MAIN AND DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATES OF SINGAPORE FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1ST APRIL, 1989 TO 31ST MARCH, 1990

Order read for consideration in Committee of Supply [3rd Allotted Day].

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

2.27 pm

Head O -

The Chairman: Amendment No. (1), 35 minutes.

Mr S. Chandra Das (Cheng San GRC): Sir, I beg to move,

That the total sum to be allocated for Head O of the Main Estimates be reduced by $100.

Sir, during the debate on the President's Address, the First Deputy Prime Minister lamented that Backbenchers had not focussed on international issues.

Sir, the Government Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs is mindful of the world outside and notes the rapid changes that are currently taking place in international and regional environments. However, Sir, we feel that the appropriate forum for the debate on international issues is in the Committee of Supply rather than the debate on the President's Address.

Sir, the past year was particularly dramatic because of the various rapid changes that took place. There has been relaxation of tensions between the superpowers and various issues such as disarmament and human rights have been touched upon.

Sir, the growing rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China, and specially with the forthcoming Gorbachev-Deng Summit this year, also has contributed to international peace and stability. Among other new developments, one that is welcomed is the ending of the seven year old Iran-Iraq conflict.

Sir, closer home, prospects for regional peace and stability have been enhanced by recent developments in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. Reports of Sino-Soviet normalization of ties could also enhance regional stability.

Sir, the US and the Philippines have also reached accord on the question of bases in the later part of last year. However, Sir, countries in the region had begun to psychologically accept that bases would have to go one day, if not in the very near future.

Sir, while trends in the global political situation are indeed promising, the same cannot be said in the international economic situation. The Uruguay Round in December ended in near disaster. The US and the Economic Community are engaged in trade disputes. And people are beginning to wonder how long the GATT system will last. Some are also having visions of a world divided into three trading blocs: North America, Europe and Asia. The forecast is that these trading blocs would wage battle with trading and economic weapons.

Sir, the global and regional scenarios that I have just described are taking place. The GPC on Defence and Foreign Affairs feels that it is important that Singapore monitors these changes carefully and responds to them astutely. We are confident that the architects of our foreign policy are already mapping out Singapore's response to some of these pro- blems. Indeed, in the Addendum to the President's Address, the Ministry has focussed on some of the issues which I have touched upon. Unfortunately, as is the fate of addendums, they do not attract the necessary attention they deserve.

In moving this amendment, the purpose of my GPC is really to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to share his thoughts with us on some of the notable developments in the past year and indicate the specific response of the Singapore Government. In particular, I refer to the following:

Firstly, the prospects of Singapore having a more positive relationship with the Soviet Union in view of changes in the Soviet Union as a result of glasnost, perestroika and also, particularly, with the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Secondly, the possibility of increased economic and trade contacts with the Soviet Union and the Comecon as a whole.

Sir, with the emergence of trading blocs in the American continent and Europe, what steps can Singapore take to ensure in concert with like-minded countries that the free trade system will survive? If this system is doomed, then will Singapore consider joining an East Asian bloc?

As the solution to the Cambodian conflict is becoming imminent, many countries are already gearing themselves to exploiting the opportunities that will follow. Several ASEAN countries are themselves setting the pace by rapidly establishing very strong footholds. Thailand is a case in point. Singapore, however, appears to be lagging quite far behind. What advice would the Minister have for our entrepreneurs who also want to venture into the Indo-Chinese markets.

Sir, next, the trends in the Asia-Pacific region suggest that Singapore is increasingly likely to have a larger measure of understanding with Japan and other East Asian NICs on economic issues rather than with its ASEAN partners. Was Singapore's attendance at the OECD-NIE seminar in late January a hint of things to come? What are the prospects for the establishment of a permanent mechanism to govern Singapore's relations between the NIEs and the OECD?

Sir, the Australian Prime Minister has recently suggested a new vehicle for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. I am sure that in the post-Ministerial meeting in July this year in Brunei, this issue is likely to be raised and we would like to know what the Minister's view would be in general.

At the level of bilateral relations, the past two years were not particularly happy ones in our dealings with the United States. While we cannot forget what was done over the GSP affair, we must, in the larger interest of both countries, move on to other things. How does the Minister view the state of Singapore/US relations under the Bush Administration? Will the debate on the so-called human rights issue mar this relationship?

Sir, I would also like to ask the Minister what are the prospects of the ASEAN-US initiative in contributing to the evolution of a free trade agreement at the regional and bilateral level?

Finally, I have one other question for the Minister, ie, is the intended half-tank petroleum exercise for Singapore cars crossing the Causeway likely to discourage Singaporeans going to Malaysia?

Dr Lau Teik Soon (Serangoon Gardens): Sir, in the present international political environment, certain assumptions are made about the behaviour of certain states, especially the major powers. To name some of these assumptions: firstly, that ideology is no longer a significant factor influencing foreign policy; secondly, that the major powers seek to disengage from military involvement in regional conflicts; and, thirdly, that the Communist governments are very concerned about economic development in their own countries. Whether these assumptions are valid or not can be debated. But the thing to bear in mind constantly is that the major powers seek the same goal: to expand their power and influence in the international community. The means may change, but the goal remains the same. The Chairman of the GPC for Defence and Foreign Affairs has already referred to the conducive international climate which has led to detente or peaceful coexistence in the relations between certain states. There seems to be opportunities for establishing bilateral ties between Singapore and other countries, opportunities which did not exist before because of ideological, political and economic considerations.

In this connection, I would like to raise this question with the Minister: are we initiating changes in our foreign policy, taking into account the favourable international climate? And, specifically, are we going to improve our relations with certain countries, not only with the Soviet Union but also with China and Vietnam? More importantly, the changing international climate has impact on regional security, particularly on the Cambodian problem. Because of the improved international climate, all parties to the conflict are involved in a peace process aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem.

On this issue, I would like to express a word of caution, that is, that the peace process should not in any way weaken ASEAN cooperation and unity. Specifically, I hope that the ASEAN governments will not discard their united position on the Cambodian problem. This united position not only has obtained for ASEAN strong international support but it has also contributed to the strengthening of ASEAN unity.

I express concern about the weakening of ASEAN unity because of certain developments in certain ASEAN countries. For example, the visit of Hun Sen, the PRK's Foreign Minister, to Thailand. Such an event may give the impression that Bangkok has elevated Hun Sen to the same position as Prince Sihanouk. In my view, such a move must surely undermine ASEAN resolve to support the CGDK and at the same time threaten ASEAN unity.

Sir, it is my view that ASEAN must seek a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem, one which is in line with the ASEAN-sponsored UN resolution. Singapore should stand firm and ensure that the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem will include the following elements:

(1) that Prince Sihanouk should be Head of the new Government of Phnom Penh when it is established;

(2) that both the Khmer Rouge and the Heng Samrin groups should not have a major role in the new government; and

(3) that international support be provided to maintain the new government's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The support could take various forms, including an international peace-keeping force and a financial and economic aid package.

Mr Chng Hee Kok (Tiong Bahru GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, after years of pressure from the international community and, of course, the ASEAN countries, Vietnam has decided to pull out from Cambodia. The Vietnamese have announced that they will withdraw their army and their forces by the end of next year or even by September this year if a comprehensive settlement can be reached.

Sir, I think we must have no illusions as to the reason for this withdrawal. There is really no change of heart from the point of view of Vietnam or the Soviet Union. The withdrawal and the improvement of international relations in the last two years is a result of very practical reasons. The Vietnamese economy is in shambles - a bankrupt economy. The main backer of the Vietnamese in Cambodia is the Soviet Union and they themselves are facing great economic difficulties. And this is the main reason why the Soviet Union has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan even though no solution has been found to solve her internal problems.

Sir, the prospects for durable peace in the region seems to be close at hand. I therefore support the Government's stand that there must be a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem, a settlement of both the external forces, factors which involve powers like the Soviet Union, China, Thailand and Vietnam and, of course, an internal settlement or national reconciliation. Any partial solution promoted by Vietnam which does not include national reconciliation internally will see another Afghanistan in the region. ASEAN has played a key role and a significant role at this crucial stage and we cannot afford to waver. Like Dr Lau, I worry that one ASEAN country and I am referring to Thailand is already talking about making Cambodia a marketplace even before an overall settlement is reached. In fact, direct contacts between Phnom Penh and Bangkok have already taken place. This is playing into the hands of the Vietnamese which has always used divisive tactics in its dealings with ASEAN. I wonder if any of this contributed to a lack of progress and success at the second Jakarta Informal Meeting. Of more concern to me is that Singapore was singled out for regular mention as taking a tough stand. It gives me the impression that there is no unified stand among the ASEAN countries.

My questions to the Minister are: what and how unified is the stand of ASEAN towards a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia? Secondly, what is the Minister's comment on his perception of Singapore as a hardliner in the Cambodian peace process in view of what Mr Chandra Das said of the huge marketplace that will open up in future at the end of the peace settlement? Lastly, what is his assessment of a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia being achieved before the end of next year?

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian political landscape is being reshaped. The major powers are continuing their internal adjustments. They are reordering their relationships with each other. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev is pursuing policies of internal restructuring very rigorously. It has accepted reality in Afghanistan and has sought accommodation with the United States that could significantly reconfigure the strategic balance between the superpowers. It is scaling down reliance on military force and emphasizing diplomacy and economic development. China under Deng Xiao-ping is continuing its reforms. The process of Sino-Soviet normalization is almost complete. In May when the two Soviet and Chinese leaders hold a summit, it will open up a new chapter in the Sino-Soviet relationship. New centres of economic and political power are also emerging. Japan is searching for a political role, commensurate with its economic strength and power, but also acceptable to its neighbours in the light of their experience with a resurgent Japan. South Korea and Taiwan are increasingly important actors on the world stage.

These developments are changing the texture of international politics and relations. There is greater calm in international politics, with improved prospects for the settlement of many regional problems. At the same time, new issues and stresses are emerging as clear-cut international divisions based on ideology are being blurred and alliance systems are loosening and a more complex pattern of relationships of criss-crossing interests and relationships evolves. This poses new problems of international leadership and management. After eight years of steadfast resistance to Soviet expansionism, the United States is also adjusting its domestic policies to deal with the twin deficits and adapting its regional presence to the new international environment in which it is no longer pre-eminent.

Mr Chairman, Sir, change is a fact of life. It cannot be resisted. Singapore is not a major actor on the international stage. Our ability to influence events is limited. We can only adapt to protect our national interest or take advantage of opportunities to advance them. We must ride the wave or be swamped by it. As international politics become more complex, we will need to be more alert and agile. As we become more developed, our foreign policy will also have to take on new responsibilities. New issues will be placed on our agenda. Singapore enjoys good relations with all the major actors in the world. We are well positioned to build upon existing relationships and take advantage of unfolding developments. Mr Das and other Members are correct in saying that Singapore have to adapt our foreign policy in response to developments. Recently we called back all our Heads of Missions to brief and reorientate them to the changes that are taking place and help them better prepare for the job. The United States

Sir, we are watching with interest the new American Administration's policies towards the global changes and how it will handle new political developments in the region. For more than two decades, the United States has been a vital source of stabilizing influence that contributed to the stability of the region. The United States presence will continue to be necessary to allow the region to grow economically. I believe that it will remain a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. This is because the United States is also a Pacific nation. About 15% of the US population live in the states on the littoral of the Pacific Ocean (California, Hawaii, Washington and Oregon). California is America's most populous state and also one of the most influential. About 37% of the United States' trade is with the Asia Pacific region. This is more than that with the EEC.

With such important interests at stake, the US must continue to make its presence felt - diplomatically, militarily and economically. The question is not whether there will be a US presence but what form that presence will take. The United States may find it necessary to redistribute its facilities more widely throughout the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia. We are already providing logistics support in some areas. The US Navy calls at Singapore regularly for bunkering and repairs. All countries in the region must carefully assess whether a US presence is in their interest and, if so, how, and what more they can do to facilitate their presence.

Mr Das also talks about the bilateral relationship between Singapore and the United States. Sir, there was some friction last year but Singapore and the US have decided to put this problem behind us and we look forward to the future and hope that it would be better. We share important common economic and strategic interests. President Bush and other members of his Administration, for example, Secretary Baker, are familiar figures to us. I expect that Singapore-US relations will continue to be warm and close under the Bush Administration. Given our different histori- cal experiences and traditions, debates on human rights issues will no doubt emerge from time to time. We will never see eye to eye with the United States on such issues but we will continue to act in accordance with what we believe is right and in Singapore's interests. Responsibility in Singapore's future is for Singaporeans. I think no one can deny us that fact. If our friends in the United States and elsewhere accept this fact, then the relationship will continue to be healthy.

China

Economic relations with the PRC (People's Republic of China) are well-established. In 1988, trade between Singapore and China grew by 27% over 1987. Re-exports to China increased by 108% in 1988. Singapore businessmen have invested about S$650 million in China, mostly in tourism related projects and in manufacturing. There is great scope for further economic ties. Many Singaporeans can speak both English and Mandarin and they are well-placed to facilitate business between China and the West. Political relations are also evolving. The recent announcement by China to normalize their relationship with Indonesia is a positive development. We hope to establish diplomatic relations within a year after the normalization of Sino-Indonesian relations.

The Soviet Union

There is scope to constructively expand our economic ties and other kinds of relations with the Soviet Union. We are reassessing our approach to the Soviet Union to respond appropriately to evolving Soviet policies. There have been an increase in the number of contacts between the Soviet Union and Singapore. For example, last year the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, a parliamentary delegation and several senior Soviet Foreign Ministry officials visited Singapore. I intend to visit the Soviet Union this year and details are being worked out. There will be more trade contacts and Singapore-Soviet joint ventures in business. The Trade Development Board led a mission last October to the Soviet Union and they have succeeded in establishing useful contacts with their counterparts in several foreign trade organizations. Both sides agreed that they should further explore the long term potential for business and infrastructural development as well as in the manufacturing and service sectors. Most European countries are also trying to reform and restructure their economies. This could lead to new economic opportunities and increased trade. We are also exploring the prospects in several East European countries.

Playing a Responsible Role

We want to play a responsible role. The evolving international landscape is not just political and strategic. New centres of economic power have evolved. This may result in a redistribution of the burden of managing the regional and international economic system. Singapore has long accepted the obligations of its membership in a global economy. We will continue to do so. We participated in the recent informal OECD-NIE dialogue or seminar in Paris. We think that as a result of this seminar with the OECD, the OECD countries now have a better understanding and appreciation of Singapore's position, in particular our open and free trade system. The dialogue will continue as and when necessary, but there is no foreseeable prospect for a non-formal mechanism.

Sir, Mr Das is concerned about the world forming trading blocs which may pose a danger to the world trading system. My view is that the world trading system is fundamentally and basically sound. The on-going Uruguay Round is the latest in the series of trade negotiations intended to maintain the system. And it is the most complex set of multi-lateral trade negotiations since the formation of GATT in 1947. The main stumbling blocks, of course, are the differences between the developed countries on such issues as agricultural subsidies. Agreement has been reached on many areas. Progress depends on the ability of the developed countries to resolve their differences.

We should not be too hasty to conclude that the recent developments such as the USA-Canada FTA and the move towards the formation of trading blocs or a single European Market in 1992 presages the break-up of the world trading system into regional blocs. The EEC has given us assurances that Europe will not retreat into a fortressed Europe. The US-Canada FTA can indeed be regarded as an example of how trade barriers can be reduced. Given the increased interdependence of the world economy, it is difficult for countries or for regions to shut themselves off from one another.

While it is not desirable to form regional blocs there is merit in looser and more open arrangements such as the proposal by Prime Minister Hawke of Australia for a consultative arrangement on economic matters in the Asia-Pacific region provided such consultations are structured so as to assuage fears that we are moving into a Pacific trading bloc. They could serve to examine how regional countries could be better integrated into the world trading and financial systems. The Asia-Pacific countries are outward looking and depend heavily on the world markets and this could be in their own interest. Besides the Australians, the Japanese and the Americans have also made proposals for closer Asia-Pacific consultations. Some ASEAN countries have expressed an interest. We shall certainly study these proposals closely.

Singapore also attended the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference regularly. We will continue to support proposals for consultative dialogue among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. We recognize that our ability to influence events or developments is limited. But as a nation that depends on trade and foreign investment to survive, it is in our interest to continue to alert all countries to the growing stresses in the international trading system and to sound the alarm whenever the door threatens to close.

ASEAN-US Initiative (AUI)

Mr Das asked about the ASEAN-US Initiative or AUI. This is one possibility for reducing barriers that is being discussed. The US is the largest trading partner for the ASEAN countries. A study on the AUI has been prepared by academics from the ASEAN countries and the US. This envisages the establishment of a broad framework bilateral agreement within which each ASEAN country may conclude bilateral agreement with the US to mutually reduce trade barriers and increase investments and other economic links. If this can be achieved, the AUI will increase trade and investment between ASEAN and the United States. However, both Asean and the United States need to show greater interest for the AUI to progress or move forward.

International Assistance

We recognize our obligations in other areas too. The total amount of Singapore's current international assistance is about $36 million. It represents more than 0.1% of our GNP. This, I believe, compares favourably with more developed and larger economies like the United States which is 0.2% of their GNP, UK 0.28% and Japan 0.31%. Our contributions include donations to aid-related international organizations, Colombo Plan and ASEAN training awards, the imputed costs of other training schemes, bilateral assistance programmes and our contributions to disaster relief. We provide training programmes in a wide variety of fields from public housing to software design, hotel management, air traffic control, port management and telecommunications. As a responsible member of the international community, Singapore will continue to seek other means of contributing, within our capabilities, to the welfare of the international community as a whole. Our contributions, however, need not be monetary. We will continue to offer training facilities and manpower in areas where we have expertise.

Economic Diplomacy

To take advantage of the opportunites and face up to the challenges, Singapore will need to emphasize its economic diplomacy. We should optimize the use of our limited human and other resources by better coordination between the Foreign Ministry, the Economic Development Board, the Trade Development Board, the Tourist Promotion Board and other agen- cies. This can help the Government to be more effective in alerting our private sector businessmen to new trade and investment opportunities, keeping our markets open and attracting foreign investments to Singapore.

Japan

As Singapore explores means of adjusting its international role, we may find a more common ground with a Japan that is also undergoing a similar process, albeit on a much larger scale. There may be a need for intensified consultations and cooperation with Japan on economic and political issues of mutual concern. There is scope to broaden and deepen bilateral ties. We can cooperate to extend joint technical training to developing countries in Africa and the South Pacific.

Relations with Indochina

Mr Das also asked about our relations with Indochina. The reordering of power relationships in the Asia-Pacific region will affect developments in Southeast Asia. Now that China and the Soviet Union have decided to settle their differences, it is no longer in doubt that there will be a political solution to the Cambodian problem. The question then is: what kind of solution? The Second Jakarta Informal Meeting (or JIM II as is commonly called) that was held last month has spelt out the basic elements for a political solution, encompassing such key elements as the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, an international control mechanism and national reconciliation. We now know more clearly where each country and party concerned stands on such key questions. What remains to be negotiated are the details and the practical implementation of the broad principles that have been setout in the JIM II Chairman's statement.

Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime have hardened their positions, perhaps in anticipation of being forced into serious negotiations or it could also be due to what Dr Lau Teik Soon mentioned regarding the publicity that Hun Sen received. Singapore believes that a just and durable solution, which will be in the interests of all Cambodian parties concerned, must be based on a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and genuine power-sharing among the four Cambodian parties under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk. We believe that there must be free and fair elections under the international supervision for the Cambodian people to exercise their right of self-determination.

A settlement in Cambodia is only a matter of time. We are beginning to look beyond the Cambodian problem to our future relationship with Indochina. The scope will increase in step with progress towards a political solution. Diplomatic relations will be established after the Cambodian problem is resolved. ASEAN has encouraged the international community to suspend aid to Vietnam because of its invasion and occupation of Cambodia. This can be reassessed if there is a just settlement in Cambodia. Meanwhile, there is no international trade embargo against Vietnam. Singapore's policy on economic contacts is to allow normal commercial transactions to take place while discouraging aid, training, infrastructural development and trade in strategic goods. Trade with Indochina is an insignificant proportion of our total world trade. It is less than 1%.

There are no complicating historical animosities between Singapore and the Indochinese countries. As a small country, we do not threaten their economic independence. As a relatively sophisticated economy, we can contribute technical expertise to their economic development in areas such as banking, oil refining, telecommunications, port management and air services. But the full development of the potential must await a comprehensive, durable and just settlement of the Cambodian problem.

Mr Chng Hee Kok asked whethere there is a difference of opinion among ASEAN and whether we have taken too hard a stand. Let me assure him, Sir, that there is no difference in opinion among ASEAN countries. Just one month before the Jakarta Informal Meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Brunei Darussalam and we agreed and stressed that all parties concerned should strive for a comprehen- sive political settlement of the Cambodian problem involving both external and internal aspects in an integral way. That means both the external and internal aspects must be resolved together, and the Foreign Ministers also reaffirmed their determination to work for the interests of the Cambodian people by continuing their cooperation with the Coalition Government of Democratic Cambodia. They also reaffirmed their view on the future government of Cambodia, ie, sovereign, independent, neutral and non-aligned under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. While Singapore may have been more outspoken, there is no difference in view on the basic question of supporting the Cambodians.

The Post Cambodia Regional Order

For the post-Cambodia regional order, it is worthwhile therefore being patient because the nature of the settlement in Cambodia will affect more than the bilateral relations with Indochina. It will have a profound influence on the basic questions of sovereignty and security. The issue is who will determine the future regional order and whether the decision will take into account the interests of all parties and countries concerned. The nature of the settlement will also determine whether there will be durable peace or whether Cambodia will continue to be a source of instability, threatening the security of its neighbours.

Whatever the outcome, relations with Malaysia, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries will continue to be the core of our foreign policy. Over the last decade, Cambodia was the central political issue that bound ASEAN together. Once the Cambodian problem is behind us, ASEAN will have to find new rallying points or risk drifting apart, to the detriment of regional cooperation and bilateral relationships. Vietnam has said that it would like to join ASEAN. This could change the character of the organization and jeopardize further ASEAN cooperation. It is still too early to say what will happen. At present, there are more questions than answers. But a just settlement in Cambodia will ease Vietnam's integration into the regional order. Staffing in the Foreign Ministry to meet these Challenges

Sir, the challenges and the opportunities ahead make it essential that Singapore develops an efficient and sophisticated Foreign Service. Our officers must be nimble-footed and alert. The importance of the Foreign Service is not in doubt. The conduct of diplomacy has become more professionalized, but we must have a stronger service to meet the tough challenges. More needs to be done to strengthen the staffing position.

Conclusion

Sir, the world is changing and Singapore must change with it. The major powers are reordering their relationships with each other, creating new opportunities and new challenges. Singapore cannot resist change but is well positioned to take advantage of unfolding developments. Our foreign policy is being adjusted to protect our national interests and take advantage of the opportunities in the context of a more fluid environment. We are emphasizing economic diplomacy. There is potential to expand economic and other kinds of relations with the Soviet Union and China. We are considering how best we can fit in as the United States adapts its regional presence to the new environment.

We may find more common ground with a Japan that is seeking a new international role. We are looking beyond the settlement of the Cambodian problem to future relations with the Indochinese countries. As we become more developed, Singapore will also have to take on additional responsibilities. Within our means and resources, we will continue to contribute to the welfare of the international community and the management of the international economy. There are many uncertainties. A settlement in Cambodia will reshape the regional order in Southeast Asia in ways that cannot be accurately predicted. ASEAN may face new stresses. Singapore has no choice but to adapt. To do so, we need an agile and alert diplomacy. To ensure that the Foreign Service will be able to match the challenges, there is a need to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of Foreign Service officers and to reward them adequately.

Mr Chandra Das also asked whether the proposal to require Singaporeans to have at least half a tank of petrol before they go to Johor will discourage Singaporeans from going to Johor. Sir, the Government encourages Singaporean tourists to visit Johor. It is not the Government's intention to hamper the flow of tourists to Johor. The Bills are only intended to plug loophole in the current legislation. This is to allow the Government to continue to use petrol duty as a measure of restricting the car population and usage in Singapore. It should not discourage Singaporeans from going to Johor.

Mr Chandra Das: Sir, I have one other query for the Hon. Minister. This refers to the British Foreign Office statement today regarding the position of Anthony Lester. I do not know who is telling the truth. The British Foreign Office now says that Mr Anthony Lester did not press them to take up the issue. If I may read the Straits Times:

'Secondly, the statement in the second paragraph that Mr Lester pressed us to do this is simply untrue. He did not.'

Sir, if QC Anthony Lester did not press the British government, then why was it necessary for the British Foreign Office even to make a statement on the subject? Another part which the spokesman has indicated and, if I may quote again, he says:

'Obviously, I can't say what will happen in the future....'

This smacks of a mild threat and I do not know whether the Foreign Office still believes that we are part of the British Empire. Maybe the Foreign Minister can comment on this.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I too read the same article that appeared in today's Straits Times and I note that the British Foreign Office spokesman said that he did not anticipate getting involved in a battle over Anthony Lester. Neither does Singapore want to get involved or be in a tussle with the British Foreign Office on this matter. But there is a need to set the record straight, as Mr Das suggested.

The Foreign Office spokesman said he was puzzled by the first sentence of our statement which says that it is a matter for the Singapore Government. I do not know why there is a need for him to be puzzled because all we said is that there is no basis for the FCO to express regrets on the Singapore Government's decision. The statement by the Ministry on 15th March clearly said that the Singapore Government had unilaterally allowed British QCs to appear in our courts and that this arrangement was not the result of any government-to-government understanding or agreement and can therefore be withdrawn unilaterally and without any reason although, in this case, the Government gave reason for not allowing Mr Lester to practise.

If the FCO spokesman had not understood this vital point, then I think it bears repeating that British QCs are allowed to appear in Singapore as a privilege extended by the Singapore Government and not by a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom. This is a matter in which the UK government has no say and for which the British FCO has no business to express regrets. Let me repeat that we do not want an isolated case between the Singapore Government and a QC to lead to friction with the UK or to result in a withdrawal of the privilege for QCs to practise in Singapore courts. However, if the British FCO continues to use this isolated case which does not involve it to criticize the Singapore Government's decision and to create ill-will between the two governments, then it may be better for us not to have British QCs in Singapore at all. Right now there is still no intention to withdraw this privilege from the British QCs.

The second point which the British FCO spokesman said was that "the second paragraph that Mr Lester pressed us to do this is simply untrue. He did not." I will have to trace the events that appeared in the press.

On the 15th of March, reported in our Straits Times by the Straits Times London correspondent, the correspondent wrote that:

'He [referring to the spokesman] said Mr Lester had been in touch with the Foreign Office over the issue, but stressed that he had not pressed them to make representations on his behalf to the Singapore Government.'

It is the FCO that said that Lester did not press them. What did we say in our statement? We said:

'The claim that Mr Lester had not pressed the FCO to make representations on his behalf ["the claim", this is not our claim, it is theirs] is clearly contributed by Mr Lester's frequent use of the Foreign Secretary's name and by FCO officials who stated that they were speaking under ministerial instructions.'

Therefore, it was Mr Lester who had used the Foreign Secretary's name frequently and the British officials who had said that the Foreign Secretary had a personal interest in the matter, and that Mr Lester knew the Foreign Secretary, and that they were speaking on ministerial instruction. If the FCO spokesman does not want the Foreign Secretary's name to be used, then they should not have invoked it in the first place or allow Mr Lester to continue to use his name. It is entirely up to the FCO.

Mr Chandra Das: Mr Chairman, I thank the Minister for his very detailed and generous reply. On this note, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Chairman: Amendment No. (2), Mr Das.

Mr Chandra Das: Sir, I beg to move,

That the sum to be allocated for Head O to be reduced by $10 in respect of Code OA 1500 of the Main Estimates.

Sir, in moving this amendment, I have three questions for the Minister.

Firstly, recognizing the manpower needs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be unique, does the Ministry have any special plans to administer a special scholarship scheme in order to develop Career Foreign Service Officers, something like the SAF Scholarships Scheme?

Secondly, Sir, I think knowledge of a foreign language is necessary for members of the Foreign Service. I would like to ask the Minister whether he has a formal programme to promote the learning of foreign languages: if so, how many officers have benefited so far? And also, does the Ministry pay officers a language proficiency allowance as an incentive for them to take up an additional language?

Lastly, Sir, on the question of training, could the Minister enlighten us whether the on-the-job training programme administered for Foreign Service Officers will also include attachments to private sector companies. Right now, I am told that the on-the-job training is limited to statutory boards and government-owned companies.

Dr Ong Chit Chung (Bukit Batok): Sir, with your permission, I will take items (a) and (b) together.

Sir, as our economy expands and becomes even more export-oriented, we need to expand our representation in various parts of the world. As it is, it is a more complex, and sometimes bewildering, world.

My question is: have we recruited a sufficient number of high-calibre officers for this vital Foreign Service? I understand that there are at present about 100 Division I officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manning the Headquarters and 26 overseas missions, and the net increase in the last few years has been insignificant. This, I believe, is hardly sufficient for our needs.

I suggest that the Ministry take stock of the situation and review its recruitment exercises. Are the terms and conditions of service sufficiently attractive? We hope it will improve with today's announcement. Are the Overseas Cost of Living Allowances (OCLA) adequate? Are there any publicity campaigns in the mass media?

I think that the recruitment mechanism will greatly improve if a separate Foreign Service Commission is set up to recruit and review officers for promotion. It can be structured along the line of the Legal Service Commission. The Chairman of PSC or his representative can sit on the Foreign Service Commission, but within its structure, the Commission will have greater flexibility and will be able to devote itself wholeheartedly to the task of recruiting and grooming our Foreign Service Officers. There is also a precedent in the Armed Forces Council which takes charge of all personnel matters in the SAF. We, Sir, should do likewise for the Foreign Service.

And to fill the gaps in-between, the Ministry should appoint more roving ambassadors. Our two roving ambassadors to Papua New Guinea and the Latin American countries have served us well, and in the last Budget debate, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that more should be appointed. However, up to now, no new appointments have been announced. I am sure the GPC on Defence and Foreign Affairs would be happy to act as talent scout and supply the Ministry with a list of names of potential ambassadors.

There is also the issue of training for the Foreign Service Officers. The diplomat's job, Sir, has become more and more complex. The current practice, however, is to recruit the officer and let him learn on the job, calling it on-the-job training. Sometimes the officers are sent overseas for short courses or post-graduate courses on an ad hoc basis. Such improvization would not do. There should be a thorough review of training. New recruits should be put through two years or at least one year of intensive training, especially training in languages, which are essential tools for the diplomat. And I believe that our Foreign Service Officers are weak in this area.

The numbers, Sir, are too small for the establishment of a School for Diplomats, but surely an experienced diplomat could be appointed as the in-house Director of Training, who could draw upon the expertise of consultants from such institutions as the Fletcher School of Diplomacy and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

With regard to overseas missions, the GPC on Defence and Foreign Affairs has done a study and submitted a copy of the report to the Minister. In this study we found that there are glaring gaps in our overseas representation.

Firstly, the NIEs constitute an area of dynamic growth and opportunities. Though we have direct representation in Hong Kong and Taiwan, we only have an honorary consul in Seoul. This, Sir, is terribly inadequate. With the recent trade liberalization policy in South Korea, there is an urgent need to upgrade our representation and to avail ourselves of the trade opportunities there.

Secondly, in North America, there is need for direct representation in Canada, which is currently covered by our Permanent Representative at the UN, based in New York. This is particularly important with the Free Trade Agreement between the USA and Canada, and the expansion of the Canadian market. We should, moreover, strengthen our representation in the United States, and run a strong public relations programme, for example, over the issue of protectionism.

Thirdly, our representation in Eastern Europe is weak, as it is covered indirectly by our men in other European capitals and as far as Cairo.

The Chairman: Dr Ong, you are not giving time for a reply. There are only 4 minutes left.

Dr Ong Chit Chung: Fourthly, there is no direct representation in the European Free Trade Area, and I think we should also send someone there.

As regards coordination of foreign policy mission, I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have someone based in Singapore to coordinate the various agencies.

The Chairman: Encik Wan Hussin, are you prepared to give way?

Encik Wan Hussin bin Haji Zoohri: Yes.

The Chairman: Thank you.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr Peter Sung): Mr Chairman, Sir, on behalf of my Minister, I would request that those people who have not got an answer in the next 4 minutes might want to raise questions for oral answer later on.

The Chairman: Good idea.

Mr Peter Sung: Roving ambassadors

Yes, we have only two. Not enough. We are appointing some and we are looking at some. And if the GPC can help us talent scout, we would be grateful.

On recruitment

Yes, there are difficulties. Salary is the main thing as the Minister for Trade and Industry has stated earlier. We are allowed 11 recruits every year by the Ministry of Finance. Our best recruitment was, in fact, during the recession years. Net increase was 7 in 1985 and 11 in 1986; 1987, 1. For 1988, the net increase was minus 1. At the moment we have 23 vacancies in Division I, and 5 in Division II.

OCLA

Our officers claim it is not enough.

Foreign Service Commision

We can consider that.

Ambassadors

Ambassadors have a hard life. They leave their homeland to serve in foreign countries, resulting in disruption to their family. Children's education and their wives' careers have to be interrupted. They make considerable sacrifices. And with the low salary, it does not help. More than half of our ambassadors serving overseas are non-career officers. When I last made a check, I found that when they come in to help us, they are already making a sacrifice. And even with that sacrifice, we are paying them more than 50% more than our career officers as ambassadors.

Scholarships

Yes, we raised that with the PSC in 1982. But PSC was then not convinced. We will try again. The task ahead is difficult. But we will press ahead.

Training

One or two years in a course specifically for language sounds very good. We would like to have that. Unfortunately with so many vacancies, we do not have the fat to rotate people for this kind of training. When they come in, they go straight into the job. Mr Das asked whether we can rotate some to the private sector. Good idea, but they may not come back.

Yes, we do have training in languages, in social graces, in communications, in technical skills, in professional skills. Our most effective kind of training is, in fact, job rotation. They do one job after another, they get to their position, sink or swim. Usually they swim.

We do not have enough numbers to start a Foreign Service Training Institute, as Dr Ong has said. We will press on to make-do with whatever we can. We will try to get the PSC to give us overseas scholarships.

Performance

In spite of all these difficulties, our overseas representation has earned us high reputation. Our missions abroad are usually thin compared to other missions. And I can say that the quality of the work that they do have earned the praised of many Foreign Missions, despite the difficulties.

I think that is all the time I have before the guillotine falls. But if there are further questions, and we have a couple of minutes, I might take one or two more.

Mr Chandra Das: Mr Chairman, I must thank the Minister of State for his very quick answers. Just for his information, the GPC on Foreign Affairs has already submitted a list of potential roving ambassadors sometime ago to the Minister. On this note, Sir, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The sum of $60,496,300 for Head O ordered to stand part of the Main Estimates.

The sum of $16,290,000 for Head O ordered to stand part of the Development Estimates.

The Chairman: Order. Time for suspension.

Thereupon Mr Speaker left the Chair of the Committee and took the Chair of the House