? I think the job of assessing the psychology of Mas Selamat is very much left to the Case Officer who handles him. The Case Officer is the one who decides on how to treat this person or Mas Selamat.

On Mas Selamat himself, I am told he was not cooperative. He was quiet and probably very intelligent, maybe very observant as well, and therefore he could take advantage of the situation. When he visited the toilet, he would have done some planning and he progressively tested whether the guard will stop him from closing the door or not and whether the guard will notice him turning on the tap or not, and so on. He exploited all those situations and that is why we have the problem.

On the confidence of the ISD and ISD officers, the problem here lies in the breach of procedure by some individuals in the Whitley Road Detention Centre. We should not generalise this to cover the whole of the ISD. I do not want to go into great details about the achievements of ISD.

I think Members have heard one part of it. I have previously said that ISD was quick enough to be alert to a piece of information that it picked up and mounted surveillance on Muhammad Aslam who had then wanted to go to Afghanistan. ISD mounted surveillance on him and his friends but during which time Muhammad Aslam left Singapore and went to Pakistan, and eventually made his way to

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Afghanistan. And despite that, ISD did not take action on his friends who are still in Singapore. When Muhammad Aslam was arrested by the Northern Alliance who were then fighting the Talibans and questions were raised as to how was it that this person had a Singapore passport. When we were asked the question, and it was reported in the press even in other countries too, ISD decided to move and arrested his friends who were working with him. That was how ISD arrested the first 15 of the JI members that led to the disclosure of the JI network. Instead of keeping the information

to itself, which would not be good for us and also for our security, ISD immediately alerted all its counterparts in the neighbourhood as well as further away. As a result, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi was arrested by the Filipinos in January 2002; and the Australians were also able to discover the JI network in Australia. And in Malaysia and Indonesia. Because of information that ISD provided on Mansour Jabarah, he was also eventually arrested by the authorities overseas. Of course, that is not the only thing that ISD does. From time to time, you will hear of cases; but most of the time what they do will not be in public view. In the last 60 years, particularly after we became independent, you can see that ISD has provided important information that led to the arrests of many people that want to do Singapore harm. And I do not want to go into the details today.

Ms Ellen Lee (Sembawang): I have three questions for the DPM.

Since independence, MHA and ISD have been quite relentless in their efforts to restore law and order, to keep crime rates low, and dismantled secret societies, amongst others. Since 911, it has also taken on the added responsibility to keep terrorism in check as well. My question is: has MHA taken too much upon itself? Is this the time to also review the tasks and responsibilities of MHA and

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ISD, so that certain tasks could be undertaken by a new Ministry instead?

My second question: WRDC's operations have now been exposed, in a sense, and a lot of details have been disclosed today. Would it now also become a target for terrorist attack?

My third question: until now, why does the Government not offer an award for Mas Selamat's arrest?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I think different countries organise their government functions differently. We have seen countries where they have all the security agencies in one place and then decide over one incident to break it up into several. The results of this arrangement are still not known – whether it is the most effective way of dealing with problems confronting the country. In another instance, which I think you will remember, a Home Affairs Ministry was split into two different Ministries and they are now back into the same one setup.

For Singapore, we have had MHA for a long time. What is the role of MHA comprising many departments - the Police, Prisons, Narcotics Bureau, Immigration and Checkpoints, ISD, and SCDF? If you look at each of these roles, I think there is only one key mission, and that is, to keep Singapore safe from harm by people, whether it is a law and order situation, whether it is people who want to smuggle things into Singapore, or whether people who want to get into Singapore and do us harm, like terrorists, or even our own people, that we have been watching, for whatever reason, like for terrorism, crime, and so on. All these functions complement one another. Therefore, MHA's role is to make sure that the different departments work together as one team. Can we split this? Well, who knows? Some day we may

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decide to operate differently. But, for now, we think that we should make use of the complementarities of the different setups within the MHA's departments and make it a better organisation. That is how we have been operating the system.

Of course, many agencies and Ministries do contribute to making Singapore safe too. For those instances when it does not deal with law and order situations, terrorism or race relation issues, etc, like we do, then we will have to find ways of working with these other agencies or Ministries. One of the things that we do often is to have inter-agency organisations. In other words, it is to have Inter-Ministerial Committees, like the ones chaired by the Minister and with other Ministers. Of course, we also have the National Security Coordination Secretariat which DPM Jayakumar is in charge of. So, when there are issues that are across several Ministries that concern our national security, then there will be another level where cooperation and coordination oversight can take place. So, we think that we have to find a suitable way to deal with the problems that we face. For now, we think that the way we have structured is correct.

Can we have more people, for example? Can we have better systems, for example? Of course, we can. But, again, every government operates within a certain budget and so does a Ministry. Therefore, we have to make use of whatever we have and do the job the best that we can.

On the question regarding the bounty award, the Government does not have a policy of offering bounties for arrests of people for whatever the cause or crime. The public-spiritedness of our people is very good and, in fact, very strong. Of the major arrests made by the Police, 40% were done with the assistance of the public. When I mentioned this to my counterparts from other countries when I

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meet them, they could not believe that members of the public in Singapore would help the security agencies in keeping crime low. But then we are not saying that no one should offer a bounty. In fact, there are those good-spirited people out there who said that they would offer a bounty for Mas Selamat. Police has no objection to them wanting to do this good work. But for the Government, and for the Police, we do not think we should go along that path. For the moment we start, what money will we award for solving heinous crimes, like a murder, for example? It will not end. But I think that policy is correct, we have to work at it, and we have to get the public behind us. For the years that Home Team agencies have spent in building relations with the community, I think that relationship is very strong.

Mr Sin Boon Ann: Sir, I would like to thank the Minister for his candour in his reply. Certainly, there is nothing that is said that shows any attempt on the part of the Government to try and hide its investigations from members of the public. I just have a question for the Government, ie, to ask the Government whether they are aware that the point of contact between a detainee and the public is always a source of potential security breach. And if it was, was the Home Team aware at that time when they had these visitations, the CCTV was not commissioned or functioning? If it was aware that it was not functioning or commissioned, why did it allow these visitations to go ahead? Because we learned subsequently that it was a combination of failures that had resulted in Mas Selamat Kastari's escape from the detention facility. So I appreciate it if the Minister could respond to these questions.

The second question is one which essentially relates to the massive turnout that the Government has put out for the search of the escaped detainee. I

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remember looking at the front pages of the Straits Times the following day, seeing hundreds of soldiers lined up in a school nearby, with soldiers hand-in-hand looking for an escaped fugitive. I would like to ask the Government whether this was essentially a serious attempt of finding the escaped fugitive or it was really a public assurance exercise to assure the public that all was under control, and also whether it was the best way forward to look for a missing fugitive.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, let us be quite clear about this – the fact that we have visitation by family members is not the reason that contributed to Mas Selamat's escape. What contributed to Mas Selamat's escape – let me repeat – is a series of lapses by the officers concerned. Family visits have been taking place for some time. When a detainee meets with his family, he is always under constant watch. In fact, they are always under constant watch by the Case Officer. So, nothing passes between them. And, again, depending on the level of cooperation that the detainee has given to the Case Officer, not all detainees have direct physical contact with the family. For some, they would, at most, be able to talk to the family behind a screen. Therefore, they would not be able to exchange or pass anything between them. For those who could have physical contact, sitting face to face across the table, nothing could change hands between them because there are always people who will watch over this process.

So, why do we allow visitation by family members? As I have explained, it is part of the rehabilitation. We want the person to be able to see his family, to be able to learn that he has gone the wrong way, and that he has people to be responsible for and therefore, hopefully, we can get him to be more cooperative and in time to be able to be released from detention.

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The massive turnout to search for Mas Selamat in Malcolm Park and just around the schools there was not a public assurance exercise. The Government does not resort to such gimmicks to assure the public just by turning out a lot of our soldiers and Police. We do not do such things. Why were they there in the first place? That was because there was information that there was a person who looked like Mas Selamat in the vicinity and got into Malcolm Park. That was why we had Police officers and later on, SAF men turning up to search the site.

Mr Ang Mong Seng (Hong Kah): ( In Mandarin ): Mr Speaker, Sir, first of all, I must thank the Deputy Prime Minister for explaining this episode about Mas Selamat's escape very clearly. He has also appointed this Committee of Inquiry which has also made its investigations and found that he escaped from the toilet window. However, CID has not managed to find any fingerprints. I want to ask the DPM if it is the only possibility of which he escaped. After he escaped, it must have taken him some time to run away.

Did we ensure that there is proper patrol in the Detention Centre? Secondly, what about Took Leng How's murder case where he managed to flee Singapore and entered into Malaysia? I want to ask DPM how is he going to ensure such things will not happen to Mas Selamat in a similar way.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Third question first. I think the situation for Took Leng How was quite different from this case. Took Leng How was able to exploit a gap in the ICA Checkpoint in Woodlands and, as a result, he was able to leave Singapore and went to Malaysia. Again, that was also due to non-following of procedures when the gate was supposed to have been closed. And learning from that experience, the situation like that should not happen again.

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How could Mas Selamat take such a short time and leave? Was it the complacency that had set in? I would explain that that was indeed the case, that the operating culture then in the WRDC was slackening and, as a result, those who were involved in making sure that he was brought from one place to another safely and securely and those who were involved in making sure that he did not make any attempt to leave without being noticed did not do a good job, and that problem will be solved after the new procedures are instituted.

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong (Tampines): I would like to thank the Deputy Prime Minister for the open and candid way he is addressing the questions. It gives the House some confidence that the Government is serious about getting to the bottom of the issue. I want to ask the Deputy Prime Minister about the lenient and even very courteous manner that the detainees are treated in the centre and whether this whole approach will be reviewed, especially in regard to different levels of risk of the terrorists that are being detained. From what the Deputy Prime Minister told us, he said that this approach is to make sure that they would cooperate with the investigations. But from what the Deputy Prime Minister said, Mas Selamat had not cooperated and did not respond to the rehabilitation programme. So can I ask whether the whole operating culture, the whole approach of dealing with detainees under ISA, will be reviewed, especially with regard to when it is co-located to the Changi Prison? Will it mean that the processes and the courtesies that are being extended today will be removed?

Another question is with regard to the woman case officer. First of all, I congratulate the Deputy Prime Minister on the statement that there will be equal treatment to both men and women, in

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terms of recruitment. Can I just ask what is the SOP for woman case officers, in terms of entering the male toilets, in times of emergency, or when there is something to investigate? Is it her own initiative to seek the help of a male case officer, or is it something laid down in the rule book?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Whether a person is a detainee or prisoner, there are certain basic standards that we have to observe to treat the detainee or prisoner humanely. While our prison condition is sparse, not like some other prisons that can have access to television and including selection of menu for the food, our prisoners are treated humanely. Similarly, for detainees. There are basic standards that we have to follow. And the key purpose is preventive detention so that the terrorists like those in the JI group can be prevented from doing harm to Singapore, and that is the primary objective. In the process, ISD would be able to extract information from them and that requires a certain level of communication and cooperation.

Therefore, so long as there is hope for the case officer to get information from the detainee, we have to treat that person in a way that will ensure that cooperation. Of course, there are also those who do not cooperate. And for those who do not cooperate, then the ways that they are treated will also be different from those who cooperate. We must leave it to the officers themselves to judge to what extent they want to extend certain privileges, or whatever, to the detainee concerned, and that is when he would be able to use his position and the ability to dispense such privileges to manage the particular detainee.

On whether the operating culture needs to be changed, from time to time, they will have to review this. We are not saying that this is a hard and fast way and therefore we have to stick by this rule. I think from the years of experience

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that the ISD officers had in dealing with detainees, they would have changed the method of operation, depending on the kind of people they deal with. And, again, that has to be changed over time too when they receive a new set of detainees in future.

On whether there are SOPs to prevent the female Special Duty Operative (SDO) from intervening in the process, firstly, there were guards there. Even if she did not do it herself, she could have asked the guards to get in. But, instead, this officer decided to call for the assistance of the Assistant Case Officer, and I cannot explain why. Therefore, the Director will have to examine all these issues and decide what appropriate disciplinary action is to be taken against those who are involved.

Mr Baey Yam Keng (Tanjong Pagar): I would like to thank the DPM for being so open about sharing the report because I think it would certainly lead to greater scrutiny and also more questions on report findings. So allow me to ask some minor detailed questions that I am sure members of the public would be very interested to know about. It centres around the clothes of Mas Selamat. I wonder if there is a SOP for the detainee to hand over his detention centre clothes when he changed into his civilian attire. The report noted that it believes that he was wearing two sets of clothes when he left the locker room. At this point in time, does it mean that the authorities cannot confirm that the detainee did return the detention centre clothes or not?

The second question is, in the toilet, for a fellow male guard, he should know that a man does not need to take off his pants fully while doing business at the urinal. So when Mas Selamat flipped his pants on the ledge above the door, does that not lead to some suspicion on the guard's side? While I note that the guard is not encouraged to communicate with

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the detainee, I do not think it means that the guard need not have some common sense to be alert and to observe what the detainee that he is keeping watch over is doing. It appears that it is not just this particular guard on duty that day in the toilet who may not have this sense because I note that the report also mentioned that Mas Selamat had over time tested the reactions of the guards by closing the urinal door and that there had been a rotation of guards over these months. So it appears that these guards do not seem to be noticing such unusual behaviour by the detainee.

My third and last question is about communications. Why is it that after four or five days after the escape, when the attire of the detainee was made public that he was wearing the civilian attire, it appears to be a bit inaccurate because the pants were all along hanging in the toilet? So it would be inaccurate to tell the public that he was wearing the civilian clothes, the top and the bottom.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, on whether there is a SOP to require the detainee to hand over his detention centre clothes or not, there is such a SOP. In fact, the procedure is such that when the detainee changes into his civilian clothes, he is supposed to hand back his detention centre clothes to the SDO. That was not done. That was why it was a lapse and that was why we think Mas Selamat could have worn another set of clothes, apart from his baju kurong , and that was why even after flipping his pants over the ledge, he could still run away because he had another pair of pants. Why he took off his pants? I think the guard at that time probably did not know why he took off his pants, and it did not occur to the guard why Mas Selamat needed to take off his pants while in the urinal. To the guard, he might have thought that for whatever reasons, Mas Selamat needed to

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take off his pants. Why did the guard not have the common sense? Indeed, that was lacking. If he had noticed that Mas Selamat had taken such a long time, because Mas Selamat was under escort, he should have straightaway gone into the toilet to find out what Mas Selamat was up to. But, unfortunately, he did not.

Why did the guards allow Mas Selamat to keep the door closed and, despite repeated tests by Mas Selamat on other guards, they also let him do the same thing? I think some of them must have come under the impression that it is a completely secure facility, not noticing that the toilet ventilation window did not have a grille. On the confusing information about what he was wearing, of course, the part about his baju kurong and pants, etc, I think Police needed to determine indeed that baju kurong belonged to Mas Selamat. There was no clear indication at that time, although he could have worn that and he could have left it there. It was not after some time, through DNA analysis, that determined that that baju kurong belonged to Mas Selamat. On the issue of telling the public that he was wearing his baju kurong , yet, the Police found one, I think that is something that is beyond me. I think the officer concerned who put up such information must have a lot of confusing information at that time. And in this whole process, sometimes they did not have the accurate information. And as I said earlier, the ISD and the Police thought that they could not give out too much information too quickly because they needed to get the information checked. Unfortunately, sometimes, such information, even when communicated, turned out to be incorrect.

Mr Gautam Banerjee (Nominated Member): I would like to commend DPM on the way he conducted the discussion in the House today. I think Members have asked whether investors and others would lose confidence in Singapore when we have an incident like this. There will

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always be lapses. Obviously, we want to reduce instances where there is a problem. I think people also look at what you do after there is a lapse, ie, what sort of process and what sort of action you take. I think within two months of this happening, you not only appointed an independent Committee of Inquiry, it has done its deliberations. DPM shared them in a very open and frank manner with the House. Some of the lapses are indeed, in hindsight, when you look at them, they were very silly things that happened - the picture that DPM showed us of the ledge and the perimeter fence. I think in hindsight you might ask, why was that not detected earlier? I think it is never easy to put the spotlight on you and to look at what went wrong and what you are going to do, going forward. I think that will restore a lot of confidence in Singapore's ability to look at problems and take action. There are lots of other countries which have problems. They have a Committee of Inquiry and you never get a response

within a very short time, do not take the action and do not take the consequences framework seriously. This is something which I think is very good. It certainly gives me a lot of confidence that the system is working. But I would like to share one point which I observed. I was just reading the Executive Summary that the Minister gave us. It took someone forty-nine seconds, in an enactment, to get out of the toilet and get to the perimeter fence and then jump over it, and perhaps another two minutes or less than three minutes to get to the PIE.

My question is: as part of the security audits that were conducted there in the past, was any scenario planning and stress testing done where people were asked: "Why not you try to escape from this place? Let us see how you do it", as part of the process not only in this detention centre but in other detention centres, including prisons. When we do security audits of computer systems, we do something like penetration testing.

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Mr Speaker: Mr Banerjee, can you keep your question short, please?

Mr Gautam Banerjee: Yes, I just wanted to emphasise the point that we try to go in and try to break into the system, which actually changes the complacency and the very cosy feeling that seemed to have happened in this detention centre.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Mr Speaker, Sir, indeed, today I have disclosed a lot of information. That was what I promised that I would do, and we are not running away from the problem. We want to recognise the problem, solve it and then move ahead to make sure that things like this will not happen again. We will review the whole process, the physical security of the place and take all the necessary actions to ensure that an escape like this will not take place again. This is the way the Government has been dealing with issues – to get to the bottom of a problem, find the cause of it, solve it and then take action to ensure that similar problems do not recur. There is no point ducking the issue. There is no point covering this up. It will only do us more harm. And I think the approach that we have taken, including communicating with the press or the public, it is a process which we need to improve. That is the way we should be open with our people. We can then get our people to work with the Government to deal with the situation that we are facing.

Did the WRDC do stress tests like that to see whether people can break out or not, or even to break into the place? There were plans, but there were no exercises to test this. But from now on, they will make sure that they will conduct such tests and exercises, not just by themselves, but also with the other Home Team agencies. The prisons do have a system like that. In fact, they do have systems to test stresses to the prisons'

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physical security, and they do have plans to deal with an escape, and not just on the immediate surroundings. The system that the WRDC security operated on was to prevent attacks from outside, ie, prevent people from raiding the place and trying to rescue the detainees. Those plans they have. That is why when the call for a guard turn-out and stand-to alert situation, they were able to get out to the correct position. They probably have never in their imagination thought that anybody would attempt to escape, because nobody has escaped from the detention centre.

But MHA does have red teaming teams and programmes to go around testing all these agencies. Even for red teaming, it is also to see whether people can intrude into their system or not, be it a computer system or a physical security structure or place like the airport. So they do have red teaming exercises to test how alert and vigilant those people who are guarding the respective places, such as the airport or the checkpoints, are in detecting intrusions or people who try to break into their system. Of course, there is an area which we need to review, that is to stress test how people break out of the system. This matter will be taken care of.

Mr Speaker: Dr Ong Seh Hong. Keep your question brief, please.

Dr Ong Seh Hong (Marine Parade): Yes, I will keep my questions brief. DPM earlier alluded to the point that this lack of action by the guards is due to the lack of commonsense. If it is a lack of commonsense among one or two persons, I can accept it. But it seems that Mas Selamat has tried many times and the previous guards also did not take action. Is it due to a lack of empowerment of the junior officers on the ground that they dared not take action that resulted in the escape? My second question is: how long did it

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take from the time Mas Selamat escaped to the time that our borders were locked up and sealed? From DPM's Statement, I understand that the 100% search was around 5.30 pm, ie, one-and-a-half hours later. I hope I have heard him correctly. I may have misunderstood him. This is because to get to the Causeway or the Second Link from any point in Singapore would usually take about half an hour. Is DPM satisfied with the response time of one-and-a-half hours to seal the border?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: When I mentioned lack of commonsense, I think we have to see this in context, and I have explained this on several occasions that those people who were there operated on the wrong assumption. For a guard not to have gotten into the toilet to find out what had happened to Mas Selamat, his wrong assumption was that the whole place, including the Family Visitation Block, is a secure facility. Indeed, it is supposed to be, except for the toilet that was not grilled. Why is it that the other guards also did not stop him from closing the toilet door? Again, most probably it was because of this assumption that they thought that the Family Visitation Block is secure. The only thing they did not take note of was that the toilet window was not secure. Similarly, for the other staff.

It was not a question of lack of empowerment that they did not do it. I think the guards were told to limit their communication with the detainees and, somehow, that translated into the situation that we had, that they do not even get in and find out what happened to Mas Selamat but instead asked the SDO and the SDO did not do it herself or even asked the guard to do that, but had to ask the Assistant Case Officer. So these lapses, in a way, contributed to a loss of time in the discovery of Mas Selamat's escape.

I mentioned the timing when the checkpoints were closed. I said that

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CTSU, which is our counter-terrorism unit at our checkpoints, was alerted – I think I mentioned 4.30 pm. But even at 4.30 pm, that means for the officers who were operating at the checkpoints, they were already checking on people. The 100% check was instituted at 5.15 pm, not 5.30 pm. Why did it take so long? Certain things needed to be done on the ground, which was why they took a bit longer time from the time that they were alerted to put up that 100% check.

Mr Speaker: If there are no more questions, I will close the session by getting Mr Chiam and Mr Low to ask their second questions. Yes, Mr Low.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, DPM seems to say that the complacency culture in the Whitley Road Detention Centre contributed to the episode. I wonder if this episode is also the result of the complacency of his Ministry for failing to supervise the agencies under his charge. I would like to know what is the Minister's personal assessment and feeling of this episode and what lessons have been learnt from the post-operation of the escape of Mas Selamat. Knowing that Mas Selamat is an unusual detainee, as he is an important JI leader and had been trained in jungle fighting in Afghanistan, with experience in jail break and jail escape in Indonesia, was special precaution taken to secure him? Is the DPM also aware that there is this ground speculation that Mas Selamat had in fact died inside at the Whitley Road Detention Centre and that the Government seems to stage all this to cover up his death? I hope DPM could clarify that.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, instead of telling me about this ground speculation, may I ask Mr Low whether he believes that indeed he thought Mas Selamat has died?

Mr Low Thia Khiang: No, I do not.

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Mr Wong Kan Seng: Mr Low says he does not believe this ground speculation that Mas Selamat has died. I do not know why he wanted to raise it here since he does not believe that Mas Selamat has died in the Whitley Road Detention Centre. I see no point in perpetuating a ground speculation in this House and giving credence to it.

On the complacency of the WRDC, as I have explained that in my Statement, does it mean that the Ministry has been complacent in supervising its departments? Every department has its functions. Every department has its leader. What we do is to make sure that we find the right people to run the organisation. From time to time, problems do take place, and this is one instance. Does it mean, therefore, that the whole Ministry and all the Home Team departments are complacent? I think that would be stretching the argument too far. Of course, within individual units, there could be some slackening in some ways. I cannot guarantee that that will not happen because, in any human organisation, from time to time, there will be human weaknesses being displayed and, unfortunately, things do happen that we do not want to see.

On what lessons we have learnt, I think the lesson is a very painful one and, indeed, we do not want this thing to happen again. Therefore, we will take this lesson very seriously and make sure that we will not let this happen again.

How I felt about it? Well, I felt disappointed that this should have happened. And I was completely shocked and surprised when I first got the news.

On Mas Selamat's jail break overseas, I do not know about his jail break. I heard that he tried to escape when he was under guard in Indonesia. He attempted to jump over the second storey and, as a

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result, injured his leg. So, of course, from that instance, he could have this streak that he wanted to escape all the time. Even in Whitley Road Detention Centre, the Superintendent did warn the guards: "Be careful.

We have detainees here who are dangerous and are high flight risk". But, unfortunately, even for those who took note of it, and Members have heard me disclosing the details, the lapses happened and lapses were caused by those individuals who did not pay attention to their work.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Thank you, Sir, for giving me this opportunity to ask my question.

Sir, I know that DPM has mentioned that disciplinary actions shall be taken against certain officers but, nevertheless, I would still like to ask him whether any heads will roll after the escape of Mas Selamat because this is a serious security breach.

Sir, I am not happy about the answer he gave on the use of tracker dogs. I thought that was the most suitable occasion that tracker dogs would have been used. Probably if we have used tracker dogs Mas Selamat would now be in custody.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: May I ask Mr Chiam whether he is an expert on tracker dogs?

Mr Chiam See Tong: Dogs have got 20 times stronger smell than human beings. Have Members watched the movie about the early southern states where these slaves used to escape and these dogs would go after them? They got no chance of running away even if they tried to go through the swamps. In this case it is the same thing. Mas Selamat would be going

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ahead and we have five sniff dogs chasing after him. Whether he goes into the bush or climb a tree, I think he will not escape.

Mr Speaker: Mr Chiam, could you let Mr Wong answer the question, please?

Mr Chiam See Tong: Yes, I will.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I am no expert in tracker dogs. I could only inform Members what I am advised by professionals and, as I have explained the moment the escape was discovered, the guards turned out and searched the area. There were lots of people on the ground and I am also advised by professional opinion that in those situations no additional value would be added by tracker dogs. I am also told that tracker dogs were deployed in certain locations in the vicinity of the Whitley Road Detention Centre.

Mr Chiam's first question on whether "heads will roll", as I have said there will be disciplinary proceedings, and we must let that proceedings run its course and those who were found accountable and liable will have to answer for those mistakes or lapses.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, will you allow me to clarify?

Mr Speaker: All right.

Mr Chiam See Tong: The DPM says that there were a lot of people and everybody was stepping on the ground. That will not confuse the dogs. In fact, this is a good case for using tracker dogs because his trousers were there and left a scent and, secondly, he could run very fast. The dogs will outrun him anytime, because he had a fall, he sprained his leg and he was limping. So, this is a case for tracker dogs to come in. I have tried to convince DPM but he does not seem to be impressed by what I said.

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Mr Wong Kan Seng: No, Sir, it is not because I am not convinced. I will pass Mr Chiam's view and his knowledge about tracker dogs to the police department and I will let them assess this. There may well be a lot of truth, there may well be a lot of insights in what Mr Chiam said, and I am no expert in this but I will convey it to the professionals for them to study and, hopefully, we will learn from this the next time too.

Miss Penny Low: Given the urgency of the matter itself, I understand that a lot of the resources have been deployed to tracking down Mas Selamat and I must compliment the team spirit of the Government, from MHA to MINDEF, to focus on the issue, but, on the other hand, prior to the escape of Mas Selamat, I understand that the manpower situation at MHA has already been quite tight. So given this huge focus on tracking down Mas Selamat, how can we assure Singaporeans that the day-to-day operations, the safety and security, law and order of Singapore would still be maintained at equally high levels?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Let me clarify my remark about using tracker dogs the next time. I do not mean to say that if there is an escape the next time we will use tracker dogs. But I am sure there will be other situations where we need to deploy tracker dogs and indeed they could well be of great use to the police for all kinds of purposes, apart from the ones that they already know.

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On assuring the public that the day-to-day operations will not be compromised, indeed, I have explained in my Statement that we deploy our resources for dedicated searches and extensive searches in the forest but now we do more targeted searches bearing in mind that we have equally important things to do in protecting Singapore, solving crimes, preventing others from doing harm to us, and so on. Those functions will continue and while we step up this operation, staff will be rotated, our job will continue to be done and we will continue to fulfil our mission. As Members have read in the papers too, there were crimes that were committed and the crimes were solved quite quickly. I do not need to go into details about which particular case but I think the one that caught our attention most was the abduction of the woman for money.