REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 1966

Order read for resumption of debate on Question [14th March, 1967],

"That this House takes note of the Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966, presented to this House as Command Paper No. 29 of 1966, and endorses the Government's views thereon as set out in the Statement by the Minister for Law and National Development made at the sitting of this House on 21st December, 1966.". - [Mr E. W. Barker]

Question again proposed.

Mr Speaker: When we rose last night, Mr Ho Cheng Choon had the Floor. Mr Ho.

2.34 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for National Development (Mr Ho Cheng Choon): (In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Government has already announced the acceptance of certain recommendations of the Commission, particularly the second method of entrenchment of the provisions to protect fundamental rights. I would also urge the Government to accept the first method of entrenchment, namely, that a Bill altering the Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless it is expressed to be one that amends the Constitution and contains no other provisions. Sir, this will help Members of Parliament understand better that the Bill is meant for the purpose of altering the Constitution, because not all people know the niceties of the law. So this first method will help us to grasp the situation.

Let me take you, Mr Speaker, as an example. If a Bill is introduced in the House specifically stipulating that it is meant to alter the Constitution, then you will know that under the Constitution it needs the support of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament to vote on it before it can be passed.

About the third method of amendment to the Constitution which provides for a referendum to decide on the adoption of the Bill altering the Constitution, in my view, this third method is redundant and, in fact, rather cumbersome, because there will be difficulties if we implement it, especially in regard to the assessment of public opinion.

We are a very small country and newly independent. We have elections once every five years. In 1963 we had a general election. We have also had a few by-elections since then. Even then the electorate had grumbled about being required to vote at the elections, especially the by-elections. In some constituencies the electorate had to vote only once, but in other constituencies they had to vote twice. So if a Bill were to be introduced into the House every year to amend the Constitution, and the people were required to vote on it, then it would be rather troublesome and it would also incur a lot of expenditure. The result would be contrary to what we would expect.

2.39 p.m.

Mr Ng Kah Ting (Punggol): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I take this opportunity to echo the Government's appreciation of the highly commendable Report presented to Parliament by the Constitutional Commission, 1966? I have read and studied the Report thoroughly, and I must say that it is one of the best Reports ever presented. I am, however, particularly happy to note that the Government has given very careful consideration to the Report and that most of the recommendations are acceptable though a few are not, while there are other recommendations which the Government agrees in principle but differs in detail.

Therefore, Sir, allow me to make a few observations on the various headings. There are (1) the Ombudsman (or the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration; (2) the Council of State; and (3) the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual. Before touching on the office of the Ombudsman, I would like to refer to the fears expressed in some quarters that the country is heading in the direction of being a one-party State. According to them, this is not good for a country and would in the end lead to a dictatorship or a totalitarian government. To dispel their fears, may I ask these people one important question? Whether or not the P.A.P. Government is, in fact, practising parliamentary democracy? The Government is essentially democratic socialist and it is, in fact, practising parliamentary democracy. We have a President who is a Malay; the Executive comprising the main races of which the Prime Minister is a Chinese; the Judiciary of which the Chief Justice is a Chinese; the Commissioner of Police who is a Eurasian; and not forgetting that the Speaker of Parliament is an Indian; the Army Commander is a Eurasian; and in the Civil Service the heads are made up of citizens of the various races.

Sir, I can go on and point out many others. Suffice it to say that it is not and never will be the P.A.P.'s policy to be dictatorial as long as it is entrusted to look after the interests of the nation. I think this is sufficient enough to show to the world that Singapore is truly a multi-racial society, truly practising democracy. We are not like some countries which talk of multi-racialism and yet practise feudalism.

Another point on parliamentary democracy is that we still have the one-man-one-vote system. We have the Parliamentary elections once every five years, and whenever vacancies occur in Parliament they are at once filled through the by-elections. Therefore, how can people say that there is no parliamentary democracy in Singapore? I think that these people ought to have their heads examined. The Government is elected by the people, and the only reason I can think of why the people of Singapore keep on returning P.A.P. candidates at the various by-elections, even though they know full well that the P.A.P. already has more than two-thirds majority in Parliament, is that the P.A.P. is the only political Party that can provide a clean and honest leadership and also maintain this progressive society whereby everyone is able to have a happy life. Therefore, this purely reflects the confidence of the people in the Government to legislate honestly, fairly and reasonably in the interests of all concerned. If the existence of a one-party State is brought about, as it is likely to happen, then it is no fault of the P.A.P. nor of the people. It is the will of the people. We must not forget, Mr Speaker, Sir, that there is still the Opposition in this House, because the P.A.P. has not got all the 51 seats. Two hon. Members are absent and their whereabouts are unknown. Why they choose to be so is for them, and them only, to answer. I cannot answer for them. However, I must stress that the P.A.P. wants Opposition, and we the Backbenchers will play this role well. Be that as it may, Sir, we will not abdicate our responsibility and we will continue to serve the people to the best of our ability, come what may.

Let me come to the first point, the office of Ombudsman. I refer to the vast powers which the Ombudsman has, as recommended in the Commission's Report. I am inclined to agree to this office, but I would like to make a suggestion. I would propose that, instead of vesting vast powers in one person alone, which would not serve a useful purpose, a committee of three be set up with each taking turns as Chairman and serving a minimum period of, say, three years. Sir, the general belief is that two heads are better than one, and I think three heads well screwed on their shoulders, so to speak, would make the office more formidable and less fallible.

Mr Tang See Chim (Choa Chu Kang): What about a hundred heads?

Mr Ng Kah Ting: That would come later in the Council. Even the Ombudsman can be fallible, and to err is human. However, with three persons in office, the administration may be slower but it would definitely and positively be surer and more reliable in consequence. For all practical purposes, when one Ombudsman has to conduct investigations and make public his findings, it would be from one viewpoint, from one angle. However, if there is a committee of three, the findings then would be a consensus of or a majority of opinion amongst three, and this would be more reliable. And as the complaints would fall broadly within the two categories mentioned in the Report, I think one man's view, opinion or decision varies with another, and this depends on how the facts are presented; also the emphasis on which the Ombudsman relies before he exercises his discretionary powers, if at all discretionary powers and decisions are subject to investigation by the office of the Ombudsman, as stated in the Report. But I would like to emphasise that there exists in Singapore a department that deals with public inquiries and complaints. The Central Complaints Bureau is, in fact, doing a fine job, for on many occasions I had to refer to this department complaints which I felt should be attended to by it, and I am happy to say that all have been dealt with satisfactorily. Therefore, the suspicion that the complaints would not be properly investigated does not arise. However, if the committee, as I have suggested, is to be set up at all, may I suggest that the members be drawn from people of high calibre and eminence in public administration, and who are not members of any political party, and for that matter, are non-partisans in political affairs?

In regard to the recommendation for the setting up of the Council of State, it is noticed that the main support for the creation of this Council rests on the fact that there is no effective or responsible Opposition in Parliament. As I have already stated earlier, this surely reflects on the confidence of the people in the Government to legislate honestly, fairly and reasonably in the public interest.

Sir, may I also point out that we still have the Select Committees of Parliament which always invite constructive and well-informed criticisms or amendments to measures proposed in Parliament. If the setting up of the Council of State would not only be too expensive, it would, in effect, only serve to delay the passage of Bills. And if the Council is to be set up, it would, to my mind, tend to become somewhat like an Upper House where its composition is made up of non-elected members. They would likely become more or less the Senate, though their duties would be purely advisory. Though the Council would sit in private, still its reports on the deliberations on the Bills referred to them would have to be presented to Parliament. Is it intended that the Council of State replaces the Select Committees which Sit in public to hear public views? However, if its sole function is merely to advise, then I see no reason why it should be so set up, for the Select Committees would serve a more useful purpose as they stand.

Next, I refer to the question of protection of fundamental rights and freedom of the individual. Sir, if we are to continue to have democracy, then this question is of paramount importance to all citizens, including individuals. Therefore, the recommendations of the Commission to embody in the Constitution the protection of the rights of life and personal liberty of the individual, the prohibition of slavery of all forms and of forced labour, the protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, equality of all persons before the law, prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement, freedom of speech, assembly, association and religion, are all very important characteristics of a true democracy. The fact that the Government will ensure that steps will be taken to incorporate them in the Constitution is another sign that it is practising democracy in spite of the overwhelming majority it has in Parliament. This should dispel the fears of the evils of Singapore having a one-party system. This will be the necessary guarantee to every individual of his rightful place here. However, I must stress strongly that this society will collapse if the people, especially certain sections, continue to exploit this issue in spite of the vigorous steps the Government is taking to ensure a fair deal to all. Therefore, the need for building an organised society out of peoples of varied migrant origins is a heavy task. But I am positive that with patience and tolerance amongst the people, this organised society, built upon multi-racialism, will ultimately emerge and Singapore will be a showpiece, not only in South-east Asia, but also in the world where everyone enjoys equal franchise. Sir, I give my support to the motion as moved by the Minister for Law.

2.55 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr Lee Kuan Yew): Mr Speaker, Sir, in giving my views on the motion before this House in the name of the Minister for Law, I would like, first, to express the gratification of the Government that a unanimous report was, in fact, possible despite the fact that almost every minority group in Singapore was represented in the Constitutional Commission. It is a reminder, in fact, of the value of having certain common denominators in any group of people if they are to function effectively and cohesively. The common denominators in this case were that, first, they were lawyers in the English tradition, and, second, whatever their religious, their ethnic and their linguistic origins may have been, they had not got embroiled in, and debased by the excesses of communal mass politics. I am not suggesting that a multi-racial society is the ideal society in all circumstances. In fact, the great powers of this world today consist of nations which are ethno-centric in composition. True, both the Americans and the Russians have more than one single race or one single language group or one single religion. But there is in both countries one single race or ethnic group which shares one common language and whose culture is, by reason of its dynamism or aggressiveness, far in dominance over the others comprised in the nation. Be that as it may for aspirants to world powers, we are confronted, as a young migrant community, with the problem of continuing a tolerant, meaningful society for some two million people nearly all of whom cannot trace their links with the Republic for more than 150 years. For when Stamford Raffles landed here in February 1819, there were only 120 Malays and 30 Chinese, and there cannot be very many of us here who can trace our ancestors to those 120 Malays and 30 Chinese.

Multi-racialism in a permissive, tolerant society becomes an imperative for us and those societies like us, which, for one reason or another, have taken into one geographic whole large components of people with diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. The reasons we advanced before merger and Malaysia why such a larger whole would have provided a much more stable, a broader basis for the survival of the values which we would like to carry forward from the old into the new society, are still valid. And when we found ourselves confronted suddenly with the problem of an independent Singapore, our pre-occupation was how to ensure that the perils of communal politics shall not inflict us. Unless care is exercised, we could so easily be torn as-under. The problem is how to create a situation where the minority either in ethnic, linguistic or religious terms, is not conscious that it is a minority; where the exercise of its rights as an equal citizen is so natural and so accepted a part of our society that it is not conscious of the fact that it is sharing, within this wider whole, equal rights with the dominant ethnic groups who accept its equality as a matter of fact.

First, let me review the events which led us to the necessity of having such a Commission. Multi-racialism is a tenet which has been espoused by every responsible political party from the very beginnings of party politics in Singapore. It was almost something taken for granted as an axiom before you expounded your political credo. But we discovered in the years 1964 and 1965 how easily it was stretched to breaking point just by a small group of people being permitted to expound extreme philosophies of political forms of government based on ethnic, religious and linguistic loyalties. We felt that the Commission would get the problem in perspective. It would also make people with a proclivity towards politics, based on loyalties of either ethnic, linguistic or religious ties, assess their possibilities of attaining power on the basis of such manipulations. The Commission gave a patient hearing to all those who appeared before it. And, if I may add, not only a patient but an extremely polite hearing to all manner of propositions which were placed before it as sound political propositions. Their unanimous conclusion is that it is a man's position as a citizen and his ability to exercise his rights as a citizen and be protected in the exercise of his rights regardless of race, language or religion, that must be ensured. That is the biggest single contribution the Commission made to multi-racial understanding, tolerance and acceptance of each other's differences in our society. But let me hasten to add that this is not a sound and enduring basis on which we can secure that such a society will always be tolerant and will always be permissive. The problem is, how do we institutionalise some of these forms and practices so that in the next generation these things become part of the accepted way of life?

What are the factors which will influence our social fabric? I suggest they can be divided roughly into two categories, our own internal policies and, second, international policies affecting our own internal policies. We by our educational policies, by the values which we systematically inculcate in our people, can ensure that the next generation will find it much more natural to accept a scheme of things in which the exercise of authority in this society by one person over another does not depend upon his colour, his name, the kind of church or temple he goes to, or the language he speaks to his family at home. In turn, the inculcation of these values in our children becomes easier if the opinion formulaters in all these various community groups are conscious of the fact that their attitudes and their actions cause either a favourable or an unfavourable reaction on the others. In other words, it is not just a process of exhortation. It is exhortation of values which are desirable, and the constant reaction of the individual who is being exhorted to adopt a particular scale of values, against the experiences of his own life. If he finds the exhortation incongruous to the experience of his life, the exhortation will be rejected.

Let me elaborate. Recently the Government was confronted with a difficult and a delicate problem, for all religious problems are delicate. A group of Buddhists applied for permission to use loudspeakers for their religious services. All churches or temples wish to expand their flock and, with modern electronic aid, the desire to modernise the proselytising zeal is only natural. If the answer from the Commissioner of Police who is in charge of these applications was "No", then inevitably unjust conclusions would be drawn that some denominations are more favoured than others. For instance, it is well known that the followers of the Muslim religion are summoned to prayer with modern electronic aid. I am happy to report that after a sober but sometimes trying exploration of all the compromise proposals, the Inter-Religious Council was able to reach some common principle upon which all such practices or innovations will be dealt with, and it was agreed that so far as was possible, such electronic devices should be confined to the precincts of a religious place. But sometimes either by non-enforcement of the law or otherwise, exemptions had been made in the past, and this particular practice had not been complied with. In such cases, if there were undue invasions of the privacy of other persons, self-restraint would be applied. Self-restraint, Mr Speaker, Sir, of the people who were otherwise permitted and have, in fact, been permitted to practise particular forms of calls to prayer. Under the new circumstances of it being cited as a precedent for others to do likewise, they have agreed to inhibit their own practices. If there had not been this capacity to appreciate a problem, if the attitude is, "I have always been allowed to do this. You have never been allowed to do this. Therefore, that must be so," then it is impossible to maintain this easy relationship. Eventually, the success of our efforts must be measured by the ability to build these attitudes and these reflections into the next generation.

But however assiduously and zealously we pursue these policies, there are events which can take place outside and around us which will have deep and searing repercussions on our own social fabric. Recently my colleagues and I were confronted with the very unpleasant task of deciding what to do with two sampan loads of refugees who came seeking sanctuary from depredations which had overtaken them in some island to the south-west of us. Villages were burnt, other human miseries occurred which led them to take this very desperate step of seeking sanctuary, knowing that, in fact, the chances of getting sanctuary were negligible. If, swayed by human sympathy, we permitted this, then we must be prepared to admit some two million or maybe three million people in similar circumstances who will seek refuge in Singapore within the next few years. Even assuming that our economy can carry them, or that they come in with sufficient resources to make a contribution to our economy, it must mean a mutation in our attitude, because they must have their repercussions on the attitudes of the rest of the population. This is what happened in India and Pakistan with each successive collision, as victims of atrocities streamed across the boundaries carrying their tales of horror of what happened to people on the basis of the colour of their skin, the structure of their nose, their eyes, the texture of their hair. Emotions are aroused which jell people into either unquestioning loyalties to those of like appearance, or blind hate and fear and hostility to those groups who look different from them. The fact that the majority in my Cabinet are ethnically and linguistically of similar types to those who landed here, made our decision all that much more meaningful to those of my colleagues who do not share these ethnic and linguistic characteristics. What we must constantly remember is that, despite ourselves, a situation may arise in which xenophobia actively encouraged or otherwise accidentally allowed out of hand spreads its pernicious influence throughout our own society. Hence the importance of having some mechanism whereby members of our society are given some assurance until long-term values are inculcated in the whole society, that there will be more than fair play, more than what they could normally have had the right to expect as citizens free and equal of the others in the society.

It is against this background that we had to decide what parts of the recommendation to accept and what parts to reject. The acid test is, does this particular recommendation, first, help to promote this feeling of oneness regardless of all the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, and in the long run promote the sense of being and feeling as a community? Second, even if it does not do that in the long run, does it in the interim provide that assurance of consultation and participation by minority groups in the management of our society, which consultation and participation would not normally have been open to them on the basis of one man one vote?

I will now deal with the principal recommendations of the Commission.

The Council of State. I know that many Members in this House, particularly those with some training on the elective principles of representative government, feel that this is a proposition which runs contrary to the whole thesis of representative government. It is true that by whatever name we call it and however we disguise its advisory capacity, it is, in effect, clothing with some authority the views of a group of people who really cannot be said to be representative of the electorate, because they cannot claim to speak on behalf of the majority of any particular section of the community. But that having been said, I think provided there are certain safeguards as to the possible misuse or abuse of the forum which we will create by constituting this Council of State, a genuine contribution can be made to give that participation and consultation which could make for much happier living for everybody.

By the very nature of our population, it is likely as the years go by that Members of this House will become younger and younger and not older and older. The young have a habit of choosing those most like themselves, of voicing the sentiments, the styles and the moods of their generation, and over the next ten years or even in the next five years, two-thirds of the electorate will be below the age of 35. I do not say that a young representative Chamber is a bad thing in itself, but I do say that - perhaps this is part of the consolation of growing old, Mr Speaker, Sir - there is something about the process of learning which, by the very nature of things, take time. If we had been older, less idealistic, more cynical and we had with greater circumspection weighed the possibilities of amalgamation between two very different textures of society, perhaps we may not have gone into merger and Malaysia with the zest, enthusiasm and idealism with which we were fired. Perhaps a lot of unhappiness might have been avoided. It is not that we would not have tried to do it, and I think it was right that we did. But our actions would have been tempered with a great deal of circumspection as to the way in which one could slowly and gradually interlock two very different ways of life.

It is the view of my colleagues and myself that the elders in this community - and the problem is that there are not very many such elders in the community - can make a positive contribution to a good and tolerant government. I have mentioned one reason why the older generation may not be adequately represented in Parliament with the passage of time. There is a second reason why many people of scholarship and distinction in their particular profession or vocation are reluctant or emotionally unfit to enter into the sharp conflict of the open political arena. They and many people find it distasteful. It is not natural for people educated and brought up in a more sheltered atmosphere to expose themselves, their public stance and their private lives to open and sometimes vicious political attack. My colleagues and I appreciate this very much, not because we enjoy these political attacks but because over a passage of time we have developed a certain tolerance to all this constant snipping and cudgelling. But we are extremely conscious of the fact that it is not easy to get men of intellectual qualities to join us in this open arena, because the heat and the dust is something they find uncongenial.

A President's Council, which really is what the Council of State will be, a kind of Privy Council to the Queen, and so an advisory council for the President, can make a valuable contribution to the mechanics of a representative government, provided that there are sufficient safeguards to see that no sectional or functional interest can be peddled. In other words, nobody can get on a hobby-horse either for life or for a specific period to pursue a particular sectional interest, whether for gain or for any other reason. Hence we differed profoundly with the proposition that such a meeting of the Council should be in public. If anybody challenges the right of the representatives of the people to take a particular course of action, then they must have the courage to come out openly into the political arena and denounce these policies. But if they reserve to themselves the right to advise caution or perhaps to take a middle course, without entering the political arena, then this advice should not be given in public, for it is impossible for any elected government to accept a change of its policies once it has been joined in political debate. We envisage this Council of State to be more than just a scrutineer of prospective legislation, if it consists of men who have had experience of our community - and there are very few such men. As my colleagues can testify, every time a senior appointment has to be made, which in other parts of the world will bring forth long screeds of highly qualified and highly able men in semi-retirement, we are scraping the bottom of the barrel, and the reason is obvious. All the men in high professional, administrative, judicial or any other positions were from abroad, and when they retired they went abroad. There were very few men who understand the texture and the flavour of our society, having looked after it in some important sphere of activity, who are around to give us that knowledge of what happened under certain given conditions, of the possible reactions, modes of behaviour, patterns of conduct of the various sectors of our population. A retired Permanent Secretary who does not have to speak his mind in public, but can quietly tell the President in his presence, or through the Chairman who will be the Speaker of this House, what his experiences were with regard to similar circumstances, will make a valuable contribution. A retired Commissioner of Police who had lived through several riots, not just between gangsters and warring bands of robbers, can make a valuable addition to the data upon which an administration must base its decisions.

We are unable to accept the recommendation that those with political affiliations should be excluded, for I think it is often those with political affiliations who can make the biggest contribution to discussion; if nothing else, from the folly and error of their past ways. There is a lot to be learned, not just by what was done right, but by what was done wrong. Again, I think it is more likely that we get honest advice in private than in public.

This brings us to the second role which I think the Council of State can provide. It means, in effect, if there is a wise and sufficiently broad-enough range of talent and expertise, that there is no single group - either functional, racial, linguistic, or religious - that has not got some access to the top institutions of power. This, in itself, has a deep psychological assurance. It acts more by the fears it makes unnecessary, than by any actual evil that is remedied. The very fact that there is almost no minority group in Singapore that can say that they are not represented by someone in this Constitutional Commission who understands some part of their life and practices makes its findings all that much more valuable.

I would like to believe that such a group of men representing accumulated experience, representing the various professional and technical institutions who are important digits in the functioning of a modern society - they could provide the kind of ballast which a very young Legislature may not necessarily have. I would urge my Members opposite - all are really on the Government side - to think sometimes of these criticisms which they take very sensitively as really an expression of tribute in a back-handed way to them. It is all right provided there are certain checks and balances which modulate the whole and so everything can work. But there must come a time when the same checks and balances may no longer apply, and it is our duty to create a situation where, even if a composition of this Chamber were different, there are still enough checks and balances to ensure the continuance of tolerant and permissive policies.

Therefore, in the drafting of the duties of the Council of State, part of the functions which might have been done by an Ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner will be taken up through this particular Council of State. In rejecting for the time being the innovation of a Parliamentary Commissioner - let me say that we have not written off this proposition. Legislation for such an institution has just been attempted in Britain in a very limited sort of way. There is no possibility of any member of the public asking for a writ to be issued by the Commissioner for a matter to be investigated. It is very limited not only in the initiative of the inquiry but also in the fields where the inquiries can take place. If after five years it is found that we have a sufficiently high degree of administration to be able to take on the added burden of having every administrative decision scrutinised by some overlord, then I think the position should be reviewed. It must be a position which we would try to attain. But faced with the realities of what we have, and the knowledge that very often the whole machinery of government depends on the capacity of two dozen really good digits in the administration, to put upon them this load is bound to slow up the whole process of decision-making. If every Commissioner of Lands, every Housing Board executive who allocates flats has at the back of his mind when he makes a decision the thought that the wisdom of his decision will be called into question and all the paraphernalia - secret minutes passed between each other of the whys and wherefores and who and what for - can be regurgitated, it is bound to make him hesitate. "I am refusing accommodation in the Geylang Serai block of flats to Malays who have just had their attap huts burnt in Lorong 3." It is a decision made partly by the Board and partly by an unofficial committee of M.P.s who feel that this creation of a ghetto atmosphere would be bad and inimical for our own society. If every such decision can be reopened and it is said, "You have refused me a flat in Geylang Serai, although I am a Malay and that is a Malay area" - then it is bound to slow up the process of decision-making.

I am not saying this in wanting to protect or perpetuate this state of affairs. I would like to believe that in the next 5 or 10 years more and more able administrators will be trained to man the institutions of the State. A position may be reached one day when there is no decision taken anywhere along the line which would be any different if they were to sit back and think "What would happen to my career." There is no desire to hide the political hand. I say quite openly of what has happened in Geylang Serai and I am quite prepared to justify it politically, that it is wrong. They should be offered cheaper rent and be made to live in Tanjong Rhu or Queenstown or elsewhere. But if the officer who often has to take this decision on broad policy directives, finds he may blot his copybook because somebody has complained, and he was found to have exercised his judgment unwisely and erroneously, it is bound to slow up the process. He is bound in the nature of things to pass it up for a decision and ask for a directive, even on specific issues. Therefore, I would like to reiterate that we have not rejected this. We have only said, "Let us wait and see." First, how does it work in its limited form elsewhere? Second, in five years let us see whether we have more able digits in our administration to be able to take on this stringent test of knowing that every decision affecting every single citizen can be reopened for scrutiny.

The Commission made several other recommendations which were not strictly within the terms of reference of the Commission, but since they have made them, it is right and proper that I should express our views on this. First, the question of the Judges. They have suggested, in fact, that we revert back to the system which existed - I think nowhere else in the world other than in Singapore before it went into Malaysia. That was a standstill arrangement and I knew how it came about because I participated in the deliberations in London which reached that compromise proposal. There was grave danger that whoever became the government, particularly in view of the Malayanisation of all the Judges then and a large number of vacancies to be filled, would then be in a position to pack the judiciary. After strenuous argument, the points of views, depending upon who was going to form the next government, a compromise was worked out whereby we allowed the Judges amongst themselves to decide how these large numbers of vacancies were to be filled.

I do not think that system has been perpetuated in any constitution anywhere else in the British Commonwealth. It would be not only derogatory of the capacity of the Government to do what is right and proper, but even more important, there would be a very serious risk of a very inbred judiciary. People are what they are, Mr Speaker, Sir. They have their good points; they have their bad points. But we should not have a small group of about six or seven Judges to decide who is to join their ranks from people for whom they must have positive reactions, either likes, dislikes, admiration, annoyance. It is a very small group from which you can appoint Judges. 170 or 200 practising members of whom only about 30 or 40 both in and outside private practice and in and outside the Government are possible candidates. It will be an unfair test of human infallibility to endow a small group of men with these powers. Having run this very Catholic system of the cadres - you know, the Pope appoints the Cardinals, the Cardinals together appoint the Pope - we are fully aware not only of the virtues but also the vices of the system. I think it would not be in the wider interests of the administration of justice or in the public interest. I can only express the hope that faith in the judicial system will never be diminished, and I am sure it will not, so long as we allow a review of the judicial processes that takes place here in some other tribunal where obviously undue influence cannot be brought to bear. As long as governments are wise enough to leave alone the rights of appeal to some superior body outside Singapore, then there must be a higher degree of confidence in the integrity of our judicial process. This is most important because so many contracts of a maritime nature with parties from many parts of the world being involved often have to choose the venue of the litigation. I see no credit in our trying to run a close circuit judicial system on our own.

The other proposition concerns that of property rights. Mr Speaker, Sir, here again it is not strictly relevant to the terms of reference. But I think it was a result of the lawyers' English legal training - the sanctity of property is one of the tenets of English laws. The whole of the British judicial system outside the criminal law rests upon the concept of private property. Sir, whether we like it or not, we have to accept the fact that not only a large portion of all this thinking but also the mechanics of our economy is based on the concept of property. But land is a special situation in Singapore. If we are swayed by considerations of private property, had we been swayed in the past by these considerations, I venture to suggest that representative government in Singapore today would not have been possible. In this Chamber in 1961 we rushed through the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act for the acquisition of fire sites; the Bukit Ho Swee fire having just taken place and some 30,000 people having had their homes destroyed. It would have been uneconomic and impossible to develop if we have had to acquire the property under the ordinary machinery of the Land Acquisition Ordinance with a right of appeal in the case of every award contested, to the High Court, with two assessors who are both trained and accept as part of their ethos the right and sanctity of private property. This becomes all the more compelling when vast sums of public revenue is being spent on developing huge areas like Jurong, Toa Payoh, Bedok. The whole of the Bedok reclamation scheme, from Bedok right up to Tanjong Rhu, would not have been possible if the concept of private property and all the rules and regulations that have been elaborated over hundreds of years were complied with, for it must mean that if you deprive a man of a sea frontage, some assessment of his loss in monetary terms must be made. A man wakes up and has awakened for the last 50 years with the sea breezes blowing in through the window. He goes off on a holiday, comes back from Europe and America and wakes up one morning - assuming he arrives late at night at Paya Lebar Airport - opens his windows and finds half a mile of rolling brown laterite. We hope in five years there will be grass lands, playing fields, a motor express highway into the city. The compensation that would have to be paid that man for the loss of his foreshore amenities - the foreshore belongs to the Government in any case - but the loss of the amenities that goes with the piece of land - would have been prohibitive. It is not possible to develop it. These developments having taken place and a new express highway at enormous public cost having been put in, all the land and all the surrounding areas which are fed by this highway must go up in price inevitably because the city centre becomes that much closer. It is unconscionable for us as a Government to spend these vast sums of public revenue and in the end allow a very small percentage of the population to profit. Nobody expects this Government or any subsequent government to expropriate. The question is, what is just compensation? And to accept the formula as it stands:

`No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property except for a public purpose or a purpose useful or beneficial to the public and except upon just terms.'

must mean endless litigation. This Chamber would then be unable to say that where your property has gone up in value on account of public expenditure on development around it, you will not profit from it. Therefore, we propose to adopt the provisions of the Indian Constitution, which I think is most democratic and sound, and say, in effect, that the legislative chamber shall decide the principles upon which such compensation shall be paid. The principle will be one on which we have acted so constantly in the past, that nobody will gain, nobody will get a windfall on account of public expenditure. A fire has just taken place a few days ago in, I think, Syed Alwi Road. A few hundred people have been displaced. We had to make a decision a few hours ago that the place shall be acquired. For we have, as a Government, to carry the burden of rehabilitating these few hundred people. This is a social burden, and for us to leave this land vacant to the landowner is to give him a fortuitous gain which he cannot expect unless he is prepared to commit arson. I am quite sure that the crime of arson has been at an all-time low, partly because landowners have a vested interest in not having arson take place. But in the long run, Mr Speaker, Sir, we have to understand our problem in some perspective. There are two particular recommendations which I think show the signs of wishful thinking. Apart from wanting the Judges to appoint themselves, they also want the President in his discretion to appoint the Council of State.

The President is what he is and is accepted by all groups because he does not have to make unpleasant decisions of who shall get what and who shall be denied. If there is one piece of cake and it is given to two persons when five want it, then three must in the nature of things be unhappy at not having been the recipients. If you have, by way of illustration, to choose a representative to this Council of State from, say, a galaxy of five able exponents of the art of accounting and you only really need one to ensure that that particular profession is adequately represented, and the committee had met and short-listed the five, four must necessarily be disappointed. I think the political participants are much better equipped to carry these unpleasant decisions than a constitutional Head of State. What it means is that you cannot by the Constitution protect yourself against a bad elected Government. There can be no such protection. Your only protection in the long run must be a highly sophisticated and educated electorate which will see that no bad government, bad in the sense that it is unable to tend to the needs of the community, will ever be allowed to take office constitutionally.

Mr Speaker: Order. Mr Prime Minister, I am afraid we have reached the time limit under Standing Orders. May I obtain the general assent of the House for you to continue? Do I have the general assent of Members for the Prime Minister to speak beyond the time permitted by Standing Orders?

Hon. Members indicated assent.

The Prime Minister: We could have all the checks and balances we want within the Constitution. But if you have a bad elected government, a whole cabinet consisting of people properly elected and determined to wreck the country, there is nothing that can be done other than to get such a government out as quickly as possible, if possible constitutionally, if not some other means must be found by the community. It is as simple as that.

I read with interest recently about the personal fortunes and activities and the political future of some American Congressman, how his popularity seems to increase with every revelation of public misconduct. There is very little you can do if that is the given situation. If the things an elected leader does are the things which the people who support him hanker secretly to do, if only they were given the chance, then every disclosure of every such fulfilment of a secret ambition must raise him in the estimation of his followers. I think we discovered that in a slightly different sort of way in our own political experience in Singapore and elsewhere in South-east Asia. We go back to the fundamental problem of one man one vote. Is that one man sufficiently possessed of enough sense to make the right decision for his own interest? In other words, is he able to identify and discern where his personal and his community's interests lie? Hence the importance again of teaching values and educating our children in attitudes and standards of conduct, community reactions, group reactions in order to ensure their continued well-being.

I would like to end on this note, Mr Speaker, Sir. Nobody really fears any racial or religious or linguistic persecution or suppression in Singapore, not at least for a decade. For these things take some time to wear off. Even assuming a major catastrophe were to take place with the political structure of power here, it would still take some time for emotional attitudes on the ground to be soured up and to change. Our problem really is how do we, within the ten perhaps slightly more, perhaps less years at our disposal, (1) institutionalise these checks and balances; and (2) ensure that the next generation is able to carry this process one step further'? If 10 years from now, in the late 1970, a new group of leaders have emerged and we are still making pious exhortations to religious tolerance and the virtues of a multi-racial society, just paying lip-service to it, then we have failed. For once the controlling hand of authority that believes in these things is weakened, then all the extremist tendencies which have been inhibited whilst there was a strong hand will again come to the fore. We have seen what happens in other parts of the world. Nobody attempts to deny the fact that there are these extremist potentials. They were there. In Ceylon, before Mr Bandaranaike became Prime Minister, they were there. In India, before the present government faced this awkward and difficult problem of the holy men and the cows as an election issue. The difference was that the grip at the helm was not so strong. Our problem is how to institutionalise and to perpetuate this strong hand at the helm. It is not possible to reduplicate ourselves in the next generation. But it is possible to deepen and ingrain certain values until they become instinctive reflexes of our people. And it is the consolidation of these values in the next generation which must occupy a large part of our time. When a minority no longer is conscious of the fact that it is a minority, that is the final state of success. When a man walks into a job or walks into an office, he is cheered or abused and he does not feel that he has received an ovation or been rebuked because of his ethnic qualities. A group of cleansing workers went on strike and they had to be punished because they were acting foolishly. Because the majority of the leaders were Indians, it was possible for them to go back to the ground and cover up the misdeeds of the leaders by saying, "Oh, what can you expect? This is an awful government because it really does not have much time for Indians." So you see we are in such a mess as long as that situation prevails and people can be deluded into believing, as indeed for all I know, large numbers of cleansing workers may believe, that their poor leaders lost because they were Indians. Perhaps my task might have been easier if, in fact, the first group of unionists had challenged the policy that the economy of Singapore is paramount and sectional interests come second. It would have been better if there had been a group of majority Chinese leadership to put it to the test. Then the lesson would have been learnt. But to be able to admit these things openly and to face them, is a much healthier situation than to pretend that they do not exist, and to refer to anybody raising these issues or even mentioning these issues as dangerous communalists. We face them, Mr Speaker, because they do happen. They do, in fact, take place and people do, in fact, believe them. I can only say this, that if these things are true, then this must be a very strange government.

If, in fact, the policy of this Government is based on considerations of race or language or culture, then it is impossible to have in certain key positions, key institutions of the State, people who share other than the majority view because the policy and the secrets of the implementation of that policy must be known. There are certain institutions of power in the State, and it is impossible completely to seal off or isolate or prevent knowledge of policies which are being pursued and the known raison d'etre of these policies from the President. He gets a copy of every Cabinet agenda, the papers, the decisions and the reasons therefor. In the Cabinet itself are ten people of very different views on ordinary matters or non-political interests. It is impossible to make decisions inimical to any single minority group without their being known to the persons who do not share the majority view or the majority affinity. There is a Chief Justice with six Judges who have to execute and implement the administration and interpretation of the laws. I do not think anybody can, by any stretch of the imagination, say that there is any ethnic group there which intends to dominate the situation, although by the very nature of their education, quite a number of our Judges are people with the qualities for bisecting, disecting and trisecting words and phrases. Then there is the Speaker who presides over so many pieces of legislation and there is the Attorney-General in his Chambers who has to draft them. There is the Commissioner of Police who has to implement the laws. There are key officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance who must know the basic policies. What we want to do is to try to establish, until we reach the point where we accept each other, the point where we are not conscious of the fact that you are different, certain conventions whereby we ensure that everybody, no matter whether he be of a majority or a minority group, feels that he has some access to his own little community, some access to someone in the seat of power where decisions have to be made.

This is the real contribution which can be made by a Council of State. It is not something which will window-dress the legislation of this Chamber. To succeed it must be a real means of consultation and participation in the mechanics of management of a community by itself. So long as there are certain conventions practised whereby there is always enough majority and minority representation in the exercise of these positions of power, we should be able to ride the transition to a more consolidated and to a more secure position in the next 10 or 15 years. But in the long term, let us be honest enough and admit that if either because our policies are not effective enough internally to generate and inculcate these multi-racial values, or because external forces have had a deleterious effect on our own community, then new forms will have to be found to keep this very diverse community together.

I would like, in urging the House to endorse the Motion in the name of the Minister for Law, to urge our representatives here to bring this message down to the people in the kampongs, in the crowded streets of the town, community centres or in the consultative committees, that whilst we operate on the basis of exhortation, tolerance, understanding, forbearance, and whilst we keep these sometimes competing interests relatively accommodated one to the other through constant consultation at all the levels of decision-making, eventually there is no way other than the inculcation of loyalty to the country which we all consider our home. Either we believe that what we have inherited after 150 years of British commercialism - very successful commercialism -- is worth preserving in some of its forms, or we do not. The British succeeded in holding this because they had superior power. Anybody who acted contrary to the general interests of somebody else other than the British was held in line. And if you acted against the interest of the British, then you would he smartly dealt with. But here is a situation where the Government must remember, as any such elected government must, that its capacity to deal with a particular problem depends upon its capacity to carry its majority with it. This is a slightly different kind of power structure. A Governor can order that a highly popular mass movement he destroyed and its leaders incarcerated, and his career prospects are brightened by the expeditious way in which he dealt with the dangerous situation. But a popularly elected Cabinet that deals with a situation in such a way that it has alienated the following, the sympathy and the support of the majority on whom its power rests, must either he a very bold or a foolhardy government. And so the process of constant repetition on the ground of where their long-term interests lie, why a multi-racial society. This process may he unnecessary for those who are capable of doing their own thinking, but is very necessary for those whose instincts are to do what comes most comfortably. And to give way to the things which the ground wants us to do, often foolishly, will be disastrous. Not to give way without educating them may be equally disastrous to us. And so the fearful responsibility in this decade to ensure that the next generation will not be faced with the same arduous task that confronts us at every turn - the constant explanation and persuasion - because of which alone we are able to do what we do; sane,, effective and sensible policies, and with the support of the population.

I would urge Members to remember this. Never mind all the jibes about one-party government and dictatorship. They are not just necessarily jibes because they can be very real probabilities if we allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of complacency and assume that this could be the order of things for all time. But the very fact that we are able consistently to carry a large section of the population with us despite this criticism, surely is the answer that democratic government is possible provided at each step you carry the majority of the people with you. It is not by accident that we introduced the National Service (Amendment) Bill at the time a by-election was about to take place. We gave the Opposition an issue to join issue with us - certain basic fundamental premises. It was an issue which barely 15 years ago caused little young boys and girls to riot. The police had then to use considerable force with a great deal of unhappiness all round. A colonial government had no intention whatsoever other than to pass the law to teach the boys and girls, particularly from the Chinese schools, how to handle weapons in order to make life more miserable for that government and it brought about that conflict. But now a by-election took place, and this was not an issue. So long as the base of our authority is one man one vote, it is not possible to go against the grain of the whole of your community in policies which do not win their acceptance. As long as we remember this and we are courageous enough not only to do the right thing which is acceptable, but to do the right thing which is not acceptable just yet, but to make sure that the ground begins to understand us when we take the next phase, then we will be able to bequeath to the next generation of leaders a healthier and sounder situation. By then it will not really matter whether or not we have this symbolic sharing of the institutions of the State. As long as we are conscious of that - as indeed people are, particularly after their experiences in the last few years; how could you be otherwise when you can be smacked down or killed in a riot on the basis of your race? - then it is our duty to take note of that and to provide some mechanism whereby an assurance is given and felt and believed that they are consulted and they are participating in the management of their own society.

Mr Ho Kah Leong (Jurong): (In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Government has accepted the main recommendations of the Constitutional Commission for the sake of establishing a multi-racial society and providing equality among all our citizens irrespective of their racial and other differences.

[Mr Lim Cheng Lock in the Chair]

4.21 p.m.

Mr Ho Kah Leong (Jurong): The Government appointed a Commission to study the constitutional provisions and to consider what basic rights should be entrenched in the Singapore Constitution. The Government's attitude is laudable. Members of the Constitutional Commission are learned and eminent personalities. As a result, they have produced this historic and weighty Report. Many of the recommendations in this Report are very practical and very much in keeping with our present situation. The Government intends to accept most of them.

Sir, Singapore has a multi-lingual, multi-racial and multi-religious society as one of its national foundations. The success and existence of such a country depend on the peaceful co-existence of the various races. We can see many countries around us experiencing riots and disturbances because of their narrow communalistic outlook. We have seen how minority races have been oppressed by majority races, as a result of which the countries concerned have been split up. This aspect has also been pointed out in the Report of the Constitutional Commission. It has recommended that no special privilege should be accorded to any group of people and that equal rights and basic rights, irrespective of race, colour or creed, should be written into the Constitution. All people will have the same rights under the Constitution. For instance, everyone is equal in the eyes of the law. There will be basic rights of equality, rights of personal liberty and equal protection and other rights. Thus the interest and rights of the minorities will be safeguarded. In addition, the right of education and other matters will be safeguarded, as a result of which the minority races will feel that they are not minorities but part and parcel of one whole community. When we reach such a state - as the Prime Minister has said just now - then our country can be said to have achieved its objectives.

Sir, democracy and the independence of the judiciary are the outstanding features of the Republic of Singapore, and these should be reflected in all Government and independent institutions. This will instil a sense of confidence in the people and it will also make them more determined to advocate democracy. If they lose heart in the democratic system, they will react unfavourably against the Government and this may lead to the collapse of the country.

The Constitutional Commission has also advanced constructive recommendations such as those relating to provisions which will ensure the Constitution as the supreme law in the Republic of Singapore, and any other law which contradicts the Constitution will be invalid. There is also a provision relating to the safeguards to be entrenched in the Constitution to ensure that the Constitution, as the highest authority, is not altered at random. There is a recommendation setting out three methods of entrenchment by which amendments to the Constitution can be effected. The first method is that any Bill seeking to alter the Constitution should specifically state so in the Bill. The second method is that the Bill altering the Constitution should be approved by a two-thirds majority of the House. The Government has already accepted this second method of entrenchment.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

4.27 p.m.

Madam Chan Choy Siong (Delta): On a point of order. Is there a quorum in the House?

Mr Speaker: In fact, there is a quorum.

Mr Ho Kah Leong: (In Mandarin): The third recommended method relates to the operation of a machinery to enable the electorate to take part in decisions on any important and urgent matters of State. This is characteristic of a democratic system. I urge the Government also to accept the recommendation of the third method in the light of the reasons set out in paragraph 78 of the Report.

There are three new provisions recommended by the Commission. One is that the electorate of Singapore should be given the opportunity to elect their own government by secret ballot periodically. The serial numbers appearing on the ballot papers and their counter-foils and the law which relates to the form of and writing on the ballot paper, in my view, are incompatible with the secrecy of the vote. So such legal provisions should be abolished so that the electorate will not harbour any suspicion or have a wrong concept about the secrecy of the vote.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me touch on one very outstanding recommendation of the Commission, namely, the setting up of an Ombudsman. He is to shoulder the responsibilities of checking the Government's administration and to safeguard the interests of the public, to see that their interests will not suffer because of any faulty administration. Though this system originated in Sweden, it is still in its experimental stage in some Commonwealth countries, I feel that the Government should set up such a system because it will raise the efficiency of the administration of various Government departments and will also safeguard the interests of the common people so that such people need not have to seek redress at the courts, which is very expensive. At present our civil service is a heritage of the British system. I am not criticising our present civil service. However, in actual fact, there are certain officials who still have the colonial attitude and have still not been inculcated with the new sense of duties and values and the correct attitude in keeping with our new independent country.

At the moment, if members of the public have any complaints, they can make them to the Central Complaints Bureau. But this Bureau does not have wide powers. Therefore, if any complaint against any department is brought before it, it is normally handed over to the head of that very department to deal with. Thus, in the end, the complaints of the common people will lead to no solution, and are of no avail. For all these reasons I feel that it is necessary to set up the office of Ombudsman.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in principle, I support the Government's views on this Report.

4.32 p.m.

Mr Tang See Chim: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Constitutional Commission was appointed in December 1965 with terms of reference the aim of which was to safeguard the rights and interests of minorities in the Republic of Singapore. After some eight months' study, the Commission presented its Report to the President in August 1966, and this Report was tabled before Parliament on 21st December, 1966.

The Report is a unanimous Report. In it the Commission makes three main recommendations, and I shall today concern myself mainly with them. They are (1) the creation of a Council of State; (2) the establishment of the office of Ombudsman (or Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration); and (3) the entrenchment in the Constitution of certain provisions affecting the fundamental rights of the citizen.

I shall take the last recommendation first. This relates to the manner of entrenchment of certain provisions in the Constitution. The Commission has recommended three methods of entrenchment, and these three methods are:

(1) That any Bill altering the Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament until it is expressed to be one for amendment of the Constitution and contains no other provision.

(2) That any Bill altering certain provisions of the Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless supported by a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament.

(3) That any alteration to certain fundamental provisions of the Constitution, notably those relating to the right to elect the Government by secret ballot, shall not be passed unless by a two-thirds majority of all elected Members of Parliament and by a two-thirds majority of all the people qualified to vote at the referendum.

Of the three methods recommended, the Government has accepted the second method of entrenchment. No reasons were given by the Government for the rejection of the first and third methods of entrenchment. All the provisions of the Constitution recommended to he entrenched by the Commission will be entrenched according to the second method - the Minister's Statement of the 21st December, 1966. The second method is legally effective and any provisions when so entrenched will not be alterable except by a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament.

The first method recommended by the Commission is not effective. Its only function is to draw attention to any Bill seeking to alter the Constitution by labelling it as such.

The third method is, in fact, the most effective method of entrenchment. Any provision entrenched under this method is almost irremovable. This irremovability, however, applies only to those who are prepared to observe the provisions of the Constitution. It would not prevent those who are not prepared to operate the Constitution within the democratic framework, from resorting to extra-constitutional means and scrapping the Constitution altogether.

May I now come to the first recommendation of the Commission? That is the creation of a non-elected advisory body to be called the Council of State. The Commission gave three reasons for this recommendation. These reasons are:

(a) To focus the attention of the public on any matters originating from Parliament which may adversely affect the interests of any minority group.

(b) To serve as an additional check on new legislation, and this would be particularly useful on matters of great public importance and on matters which might affect the minority.

(c) To put forward, where it considers necessary in the public interest to do so, constructive and well-informed criticisms or amendment of measures proposed in Parliament especially where there is no responsible or effective Opposition in Parliament.

The Government has accepted, in principle, the creation of this body, but it does not agree with the Commission on the suggested composition and functions of the Council. Further, the Government has rejected the Commission's recommendation that debates in the Council should be in public. The Government is of the view that the Council's sittings should, instead, be in private and the reason for this is - I quote the Minister (Vol. 25, No. 14 of Hansard, 21st December, 1966, col. 1055) - the reason is:

`to ensure that discussions taking place are frank and constructive and not held with an eye on the Press or publicity or with a view to scoring a political point.'

The first point I want to make about this recommendation for the creation of a Council of State is that it is not legally effective in protecting the minority rights.

The rationale of this recommendation is that the Council should be able in its debates to focus the attention of the public on any matter originating from Parliament which may adversely affect the interests of the minority group. The reason for this is found in paragraph 16 of the Report. By rejecting the suggestion that the Council's debates should be in public, the Government has taken away the very basis for the creation of such a body. The second and third reasons advanced by the Commission in the creation of the Council of State are, in my opinion, wrong reasons. The second reason is against established democratic principles. The third reason is based on factors that can only be considered as transient.

Let me take the third reason first. This is that we have at present no responsible or effective Opposition in Parliament. It is true that we have not had an Opposition for the last year and a half. But in terms of a nation's constitutional development, a period of a year and a half, nay, 15 years, can only be considered as a transient phase. This is, therefore, a transient phase in our political development. Yet it is on this very transient phase of our development that the Commission has now made recommendations which will have lasting effects.

The next general elections are just round the corner. They must he held by September 1968. No one can predict what will be the position after the general elections. Are we to abolish the Council of State on an Opposition Party being returned to Parliament then? Or are we to leave it to carry on with the functions now prescribed for it by the Commission, thereby usurping the functions of the Opposition? The very process of the Council discharging any function which should be within the exclusive province of an Opposition in Parliament renders the Opposition ineffective; the very thing which the Commission assiduously seeks to overcome.

The second reason prescribed by the Commission for the creation of the Council of State is, in my opinion, against established democratic principles. The Commission envisages that the Council should be able - and I quote this from paragraph 16, Mr Speaker, Sir:

`to serve as an additional check on new legislation and this would be particularly useful on matters of great public importance and on matters which might affect the minorities.'

Sir, it is the basic principle of parliamentary democracy that Parliament should be supreme. Parliament, it is said, can do anything except change a man into a woman and a woman into a man.

Mr Speaker: Mr Tang, I think this is a very convenient point at which to suspend the sitting. I am taking the suspension a little earlier today. I will suspend the sitting now and resume the Chair at half-past Five.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 4.44 p.m, until 5.30 p.m. Sitting resumed at 5.30 p.m.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Debate resumed.

Mr Tang See Chim: Mr Speaker, Sir, just before the suspension, I was saying that it is a basic principle of parliamentary democracy that Parliament should be supreme and that Parliament, it is said, can do anything except change a man into a woman and a woman into a man. So it ought to be. Parliament is responsible to none but the electorate. But it is always sensitive to public opinion, the influence of public opinion being exercised through the elected Members of Parliament. Any check on Parliament, therefore, should come from within Parliament and not from outside it. In proposing the setting up of a Council of State outside the framework of Parliament to check on any legislation proposed in Parliament, the Commission is recommending something which is against the basic principle of parliamentary democracy. If it is said that the proposed Council is only an advisory body and is not meant to be legally effective in checking the will of Parliament, then the recommendation of the Commission becomes a huge academic exercise from which nobody benefits. In short, this particular recommendation of the Commission is not legally effective in safeguarding the rights and interests of the citizens. The acceptance by the Government of the principle of creating such a body, in my opinion, is a mistake, a mistake which would involve the spending of a tremendous amount of the taxpayers' money without any resultant benefit to them.

May I now say a few words on the composition of the Council of State? The qualifications and disqualifications for membership are set out in paragraph 59 of the Report. I want to comment only on paragraph 59, sub-paragraph (v) , item (a) . This sub-paragraph reads as follows:

`(v) the disqualifications for membership shall be -

(a) membership of any political party at the time of appointment;'.

This disqualification will discourage people from joining political parties and will act as a brake on the recruitment of talent into political parties. Members of Parliament are at our present political development necessarily members of political parties and the calibre of Members of Parliament depends on the talent on which political parties can draw. This disqualification will put a dead hand on the recruitment of persons and will not improve the calibre of Members of Parliament about which the Commission seems to complain. The Government's idea about permanent membership, too, appears not to have been well thought out. With regard to this category of membership, the Minister's Statement on 21st December, 1966, reads, and here again I quote. This is in Volume 25, No. 14 of Hansard, col. 1055, towards the bottom of the page:

'(i) Permanent members: This would consist of men of distinction who will be chosen from those who hold or have held high offices, e.g. Cabinet Ministers, former Chief Ministers, the Chief Justice, the Speaker, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, Puisne Judges, the Attorney-General and former Permanent Secretaries. There would be no age limit;'.

I cannot quarrel with former Cabinet Ministers or even the Chairman of the Public Service Commission being members of the Council, but involving Judges in politics may be something which any democracy may want to avoid. I say this because it is not quite clear whether only those who have held office would be appointed to membership or those who are, in fact, currently holding these offices, because reading from the Report, it says here,"... from those who hold or have held high offices". Furthermore, it is not clear from the Minister's Statement whether the present incumbents of the posts of Permanent Secretaries or only retired ones are being appointed to membership of the Council. If the present incumbents are appointed, then it would blur the distinction between the Executive and the Legislature and will detract from the responsibility of the civil servants towards the Minister and weaken the Minister's control of the civil servants. If only retired Permanent Secretaries are appointed to membership, then they may be too old and senile to discharge their responsibilities effectively.

All in all, I have the feeling that the Commission have not given sufficiently deep thought to the problem of the creation of a Council of State. They seem to be influenced by a basic distrust of democratically elected representatives of the people. Hence, their recommendation of an appointed Council of State without considering the wide implications of its creation in the democratic framework. I am of the opinion that the appointment of such a Council would not remedy the particular political situation we are facing at present. Its remedy lies, in the final analysis, in an educated and enlightened electorate.

As a temporary measure to meet the situation, perhaps the Government may consider the following proposals:

(1) Appoint Ministerial committees composing of experts to advise the Ministers in the initiating and framing of legislation.

(2) Refer as many Bills as possible to Select Committees, thereby giving affected outside interests an opportunity to make representations.

(3) Lengthen the period between the First Reading and Second Reading of any Bill so as to give Members of Parliament more time to study them. In this connection, to refrain from introducing Bills on a Certificate of Urgency.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I now come to the second recommendation of the Commission, and that is the creation of the office of Ombudsman? The Government has rejected the Commission's recommendation without giving any substantial reasons for doing so. The Government's only reason is that the time is not opportune and that the introduction of such an office should be deferred until the results of the experiment in New Zealand and elsewhere are known. Here may I refer to the reason given by the Prime Minister in this Chamber this very afternoon? The Prime Minister's reason appears to disclose a lack of confidence in our civil service. The Prime Minister, having said what he did say in this Chamber, I think the efficiency and fairness of our civil service can only be vindicated by the establishment of such an office. I am afraid I do not consider the reason given by the Minister for Law and National Development and the reason given by the Prime Minister good reasons. New Zealand has had an Ombudsman since 1962 and by all accounts the office is a great success. Here, Mr Speaker, Sir, may I quote part of a speech by the Honourable J. R. Marshall, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Commerce and Minister of Oversea Trade of New Zealand, to the 11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, at page 213 in the Conference Report? He says:

`On the basis of three years' operation of the office [meaning the office of Ombudsman], we in New Zealand can commend the institution to the serious consideration of other members of the Commonwealth. But this commendation is subject to some reservations. In the first place, we do not recommend our system except in our own circumstances. For others we recommend only the idea of an Ombudsman. Constitutional development of this kind must grow out of the needs and experiences of each country.'

I am of the opinion that we are in a stage of constitutional and political development when the establishment of such an office would benefit our administration. The office of Ombudsman safeguards the citizens against two ills which are the result of the growth of modern government. These two ills are, to put them shortly, (1) misguided decisions by authorities in the exercise of their discretion; (2) maladministration. As Dicey, one of Britain's great constitutional lawyers, has said, and I quote: "Wherever there is discretion, there is room for arbitrariness." It is quite possible nowadays for an individual's rights to be accidentally crushed by the vast government administrative machinery. Hundreds and thousands of administrative decisions are made by our Government departments each year affecting the life of every citizen. Some of these decisions are bound to be arbitrary and unjustified. Under our present institution of government, there is no easy way for the ordinary citizen to gain redress. Courts are not quite an appropriate forum for the investigation of these complaints. Quite apart from the fact that they are expensive and slow, the courts cannot go behind a Minister's decision and exercise their discretion on his behalf. Members of Parliament are ineffective in that they cannot have access to departmental files. The same reason goes for the Press. The advantage of the Ombudsman is that, unlike M.P.s and the Press, he is politically neutral and has the power to call for departmental files to get at the full facts of the case. Unlike the courts, he does not require elaborate court procedure and no fee, or at most only a small fee, is charged for his services, so that his action is cheaper and faster when compared with the review by the courts. The creation of the office of Ombudsman not only would safeguard our citizens from the arbitrary decisions of those in authority and from maladministration, but would also serve as a protective shield for the civil service. It will protect them from unfounded allegations and accusations. This will further increase the confidence of the public in our administration. The fact that there is a difference in the development of Singapore and the development of the countries at present having an Ombudsman is, as I see it, no argument. All studies so far show the desirability of introducing such an institution and it is significant that almost all the countries that have conducted studies into this office now accept the principle of having such an office. The latest example is the United Kingdom. We have an efficient and honest civil service. We are rightly proud of it. We should not, however, be content. The creation of the office of Ombudsman will be a step forward. It would be a step towards greater efficiency and incorruptibility of our civil service. Its introduction will be the first in this region and it will be the pride of Singapore.

5.47 p.m.

Mr S. V. Lingam (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, Sir, in the first place, I wish to congratulate the Government on appointing a Commission to look into the rights of minorities in our Republic. The impartial Commission has done a wonderful job, as a result of which we have the Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966, in front of us now. The Government, in accordance with its declared policy of multi-racial, multi-lingual and multi-religious Singapore, has, in fact, accepted most of the recommendations of the Commission. While agreeing in principle with other recommendations, only a few of the recommendations are not acceptable to the Government. It is heartening to note that the Government is willing to accept in principle the provisions regarding equal treatment of every citizen in the eyes of the law as recommended by the Commission.

But, Sir, I need a clarification from the Minister for Law and National Development on one point only, i.e, land acquisition. We are a Republic with an area of about 225 square miles, and not all the land in our island can be used for development. With the increase of population and social amenities, we need more land for housing, roads, recreational facilities, etc. Because of shortage of land, we are building underground and multi-storey car parks. But, at the same time, we see quite a number of plots of land belonging to private individuals not being put to proper use. In order to make use of such lands, the Government has to do something; and for that I agree it should have some sort of constitutional power. Having this in mind, I welcome the Government's intention to include the terms of Article 13 of the Constitution of Malaysia in a modified form. The Commission has recommended that no property will be acquired except upon just terms. The Government has stated that it would accept the recommendation but without the words "upon just terms". As a layman who does not know much about law, I fear that the removal of these words may be construed by some people to mean that no compensation will be paid at all for land acquired by the Government. But I am sure that it is not the intention of the Government not to pay any compensation. Definitely the Government will pay compensation. But whether the affected party thinks the amount paid by the Government is adequate or not is a different matter. Sir, I shall be thankful to the Minister if he can make it clear, in the article in the Constitution dealing with land acquisition, that compensation will be paid. Such a modification will ensure that the Government will pay compensation for land acquired and that the property owner will not be made to give his land free.

5.56 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Culture (Mr Fong Sip Chee): Mr Speaker, Sir, Members will recall that once Sir Winston Churchill said, "Democracy is the worst system of government, but it is the only one that works." We are gathered here today to examine the basic principles and also to come to some form of compromise on which to work out a new Constitution for our young Republic. This reminds us of what John Russell said about constitutions. He said, "Every political constitution in which different bodies share political power is only enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is distributed." One of the conscious fears of the people of Singapore is the question of whether or not the basic rights of the minority - in short, the basic rights of human beings - can be entrenched in the Constitution in order to provide a form of safeguard for them. And among the suggestions and recommendations of the Constitutional Commission were the office of the Ombudsman and the Council of State.

Sir, in as much as we understand and appreciate the functions and the good work that an Ombudsman or a Parliamentary Commissioner can do and can contribute to this new Republic, I think one cannot, at the same time, automatically conclude that that is the best form, having regard to the existing social structure and the population at large. The office of the Ombudsman automatically presupposes a very high degree of public administration and, of course, a highly and extremely sophisticated population. It is not for us to say that our population is not sophisticated or our public administration is not up to the standard that would have been expected perhaps by the Member for Choa Chu Kang. But it would be naive for us to believe that we have come to that kind of standard when compared to the Western world for the adoption of a Parliamentary Commissioner. Parliamentary democracy and franchise in voting is indeed new in Singapore and, in fact, in Asia. I do not believe that ten years or maybe even 20 years of education on voting and the value of representative government can really defeat the prejudice of the people of Asia, who in the known history of 4,000 years, have not known a single instance in which a government was put into power through voting. Sir, we are not dismissing the recommendation for the establishment or creation of an Ombudsman for Singapore. But if you are to examine this office, I would say it came into being only very recently. I mean the known parliamentary history, particularly after the industrial revolution. The first known case of the appointment of an Ombudsman was in 1809. Is that correct, Mr Tang?

Mr Tang See Chim: That is correct, but that is not recent.

Mr Fong Sip Chee: Well, when you compare human history of so many thousands of years. 200 years can be regarded as very recent. In 1809, in Sweden, a Parliamentary Commissioner of Justice - and in their term, it was known as the Justitieombudsman - was appointed. It is only in 1915 that Sweden appointed another form of Parliamentary Commissioner known as the Commissioner of Military Administration --and in their term, they call it the Militieombudsman. Denmark first thought of the idea after the war in 1946. That can be very recent and it was not until 1953 that the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee of 1946 was incorporated in the Constitution for Denmark. It was not until 1955 in March when the first Parliamentary Commissioner for Denmark was appointed. Finland had its Parliamentary Commissioner in 1919. In New Zealand, the National Party put forward the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner in its election campaign in 1960. It was only two years later that the Parliamentary Commissioner was appointed. Sir, I have listed out all these just to show that not only the office of the Ombudsman is novel in the Commonwealth, but in general it is still a very new idea provided the Member for Choa Chu Kang can accept that 1809 is recent.

Sir, the Ombudsman is a man of high integrity and high administrative ability, and as the Prime Minister had said earlier, you almost have to scrape the bottom of the barrel to look for a suitable candidate to fill a high position Indeed it is difficult to secure the services of a man of that calibre for the office of Ombudsman. The Member for Choa Chu Kang - I must congratulate him on doing considerable research - has said that recently the British Government has adopted the idea of a Parliamentary Commissioner. But he has deliberately or otherwise omitted to inform the House of the recommendation of the committee on this particular question. Mr Speaker. Sir, I am referring to the Report by Justice, "The Citizen and the Administration" - you have got it there? [Asking Mr Tang See Chim]

Mr Speaker: I do not have it, Mr Fong. When you ask, "You have got it there?", you mean, have I got it?

Mr Fong Sip Chee: I was referring to the Member for Choa Chu Kang, Sir.

This Committee comprised Sir John Whyatt - he was the Director of Research and formerly Chief Justice of Singapore - the Chairman was Mr Norman S. Marsch; the members were Sir Sydney Caine and Dr H. W. R. Wade. All of them are men of eminence. In the recommendation of this Committee contained in page 79 of this Report, I quote - Sir, it is a fairly long one but I hope the House will bear with me on this - paragraph 166:

`Our conclusion regarding complaints of maladministration is that Parliament is and must remain the most important channel by making representations to the Executive about grievances.'

It did not say the Parliamentary Commissioner but Parliament must remain the most important channel. It goes on to say:

`We think the existing Parliamentary procedures, in particular the Parliamentary Question procedure and the Adjournment Debates, provide a valuable means for dealing with complaints of maladministration raised by Members of Parliament but that they would be more effective if they were supplemented by machinery which would enable such complaints to be investigated by an impartial authority if the Member requested it. We have therefore proposed that an officer, to be called the Parliamentary Commissioner (or by some other suitable title), with a status similar to that of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, should be appointed, and subject to certain conditions, should investigate complaints of maladministration against Government Departments received from Members of Parliament.'.

Sir, if we carry the argument of the Member for Choa Chu Kang further, then this recommendation itself is not conclusive, because it states that only complaints received from Members of Parliament should be investigated and, of course, it suggests that the complaints should be supplemented by other machinery if and when a Member of Parliament requests an investigation into a certain matter. We already have that machinery in Singapore which has been referred to so often.

Mr Tang See Chim: Mr Speaker, Sir, may I be permitted to interrupt?

Mr Speaker: Mr Tang, is it a point of order or clarification?

Mr Tang See Chim: It is a point of clarification.

Mr Speaker: Is the Parliamentary Secretary prepared to give way?

Mr Fong Sip Chee resumed his seat.

Mr Tang See Chim: May I thank the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Culture through you, Mr Speaker?

He has accused me of deliberately or otherwise not quoting to this House the conclusions and recommendations of A Report by Justice which I have here. I must thank him for his quotation to the House, because it does, in fact, support my contention that the office of Ombudsman should be established in Singapore. May I clarify? He has said that ---

Mr Speaker: Mr Tang, I think you are going beyond the bounds of a point of clarification.

Mr Tang See Chim: I will clarify now.

Mr Speaker: The point I am making is this. When any quotation is made, selection is necessary, and for every passage you select, I am sure that Mr Fong and other Members who do not want an Ombudsman can quote passages of equal cogency. Please make your point very short. Anything else will amount to your having a right to speak a second time. This, I am loath to give you.

Mr Tang See Chim: I am sorry, Mr Speaker, Sir,I want to correct the Parliamentary Secretary. The machinery recommended by Justice is the very office of Ombudsman. He has said that the machinery to supplement a Member's right is not Ombudsman, but according to the very passage he has quoted, the machinery that this Report recommends is, in fact, the very establishment of the office of Ombudsman.

Mr Fong Sip Chee: Sir, I was coming to that before I was interrupted by the Member for Choa Chu Kang. I said that we already have that machinery in Singapore which has so often been referred to by my colleagues, and that is the Central Complaints Bureau. But we do not require a Parliamentary Commissioner to head the Central Complaints Bureau. We have a Director there, and the results of investigations by this Bureau have proved to be effective and honest without any fear of intimidation from any quarter. Sir, I am inclined to think that the Central Complaints Bureau serves the same purpose as the Parliamentary Commissioner. But the difference is that A Report by Justice states that the machinery can "be called the Parliamentary Commissioner (or by some other suitable title)", but we call it the Central Complaints Bureau. Sir, the British Constitutional Commission was appointed as a result of the Prime Minister's speech in November 1959 on the question of looking into the appointment of an Ombudsman. The period 1959 to 1967, by any stretch of the imagination, can be regarded as recent. Even in the Report, they have not altogether recommended that the holder of the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner must be appointed, and they have not made any firm recommendation as to whether it should be termed "Parliamentary Commissioner" or "Ombudsman". We have that machinery. In fact, it is operating very smoothly in Singapore. Sir, I do not believe that any citizen in Singapore cannot seek redress of his grievances. After all, a citizen can seek redress in court, and according to the Hierarchy of the judicial system - the House of Lords, the Privy Council or the Judicial Committee, the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the Magistrate's Court - he can go through all these channels.

Mr Tang See Chim: It is expensive.

Mr Fong Sip Chee: We can perhaps reduce the expenses, if the Member for Choa Chu Kang can be generous enough!

Mr Speaker: Order. Mr Tang, the Parliamentary Secretary listened to you with courtesy. If we have interruptions on a controversial issue like this, we may take a very long time. Mr Fong.

Mr Fong Sip Chee: After all, any Minister in the Cabinet of the Republic of Singapore may sue or be sued. If any individual citizen thinks that he has been victimised, or any decision by the Cabinet or a Minister is contrary to the basic rights of a citizen which the Minister for Law has stated will be entrenched in the Constitution, he can seek redress in court. As the Prime Minister has said, we have not dismissed the idea altogether. All he has said is that the Ombudsman is of very recent history and that we had better wait and see, and perhaps we could benefit from the mistakes or the good work of the Ombudsman in other countries.

We come to the Council of State, Mr Speaker. It has been said that the Council of State is able to rectify any legislation made which infringes upon the individual rights of a citizen. Sir, as I see it, with a Council of State, Singapore will he bicameral. Sir, in a small newly independent country like Singapore. we cannot afford the luxury of a two-House system. We cannot afford to have another Upper Chamber in order to provide a kind of back-door for those political "rejects" to obtain admission to this Upper House. Then again, if we have an Upper House, we will have to consider whether they are to he elected or appointed. If they are to be appointed or by virtue of their position they may serve in the Upper Chamber, then any legislation made in the Lower House can be defeated or vetoed by the Upper House. This is against the very principle of representative government; that is, they cannot veto or defeat any legislation of the Lower House which is elected by popular vote. The U.S. Senate, for example, is a very powerful body because all Senators are elected, but our Council of State is somewhere between the two-House system. It will definitely serve a purpose. As the Prime Minister has said earlier, the population of Singapore is getting younger and younger, and in the next five or ten years, two-thirds of the population will be below the age of 35. Even in the United Kingdom, where considerable doubts have been raised about the desirability and necessity of the continued existence of the House of Lords, they have found it difficult to dispense with it because a separate body, advisory or otherwise, would still be required to assist the machinery of State. The Council of State is indeed the very appropriate answer, having due regard to the situation in Singapore. I would rather prefer that members of the Council of State should have political affiliations, because they will be able to judge matters in wider perspective, as they have a proper understanding of the social structure of society, rather than those who represent a religious or a minority group. I am not doubting the ability of the prospective members of the Council of State, but if one were to represent a religious or a racial group, he is bound to be pressurised and he would not be able to examine any legislation in all its aspects. So a man with political affiliations and political sophistication is better equipped to sit in the Council of State than the man who serves only the purpose of a small group of people and who fails to weigh the implications of any legislation to the society at large. But there is a fear that members of this Council may misuse their position for their political ends. I cannot agree that the Council of State should sit in public. After all, its members will not be elected. Their comments will only be in an advisory capacity and we will, of course, take their advice into account, but they should not be made so powerful as to defeat the aims of the Government which is elected by popular vote. They will serve merely as Elders in the State.

In this connection, Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to associate myself with the sentiments expressed by the Minister for Law. One compromise might appear to be - I hope perhaps to the satisfaction of the Member for Choa Chu Kang - for us to streamline or reconsider the functions and portfolios of the Central Complaints Bureau and to increase the responsibilities of the Director so that he can have slightly more power than he now has.

Sir, I propose this to the Minister for Law, and I hope he will consider seriously extending the scope of the functions of the Central Complaints Bureau. Perhaps the Member for Choa Chu Kang may wish to contribute more ideas to the Minister when he accepts my proposal.

6.15 p.m.

The Minister of State for Education (Inche A. Rahim Ishak): Mr Speaker, Sir, first I would like to deal with the recommendations of the Constitutional Commission on minority rights that an Ombudsman be appointed. I wish also later to deal with the question of the special position and rights of minorities with particular reference to the Malays.

Earlier in the afternoon, in addition to the reasons given by the Prime Minister for not appointing such a Parliamentary Commissioner today in Singapore, I would like to give two other reasons why the necessity has not really arisen for such appointment. Firstly, as a unitary Republic, we do not have those conflicts between State and Federal Government authorities which may exist in a Federation, which possibly exist in the Federation like the Federation of Malaysia. On the other hand, in a unitary State like Singapore, we have a central forum where grievances can be aired and where Ministers have to answer for all matters of public administration; matters going down to the minutest detail, as you know, Sir, have been brought up to the Legislature. Secondly, as a small Island Republic with only an area of 225 square miles and where road transport, among other things, is good, every citizen has easy access to persons in authority for the speedy redress of grievances. Unlike New Zealand, the United Kingdom, or even Malaysia, we are a small and concentrated community and traditional methods for the redress of grievances in a small island like our Island Republic have always been found to be adequate and, in fact, are still adequate. Perhaps in five years' time development may show that these methods are not adequate. That we do not know now. If so, if they prove to be inadequate later, changes can and will be made and we can then benefit from the full experience of New Zealand and the more recent experience of the United Kingdom and other such countries in the Commonwealth near or far away from us, who may appear to beat us to the gun and steal a march. Mr Speaker, Sir ---

Mr Barker rose ---

Mr Speaker: Mr Barker.

Mr Barker: I do not like to interrupt the Minister of State for Education, hut if Members of the House and you, Sir, feel, like me, that this is a convenient time to adjourn. I would like to move accordingly.

Hon. Members indicated assent.