SUSPENSION OF MEMBER (Speaker's Ruling)

[Mr SPEAKER in the Chair]

Mr Ong Eng Guan (Hong Lim): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move,

That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded and that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein.

Mr Speaker, Sir, before I proceed with the subject of my motion, I wish to draw your attention to today's Straits Times which contains an account of today's proceedings. Page 1 of today's Straits Times contains a paragraph which reads as follows:

`This right has been admitted in the case of the House of Commons and in all Legislatures patterned after it.'

There is another paragraph at page 20 which reads:

`Last Monday, the Speaker ruled that under Standing Orders the Assembly had powers to discuss the motion and, if the evidence warranted it, to find the member guilty of "dishonourable conduct".'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, it reads on:

`He also said that the Assembly had inherent powers, should a member be found guilty, to suspend or even expel him.' Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to seek your opinion as to whether any of the passages referred to is a matter which is sub-judice.

Mr Speaker: The answer to the question is that there is no matter which can be considered sub-judice at the moment. The expression "sub-judice" is used with reference to a court of law. If the Member for Hong Lim is raising the point as a matter of privilege, then I will look into it and make my decision at some other time. Is that the point the Member for Hong Lim wishes to make, whether or not there has been a breach of the privileges of this House?

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Yes, Mr Speaker, I wish to raise this point as a matter of privilege. I wish also to draw your attention to the fact that this report is not only contained in the Straits Times but a similar report also appears in other newspapers.

Mr Speaker: Order. I shall look into the matter and give my ruling on some other day.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, coming back to the motion. First of all, I must ask your kind permission to permit me to trace very briefly the events in this Assembly before the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister was introduced.

On 20th October, 1960, during the debate on Malayanisation, I was challenged in this Assembly to repeat outside the speeches I made.

Mr Speaker: Order. I know it is a very difficult problem facing hon. Members, especially the Member for Hong Lim, but at the moment we are dealing specifically with the motion by the Member for Hong Lim which challenges the ruling of the Speaker in admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister. It seems to me that the motion raises a matter of academic interest, and the arguments should be confined to arguments which are of academic interest. I do not know how the incidents which led to the motion which was filed by the Deputy Prime Minister have anything to do with the motion we are now considering.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir,I am trying to trace the events which precipitated this motion so that we can discuss whether the Deputy Prime Minister raised this motion in order to uphold the dignity of the House, or whether it has got anything to do with the practice of parliamentary democracy.

Mr Speaker: Order. I am afraid if the hon. Member does that, he will go very, very far away from the motion itself. The motion merely asks this House to say that the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded. The House is asked to rescind that ruling and then to say that the Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Would you, Sir, allow me to continue from where I left off on Monday on quotations from Sir Ivor Jennings - just short extracts?

Mr Speaker: Yes, certainly, if they are relevant to the motion.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Sir, Ivor Jennings, one of the foremost British constitutional lawyers, has said in his book Parliament:

`The power of the Opposition rests only on sufferance. There is nothing whatever in the constitutional machinery that prevents an Opposition from being suppressed. Nor is there anything effective to prevent the power of the Opposition from being completely destroyed by the destruction of free elections. The Opposition cannot out vote the majority. It can only carry out the threat to defy it and appeal to the people.'

Mr Speaker, in the debate last Monday, we were assured by the Leader of the House, in his speech, that freedom of speech is not in danger. Sir, freedom of speech is the cornerstone of parliamentary democracy. We would have been happier if that were the true position in Singapore today.

The motion by the Deputy Prime Minister has quoted a historical precedent. I have not been able to search a similar precedent in other Parliaments where a Member of the Parliament has been charged with making so-called malicious falsehoods and his suspension is asked for.

Mr Speaker: Order. I have indicated before that I do not like having to intervene in a matter of such grave magnitude to the House. But it seems to me that the Member for Hong Lim is now going back to the original motion. What I think the House is interested to know is, on what grounds does the Member for Hong Lim say that the ruling of the Speaker should be rescinded and that the Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised in the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister? Mr Ong Eng Guan.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am coming slowly to the subject. The Leader of the House quoted 12 instances of breach of privilege, but he has not indicated which of the 12 commandments I have violated. Sir, it is my submission that this Assembly is not a sovereign Legislature. This Assembly is unlike the House of Commons. It is most important and vital to bear it in mind at all times during today's debate that this Assembly does not possess the same inherent powers as the House of Commons. Sir, this is my first submission.

On this subject of the powers and privileges of colonial legislatures, may I be allowed to quote from Martin Wight's book The Development of the Legislative Council which I got from the Assembly Library yesterday? This is a research on the development of colonial legislatures between the years 1606 and 1945. Mr Martin Wight says on the subject of "Privileges":

"As colonial legislatures have not the powers of the House of Commons, so they lack the House of Commons' privileges. Under the old empire, the colonial assembly regularly claimed parliamentary privileges, and governors usually conceded the exemption of assemblymen from arrest and suits at law during the session of the legislature, but as a royal grant, not an inherent right. Under the new empire, there existed means of checking colonial pretensions; and when in 1839, in the course of the troubles that led to the suspension of the first representative constitution of Newfoundland, the Newfoundland assembly ordered an arrest on a complaint of contempt of privilege committed out of doors, the case was carried to the Privy Council, which held that the assembly had only such powers as were reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions as a local legislature, but not the exclusive privileges which the ancient law of England has annexed to the House of Parliament'. Subsequent judgments have confirmed that a colonial legislature can remove an obstruction to business, but not punish for any action taken. The extraordinary privileges of the British House of Commons, existing by ancient usage and prescription, are the consequence of its complex and unique origins which transcend the merely legislative function. They cannot be claimed by a colonial legislature by virtue of performing similar legislative functions, but only by virtue of its own enactment. There is no doubt that apart from statute a colonial legislature had no more real power than a debating society except in so far as measures to preserve order therein might be allowed to take more drastic forms than in a mere debating society'.".

Sir, that is my first submission.

In support of this first contention, Sir, may I quote from the book by Sir Henry John May on the South African Constitution, wherein he writes on the powers and privileges of Parliament? Sir, on page 126 of his book, Sir Henry John May wrote:

`In the United Kingdom, Parliament has from ancient times enjoyed certain privileges and powers founded mainly upon the law and custom of Parliament lex el consueludo Parliarnenti based upon ancient usage. Each House adjudges whether any breach of privilege has been committed and punishes offenders by censure or commitment the courses of which can now be inquired into by the courts of law. This body of custom, though narrowed and confirmed by statute is peculiar to the Parliament of the United Kingdom and it cannot therefore be inferred that like power belong to the legislative assemblies of comparatively recent creation in the dependencies of the Crown. When a Legislature is created in a colony and no special statutory powers are granted to it, it possesses only such powers as are reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions and duties as a local legislature. The deciding line is to be found in the distinction between the powers to punish for contempt, which is the judicial power, and the power to remove any obstruction offered to the deliberations or actions of the legislative sitting, which last power is necessary for self-preservation. If a member of an assembly is guilty of disorderly conduct in the House while it is sitting, he may be removed or excluded for a time, and even expelled, so that the House may proceed with its deliberations. But there is a great difference between such powers and the judicial power of inflicting a penal sentence for the offence. The right to remove in order to facilitate the business of the House is one thing; the right to inflict punishment is another.'

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I, with all humility, submit to you that this Assembly has no inherent power which the House of Commons enjoys? This House has no inherent power even if this, Sir, is a sovereign legislature. As I mentioned just now, Sir, in the South African example, the powers and privileges of Parliament have to be derived from statute. Sir Henry John May wrote in his book, which I quoted just now, on page 127:

`It has therefore been thought necessary specially to grant the Union Parliament [i.e. the Union of South Africa Parliament] such powers and privileges as it should have. Section 57 of the South Africa Act provided that until Parliament was able to draw up its own code, the powers and privileges of the Cape Parliament were to apply [i.e. the Cape Parliament]. In 1911 Parliament [i.e. the South African Parliament] passed the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act. This is a comprehensive statutory code defining the powers and privileges of Parliament and of its Members and Officers, and contempt of Parliament, and it regulates the methods by which contempt of Parliament may be punished.'

Sir, arising from my submission just now, firstly, the power to condemn, and, secondly, the power to suspend Assemblymen in this House must be derived from statute. There is no inherent power as there is in the House of Commons. Therefore, it must be derived from either (1) the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, or (2) it should be derived from an Ordinance passed by this Legislative Assembly, or (3) it should be derived from the Standing Orders of this Assembly.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I shall first speak on the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council. Apart from section 48 empowering the making of Standing Orders, the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council contains no provision which could be construed as directly creating a power in this Assembly to regulate its own internal affairs. The only other provision of this Order in Council relevant to the privileges of the Assembly is section 59, which reads:

`It shall be lawful, by law enacted under this Order, to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly and its Members but no such privileges, immunities or powers shall exceed those of the Commons' House of Parliament in the United Kingdom or of the Members thereof.'

Mr Speaker, Sir, this is not a direct grant of privileges. It is thus clear that the Singapore Constitution does not make provision for the expulsion pf Members. It is also my submission, Sir, that the Singapore Constitution does not make provision for the suspension of Members.

It is therefore my second submission, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the second part of the Deputy Prime Minister's motion is ultra vires the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council. 1958. Sir, we must thus seek the power, if there is any, in an Ordinance. The only relevant Ordinance is Ordinance No. 33 of 1955 - the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance. Section 20, which is the only provision, empowers, the Assembly to suspend Members but only in the case of contempt of the Assembly. Section 20 defines "contempt of the Assembly" as:

`(1) Any member of the Assembly who

(a) being a member of a Committee of the Assembly, publishes to any person not being a member of such committee any evidence taken by the committee before it has been reported to the Assembly; or

(b) assaults or obstructs a member of the Assembly within the Chamber or precincts of the Assembly; or

(c) assaults or obstructs any officer of the Assembly while in the execution of his duty; or

(d) is convicted of any offence under this Ordinance,

shall be guilty of contempt of this Assembly.'

Mr Speaker, Sir, the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister does not charge the Member for Hong Lim for contempt of the Assembly. I am not being charged for having violated any provisions of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance. Sir, it is therefore my third submission that the Singapore Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, does not empower this Assembly to pass the second part of the Deputy Prime Minister's motion, that is, to suspend the Member for Hong Lim on the charges laid down in the first part of his motion. Sir, from there onwards -

Mr Speaker: Order. I would like, and perhaps the Members would like, to clear the issue. It seems to me that the hon. Member for Hong Lim is now debating as to whether this Assembly has he power to, suspend or even to punish, apart from the powers given by the statute. What I think the honourable Members of this Assembly would like to know, and I myself would like to know, is whether or not this Assembly is debarred from debating the Question - there is a subtle difference there. I trust the hon. Member for Hong Lim is following me. I think what the Assembly would like to know, on the motion before this Assembly, is whether or not this Assembly is even barred from debating the subject matter. As to what the Assembly can do in the circumstances is also another issue, that is the punitive power of the Assembly. Is the hon. Member for Hong Lim now alleging that this House has no jurisdiction even to debate the substance of the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister? I think that is the issue which has been raised in the hon. Member's motion. The other issue is how far the Assembly can go in the matter. They are perhaps issues which can be taken up when we deal with the Deputy Prime Minister's motion. The point now is: can this Assembly debate that motion?

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I will come to that later. Continuing from what I said just now, it is my third submission that since the Singapore Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance declares itself, in its long title, to be "An Ordinance to declare and define certain powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly", and since by section 2C it does declare and define the power of suspension, it follows that no other power of suspension exists. Mr Speaker, I will come to the first part - if I could try to explain. I am trying to go through both parts in one breath.

Sir, let me now refer to the Standing Orders of the Singapore Legislative Assembly. Is there any power under the Standing Orders for the Deputy Prime Minister's motion? Last Wednesday, when the Deputy Prime Minister wanted to move a motion for suspension under No. 30 (e) of the Standing Orders, it was ruled that Standing Order 30 (e) should he read in conjunction with Standing Order No. 56. Reference was therefore made to Standing Order 56, paragraph (5), which reads as follows:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the Assembly of the power of proceeding against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly.'

Sir, may you permit me to dwell at some great length on the interpretation of S.O. 56 (5)?

In the past two days, I have gone through the Standing Orders of many other colonial legislatures, and they are basically the same. They are based on model Standing Orders adopted by the Colonial Office Conference in 1927. Thus, Standing Order 56 (5) of the Singapore Standing Orders is to be found in the Standing Orders of almost every other colonial legislature. Before I dwell at great length on Standing Order 56 (5), may I first explain that paragraph (2) of Singapore Standing Order No. 103 could also be found in the Standing Orders of other colonial legislatures? Standing Order 103 (2) states that in any matter for which the Standing Orders of Singapore do not provide, the relevant practice of the House of Commons shall be followed, but no restriction which the House of Commons has introduced by Standing Order shall be deemed to extend to the Singapore Assembly or its Members until the Assembly has itself provided by Standing Order for such restriction.

Sir, first of all, what is meant by "the relevant practice of the House of Commons" on the suspension of Members? According to Erskine May, in his authoritative work "Parliamentary Practice", (16th Edition.). pages 104 and 105, it appears that suspension can still theoretically be imposed at the discretion of the House of Commons, But on 25th July, 1877, as a result of persistent obstruction by Members, Mr Speaker Brand made the following ruling:-

`The House is perfectly well aware that any Member persistently and wilfully obstructing public business without just and reasonable cause is guilty of contempt of this House and is liable to punishment, whether by censure, suspension from the service of the House, or commitment, according to the judgment of the House.'

This is reported in the House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 1877, 235, col. 1814. Therefore, in February 1880, the procedure for suspending a Member was laid down in Standing Order 22 of the British House of Commons. Please refer to page 471 of Erskine May. The House of Commons' Standing Order 22 is similar to the Singapore Standing Order 56. Since February 1880, it appears that no suspension of Members has been made except on grounds contained in Standing Order 22. It seems, therefore, that in the House of Commons, suspension of a Member has been restricted to cases covered by the House of Commons' Standing Order 22, which is Singapore Standing Order 56. Although the House of Commons, in theory, has inherent and absolute power, it nevertheless, Mr Speaker, is restricted in its practice by a huge body of conventions and precedents. This is important, and we should bear this in mind when we interpret the words "the inherent power of the House of Commons".

Sir, this restriction of powers on the suspension of Members in the House of Commons has been introduced in Singapore by Standing Order 56. My submission to you, Sir, is that according to the practice of the House of Commons, the Deputy Prime Minister's motion is out of order. The Deputy Prime Minister has not quoted any precedent from the House of Commons' practice to back his case. Sir, suspension of a Member under Standing Order 56 must comply with the following conditions:-

First, the offence must be (a) disregarding the authority of the Chair, and (b) persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of the Assembly by abusing the rules of the Assembly;

Second, the motion must be made immediately after the commission of the offence.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have not been charged for having violated Standing Order 56 or any other Standing Orders of this Assembly. Can this Assembly use Standing Order 56 (5) to suspend a Member? Standing Order 56 (5) cannot be interpreted to mean that this Assembly can pass any resolution for whatever reason against any Member. These are my arguments. Sir. Standing Order 56 (5) cannot be taken in its literal sense as Standing Order 30 (e) cannot be taken in its literal sense. Otherwise, acting under Standing Order 30 (e), this Assembly can suspend a Member at any time without notice, without reason, without debate, and even during his absence.

Mr Speaker, Sir, it has been ruled that Standing Order 30 (e) should be read in the general context of the whole Standing Orders of the Singapore Legislative Assembly and with special reference to Standing Order 56. It is thus my contention, Sir, that likewise Standing Order 56, paragraph (5) should be read in the general context of the whole Standing Orders of the Singapore Legislative Assembly with special reference to Standing Orders 52 to 58 which come under the general heading of "Rules of order in the Assembly". The whole purpose of Standing Orders 52 to 58 is to preserve order in the Assembly. Everyone of these seven Standing Orders deals with rules of order. Briefly they are:

Standing Order 52: The Chairman to be heard in silence.

Standing Order 53: Decision of the Chair is final.

Standing Order 54: Irrelevance or repetition may cause speech to be discontinued.

Standing Order 55: Disorderly conduct.

Standing Order 56: Order in debate.

And in this Standing Order 56, a Member can be suspended only for disregarding the authority of the Chair or persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of the Assembly by abusing the rules.

Standing Order 57: Suspended Members to withdraw from precincts of the Assembly.

Standing Order 58 gives the Speaker power to adjourn or suspend a sitting in case of grave disorder.

Sir, it is clear that these Standing Orders, that is, Standing Orders 52 to 58, are rules of order in the Assembly - that is, order in debate - and if a Member has not been guilty of any offence under any of such Standing Orders, no motion to suspend is justified under the Standing Orders, and it is, therefore, out of order.

Mr Speaker. Sir, I have not been charged for any offence against these Standing Orders. It is therefore my contention, Sir, that Standing Order 56, paragraph (5) is controlled and restricted by Standing Order 56, paragraph (1) according to the rule of law known as usdern genesis, that is, of the same kind or nature. This is one of the rules of construction applied by the courts in construing documents of all kinds, whether statutes, deeds, mercantile documents and others. My submission is that S.O. 56 (5) is therefore restricted to those grounds of suspension set out in S.O. 56 (1) . S.O. 56 (5) should be read under the general heading of Standing Orders 52 to 58. "Rules of order in the Assembly". Under Standing Order 56 (5) , a Member, as distinct from the Chair, under S.O. 56 (1) may move a motion against another Member for having violated S.O. 56 (1) to maintain order in the debate in case the Chair did not move such a motion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, therefore S.O. 56 (5) is very useful in case the Chair is occupied by a less capable person or by a Party man. It is also my contention that the phrase in S.O. 56 (5) "Proceeding against" cannot be interpreted to include the powers of suspension or expulsion. It could mean reprimand. It could mean that this House can levy, say, a forfeit or anything on a guilty Member. Mr Speaker, Sir, if it were ever intended that S.O. 56 (5) should be read in its literal construction, then my submission is that Standing Order 56 (5) should have been a separate and independent Standing Order when the model Standing Orders were drafted and adopted by the Colonial Office Conference in 1927, and not as a paragraph under Standing Order 56. Sir, it should be as an independent Standing Order. Perhaps a new Standing Order to be numbered, say, 104, after the 103 Standing Orders in this Assembly. It should be taken out of the heading "Rules of order in the Assembly".

Sir, in 1927, when the Colonial Office Conference was held and which adopted the set of model Standing Orders for all colonial legislatures, most of the colonial legislatures then were having official majorities with the Governor taking the Chair. The colonial legislatures were legislative only formally. For though its consent is necessary to pass legislation and the Annual Estimates, that consent is assured by the official majority. The capacity of the unofficial members, mostly nominated, is really advisory. The nominated unofficial members, being nominated by the Crown, will always co-operate with the Crown on general policy and important issues for obvious reasons. The most important activity of these Colonial legislatures at that period was the debate on the Annual Estimates. This is what Martin Wight in his book, "The Development of the Legislative Council" at page 123 said:

"`There is no doubt that apart from statute a colonial legislature had no more real power than a debating society except in so far as measures to preserve order therein might be allowed to take more drastic forms than in a mere debating society.' ".

Sir, I emphasise the words "to preserve order". The Singapore Standing Orders are based on the model Standing Orders of the Colonial Office Conference of 1927, and Standing Orders 52 to 58 are meant just for the preservation of order in this Assembly.

Sir, during the past two days I have made a study of the Standing Orders of other colonial legislatures. May you permit me to reproduce here the equivalent of Standing Order 56 (5) in the Standing Orders of other legislatures to show the interpretation, and they are all concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir, with breaches of order? First of all, Nigeria. Under the Standing Orders of Nigeria, Standing Orders 33 to 35 come under the general heading of "Order". S.O. 35 (9) says this:

`Nothing in this Order shall be taken to deprive the House of the power of proceeding against any Member resolution of the House.'.

Word by word the same as S.O. 56 (5) of Singapore Standing Orders.

Jamaica - Standing Order 29. The heading is "Speaker to be heard in silence." Standing Order 30 - "Responsibility for Order." Standing Order 31 - "Breaches of Order". I quote the equivalent of our S.O. 56 (5). That is Standing Order 31(9):

`Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to prevent the House from proceeding against any Member for any breach of order not specified therein or from proceeding in any other way it thinks fit in dealing with the breaches of order herein mentioned.'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, you will see that the Jamaican equivalent of S.O. 56 (5) deals, in more detail, with what is the purpose of that particular clause.

I shall now deal with the Standing Orders of Hong Kong. Standing Order 21 - "President to be heard in silence."; S.O. 22 - "Responsibility for Order"; S.O. 23 - "Breaches of Order". I shall reproduce the equivalent of S.O. 56 (5) in Hong Kong. Their's is Standing Order 23 (9):

`Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to prevent the Council from proceeding against any Member for any breach of order not specified therein or from proceeding in any other way it thinks fit in dealing with the breaches of order.'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I must beg your pardon if I am trying your patience in repeating all these Standing Orders. I now come to the Gold Coast. Standing Orders 46 to 48 come under the general heading "Rules of Order". Rule 46 - "Chair to be heard in silence"; 47 - "Decision of Chair final"; 48 - "Order in the Assembly". I shall now reproduce the equivalent of our S.O. 56 (5) in the Gold Coast Standing Orders. Their's is S.O.48(8):

`Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to prevent the Assembly from proceeding against any Member for any offence not specified herein.'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, please remember the word "offence". "Offence" means "offence against breaches of order". Now I shall produce the Standing Orders of our closest neighbour, the Federation of Malaya. Both 1950 and 1957 are the same on this subject. Standing Order 47 concerns breaches of order. S.O. 47 (9), which is the equivalent of our S.O. 56 (5), reads as follows:

`Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to prevent the Council from proceeding against any' Member for any breach of order not specified herein or from proceeding in any other reasonable way it thinks fit in dealing with the breaches of order herein mentioned.'.

Now, Mr Speaker, Sir, I come to Ceylon. Standing Orders 82 to 87 come under the general heading of "Order in the House", and Standing Order 87 says:

`Nothing in these Orders shall prevent the House from proceeding against any Member for breaches of order specified in these Orders in any other manner than the manner specified in these Orders.'.

Mr Speaker, my last quotation will be from the Standing Orders of the Assembly of Victoria, Australia. Standing Order 141 of the Victorian Parliament is a very long one and reads as follows. (It is in one Standing Order):

`If any Member be named by the President or reported by the Chairman of Committees for

(a) wilfully interrupting or making a disturbance during the business of the Council or Committee of the whole Council; or

(b) disorderly conduct or;

(c) using objectionable words and refusing to withdraw the same or behaving offensively and refusing to make a satisfactory apology; or

(d) wilfully and persistently refusing to conform to the Standing Orders; or

(e) wilfully disregarding the authority of the Chair,

such Member shall be called upon to make an explanation or apology he thinks fit and a motion may be moved forthwith, no amendment, adjournment or debate being allowed, that such Member be suspended from the service of the Council during the remainder of the sitting or for such period as the Council may think fit. Any Member suspended under this Standing Order shall immediately withdraw and shall not come within the precincts of the House during the period of his suspension unless, on receipt of a satisfactory apology in writing, the Council resolved on motion made without notice and determined without amendment or debate to discharge the order of suspension. Nothing herein shall be taken to deprive the Council of the power of proceeding against any Member according to ancient usages.'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this is one of the best quotations so far. In the Victorian Parliament, Standing Order 141 is in only one paragraph. It is not like the Singapore Standing Orders separated into five paragraphs, and the last sentence in the whole paragraph is this:

`Nothing herein shall be taken to deprive the Council of the power of proceeding against any Member according to ancient usages.'

Mr Speaker, Sir, from the examples of the other legislatures I have quoted above, Standing Order 56 (5) of Singapore is clear. It is concerned only with a breach of order in this Assembly and is not capable of wider interpretations. Therefore, under Standing Order 56 (5), the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister, which charges a Member for making malicious falsehoods, is out of order.

Mr Speaker, Sir, during the speech the Deputy Prime Minister has not stated under which specific authority this Assembly can discuss this motion.

1. Was it under the inherent powers of the House of Commons?

Sir, I have submitted just now that a colonial legislature has no inherent power, unlike the House of Commons; or

2. Was it under the Singapore Constitution?

I have submitted, Sir, that as far as the second part of his motion is concerned, the Singapore Constitution makes no provisions for the suspension or expulsion of Members. The Deputy Prime Minister's second part of the motion is against the Singapore Constitution; or

3. Was it under the Singapore Legislative (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance?

I have submitted, Sir, that I have not been charged for having violated the laws of this Ordinance which provides for the suspension of Members. The Deputy Prime Minister's motion is therefore against this particular Ordinance; or

4. Was it under the relevant practice of the House of Commons?

I have submitted, Sir, that the Deputy Prime Minister gave us 12 breaches of privilege. He quoted 12 commandments and he did not indicate which of them I have violated. On the one hand, the Deputy Prime Minister quoted 12 breaches of privileges; on the other hand, he charged me for abuse of privilege. It seems to me that he is not clear about even the fundamental distinction

Mr Speaker: Order. I think the hon. Member should not go into a debate now on the details of the Deputy Prime Minister's motion. Let us now concentrate on what I have called this academic problem. We should try, as far as we can, to confine ourselves to that.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, no precedent in the House of Commons has been, quoted as an authority. I believe there has been no such precedent. The motion is thus against the practices in the House of Commons.

I have also submitted, Sir, the restrictions imposed on this Assembly by S.O. 103 (2) of the Singapore Standing Orders; or

5. Was it under Standing Order 56 (5)? Just now I quoted at length Standing Order 56 (5) which concerns itself only with a breach of order in the Assembly and is not capable of wider interpretations.

Sir, I have not been charged for a breach of order. Where is the authority, Sir, for the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister? It is therefore my humble submission, Sir, that this Assembly has no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with the matters raised in the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister. I submit that his motion is against the provisions of the Singapore Constitution, against the Singapore Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, and against the Standing Orders of this Assembly. Sir, I submit that the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister is out of order and unconstitutional.

Sir, on an unprecedented constitutional issue of this nature, whether this Legislative Assembly will be acting ultra vires the Singapore Constitution and against the laws of this country, I must submit that the decision cannot be made by vote of the House. In my opinion, Sir, none of us here is an authority on constitutional matters, despite the fact that all of us have a battery of lawyers studying this grave constitutional issue facing this Assembly. I must submit, Sir, that this Assembly should seek expert advice from leading constitutional experts in the United Kingdom and, in the meantime, no decision can be made by this Assembly.

Sir, to this Assembly, this is a constitutional issue, but I consider this is not merely a constitutional issue. It is at the same time a grave political issue.

Mr Speaker: Order. I think, at the moment, this Assembly is not interested in the political issue. I think it is interested in the constitutional issue. Let us concentrate on the constitutional issue.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: I will finish within a few seconds, Sir, I therefore ask the Prime Minister to take this issue to the people. Resign both our seats forthwith to take this-

Mr Speaker: Order. It is completely irrelevant to the motion that is before the House. The motion is quite clear. It seeks to convince this House that the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister cannot be heard, and I think that is all we are interested in in this House. If there is to be a challenge of any sort, that can be made elsewhere, but not in the Assembly.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Thank you, Sir. This is my speech. Sir, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Before I pose the Question, I think the Member for Hong Lim might make the issues he has raised more clear. By his speech is he saying that the Speaker ought to have ruled the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister out of order just like that, out of hand? Is that it?

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Yes, Mr Speaker, Sir, that is my submission.

Mr Speaker: Another point of elucidation then is this. If therefore a Member - I am only taking a hypothetical case - is alleged in this House to be guilty of abuse of the freedom of speech by uttering slanderous words in this Assembly which might bring this Assembly into disrepute, is the Member for Hong Lim then urging that this Assembly. firstly, cannot condemn or suspend the Member and, secondly, that this Assembly cannot even debate the conduct of the Member in this Assembly?

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, that is also my submission. I have submitted just now that there is nothing in the statute to provide for such a motion.

Question proposed.

The Deputy Prime Minister (Dr Toh Chin Chye): Mr Speaker, I have taken the State Advocate-General's opinion on this motion moved by the Member for Hong Lim.

The Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, enables the Legislative Assembly to make, amend and revoke the Standing Orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business. In the exercise of this power, the Legislative Assembly has made Standing Orders, and Standing Orders 52 to 58 of these Standing Orders provide for the rules of order in the Assembly Standing Order 56 (1) to (4) reads as follows:

`(1) Whenever a Member has been named by the Speaker or by the Chairman, immediately'-

Mr C. H. Koh (Joo Chiat): On a point of explanation.

Dr Toh Chin Chye resumed his seat.

Mr Koh: Mr Speaker, Sir, may the Hon. the Deputy Prime Minister give us the section of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, which he says gives the power to do such and such a thing?

Dr Toh Chin Chye: I refer to section 48 (1) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, which reads: `Standing Subject to the provisions of this Orders. Order, the Assembly may from time to time make, amend and revoke Standing Orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business.'

I hope, Sir, that will satisfy the Member for Joo Chiat.

Now, let me proceed. Standing Order 56 (1) reads as follows:

`Whenever a Member has been named by the Speaker or by the Chairman, immediately after the commission of the offence of disregarding the authority of the Chair, or of persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of the Assembly by abusing the rules of the Assembly, or otherwise, then, if the offence has been committed by such Member in the Assembly a motion shall forthwith be proposed by a Minister or Parliamentary Secretary present "That Mr... be suspended from the service of the Assembly", and the Speaker shall forthwith put the question on that motion, no amendment, adjournment or debate being allowed; and, if the offence has been committed in Committee of the whole Assembly, the Chairman shall forthwith suspend the proceedings of the Committee and report the circumstances to the Assembly; and the Speaker shall on a motion being made as aforesaid forthwith put the same question, no amendment, adjournment or debate being allowed, as if the offence had been committed in the Assembly itself.'

Paragraph (2) reads:

`Not more than one Member shall he named at the same time, unless two or more Members, present together, have jointly disregarded the authority of the Chair.'

Paragraph (3) reads:

`If a Member is suspended under the provisions of this Standing Order, he shall he directed by the Speaker to withdraw. His suspension shall last for such period as may be determined by the Assembly.'

Paragraph (4) reads:

`If a Member, or two or more Members acting jointly, who have been suspended under this Standing Order from the service of the Assembly, shall refuse to obey the direction of the Speaker to withdraw, when severally summoned under the orders of the Speaker by the Serjeant at Arms to obey such direction, the Speaker shall call the attention of the Assembly to the fact that recourse to force is necessary in order to compel obedience to his direction. When the Member or Members named by him as having refused to obey his direction has or have been removed from the Assembly he or they shall thereupon without any further question being put be suspended from the service of the Assembly during the remainder of the session.'

Now, Sir, so far the Standing Orders deal with the powers of the Speaker or Chairman to deal with any Member who commits the offence of disregarding the authority of the Chair, or of persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of the Assembly by abusing the rules of the Assembly; but Standing Order 56 (5) goes on to provide that:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the Assembly of the power of proceeding against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly.'

Sir, quite apart from the powers of the Speaker or Chairman under Standing Order 56 (1), the Legislative Assembly itself has power to proceed against any Member by resolution. It is under Standing Order 56 (5) that my motion was brought.

You, Sir, have ruled that I have satisfied the House that the proceedings I took were proper to be brought and could properly be debated in the Legislative Assembly. The Member for Hong Lim has now challenged this ruling under Standing Order 53 which provides:

`The Speaker in the Assembly . . . shall be responsible for the observance of the rules of order in the Assembly. . . and his decision on any point of order shall not be open to appeal and shall not be reviewed by the Assembly except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose.'

Section 54 (1) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, in so far as it deals with motions, provides that:

`Subject to the provisions of this Order and of the Standing Orders of the Assembly, any Member may ... propose any motion for debate in ... the Assembly, and the same shall be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of the Assembly.'

The limitations on the powers of the Assembly are expressly laid down in the Order in Council: for example, in section 54 (2) (b) which says, in effect, that the Assembly shall not proceed upon any motion the effect of which is to impose or increase any tax, or to impose or increase any charge on the revenues or other funds of Singapore, except on the recommendation of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara signified by a Minister. Thus, prima facie, the Assembly has power to deal with any motion, and anyone who asserts that the Assembly has no such power must show that there is some statutory provision in the Order in Council which restricts the powers of the Assembly.

The first part of my motion seeks merely to condemn the Member for Hong Lim for his undignified conduct. I would submit that this Assembly has clearly powers to deal with this part of the motion. Standing Order No. 46, paragraph (10) provides that:

`The personal conduct of Members of the Assembly shall not be referred to except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose.'

This, when read together with Standing Order No. 56, paragraph (5), which provides that:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall he taken to deprive the Assembly of the power of proceeding against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly.'.

gives the Assembly power to condemn the conduct of any Member. Such a power is necessary to maintain the decorum and dignity of the Assembly and must be possessed by every Legislative Assembly. The Member for Hong Lim has referred to this Legislative Assembly as a colonial legislature. The Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, confers complete internal self-government on the State. This Assembly has, therefore, sovereignty over its own proceedings, and it cannot be called a colonial legislature. I would therefore say, Sir, that there is no doubt as to the correctness of your ruling that this Assembly is competent to deal with the first part of my motion.

Mr Speaker: The motion by the Member for Hong Lim also takes in the second part of the motion. I do not know whether the Leader of the House would like to touch on that aspect.

Dr Toh Chin Chye: I will deal with that when the time comes, and after we have disposed of the first part of my motion.

Mr Speaker: In elucidation, I think the Members of the House would like to know whether it is the contention of the Leader of the House then that the Speaker's ruling in admitting the second part of the motion is also in order. Perhaps I could make myself a little clearer. Apart from the question whether or not the Assembly, in fact, has the power to suspend - that is apart from that Question because in debating the second part of the motion, the Assembly is, of course, at liberty to make amendments; if it is satisfied that there is no power to suspend, then, of course, the amendment could be to censure or to admonish.

Dr Toh Chin Chye: Mr Speaker, Sir, if it is your wish, I will deal with the second part of the motion.

May I begin, Sir, by referring to your ruling on Monday? I quote from the [unrevised] transcript of proceedings of this House on 19th December, 1960:

`As I see it, therefore, if this House is satisfied that the conduct of the hon. Member for Hong Lim is such as to be an affront to its own dignity and prestige in the sense, inter alia, that that conduct has brought discredit to the House as a whole - not merely to individual Members of the Government Parliamentary Party, or indeed, to any other Member of the House or to persons outside this House - then the House may feel itself justified in condemning or censuring the hon. Member for Hong Lim and therefore in proceeding to consider what punishment, consonant with its powers, it should mete out to him.

What those powers are is a matter of law on which I am not called upon to pronounce. Suffice it to say that there is an undoubted power inherent in any House, in the interest of the orderly conduct of its business and the preservation of its dignity and prestige, inter alia, to suspend or even expel Members who are, in its opinion, unfit to sit in the House and who would bring discredit upon it. But let me sound a word of warning. Whether this Assembly has those extreme powers unabridged, is a matter this Assembly will have to inquire into with care and, if need be, upon which this Assembly might wish to seek legal advice. I myself feel it my duty as the guardian of the privileges of this House and the custodian of the rights of hon. Members to sound that note of warning having regard to

Firstly, section 48 (1) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, which I have already quoted;

Secondly, the Standing Orders made thereunder;

Thirdly, section 59 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, which reads as follows:-

"59. It shall be lawful, by laws enacted under this Order, to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly and its Members; but no such privileges, immunities or powers shall exceed those of the Commons' House of Parliament in the United Kingdom or of the Members thereof.";

Fourthly, the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, the long title of which reads as follows:-

"An Ordinance to declare and define certain powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly established under the Singapore Colony Order in Council, 1955, and of the Members of such Legislative Assembly, to regulate the conduct of members and other persons in connection with the proceedings thereof, to give protection to the persons employed in the publication of the reports and other papers of the Legislative Assembly and for purposes incidental to or connected with the matters aforesaid.".'

Sir, those provisions of law and of the Standing Orders do give to this Assembly powers to suspend a Member under certain circumstances. But as I have indicated, this Assembly will have to satisfy itself that these provisions of law and of the Standing Orders have not, in fact, abridged the inherent power of this Assembly to suspend a Member, more especially in the circumstances which have arisen in this particular matter. The powers of the Legislative Assembly to regulate and to provide for the orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business is contained in section 48 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958. Section 59 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council also provides that:

`It shall be lawful, by laws enacted under this Order, to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly and its Members; but no such privileges, immunities or powers shall exceed those of the Commons' House of Parliament in the United Kingdom or of the Members thereof.'

No such law has so far been made under the Order in Council. The Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly established under the Singapore Colony Order in Council, 1955. But the Ordinance is made applicable to the present Legislative Assembly by virtue of section 121 (2) (f) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958. The Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, was enacted under the Singapore Colony Order in Council, 1955, which had a provision in section 65 similar to section 59 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958. While the Orders in Council of 1955 and 1958 enable legislation to be enacted to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly and its Members, the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, merely purports, as stated in its long title, to declare and define certain powers - I repeat - certain powers, privileges and immunities of the Assembly and its Members. The Ordinance is, therefore, not exhaustive of the powers, privileges and immunities of the Assembly. It seeks, in the main, to deal with the privileges and powers of the Assembly vis-a-vis the Courts.

Contempts of the Assembly are dealt with in section 20 of the Ordinance, but the Ordinance does not seek to deal exhaustively with all the powers of the Assembly vis-a-vis its own Members. The regulation of the orderly conduct of the proceedings of the Assembly is a matter on which the Assembly itself is competent to make Standing Orders for their purpose. Standing Orders derive their validity not from any local Ordinance, but from the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, itself. And the provisions of Standing Order 56, paragraph (5) which refers to the power of the Assembly to proceed against any Member according to a resolution of the Assembly, cannot be read subject to the provisions of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955. It cannot seriously be argued, for example, that Standing Order 56 paragraph (1), which clearly gives the Assembly power in certain circumstances to suspend a Member, is ultra vires the provisions of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955. Neither can that Ordinance affect the inherent powers, of the Legislative Assembly which are referred to in Standing Order 56, paragraph (5) . The inherent powers of a colonial legislature, even if we regard this Assembly as a colonial legislature, have been dealt with in a number of Privy Council cases. In Calvin vs. Castle, 1844. Volume 4; more Privy Council cases, 63, Baron Park, in giving the opinion of the Privy Council, said:

`We feel no doubt that such an Assembly has the right of protecting itself from all impediments to the due course of its proceedings. To the full extent of every measure which it may be really necessary to adopt to secure the free exercise of their legislative functions, they are justified in acting by the principle of the common law.'

In Burton vs. Taylor, 1886, Volume 11, Appeal Cases, page 197, the Earl of Selbourne, in giving the opinion of the Privy Council, said:

`It results from these authorities that no powers of that kind are incident to or inherent in a colonial Legislative Assembly without express grant except as such as are necessary to the existence of such a body, and the proper exercise of its functions which it is intended to execute. Whatever in a reasonable sense is necessary for these purposes is impliedly granted whenever such a legislative body is established by competent authority.'

Later in his speech he said:

`The power, therefore, of suspending a Member guilty of obstructing or disorderly conduct during the continuance of any current sitting is, in their Lordships' judgment, reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of any Legislative Assembly of this kind. And it may well be that the same doctrine of reasonable necessity would authorise a suspension until submission of apology by the offending Member which, if he were refractory, might cause it to be prolonged, not by the arbitrary discretion of the Assembly, but by his own wilful default for some further time.'

At the very least, therefore, the Legislative Assembly has the power, even if it is regarded as a colonial legislature by the Member for Hong Lim, to take such measures as are necessary to secure its existence and the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to execute. In addition, we have the express power contained in Standing Order 56 paragraph (5). This gives the Legislative Assembly power to proceed against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly. The procedure for this is not expressly laid down, but for this, reliance can be placed on Standing Order 103 paragraph (2), which provides, in effect, that in any matter for which the Standing Orders do not provide, the practice of the House of Commons shall be followed.

Section 54 (1) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, in so far as it deals with motions, provides that:

`Subject to the provisions of this Order and of the Standing Orders of the Assembly, any Member may ... propose any motion for debate in ... Assembly, and the same shall be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of the Assembly.'

The limitations on the powers of the Assembly are expressly laid down in the Order in Council, for example, in section 54 (2) (b), which says, in effect, that the Assembly shall not proceed upon any motion the effect of which is to impose or increase any tax, or impose or increase any charge on the revenues of Singapore except on the recommendation of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara signified by a Minister.

Thus, prima facie, the Assembly has power to deal with any motion, and anyone who asserts that the Assembly has no such power must show that there is some statutory provision in the Order in Council which restricts the powers of the Assembly. Even if we are unable to find any express enactment giving us power to deal with this motion, this House should, in my opinion, be bold and generous enough to claim and assert the power. For to say that this Assembly has no power to deal with this motion is tantamount to asserting that this House is unable to regulate the orderly conduct of its own business. This Assembly will then cease to be an effective body, and instead of decorum and order, we will have licensed misconduct and chaos. If anyone should assert that this House has no power to adopt this motion, let him go to some other tribunal and say that the Assembly has no such power. This House at least should not accept the argument that it has no such power. Nay, even if some other tribunal were to assert that the House has no such power, we should not meekly accept such a ruling, but should assert the legislative supremacy of this House to give itself such power.

It would be a surrender of our powers, rights and privileges for us to say that such a motion as is proposed cannot be moved and adopted by this Assembly. Whilst Standing Order 56 paragraph (5) gives the Assembly power to take proceedings against any Member by resolution, it does not set out the practice and procedure, and we have, therefore, to go for guidance to the practice and procedure of the House of Commons. The practice in England, as I have stated earlier, is, if the matter of the complaint is a charge alleged to be made by one Member against another, to give an opportunity to the Member to establish the charge, that is, if he wishes to do so; or to withdraw the charge. Where the Member has refused either to withdraw the charge or to substantiate it, the House may adjudge him guilty of a breach of privilege and deal with him accordingly. Where the Member accused has made a proper apology, the motion may be withdrawn, or the House, while condemning the Member's conduct as a breach of privilege, may resolve that it would not proceed further in the matter.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have given only a precis of the opinion of the State Advocate-General on this matter. In due course, a full written opinion will be forwarded to you and all Members of this Assembly.

Mr Koh: Mr Speaker, on a point of explanation.

Dr Toh Chin Chye resumed his seat.

Mr Speaker: Mr Koh.

Mr Koh: When can we expect that opinion of the State Advocate-General?

Dr Toh Chin Chye: This written opinion will be delivered to Mr Speaker probably between ten days and a fortnight.

Mr Speaker, I was under the misapprehension that we would proceed to my motion, and I have certain other matters to deal with. But if you will permit me to continue. I shall do so.

Mr Speaker: As I see it, the issue at the moment before the House is whether or not this House has power to entertain the motion. That is the only issue. Has this House power to entertain the motion, in view of what has been said by, I take it, the legal luminaries of Singapore? If the House is satisfied that it has power to entertain the motion, then, of course, the motion proceeds, and what course that motion takes is a different matter entirely. We now have to decide whether or not we could continue with the motion which has been filed by the Deputy Prime Minister.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: On a point of order, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Point of order. Yes. Mr Ong.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Can I ask that we adjourn this sitting until we have full details of the opinion of the State Advocate-General to enable a more detailed debate on the subject?

Mr Speaker: That, of course, is not a point of order. From the suggestion which the Member for Hong Lim is making, it seems to me that the issues have, in fact, been somewhat confused. We are now debating the motion whether or not the Speaker was correct in admitting this motion as a motion. In other words, the Speaker is of the opinion that this House has power to entertain the motion. Whether this House has power to condemn or to suspend in the circumstances indicated, that is a separate issue. It seems to me that the issues have, in fact, been confused. I would like to dispose of the first issue, which is whether or not this House has power to entertain the motion. And if the House is satisfied that it has power to entertain the motion as such, then we go back to the Deputy Prime Minister's motion. The first part has already been proposed to the House. The first part suggests that the House condemns. As I see it, the Member for Hong Lim says the House has no power to condemn, and the Leader of the House maintains that the House has power to condemn. That is the issue which perhaps would be raised When we come to the first part of the motion of the Leader of the House. Similarly, the same issue might be raised when we come to the second part of the motion. The issue would be - Has the House power to suspend? The first thing to dispose of, I think, to put it very shortly, is this - Has the House power to entertain the motion filed by the Deputy Prime Minister?

Mr Koh rose -

Mr Speaker: Is it a point of order or a point of explanation?

Mr Koh: Point of order. Mr Speaker, Sir, will I be in order now to move an amendment to the motion of the Member for Hong Lim?

Mr Speaker: What are the terms of the motion?

Mr Koh: What I have in mind is this - That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be - and this is my amendment, Mr Speaker:

`referred to Sir Ivor Jennings or other leading counsel on constitutional law for an opinion'.

Will I be in order to make that amendment now?

Mr Speaker: Can I have the terms of the amendment?

Mr Koh: The words "rescinded"-

Mr Speaker: Can I have the amendment in writing?

Amendment handed in.

Mr Speaker: I will have to decide whether or not this suggested amendment is, to quote the words of Standing Order 34, an amendment which is relevant to the motion before the House; and beyond that, I must also decide whether the amendment is within the scope of the original motion. This is a matter of some little difficulty, and I propose to suspend for an hour to give Members time to have their tea and perhaps to discuss this matter amongst themselves. I will take this Chair again at half-past five.

Sitting according suspended at

4.22 p.m. until 5.30 p.m.

Sitting resumed at 5.30 p.m.

[Mr SPEAKER in the Chair]

Order read for resumption of debate on Question, "That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded and that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein."

Mr Speaker: Before the Assembly rose, I intimated that it was perhaps an appropriate time for tea and that during the interval I would consider the desire expressed by the Member for Joo Chiat to move an amendment to the motion before the House. The Member for Joo Chiat has intimated that he desires to move an amendment which seeks to leave out the words from "be" to the end and there to insert "referred to Sir Ivor Jennings or other leading counsel on constitutional law for an opinion". So that if accepted the amended motion would read:

`That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be referred to Sir Ivor Jennings or other leading counsel on constitutional law for an opinion.'

An amendment to be admitted must be relevant to the motion which seeks to amend and must not import anything outside the scope of the motion, that is to say, it must have reference to the substance of the motion itself and have the effect rather of restricting the field of debate which would otherwise be open on the question on the motion. The motion invites the House to rescind the ruling of the Speaker and to say that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with certain matters. The amendment invites the House to seek expert opinion on the ruling of the Speaker. To my mind, the amendment poses an entirely different proposition. It is outside the scope and confines of the motion itself and is therefore inadmissible.

The Member for Joe Chiat had the Floor. Does he wish to address the House?

Mr Koh: Mr Speaker, Sir, you have made the issue now very clear and, as I understand it, it is this, whether your ruling is correct or not.

The Deputy Prime Minister has addressed you very lengthily. If I am correct, the two basic principles propounded by him are (i) that the power of this House is unrestricted, except those powers restricted by any Ordinance or rules made thereunder. I repeat, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the powers of this House are unrestricted unless - if I am wrong, I hope the Deputy Prime Minister will explain - as I say, as I understand it, his contention on law is that unless the powers of this House are restricted by any Ordinance or any rules or regulations made thereunder, then those powers are unrestricted.

Mr Speaker: I think I did endeavour to channel the debate to the course I thought was proper, and I indicated that, in my view, the motion we are now debating is merely a motion to say whether or not the House has power to entertain the motion as it stands. That is the issue. And the other issue is whether or not the House has power to condemn or suspend. Those are the issues which perhaps really arise on the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister. What we are now concerned with is whether or not the Speaker was right in admitting the motion so that the House would be able to entertain it.

Mr Koh: Mr Speaker, Sir, I do understand you, but may I explain that you are also bound by certain laws? I say this with respect. Sir. And it is the Deputy Prime Minister's contention that your powers also are unrestricted unless restricted by some written law or rules or regulations.

Now, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Assembly is not a sovereign Assembly, as the Member for Hong Lim has said. The British Parliament is in a completely different position to our Assembly. Our Assembly was brought into existence by virtue of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council-Part V which is headed "Constitution of Legislative Assembly", at page 19. The sections involved are sections 34 to 46.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have said just now and with humility I say that this has reference to the matter under discussion now. The Deputy Prime Minister says that unless you have something restricting the powers, then the powers are unlimited. That is contrary to all the rules of interpretation that we are used to in our courts of law. The principles of interpretation are dealt with very ably by Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes. I have here, Sir, the 10th Edition (1953) of Maxwell and on page 12 he says:

`It is but, a corollary to the general principle of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or to be taken from a statute unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express.

It is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.'

That was said, Mr Speaker, Sir, in the case of Thompson v. Gould, 1910, Appeal Cases 409 and 420.

Also:

`We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.'

Those words were spoken by Lord Lorburn, Lord Chancellor, in the case of Vickers v. Evans, a 1910 case reported in Appeal Case 444.

`Words plainly should not be added by implication into a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context.'

If I read that paragraph correctly, Mr Speaker, Sir, it means that we cannot give more powers than the powers given by a statute. To bring it closer to the subject under discussion, we have here a statute, the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, and in particular sections 34 to 46 thereof. We must act within the four corners of this Order in Council. We cannot import into it powers which are not given by it. And therefore I say it would be inverting the ordinary interpretation of statutes to adopt the contention of the Hon. the Deputy Prime Minister. Sir, if I am correct in that contention, then your powers are given by section 35 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council which reads as follows:

`(1) Subject to the provisions of section 111 of this Order, when the Assembly first meets after any general election and before it proceeds to the despatch of any other business, it shall elect a person to be Speaker, and, whenever the office of Speaker is vacant otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the Assembly, shall not transact any business other than election of a person to fill that office.

(2) The Speaker may be elected, in such manner as the Assembly may from time to time decide...'.

That concerns, Sir, the election of the speaker. It goes on to section 36 (Remuneration of Speaker), section 37 (appointment of Deputy Speaker) and then to section 38 the marginal note of which reads "Performance of functions of Speaker":

`Subject to the provisions of this Order, the functions conferred by this Order upon the Speaker shall, if there is no person holding the office of Speaker or if the Speaker is absent from Singapore.'.

It does not define your powers at all. Now this (Constitution) Order in Council is the fountain of the powers of this Assembly, and if it does not give any powers to you, then where do we find those powers, Mr Speaker, Sir? We have, under the (Constitution) Order in Council, Part VI, which is headed "Powers and Procedure of the Legislative Assembly", section 48 (1) which has been quoted many times today, and which gives power to this Assembly to make, amend and revoke Standing Orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business. Now here is a law which gives the subject matter upon which our Standing Orders must be based, and that is the regulation and orderly conduct - I emphasise the word "conduct", Mr Speaker, Sir - of its own proceedings and the despatch of business. That is the over-riding section which our Standing Orders must not be ultra vires. Now to say that Standing Order 56, paragraph (5) gives extensive powers to this Assembly would contravene section 41, subsection (1) of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council. And, therefore, we must take it that paragraph (5) of Standing Order 56 deals only with subjects given within that Standing Order. It is not a comprehensive omnibus type of order.

Then we have, Sir, what is known as the privileges Ordinance. There again, as the Member for Hong Lim has brought to your attention, the offences for which a Member may be suspended are defined, and in the section defining the matter - section 20 of the Ordinance - there is no mention at all of the subject matter of the motion. Under those circumstances, Mr Speaker, Sir, would it be correct for this Assembly to discuss something for which it has not been given power in any written law or regulation made thereunder? I think the answer to that question is the answer to the motion before the House today.

Now, I cannot quote any written law which says that the Speaker cannot make a motion in the terms that are before the House today; nor can the Deputy Prime Minister quote any section which says that you can do it. But I do quote Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes which says that unless the written law itself gives a power, you cannot import into the Ordinance anything which is not within the four corners of the Ordinance. That is as far as I can carry the legal aspects of the motion before the House now, Sir.

5.50 p.m.

Mr A. P. Rajah (Farrer Park): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Deputy Prime Minister, in reply to the Member for Hong Lim, informed the House that the motion which he had placed before the House was brought under Standing Order 56, paragraph (5). Standing Order 56 prescribes the order in debate and sets out what the Speaker can do, whereupon certain consequences then ensue. Now, paragraph (5) says:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the Assembly of the power of proceeding against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly.'

The Deputy Prime Minister says that he brings his motion within the ambit of this paragraph of this Standing Order. And he says that this comes within the phrase "any resolution of the Assembly". Mr Speaker, in coming to any conclusions as to what exactly the phrase "according to any resolution of the Assembly" could mean, I think one has to look at the House of Commons Standing Orders from which our Standing Orders are taken. The equivalent proviso in the House of Commons Standing Orders reads as follows:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the House of Commons of the power of proceeding against any Member according to ancient usages.'

The operative words there, Mr Speaker, Sir, are "ancient usages", and our operative words here are "according to any resolution of the Assembly". It seems to me that the Deputy Prime Minister seeks to equate "ancient usages" of the House of Commons to "any resolution of the Assembly". Mr Speaker, even the House of Commons is restricted as to what it may do under paragraph (6) of Standing Order 22. The House of Commons itself cannot go beyond "ancient usages"; in other words, the House of Commons has not got an unbridled licence to bring in any resolution it may like. The power of the House of Commons to bring such a resolution under paragraph (6) is a restrictive one; not an expanded one but a restrictive one, and it restricts itself to the ancient usages which the House of Commons enjoys. So therefore that is a restrictive clause imposed upon the House of Commons, which does not enable it to go outside ancient usages.

Now, by this phrase "according to any resolution of the Assembly", can we give ourselves very much wider powers than the House of Commons itself enjoys? I submit, with respect, that is not what the Deputy Prime Minister means. If that is not what he means, then there must be some meaning given to this phrase "according to any resolution of the Assembly". I submit, Mr Speaker, with respect, that before one can find out exactly what this Assembly can bring within the scope of this paragraph, one has to resolve in one's own mind what the powers of the Assembly are. Therefore, it becomes necessary to look at the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958. We go back to Part VI of the Constitution, on page 25, Mr Speaker, Sir, - "Powers and Procedure of the Legislative Assembly". Section 47 says:

`Subject to the provisions of this Order, it shall be lawful for the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, with the advice and consent of the Assembly, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Singapore.'

So it would appear that this Legislative Assembly does not make laws; it is the Yang di-Pertuan Negara who makes laws with the advice and consent of this Assembly. That is the first thing. The second thing is:

`Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Assembly may from time to time make, amend and revoke Standing Orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business.'

In the section, Mr Speaker, it does not say "the Assembly may from time to time make, amend and revoke Standing Orders" on anything it likes. It puts a check on the powers of the Assembly in so for as Standing Orders are concerned. It further goes on to say in that subsection that the Standing Orders then extant shall be applicable until such time as they are adapted or altered. That really does not matter, but it is section 48 (1) that makes the difference - "for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business." I am going to suggest to you, Mr Speaker, Sir, that this only gives the Assembly power to make regulations in so far as proceedings and behaviour within these precincts are concerned. Under this particular subsection of the Constitution, it does not give the Assembly power to go beyond the House, or to regulate conduct and matters beyond the House.

Now, section 59 of the Constitution, on page 27, Mr Speaker, reads:

`It shall be lawful, by laws enacted under this Order, to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly and its Members; but no such privileges, immunities or powers shall exceed those of the Commons' House of Parliament in the United Kingdom or of the Members thereof.'

So I make the point - and it seems to be borne out by the Constitution - that in so far as Standing Orders are concerned, it shall confine itself to "the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business". And in so far as the "ancient usages" are concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir - now we come back to the phrase "ancient usages of the House of Commons" - they are nothing but the powers and privileges of the House of Commons. So the Order in Council says this: if you want to regulate your own proceedings within the Chamber, you may frame Standing Orders to that intent and purpose; but if you want to give yourself powers and privileges, you shall not give yourself powers and privileges beyond those now enjoyed by the House of Commons, but you shall do it by statute:

`It shall be lawful, by laws enacted under this Order'.

I take it that "laws enacted under this Order" merely means a statute or an Ordinance to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of the Assembly. So that before one determines what this House can do or cannot do, what it can entertain or cannot entertain, one has to look at section 48 and section 59 of the Order in Council before one can come to what the powers and privileges are and what this Assembly can do.

So that in so far as this particular motion is concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir, I am suggesting to you that the three relevant documents we need look into are: first of all, the Constitution; secondly, the Standing Orders; and thirdly, the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955. So these are the three sources from which this Assembly derives whatever powers or privileges it may have or whatever procedure it is to follow. So before one can determine, Mr Speaker, Sir, whether your ruling is a correct ruling or not, I think one has to determine exactly whether the motion put in by the Deputy Prime Minister is something which this House can entertain either under the Order in Council or the Standing Orders or the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955.

Now the Order in Council, Mr Speaker, Sir, merely sets out what this Assembly can give itself in the way of powers in general terms. But what those powers are, how they are to be used, and what they are to be is a matter for the Assembly itself to determine, either in the form of Standing Orders or in the form of an Ordinance. In so far as the Standing Orders are concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir, the Standing Order that could be applicable to this is Standing Order 56, paragraph (5), and the Deputy Prime Minister also suggested that Standing Order 46 paragraph (10) might apply. He said:

`The personal conduct of Members of the Assembly shall not be referred to except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose.'

By that I take it that the Deputy Prime Minister intended to suggest that as the Member for Hong Lim had touched upon the personal conduct of two Members in this Assembly, therefore, it was relevant to this motion which he moved. But with due respect to him, I would say that whatever the Member for Hong Lim might have said, he did not say it in connection with the personal conduct of any Member of this House. Whatever he did say was in connection with the public conduct of certain Members of this House who were holding public office. Therefore, this particular section, with due respect, cannot be brought into play in the consideration of whether or not the motion as framed by the Deputy Prime Minister is admissible.

Mr Speaker: Order. Let me try to elucidate that point, because it rather puzzles me. My understanding of that part of the Deputy Prime Minister's speech which touched on that is that his motion was akin to a motion with reference to the personal conduct of a Member of the Assembly, that is, the personal conduct of the Member for Hong Lim.

Mr Rajah: I beg your pardon, Sir, and that of the Deputy Prime Minister. If that was the contention of the Deputy Prime Minister, then might I say that that is not what is intended to be covered by section 46 (10) of the Standing Orders? Sir, `The personal conduct of Members of the Assembly shall not be referred to except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose', I take it, means that if the personal conduct of a Member outside this House brings dis-respect to this House, then a substantive motion could be moved. But the personal conduct here complained of, in respect of which the Deputy Prime Minister seeks to suggest that this motion could be brought, is conduct in the Assembly in the course of his duties, and it has nothing to do with his personal life. Therefore, I would submit that that particular proposition put forward by the Deputy Prime Minister is not relevant to the issue now before the House.

Sir, I would admit that if this House had all the powers and privileges of the House of Commons, then this motion is admissible. I do not contest that. But what I am suggesting to the House is this. In the circumstances in which the House now finds itself, with the Order in Council, with the Standing Orders as they are now extant, and with the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance as it is now extant, this House has no power to entertain this motion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this motion which the Deputy Prime Minister has introduced in this House is, in fact, an attempt to punish a Member for the abuse of privilege, contempt of the House, and as a result of which certain punishments ensue. In determining those things, Mr Speaker, Sir, one has to find out what is the nature of a contempt of the House. Now-

Mr Speaker: Order. I am sorry to be intervening. But I think Members of the Assembly would like elucidation of this particular point. Is the Member for Farrer Park not confusing the meanings of "resolution" and "motion"? The "resolution" against the Member, which is the word used in paragraph (5) of Standing Order 56, as distinct from a motion. A resolution is the result of a motion. Therefore, the question which really arises on this motion by the Member for Hong Lim is - can a motion seeking a resolution be entertained in the Assembly? Is not the Assembly then at liberty to discuss the motion, and thereafter dismiss the motion if it is satisfied that a resolution on that motion cannot be passed? Is that not the issue on this particular motion?

Mr Rajah: Mr Speaker, Sir, that is the hair which you, with due respect, are splitting! If a motion which is brought to the House is a motion until such time as the House has come to a decision on it, when it then becomes a resolution, then I admit that there is a difference. If a resolution of the House is something which the House has made its determination on, then I agree that there is a distinction between the word "motion" and "resolution". As I have always felt, the way in which the Deputy Prime Minister has sought to bring this motion in two parts has placed me in a difficulty in arguing this case, or presenting a case. If the point of the motion is merely to discuss it, without reaching a conclusion, perhaps the House can debate it. But if the purpose of the motion is in order that the House might come to a resolution to punish the Member for Hong Lim for a breach, then I say this House is not competent to come to a resolution on it. If, Mr Speaker, you are saying that a motion can be introduced merely to discuss the pros and cons of it, without coming to any resolution on it, in the sense of condemning or taking positive action, then perhaps it is all right. But if the motion is to go further, to seek a remedy for what the motion claims are wrongs, then I am saying that the remedy is not there, and, therefore, the motion cannot be brought to a resolution. If the Deputy Prime Minister will concede me that, I will stop talking.

Mr Speaker: Order. Is the Member for Farrer Park contending that the motion, as a motion, cannot be discussed if it seeks a resolution which is ultra vires? Or is it not the position that the motion, as a motion, can be discussed, and if the Assembly is satisfied that the resolution sought is ultra vires, it will just dismiss that motion out of hand? The debate must-

Mr Rajah: Sir, here again my difficulty is this: if there had been two motions before the House - the first motion in respect of the first part, and the second motion in respect of the second part - I would have conceded that the first motion could have been introduced and discussed. But the motion is so framed that the resolution on the first motion precedes the resolution on the second motion. That is my difficulty in this.

Mr Speaker: I have solved that difficulty, because I have made it quite clear that I am now treating the motion as two distinct motions. The first one is whether or not the Assembly will condemn the Member for Hong Lim for certain conduct, and, thereafter, depending on the result of that motion, the House will then proceed to consider the second motion. It is in two distinct parts.

Mr Rajah: The question whether this House can condemn the Member for Hong Lim in respect of certain conduct in this House, may I put it to the House, is not admissible. Let me get down to grips with that.

Sir, Standing Order 56 paragraph (1) sets out the circumstances in which you yourself, Mr Speaker, name the person, and then a Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary moves a motion, and that is put to the House without debate and the suspension then takes place. That is not the case in this particular matter. Now the Deputy Prime Minister seeks to bring it under paragraph (5). Therefore we have to find out what are the motions which can be introduced under paragraph (5). The motions which can be introduced under paragraph (5) would depend, Mr Speaker, Sir, on the Constitution firstly, and on the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955. Now section 20 of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, sets out the circumstances in which certain proceedings could be taken. Perhaps I had better read out the whole of that section, Mr Speaker:

`20. -(1) Any member of the Assembly who

(a) being a member of a committee of the Assembly, publishes to any person not being a member of such committee any evidence taken by the committee before it has been reported to the Assembly; or

(b) assaults or obstructs a member of the Assembly within the Chamber or precincts of the Assembly; or

(c) assaults or obstructs any officer of the Assembly while in the execution of his duty; or

(d) is convicted of any offence under this Ordinance,

shall be guilty of contempt of the Assembly.

(2) Where any member is guilty of contempt of the Assembly, the Assembly may, by resolution reprimand such member or suspend him from the service of the Assembly for such period as it may determine.'

My point, Mr Speaker, Sir, is that paragraph (5) of Standing Order 56 relates itself to section 20, subsection (2) of the Ordinance. That could then make sense, Mr Speaker, Sir, because in the House of Commons it reads:

`Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the House of the power of proceeding against any Member according to ancient usages.'

Now our Standing Order reads:

`... according to any resolution of the Assembly.'

This paragraph (5) had to be put into the Standing Orders in order to enable a resolution to be brought in to bring in misconduct within the terms of section 20. Section 20, Mr Speaker, Sir, deals with two types of offences, if I may put it that way. The first type of offences, set out in section 20 (1) (a), 20 (1) (b), 20 (1) (c), could refer to Members of the Assembly; whereas section 20 (1) (d), "is convicted of any offence under this Ordinance, shall be guilty of contempt of the Assembly." refers to persons outside the Assembly in all cases. There is a further section in the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance - section 22 - Mr Speaker, which says this:

`(1) A member shall not in or before the Assembly or any committee take part in the discussion of any matter in which he has a direct pecuniary interest without disclosing the extent of that interest.

(2) Any member who acts in contravention of this section may be adjudged guilty of contempt by the Assembly and shall be liable to the penalties provided in section 20 of this Ordinance for such contempt.'

So that section 22, Mr Speaker, Sir, and section 20 (1) (a) , section 20 (1) (b), and section 20 (1) (c) provide cases of Assemblymen being brought up before the House for discipline. If paragraph (5) of Standing Order 56 were not there, then I am suggesting to you, Mr Speaker, Sir, that such disciplinary action could not have been taken. It is because of that that paragraph (5) is there, and it is not intended to serve any purpose beyond the purposes set out in this Ordinance. That is my contention. If the terms of the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister could be brought to bear on matters which are within the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, then I would concede to him that this motion is in order. Otherwise, Mr Speaker, Sir, it cannot be moved. Maybe there is a hiatus. If there is a hiatus, it is up to us to resolve it. But looking at the three documents, I think this Assembly is not competent to say that even if there is a hiatus, we can still bring up a motion in spite of that hiatus. I think, to that extent, we are a restricted body. The powers must be expressly given to us, and as they have been expressly given to us in the statute and in Orders, we must therefore confine ourselves within the four corners of the powers so given.

Sir, the powers given to the Assembly with regard to powers and privileges are restricted. In the Courts Ordinance here, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is expressly given by the section in the Courts Ordinance which says: that in so far as punishing for contempt of court for the High Court is concerned, it shall be equivalent to the powers enjoyed by the High Courts in England.

So that the High Court here, in so far as the punishing for contempt of court is concerned, has an equivalent jurisdiction as the High Courts in the United Kingdom. But in so far as this aspect of the powers and privileges of the Assembly is concerned, we do not enjoy the same privileges and the same powers that the United Kingdom Parliament has, Mr Speaker, Sir, because our powers have been restricted under the various relevant documents. Because of that, I am now saying that the Deputy Prime Minister was wrong when he suggested to the House that this Standing Order gave him the power to move this motion. I am suggesting to him and to you, Mr Speaker, Sir, that this paragraph of Standing Order 56 does not enable the Assembly to entertain any motion of this nature. It only relates to matters in respect of which this Assembly has express powers. The Member for Hong Lim, Mr Speaker, Sir, gave it a much more restricted meaning. I am not saying he is right or wrong. He may well be right. But I am saying this: the most I am prepared to concede is that what anybody can bring under this paragraph (5) is anything which the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, prescribes. Supposing paragraph (5) were not there, Mr Speaker. Sir, it would not be possible to move a resolution to suspend a Member in respect of matters set out in section 20 of the Powers and Privileges Ordinance, 1955.

Section 48 of the Singapore Constitution says:

`... for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business.'.

Sir, powers to make those regulations have been given to us, and if this Assembly has not given itself sufficient powers under this section to regulate its own business and its own proceedings, and if it finds that there are deficiencies in the Standing Order which is bringing about certain difficulties and troubles, then I think the solution is to amend the Standing Orders to bring certain behaviour within the ambit of the Standing Orders. If the Standing Orders are deficient, I think it is not competent for this House to say that because the Standing Orders are deficient, therefore it has inherent authority to punish in spite of that deficiency. That would not be right, if I may suggest. So my contention briefly, Mr Speaker, Sir, is that, reading the three documents together, namely, the Order in Council, the Standing Orders and the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, it appears to me that the subject matter of the motion which the Deputy Prime Minister has introduced is not covered by these three documents, and therefore this motion is not admissible.

Mr Speaker: There is another legal luminary who has been very silent. I wonder whether he will give us the benefit of his views?

The Prime Minister (Mr Lee Kuan Yew): If you want me, Mr Speaker, to assist you in any way in all these legal matters, I am willing to do so. But as the Deputy Prime Minister has indicated, I do not really wish to participate in the debate as such. But if you feel, Mr Speaker, Sir, that I should make some contribution to clarify the legal position, I will be happy to do so.

Mr Speaker: I think it has been made very clear that neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister for Labour and Law will partake in the debate on the substance of the motion moved by the Deputy Prime Minister. But this motion which has been moved by the Member for Hong Lim, I think, affects the House as a whole, and there is, in fact, academic interest in it. So far there have been conflicting opinions, and if there is another opinion which could be added to the conflicting opinions, perhaps the House will be a little more "confused" and then decide on other courses to be taken.

6.22 p.m.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, if I thought that, by speaking, I would add to the "confusion", I would certainly restrain myself from undertaking such a hazardous task. However, may I try to restate the problem as I see it? We are concerned at this moment with a resolution by the Member for Hong Lim which, in effect, says that you, Mr Speaker, Sir, have wrongly ruled. That is all we are concerned with - that the ruling you make in allowing the motion to be on the Order Paper and then allowing the Deputy Prime Minister, as Leader of the House, to move the first part of the motion was out of order. That is all we are concerned with. I beg to submit that the arguments put forward by the Member for Farrer Park are not relevant to that part of the problem with which we are confronted. His arguments would be relevant when the question whether or not the House has powers to punish arises.

Mr Speaker, Sir, can I just restate the three relevant provisions, and restate them in their order of importance? The most important document that was referred to by the Member for Farrer Park is the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council. That is a piece of legislation which over-rides the Standing Orders and the statutes of this Assembly. That is the constitution upon which the whole of the super-structure of the law is based. There are certain parts of that constitution which we can amend in this Legislature. That has been granted to us in an appendix in the Order in Council in respect of certain matters. The powers of this Assembly shall be supreme. I would suggest, Mr Speaker, Sir, that in respect of all those sections where the power is in this Assembly to amend, then to that extent this is a completely sovereign Assembly. The first important section is section 54 (1). The first important rule of interpretation is that words shall be given their common and ordinary meanings. And it says, "Subject to the provisions of this Order", that is, subject to the provisions of any other section in this Order, "and of the Standing Orders of the Assembly" made under this, "any Member may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to, the Assembly, and the same shall be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of the Assembly." That I say is the complete and absolute answer to anyone who challenges your ruling. In fact, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would say that `had you ruled otherwise, then we would have drawn your attention, and any member of this House would have the right to draw your attention, to this the most important document - important in the sense that it over-rides any other document. It says there "any motion". This is a motion which is "any motion". It goes on to say "it shall be debated". I do not want to do what on one famous occasion in this House legal luminaries sought to do, and that is to exhibit their skill in argument on the intricacies of the law. You will recall that there was an argument that "shall" means "ought to". It is as simple as that. Unless there is any other document as important in status as this which says to the contrary that the Assembly can do nothing, then I say, Mr Speaker, Sir, that this is the beginning and end of the argument. However, lest it be feared that I had not adequately alerted my mind to the argument propounded by the Member for Farrer Park, may I go on to say this? His argument is as follows.

That any motion where we are to censure a Member in this Assembly, must mean a motion which complies with S.O. 56 (5) of the Standing Orders; subsidiary legislation, which he then goes on to enact by spelling out "ancient usages" to mean the Powers, Privileges and Immunities Ordinance of the Legislative Council, as it then was, a motion within the terms of reference of that Ordinance. Sir, there is not the slightest authority, either in law or logic, to support that proposition. To construe the plain meaning of the word in section 54 to mean that, we are going against the first principle of the interpretation of any statute or any document, that words shall mean what they are ordinarily supposed to mean. "any" there, means, in my submission, "any" and "shall" means "it shall be debated".

Mr Koh: On a point of information, Mr Speaker, Sir.

The Prime Minister: Surely.

Mr Speaker: Mr Koh.

Mr Koh: I hope the Hon. the Prime Minister will not forget that section 54 (1) of the Constitution begins with "Subject to the provisions of this Order and of the Standing Orders".

6.30 p.m.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I was aware of the opening words of that section, "Subject to the provisions of this Order" - subject to any other provision in this Order. What I was saying the Member for Farrer Park has not done is to show that there is any provision either in the Constitution or in the Standing Orders which says, "You shall not move a motion to condemn a Member of the Assembly" either by expressed words or by implication. I say that in the absence of any such expressed words, either in the Constitution or in the Standing Orders, you, Mr Speaker, Sir, are obliged to allow this motion and let it be debated.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I develop the other limb in my argument, that in so far as this provision is concerned - section 54 (1) - it is in that part of the Schedule in the Constitution which is amendable and repealable by this Assembly. It is in the Third Schedule, "Provisions of this Order which may be amended by the Legislative Assembly". I say that in so far as this provision is concerned, in so far as the conduct of debate, procedure and motions, other than the prohibition contained in subsection (2) or in any other subsection in this Order or Standing Orders which prohibit, is concerned, the power is absolute and cannot be questioned, in my submission, either in this Chamber - because we are our own judges - or in any other tribunal in this country, because within this Constitution, as far as section 54 is concerned, the Assembly is sovereign.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me elaborate by taking the point which was made by the Member for Farrer Park in connection with the powers of punishment. May I first preface my remarks by saying that I do not believe that there is a more odd and curious situation anywhere in any non-independent country where the people, or their representatives, do not claim the right to do what they consider necessary for their own good government. But here in this Chamber, as representatives of the people, doubtless unwittingly, we have had the spectacle of legal luminaries and others who are by force of circumstances compelled to take an interest in the intricacies of the law advocating that we, as a Chamber, should restrict our right. The fundamental assumption upon which I suggest we proceed is that we are a sovereign Assembly until somebody says to the contrary, as far as those provisions in the Constitution which are amendable are concerned.

The Member for Farrer Park says that if a motion seeks to do something which is not properly or is not obviously within its competence, then not only is the resolution ultra vires but the motion should also never be debated. Sir, there are two distinct propositions, and both of them, in my submission, are spurious. The first proposition is that if a matter is ultra vires, in the sense that this Assembly seeks to do something which, in fact, it cannot do, therefore the Assembly is not only incapable of doing it but also should be prevented from debating it. That is, in short, the proposition advanced by the Member for Farrer Park. Let me put this hypothetical case. There is one thing, Sir, which this Assembly definitely cannot do, and that is to expel a Member of this Assembly from his membership, which the House of Commons can do. We cannot do so because this document, which we cannot amend other than what we are allowed to amend in those sections of the Third Schedule, has laid down when a seat shall be vacated, and expulsion from the Assembly is not one of those circumstances. Therefore, if we attempted to expel a Member, I think a petition could be brought to the Privy Council to assert that he is still a Member because we have infringed the primary document - the Constitution. Section 42 (2) of the Constitution, where membership is concerned, ("Tenure of office Members.") reads:

`The seat of a Member shall become vacant-

(a) if he ceases to be a citizen of Singapore...;

(b) if he enters into the employment of any foreign power ...;

(c) if he is appointed to or to act in any public office ...;

(d) if he is adjudged or otherwise declared bankrupt ...'.

But nowhere does it say when he is expelled by the Assembly. But I say that even in respect of this section, we can give ourselves the power by amending section 42 (2), because that is one of the amendable sections in the Third Schedule.

Now let us assume that we refuse to take the necessary legal preliminary step of amending the Constitution and say, "(x) When he had by resolution of the Assembly been so expelled", and we by resolution expel a Member, is it seriously suggested that we cannot? First, you, as Speaker, cannot allow the debate to take place; and, second, that this Assembly cannot pass it as a resolution. Where is the authority? It is one thing to attempt to do something which is ultra vires. It is another thing to ask you, Mr Speaker, to say that it cannot be done. Whether it can or cannot be done, Mr Speaker, Sir, as you have very wisely pointed out at the very beginning of the preliminary remarks before the debate began, is something which has to be tested and tried in some other tribunal; and there are many borderline issues upon which the rights of this Assembly may be in doubt. Is it suggested that in any of this hinterland upon which' we are not quite sure whether the writ of the Assembly runs or not we should abrogate our powers? I suggest, Sir, that it runs to the full extent of the strength of this Assembly, and anybody who says it does not run must prove it. Only on that basis are we likely to discharge our responsibilities as representatives of the people.

The other argument, that it should not even be debated because in so debating it we may lead ourselves from a motion into a resolution, and therefore end up in a resolution which somebody else may challenge in some other tribunal as ultra vires, is, in my submission, non-sequitur. Sorry, "non-sequitur" means it does not follow, it has no connection in logic. I beg the pardon of the Members of the Opposition. I would like to avoid, Mr Speaker, Sir, so far as is possible - I think hon. Members should - legal jargon, because I am sure the proceedings on this debate will be followed with considerable interest not only in this country but in other parts of the world where interest in the theory and practice of parliamentary democracy still survives. But to carry out to its logical conclusion the proposition of the Member for Farrer Park - that if a mutter is ultra vires, therefore no resolution should ever be allowed; because a debate may lead to an ultra vires resolution, therefore a debate should not be allowed-then I say, Mr Speaker, Sir, there would never have been anybody who would have cause to complain to any higher judicial tribunal. Because, to begin with, all you need have to do is to get an injunction against the Speaker and say, "Mr Speaker, you will not allow that motion, because it is not quite certain (1) whether the writ runs and the Assembly has the power to do those things; (2) whether the Assembly should be allowed to run the hazard of a debate which will land it with a resolution which is ultra vires." Sir, in legal language, it really means this. Where is the authority for the proposition that this Assembly, in the conduct of its own affairs, is confined by any other document than the Standing Orders and the Constitution? There are only two documents, I submit with great respect, Sir, which bind this Assembly in the conduct of its business: the Constitution, which has its dos and don'ts on broad principles, and the Standing Orders, which say these are the rules in detail as to how things are to be done.

Now to put the positive side of the case. Here is the Constitution about which I first said "Any motion shall be debated." The detailed rules under Standing Orders 46 (10) and 56 (5) dearly envisage a substantive motion on the personal conduct of Members of this Assembly. Sir, Standing Order 46 (10) says in the negative:

`The personal conduct of Members of the Assembly shall not be referred to except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose.'

Sir, I do not think one requires a great stretch of the imagination to put it in the positive. This is a prohibition. It says that you shall not do so and so unless so and so. In other words, if you want to touch upon the personal conduct of Members, either in praise or in denunciation, you will move a substantive motion. That is what it means. Standing Order 46 (10) says - not what the Member for Farrer Park understood the Leader of the House to mean - that because my personal conduct has been referred to, therefore I am entitled to attack the person who had attacked me. It has nothing to do with that proposition. I am spelling from Standing Order 46 (10) the clear inference - the only logical inference - that the personal conduct of Members of the Assembly can, upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose, be referred to. That, Mr Speaker, Sir, is what the first part of the motion intends to do. Clearly and beyond any doubt, it is within Standing Orders 46 (10) and 56 (5).

As to the second limb, I say again it comes within section 54 (1) of the Constitution. Whether it is ultra vires the Constitution or not is another matter to be determined in some other tribunal. But for the reasons you have stated, the unhappiness and uneasiness you feel as to the certainty of the matter, and the greater confusion that has been added to it since the debate began. I think it is only right and proper - and perhaps desirable in the interest not only of this Assembly but of the country as a whole - that we should have time to consider all possible advice on the matter. But on one thing we need no advice and should need no advice, and that is how to run the business of this Assembly, how to comport ourselves as representatives of the people without the advice of luminaries like Sir Ivor Jennings or other legal experts.

The issue that is raised by this motion is simply this: do we seriously say to ourselves that this House cannot debate this motion? Whoever says that must quote against section 54 (1) of the Constitution either a provision in the Constitution, or a provision in the Standing Order which says explicitly, "You shall not do this particular thing," as has been set out in Standing Order 46, "You shall not use offensive, insulting language,", "You shall not do this,", "You shall not do that." But nowhere does it say, "You shall not condemn the personal conduct of a Member." In fact, I think it is partly because of the sense of delicacy of the draftsman who first drafted the particular Standing Order 46 (10) that he had desired to put it in the negative; not to say, "We shall be happy if you condemn a Member" but to say, "We are unhappy that you should condemn a Member, unless there is a substantive motion to that effect." And there is a substantive motion. The question is whether it is properly administered in this House. That is all. And I say, the less we now say about the other things, the better it is, because the issue at the moment is this: is the Speaker right or wrong in having allowed this motion to be debated? I say this: if the Speaker had done anything else, he would have contravened the Constitution and the Standing Orders made under the Constitution.

6.48 p.m.

Tun Lim Yew Hock (Cairnhill): Mr Speaker, Sir, I hesitate to enter into this debate after two legal minds have given an exposition of whether or not the Constitution gives this Assembly the right to debate the motion before the House. But, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like, at the very outset, to say this: you have, in your announcement before the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister was moved, stated that the motion should be in two parts and you have given us a certain line of debate that I submit, Sir, with due respect, had made it difficult for the Opposition to enter into this debate which, in the minds and the hearts of the people outside, has nothing but a political motive.

Mr Speaker: Order. I have tried very carefully to ask hon. Members to treat this motion as a motion which affects the House as a whole, without any reference to politics or to political motives, or any allegations to that effect. If the Speaker allows this debate to range over political issues, then I am afraid the debate will go very, very far away from the issue which is, in fact, an academic issue and which the House is called upon to decide as an academic issue.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: With respect, Sir, I am afraid you have not listened me out. What I was going to say was that we on this side of the House think that the right way to discuss this motion is as you have ruled and that we do not give credence to what the people outside say, although we consider ourselves to be representatives of the people.

I have this difficulty now, Sir, in the light of what the Prime Minister has said. He has said, "Let us go ahead with the first part of the motion." As far as the second part is concerned, there is some doubt in his mind that it should-

The Prime Minister: Not in my mind.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: He has at least, Sir, considered that there is a case that he could be wrong, and in order - no, that-

The Prime Minister: In elucidation, Sir.

Tun Lim Yew Hock resumed his seat.

The Prime Minister: I neither want to be right nor wrong. All we want to make sure is that the correct position is placed before the House. I think this is important, when we are on a plane which I hope is above political issues, such as we are on, and on which an important constitutional precedent may be set. Mr Speaker, Sir, by our conduct, our demeanour, our words uttered in this particular motion, we are setting the tone and the pace in the tradition of this particular Chamber. What I want to have on record is not that I am in doubt or anybody is in doubt. You have expressed certain doubts, Sir, in your own wisdom. We have been advised by the State Advocate-General, who is the correct officer within the Constitution to so advise, and I say, let there be time to consider the State Advocate-General's opinion, and let there be time to seek other opinions if you so desire on the other issues. But on the issue before us now - whether we as a Chamber know or do not know how to comport ourselves in our own business - I say the less time wasted the better.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thought, after that discourse on the interpretation of law, the Prime Minister would have stood up on a point of order and given an explanation of something that has confounded me. I gave way because of a point of order, and it was no point of order.

Mr Speaker: Order. I think the point of elucidation was quite clearly stated by the Prime Minister. It was a point of elucidation.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: Sir, if it was a point of elucidation, well, he has so elucidated. But I want some elucidation here, Sir, If it is felt desirable and necessary, in the interest that is being centred around this motion not only in Singapore but elsewhere, that there should be legal advice sought, what is the position about this motion? If we are to say that we are right, then why seek advice? But we cannot say that we are wrong. Because we want to seek advice, we do not say that we are wrong. But do we want to say that we are right? Once we say that we are right, we should stick to it and say that we are right. The unfortunate thing, Sir, as the Member for Farrer Park has brought out, is that the two parts of the motion have been put into one motion. Had it been just one motion moved at that time, the Opposition on this side would have debated that point and discussed whether or not it is desirable that the dignity of the House be maintained. And there can be only one answer. But, unfortunately, it is because of the wording of the motion as a whole that has brought about all this confusion and all the lengthy debate on a matter which, honestly speaking, is clouded with what is to come in the second part of the motion.

Mr Speaker: I am just wondering whether, in view of the conflicting opinions that have been expressed not only in regard to the motion before the House, but also in regard to the Deputy Prime Minister's motion, it would not be in the interests of the House to adjourn the debate on both motions to obtain legal opinion on the whole issue, which seems to have been confused, which seems to be inter-related, and which seems to have been clouded.

Mr Ong Eng Guan rose -

Mr Speaker: Mr Ong Eng Guan, in reply?

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I support your suggestion with all my heart-

An hon. Member: And soul!

Mr Ong Eng Guan: First of all, I wish only to mention about -

Mr Speaker: Order. If the hon. Member supports the suggestion of the Chair, then perhaps he will give time to any other Member who would like to move that the debate be adjourned.

No Member speaking? Mr Ong Eng Guan, in reply.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Prime Minister in his speech said that this is a sovereign Legislature. But on the other hand, he said that it is definite this Assembly has not the powers to expel a Member. It is my submission, Sir, that all sovereign Legislatures have the right to suspend and expel Members.

Sir, Singapore is still under the British Colonial Office, and the Constitution is still colonial in character. I submit that this is a colonial Legislature and, as such, it is not a sovereign Legislature. I think the Prime Minister was going to confuse it is stated in the book by Martin Wight, that a colonial Legislature is not a sovereign Legislature but it is sovereign within its powers. Sir, in other words, this Assembly can only operate within the Constitution and the laws of the country. The motion by the Deputy Prime Minister was not raised under any particular laws or Standing Orders of this country. First it was raised under Standing Order 30 (e). It was then shifted to Standing Order 56 (5). Now reference is also made to Standing Order 46 (10) which refers to a substantive motion on personal conduct. Mr Speaker, Sir, the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister is not a motion on my personal conduct - not a motion on the personal conduct of a Member, but on his official conduct in this Assembly.

Sir, it has also been stated by the Prime Minister that section 54 (1) of the Constitution gives any Member the right to raise any motion for debate. May I read out the whole of section 54(1)?

`Subject to the provisions of this Order and of the Standing Orders of the Assembly, any Member may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to, the Assembly, and the same shalt be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of the Assembly.'

Mr Speaker, Sir, the qualification is quite clear. A motion for debate must be subject to the Standing Orders of the Assembly, and it can only be disposed of according to the Standing Orders of this Assembly.

Sir, the other point I wish to raise is all about the cases cited just now by the Deputy Prime Minister. He quoted a tot of cases which are cases concerning a breach of order of legislatures. I have not been accused at any time of a breach of order, and therefore, all those cases are irrelevant to the motion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the proposal raised by you just now, which is the same as my proposal - that since there is so much conflicting opinion in this Chamber on this issue, and since any decision might be against the Constitution, I submit that this matter be referred to more expert legal opinion and that the matter be temporarily suspended.

Mr Speaker: The hon. Member is too late. I did give an opportunity to any Member who wished to move the adjournment of the debate. The debate has now been completed and I will have to put the Question to the House. The Question is, "That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded and that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein."

As many as are of that opinion, say Aye.

Some hon. Members: Aye.

Mr Speaker: To the contrary, say No.

Some hon. Members: No.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Division.

Mr Speaker: I think the Noes have it? Do I hear a division? Hon. Members must know that they must claim a division when I sense the voices. I will put the Question again.

The Question is, "That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded and that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein."

As many as are of that opinion, say Aye.

Some hon. Members: Aye.

Mr Ong Eng Guan: Division.

Mr Speaker: Will the hon. Member just wait until I have sensed the voices?

As many as are of that opinion, say Aye.

Some hon. Members: Aye.

Mr Speaker: To the contrary, say No.

Some hon. Members: No.

Mr Speaker: I think the Noes have it?

Mr Koh: Division.

The House divided: Ayes, 11; Noes, 33; Abstentions, Nil; Absent, 7. Ayes. Noes. Abdul Hamid bin Baharuddin bin Haji Jumat. Mohamed Ariff. Ahmad Jabri bin Bani, S. T. Mohammad Akib. Buang bin Koh, C. H. Omar Junid. Lim Yew Hock. Byrne, K. M. Lingam, S. V. Chan Choy Siong, Mohamed Ali bin Miss. Alwi. Chor Yeok Eng. Ng Teng Kian. Fung Yin Ching, Ong Eng Guan. Miss. Rajah, A. P. Goh Chew Chua. Seow Peck Leng, Goh Keng Swee. Mrs. Hoe Puay Choo, Thio Chan Bee. Madam. Kandasamy, G. Lee Kuan Yew. Absent. Lee Siew Choh. Ahmad bin Ibrahim. Lee Teck Him. Chan Chee Seng. Leong Keng Seng. Chan Sun Wing. Lin You Eng. Lee Khoon Choy. Low Por Tuck. Lim Cheng Lock. Mohd. Ariff bin Mammen, John. Suradi. Sahorah binte M. Ismail Rahim. Ahmat. Ong Chang Sam. Ong Pang Boon. Rajaratnam, S. Ramaswamy, S. Sheng Nam Chin. Tan Cheng Tong. Tan Kia Gan. Tee Kim Leng. Teo Hock Guan. Toh Chin Chye. Wee Toon Boon. Wong Soon Fong. Yaacob bin Mohamed. Yong Nyuk Lin. Motion accordingly negatived.