CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT) BILL

Debate resumed.

The Minister for Trade and Industry and Second Minister for Defence (Services) (BG Lee Hsien Loong): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, I will avail myself of this opportunity to say that I fully support what the First Deputy Prime Minister had said earlier.

This question of ISA is not new. The ISA has been in force for over 40 years. In recent years, there were the Marxist incidents, the Hendrickson incident and the arrest of Francis Seow. These cases happened one after the other. In the past two years, we had serious and heated debates, taking place both inside our country and outside the country. In fact, two years ago when we arrested these Marxists we had already taken our basic stand and decision. We did not just decide the fate of Vicent Cheng and others only. In fact, we had made our basic decision, because this was a new situation, a new electorate, and new leaders. Should these new leaders make use of the old law to deal with different questions and problems? Of course, new you do not have to mention it. But old it is also quite clear, but different problems. Now it is not a question of Chinese educated communists but a question of English educated intellectuals. Some had links related to European Communists, others to the Philippine Communists. Others were not communists but religious extremists, against whom we must also use the ISA. So this was a basic fundamental decision. Our decision was that we must carry on with this ISA. Therefore we arrested Vicent Cheng. Thereupon we found out their link with the Philippine Communists. Thereby we discovered that Tan Wah Piow in England had been manipulating this group of people. If we had not arrested these people, we would never have discovered all these facts.

One year later, some of them denied their statutory declarations made under detention. So we re-arrested them and re-examined them. Then, as we also had some suspicions about Patrick Seong, their lawyer, therefore we arrested Patrick Seong and interrogated him. Was there any evidence? No. But we had great suspicion about him. Because we arrested Patrick Seong, thereby we found out Francis Seow's link with Hendrickson, and the American diplomat's attempts to interfere in Singapore's internal political affairs. Therefore we arrested Francis Seow and asked him about the relationship between him and Hendrickson, and what Hendrickson told him to do. This was not based on evidence, but again on some doubt or suspicion. So in the end our actions were proved right. If we had not arrested these people, Singapore's future might be quite different from what it is now.

All these had happened before the last General Elections. Sir, you know that no government would like to do this kind of thing before a General Election because it confuses the people's minds, creates instability, and may affect the government's votes. But the country's security must come first. Therefore we had no choice but to do this. Of course, it had caused some hue and cry. In Singapore, the Opposition made a hue and cry of it. Outside, the human rights groups in America, Australia and England organized a campaign to pressure the Government of Singapore, to cause us to change our attitude and stand. In the end, we had a verbal fight, to and fro and tit for tat, for the ensuing few months. Those involved did nothing else but to write letters to counter attack. We said very clearly that this matter was a decision for the people of Singapore, because the Government had to work for the people, to do things for the people. At every general election the Opposition had raised the matter of ISA and the Government's power of arrest as an election issue. Therefore ISA would again become an issue at the next general elections. As early as April last year, a Government's press statement had also said very clearly stated that foreigners should not interfere, as this matter should be left for the Singapore people to decide. Therefore nobody can say that PAP is doing things undercover or stealthily. It is not like the Opposition. Indeed, when the General Election came, we laid he cards clearly on the question of ISA as an issue at the General Election.

Earlier when I was discussing with MP Chiam in English I rread out a passage which I said was our General Election platform, that is a document entitled "Prosperity Forever, Good Years Forever". Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to apologize to you and to all Members here that the specific passage was from another election document. But although the language used was different, the meaning was the same. Let me read out the Chinese translation:

'The Internal Security Act provides us with safeguards. Unfortunately, we are living in a dangerous world. Those who are opposed to Singapore always do not go by the rules of the games. When they cannot achieve their aims through democratic and legal means, they resort to undemocratic and illegal tactics. They organized pressure groups and then manipulate from behind the scene. They seek foreign assistance and support. They do not use peaceful persuasion but resort to violence, bloodshed and riots to achieve their political aims. The Internal Security Act will enable us to counter such threats.'

The wording is different, but the meaning is very clear. The General Election was the time for the people to choose. They supported this stand. Not only did the people support us on this issue; the Opposition, by not raising this question, also showed that they recognized that the people supported this stand.

Now that the people have elected a new leadership, the question before the new leadership is whether we have the determination to carry on with this decision. The Court of Appeal's review of cases of Teo Soh Lung and others has given us another opportunity to review this question. The question is very simple. First, has the situation of Singapore entirely changed so that we need not implement the Internal Security Act? Or, second, should we follow the British model? Their conditions have changed. They have entered the European Common Market. They changed their laws. Must also follow suit exactly? Or we should directly explain that the power of arrest is an Executive reponsibility and not the duty of the Judiciary? The Minister has to consider all factors in order to arrive at a political decision: whether this person is detrimental to Singapore, whether he has done something wrong, or whether he has not yet done anything wrong but has the intention to do something dangerous to Singapore, whether there is adequate evidence or not, it is better to arrest him and question him. If the answer is we want to do this, then our final question is, whether we should change our law so that we may restore to the position before the latest trial, so that those foreign elements and those who are a threat to Singapore may understand that we have a unanimous, firm and resolute stand in Singapore? The Cabinet after considering this matter decided unanimously that we must take action. It is always better to take action first.

The Government recognizes the ISA as a powerful means to carry out its function. Of course, in the hands of a dishonest government, it may be a dangerous weapon. A dishonest government can do many wrong things even without ISA, but the ISA is one tool it can misuse. But we should understand that without this Act, no government would be able to govern Singapore and to deal with any potential space threat to the security of Singapore.

In principle, the Government is agreeable to the idea of having a double safeguard. But the question: is what kind of second safeguard? When we talk about safeguarding CPF funds, the elected President is the second key. That is a second safeguard. But for internal security, we have to search for an organization that is able to execute the second key. Judicial courts and the Appellate courts would not do, because who nominates the judges to make the decision? It is not a matter of law, it is a matter of security. So it should be an executive body, a political organ. As to how to go about it, we are considering the matter. It takes a period of time. But in principle and in law, I feel that the amendment Bill before us is very necessary.

Mr Davinder Singh (Toa Payoh GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to respond, if I may, to a couple of points, the first made by the Member for Potong Pasir. In his address to this House, the Member produced an undertaking which reads:

'I, Chiam See Tong, MP for Potong Pasir, in consideration of the Government of Singapore releasing Chia Thye Poh ...' goes on to agree to:

'act as his guarantor that Chia Thye Poh will not participate in any violent activity calculated to overthrow the legitimate government of Singapore' and the gist of it is that if he should do so, if he should breach that undertaking, then he would vacate his seat.

I speak purely from a legal angle. Whatever may be the policy decision of the Executive in response to this document, it is couched as a contract. The words "in consideration" and "as guarantor" are used specifically so that if it has any force, it purports to have force as a binding and valid agreement.

Sir, there is a principle at common law that the courts will not uphold and, in fact, will strike down contracts which are illegal. There are a number of heads under which contracts may be illegal. A contract to commit a crime is illegal. A contract which is against public morals is illegal and a contract which is against public policy is illegal. What we have here is an offer to the Government to commit an illegal act. The deal is this. You abdicate your responsibility, you forget everything that you have said for the past 20 years about this man, you forget your convictions that he is a threat to Singapore, in return for my undertaking and my guarantee, you release him in the hope or the expectancy that the undertaking might be breached and therefore you would have a House where all elected MPs would be of the PAP Party only.

Sir, I am not the legal adviser to the Government. But if I may offer some gratuitous advice. I would respectfully suggest that no consideration be given to this document purely because it is an offer to engage in illegal transaction and it runs contrary to this Government's position for years.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Point of clarification, if I may.

Mr Speaker: All right, make your clarification.

Mr Chiam See Tong: This is a serious matter. But Mr Davinder Singh has attempted to turn it into a joke. If one of his brothers were to be detained for 20 years, I wonder what his feelings will be like. This is not an illegal contract. The Government itself wants Chia Thye Poh to sign an undertaking so that he can be released. It is not a legal contract. We are men of our words. We have given an undertaking not to be decided by the courts of law but to be decided by the people of Singapore. Where do you stand? Are you bound by your words? That is what it is all about in politics. I think Mr Davinder Singh, briefly only in Parliament, has a lot more to learn.

Mr Davinder Singh: Sir, this is no light matter. It is very serious because I stand before this House today and I say that it is my view that this offer, if consummated by an acceptance, would be tantamount to an illegal contract which would be struck out by the courts and will not be upheld even if an attempt is made to enforce it.

The other point. There is a significant distinction in law between the Government's offer to the detainee to sign an undertaking and a third party stepping in as a guarantor to say, "Forget that undertaking and in view of it, I will be guarantor." That distinction cannot be overlooked.

Now, Sir, if I may be allowed to proceed to the second point which I indicated I would like to respond to, and that is, Dr Lee Siew-Choh's point about the proposed amendment to the Constitution, in particular, Article 94(3). As I understand his argument, he rejects the Minister's point that the proposed amendment is inserted purely for the avoidance of doubt. I support that argument and that this Article is merely inserted, to use the Minister's words, for the avoidance of doubt, the point being that the Chief Justice has not acted ultra vires at any time.

Sir, Members may not have copies of the relevant Articles in the Constitution before them but if I may take Members through the Articles. Article 94(3) states:

'A person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court or a person who has ceased to hold the office of a Judge of the Supreme Court may sit as a Judge of that Court, if designated for the purpose ... in accordance with Article 95, and such person shall hold office for such period or periods as the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, shall direct.' And Article 95 sets out the means by which the appointment is made. The relationship between the two is this. Article 94 is the substantive provision for appointment and Article 95 is the procedural Article in that it sets out the manner in which appointments are made. The issue therefore is: what is the meaning of the word "Judge" in Article 94(3)? Do we have to insert the words "Chief Justice" in Article 94(3) and my submission, Sir, is that we do not have to. The word "Judge" includes in the context of Part VIII of the Constitution the Chief Justice unless it is expressly provided otherwise and this is plain from reading a number of these Articles.

Article 94(1) says:

'The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as may, from time to time, be appointed.' "Chief Justice and such other Judges" in other words, the Chief Justice is one Judge and then there are such other Judges. Article 95(1) says:

'The Chief Justice and the other Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.' Once again, "the Chief Justice and the other Judges". However, if it is necessary to draw a distinction between the two, the Constitution addresses it in this manner. Article 95(2) says:

'Before tendering his advice as to the appointment under clause (1) of a Judge, other than the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister shall consult the Chief Justice.'

Sir, we have a situation where if it is intended to draw a distinction between a Judge and the Chief Justice, he Constitution would say, "a Judge other than the Chief Justice". Article 94(3) does not make this distinction. It is plain that a person or the Judge referred to in Article 94(3) includes, for the purposes of construction, the Chief Justice.

Sir, I am sorry that I have to go through this technical analysis only because I think it is necessary to address the point, which is a very serious point, that the Chief Justice has been acting ultra vires. Dr Lee also refers implicitly to Article 95(3) to support his argument that the position and the discharge of duties was outside the Constitution. Article 95(3) says:

'This Article shall apply to the designation of a person to sit as a Judge of the Supreme Court under clause (3) of Article 94 and to the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner of the Supreme Court under clause (4) of Article 94 as it applies to the appointment of a Judge of that Court other than the Chief Justice.'

Sir, for the record, that Article only makes it plain that when it comes to the appointment of a Judge after his office is terminated, then the same procedural requirements which apply when he is first appointed remain the same. In other words, in the first instance, when a Judge is to be appointed, he shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Chief Justice. But when the term of the Chief Justice is to be extended, it makes sense that there is no need to consult the Chief Justice. The Prime Minister would advise the President.

My third point is this. The Chairman of the GPC for Law has earlier today affirmed the GPC's support for the amendment. I am a member of that GPC and I likewise affirm my support. The issue today is not whether the ISA is necessary or not. The issue today is whether the amendment ought to be in place and the amendment deals with one point whether the established law up till 8th December 1988 should continue to apply notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal? My point, Sir, is that the legislation, if amended, must take into account one factor and, that is, accountability. It has been held by the Court of Appeal and if I may quote from the decision in relation to accountability to Parliament, this is a comment of Lord Diplock:

'It is not in my view a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their function. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy and of that Parliament is the only judge. They are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do and of that the court is the only judge.'

I support the reaffirmation of the subjective test. But I would also urge the Government, and in fact the ground has somewhat been cut from under my feet by the earlier statements (the First Deputy Prime Minister) to establish or institutionalize a mechanism somewhere between the judiciary and Parliament which would ensure accountability will assure that whatever actions are done, are done in good faith and that there is no abuse of power. And until that happens, I would urge the Government to continue what it has been doing, ie, to put itself up before the press, defend and substantiate everything which is being done, open everything up for scrutiny, because the majority of the people in Singapore have come away with the view, I believe, that such actions have been done in good faith and in the interest of Singapore.

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to thank Members who have spoken on the Bill, and I would only want to respond to some of the points made by hon. Members.

First of all, in view of the comprehensive rebuttals given by my colleague Members in the House, Mr Davinder Singh and Mr Shanmugam, on the points raised by Dr Lee Siew-Choh concerning the Chief Justice's position, I think it is not necessary for me to spend any further time except to say that his arguments have no merit. And as both my colleagues have pointed out, the purpose of the amendment is to put the matter beyond any doubt.

May I now go on, Sir, to the points raised by hon. Members on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill and the Internal Security (Amendment) Bill. I will not deal with all the points but only the major points which I think need addressing. First, Sir, the hon. Member, Dr Ho Tat Kin, said that he is concerned with the reactions or comments that he has heard that this amendment abolition of appeals to Privy Council, in particular is a reaction to the Privy Council's decision on Mr Jeyaretnam's appeal concerning disbarment. Sir, Members would have heard me saying in my speech that we have for some time been concerned with how long we can continue appeals to the Privy Council for the reasons that I have mentioned.

Now that he has raised this point, I think I should disclose to this House that, in fact, we have been considering this matter for several years. I will ask the Clerk of Parliament to kindly distribute certain documents because these documents will show what I mean. [Copies of documents circulated to hon. Members.] What I am circulating, Sir, are extracts from letters written by the Prime Minister in correspondence with a United Kingdom Law Lord who was a Queen's Counsel some 30 years ago, who had represented the Prime Minister in a case that many years ago. And the Prime Minister had kept in touch with him as a personal friend throughout these years and he is now elevated as a judge and indeed as a Law Lord and is, in fact, sitting as one of the Law Lords in the Privy Council. The correspondence involves some discussion concerning a matter relating to one of the Inns of Court. So I have just reproduced the relevant extracts from the Prime Minister's letter in reply to this Lord Justice's letter. I first refer to the Prime Minister's reply to an earlier letter from the Lord concerning the matter of one of the Inns of Court. And I think I should read it out, Sir. Prime Minister said:

'I hope the Privy Council will remain relevant to Singapore's judicial system indefinitely.' This is 9th January 1985. He said:

'The elevation of lawyers and judges from many parts of the Commonwealth to the Privy Council, with experience of conditions in different parts of the world, has ceased. I do not see how the flow can be resumed. It troubles me that appellate judges in the Privy Council have no experience of the totally different social, economic and political conditions obtaining in the countries they hear appeals from. However able the men who stay at the English Bar and later go on the Bench, they are unlikely to gain this exposure to conditions abroad in the Commonwealth, apart from the occasional brief.'

This was a letter written in January 1985. To this letter, that particular Lord Justice replied. But since we have, as a matter of courtesy, to obtain the consent of that Law Lord, I am not in a position to reproduce the exact copy of the letter. But I might say that in his reply that Lord Justice said that he entirely agreed with the Prime Minister - that it was a pity that appellate judges in the Privy Council had little experience of the totally different social, economic and political conditions obtaining in the countries from which they hear appeals. He entirely agreed and he said also that there were many amongst his colleagues who felt that they had really missed a big opportunity to provide that the Privy Council should sit from time to time in the Commonwealth countries in which the cases emanate, to which the Prime Minister wrote again on 7th February. And the Prime Minister commented:

'A better solution to Singapore's need for talented advocates in her courts, especially in international commercial cases, is to widen admissions to able and experienced lawyers from the American and other Commonwealth bars.'

My purpose, Sir, I am unfolding these extracts to respond to Dr Ho Tat Kin to show this is not a knee-jerk reaction. This is something we have been considering for many years. We have been monitoring the trends, observing, thinking of how it will have an impact on us. And now we have decided.

May I then go on to another point, Sir. Several colleagues have spoken about the need for these amendments to the ISA but have an expressed concern, and I think a genuine concern on their part, that down the road 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, we can never be sure that the PAP Government is going to be always in charge, that some freak result or other turn of events may bring into power, as Mr Shanmugam said, a minority government, hanging on threadbare power, and may be unscrupulous, dishonest to want to abuse these powers. If the question is: can the powers in the ISA be abused? Then the honest answer to that is, yes, with or without the amendments they can be abused. But then, Sir, it is not just the ISA but all government powers, all Government legislation which confer discretionary powers in the Government can be abused - Internal Security Act, Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, Misuse of Drugs, powers on immigration, citizenship, granting of licences, permits. Such powers can be abused. The best safeguard is what was mentioned by the First Deputy Prime Minister. The most important safeguard is for the people to ensure that the Government elected is composed of men of integrity, honesty and incorruptibility.

Freak result the scenario painted by several Members, including Mr Shanmugam is not to be excluded. But I think it is highly illusory to imagine that in that kind of scenario which they have painted the solution is to vest the courts with the power of judicial review. Because once such a dishonest bunch of crooks comes into power, the first thing they are going to do is to pack the courts. Isn't it? And under our system there is no limit to the number of judges who can be appointed. So that is why one must think again if one believes that to take care of that situation, the remedy is in giving the final say to the judiciary. It is highly illusory.

As the First Deputy Prime Minister pointed out, this is something that we ourselves have also been giving thought to. Just as you can have a situation where a dishonest government can raid the reserves, and it is necessary to have a safeguard to protect the reserves and key appointments. So, also, we will have to consider and we will put in place similar safeguards to take care of the situation that Mr Shanmugam and other Members have mentioned. But such safeguards and checks cannot be judicial safeguards for the reasons I have given in my speech. Or, if the judiciary is to have the final say on matters concerning exercise of discretionary powers, particularly in the area of defence or national security, then surely it must lead, must it not, to friction and confrontation between the executive and the judiciary?

Members have seen what is happening in Malaysia where the executive considered the judiciary has trodden on matters not within their purview. They react disciplinary proceedings, firing of the head of the judiciary, several other judges subject to disciplinary proceedings, foreign judges brought in to sit in those disciplinary proceedings. Do we want that to happen here?

Then, Sir, Mr Chandra Das asked me for my comments on the newspaper articles by Mr Cheng Shoong Tat which he found, as a non-lawyer, not to make much sense, and which my colleague, Mr Shanmugam, thought make great sense. So is the non-lawyer right or the lawyer right? First, he asked me for my comments on Mr Cheng Shoong Tat's proposition that since we have made these amendments, there should be no reservations or difficulties in continuing with appeals to the Privy Council. What Mr Cheng says is that our amendments tabled today are so well drafted to use his words, "with such clarity", again unambiguously worded, "that there can be no harm in allowing appeals to Privy Council". Because all that the Privy Council will be doing is just to interpret these very beautifully drafted amendments.

Sir, Mr Cheng is inconsistent because elsewhere in that same article, he tells us forcefully and persuasively that no matter how carefully the law is drafted, in the United Kingdom the courts have gone behind the legislative intent and, to use his words, "the judges stretch, at the slightest opportunity, the meaning of Acts of Parliament."

There can be no such thing as antiseptic interpretation of laws. Laws have meaning in the context of social, economic and political circumstances of a given society. Likewise, judges who interpret the laws have a role not in vacuo, but have a role in the context of the society whose laws they are interpreting and applying. And therefore they must be knowledgeable of, and familiar with, these circumstances and society in which they are interpreting the laws.

Then Mr Cheng mentioned, and Mr Shanmugam raised the point, that there can be no harm in the judges having a limited power, which Mr Shanmugam described as "residual power", to see whether the act of the Executive and invocation of the ISA is reasonable or not. The word used by Mr Cheng is "relevance" and he said it is difficult to see how the court's responsibility over national security can be compromised if it is required to satisfy a court that its decisions arrived at after considering relevant evidence. Of course, the key question is "relevant". What is relevant? What is reasonable? And I go back to the central point in my speech, that if a court is to be entrusted with the power to decide that the Executive's decision is reasonable or based on relevant consideration, it must mean surely that it must have the power to review objectively all the circumstances leading to the exercise of the discretionary powers. And if you are giving this power to the court, it must mean that the court has the final say, and that is the crucial policy question for us to decide on matters of national security, who has the final say the courts or the Executive?

If I might demonstrate this point, Sir, and I might close my remarks by taking an actual example because part of the difficulty in this exercise is talking in abstract terms. But let me take an actual example, and that is, the arrest of the silat group in 1987. I think Members are all familiar with the facts. And Members consider how this could have been amenable to the judicial process. In 1987, ISD arrested and detained four silat group members for spreading rumours of, and making, preparations for impending racial clashes. Consider this. First, the Government could not prosecute them in court because the information that they were up to mischief came from sources which could not be revealed without putting them at risk and jeopardizing other ongoing investigations. Secondly, one of them was found with parangs. But he could not be charged with possession of offensive weapons because the parangs were not carried in a public place. They were kept in the house. That is not an offence. But we knew what was the purpose. Thirdly, the Government could not rely on the confessions of the four to secure conviction because these confessions were inadmissible under the strict rules of law. If we are to proceed in court against those odds, the prosecution would surely fail and the court would be duty bound to release them. The best evidence in such cases for successful prosecution is to catch them redhanded, in the act of committing a crime. But the question is: should the Government wait until they attack innocent people and foment racial strife?

I cite this example to show that the Executive must take pre-emptive action, based on security assessment by the professionals in the ISD. It is not a judicial decision, nor does it lend itself to judicial process. Equally so, it is well nigh impossible, (just as it is impossible to prosecute) equally it does not lend itself to objective evaluation by the courts. Because these are security decisions taken on security grounds, not legal grounds, by the Executive based on the security experts whose job it is to watch, monitor, security threats and make security assessments. I leave this example to Members to ponder about because in real life, when we talk of the ISA, we are dealing with security threats which manifest themselves in many forms and the Executive has to act quickly. It is not amenable to the judicial process.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, may I be allowed to clarify?

Mr Speaker: Very briefly, please.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, the Minister has given an example of the silat group. I would not question the decision made by him. But in regard to Mr Francis Seow's case, can the Minister tell us in what way he was a threat to the national security of Singapore?

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Speaker, Sir, it would appear that the Member has forgotten that in 1988 we had a full, unrestricted, debate lasting five days on the Hendrickson affair, the arrest of Mr Francis Seow and the re-arrest. And I do not intend to repeat what we have said.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, it has been said that the American bases in the Philippines are to protect us from the Communists. Why should they undermine our security?

Mr Speaker: Mr Chiam, I think you should not make any more clarifications.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh rose

Mr Speaker: Dr Lee, do you want to make a clarification?

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: I want to speak on the second Bill.

Mr Speaker: We are not on the second Bill yet.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Not yet. I will wait then.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr Peter Sung): Sir, could I ask Mr Chiam who told him that the American bases in the Philippines are to protect us from the Communists?

Mr Chiam See Tong rose

Mr Speaker: I think Mr Chiam is not clear. The Question is, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

A Division will be taken to ascertain that the Second Reading of the Bill is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament, which is 54 Members, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitution. Ring the Division Bells.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Division taken: Ayes, 80; No, 1; Abstention, Nil. Ayes Ayes (cont.) Abbas Abu Amin Ng Kah Ting Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin Ng Pock Too Abdullah Tarmugi Ong Chit Chung Ahmad Mattar Ong Teng Cheong Beng Kian Lam, Arthur Othman bin Haron Eusofe Chandra Das, S. Ow Chin Hock Chay Wai Chuen Peh Chin Hua Chen, Bernard Seet Ai Mee Chen Seow Phun, John Shanmugam, K. Chew Heng Ching Sia Khoon Seong Chin Harn Tong Sidek bin Saniff Chng Hee Kok Sung, Peter Ch'ng Jit Koon Tan Cheng Bock Chong, Charles Tan, Dixie Choo Wee Khiang Tan, Augustine H.H. Chua Sian Chin Tan Keng Yam, Tony Davinder Singh Tan Soo Khoon Dhanabalan, S. Tan Tee Yong, Philip Goh Chee Wee Tang Guan Seng Goh Chok Tong Tay Eng Soon Goh Choon Kang Teo Chong Tee Heng Chiang Meng Vasoo, S. Ho Kah Leong Wan Hussin bin Haji Zoohri Ho Tat Kin Wan Soon Bee Hong Hai Wang Kai Yuen Hu Tsu Tau, Richard Wong, Aline K. Ibrahim Othman Wong Kan Seng Jayakumar, S. Wong Kwei Cheong Koh Lam Son Yap Giau Cheng, Eugene Koh Lip Lin Yatiman Yusof Lau Ping Sum Yeo Cheow Tong Lau Teik Soon Yeo Ning Hong Lee Boon Yang Yeo Toon Chia Lee Hsien Loong Yeo Yong-Boon, George Lee Kuan Yew Yu-Foo Yee Shoon Lee Yiok Seng Zulkifli bin Mohammed Lee Yock Suan Leong Horn Kee No Lew Syn Pau Lim Boon Heng Chiam See Tong Lim Chee Onn Loh Meng See Abstention Low Seow Chay Mah Bow Tan Nil

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill.- [Prof. S. Jayakumar.]

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment.

Third Reading

Mr Speaker: Third Reading on what day?

Prof. Jayakumar: Now, Sir. I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."

Mr Speaker: The procedure at the Second Reading will again be adopted here. Ring the Division bells.

Division taken: Ayes, 80; No, 1; Abstention, Nil. Ayes Ayes (cont.) Abbas Abu Amin Ng Kah Ting Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin Ng Pock Too Abdullah Tarmugi Ong Chit Chung Ahmad Mattar Ong Teng Cheong Beng Kian Lam, Arthur Othman bin Haron Eusofe Chandra Das, S. Ow Chin Hock Chay Wai Chuen Peh Chin Hua Chen, Bernard Seet Ai Mee Chen Seow Phun, John Shanmugam, K. Chew Heng Ching Sia Khoon Seong Chin Harn Tong Sidek bin Saniff Chng Hee Kok Sung, Peter Ch'ng Jit Koon Tan Cheng Bock Chong, Charles Tan, Dixie Choo Wee Khiang Tan, Augustine H.H. Chua Sian Chin Tan Keng Yam, Tony Davinder Singh Tan Soo Khoon Dhanabalan, S. Tan Tee Yong, Philip Goh Chee Wee Tang Guan Seng Goh Chok Tong Tay Eng Soon Goh Choon Kang Teo Chong Tee Heng Chiang Meng Vasoo, S. Ho Kah Leong Wan Hussin bin Haji Zoohri Ho Tat Kin Wan Soon Bee Hong Hai Wang Kai Yuen Hu Tsu Tau, Richard Wong, Aline K. Ibrahim Othman Wong Kan Seng Jayakumar, S. Wong Kwei Cheong Koh Lam Son Yap Giau Cheng, Eugene Koh Lip Lin Yatiman Yusof Lau Ping Sum Yeo Cheow Tong Lau Teik Soon Yeo Ning Hong Lee Boon Yang Yeo Toon Chia Lee Hsien Loong Yeo, George Yong-Boon Lee Kuan Yew Yu-Foo Yee Shoon Lee Yiok Seng Zulkifli bin Mohammed Lee Yock Suan Leong Horn Kee No Lew Syn Pau Lim Boon Heng Chiam See Tong Lim Chee Onn Loh Meng See Abstention Low Seow Chay Mah Bow Tan Nil

Mr Speaker: The Third Reading of the Bill has been carried by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament.

Bill accordingly read a Third time and passed.

4.40 pm