INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

2.32 p.m.

The Minister For Health And Law (Mr K. M. Byrne): Mr Speaker, Sir, I have His Excellency's permission to signify his recommendation for this Bill.

Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1960, provided in section 83 that:

`The President shall, once in each year, furnish to the Minister for presentation to the Legislative Assembly a report on the working of the provisions of this Ordinance relating to the Court, to arbitration and to the registration of collective agreements and of any other provisions of the Ordinance in relation to which he considers it appropriate to report, and in particular the extent to which the objects of the Ordinance have been achieved and any considerations or circumstances which have prevented or hindered the achievement of these objects.'

Sir, the President of the Industrial Arbitration Court has submitted his report for the period 15th September, 1960, to 31st December, 1961, and this has been published in Paper S. 4 of 1962.

In the course of his report, the President said (paragraph 33 of his Report):

`A year of operation has shown that the Ordinance is in the main an effective Legislative measure. However, during the course of the Court's work it was discovered that some sections of the Ordinance could be amended to achieve greater clarity and to avoid certain anomalies arising out of its application.'

Paragraph 34:

`You are aware that as early as the 25th January, 1961, I suggested certain amendments to the Ordinance and that, at intervals, I consulted with your predecessor, with the State Advocate-General and, later, with the Minister for Law with a view to clarify and strengthen certain sections of the Ordinance and for the removal of anomalies.'

Paragraph 35:

`I was mainly concerned on the one hand, with the heavy burden of work, and on the other hand, with my desire to speed up proceedings. I also expressed certain views on the two panels of members, on representation before the Court, on the notification of trade disputes, the registration and certification of agreements, representation in negotiations and, at a later stage, on the review of cases.

Paragraph 36:

`Correspondence and discussions on these matters continued between the Court and the appropriate authority throughout the year, and I am satisfied that our discussions were most fruitful.'

Paragraph 37:

`The Minister for Law, with your concurrence, early in 1962, is to suggest to the Legislative Assembly certain amendments to the Ordinance.'

Paragraph 38:

`I am aware of the nature of the amendments. They cover nearly all points on which I sought clarification during the year.'

Sir, this Bill has been drafted on the representations of the President and has been agreed to with him. The main purpose of the Bill is to enable the setting up of a second Industrial Arbitration Court to deal with the increasing work of the Court. This has been considered necessary, not only because of the disputes, which have been referred to the Court for arbitration, but also because of the large number of collective agreements presented for certification.

Clause 2 of the Bill amends the definition of "Court" and the definition of "President" to provide for the setting up of more than one Court and the appointment of a Deputy President.

Clause 3 of the Bill provides for the appointment of a Deputy President. Clause 4 of the Bill provides for the remuneration and allowances payable to him and gives him the same protection and immunities in the performance of his functions and duties as the President.

Clause 5 of the Bill provides that for the purpose of constituting the employee panel for the Court, the Minister may invite nominations from trade unions of employees instead of from the Singapore Trade Union Congress, which has ceased to exist.

The members of the Court will be required to take the oath of allegiance and the judicial oath. This is provided in clause 6.

Clause 7 of the Bill will enable the Minister to intervene and direct a compulsory conference in all cases of trade disputes. The power of certification of collective agreements is proposed to be given to the Court. But for this purpose the Court is to consist of the President. Clauses 8 to 14 of the Bill provide for this. The purpose of this is to emphasise that the act of certification is the act of the Court and to equate the status of a collective agreement to that of an award. It will also enable proceedings to be taken to punish persons who are guilty of offences against the Court or contempt against the Court as provided in sections 65 and 66 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Court is given power to refuse to certify a collective agreement if it is of opinion that the memorandum of agreement does not set out satisfactorily or adequately the terms of the collective agreement between the parties.

The Bill further provides that it will be an offence for the person or a trade union to fail or neglect to bring a collective agreement or any of the terms of such agreement to the notice of the Court in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance, or to deliver to the Registrar a memorandum which does not contain all the terms of the collective agreement. It is also made an offence for a person or a trade union to enter into a collective agreement, which is specified to continue in force for less than eighteen months, or more than three years, and which cannot be registered under the provisions of the Ordinance.

The purpose of these amendments is to provide that all collective agreements shall comply with the provisions of the Ordinance and shall be registered under the Ordinance.

Clause 11 of the Bill makes it an offence for a person or trade union to enter into negotiations in relation to industrial matters otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. The purpose of this is to ensure that all negotiations relating to industrial matters are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. The definition of "industrial matters" has been amended so as to exclude individual agreements or contracts of service between employer and employee relating to the employment or terms of employment of such employee. This is provided for in clause 2.

The prohibition against representations and negotiations is extended to all trade disputes. This is provided for in clause 10.

Clause 12 of the Bill provides that referees may be appointed only from persons included in the list of names maintained by the Minister. It also provides for an appeal from the decision of the referee to the Court.

Clause 13 provides that no award or decision or order of the Court or the President or a referee shall be challenged or be subject to review by any court. The present position under which the decision of referees may be challenged in court, with the result that costs might be awarded against the referees, has created difficulties as referees who have been nominated have refused to serve.

The Bill has been referred to the Bar Committee, but I regret to say that there are certain matters on which there appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the functions of the court, with the result that certain provisions of the Bill have not been approved by the Bar Committee. The purpose of the Industrial Arbitration Court is not to decide disputed questions of law, but to register collective agreements which are made between the parties or to make agreements for employers and employees when they cannot reach agreement on their own account. It cannot therefore be treated like an ordinary court of justice and it is in recognition of this fact that the Ordinance provides that the Court shall not be bound to act in a formal manner or be bound by the Evidence Ordinance, but shall act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms. It is for this reason, too, that legal representation is restricted. It will be disastrous if the work of the Court could be delayed by arguments on legal technicalities or questions of law. The Ordinance itself provides for a summary decision on questions of law by reference to the State Advocate-General. This might not be perfect. It has at least the merit of having a quick decision without long drawn out legal arguments and costs. All this shows that the processes, the purpose and the orders of the Industrial Arbitration Court cannot be regarded as those of courts of justice. The Court is, as I have said, concerned with the registration of collective agreements made between the parties and the making of agreements for employers and employees when they cannot reach agreement on their own account. Once this is accepted, I feel it will be wrong to allow appeals from such agreements and awards.

It has already been accepted that the parties should not be represented by advocates and solicitors in negotiations under the Ordinance. This has, on the whole, worked very well in practice and the parties have been able to deal with the substantial merits of their claims without regard to technicalities and legal forms. As it is the view of the Government that all negotiations should be conducted under the provisions of the Ordinance, it is logical that prohibition against legal representation should be extended to all negotiations relating to industrial matters. The amendment to section 21 of the Ordinance by clause 7 of the Bill will enable a relaxation to be made in the general prohibition against participation in negotiations in industrial matters by advocates and solicitors. Where the Minister feels that the presence or assistance of an advocate and solicitor may be useful, he may direct such advocate and solicitor to attend for compulsory conferences under section 21 of the Ordinance. This was agreed in a meeting which I held with the last committee of the Singapore Bar Committee.

As regards the transfer of power of certification of collective agreements from the President to the Court, the purpose of it is to equate the certifying of agreements with the making of awards and to enable proceedings to be taken where offences are committed in relation to the Court and in the case of contempts of the Court under sections 65 and 66 of the Ordinance.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

2.44 p.m.

Mr S. T. Bani (Thomson): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill which the Minister has moved amending the Industrial Relations Ordinance contains certain provisions that will bring about significant changes in industrial relations in Singapore.

Sir, first of all, it will be remembered that the Industrial Relations Ordinance was drawn up after thorough discussions with the representatives of workers and trade unions. It is also well known that certain provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance were themselves of a controversial nature and the overall Bill presented to this House was, in fact, a compromise Bill which contained as much of the unions' views as the Government considered possible, and the unions agreed to certain provisions as a general compromise, provisions which the Government had advocated.

Sir, it will be remembered perhaps that I was one of the Members of this House who supported the Industrial Relations Ordinance. But that support was a conditional support. I recall that I did clearly say that if it were the Lim Yew Hock Government then proposing the Industrial Relations Ordinance, then there would be pickets outside the Legislative Assembly House. I said that the unions were prepared to accept the Industrial Relations Ordinance as it was introduced here because the workers and unions had confidence then in the Government and they believed that the Ordinance would be put to use in a manner that would bring great advantage to the unions and workers in the process of collective bargaining. Sir, unfortunately, experience has only brought about disappointment to many unions. I notice in the amendment that the intention of the Government seems to be to provide another Court. I must say whether it is to be one Court or two Courts is not as important as to what purpose these Arbitration Courts are to be put to use. Sir, if the Arbitration Courts are to be looked upon by workers and employers as political institutions of the Government, and if workers are to regard them merely as instruments of the P.A.P. and even if employers are to look upon them as instruments of the Government for taking decisions which are politically advantageous to the Government, then I say that one, two or three Courts are not going to help industrial relations in any way.

Sir, this does not mean that the Barisan Sosialis are against the amendment to provide for more than one Court. We do realise that the present Arbitration Court is not able to cope with the cases. I am told that some cases which were referred as early as late last year are still to be heard by the Court. Therefore, in principle, we have no objection to having two or three Courts as the case may be. But what we are against is the use of the Arbitration Court for political purposes. Sir, I do not have to go into examples to quote what some unions and employers have said about the Arbitration Court. I am quite certain that the Minister for Health and Law is aware and I am quite certain that Members, generally in the Government Benches, are aware of this.

Sir, when the Arbitration Court was appointed, it was stated that the purpose of the Court was to assist in industrial relations. The Government statement and the statement of the President of the Court made at the opening of the Court, and even the Government manifesto made it quite clear that the Arbitration Court was not going to mean compulsory arbitration, that the Arbitration Court was not going to mean interference in industrial relations. Sir, there have been cases, but before I come to them, clause 11 in page 4 of the amending Bill to insert a new section to the Ordinance provides for compulsory conciliation together with clause 7 in page 3. There have been cases in the past where the Government conciliation machinery had thought fit to interfere in legitimate trade disputes. We have nothing whatsoever against the Government for assisting the settlement between employers and employees. But we cannot have the Government interfering in collective bargaining when it is not called upon to interfere. We cannot accept the position where the Government interfere with collective bargaining to make political capital. I need only quote, Sir, the notorious case of the Government intervention in the Shaw dispute.

Tun Lim Yew Hock (Cairnhill): You said you won.

Mr Bani: It is important that if the Government want to honour what they said in the election manifesto and what the Court President and what the Government themselves stated at the opening of the Court, that the actual purpose of the Court is to try and assist both unions and employers in bringing about a settlement, then they must try and avoid unnecessary interference in trade disputes. That again, I believe, is well known to Members. Today when collective agreements are drawn up and sent to the Court for certification, even in the wording of the agreements, quite a lot of fuss is made by some people in responsible positions in the Arbitration Court.

Sir, I do not know whether the Minister for Health and Law will agree with me that it is necessary when drawing up collective agreements to have phraseology that is acceptable to the workers and the employers. It does not necessarily mean that the legal form of wording is necessarily understood and accepted by workers and by employers. Sir, it has been found in practice that a good agreement is an agreement that is simple and straightforward with no legal jargon. But unfortunately, in practice, we have found the Arbitration Court wanting to change "shall" to "will" and "but" to "and", and "a" to "b", and so on. I am sure, Sir, if the Minister wishes to be serious, he will agree with me that this is not the important criterion for wanting to certify an agreement. There have been cases where I have myself been told personally that because I have refused to change one word "will", the agreement must not be certified. Sir, in the principal Ordinance, the President of the Arbitration Court can only refuse to certify an agreement if he considers it to be against public interest. I notice there is an amendment moved here - and basically that is maintained - viz, clause 8, at page 3 of the Bill:

`The Court may in its discretion refuse to certify a memorandum delivered under subsection (1) of this section if it is of opinion that it is not in the public interest...'.

And principally the position is that only if the Arbitration Court considers that a collective agreement is not in the interests of the public, then it can refuse to certify a collective agreement. But, Sir, there have been cases where collective agreements have not been certified for various other reasons.

Sir, what I have to say in respect of the various clauses I would rather reserve until we come to the Committee stage. But what I do want to say. Sir, in conclusion is that this amendment Bill is being rushed through in quite some haste. We in the Barisan Sosialis feel that the unions must be consulted on this amendment before it is adopted. Thus, Mr Speaker, Sir, it is a fair and reasonable suggestion that we are making. The principal Ordinance was drawn up only after consultation with the unions and their representatives. And I say that the amendments, particularly the amendments which would in my view bring about very significant changes - for example, changes to provide for compulsory conciliation which is just one step below compulsory arbitration - we have reason to believe, Mr Speaker, that the Government are, in fact, thinking of compulsory arbitration. We feel that amendments of this nature and of this significance are matters that will affect radically all trade unions, all employers and every aspect of industrial relations in Singapore. Therefore, we think it is only fair that the Government arrange to have proper consultation with trade unions and their representatives before they seek to pass this Bill.

2.58 p.m.

Mr A. P. Rajah (Farrer Park): Mr Speaker, Sir, there are one or two points on which I wish to address the House. If I may say so, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to deal with what I consider to be the legal aspects of this Bill, and my colleague, the Member for Cairnhill, will deal with what may be called the trade union aspect of this Bill.

Sir, I agree with the Member for Thomson that the purpose of moving the original Bill was, as he says, to assist industrial relations in Singapore. You may recollect, Mr Speaker, Sir, that when that Bill was brought into the House originally, there was a difficult situation prevailing in the industrial world, a situation that was tending to upset the economy of the country. And therefore it became necessary to introduce the Bill in order to bring some stability in industrial relations.

The justification for this Bill, Mr Speaker, Sir, from my point of view is this: the employer and the employee as a result of this legislation would be able beforehand to know where either stands in matters related to industrial disputes. So that unless there is a firm base on which both parties to a dispute could work on and unless that firm base continues throughout the dispute and also throughout the hearing of the dispute in the Court, we could have a situation where either party could have any confidence in this law.

The first point I wish to bring up arising out of the point I have now made, Mr Speaker, Sir, is this: the first base - the first inescapable base - on which industrial relations can be regulated is the base of the law. Now, both parties to a dispute must clearly understand the law affecting an industrial dispute; and how that legal position will be effected in a dispute as a result of a decision by the Industrial Arbitration Court is a matter which concerns both parties to the dispute. Mr Speaker, I agree with the Minister for Law that the Industrial Court must have a great deal of latitude and that it must have a great deal of room in which to manoeuvre - if I may use that phrase, and I use it in no disrespectful sense - in order that industrial peace might be maintained. But, Mr Speaker, Sir, if in the latitude given to this Court it violates the law of the land, then that Court is bringing about a situation in Singapore when neither party to the dispute can have any confidence in the Court because neither party will know what the Court will do next, if it is not firmly anchored to the base of the law. To make my point clear, Mr Speaker, I will refer to two cases which the Court decided. I think one is the case of the newspaper known as the Kerala Bandu where there was a dispute between an employee and the employer, the newspaper. So far as I could read the judgment of the Court, it held that the dismissal of this employee was justified. Having held that the dismissal of the employee was justified, the Court then went on to order six months' compensation to the employee whose dismissal was justified. Now, the Court cannot have it both ways, Mr Speaker, Sir, If the dismissal was justified, no question of compensation arises. That would be the normal decision in a Court. Now, is the Industrial Court then to be allowed to set itself above the law of the country and while holding that the dismissal was justified, yet to say, "I feel you the employer should give him six months' compensation"? If it says six months, it could well say two years. What point does one then reach, Mr Speaker, Sir, if the Industrial Court is allowed arbitrarily to flout the law of the land? Might I mention just one other case? I think it was in a dispute between a transport company and its employees where the Industrial Court ordered that the transport company should take back the employees whose case the Court had tried.

The first principle of law in a contract of employment is that there can be no specific performance of a contract of employment. That is the base of the law on which we all securely rest. If the Industrial Court is allowed to upset that base, I ask you, Mr Speaker, Sir, what confidence can there be in the employing public? In our economy the employing public is just as important as that section of the public which is being employed. Unless both of them know what their rights and liabilities are under the law of the country, and how the Industrial Court will honour the law of the country, it will be impossible, in my submission, Mr Speaker, Sir, to establish a state of affairs where both parties could have any confidence in this Court. That brings me to the present Bill by virtue of which the Government is now seeking to give this Court even greater powers and greater latitude by trying to make it absolutely impossible, in so far as human ingenuity can, to take any dispute from this Court to the High Court. It appears that there are certain loopholes under the existing Ordinance through which the decisions of the Industrial Court were taken to our normal Courts and as a result of which certain decisions of the Industrial Court have been queried. Some of the amendments here are intended to plug these loopholes. I do seriously ask the Government to consider this: whether it is their intention, by giving the Industrial Court this immunity by not allowing any appeal to any other tribunal, to enable the Industrial Court to go on such a rampage as to over-ride the law of the land and to formulate their own laws in making decisions.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the second point is the question of referees. Under the existing Ordinance, it is possible now for the President of the Industrial Court to be named a referee either under a collective agreement under section 23 of the Ordinance or under an award made by the Court - where either the parties privately amongst themselves could nominate the President of the Court to be a referee or the Court itself could nominate the President to be a referee. Now the situation was reached where the referee's decision was challenged and the referee himself sat as a court on his own decision - a situation highly undesirable, however much one may contend that it is quite legal under the provisions of the existing Ordinance. I see that the Government is taking steps to alter the existing law by making it not possible for the President or the Deputy President to sit as a referee. I welcome that, because it is contrary to the accepted principle of law that a person who makes a decision should be allowed to sit in judgment on an appeal from his decision.

But I do draw the attention of the Minister to this. Under section 23 - these are matters on which I will elaborate when we come to the clauses in Committee - it would appear from the general phrasing of the Industrial Relaxations (Amendment) Bill now before us that the right of appeal from referees appointed under section 23 of the Ordinance is not the same as under the section which provides for an appeal from a referee under a Court award.

A point the Minister was making was that a collective agreement will now go to the Court for approval, meaning the President and two other persons appointed from the panels instead of as now to the President alone, and thereby implying that the position is being made much better than it is today. But what he gives with the left hand he takes back with the right by moving another amendment to section 55 of the Ordinance which says that the powers of the Court under sections 23, 52, 53 and 54 of this Ordinance shall be exercisable by the Court constituted by the President alone. So although he says under section 23 the agreements will be approved by the Court, but under section 55 he brings in an amendment whereby the President acting under section 55 means the Court itself.

I do suggest to the Minister that wherever a referee has given a decision, that referee's decision should go to an Industrial Court composed of three persons and not to the President alone. And I make this further point. That any appeal from the decision of an Industrial Court on a point of law should be treated like that of an appeal from the normal courts of the country.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: Mr Speaker, Sir, the most significant phrase of the speech of the Member for Thomson is this, "That the Industrial Arbitration Court is made an instrument of the P.A.P." When the Industrial Relations Bill was debated in this House in 1960 at that time there was only the genuine opposition of eight Members - I did say that it would appear that what the Government was trying to do was to make this law to serve the P.A.P. At that time, the 13 great Barisan Members who sat on the other side of the House ridiculed my allegations. They laughed at me. They were not content with that. They even cried out that had it been a Lim Yew Hock Government, such a Bill would not have been introduced by that Government. Strange to say, Sir, the shoe must now be pinching the foot of the Member for Thomson for him to use the same words as I used. The Industrial Arbitration Court is intended to be an instrument of the P.A.P.

Sir, my colleague, the Member for Farrer Park, has pointed out the various points of law. But what I want to add now is just a little bit from the trade union angle. One thing that struck me as being funny is that it is now the intention of the Government, by the proposed amendment, to wipe out the T.U.C. of which they were singing high praises in 1960. They said that the T.U.C. was wonderful, a genuine organisation for workers, and that it had the support of the Government, and therefore, it must be given due recognition. Now it seems that the T.U.C. is to be taken out of the picture. I cannot understand why, because, as far as I know - and I may be wrong, I am subject to correction - the T.U.C. is still a legal entity. It has not been dissolved in accordance with the Constitution of the T.U.C. It was said to have been dissolved just because the Secretary-General of the T.U.C. had a few words with his colleague, the Minister for Labour and Law, at that time, along these lines. "Things are getting dangerous. The Communists are getting control. We must dissolve the T.U.C." So said Mr Kandasamy, the Secretary-General; and there was the Minister for Labour and Law saying, "Yes, we must dissolve the T.U.C." And yet the T.U.C. is today a legal entity. I am subject to correction. If I am wrong, the Minister will, of course, point out my mistakes. But as far as I know, the T.U.C. is still a legal entity. Now it would seem that the great heroes of the T.U.C. - the Ten Tall Men - plus the tallest of them all, the Secretary-General, are now divided into two camps, the P.A.P. and the Barisan Sosialis. The T.U.C. is no longer functioning, although the T.U.C. is still a registered body. I do hope that when the Minister asks for nomination from the trade union employees he must take due note that the unions which will be asked to nominate employees are genuine unions and they should not try to consider it from the point of view whether it is a P.A.P. union or a Barisan Sosialis union or an independent union.

If the Minister for Health and Law were to continue the evil practice that the P.A.P. has been following for the past two and a half years, before the disintegration of the P.A.P., life would be unhappy for all. It could not solve industrial disputes in that way. It is not possible. In fact, I did say that the Bill they were introducing in 1960 would not help to bring peace in the industrial field. In fact, it would encourage more industrial unrest. It has happened. And now the Government, having learnt the error of their ways, have seen fit to introduce an amendment Bill to help correct the mischief which they deliberately perpetrated.

Sir, the amendment Bill is important. When the original Bill was debated, we did urge upon the Government that it should be referred to a Select Committee because at almost the last minute, the Government introduced 50 rush amendments. We were defeated because the Barisan Sosialis were on the other side and they were at that time in cahoots with the P.A.P. But now, although the amending Bill is such a small Bill, yet the effect of the amendments to be proposed is great.

I would urge upon the Government, in order to bring a healthier atmosphere to the industrial field and to give the trade unions an opportunity to give their views on the proposed amendments, to refer this Bill to Select Committee.

Mr David Marshall (Anson): Mr Speaker, Sir, I will be very brief. I am conscious that the Singapore Bar Committee has made considerable recommendations with reference to this Bill and I find that its recommendations have not been considered. I am sure that the trade union movement has had no opportunity to study this Bill - it having been sprung on us at the commencement of this referendum debate - and I rise merely to support the Member for Cairnhill in his plea that important though it is that we should have an early second Court, it is nevertheless even more important, in the light of the amendments proposed, that this Bill should be sent to Select Committee, and that the trade unions and others interested be given an opportunity to make their representations.

Mr Speaker: Mr Byrne, in reply.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, I will first deal with the questions raised by the Member for Thomson just now. He has gained the impression that, by the amendment we have proposed in clause 11 of the Bill, the Government are seeking to introduce what he has termed "compulsory conciliation". Clause 11 of the Bill introduces a new section 27A in the Ordinance. Mr Speaker, Sir, I do not follow how he could have got that impression.

Mr Bani: On a point of explanation, Sir.

Mr Byrne resumed his seat.

Mr Bani: I did say clause 7 of the Bill on page 3.

Mr Byrne: I thought the hon. Member referred to the new section 27A in clause 11. Which clause is it to which the hon. Member referred?

Mr Bani: I referred to clause 7 of the amending Bill which seeks to amend subsection (1) of section 21 of the principal Ordinance which would, in effect, be compulsory conciliation.

Mr Byrne: If the hon. Member is referring to the amendment to section 21 of the principal Ordinance, there would really be no point for me to speak on clause 11 now. There has been no interference whatsoever with the procedure laid down in respect of collective bargaining in Part III of the Bill. Although this procedure is referred to in section 21 of the Ordinance, it was never followed in the sense that the Minister could always compel compulsory conferences even if the procedures set out in the earlier provisions of this part of the Bill were not followed, and the amendment gives effect to the existing practice. That is all it does. It was found in practice that there were unions which did not follow the procedures laid down in this part of the Bill and circumstances arose where the Minister had to call compulsory conferences. In those circumstances, if you will look at the wording of section 21 of the Ordinance, the Minister would legally be restrained from directing persons to attend conferences where the procedures were not followed. But, in fact, he did call compulsory conferences. And this amendment gives effect to that practice. I cannot see how the Member for Thomson can say that the Government are intending, by this amendment, to introduce what he has termed "compulsory conciliation".

The second point he made was that we were amending the provisions with regard to collective bargaining to make it more difficult for the unions to get their collective agreements registered. Mr Speaker, Sir, it was found in practice that the unions were entering into collective agreements with employers, and on the sideline entering into other agreements which were not shown in the agreements which they brought before the Court for registration. This amendment has been introduced to put a stop to those malpractices. Surely the Member for Thomson cannot object to this amendment in view of his knowledge that there were such sideline agreements being entered into between employers and unions.

Now on his third point, the Member for Thomson said that there must be consultation before any amendments are introduced. We agreed clause 83 of this Bill with the "Ten Tall Men" in the former T.U.C. It is provided here that amendments should be made in accordance with the observations on the working of the Ordinance by the President of the Court, and this amending Ordinance is introduced in consequence of the Report that the Government have received from the President of the Industrial Court on the working of the Court for the period 15th September. 1960, to 31st December, 1961. So where then is there any justification for his contention that there must be consultation before an amending Bill like this is introduced?

Now, let me deal with the comments of the Member for Farrer Park. He said that there must be a legal basis for all judicial determinations. He has quoted the case where the Court found that the dismissal of a certain employee was justified and it still proceeded to award compensation. He has also drawn the attention of the House to another case where an employee in a transport company was dismissed and the employer was obliged to reinstate him in employment. Mr Speaker, Sir, those are the very functions of this Court. It is provided in section 56 of the Ordinance that the Court in making its decisions

`. . . shall act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms.'

It is because of these considerations that the Court can make such orders. The Court is able to look into all the circumstances of the case and then make a determination.

On the question of referees, we have realised that it would be against good legal practice to allow the President of the Court to be a referee in an award and for him then as the President of the Court to adjudicate on the award that he has made; and for that purpose these amendments have been made. In the case of referees, whether they are appointed by the collective agreement itself or whether a referee is designated in an award, when he makes a decision, and if there is an appeal, it would have to be the Court under section 40 of the Ordinance.

Now, for the submissions of the Member for Anson. Of course, he knows very little about this. I will, however, tell him that I held many meetings with the Bar Committee on the amendments that we propose to this Bill. They insisted that (here should be an appeal on a point of law to the Court of Appeal from the decisions of this Court. Mr Speaker, Sir, I have indicated just now, in moving the Second Reading of the Bill, when the Member for Anson was not present, why it is not possible for us to allow an appeal on the facts from an award to a Court of Appeal.

Mr David Marshall: Not on facts.

Mr Byrne: On facts or on mixed questions of facts and law to the Court of Appeal. That is not possible for this reason, that the processes are quite different. The common law, as we know it, enforces private agreements between the parties. The common law, as we know it, never enforces a collective agreement as such. Under the procedures of this Court, the parties make collective agreements which they proceed to register. If they fail to make these agreements, it is this third party which is designated the Court which makes the agreements for them. Under that procedure, it is not possible for points of law to arise in the making of the agreement. For that reason, it is not possible for there to be an appeal, from an award of the Court to the Court of Appeal.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I hope I have adequately explained to the Members of the House the reasons for the amendments to this Bill. I would say that we are not attempting any major revisions of this Ordnance. We are only introducing improvements which have been suggested by the President of the Court on the working of this tribunal for the past 18 months.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole Assembly.

Assembly immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill.-[Mr Byrne].

Bill considered in Committee.

3.31 p.m.

[Mr SPEAKER in the Chair]

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2-

Question proposed, "That clause 2 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Bani: Mr Speaker, Sir, on clause 2 (b), the definition of "industrial matters" is being amended. Sir, in the principal Ordinance, "industrial matters" means "matters pertaining to the relaxations of employers and employees which are connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person." Now, this amendment, Sir, seeks to insert the exclusion "but shall not include any individual agreement or contract of service between employer and employee relating to the employment or terms of employment of such employee". It appears to me that if this exclusion is inserted, it may very well affect the unions in their industrial relaxations with the employers. For instance, it may be that an employer can have an individual contract with an employee who may be eligible to join a trade union and such contract can contain terms which may be considered unsatisfactory. It does appear to me, if such a case should arise, that the union will - be denied the right to negotiate on that issue with the employer because that will not come within the definition of "industrial matters". I would like to ask the Minister to clarify this, Sir, If the Minister can assure us that this will not be the case, then we will have no objection to this amendment. But it does appear to me, as I say, that there is every possibility of an employer drawing up a contract of service with an employee on unsatisfactory terms and then refusing to negotiate with the union on such terms, because such terms do not come within the definition of "industrial matters".

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, all that the amendment does is to shut out from the provisions of this Ordinance any individual agreement of service between an employer and an employee which does not concern a union. The Member for Thomson has not looked carefully at section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance wherein it is provided that an employee, bound by an award, may recover in any court of competent jurisdiction any amount which he is entitled to be paid by way of wages or otherwise in accordance with the award. An award, Mr Speaker, is both an award made by the Court and the collective agreement which is registered with the Court. So that it is not possible for employers to use this amendment to enter into individual contracts of service with individual employees so as to defeat the purposes of this Ordinance.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 3 and 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 -

Question proposed, "That clause 5 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Bani: Sir, clause 5 is a very significant amendment. Sir, in the explanatory statement it is quite clearly stated that:

`The appointment of members to the employees panel is to be selected by such trade unions of employees as may be invited by the Minister.'

Sir, this amendment will mean the deletion of the Singapore Trades Union Congress from the principal Ordinance and the substitution of the phrase "a trade union of employees". As is well known today, in place of the Singapore Trades Union Congress, there is no central organisation of trade unions. There is the Singapore Association of Trade Unions, which is awaiting registration, and the Singapore National Trade Union Centre, which is also awaiting registration.

In the first place, Sir, the legal position of the Singapore Trades Union Congress is still not clear. As the Member for Cairnhill has already pointed out earlier on, the T.U.C. legally still functions. In fact, I believe the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Labour in this House itself once confirmed that the T.U.C. was still a legal body. While, on the one hand, the T.U.C. legally exists, we have two other central organisations seeking registration. The Minister proposes to have appointments made to the panel of the Court from nominations by individual unions. If the explanatory statement is of any guide, it is quite certain that such nominations will only be accepted from unions that may be invited by the Minister. Sir, knowing the performance of P.A.P. Ministers in the past there is no doubt whatsoever that it would disregard the large number of unions which do not come within the ambit of the National Trade Union Centre. There is no doubt again that the majority of the unions are within the S.A.T.U. group of unions. If a proper representative panel is to be had, then representation must be sought from all unions irrespective of whether they belong to the S.A.T.U. group of unions or the N.T.U.C. group of unions. I would like to ask the Minister, first of all, whether it is his intention to consult all unions or just selected unions.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member for Thomson is aware of section 6 (2) of the Ordinance which provides that:

`The employer panel and the employee panel shall each consist of ten persons appointed by the Minister whose names shall be notified in the Gazette.'.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member for Thomson was one of the Ten Tall Men when there was a T.U.C. As a Minister I had written to the T.U.C. umpteen times for nominations from them. But the Ten Tall Men would only designate four persons to serve on the employee panel of this Court. There have been differences amongst them and a break-up of the trade union position, but these four persons are still members of the employee panel. Mr Speaker, Sir, we would be glad to have a representative selection of the trade unionists to be on the employee side of the Court. I can give the Member for Thomson this assurance, if it is really necessary, that we would be glad to have nominees from these respective groups on this Court. He knows the position, Mr Speaker, Sir. He is trying to make a political point, knowing it to be untrue, in this House today.

Mr Bani: I am glad the Minister is able to give an assurance on the lines that I have asked for. But I must say that if the T.U.C. does not nominate sufficient members to the panel, then it is as much the fault of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Culture as it is mine and any other member of the Secretariat. Be that as it may, Mr Speaker, Sir, I want to ask the Minister what is the necessity in wanting to have the amendment made here to delete the Singapore Trades Union Congress when the Trades Union Congress, in fact, at the moment exists as a legal body, although the Secretariat of the T.U.C. does not function, although the Executive Council of the T.U.C. does not function, because they have all read in the papers that the Minister has had it dissolved. Nevertheless, it appears that the legal position of the T.U.C. is such that it still functions. Surely if the Minister wants to amend the provision to provide for some other organisation instead of the Singapore Trades Union Congress, then it must necessarily be a central organisation of trade unions. But if he just simply says "a trade union of employees" - Sir, in Singapore there are on paper about 120 trade unions. About 30 of them are ghost unions and about 90 of them are active. Surely the Minister is not going to write to 90 trade unions in Singapore asking them to nominate members to the panel.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, we must accept the fact that the T.U.C. is in a state of suspended animation. Two groups have broken away from it and set themselves up as the S.A.T.U. group and the National group of trade unions. Mr Speaker, Sir, we have to accept this as a fact. We have had difficulty already in getting the employee panel for the Court that is functioning now. We propose to introduce another Court. So we must have more of these gentlemen to serve on these employee panels. We are doing our best to get a representative group for these panels. It is no use writing to the T.U.C. when you know that there will be no response from that organisation. We are practical people. We want to deal fairly with the unions. We know which unions have large followings, and the Minister should be left to exercise his discretion to write to the unions to submit their names. I am telling you, Mr Speaker, that some of these powerful unions do not want to be associated with the work of this Court. They want to keep outside and snipe at it. We have great difficulty in getting them to nominate to the panels of these Courts and if the Member for Thomson could urge them to serve in them we should be delighted indeed.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6 -

Question proposed. "That clause 6 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Rajah: Mr Speaker, it is proposed to introduce a new sub-clause:

`The members of the Court shall take the oath of allegiance and the judicial oath.'

I take it that the members of the Court here include the two panel members. Could I ask the Minister what oath of allegiance and what judicial oath the Bill has in mind?

Mr Byrne: These are oaths all magistrates and judges take. The President of the Court has taken both these oaths and we feel that it is right and proper that the members on these panels when they serve on these panels understand that they are there exercising a judicial function. If they were to adopt a partisan attitude, then there would be very little confidence in the work of the Court. It is for that reason that this extra provision has been added to section 13 of the principal Ordinance.

3.45 p.m.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 -

Question proposed, "That clause 7 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Bani: Sir, section 21 (1) of the principal Ordinance provides:

`The Minister may, where he considers it possible that a trade dispute notified by the Commissioner under section 18 or 20 of this Ordinance may be settled by conciliation or further conciliation, direct a person, whether engaged in or connected with the trade dispute or not, to attend at a time and place specified in the direction at a conference presided over by the Minister or such person as the Minister directs.'

Sir, it is quite clearly provided here that the Minister may only direct trade disputes that have been notified by the Commissioner under section 18 or 20 of this Ordinance. Whereas if the amendment were to be accepted, then it would mean any trade dispute. Sir, I do not know the intention of the P.A.P. Government as to exactly what they propose to do. But knowing again, Sir, their performance in the past and realising that there is a new clause moved to section 27A, it does appear to me that the intention of the Government is, in fact, to make conciliation compulsory. Sir, I will be ---

Mr Byrne shook his head.

Mr Bani: Sir, the Minister for Health and Law shakes his head. I will be very glad indeed if the Minister will stand up and say that they will not make conciliation compulsory. At the moment, as the Minister says, he has the power to call for compulsory conferences. But he can only do so if the dispute has been notified by the Commissioner under section 18 or 20 of this Ordinance. Sir, the Minister may say later on that the Communist group of unions are avoiding the conciliation machinery and are not abiding by section 16 of the Ordinance which provides that negotiations are to follow as a set procedure. I must tell the Minister, Sir, that it is not that these unions want to avoid the Ministry of Labour. It is not that they want to carry out negotiations outside the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Minister knows full well that there are numerous disputes that arise between unions and employers every day. There are disputes as important as wage claims, claims in respect of improvement of conditions of service; also there are disputes like dismissals, pay cuts and so on. There are hundreds of these disputes. I shall deal with that point when we come to discussing clause 11 of the amendment Bill. But it is however related to section 7 of the Bill. It is not possible, in the first place, to have every single dispute follow the provisions of this Ordinance. That I think the Minister will agree. We have no objection whatsoever to having section 16 and other related sections followed strictly in industrial relations. But what we do not want is to give the Minister wide powers - a blank cheque - to compel any dispute to be referred to the Ministry of Labour.

It is not out of place for me to mention once again the Shaw dispute. In the Shaw dispute, the Minister for Labour unreasonably interfered with the negotiations. He called on the workers to attend a conciliation meeting in the Victoria Memorial Hall, a call unprecedented in the history of the labour movement in Singapore, a call that was made in complete disregard of a trade union that was legally registered to represent the workers, a trade union which enjoyed the confidence of the workers. I do not want to go into various other examples. But I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind, knowing the P.A.P., that the purpose of this amendment is to have the right to interfere with any trade dispute as they choose. As I said, if the Minister is prepared to give an assurance, and if provided he honours that assurance that it is not his intention or the intention of his Government to interfere with trade disputes when they are not called upon to interfere, then I shall be much obliged indeed.

Tun Lim Yew Hock: Mr Speaker, Sir, I think the Member for Thomson has got the wrong end of the stick. Sections 18 and 20 provide that a trade dispute has to be notified by the Commissioner to the Minister. Section 16 says:

`A trade union of employees may serve on an employer...notice...for a collective agreement setting out proposals for a collective agreement.'

Now, if after one week the employer has not served a notice of acceptance, then the union under section 18 will inform the Commissioner for Labour that the employer has ignored the service of the notice. Then the Commissioner will do what he can to try and bring the two parties together, and when the Commissioner feels it is his duty, he shall then notify the Minister. And if the Minister so directs, he then notifies the Registrar of the Arbitration Court. Section 20 is just an extension of section 16 where a notice has been served and where the employer has accepted the notice and the two parties have sat for a period of two weeks and tried to thrash out an agreement, and where no agreement has been reached, any party - the union of employees or the employer himself - can notify the Commissioner. The Commissioner then will do what he can to bring about peace through conciliation. It is only when he so feels that his attempts at conciliation are unsuccessful that he notifies the Minister. The Minister, if he so directs the Commissioner, shall then notify the Registrar of the Arbitration Court. Unless these two sections of this Part of this Ordinance have been complied with, section 21 means that unless the Minister has been notified of a trade dispute, he cannot exercise his powers under section 21. The powers conferred on the Minister under section 21 is to try to bring about peace. The amendment will just give the Minister the extra power that is required to promote industrial peace. With this amendment he can, even if the union or the employer tries to hide things away from the Commissioner, and even if they do not go through the process outlined in Part III where the Commissioner has not been notified of any negotiations or any dispute, the Minister can, if he feels that the interests of the country demand it, bring the two parties together by force and tell them that they have to sit down and find a solution to the dispute. The Minister has no power under section 21 to force any party to accept anything. What he has the power to do is to summon any trade union or any employer to come to his office for a discussion even though that union or that employer deliberately keeps it quiet and wants to keep the dispute outside the scope of this Industrial Relations Ordinance.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, the procedure in respect of collective bargaining set out in Part III of this Bill was agreed to between the Government and the Ten Tall Men. Mr Speaker, Sir, they undertook to follow these procedures. The moment this Bill was enacted, Mr Speaker, Sir, they refused to follow the procedure set out in this Part of the Bill. They proceeded to make agreements which they considered to be in pursuance of industrial relations outside the provisions of this Ordinance.

If you will look at Part III of the Bill you will see it sets out the procedure to be followed. Whenever a union enters into collective bargaining, in all fairness and in all justice, it must serve a notice to treat first. It must give the employer a chance to consider its proposals. There must be a meeting between the parties. Then if they cannot reach agreement, if they are deadlocked, the dispute is referred to the Commissioner for Labour. He tries to conciliate. And if they still fail to reach agreement, then he refers the matter to the Parliamentary Secretary or to the Minister. These are the processes they have agreed with us. No sooner had this Bill been enacted, Mr Speaker. Sir, then they refused to follow these procedures. They said that there was such a thing as collective bargaining outside the procedures of this Ordinance.

Mr Speaker, Sir, that is a loophole in the law. We believed that we were dealing with honest people. Because of their dishonesty, Mr Speaker, Sir, we have to tighten up the provisions of this Bill. That is why it is provided - and clause 7 so provides - that the Minister shall have the power to compel a compulsory conference whether they have followed these procedures or not. And clause 11 of the Bill, which introduces a new section 27A, makes it an offence for anybody to conduct negotiations otherwise than in accordance with the procedures set out in this Ordinance.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member for Thomson knows the position very well that these procedures have to be followed only on occasions when, say, a union puts forward proposals for a collective agreement in relation to any industrial matter. If it wants to ask the employer for a collective agreement with regard to salaries or conditions of service, then it must have recourse to these procedures. But where things like this happen, where men are dismissed in the course of their work, Mr Speaker, Sir, these procedures do not require that you serve a notice on the employer. Why should you serve a notice on an employer with regard to a dismissal? That is the view the Member for Thomson was putting forward. If he looks at section 16 of the Ordinance, it is quite clear that these procedures must be followed only when there are requests for a proposal with regard to a collective agreement.

4.00 p.m.

Mr Bani: Sir, the Minister for Health and Law is in the habit of getting excited very quickly, Mr Speaker. I must state quite clearly that nobody is against using the Government conciliation machinery. Nobody is against going through the procedures laid down in the Industrial Relations Ordinance. If there have been cases where notices for collective agreements were not sent under section 16 of the Ordinance, there have been good reasons. As far as I know, and I am advised so by legal men, whether at the moment a notice is served under section 16 or not, the Minister, if he wants to, can refer that dispute to arbitration, because he has the power. Now, we as reasonable men, Mr Speaker, Sir, expect the Ministry of Labour to interfere in industrial relaxations only to seek to use the conciliation machinery when there is a deadlock, or when there is no progress made between employer and employee and where either the employer or the union requests conciliation.

But the Government's opinion of conciliation is quite different, Mr Speaker. To the Government, conciliation means they just interfere wholesale, anyhow, and at any time they like. That, I say. Mr Speaker, Sir, is not desirable in industrial relations. Sir, it is one thing to expect the Government to assist in industrial relations by making its facilities available, but it is another thing to tolerate the Government interfering in industrial relations purely for the purpose of making political capital out of it.

Sir, the Minister was saying that only notice for a collective agreement need be filed under section 16 and the other sections of the Ordinance. He also said that a collective agreement would only refer to matters like wages and conditions of service, and so on. Sir, the Minister does not know what is happening in Singapore. Today there are many employers who refuse to negotiate with the unions on any matter that comes within the definition of "industrial matters" as provided in the Ordinance, unless a notice is served under section 16. All that the Minister for Law has to do is to consult his Conciliation Officers in the Ministry of Labour to know the truth of this statement. Today, an employer can refuse to negotiate with a union on a dismissal case if the request to open negotiations on that case is not filed under section 16. And if the Minister does not know this, then he is not aware of what is happening in the industrial world. There is no use seeking to provide amendments that will render the position impracticable. And I say, Sir, quite honestly that the new section that they are proposing - section 27A - and this clause 7 will simply mean that the Government have a free hand to interfere in industrial relations. That is exactly what we seek to oppose. But this, again I repeat it, does not mean that we do not want to use the Government conciliation machinery. The Minister knows that if he asks the Minister for Labour to compile statistics to show which unions have sent in the most number of disputes to the conciliation machinery, the answer will be unions that they call Communist front organisations.

Sir, if our intention is not to use the Ministry of Labour - and we do not have to go there - then what more, Sir, we have had a situation where the majority of collective agreements drawn up in Singapore have been drawn up outside the Ministry of Labour. I hope the Minister will not stand up and say again that we are against the use of the conciliation machinery in the Ministry of Labour, that we do not want to file notices under section 16 of the Ordinance, and that we do not want to use the provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance to carry on our negotiations. As I said, the position is such that today there are many employers who refuse to negotiate on any matter if notices are not filed under section 16 of the Ordinance.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker. Sir, the Member for Thomson just now referred to the Shaw case. He said that the Minister for Labour took unprecedented action in asking the workers to meet him in connection with that dispute. Mr Speaker, Sir, he has also said that the position today is this: that employers refuse to treat with the unions unless they follow the procedures set out in this Ordinance. Mr Speaker, Sir, there is all the more reason therefore why there should be this power vested in the Minister. He should have the power to send for the parties if they cannot reach agreement. There is nothing to prevent both sides getting together, following these procedures outside the Labour Ministry and entering into agreements and then taking their agreements and getting them registered with the Registry of the Industrial Arbitration Court. We welcome that. There will be no trouble for the Labour Ministry and both sides can get together, make their agreements and register them. It is only when there is a breakdown in negotiations, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the procedures for conciliation available to both sides in the Labour Ministry must be resorted to. And that procedure is indicated in this Part of the Ordinance.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this section 21 and these procedures were agreed with the Ten Tall Men. They wanted it to be so. They wanted the Minister to have these powers. They mentioned to us, at the time when this Bill was drafted, that they were in an impossible position unless the Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary were vested with the power. They might make approaches to an employer for a collective agreement, but he tells them, "Go and play." And it is because of their representations that these powers were given to the Minister. Now they say the Minister is trying to force his will on them, that he is trying to compel them to follow collective bargaining procedures. Mr Speaker, Sir, all this is laid down in the Bill. Why does he make such a lot of fuss about it? I do not understand him at all.

Mr Bani: That is what you propose to do.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8-

Question proposed, "That clause 8 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Rajah: Mr Speaker, Sir, clause 8 deals with section 23 of the principal Ordinance. One of the amendments there, Mr Speaker, Sir, is that wherever the word "President" occurs, to substitute the word "Court". As we know, Mr Speaker, the Court consists of the President, or the Deputy President as the case may be, and two members from the panel. When one reads the amended clause, one gets the impression that it will go to a Court of three. If you will be good enough to turn to page 5 of the Bill, under clause 14:

`Subsection (1) of section 55 of the principal Ordinance is hereby amended by inserting immediately after the word "sections" appearing in the first line thereof the expression "23,".

Reading in that intended amendment to the existing section 55, the amended section 55 will read as follows:

`The powers of the Court under sections 23, 52, 53 and 54 of this Ordinance shall be exercisable by the Court constituted by the President alone.'

So the result of these two amendments - which, as I said, you give with one hand and take with the other - really leaves in effect the amended section 23 - there is the word "President" - exactly the same as section 23 is today. Although the amended clause that is agreed to will read "Court", yet the President will exercise the power of the Court on his own as he is, in fact, now doing under statutory authority. I see no point in making such a song and dance about altering the word from "President" to "Court" when a corresponding amendment is made to the existing section 55. That is the first point.

The other point is on the amendment "may be a person designated in the agreement or" with which I am in entire agreement with the Government. This gets us away from the present position where the employer and the employee may appoint the President or the Deputy President of the Court, which I think is very desirable. I welcome that amendment.

Now, Mr Speaker, perhaps it might be convenient if I deal with clause 12 at this stage because what I am going to raise on this clause would impinge on that. Clause 12, Mr Speaker, Sir, gives the right of appeal from the decision of the referee to the Court, and the decision of the Court on such appeal shall be final and conclusive. I welcome that portion of the amendment which allows an appeal from a referee to the Court and an appeal from a referee to the Court in that case would be to a Court of three persons. That is a good provision. I accept that.

4.15 p.m.

Now, if one looks at section 39, it refers to awards and referees under an Award; whereas a referee appointed under an agreement is dealt with under section 23. Then the new subsection (3) to section 39 reads-

`An appeal shall lie from the decision of the referee to the Court and the decision of the Court on such appeal shall be final and conclusive.

On my reading of the Bill as it stands, it appears to me, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the Government intends an appeal both from a referee under an agreement and a referee under an award, that is, the Government intends that there should be appeals in respect of both those referees. In the form the amendments have been put forward to the Assembly, it would appear that there is only a right of appeal from the decision of a referee under an award by virtue of section 29, because provision for an appeal, which is subsection (3) under clause 12, does not apply to an appeal from a referee under an agreement.

Mr Byrne: Why?

Mr Rajah: It is because this section, Mr Speaker, only deals with a referee under an award. I think the Minister also said that the Court may, upon application made by a trade union or a person bound by an award, give an interpretation of an award. I cannot see any clause, if I could be enlightened on this. If the Minister can point to any clause which makes it a statutory right for an appeal from a referee under an agreement, I should be quite content to sit down. But as the Ordinance now stands, with the amendments, it seems to me that there is ---

Mr Byrne: Section 24 - "Collective agreement deemed to be an award."

Mr Rajah: Yes. I am glad the Minister raised this point. But it does not seem as of right, because the Minister has to exercise certain powers under section 37 of this Ordinance before an agreement registered under clause 23 becomes an award for the purpose of this Ordinance. It seems to me, Mr Speaker, not as of right.

The Chairman: Perhaps the Minister will be able to explain.

Mr Rajah: Yes. That is the second point. The other point is this. I was going to mention that so far as the new sub-clause (5) , which would go in as subsection 5 to section 5 is concerned, I have no comment on that, Mr Speaker. I welcome that.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member for Farrer Park referred to the amendment to section 23 of the Ordinance which substitutes the word "Court" for the word "President". Mr Speaker, I have already explained in the Second Reading speech that the purpose of this amendment is to emphasise that the act of certification is the act of the Court and not only the act of the President, and to equate the status of a collective agreement to that of an award. It will also enable proceedings to be taken to punish persons who are guilty of offences against the Court for contempt against the Court. Mr Speaker, Sir, there have been cases where the President has in open Court certified agreements. In those cases, there have been attacks on his authority. If there was not this amendment it could be held that when certifying agreements he was not sitting as a Court, and to enable such contempts to be punishable, Mr Speaker, Sir, it would be necessary for this amendment to be made to section 23.

On the other point, Mr Speaker, Sir, that is, the question of an appeal lying from the decision of the referee to the Court, this is provided for by the amendment to section 39 of the Ordinance. Mr Speaker, Sir, a collective agreement which is registered is in law the same as an award made by the Court. This amendment would allow an appeal to lie to the Court in respect both of the collective agreement which is registered and which is an award as well as in respect of an award which is made by the Court.

Mr Rajah: With respect to the Minister, I still cannot see it. My point is this. Unless the Minister acts under clause 37, which brings it within section 24, it is only then that it would be deemed an award for the purposes of this Ordinance. Under section 24:

`A collective agreement, a memorandum of which has been certified by the President [in this case it would be the Court] shall, as between the parties to the agreement or any successor to, or any assignee or transmittee of, the business of a party bound by an agreement, including any corporation which has acquired or taken over the business of such a party, and any persons or trade unions upon whom it is declared to be binding by order made by the Minister under section 37 of this Ordinance, he deemed to be an award for the purposes of this Ordinance.'

So it appears to me that it can only become an award for certain purposes of the Ordinance if the Minister acts under section 37. There seems to be a hiatus. If section 23 had said:

`The memorandum when certified by the Registrar shalt be deposited with and registered by the Registrar and shall have for the purposes of this Ordinance the effect of an award.'

or something like that, then there would have been absolutely no difficulty, and all doubts would have been cleared. But the scheme under which this Ordinance has been drafted seems to proceed on the basis that a collective agreement will remain a collective agreement as opposed to an award given by the Court until the Minister acts under section 37 of this Ordinance by virtue of the provisions of section 24. I may be mistaken. I stand subject to correction. I am not trying to be difficult.

The Chairman: Will the Member look at section 24 and stop at "agreement" in lines 4 and 5, and skip the phrase starting with "including" and ending with "Ordinance" - four lines down below that, and then carry on, "be deemed to be an award".

Mr Rajah: Omit from "including" up to "Ordinance"?

The Chairman: The words "including any corporation" up to "Ordinance" are just explanatory.

Mr Rajah: My point is this. If the Minister is, in fact, satisfied that that is so - I merely raised it because I thought there was an omission - if the Minister is satisfied, I am quite happy with it, so that persons who come under a collective agreement will be in a position to avail themselves of the right of appeal to the Court. That is all I am interested in. If the Minister says that is so. I am quite happy.

Mr Byrne: That is so, Mr Speaker, except that this is an entirely different proposition which is the extension of the operation of an award to other parties.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 -

Question proposed, "That clause 10 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Rajah: Sir, if I may, I want to raise certain points which will clarify the position of members of the Bar. It has been the contention up till now that in certain circumstances and under certain conditions, it would not be a violation of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance if a solicitor acted on behalf either of a trade union of employees or a trade union of employers. That is accepted. Now, does the deletion of the phrase "under this Ordinance" mean that under no circumstances should a solicitor in any way advise or help either party when there is a dispute as between an employer and an employee? I ask the Minister this question, Sir, because I think it is important from the point of view of the Bar. The Bar should know exactly what the position is, because any interference with the provisions of section 25 results in an offence. I do not think we want members of the Bar to commit an offence unwittingly.

Mr Byrne: Mr Speaker. Sir, I had met the last Committee of the Bar Committee. They said that they would be happy to leave the parties to negotiate between themselves and to follow the procedures that are set out under Part III of the Ordinance. But they said to me, Mr Speaker, that they would be happy to come in if they were invited by the Minister to do so. That is provided for by the amendment that has been made to section 31 of the Ordinance, where it is provided now, as amended, that the Minister may, where he considers it possible that any trade dispute may be settled by conciliation or further conciliation, direct a person, whether engaged in or connected with the trade dispute or not, to attend at the time and place specified in the direction at a conference presided over by the Minister or such person as the Minister directs. They said that the parties would get together and follow these procedures. If there are deadlocks, then the matter is referred to the Minister, and if the Minister thinks that it is necessary to compel a compulsory conference, then they can be invited to attend. From then on they can take over. That has been actually agreed between myself and the last members of the Bar Committee.

4.30 p.m.

Mr David Marshall: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to draw the attention of the Minister to the fact that very often members of the Bar give assistance to trade unions in clarifying and helping them to an understanding of the various issues before negotiations are undertaken. It seems to me that by omitting the words "under this Ordinance" it is now being made unlawful both for the trade unions to consult a lawyer as to how to frame and formulate their demands, and for a lawyer to advise them.

Sir, this has proved a healthy procedure, but I must confess I am more than surprised at the suggestion that the Singapore Bar Committee is amenable to the proposed deletion and the proposed prohibition of the Bar from exercising a valuable function. I cannot understand the need for preventing the Bar from giving assistance and guidance before the commencement of negotiations. I will put it no higher than this - is the Minister sure of his premise when he suggests that the Bar Committee is happy to see this amended?

Mr Byrne: The last Committee. They have now a new Committee. The previous Committee did agree that with me. They said, "Let the parties get together; let them negotiate on their own; let them comply with the provisions in Part III of the Ordinance and we would be happy to come in, if we are invited to do so by the Minister."

Mr David Marshall: Mr Speaker, I would put it no higher than this, Sir, from the information which is in my possession as a member of the Bar Committee; but I would urge the Minister to look at the correspondence between the State Advocate-General and the Bar Committee, particularly the letter of the 21st of June, and he will find that in fact both Committees - both the previous and the present Bar Committees - do not consider it helpful, for the public interest, that the Bar should be excluded from assisting in the formulation of demands or understanding of the legal provisions before negotiations are commenced. I am happy to show him my file if he would like to look at it for his personal information.

Mr Byrne: Sir, I am aware of that, it was in pursuance of those representations that I held meetings in my office at which members of the previous Bar Committee were invited to be present, and the State Advocate-General was also present at those meetings. It was then suggested, as a compromise, to leave negotiations to the parties, and that they would only step in if they were invited to do so by the Minister when there was a breakdown in the negotiations.

Mr Rajah: Would the position then be this if this amendment were passed. If there was some likelihood of a dispute between an employer and his employees and if either the employer or the employees went to a lawyer and were to say, "It looks as if there is going to be a dispute. Now, will you advise me as to what I should do if a dispute occurs?", and if a solicitor should advise either party, at the request of that party, would he be committing an offence under this Ordinance? Is this amendment intended to prevent such advice being given?

Mr David Marshall: The Minister will appreciate that he could not exercise the powers indicated in section 21 until, in fact, there have been negotiations under sections 16 and 17. What I am talking about, Sir, is the - how shall I say it? - pre-official negotiation period when it is sought to obtain clarification and guidance on the legal aspects. I cannot believe that the Minister should find that in any way offensive; that the Bar should guide either employers or trade unions in formulating their position or in understanding the legal position. By deleting the three words in question, Sir, he would be making that illegal.

Forgive me, Sir, I have been through this before, but if I may show you. At the present moment, Sir, when negotiations are under this Ordinance, it would be improper to offer or receive any proposal or to act on behalf of a trade union except with the qualifications under section 60. And negotiations under this Ordinance, Mr Speaker, Sir, start with section 16, when a formal notice is served on an employer, or the employer serves the notice, and there is an acceptance under section 17. When that happens, then negotiations begin under this Ordinance. Any period prior to the service of notice is negotiations outside the Ordinance. I understood the Minister to say that he would be very happy and would welcome negotiations outside the Ordinance when the two parties can really get together in a friendly spirit and bring about an agreement which they can present to the Court and have it registered. Which seems a very sensible and commonsensical approach, Sir, and I accept that he wishes that. But in fact, by deleting these three words for whose deletion there seems lo be no real reason urged, he will be preventing members of the Bar from giving any assistance in that direction.

Mr Byrne: As I have told the House just now, Mr Speaker, Sir, there were these discussions with the previous members of the Bar Committee but I do not feel very strongly about it. I would be happy to agree, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the three words remain in this section.

The Chairman: The position then is that the voting will be against clause 10.

Question put, and negatived.

Clause 10 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 11 -

Question proposed, "That clause 11 stand part of the Bill."

Mr David Marshall: I rise on a point of guidance, Sir. Did I understand the Minister - and it seems that I understood him correctly - that he would welcome those negotiations between unions and employers in a healthy atmosphere of mutual respect which eventuates in an agreement which can then be registered? But am I wrong in thinking that this clause - the new proposed section 27A - makes it an offence for any person or trade union to negotiate otherwise than in accordance with Part III? So it will be impossible to have negotiations outside Part III.

Sir, if my understanding is correct, then may I understand how they can have those friendly negotiations without serving notices? Perhaps the Minister would assist me?

Mr Byrne: As I have said just now with regard to section 16 of the Ordinance, it is only when, say, a trade union asks an employer for a collective agreement with regard to industrial matters as defined in this Ordinance that these procedures must be followed - the procedures of serving a notice to treat and for the parties to get together within a reasonable time, for the employer to consider the proposals, for them to bargain, until they reach a deadlock. The matter is then referred to the Commissioner for Labour and then to the Minister.

Now, Mr Speaker, Sir, that is only in respect of cases where they ask for a collective agreement, but life is not that alone in the trade union world. There are people who are dismissed every day, and in those cases, Mr Speaker, Sir, it would be absurd to ask the union to comply with these procedures. In these cases they would have to meet the employer and ask him to consider the reinstatement of a dismissed employee, and if he is in any way difficult, the union can then use the procedures open to it under section 21 of the Ordinance.

Mr Bani: It appears that there are one or two things arising from what the Minister has just said. Sir, this new clause will make it an offence for any person or a trade union to enter into negotiations in relation to industrial matters. The Minister has conveniently suggested that industrial matters may only be matters that may end up in collective agreements, but if we look at the definition of "industrial matters", we will notice that everything under the sun that goes on between an employer and the employees comes within the definition as stated in the Ordinance. It should simply mean, Mr Speaker, Sir, any person or union which enters into discussion on any matter that is defined here as "industrial matters", or any matter that affects the employee in his employment. I do not know whether the Minister was thinking of section 16 alone just now, or was he answering in reply to the Member for Anson after consideration of section 27 and the definition of "industrial matters".

4.45 p.m.

Mr David Marshall: Probably there have inadvertently been some words omitted there. You will notice "a person who or trade union which enters into negotiations in relation to industrial matters". "Industrial matters", Sir, even with the present additional definition, does not cover merely collective agreements, but covers the entire relationship, whereas, if I understand the Minister aright, he wants the words "which enters into negotiations for collective agreements in relation to industrial matters". In that case, would he accept an amendment to insert the words "negotiations", "for collective agreements"?

Mr Byrne: No, Mr Speaker, Sir. The new section 27A provides that "Any person who or trade union which enters into negotiations in relation to industrial matters otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Ordinance ..."" this part of this Ordinance" refers to Part III - the collective bargaining part of the Ordinance, Sir. There is no doubt about that, Mr Speaker, Sir, and all that is required is that the procedures under this part of the Ordinance are complied with in respect of proposals for collective agreements.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13-

Question proposed, "That clause 13 stand part of the Bill."

Mr Rajah: Sir, I have made my point on the Second Reading of this Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I can understand that the right of appeal should operate in service for which this legislation has been framed. I am fully aware of that. But the Minister will also agree that if one gives to a Court unlimited powers - as indeed this Court has, for has not the Minister himself said that the Court can act in equity and good conscience - and, as a result thereof, the Court can over-ride existing law and substitute therefor its notions of equity and good conscience, then, in these circumstances, Mr Speaker, Sir, the Industrial Court would be more powerful than God himself for where God himself could be bound by his own decisions, the Industrial Court would only be bound by its notions of equity and good conscience.

Now, Sir, such power could be abused, wittingly or unwittingly. I am not saying that there should be an appeal from his decision on points of fact, but there may be points of law involved, particularly when the President of the Court is not being assisted by a legal man, on which he could go wrong. What then could be the harm if the provision for appeal is inserted in the Bill? In order that there might not be any abuse of that right to appeal, the State Advocate-General should certify that there is a point of law on which an appeal could be moved. The Minister himself has recognised the difficulty. There do arise points of law in these courts and those points of law, under the Ordinance, the President is entitled to go to the State Advocate-General for advice. The State Advocate-General gives it, which, in effect, means that the Government does recognise that points of law do arise, even in industrial disputes. All I am asking the Minister to say is whether the Government will consider, either now in this Bill or at some future time, the question of enabling any litigant to appeal from the Industrial Arbitration Court to a Court of Law in the country on points of law. In order to prevent frivolous appeals, the State Advocate-General as I have indicated should certify. In England in respect of certain appeals there are provisions whereby the Attorney-General does certify and where a point of law is involved the case goes to a higher tribunal. Similarly, here, the State Advocate-General could be given power to certify that a genuine point of law does exist and on this point of law there could be an appeal.

Mr David Marshall: Sir, I would like to add my voice to that of the Member for Farrer Park with reference to this most unusual provision.

Sir, it is necessary to give power, but absolute power it is never necessary to give; and to give absolute power, Sir, is to risk a tyranny. Throughout history, Sir, it has been repeatedly proved that it is wise to give the power of appeal to higher tribunals from the natural failings and errors to which perfectly honest individuals may be subject. Sir, I would draw your attention to the possibility, for example, of the President refusing to certify an agreement for no reason at all. He does not like one of the parties: he will not certify it. There is no power for an order of mandamus to direct him to do his duty. Supposing he does not like one of the parties and he sends him to prison for contempt, because he does not like the colour of his hair. There is no power to appeal from that order.

Mr Speaker, I would like you to appreciate that I recognise the validity of the Minister for Law's stand that in matters of policy and in matters of fact, the decisions of this tribunal shall not be challenged. I accept that, Sir, and I give you as an analogy, Sir, not in Singapore but in Australia, for example, the Income Tax Board of Revenue. You cannot appeal, except on points of law, because the Commissioner himself and the Board that settles the disputes are themselves experts in matters of assessing facts and the court is shut out from examining the facts, which they must accept. But to shut out the court, Sir, from deciding on points of law is to create an island of tyranny, however good the intention. I do urge upon the Minister to recognise that it is for the welfare of the courts, for the health of the courts, as well as of the country, that there should be provision permitting an appeal on a point of law, not in fact making doubly worse the existing section but improving it, by introducing provision whereby an appeal on a point of law exclusively could go to the High Court.

Mr Byrne: I should like to have an indication of what particular orders of the court should be the subject of an appeal. One matter that the Member for Anson referred to was the question of an appeal from an order punishing a contempt. Mr Speaker, Sir, the other suggestion of the Member for Anson just now was that if the President refused to certify an agreement for no apparent reason, then there was no appeal. But surely that is an absurd suggestion, Mr Speaker, Sir, If the President ever did that, there was the power to revoke his appointment.

Now, in the case of the only matter which the Bar Committee thought could be the subject of an appeal - that is a punishment for contempt - no such case has yet arisen. So I suggest, Mr Speaker, Sir, that we wait for another year - let this Ordinance continue to operate - till we receive a further report from the President - and there will be now another Court, a second Court, there will be a report that we will be receiving from the Deputy President also - and when we recieve their reports, we can consider what sort of appeals we should allow from the decisions of this court.

4.49 pm.

Question put, "That clause 13 stand part of the Bill:"

Mr David Marshall: Division, Sir.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 22; Noes, 17 Abstentions, 3; Absent, 9. Ayes. Noes. Buang bin Bani, S. T. Omar Junid. Chan Sun Wing. Byrne, K. M. Fung Yin Ching, Chan Chee Seng. Miss. Chan Choy Siong, Lee Siew Choh. Madam. Leong Keng Seng. Chor Yeok Eng. Lin You Eng. Goh Chew Chua. Low Por Tuck. Goh Keng Swee. Marshall, David. Kandasamy, G. Ng Teng Kian. Lee Khoon Choy. Ong Chang Sam. Lee Kuan Yew. Rajah, A. P. Lee Teck Him. Seow Peck Leng, Lim Cheng Lock. Mrs. Mammen, John. Tan Cheng Tong. Mohd. Ariff bin Tee Kim Leng. Suradi. Teo Hock Guan. M. Ismail Rahim. Thio Chan Bee. Ong Pang Boon. Wong Soon Fong. Ramaswamy, S. Tan Kia Gan. Toh Chin Chye. Abstentions. Wee Toon Boon. Yaacob bin Abdul Hamid bin Mohamed. Haji Jumat. Yong Nyuk Lin Ahmad Jabri bin Mohammed Akib. Mohd. Ali bin Alwi. Absent. Ahmad bin Ibrahim. Hoe Puay Choo, Madam. Koh, C. H. Lim Yew Hock. Lingam S. V. Ong Eng Guan. Rajaratnam, S. Sahorah binte Ahmat, Madam. Sheng Nam Chim.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported, with an aniendment: read a Third time and passed.

4.57 p.m.

Mr Speaker: I propose to suspend now. I suspend this sitting and will take this Chair again at 5.30 p.m.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 4.57 p.m. until 5.30 p.m. Sitting resumed at 5.30 p.m.