ISSUANCE AND USE OF FIREARMS IN THE MILITARY SERVICE

ISSUANCE AND USE OF FIREARMS IN THE MILITARY SERVICE:

(Control measures):

* 1. *Dr Lam Pin Min asked the Minister for Defence in light of the recent incident involving the unauthorised possession of firearms in public by a national serviceman (a) what are the current control measures in ensuring the proper issuance and use of firearms in the military service; and (b) whether there will be additional measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

2.

Mr Low Thia Khiang asked the Minister for Defence how Corporal Dave Teo Ming managed to slip out of Mandai Hill Camp with arms and ammunition.

The Minister for Defence (Mr Teo Chee Hean): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your permission to take Question Nos. 1 and 2 together?

Mr Speaker: Yes.

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Mr Speaker, Sir, the criminal case against CPL Dave Teo is pending. Investigations by the Police are

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ongoing. My answer must therefore be circumspect so as not to prejudice the ongoing case and police investigations. My answer will therefore focus on the SAF's control of arms and ammunition and be based primarily on preliminary findings by the SAF and MINDEF only.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the SAF's mission is to defend Singapore and in order to do so, it has to train and carry out duties, both in peacetime and in times of conflict and emergencies, and SAF soldiers have to be issued with weapons and ammunition. MINDEF and the SAF are very mindful that the misuse of firearms can lead to very serious consequences. Hence, there are stringent systems and procedures to ensure that arms and ammunition are strictly controlled, and that if there are any lapses in the control of arms and ammunition in the SAF, these are promptly and properly dealt with.

Following the incident involving CPL Teo, the SAF immediately convened a Higher Board of Inquiry (HBOI) to determine how this could have taken place and to review whether our current systems and procedures are adequate to prevent a similar incident from occurring. Separately, we also audited and reviewed the security of all SAF camps.

The HBOI reviewed current systems and procedures for the screening of personnel for suitability to bear arms, the issuance and use of arms and ammunition, the conduct of guard room duties, camp security, and post-incident reporting. The review concluded that these systems are sound. Together, they allow SAF soldiers to carry out their duties and training, while deterring and detecting those who may seek to steal or make improper use of arms and ammunition, making it very difficult for anyone to do so.

Dr Lam Pin Min asked about current measures to control the issuance and use

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of firearms in military service and whether there will be additional measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Let me describe the current procedures.

The SAF has very detailed procedures to control the issuance and use of arms and ammunition. Arms and ammunition are separately controlled and strictly accounted for on an individual basis. In all camps, firearms are kept in an armoury while ammunition is stored separately in ammunition dumps. In peacetime, live ammunition is only issued for live firing, guard duties and specific operational needs. Live ammunition and firearms are also kept separate in these activities until the point of use. In all cases, the issue and return of firearms and ammunition are carried out formally with clear procedures by designated persons, at designated locations.

In the Guard Rooms, firearms are to be kept chained on a rack when not in use, while ammunition is to be placed in a secured storage container. Servicemen assigned Guard Duties are only issued firearms and ammunition just before the start of their shift. These items are to be returned promptly at the end of the duty personnel's shift to the Guard Commander, who has to account for the quantity, serial number and the condition of the arms and ammunition.

For the control and management of ammunition during training and live firing exercises, a serviceman who is at least a Platoon Sergeant is tasked specifically to account for the issuance and return of ammunition. Each serviceman registers for the issue and return of his own ammunition. In ranges and live firing exercises, servicemen are only issued ammunition just prior to the commencement of their firing.

Immediately after training activities, any remaining ammunition is recovered

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and counted and returned to the ammunition depot. Spent or empty cartridges are also recovered. Servicemen are also required to check if they have inadvertently failed to return any ammunition before they make a declaration that they do not have any live rounds or empty cartridges in their possession. They are then required to empty out their personal equipment for inspection by their commanders. Accounting for rounds must be completed before training is considered to have ended. In addition, in case any serviceman has evaded these checks and secreted any rounds after the firing exercises, commanders also conduct spot checks during barrack inspections and when servicemen leave camp.

With such a system in place, the risk of theft, loss or unauthorised possession of any weapon or live round is very limited. Every serviceman knows that the unauthorised possession of any weapon or live round will result in disciplinary proceedings and very serious punishment.

The SAF also screens personnel for suitability to carry firearms. Prior to enlistment, pre-enlistees are assessed for suitability for National Service (NS). Pre-enlistees with a history of psychiatric disorder or those who have been convicted of serious offences are considered for non-enlistment for NS, depending on the severity of their condition or the severity of the offence they have committed. Those who are enlisted may be disallowed from bearing arms, or are not assigned to vocations where sensitive training or skills are involved.

After enlistment, measures are in place to ensure that servicemen deployed to various vocations are fit to discharge their duties. Commanders routinely interview

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their servicemen so that those with disciplinary or psychological problems and those in need of assistance can be identified for follow up by competent authorities. A serviceman who is assessed to be a security risk either because of his disciplinary history or mental state may be temporarily excused from duties which require him to bear arms and, after proper medical or security evaluation, re-deployed to another vocation where he does not do so.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me now turn to the HBOI's findings on the case in question. CPL Dave Teo Ming, a 20-year-old full-time National Serviceman, was serving as an Infantryman in the 1st Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment, or 1 SIR. Prior to enlistment, CPL Teo was assessed to be suitable for service as an infantryman. CPL Teo's service record during full-time NS, from his enlistment till 2nd September 2007, did not indicate behaviour that warranted disqualification from bearing firearms. CPL Teo was observed to have performed well during his unit's overseas proficiency evaluation exercise in April this year.

CPL Teo was interviewed by his Platoon Commander in June this year, who noted that he was stressed over relationship problems with his girlfriend. However, in the two interviews following that, the last being in August, he did not raise the issue of his failed relationship again. During the two weeks prior to the incident on 2nd September, neither his Platoon Commander nor his bunk mate noticed any unusual behaviour by CPL Teo.

CPL Teo was on Guard Duty and assigned patrol duties at Mandai Hill Camp on the night of 2nd September 2007. In line with procedures, he was properly issued his personal firearm, a SAR 21 rifle, and five rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition at the start of his shift at

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2000 hours. His Guard Commander realised that he was absent from his place of duty at 2359 hours, when he did not return his firearm and ammunition at the end of his shift.

A search was immediately initiated for the missing serviceman as well as for his firearm and ammunition. When preliminary investigations by the Military Police indicated that the missing firearm and ammunition were no longer on the camp premises, the Singapore Police were contacted at 0545 hours. The SAF worked closely with the Police and at about 2000 hours on 3rd September 2007, CPL Teo was apprehended at Orchard Cineleisure. I must commend the Police on a job well done in apprehending CPL Teo and in recovering his weapon and the ammunition.

When CPL Teo was arrested, his firearm and eight rounds of ammunition were recovered. All five rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition which were issued to him for guard duty on 2nd September were recovered. Investigations have traced the additional three 5.56 mm tracer rounds to a batch of ammunition that was used during a section live firing exercise that CPL Teo participated in two weeks earlier, in August 2007. The Police and the SAF are still investigating exactly how he acquired these three tracer rounds.

Sir, the HBOI concluded that although the SAF's systems and procedures are generally adequate, this incident involved three lapses specific to this situation. Firstly, there were weaknesses in the implementation and supervision of Guard Room procedures at Mandai Hill Camp that night. Secondly, weaknesses in the physical construction of Mandai Hill Camp also enabled CPL Teo to slip out without being detected. Thirdly, in terms of post-incident management, there was non-compliance with reporting procedures which require the quick reporting of all

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serious incidents, such as those involving missing arms and ammunition.

There are clear procedures, laid out in detail, for all activities under the purview of the Guard Room. Guard duties involve sentry and patrolling duties. CPL Teo was assigned patrolling duties on the night of the incident. Procedures require patrolling duties to be conducted on two-hour shifts and in pairs, to ensure mutual support and responsibility while on duty. Guards on patrol duties are also required to make situational reports to the Guard Room at half-hourly intervals.

These procedures were not carried out properly on the night that CPL Teo was on duty. If they had been properly enforced, it would have been extremely difficult for him to have left the camp undetected, and even if he had managed to slip out, his absence would probably have been detected and reported earlier.

Following this incident, the SAF has audited and reviewed the camp guard security of all SAF camps to determine whether such non-compliance of orders and procedures exists in other camps. The audit found that SAF camps comply with the relevant orders and procedures, and that this is a problem localised to this unit. Nonetheless, all SAF units have reiterated the importance of adhering to orders and procedures, and the SAF has stepped up the frequency of security audits of all SAF camps to ensure compliance with stipulated camp guard procedures.

Investigations based on video footage from the security cameras show that CPL Teo did not leave camp by the Camp gates. Investigations have shown that CPL Teo absconded by jumping off the far corner of the second floor parapet of the Guard Room onto the car park outside the Camp premises, out of the visual scope of the other Guards. Before doing so, he

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had dismantled his rifle and concealed it in his field pack. That he managed to do so, revealed a weakness in the physical security of the camp - which was designed to prevent unauthorised entry, rather than unauthorised exit - a weakness which has since been rectified at Mandai Hill Camp.

Since this incident, we have done a thorough audit of the physical security of all SAF camps and guard rooms. Most of them fully meet the physical security requirements. A few require some improvements. We are in the process of implementing these improvements and have tightened our camp physical security standards.

For serious security incidents such as those involving missing arms and ammunition, the unit's Duty Operations Officer is required to report the incident to the Army's General Staff Operations Centre, within 30 minutes.

In this case, CPL Teo, together with his firearm and ammunition, was discovered missing by the Guard Commander at 2359 hours on 2nd September, but the Army's General Staff Operations Centre was only informed of the incident at 0300 hours.

The Military Police were alerted at 0330 hours. When preliminary investigations by the Military Police indicated that the missing firearm and ammunition were no longer on the camp premises, the Police were contacted at 0545 hours.

This is a significant breach of reporting standards. The criticality of swift reporting of incidents, in particular those involving missing arms and ammunition, has been impressed upon all SAF units.

Mr Speaker, concrete action has been taken to rectify the three lapses identified by the HBOI. Personnel found to have been negligent in their conduct of duties

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in this case will also be disciplinarily dealt with.

Sir, I wish to reiterate that MINDEF and the SAF take the matter of control of arms and ammunition very seriously. The HBOI has assessed that the systems and procedures for the control of arms and ammunition in the SAF are adequate and clearly spelt out. But for systems and procedures to work properly, they rely on people for effective implementation. The SAF will continue to focus on effective training and supervision to ensure that servicemen at all levels know the procedures and how to implement them. The SAF will also be increasing the frequency of security audits in the camps to ensure compliance with orders.

MINDEF and the SAF continue to work closely with the Singapore Police in their ongoing investigations into CPL Teo's case.

Ms Indranee Rajah (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to ask the Minister two supplementary questions. The Minister has indicated that there were three breaches, as it were, one of which was delay in post-incident reporting. My question is: what was the reason why there was a delay? And the wider question is: is there a general mindset that where something goes wrong, there is that instinctive urge to hold back the reporting until, hopefully, they can do something to rectify it? If that is the case, it is something that has an impact on the SAF at large and is something that would need to be tightened up. That is the first question.

The second supplementary question is this: the Minister mentioned that all the ammunition was accounted for. In the case of CPL Dave Teo, he was found with five rounds and three rounds. The five rounds were the ones that he had when he was on guard duty. For that, the Minister has explained. But the three

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tracer rounds came from two weeks previously which would indicate that the camp was not aware that those rounds were missing. My question is how that was overlooked and whether that is something that has since been tightened up as well.

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Mr Speaker, Sir, the requirement to report immediately to the Army's General Staff Operations Centre is stated in the procedures and the camp should do so once it has realised that an incident that requires reporting has taken place. Of course, that requires an assessment of the person on the ground. I would not want to speculate specifically on this case but, in general, if you say that you find a person who is missing, it could be that the person has fallen ill or something has happened to him and, therefore, you initiate a search for him in the first place, rather than presume that he has run away. These are possible things which, on the ground, the individual Commanders have to make an assessment and whether or not they should make a report of each of these things immediately. My own assessment is that, in this case, because it did involve arms and ammunition, the Commanders should have reported earlier, and as soon as they felt that there might have been some chance of him having gone out of the camp.

In the case of ammunition, I have described the procedures in place for accounting of ammunition during live firing. These procedures are very strict and very strictly adhered to. But I cannot say that it is impossible for a determined person to secrete one or two rounds of ammunition but it will be very difficult for him to do so. He will be taking a very high risk and also it will be very difficult for him to take a large quantity of ammunition with him. There are very clear procedures in place. I think every serviceman who has been to the ranges

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for live firings will know these procedures are very strictly followed and that physical searches are also conducted, so that it is very difficult to do so and the chances of any of these things happening are very low. The investigations in this particular case are still continuing and I would not want to make any presumption on how that might have happened.