LEGAL PROFESSION (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read. 12.48 pm

The Minister for Law (Prof. S. Jayakumar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, this Bill seeks to amend the Legal Profession Act to make changes to the composition of the Board of Legal Education consequent to the establishment of the Academy of Law, and also to make several procedural changes to the method of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for professional misconduct and also to make provision for the appointment of senior counsel.

Before I come to those amendments, let me first deal with two amendments which have aroused some publicity and which have also been the subject of comment by the Law Society of Singapore. These are clause 13 and clause 9 of the Bill. Clause 13 will abolish appeals to the Privy Council in disciplinary cases, and clause 9 will make the underlying criminal convictions on which disciplinary proceedings may be based to be final and conclusive.

Let me first deal with clause 13 which seeks to abolish appeals to the Privy Council in cases concerning disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. Sir, there are good reasons for this amendment. First of all, all lawyers are officers of our Supreme Court. This is specifically provided for in the Act. Section 79 of the Legal Profession Act says:

'Any person duly admitted as an Advocate and Solicitor shall be an officer of the Supreme Court.'

Section 80 says:

'All Advocates and Solicitors shall be subject to the control of the Supreme Court ...' So they are officers of the Court. Which court? Not of any foreign court but of our Supreme Court. It follows then that it must be Singapore judges who should decide who amongst the lawyers are fit or unfit to practise on grounds of professional misconduct, moral turpitude or criminal convictions which imply a defect of character and so on. But if as a result of being overruled by the Law Lords in the Privy Council, the Singapore judges cannot remove from practice lawyers who are unfit, then the courts in Singapore and the judges in Singapore will not be able to maintain discipline at the Bar. And they will not be able to exercise the control which the Act says that they must exercise over lawyers. The final decision on who can practise as a lawyer or who can be removed from practice must therefore be vested in the judges in Singapore. I may add that British Law Lords are not familiar with the nature of our legal profession in Singapore which unlike the United Kingdom is a fused profession. In other words, our lawyers in Singapore are both advocates and solicitors, whereas in the United Kingdom lawyers are either barristers or solicitors. Moreover, the Law Lords would lack local perspective when dealing with disciplinary cases which are essentially of a domestic or Singaporean character.

Secondly, who is it who admit lawyers to practise in Singapore? It is not any foreign court. It is the Singapore Supreme Court which admits persons as advocates and solicitors in Singapore. It is not the Privy Council. It is therefore illogical that our judges who have the final say on who should be admitted should not have the final say on who should be disciplined or struck off the rolls.

Thirdly, some words about the origins of the present provisions. I was interested to know when did we provide for appeals to the Privy Council. Was it just before Separation, after Separation, or what? Members will be interested to know that the existing provision on appeals to the Privy Council was inserted in the old Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance more than half a century ago, in 1935. At that time, most if not all the lawyers in Singapore were Britishers. The Colonial Government gave them this right of appeal which in the United Kingdom they themselves did not have. In fact, in Britain, their home base, a barrister would be disciplined and disbarred by his Inns of Court. And a solicitor would be disciplined and struck off the rolls of solicitors by a disciplinary tribunal established under the Solicitors Act.

Perhaps one can say that appeals to the Privy Council in those early days might have been justified on the argument that in those days, lawyers who practised in Singapore could do so only on the basis of training and qualifications in the United Kingdom, either as a barrister or solicitor. But this is no longer the case. With the establishment of the Law Faculty in the National University of Singapore, only a small handful of lawyers are now trained in Britain. For example, out of a total of 1,558 lawyers admitted to the Bar from 1978 to 1988, 1,123 or 72% are Singapore trained and only about 22% are United Kingdom trained. Last year, for example, of the 207 persons who were admitted as Advocates and Solicitors, the overwhelming majority, 158 or 77% were locally trained compared to 38 who were trained in the United Kingdom.

So the picture has changed. We are no longer a colonial situation where the majority of lawyers are United Kingdom trained or Britishers or expatriates. It has changed significantly. So we must develop our own admission standards and maintain our own high professional standards. So it must be the Singapore judges, not the British Law Lords in the United Kingdom, who must decide who is fit and not fit to practise.

Let me also add that those who are trained in the United Kingdom are not taught Singapore laws and therefore they are not conversant with Singapore laws. This might not have been of great consequence at the time when Singapore laws and United Kingdom laws were not very different. But as I have mentioned at the previous sitting, the United Kingdom law and the trends in judicial interpretation are taking divergent paths from our laws, as well as social and other policy considerations underpinning those laws are very different from those in the United Kingdom. Because of this, we may have to review the existing system because it is a matter of time before we have to require those trained in the United Kingdom, perhaps, to take and pass qualifying examinations in Singapore law before admission to practise.

Sir, may I also say for Members' information, what is the position in the United Kingdom? There, serious complaints against barristers are handled by a disciplinary tribunal chaired by a judge with four other members including one lay member. This tribunal has the power to suspend or disbar barristers and appeals from that tribunal lie to at least three judges who are called Visitors of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice after consulting the Lord Chancellor. There is no further appeal. I mention this because nearly all United Kingdom trained Singapore lawyers are barristers. 458 are barristers, only 15 solicitors. Most of them are barristers as it takes a much longer time really for a person with a university law degree to be admitted as a solicitor as he will have to undergo a 3-year course leading to a rigorous solicitor's final examinations followed by two years of articleship. So the majority of those who are trained in the United Kingdom are barristers. And for barristers in England, I have told members what the procedure is.

What is it that this amendment seeks to do? Under the existing provisions of the Legal Profession Act, section 95(6), it is provided that from the court of three judges there shall be no appeal except to the Privy Council. We are now deleting this wording which allows appeals to the Privy Council.

Sir, let me at this stage also deal with a point which has been raised in the press by some lawyers, namely, that this amendment on removing appeals to the Privy Council is unfair because it singles out only the legal profession and that other professions such as doctors and accountants are not affected. Is this true? It is not. I have circulated for the information of Members extracts (Cols. 801 - 808) from the legislation relating to other professions: Accountants, Architects, Doctors, Dentists, Professional Engineers, Pharmacists, Land Surveyors. Members may wish to peruse these extracts. They will note that the law on disciplinary procedure for each of these professions is that, from the disciplinary body of a profession, an appeal lies to the High Court (which means a single judge) and it is expressly provided for each of the professions that the decision of that judge in the High Court is final. In other words, there is not even an appeal to the Court of Appeal, let alone the Privy Council. extracts - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS: OTHER PROFESSIONS (Cols. 801 - 808)

Are the lawyers, therefore, as a result of this amendment, worse off than the other professions? On the contrary, Sir, even with these amendments, it can be said that the lawyers compared to the other professions are in a privileged position.

Let me explain why. First, the judiciary is involved as an integral part of the disciplinary process. No other profession has this feature. Second, for the lawyers there are several tiers: Inquiry Committee, decision by the Council of the Law Society on the Inquiry Committee Report, Disciplinary Committee, then a Court of 3 judges. Thirdly, even in the initial stages where the Inquiry Committee recommends a formal investigation by the Disciplinary Committee and the Council agrees, the Council must apply to the Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Committee. No other profession involves the head of our judiciary in this way. That is not changed. Then what happens after the Disciplinary Committee has heard the case? It reports to the Council but it must also report to the Chief Justice. And where the Council determines that there is cause for disciplinary action, it must apply to the court for the lawyer to be struck off, suspended or censured, and the matter is then heard, not by a single judge but by a Court of 3 judges.

Therefore, I would say it is incorrect to claim that lawyers, as a result of this amendment, are worse off or are in a more inferior position compared to the other professions as their cases will still be heard by a Court of 3 judges.

May I now turn to the other amendments on finality of convictions in disciplinary proceedings. Members will recall that when I answered Dr Lee Siew-Choh's Oral Question on Mr Jeyaretnam's case pardon, I pointed out that the Privy Council's judgment in that case in effect converted what was an appeal on disbarment into an unauthorized appeal on the criminal convictions. This, in fact, has opened a loophole for lawyers who have been convicted of criminal proceedings in the courts and then face disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Law Society. They can now try to re-litigate their convictions during the disciplinary proceedings in the Inquiry Committee, in the Disciplinary Committee or the Court of 3 judges, either by using the proceedings themselves as a further court of appeal or by obtaining an unauthorized criminal appeal to the Privy Council, as Mr Jeyaretnam did. As a result of that judgment, it means that the Law Society, the Inquiry Committee, the Disciplinary Committee and the Court of 3 judges will no longer be able to accept the criminal conviction as a given fact. Instead it will have to entertain arguments and to determine whether the courts had convicted him properly before taking disciplinary action. In effect, the Law Society and all those involved in the disciplinary process will have to sit in judgment over the courts which convict him.

When the matter goes to the Court of 3 judges, they will in effect be sitting as a further appellate tribunal to review the merits of the underlying criminal convictions. Sir, these are absurd and totally unacceptable consequences which were never intended by the Legal Profession Act. So clause 9 of this Amendment Bill provides that disciplinary proceedings instituted against an advocate and solicitor in consequence of his conviction for a criminal offence, a Disciplinary Committee must accept that conviction as final and conclusive. This will prevent any attempt to turn the disciplinary proceedings into an appeal against a criminal conviction. The amendment, in other words, makes it clear that the convictions, ie, the conviction on which the disciplinary proceedings are based, will be final and conclusive. Sir, it must be so, otherwise we will be confusing the judicial or appellate process with the disciplinary process and the two must be kept distinct and separate.

Let me now, Sir, go on to the other amendments. The Academy of Law was established last year to bring the legal fraternity together. The Academy brings under one organization practising lawyers, judges, legal service officers, law lecturers, students and even non-practising lawyers. One of the functions of the Academy is the provision of training for lawyers who intend to practise, especially young lawyers and students. The Board of Legal Education already comprises representatives of the three branches of the profession. The purpose of the amendment is to make it clear that the Senate of the Academy will be in overall charge, the direct supervision of legal education of young lawyers will remain with the Board of Legal Education but the amendment makes it clear that the Senate of the Academy may give directions to the Board in the exercise of its functions. In other words, this will give the Academy the overall charge of matters pertaining to the provision of legal education. It also seeks to change the composition of the Board of Legal Education which will empower the Senate of the Academy to appoint members of the Board.

Sir, in 1986 the Legal Profession Act was amended for legal officers and lay persons to also serve on the Inquiry Committees and Disciplinary Committees in dealing with complaints against lawyers on professional misconduct. These disciplinary bodies, as reconstituted in 1986, have been functioning satisfactorily and the amendments are based on the experience of the last two years and are intended to make changes for the better administration. These are really procedural matters concerning disciplinary proceedings and to expedite the work of these bodies. They provide for a larger number of advocates and solicitors and lay members to serve on the panels of Inquiry Committees in order to lighten the workload. The amendments will also improve the manner in which these committees will carry on the work and to carry out the work effectively. It really streamlines the procedures of these committees. For example, an Inquiry Committee will now be able to meet when they wish and also to dispense with the formal meeting where circumstances so warrant.

Finally, Sir, another significant change introduced by this Amendment Bill is the introduction of provisions to give the Senate of the Academy of Law the power to appoint leading lawyers in private practice and in the Legal Service as Senior Counsel, ie, Senior Counsel of the legal profession. Only those lawyers who by virtue of their ability, standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience of the law who deserve the distinction and the title of senior counsel will be appointed. Our Senior Counsel will, in effect, be the local equivalent of Queen's Counsel in England and it is hoped that these leaders at the Bar will provide the inspiration for the younger members of the profession to strive for excellence in their profession.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Dr Arthur Beng Kian Lam (Fengshan): Mr Speaker, Sir, having discussed the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill with several lawyers over the last few weeks, I have found the reaction of the profession to be very diverse. I will attempt to summarize some of the feelings. I will first deal with the issue of Disciplinary Procedures.

One view expresses deep concern that there is no longer the right to appeal after conviction by the Court of 3 judges. This feeling is not so much against the fact that the Privy Council is removed as the final Court of Appeal, but the fact that there is no longer a Court of Appeal beyond the decision of the 3-judge Court. Those holding this view accept that it is correct that our local judges, being the persons who admit the young lawyers or the young graduates to the Bar, be the ones to judge whether a lawyer is fit or not fit to continue service at the Bar. They reason, however, that both the Inquiry Committee and the Disciplinary Committee have mainly an investigative function. Their role is to investigate into the facts of the case. In the case of the Inquiry Committee, it makes its report to the Council of the Law Society. In the case of the Disciplinary Committee it only records its findings in relation to the facts of each case and, according to those facts, shall then determine:

(a) that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 80;

(b) that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under that section, the advocate and solicitor should be reprimanded; or

(c) that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under that section.

Should the case proceed further, then the case is heard by a Court of 3 judges, one of whom is the Chief Justice. This trial is regarded by this group as being the court of first instance. Those holding this view feel that after this first trial there should be recourse to an appeal. They suggest, that after the investigation in the finding stage, ie, the Inquiry Committee stage and Disciplinary Committee stage, then the next stop should be the High Court with one judge. This now becomes the court of first instance; and is then followed by an appeal to a Court of Appeal comprising three judges whose decision will be final and conclusive.

In summary, Mr Speaker, Sir, the argument by those holding this point of view is that they are satisfied if there is provision for a court of appeal and that the court of appeal need not necessarily be the Privy Council. Perhaps the Minister may wish to comment on this suggestion. My colleague, Mr Davinder Singh, will deal further with clause 9 regarding the question of finality of rulings.

A second view expressed is that lawyers should be viewed differently from that of other professions. Why? They put their case in this way. If an accountant, doctor or architect has a problem, he is represented by a lawyer, someone outside his own professional circle. For example, if the professional happens to be a doctor, the case is represented by his legal counsel to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee of the Medical Council (consisting of three members of the Medical Council, all doctors). If necessary, the doctor is represented again by his lawyer, either at an inquiry held by the Medical Council or as an appeal to the High Court (against a decision by the Medical Council).

The reasoning, if I may summarize it, runs this way. Who is the professional facing the problem? A doctor. Who represents him? Someone outside his profession, a lawyer. The case is then presented to two groups of lawyers - the Preliminary Proceedings Committee and the Inquiry Committee of the Medical Council. But the final appeal is heard in a High Court before a judge, who is a lawyer.

In the case, however, of the lawyer, if he faces a problem, he is throughout the disciplinary proceedings dealing with lawyers, whether as his counsel or the Law Society. This, Mr Speaker, Sir, is the origin of the feelings of insecurity from which arises the feeling that a Court of Appeal is necessary. At the inquiry committee and disciplinary committee stage of course, one member of the Inquiry Panel is a layman.

Sir, a third view is that there are sufficient checks and balances in this present Amendment Bill. Those holding this view feel that the onus is on the lawyer as a professional to maintain high standards so that there is no need for his professional conduct to be subject to scrutiny. To them, the best safeguard is to maintain high ethical standards of professional conduct and competence. Sir, our GPC supports this view, and also takes notes of the views expressed earlier.

Sir, I am sure that there are many more views that prevail, apart from the three that I have presented. Which is the view that has the majority support? I will not hazard a guess, as there is always a "silent majority" to contend with. I am sure that each of the views that I have presented will have its supporters and critics.

Sir, I believe that a delegation from the Law Society met with the First Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Law. Will the Minister enlighten this House as to the issues discussed?

Sir, I next refer to the Board of Legal Education. Sir, under clause 4 of this Bill, it is stated that the Board shall consist of the Attorney-General, the Dean of the Faculty, and eight other members nominated by the Senate of the Academy of Law. Let us compare this to what the Act is, as it now stands. It consists now of the Attorney-General, a judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the Chief Justice, two advocates and solicitors nominated by the Minister, three advocates and solicitors nominated by the Law Society, the Dean of the Faculty of Law, and two members of the Faculty nominated by the Faculty.

Sir, the view expressed to me by some lawyers is that this amendment gives no recognition to the contribution of the Law Society towards Legal Education. The Law Society contributes about $150,000 annually towards Legal Education for the "Practice of Law Course" which all new graduates must pass before being called to the Bar. This indeed is a credit to the Law Society. I do not believe that there are many other professional bodies who invest this much money directly as a professional body towards professional education. The GPC is glad that the Minister has taken into account this sentiment and has moved for an amendment so as to allow five advocates and solicitors to sit on the Board of Legal Education. These five advocates and solicitors will be nominated by the Senate of the Academy after consultation with the Council of the Law Society.

Sir, there is still the view of the Faculty of Law of the National University which has to be taken into account. In this amendment, the representation from the Faculty is reduced to one from three, that is, only the Dean of the Faculty. Perhaps the Minister would also like to consider this sensitivity as the Faculty staff, I understand, are also key players in the Practice of Law Course.

Sir, the GPC for Home Affairs and Law in supporting this Bill takes two points into serious consideration. Firstly, it is the duty of Government to ensure that the judiciary and lawyers, who are the officers of the court, continue to remain independent, and that all officers of the court are men of integrity and competence. Secondly, it is the duty of the Government to ensure that all professional bodies, including that of the legal profession, continue to maintain high standards of integrity and competence to protect the public who depend on the professional for advice.

Sir, I am told that the legal profession feels uncomfortable with what it perceives as Government interference in the legal profession. Changes are always uncomfortable. However, change is a fact of life - we are in a dynamic state of transition, and to cling on to traditions or practices no longer relevant serves no purpose. Just as we adjust and adapt as a society to economic progress, so professionals also have to keep up with change and to change whenever necessary.

Sir, in the United Kingdom, three papers have been presented by the Lord Chancellor's Department entitled: (1) The Work and Organisation of the Legal Profession; (2) Conveyancing by Authorised Practitioners; and (3) Contingency Fees. It is interesting to note that these three Green papers were presented to the Parliament in UK only in January 1989.

Sir, the changes that are proposed in the Green papers have been described by the Times of London on 26 January 1989, and I quote, "as the most sweeping changes this century in the legal profession". The Green papers are now the subject of discussion and controversy. Sir, with your permission, I would like to quote one small section which is relevant to the subjects under discussion today. On the issue of "Maintenance of Professional Standards (on page 13 of the Green paper, paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3) it has this to say:

'4.1 The Government believes that it should be the duty of any professional body to ensure that the standards of competence and professional conduct among persons who practise in that profession are sufficient to secure adequate protection for clients, and that the services provided by such persons are provided both economically and efficiently.'

'4.2 This means that such a professional body must ensure that:

(a) professional services are offered efficiently and with the required degree of professional expertise;

(b) any complaints about services are investigated promptly, thoroughly and impartially;

(c) matters are put right as quickly as possible with, where necessary, appropriate recompense;

(d) where a professional man or woman fails to meet the required standards, appropriate action is taken; and

(e) where the failure amounts to professional misconduct, appropriate sanctions are imposed, if necessary amounting to expulsion from the profession.

'4.3 The Government believes that those who provide the public with legal services must do so in a competent and professional manner. It should therefore be one of the functions of the legal professional bodies to ensure this happens.'

Sir, this Green paper reminds us again of the duty of Government and professionals, and not only lawyers, but of all professionals.

Sir, the GPC supports the motion.

Mr Loh Meng See (Kampong Glam): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the motion by the Minister for Law.

I have seen the resolution announced to the public by the Law Society. I do not think the Bill will affect the livelihood and reputation of the lawyers. On the contrary, this motion will raise the professional status and the reputation of the lawyers. Our lawyers are a group of professionals who have very high professional standard and integrity of character. As such, they do not need to be restrained by strict disciplinary regulations. They also need not worry about any miscarriage of justice against them. I feel that they are very capable of defending themselves. Moreover, unlike the other professionals such as doctors, engineers, accountants, the disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are before a court of three judges. Therefore, a three-judge decision should be final and there should not be further appeal. Other professionals do not have any tribunal other than the High Court for them to appeal to. All Singapore lawyers are the officers of the Supreme Court here. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable that our Justices should have this legal jurisdiction over the professional conduct of the lawyers. Moreover, the lawyers are admitted to practice by the judges in the first place. All our people hope that our lawyers will lead the way in this move of doing away with appeals to the Privy Council. They should not use the arguement that the Privy Council can exercise supervisory function over our judiciary as reason for retaining the appeal.

I feel that now is the time for ourselves to be in charge of our own judicial matters, and the pursuit of excellence in the field of law should start from now.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill is a Bill of concern not only to the legal profession. The changes proposed involve principles, important principles, which affect not only lawyers but also all the people of Singapore. What I have in mind, Sir, are some of the basic principles and values that underscore the proposed amendment.

The Government has made great play about core values as the basis for our National Ideology. Our Prime Minister has stressed that Ministers and MPs must be men and women of integrity and be honest. And our 1 DPM and other Minis- ters have often stressed other universal core values, including social justice. We agree with what the Prime Minister and all the Ministers have said. And since all these values are to be taught in schools and will form part of our future lifestyles, we must ask: Is Honesty one of those core values? Is the pursuit of truth one of those core values? Is the pursuit of justice one of those core values? The Government on previous occasions had never given an answer. I suppose the Government should give an answer because the answers given will in many ways tell us how they will react to criticisms concerning the Bill.

The Minister has given some reasons as regards why they have brought in the Bill, speaking of Singapore courts having control of our lawyers, of our Singapore judges having the final say on the admission of lawyers and of Singapore standards. With respect, Sir, they do not sound very convincing to me. For a start, I suggest that the Government should be honest with itself and with the people and truly explain why this amendment is being introduced.

Many people outside the House (as already lightly touched on by the Minister) see this amendment as a knee-jerk reaction of Government to the recent judgment of the Privy Council on the appeal of J.B. Jeyaretnam. Is that correct? Would the Government inform the people if that is the real reason why it has brought in the amendment? If that is not correct, then the Government should explain convincingly what its real reasons are and that they have nothing to do with the reaction to the judgment of the Privy Council.

In connection with this, Sir, let me touch on some recent events connected with the issue. We have witnessed the Attorney-General publicly pronouncing that the Privy Council is wrong in its conclusions. This sounds rather odd to me, as I have been taught that in a democratic society, the prosecutor must be separate from the judge. Now it would appear that the AG acts first as a prosecutor and then again as the judge on the Privy Council judgment which, in fact, is the final outcome of a sequence of events initially started from prosecutions in the courts of Singapore. This anomalous spectacle has been clearly brought out in the letter in the Straits Times on the 2nd February 1989. And I myself have sent in a Question for oral answer which you have disallowed. I asked whether the President should be advised to appoint a special committee of persons of personal integrity to inquire into and make recommendations as to whether the stand taken by the AG on the Privy Council judgment is morally correct. I feel that the controversy which has arisen should be settled, one way or the other. But unfortunately in this instance, the Government has chosen to simply accept its own officers' statement as true and correct. Unfortunately, Sir, because this has not helped to settle the controversy but, on the contrary, has only helped to fuel the controversy even more.

The nub of the whole question is this. Is the Government interested in the pursuit of truth and justice? If it is, should it not consider other people's views in addition to its own? As very pointedly stated in the letter in the Straits Times on 2nd February 1989, and I quote:

'the Executive should have seen that the weight of opinion of a five-man final appellate court far outweighs the opinion of one man. It is important that justice must be seen to be done.' Yes, justice must be seen to be done. But justice has not been done nor has justice been seen to be done. The AG says the Privy Council is not infallible. Few people would disagree on that if it was taken as an abstract statement. But by the same token, the Government should realize that the public prosecutor, or anyone for that matter, is also not infallible. Therefore, there is a real mix-up of rights and wrongs, and the whole thing would be laughable if it was not so tragic for the people involved. And the Government should have got all its eyes and ears reporting to it as to what is really happening. Public sentiment is not unknown to the Government. The Minister says that the Privy Council has converted the inquiry of a disciplinary appeal into an inquiry of criminal appeal. Although I am not a lawyer, anyone should be able to tell the Minister that the issues involved all form parts of the appeal. How was Jeyaretnam disqualified in the first place? He was disqualified as a result of certain prosecutions which led to his criminal conviction, and that is why everything has to be taken together. You just cannot separate one part from another, and take only one part in isolation.

At a press conference only a few days ago - not reported in the Straits Times though - J.B. Jeyaretnam has suggested that the Public Prosecutor refer questions to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which the Minister has mentioned, so that the court can say whether the conviction of Jeyaretnam was right or wrong, looking at these convictions themselves in the light of the Privy Council judgment. That I agree, would be one good way to resolve the controversy. Will the Government accept the suggestion to put the case before the Court of Criminal Appeal? He can easily do that if he wants to. The law is there. And, of course, Sir, you may ask: has any of all this to do with the Bill? Yes, it has. If the court says that the Privy Council judgment is wrong, then there is at least some justification for doing away with appeals to the Privy Council. But if the Court of Criminal Appeal agrees with the judgment of the Privy Council and if the Government persists in going ahead with the amendment, then it is in fact saying that the Government and Public Prosecutor are not interested in upholding justice. And because the Privy Council tries to uphold justice in this particular case, so the Government has now decided to abolish appeals of lawyers to the Privy Council.

It could be said, Sir, that the Government is reacting with childish pique to serious matters of principle. Is that what the Government wants to tell the world? From the reasons given by the Minister, the Government has contended that the Privy Council is interfering in local politics. This is not really true. But this contention,even if true, cannot apply to a lawyer appealing against his being struck off the rolls, unless of course the Government admits that the lawyer is struck off because of political reasons. And it is not desirable that the Privy Council should interfere in political affairs. Is that the Government's position? Or is the Government admitting that by this Bill Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off the rolls for political reasons?

The Straits Times on the 13th of this month reported that lawyers in the Carib- bean islands were seeking to abolish the right of appeal to the Privy Council, but for entirely different reasons. They feel that the Privy Council is very reluctant to overturn decisions of the local courts and "an increasing number face the death penalty without due process of the law". Thus, while the lawyers in the Caribbean islands are complaining that the Privy Council will not interfere with the local courts, our Government here says that the Privy Council only interferes too readily. Which is the truth? The truth is that in Singapore the Privy Council does not interfere unless there is gross injustice following erroneous application of the law as in J.B. Jeyaretnam's case.

The Minister has said that the Privy Council "was a litmus test of judicial independence". And the Prime Minister has said that the judgments of judges in Singapore would go up to the Privy Council, thus providing for independence of the judges because they know that their judgments would be examined. And now the Bill seeks to deny appeal to the Privy Council for lawyers. Why? So the key issue again crops up. Is the Government interested in upholding justice?

The Minister has accepted the advice of the Attorney-General and on one occasion, he quoted the Attorney-General as saying the following:

'The Legal Profession Act was never intended to allow the Council to reconsider such convictions. If what the Council did became a precedent, it would mean that all disciplinary committees dealing with convicted lawyers would have to examine the correctness of the convictions before reaching their decision. This would then place an intolerable burden upon them.'

Sir, I have been told that that is not the true position. After all, reviewing of cases is done only in very exceptional circumstances. For example, in J.B. Jeyaretnam's case he was denied the chance to appeal because of certain court procedures. Moreover, how often do lawyers get convicted? Very very rarely, Sir. There are very few J.B. Jeyaretnams. Only one. So there is no real intolerable burden being placed on the disciplinary committees.

This denial of the courts to review a conviction, as already mentioned by speakers before me, could be most damaging and ruinous to the convicted lawyer. It leaves him completely helpless. But more - I speak for lawyers because I feel it although I am only a doctor - it is a grave violation of the principles of justice, as has also been stressed by the Law Society in its resolution.

The Minister a little while ago referred to other professions and how they deal with their members who have been convicted in a Magistrate's court. And speakers have spoken of disciplinary procedures concerning medical doctors. I do not need to go into that again. But what I want to stress is that all convictions in a magistrate's court in all the professions have not been accepted as final and conclusive, as has been stressed in the Bill. It all depends on the concrete situation and there is always a review. First, an inquiry committee reviews the case. When the committee finds that there is a prima facie case against the convicted doctor or engineer, he is then presented before the Singapore Medical Council or Professional Board. He is allowed representation by counsel and witnesses may be called as already stressed by Dr Beng. In th case of a doctor, it is only after due inquiry and after the council finds him guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect that he is penalized professionally. Therefore, it is entirely different from what the Minister has been saying. There is a recourse to a review and an appeal even to the High Court which could be final.

So we must be very clear in our minds as to what we are arguing on. Their cases are reviewed. What I am trying to stress, Sir, as Dr Beng has also said, is why should the lawyers be dealt with differently? Clause 9 seeks to establish the lawyer's conviction in the lower court as final and conclusive. This means that one conviction in any of our courts is enough to seal a lawyer's fate so far as his professional status is concerned. It can be said that he is automatically disbarred from practising as a lawyer by just one conviction in court. Is that fair and just? Is that how the Government hopes to deal with Mr Francis Seow? Is the Government fearful that if given an opportunity to appeal to the higher court and to the Privy Council, that Francis Seow might do another JBJ? A Law Society resolution reads:

'The proposed withdrawal of the power of the courts to review a conviction when appropriate is a serious infringement of the principles of justice.'

And so it is - a serious infringement of the principle of justice. The Minister has reminded us that lawyers are supposed to be officers of the court. They are also supposed to be fearless, I have been told. I do not know how fearless they could be in the defence of their clients. But because in so doing they often have to challenge the Government on points of law, they could run the risk of being victimized by the State in some way. They therefore need more protection than members of other professions and that protection is the opportunity for their conviction to be re-opened, up to the Privy Council if necessary. A good example again is J.B. Jeyaretnam.

Sir, the whole issue before the House is not what the Minister has tried to tell us, but the issue of justice. Justice for the people of Singapore. They have recently passed a law to deny justice to the people who have been arbitrarily arrested and detained without trial. Now we have this Bill seeking to deny justice to lawyers. The Privy Council judgment has shown that grievous injustice has been done. And that injustice has yet to be put right.

Sir, I have struggled against injustice all my political life, more than 30 years, a longer period than that of our friends have been here, and I will continue to do so, so long as I have life, whether in or outside Parliament. I urge the Government leaders - desist from the wayward path. Uphold justice. Set an example to our people and maybe that will be more educational than all the grandiloquence of Ministers about core values.

Dr Wang Kai Yuen (Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, when I was preparing for the debate on this Bill, I asked myself what would the concern of a rational, logical and an informed Singaporean be regarding this Amendment Bill. The questions I come up with are those of a lay person and they centre around clause 13 of this Bill, ie, the abolition of the provision for appeal to the Privy Council for debarred lawyers. I will put this question to the Minister seeking his clarification.

As the Minister has pointed out in his speech, the legal profession was given special considerations as being the only profession to have the final appeal to the Privy Council. The Minister has also touched on the origin of section 95 of the principal Bill which is the provision of this appeal, but the arguments he has gone through for and against this appeal are not new ones. When the principal Bill was drafted and subsequently passed in Parliament in 1966, fine legal minds must have gone through the arguments for and against and come up in support of that provision. The principal Bill was amended nine times, the last of which was in 1986. We were also told by the Minister during the debate on ISA (Amendment) Bill at the last sitting of the House that the question of appeal to the Privy Council had been considered in the Cabinet for several years. As such, can we assume that the Minister and the drafters of the 1986 amendment would have also considered the question of this access to the Privy Council and again came to the conclusion that it would be better to retain that provision? As such, it would seem to me that there are good reasons to give lawyers this special privilege, some of which may still be valid today. I am not sure the Minister has touched on every one of them.

One of the Minister's arguments against retaining this provision is that it would have placed an unbearable burden on the Disciplinary Committee in taking action against lawyers convicted of offences by our courts. Let us assume for one moment that the rationale to retain the legal recourse to Privy Council is still valid. My question will be: is there any other alternative that the Minister can advocate that will reduce this burden whilst still retaining the appeal to Privy Council. For instance, can a case be heard by the Privy Council first before disciplinary action is taken? Alternatively, disciplinary action taken by the committee can be considered as a purely consequential action taken by the committee by removing the discretion from the Disciplinary Committee. Perhaps we can change the legal provisions such that the Disciplinary Committee cannot be sued for damages as a result of any consequential action taken by it. Other alternatives have also been proposed by the hon. Member for Fengshan. I surmise the Minister with his wisdom has indeed considered all these alternatives and found them wanting. Perhaps he can enlighten us with his reasons.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the next concern I am raising deals with the linkage of our legal system with the Privy Council in general. Under the current arrangement, our legal system has operated very well and our judges are well respected. The question is, is our legal system ready for this dissociation of this link? Would that be an improvement of the current situation particularly in view of the fact that many of our senior judges are past or approaching retirement age? For instance, the Government has retained the service of the Chief Justice beyond his retirement age, the reason being that it has been difficult to find a replacement. The Government in the past has also stated on many occasions that it is hard to attract the best legal minds into the Legal Service, the latest speech by the Minister for Finance in Parliament being one. This gives the impression that as one looks down the pipeline for younger judges to take over from the current ones there are gaps. My concern would be what action would the Government be taking to ensure that the integrity and the high esteem our courts have enjoyed so far would be maintained in future? In fact, in view of the abolition of the right to appeal to the Privy Council in this Bill and in view of the fact that the Government has already given notices that in due course our link with the Privy Council would be severed completely in future, the need to attract the best legal minds into the Legal Service would become all the more urgent. I urge the Government to take concrete steps in this matter. In ensuring the high standards of our courts, Mr Speaker, Sir, money should be the consideration of the lowest priority.

Mr K. Shanmugam (Sembawang GRC): Sir, before I start speaking on the proposed amendments, I would like to make an observation on a comment made by Dr Lee Siew-Choh. He said, if I had heard him correctly, that Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off for political reasons. Sir, Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off the rolls by the courts of Singapore based on his previous conviction. His appeal to the Privy Council succeeded and he was reinstated as a lawyer.

Sir, it is unfair to our judges to impute political motives for the decisions they make. It sickens me to hear such statements. It is scandalous, wholly unsupported --

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Let me make a clarification, Sir?

Mr Speaker: Do you wish to give way?

Mr Shanmugam: No, Sir.

Mr Speaker: He is not giving way.

Mr Shanmugam: -- scandalous, wholly unsupported allegation and does great disservice to the institutions of democracy. The judiciary is an important pillar of our democracy. It should be seen to be independent and it should not be attacked under the cloak of parliamentary privilege unless such allegations are supported by the strongest possible evidence.

Dr Lee and I have exchanged words on this subject before but he does not seem willing to cease making allegations against the courts. I trust that he will do the honourable thing and withdraw his allegations against the courts. It is one thing to accuse the Government of bad faith. The Ministers are here to defend themselves. It is another to accuse the courts. The judges are not here to defend themselves and in any event they cannot make any public statements to clear their name. And further, the very making of the statement itself casts an imputation and the damage is done. As Parliamentarians, we have a responsibility. We should not make statements for the sake of political motives.

Sir, I will now turn to saying a few words on the proposed amendments to the Legal Profession Act.

Sir, I restrict my comments to two clauses. The first is clause 9, inserting a new subsection (5) to section 80 of the Act. The effect of the amendment is to attempt to ensure that where a lawyer is convicted of a criminal offence and subsequently faces disciplinary proceedings, he cannot in the disciplinary proceedings argue that his earlier conviction was wrong. Sir, one view of the amendment is: let us have some finality. Where a lawyer is convicted, let that be the end of the matter. And in the disciplinary proceedings, the only ques- tion should be whether he should be struck off based on his previous conviction which should not be re-opened.

Sir, I can see the force of the view but I do not accept that line of argument. During the criminal proceedings, the lawyer would have tried every possible argument. If he does not succeed, he is convicted. That is the end of the matter as far as the criminal proceedings are concerned. He, like any other citizen, pays the penalty either by paying a fine or going to jail. The law does not attempt to deprive him of his livelihood. That is not the intention of the law. However, where an offender is a professional, enjoying a position of trust with the people, we go further and consider whether such an offender should continue to enjoy that position of trust vis-a-vis the public. If he is of a defective character, he must be removed from that position. During the disciplinary proceedings, it is for the courts to look at all the facts and decide whether the lawyer is of such a defective character so that he should be struck off. The lawyer is entitled to legal representation and he is entitled to advance all arguments that he or his counsel may feel are of merit. The courts are equipped to deal with all such arguments and throw out unmeritorious arguments.

Sir, the amendments will remove, as it were, from the lawyer's armoury, one line of defence that the lawyer has. He cannot argue that he should not be struck off because his earlier conviction was wrong. Sir, an argument by a lawyer that he was wrongly convicted could be either good or bad. If it is a bad argument the court will throw it out, and presumably he will be disciplined, struck off if there are no other merits to his case. However, if that argument is good, then it will appear that he should be entitled to rely on it and continue to practise as a lawyer. In either event it does not matter to society as to what argument the lawyer is or is not entitled to advance. However, where the court's power to consider the validity of the conviction is removed, then in some cases at least, there is a possibility that a further striking off will be predicated upon a previous wrong conviction. Parliament should be careful before it enacts legislation to prevent certain arguments being put forward in legitimate self-defence.

My central point is that the State and the legal profession and the public lose nothing by allowing the lawyer to rely on all such arguments that are available to him. There is no question of the proceedings being duplicated. Our judges will throw out arguments which have no merit. Any possible downside, I think, is more than balanced by the fact that possible injustice may be averted.

There is a downside to the Law Society in that it has no choice but to bring disciplinary proceedings where a lawyer has been convicted. And in such disciplinary proceedings, as a matter of law, the Court decides that he was wrongly convicted in the first place and ought not to be disciplined, the Law Society is then made to pay costs through no fault of its own. But that is a small problem which can be taken care of by amending the Legal Profession Act providing that the Law Society should not pay costs where it brings disciplinary proceedings where such disciplinary proceedings are predicated upon a criminal conviction by a Court of law.

Sir, the reason I feel this way is that in a disciplinary proceeding a life-time of investment in the profession, livelihood and a good name are at stake. We have to be careful. No doubt all this would have been affected by the earlier criminal conviction, but nevertheless, these are serious factors to consider. And I wonder if a suitable formula cannot be found to allow or ensure that the Court retains the power to do justice in exceptional cases.

The second clause, to which I personally attach less importance, is clause 13. This clause removes the right of the lawyer's appeal to the Privy Council. Sir, I have heard the Hon. Minister on the point and share the view that the discipline of the profession should really be an internal matter. The ethos of the profession in the local context is better understood by our own judges who are in a better position than the Law Lords of the Privy Council to decide what constitutes a defect of character which renders the lawyer unfit to practise in Singapore.

But nevertheless two questions arise. First, the foregoing reasons support the contention that, as a matter of fact, our judges are better suited to deal with the question of defect of character. But, Sir, sometimes questions of law arise. In fact, in the recent past, the Privy Council has reversed the Lower Courts on questions of law, I think, four times in disciplinary proceedings. That is not to say that our judge cannot decide questions of law. They do so all the time and are almost uniformly affirmed by the Privy Council. Our judges are of the highest quality and the Privy Council does not exist because our judges are not good. It exists as a Court of Appeal to review decisions. A hierarchical structure of Courts is necessary to ensure that all decisions are reviewed and ensure that nothing is overlooked.

Thus, if the right to appeal to the Privy Council is abolished, then we must seriously consider setting up a permanent Court of Appeal since this is the second occasion on which the right of appeal to the Privy Council is being taken away. Sometimes the Privy Council takes a different view from the Lower Courts, rightly or wrongly. Reference has been made to Mr Jeyaretnam's recent case. I personally do not think that the Privy Council's decision is correct as a matter of law. I say that with the greatest of respect to the Lordships. But nevertheless, the Minister may consider whether the right of appeal to the Privy Council should be retained where the appeal is on a question of law - only on the reasoning that a further Court of Appeal may exercise a residual power where it feels that the Lower Courts proceeded on an error of law.

Alternatively, the Hon. Minister may consider whether the proposed structure (the proposed structure being the show-cause action being proceeded with in front of a Court of 3 judges whose decision shall be final) - whether that proposed structure should be amended to allow a two-tier structure, an appeal, or the show-cause proceedings before a single judge of the High Court with a right of appeal to a Court of 3 judges. I say this because in the heat of the proceedings, and it be the first proceeding, various arguments can be overlooked. Sometimes evidence is not presented through the errors of counsel; sometimes evidence comes to light after the proceedings have taken place. Thus, if there is a right of appeal during the appellate stage, counsel for the appellant has had the opportunity to sit back and review the entire case, look at fresh evidence and perhaps decide to present arguments in a different light. So for all these reasons, a right of review is a necessary ingredient or the system of justice.

I would urge the Hon. Minister to consider - if the Government wishes to do away with the right of appeal to the Privy Council - whether a two-tier structure providing for appeal should not be present.

Sir, but for these observations, I support the amendments.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: A point of clarification, Sir.

Mr Speaker: All right.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: A serious allegation has been made against me. And therefore I have to say a few words in reply. He said that I had accused the judges of saying something about Jeyaretnam. I tried to use the very words that he used, but I think I missed his words. Anyway, Sir, I think his defence of the judges is misplaced. He is acting like a Don Quixote, tilting at the windmills.

I made no allegation at all. I asked the Government whether it was prosecuting and disqualifying J.B. Jeyaretnam. Who prosecuted J.B. Jeyaretnam? Not the judges. It is the Government. And therefore to imply that I had alleged that the judges had dealt with Mr Jeyaretnam in that manner is not correct. Moreover, I also said that I agreed with Mr Jeyaretnam's request that the Government ask the Court of Criminal Appeal to decide as to the rights and wrongs of the case. If I could say that, that the judges should give final judgement in this case, how could I mean that the judges were partial or that they had been instrumental in disqualifying Mr J.B. Jeyaretnam?

Mr Chiam See Tong: Thank you, Sir, for allowing me to join in the debate.

Sir, the legal profession is unique in Singapore. Lawyers are allowed to hold clients' money. All the other professions named by the Minister - the accountants, architects, dentists, doctors, land surveyors, pharmacists, professional engineers - they have no such professional privilege. And in the sale of land, Sir, the lawyers also hold money as stakeholders. I know some legal firms hold vast sums of money. Sir, therefore, if there is any provision which will protect the clients and uphold the honesty and integrity of the profession, I will support the legislation. But in this particular case Dr Lee has pointed out, the issue is really one of justice - whether or not by the amendments, it will serve greater justice to the lawyers. I do not think so.

Sir, unfortunately, this legislation comes at the wrong time. I believe timing is important, and if it comes at the wrong time it will give wrong signals to the people of Singapore. Sir, it comes at the most inopportune time because it comes after Jeyaretnam's appeal judgment has been released. If these amendments were to be made before the judgment was revealed, then I think there would be less criticism.

Sir, the judgment of the Privy Council is very strong. May I be allowed to read part of it.

"Their Lordships have to record their deep disquiet that by a series of misjudgments the appellant [that is Mr J.B. Jeyaretnam] and his co-accused Wong have suffered a grievious injustice. They have been fined, imprisoned and publicly disgraced for offences of which they were not guilty. The appellant, in addition, has been deprived of his seat in Parliament and disqualified for a year from practising his profession.

Their Lordships' order restores him to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore. But because of the course taken by the criminal proceedings, their Lordships have no power to right the other wrongs which the appellant and Wong have suffered. Their only prospect of redress, their Lordships understand, will be by way of petition for pardon to the President of the Republic of Singapore.'

So, Sir, after such a judgment, I wonder whether the Government has proceeded to amend the Legal Profession Act out of anger, or not to allow the Privy Council to interfere in disciplinary proceedings in relation to lawyers in Singapore.

Sir, again I say the timing is wrong because we know another prominent Opposition member, Mr Francis Seow, is involved in tax cases in our courts. So people will naturally say that these amendments have been hurriedly put together to prevent him from practising law at a future date. Sir, it is regrettable that the amendment should come at the wrong time.

Sir, the Minister has not really convinced me with his reasons for the need to amend the Legal Profession Act to take away appeals to the Privy Council. But I would like to go on record that I think it is high time that Singapore, after over 20 years of our judicial system in Singapore, should grow up and not be tied to the apron strings of the Privy Council.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr Chiam See Tong: But that is another issue altogether. I would say that if we are to take away appeals to the Privy Council in cases of disciplinary proceedings concerning the lawyers, then it should be across the board, for other cases as well. Perhaps we should have some kind of a permanent court of appeal. As I said, this is another issue.

Sir, as I was saying, the Minister has not really convinced me why lawyers cannot appeal to the Privy Council in regard to disciplinary proceedings against them. The Minister says that by taking away this appeal to the Privy Council, lawyers are in no lesser position than the other professionals. Sir, I have not been involved in any appeal to a single judge in the High Court in relation to misdeeds of the other professionals. But I understand that in the appeals of the other professions, they are allowed in the appeal to look into their convictions.

The Member for Sembawang tried to argue strenuously that some kind of a provision must be made to allow our three judges to look into the convictions in exceptional cases. That is the ruling of the Privy Council and I agree. If you are going to cut off completely and only accept per se the convictions, then justice is not served. Because there is always the possibility that the judgments were wrong in cases where they are not allowed to appeal. So the judges on appeal should be allowed to look into convictions. And this is the position of the Privy Council.

Sir, he says that there is a loophole. By going on appealing to the Privy Council, they can go through their convictions all over again, re-litigate so to say. But the Privy Council has made it very clear that it is only in exceptional circumstances, and they refused to set what the special circumstances are. They go by the merits of the case and if they deem that it is necessary in the case of Mr J.B. Jeyaretnam, they will look into it, especially in cases where appeals have been cut off from the litigant.

Sir, they say that lawyers should be looked into by their own judges. It is an internal matter. I understand that nearly all the recent cases - I know of at least five lawyers who appealed to the Privy Council in regard to disciplinary proceedings - they have been successful. In actual fact, they have decided against the decisions of our courts here.

Sir, I understand that in the case of Malaysia, they have taken away their appeals to the Privy Council in all cases because the majority, I believe 90% or more of the cases that went up for appeal to the Privy Council, in fact, the Privy Council held the same decision as their final court of appeal. So it was justified. There was really no injustice in the sense that going to the Privy Council as the last appellate court is redundant because the result inevitably will be the same. But it cannot be said of Singapore's case in relation to our lawyers. I believe not only the lawyers in going to the Privy Council were successful in their appeals but the Law Society was made to pay heavy costs. Many lawyers were complaining. I think there should be less complaints against lawyers. So I really see no valid reason to take away appeals to the Privy Council.

What this House should do is, in fact, to see whether or not it will serve the ends of justice by going to the Privy Council. If it does not, then you can take it away. But if it does, it should remain. So the issue is really whether or not justice is further served by going to the Privy Council. If the answer is yes, then it should be allowed.

Sir, I think the Minister must come out with more convincing reasons. Because he himself, I believe, as quoted by Dr Lee, says that one important positive benefit of the Privy Council is that it makes otherwise costly errors remediable. It is also a litmus test of judicial independence. And the Prime Minister reinforces this opinion. In Singapore, we have an extra supervision on them. When they write their judgment, they know it could go up to the Privy Council. He was referring to the judgment of our judges. So the issue here is judicial independence.

Sir, in the other civil cases and criminal cases, even rapists, as has been said, and murderers will get a better hearing than lawyers because they can appeal to the Privy Council. They have the benefit of going to the Privy Council. So really there is no parity. On the one hand, other cases are allowed to appeal to the Privy Council. But in the case of the legal profession, we are not allowed.

Sir, I agree that the Senior Counsel concept to be established in Singapore is a good idea and I believe this will encourage specialization and certainly will improve our standard of litigation. I sincerely hope one day we do not have to depend upon the crutch of Queen's Counsel who are invited from England to our Singapore courts.

Mr Chandra Das: QC Chiam!

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, the other point which I would just like to mention is that I think the Law Society should not be kept out of the Board of Legal Education. I think they must be allowed to play a greater role in the education of lawyers.

Mr Choo Wee Khiang (Marine Parade GRC): Point of clarification, Sir. I would like to ask Mr Chiam whether our country is a sovereign state, in the first place. Secondly, is he inferring that our judges are inferior to other judges within the Commonwealth, for example? And whether the lawyers produced by our NUS are inferior to lawyers in England? If so, then there is no need for us to have the NUS Law Faculty and all of us should do law degrees in Britain.

Mr Speaker: Do you wish to respond, Mr Chiam?

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, I do not know what the Member for Marine Parade GRC wants from me. I think it is tit for tat. His question is completely irrelevant. The points that I have brought up show that we are a sovereign state. Because I have said that I am for an independent final appeal court here. I am for dispensing with appeals to the Privy Council. I do not know what he is ---

Mr Choo Wee Khiang: In the course of making your speech, you were very confusing. We do not know where you are. At the beginning, you said you were for. But later on you said you were not. And somehow you came back to your original note saying that you were for. Please clarify your position.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, I do not think I was confusing. If he had only listened carefully, I think he would have got all the points that I was trying to bring out. I was very coherent. I do not think that I need to answer the Member.

Mr Speaker: Order. I suspend the sitting and will take the Chair again at 3.00 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 2.27 pm until 3.00 pm. Sitting resumed at 3.00 pm

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Debate resumed.

Mr Davinder Singh (Toa Payoh GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, as a member of the legal profession, I have an immediate and direct interest in the provisions of this Bill. One of the proposed amendments deals with the status of convictions in disciplinary proceedings which may be instituted against a solicitor. I am referring to the amendment to section 80 of the Act which is in the following terms:

'In any proceedings instituted under this Part against an advocate and solicitor consequent upon his conviction for a criminal offence, an Inquiry Committee, a Disciplinary Committee appointed under section 87 and a Court of 3 judges referred to in section 95 shall accept his conviction as final and conclusive.'

This has provoked comment from the Law Society which, in a circular to MPs, has opposed the amendment on the ground that any attempt to place constraints on the inherent jurisdiction of the courts will affect the fair and proper administration of justice.

In deciding my stand on this issue, I have had to consider whether the benefits which would flow from the amendment would outweigh any prejudice which a solicitor might suffer as a result of it. In my view this depends on the answers to two questions: (1) What does the amendment seek to achieve? (2) What practical effect the amendment would have on a convicted solicitor up on a disciplinary charge?

Before a solicitor is dealt with by a court of 3 judges, there is a two-tier investigative process. He goes through an Inquiry Committee and then a Disciplinary Committee. The important thing to note about this is that both committees include lay persons. I ask: is it fair to ask members of these committees, especially the lay persons, to embark on an inquiry as to whether a conviction is flawed? Are they competent to do so? Think about it. A non-lawyer sitting on these committees, confronted with a charge based on a conviction, is being asked, if the conviction is attacked at that stage, to re-assess the entire evidence, study the submissions of law, understand the reasons for the decision, and then come to a conclusion, either identical or different. Anyone having read the decision of the Privy Council in its recent ruling would have immediately realized that this is no simple process and it is not something which a lawyer or any lawyer, leave alone a layman, can embark on.

According to the Law Society's Annual Report for the year ending 31st August 1988, the Law Society had to deal with 103 complaints. Of these, 91 were completed and 20 were referred to the Disciplinary Committee; 11 were dealt with by the imposition of a penalty and 60 were dismissed. The Member for Potong Pasir has categorized the issue before this House as one of justice. That is a fair way of saying that that is the issue provided that you are only looking to the interest of solicitors. There are other people involved. These are the people who sit on the committees, especially the laymen. Therefore, with respect, really the issue is, is it fair? And not whether the solicitor is treated in a just manner. Is it fair that the laymen on these committees with their workload and bearing in mind the constraints of time within which they have to work, is it fair to ask them to re-assess the evidence which might have been led in a 20-day trial, a 30-day trial, look at the submissions of law, analyse the decisions of the judge and go behind it?

However, one might then argue for making a conviction final and conclusive before the Committees since laymen sit on it, but not before a court of 3 judges, since you have experienced judges on it. The answer to that must be that there must be one standard, which the committees can safely and properly act upon, knowing with certainty that it is that same standard which will apply before a court of 3 judges. Consider the wastage and resources, time and effort, if arguments which are not admissible before the two-stage committee inquiry procedure, are then admissible in court only to have the entire procedure rendered futile.

I would like to add at this point that what I say about the difficulties inherent in going behind a conviction apply to all professions where disciplinary proceedings are instituted. Laymen sitting on committees, by whatever name called, are in my respectful view unable, not competent, to consider whether convictions are flawed and whether they ought to be overturned. And therefore if similar problems exist or may arise in other professions, I would urge the Government to extend the same principle of making convictions final and conclusive to all such professions.

The second question I have had to consider is the effect of the amendment on solicitors. A conviction is only one of the many grounds upon which a solicitor may be brought up for disciplinary proceedings. There are 10 other grounds. The relevant provision provides that a solicitor shall be liable to be struck off, suspended or censured, if he has been convicted of a criminal offence, implying a defect of character which makes him unfit for his profession. There is therefore a 3-stage inquiry. (1) There must be a conviction. (2) It must imply a defect of character. (3) It must render him unfit for his profession.

Today a solicitor can attack a charge which is based on a conviction at all three levels. He can say that the conviction is flawed. He can say that in any event it does not imply a defect of character. Or even if it does, it does not render him unfit for his profession. What is significant is that the amendment may not, contrary to some views, totally detract from the right of a solicitor to challenge the conviction in all instances. There is in law a process called Revision. It is a procedure whereby petitions are filed to the High Court for the High Court to consider the manner in which the Subordinate Courts conducted themselves. If there has been a miscarriage of justice, the High Court can intervene, quite apart from whether this amendment exists or not. And the guideline applicable in the exercise of discretion in Revisionary circumstances is "in the interest of justice", which is a far wider discretion than that which applies in disciplinary hearings because, according to the Privy Council, the courts can only intervene in "exceptional circumstances". Whereas in Revisionary proceedings they may do so "in the interest of justice".

I venture to suggest that a court confronted with a potential risk of injustice will be quite amenable to an appropriate adjournment for a petition for a Revision to be filed and heard before disciplinary proceedings go on. I accept that a Revision is not available in all cases. But even in those very, very few cases where a Revision is not available, it is always possible for a solicitor up on a conviction charge before a disciplinary committee or a court of 3 judges, to go behind the conviction, not for the purposes of showing that it is flawed, but for the purposes of sentence. In other words, in mitigation. You may suggest, if you were before a court of 3 judges and if you are convinced that the conviction is bad, that notwithstanding the statutory amendment, because there is such a risk of injustice, do not strike me off, do not suspend me, censure me. So the door is not completely shut.

Sir, one goes back to the original question: whether with this amendment there is a serious risk of grave injustice and, if so, whether the benefits which will flow from re-defining the tasks and the burdens on the Inquiry Committee would outweigh any prejudice which a solicitor might claim to suffer as a result of the amendment? It is my view, and here I go back to the issue again, that in fairness to the members of the Inquiry Committee, the amendment should stand because the benefits which flow it far outweigh any prejudice which might result.

I support the Bill. 3.14 pm

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to thank Members for the views that they have expressed in the debate and for those who have supported the Bill.

Let me now take up some of the points which were expressed. First, I will comment on the points raised by the Chairman of the GPC for Law and Home Affairs, Dr Arthur Beng, who supported the Bill. He also conveyed to this House a summary of the views, as he understood, which the lawyers had. I was familiar with some of the views that he recounted but I was not familiar with one particular view which I found rather surprising. It was this: that the lawyers want extra tiers of appeal because the other professionals, the doctors, accountants, architects, etc, who are subject to their disciplinary proceedings for misconduct are non-lawyers being defended by lawyers. In other words, doctors, accountants, and others, have lawyers, who are strangers to their profession, defending them. But as he put it, lawyers who are subject to disciplinary proceedings have the tragic misfortune of being represented by one of their own species. I hope the lawyers who express this view, are in the minority because they are expressing very little faith in their own brothers-at-law.

The other view which several Members referred to is that lawyers are concerned or feel that the disciplinary bodies, like the Inquiry Committee and the Disciplinary Committee, are not decision-making bodies but investigative, fact-finding bodies. The real decision, according to their view, is made only by the Court of 3 judges, and therefore, there is a sense of unfairness that there is no further appeal. I have two comments on that. First, that is not really correct. It is not really correct to say that the disciplinary bodies only recommend or investigate. The Inquiry Committee, for instance, makes a report to the Law Society Council on its findings, and the Council has to take a decision. So there is a decision. And if the Council determines that - there must be a reference to the Disciplinary Committee; in fact, the Law Society Council has no choice; it must refer to the Disciplinary Committee. So in that sense, the Inquiry Committee's decision is effective. Then take the Disciplinary Committee. Is it just an investigative body? It is almost like a full-blown trial. There is a prosecutor appointed to prosecute and the lawyer who is subject to disciplinary proceedings has counsel; in quite a number of cases, Queen's Counsel. True, the Disciplinary Committee can either make a finding that there is a cause of gravity or there is not sufficient cause of gravity for reference to aCourt of three judges, or it can reprimand. But its finding is effective. In other words, if it finds that it must be referred to a Court of three judges, that is binding and it goes to the Court of three judges. It is a decision.

The second comment I want to make is that if that is the view being held that a Court of three judges is viewed as a first body that makes the decision - effective decision of striking off, censure - then of course it can be easily taken care of, couldn't it, by having it restored to the same position of the other professions. In other words, the Disciplinary Committee can be given the full panoply of powers - reprimand, fine, censure, and strike off the rolls, and an appeal to a court of 3 judges or a single High Court judge. The question is, which is the most appropriate solution? Other Members have also spoken that perhaps that there should be a permanent Court of Appeal or that there should be reference to a single High Court judge and then to a Court of Appeal. And the Chairman of the GPC asked if the Government would be receptive to his proposal. Let me say that the Government will be prepared to consider this or any other proposals which will improve, strengthen, or make more effective the existing disciplinary procedures.

In fact, Mr Speaker, Sir, in the past few days I also received a proposal from a retired judge, Mr Choor Singh, who also serves as a Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee. He has asked us to consider several changes. For example, he has proposed that we consider conferring on the Disciplinary Committee additional powers - powers to impose a penalty of a fine, reprimand, censure, suspend and/or strike off lawyers from the rolls. His argument was that under the revamped procedures, we now have retired judges, very senior lawyers, serving the Disciplinary Committee and we can give the powers because at the moment the Disciplinary Committee does not have the power to impose a fine, suspend or strike off the rolls. He also asked to consider that from the Disciplinary Committee with such additional powers, there can be an appeal to a single High Court judge, and thence to the Court of Appeal.

Some lawyers, like Members in this House, have also proposed that, as a consequence of abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, we also consider changes to the system so that instead of a reference to a court of 3 judges directly, it should be to a single High Court judge and then to a Court of Appeal. Let me say that the Government will consider these suggestions but it will take some time, during which we will also study changes proposed in the United Kingdom Green Paper, mentioned by the Chairman of the GPC, to see if there is any proposal there which would be also useful to us. And if there is any merit to all these proposals, they can be taken up when we next amend the Legal Profession Act.

Let me add that we are indeed examining other provisions of the Legal Profession Act such as the provision which restricts judges from practising law when they retire or leave the Bench. Sir, this provision has discouraged several good lawyers from accepting appointments as judges. This is a problem which Dr Wang Kai Yuen also raised in his speech. It is settled convention in Britain as well as the old Commonwealth countries that judges upon retirement do not re-appear as advocates in the courts over which they presided. But this should not prevent us from considering procedure where they can practise as solicitors without appearing in the Courts. So after considering the changes that have been made in other old as well as new Commonwealth countries, we will amend this section of the Legal Profession Act.

The Chairman of the GPC also asked if I could give some information on the meeting which the First Deputy Prime Minister had with the Council's President and members of his Council. The President of the Law Society wrote to the Prime Minister asking for a meeting and the Prime Minister replied stating that as the 1DPM was in charge of matters such as this, First Deputy Prime Minister would meet with the President, Vice-President and five other representatives. The meeting took place on 9th February at which the Attorney-General and I were also present. The purpose of the 1DPM was to give an opportunity to the President and his Council colleagues to expand on their views and to convince 1DPM with good arguments that the amendments should not be proceeded with. He told them that he could understand the emotional reaction or natural reaction which lawyers would have to the removal of appeals to the Privy Council. This was understandable. However, as 1DPM also put it to the lawyers, the key issue was whether any serious injustice would be caused by these amendments. He noted that this was not the case as even after the amendments, the lawyers would have several tiers of appeal or disciplinary processes ending up in a court of 3 judges, a feature which no other profession had. Similarly, on the question of making the convictions final and conclusive, the Law Society argued against the amendments. But 1DPM explained that if we did not make these amendments, the disciplinary process could be converted into an unauthorized appeal on the convictions.

On the third question of the composition of the Board of Legal Education, 1DPM and I informed them that the intention was that of the eight persons to be appointed, a good number would be advocates and solicitors. There was no intention not to do anything else. We took their point that the role of the Law Society should be given recognition and we informed them that this provision will be modified. Members will note that I have tabled an amendment which will be taken up during Committee stage.

Sir, I think the meeting was useful in that it enabled them to put across their views to us, and at the same time for them to understand the Government's position on this matter.

Let me now, Sir, take up the points of Mr Shanmugam, Mr Davinder Singh and a few others who touched on the question of the provision of making the convictions final and conclusive. Mr Shanmugam expressed the view that the court should have the power to review the convictions in exceptional circumstances. The point to be borne in mind is that if we do not make this amendment, surely each lawyer who is on a disciplinary charge must be tempted to argue that his case is an "exceptional" case and soon "exceptional cases" will become the norm. The amendment on this point - to make the underlying convictions final and conclusive - does not mean that the court cannot look at the facts of the case under any circumstances. In fact, Sir, Mr Davinder Singh has explained this to some extent - the court not only is prevented but may have to look at the circumstances of the case because under the Act, section 80 provides that if a person is convicted of criminal offence implying a defect of character which makes him unfit for his profession, it must follow that the disciplinary body or the court of 3 judges can look at all the facts of the case, in other words the criminal conviction, to come to a decision whether this conviction of that offence does or does not imply a defect of character which makes him unfit for the profession. The amendment that is before the House does not prevent the disciplinary body or court of 3 judges from doing that. Likewise, as Mr Davinder Singh pointed out, if the disciplinary body answers that question in the affirmative - yes, it does imply a defect of character rendering him unfit for his profession - it is still open to the disciplinary body to look at the facts of the case in the surrounding circumstances to decide whether the penalty should be a reprimand, a fine, censure or a more extreme penalty such as suspension or striking off the rolls. And this amendment does not prevent a court of 3 judges or adisciplinary body from looking at the conviction for those purposes. Then what does the amendment seek to do? What the amendment seeks to do is that the disciplinary body, a court of 3 judges, cannot review the merits of the original criminal conviction and to inquire into the legal validity of that conviction. In other words, what this amendment seeks to do is to say that in the disciplinary process, the IC, the DC and the court of 3 judges, cannot go behind the conviction and to confer on themselves, either an appellate judicial function or a revisionary judicial function, of a court of appeal. In other words, we must keep distinct the appellate (or a revisionary power if there is one in a particular case) and the disciplinary process. That is all that the amendment seeks to do. If the disciplinary body and the court want to look at the conviction for purposes of determining what is the appropriate penalty or for the purpose of determining whether the conviction renders him unfit for practising his profession, it is open to do so. And those provisions of the Act have not been altered.

The point has also been made, I think by Mr Davinder Singh, and others whether we should not look at the other professions, as far as the finality of the convictions is concerned. I have taken his point. We may indeed have to review the legislation for other professions and it will take us some time to do that. I want to thank him for the suggestion.

Sir, let me now deal with the points raised by Dr Lee Siew-Choh and Mr Chiam. Dr Lee Siew-Choh, after a few sittings, I think if we close our eyes, we are under the impression that it is Mr Jeyaretnam talking! I know that he is, if I may borrow a phrase from Mr Jeyaretnam, beholden to Mr Jeyaretnam for many matters. But I hope that he will give us some refreshing views of his own instead of appearing to sound like Mr Jeyaretnam all the time.

Sir, he asked: is this a knee-jerk reaction to the Privy Council decision? I have already spoken on this at length at the previous sitting and I explained that the whole question of appeals to the Privy Council has been under consideration for some time. I even revealed extracts of correspondence between the Prime Minister and one of the Law Lords dating back several years. And I pointed out that we are taking our time to consider the overall appeals to the Privy Council. But I am not in the least bit embarrassed or apologetic in saying that in certain areas such as this or on ISA appeals, some events or decisions do bring matters to a head. They crystalize our thoughts and we introduce amendments.

In the ISA case, we have been concerned for some time, for instance, about appeals to Privy Council on security matters after the Spy Catcher case. But matters are brought to a head when our Court of Appeal expounded the principles and the cases in the Commonwealth and other countries which they are going to follow. So I came to the House and amendments to the Internal Security Act and to the Privy Council on security cases were tabled. So also here. I have indicated at a previous sitting what is the opinion of the Attorney-General on this case, how the Privy Council did not hear the Attorney-General, how important legal arguments were consequently not fully addressed. Although we are taking our time on the rest of the implications of appeals to Privy Council, there is no embarrassment in saying that certain decisions do cause us to crystallize our thoughts and act without delay.

Then he talked about Francis Seow. I think after the revelations of Mr Francis Seow, residents in Eunos will know what a narrow escape they had, how close they came to electing a person like Mr Francis Seow and they must be very grateful that the result was what it was. Dr Lee Siew-Choh said these amendments are for Mr Francis Seow. But he did not tell us when Mr Francis Seow is coming back. That is important because Mr Chiam says the timing is wrong and that we should wait for Mr Francis Seow to come back. But supposing he does not come back. We do not move these amendments at all? It cannot be.

When is the right timing then? Do we wait for Mr Francis Seow to come back? And Dr Lee Siew-Choh does not tell us when his colleague is coming back. We should hold this amendment in abeyance, indefinitely perhaps. We cannot do that.

Sir, Mr Shanmugam has pointed out that Dr Lee Siew-Choh insinuated that Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off the rolls for political reasons. This is a very serious allegation, as Mr Shanmugan has pointed out. It is a very serious allegation because striking off is by a court of three judges. And to say that this is for political reasons is to make a very serious allegation and I like to remind him that his predecessor was subjected to a penalty and was chastised by this House for making similar allegations. And I would like to know whether he denies saying this, stands by it, maintains the allegations or withdraws the allegations.

Finally, Sir, Mr Chiam throws the quotations of the Prime Minister and myself on what we said about the Privy Council. I was wondering when these quotations were going to be thrown at us. Did I say this? Yes, I did. I always thought for sometime that it is good to have appeals to the Privy Council, provided (and that is a very important proviso) that the Privy Council remains relevant to the circumstancesand conditions of our time. I have shown at the previous sitting how United Kingdom laws, trends in judicial interpretation, have gone off in divergent trends unsuitable for our purposes. So it is really with some reluctance, if not sorrow, that we are cutting off appeals to the Privy Council. At our last sitting, I said that we are not just in security cases concerned about appeals to Privy Council but in other cases as well.

Since the Member referred to this quotation, let me also for good measure ask him to look at what I said on 17th March 1981 when I was a Backbencher, a few months after my election. This was when the Prime Minister had spoken about the difficulty in getting judges and he remarked that we may have to employ expatriate judges. I then said: (Vol. 40, No. 8, col. 707).

'I wonder whether an expatriate judge would have that sense of appreciation of the policy underpinnings of certain laws which he might have to administer in cases appearing before him. I am thinking particularly of cases like Constitutional Law cases where this may impinge on important national interests and the judge ought to have an awareness of the social and political underpinnings of the laws.' That concern was expressed eight years ago about expatriate judges in Singapore. What more of judges sitting thousands of miles away? So he should also look up that quotation. I have not been inconsistent. But let me in any case give advance notice in case he is going to keep this quotation also for future reference and to use it against me. It does not mean that as Minister for Law that I will never advise my Cabinet colleagues against getting expatriate judges under any circumstances. Because if we fail to get our ablest and the best of our own lawyers to serve as judges, it may be the only solution.

So the point I am making is a simple one. Yes, at one time we thought the Privy Council was useful but reluctantly we have to sever the links. Yes, we have reservations. I have reservations on expatriate judges. But if we have no choice and the courts are going to be swamped by a backlog of cases and tremendous delays in fixing of dates, we may well have to do that. Nothing is immutable. Overriding interest is the national interest and that is the note on which I would like to end.

When we talk about justice, justice for whom? These disciplinary procedures and proceedings are to protect whom? True, there are safeguards for the lawyers, opportunity to be heard, tried and heard by fellow peers, several tiers so that different bodies can address their minds before the final decision is taken which may affect his livelihood. But I would like to suggest to the House that the overriding interest is a public interest and the many people who know nothing about law and whose private lives or public lives or family matters are in the hands of the lawyers. And as Mr Chiam has pointed out, lawyers are stakeholders for thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars. So let us not have a distorted perspective of justice when we discuss the Legal Profession Act. The fundamental consideration must be that the legal profession must have in mind as overriding interest the public it serves and that it has a duty, not just the Government, it has a duty to ensure that the delinquent and the errant amongst them must be disciplined, and effectively disciplined, so that the good name of the profession is preserved and that the public who have no choice but to go to the lawyers will always have confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Some clarifications, Sir.

Mr Speaker: All right.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: The Minister has just said that I alleged that the judges had a hand in this. But what I said was that it was a political prosecution, and not a prosecution by the judges. The judges have nothing to do with it.

Prof. Jayakumar: Let me quote from what he said.

The Prime Minister: There is a transcript.

Prof. Jayakumar: And this is from the transcript. He said:

'And it is not desirable that the Privy Council should interfere in political affairs. Is that the Government's position? Or is the Government admitting that by this Bill Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off the rolls for political reasons?' This is a clear insinuation that the court struck off Mr Jeyaretnam for political reasons.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: No, Sir, that was not the meaning. I said it was a political party that was going for him.

Prof. Jayakumar: Then I must ask whether he withdraws these words.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: I am not against the judges, Sir. I do not see why I should withdraw those words. I do not understand.

Prof. Jayakumar: Let me read it again: 'Or is the Government admitting by this Bill that Mr Jeyaretnam was struck off the rolls for political reasons?'

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Do those words mean that I said that judges struck him off?

Prof. Jayakumar: I thought that at the end of the day everybody knows that the striking off is by a court of 3 judges. So I think Dr Lee Siew-Choh must tell us whether he stands by these words or withdraws these words.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: I repeatedly said that I do not allege that the judges did it.

An hon. Member: Then withdraw.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: If that is the interpretation or meaning, then, of course, I withdraw.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Prof. Jayakumar].

Bill considered in Committee.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Clause 1 to 3 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 -

Prof. Jayakumar: Sir, I beg to move,

In page 2, to leave out lines 22 and 23 and insert -

"(c) five advocates and solicitors nominated by the Senate of the Academy after consultation with the Council of the Society; and

(d) three other members nominated by the Senate of the Academy.".

Let me explain, Sir, that the intention of the original wording of the amendment Bill that eight other members be appointed by the Senate was to give the Senate of the Academy flexibility to appoint eight members. It was always the intention that sizeable, if not majority of these eight members, should be advocates and solicitors. However, concern was expressed by the Law Society that by not mentioning expressly that the Law Society has a role in this, due recognition was not given to the contributions of the Law Society towards the Board of Legal Education; and this point was also raised in the meeting with the First Deputy Prime Minister.

Let me say, Sir, that the Board of Legal Education has indeed received considerable assistance from the Law Society, both by way of financial contributions as well as through voluntary service given by a large number of lawyers mentioned by the Chairman of the GPC, who have given off their time in conducting courses or lecturing. Therefore, if there is a doubt on the part of the Law Society, this doubt should be rectified and the purpose of this amendment which I am moving in Committee, Sir, is to make clear that five out of the eight members to be appointed by the Senate will be advocates and solicitors and the Senate shall appoint them after consulting the Council of the Law Society. This means there will be three additional members who will be appointed by the Senate. The Chairman of the GPC asked me whether more members from the Faculty can be appointed, and I am sure this point will be considered by the Senate when they choose the three additional members.

Sir, I beg to move.

Amendment agreed to.

The Chairman: A consequential amendment will have to be made:

In page 2, line 21, to leave out "and".

This will be done.

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 5 to 14 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported with an amendment; read a Third time and passed.