DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH INDONESIA

DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH INDONESIA:

(Implications):

1.:

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs in light of the rejection of the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Indonesia and Singapore by the Indonesian Parliamentary Commission for International Affairs and Defence, what are the implications on both the extradition treaty and the DCA.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr George Yong-Boon Yeo): Mr Speaker, Sir, it is true that a number of Indonesian DPR members have rejected the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) even before the Indonesian Government has officially submitted it to the DPR for ratification. Some claimed that the DCA infringed on Indonesia's sovereignty. Others denounced the Extradition Treaty (ET) and DCA agreements as an unfair deal for Indonesia. Many strange allegations were made against the DCA and against Singapore during hearings in the DPR.

Sir, please allow me to reiterate some key points about the ET and DCA. The two leaders, Prime Minister Lee and President Yudhoyono, agreed in October 2005 that the ET and DCA would be negotiated as a package with a balance of benefits for both sides. Their intention was for the conclusion of these two agreements to elevate relations between Indonesia and Singapore to a higher plane. It was in this spirit that Singapore negotiated the ET and DCA with Indonesia.

As to be expected, the negotiations were complex and took many rounds. It was important for both countries to

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benefit from each of the two agreements, taking into account each country's sovereignty and core interests. After nearly two years of negotiations, with both sides showing goodwill and making compromises along the way, we eventually agreed on a package of agreements on 23rd April 2007. This package comprised the ET, the DCA and four Implementing Arrangements or IAs. The four IAs were the Military Training Area IA and three other IAs on specific joint projects involving the three Services. The final round of negotiations was carried out by the Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Defence Chiefs in Singapore. All the main documents, namely the ET, DCA and the Military Training Area IA, were initialled that evening in an atmosphere of relief and celebration which was well covered by the international media. It was agreed that the main agreements would be signed in a formal signing ceremony in Bali on 27th April 2007, by the Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and the Defence Chiefs respectively, and witnessed by PM Lee and President Yudhoyono. We would have signed the other three Implementing Arrangements on that same day, but, at the Indonesians' request, purely for administrative and logistical reasons because they were not able to get all three of their Service Chiefs together for the Bali signing, we agreed that they could be signed in a separate ceremony by the Service Chiefs of both countries in Jakarta on 7th May 2007, to be witnessed by the two Defence Chiefs.

As the whole package of agreements had been agreed to by both sides, we were therefore most surprised when Indonesia asked Singapore to make substantive changes to the IAs after the main agreements had been signed. There were also arguments from the Indonesian side that the agreements were incomplete.

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Sir, as I have pointed out, the ET, the DCA and the four IAs were negotiated and concluded as parts of a carefully balanced package. Insisting on substantive changes or introducing new elements afterwards means that there was no agreement in the first place. In effect, the entire package would be unravelled. This would make future negotiations with Indonesia, or with any other country for that matter, difficult if not impossible because there would be no finality even after an agreement had been reached.

Some DPR members have asked the Indonesian Government to accept the ET but reject the DCA. This is not possible as both agreements were negotiated and concluded as a package, a point which has been publicly acknowledged by both Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono.

Singapore's position is a clear and simple one. We have to abide by the sanctity of agreements once they are concluded. While maintaining this principle, we have nevertheless tried our best to be helpful to the Indonesian Government without reopening settled agreements. We have therefore conveyed a proposal to Indonesia on 22nd May 2007 suggesting a way forward. We are still waiting for Indonesia’s response to our specific proposals. At a breakfast meeting on 12th June 2007 in Singapore, Foreign Minister Hassan assured me that there is no intention by the Indonesian side to reduce the substance of what has already been agreed. He said, however, that Indonesia needed some clarification of details to facilitate the implementation of the DCA.

Mr Speaker, Sir, we are aware that the dynamics of Indonesia's domestic debate are complicated and that the Indonesian Government may need more

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time before tabling the ET and DCA to the DPR for ratification. In the meantime, it is in the interest of both countries to continue strengthening bilateral cooperation in other areas. We are after all close neighbours with a high degree of inter-dependence.

Sir, Mr Michael Palmer has also submitted a question on the DCA to the Minister for Defence. Details on the DCA will be covered by the Minister for Defence.

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong (Tampines): Thank you, Minister, for the comprehensive reply. When the agreements were signed in Bali, it was hoped that it would bode better relations between Indonesia and Singapore but, given the opposition from the legislators in Indonesia, even the governors from Riau and the Riau Islands, and various allegations made, I wonder whether the Minister can give us an assessment of whether these two agreements would indeed spell better relations or give us new areas of dispute and friction.

Can I also ask the Minister whether he thinks there is political will at various levels to move forward on this and to make sure that at the end of the day both sides will have a balance of benefits?

Mr George Yong-Boon Yeo: Mr Speaker, Sir, there was hope when we entered the negotiations - there was certainly a lot of hope when we signed the agreements - and we continue to be hopeful that we will be able to work through the remaining problems, and have these agreements ratified by both sides and come into effect. On our side, there is no lack of will. On the part of President Yudhoyono, there is no lack of will, but we recognise at the same time that the politics of Indonesia are complicated and that sometimes, we may need a certain passage of time before some of these

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things can be done. But we remain hopeful and patient.

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