CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT NO. 3) BILL
Parliament of Singapore · 3 January 1991
Official Report, 3 January 1991, Vol 56, Issue 11 · Open in the reader (summaries, search, filters)
Order for Third Reading read.
The Prime Minister and Minister for Defence (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."
We have taken a long time and taken our time to bring the Bill to this stage, deliberately. The Elected President proposal is an important innovation to the way we govern ourselves. It seeks to check and balance the powers of the elected Government in two key areas - the spending of reserves accumulated by a previous government and the preservation of integrity of the public service. It is an innovation tailored to meet the unique circumstances of Singapore. Because it will change our familiar system of government, we have moved step by step to take this Bill through Parliament.
The Elected President proposal was first mooted by the then Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew in 1984. The first White Paper was published and then debated upon four years later. A second White Paper incorporating useful suggestions by MPs and members of the public was tabled in August 1990. This was followed by the Bill, and a thorough debate on the Bill in October last year, at the end of which I referred the Bill to a Select Committee. The Report of the Select Committee is now before the House.
The Select Committee considered some 34 serious representations and sought clarifications from 10 representors in public sittings. I believe the Bill, as amended by the Select Committee, is practical and effective in meeting its objectives.
I want to place on record my and the Government's appreciation for the many constructive comments and criticisms and suggestions made by both MPs and representors. Their participation has been useful and helpful. The Bill is the better for it.
For the debate today, I propose that we avoid covering old grounds. I suggest that we focus on the Report of the Select Committee and the various changes made to the Bill. I shall myself focus only on three politically more significant areas:
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pre-qualifying the Presidential candidates;
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requiring candidates who are members of political parties to resign from their party before nomination day; and
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requiring the President to consult the Council of Presidential Advisors on appointments.
Changes have also been made to the financial provisions but I shall not deal with them because they are essentially technical. These changes are an improvement. They increase the effectiveness of the financial provisions but without unduly hampering the operations of Government, statutory boards and Government companies.
On the first major issue, this was whether we should retain the approach in the original Bill whereby Presidential candidates are required to meet more than minimal constitutional qualifications and disqualifications. The original Bill seeks to require exacting standards of competence, experience and rectitude of Presidential candidates. But some representors argued that the qualifications would deprive many people from the chance of being elected President.
The Select Committee examined this issue at length and decided to retain the pre-qualification approach. The Report listed many reasons but the main reason is that it must not be easier for a person to become a President than a Prime Minister. In other words, if you compare the position of the President with that of the Prime Minister, one should not be able to become the President much more easily than to become the Prime Minister. I agree.
The Elected President's responsibility is as critical as that of the Prime Minister's. He has to ensure that Singapore does not fall apart through a drop in the high standard of governing. This is not an easy job. He has to keep an eye on the Government in the two key areas entrusted to him, and if he disagrees with the Govern- ment, to withhold consent to specific proposals of the Prime Minister within these two areas. This means he must be at least as experienced and wise as the Prime Minister, if not, more so, and have the moral stature to say 'no' to the Government.
The President's moral stature is important. If he lacks the necessary experience and stature, he will not have the moral weight to veto the Prime Minister should he hold a contrary view. This moral standing can come only if the President is a man of substance, tested and known for his integrity, objectivity, competence and judgment. It cannot come simply through winning elections.
To give a plausible scenario: if qualified men do not come forward to stand for elections, an unsuitable man may be elected by default. Such a man will not have the moral authority to hold the second key. Having an unsuitable man elected as President is not a figment of the imagination. In my experience, fighting elections over the last 14 years, good candidates generally fight shy of elections as MPs while many unsuitable ones rush in, hoping for a strike.
We cannot chance a freak election result in Presidential elections. It defeats the very purpose of having an Elected President if a freak result is possible. Pre-qualifying all Presidential candidates removes the nightmare of freak Presidential election results because the contest would be between qualified people. Whoever is chosen can do the job.
I move on to the second major area, and this is whether candidates for the Presidency should resign from their political party. The Bill, as it originally stood, did not have this requirement. Several representors argued before the Committee that the Elected President should sever all links with the political party to which he belonged. As Members know, the Select Committee has accepted that: firstly, a candidate in a Presidential election must cease to be a member of any political party on nomination day; secondly, after he has been elected, he must affirm on oath that he will not allow any past affiliation with any political party to affect the discharge of his duties.
Between the two recommendations, the second, ie, taking an oath, is more important in ensuring that the President is objective and impartial in dealing with any government. As for the first, it does not follow that a President cannot discharge his duties impartially, or cannot be regarded as the President of the entire nation, merely because he continues to be a member of his political party.
Consider the following points. In the elections, what would be at issue? Surely, it is the candidate's competence and experience for the job as well as his character and reputation, rather than his political affiliation. He either has, or does not have, these qualities. If he has them, being a member of a political party will not prevent him from dutifully discharging his duties. Also, once elected, the President has to take a solemn oath to discharge his duties to the nation as a whole. Note the words "bear true faith and allegiance to the Republic". He is bound by this oath which overrides his own personal interest and that of his party, family or friends.
It is fallacious to argue that one cannot live up to this oath just because he continues to be a member of his party. As the Select Committee rightly observes:
'It does not follow that a President who is a member of a political party is incapable of discharging his functions impartially. Every President has to take an oath of office and affirm that he will discharge his duties "without fear or favour, affection or ill-will". He is bound by this oath for the duration of his term of office. If voters believe that a candidate cannot live up to this oath, they should not elect him. A candidate who is likely not to heed the oath and instead pursue partisan political interests will probably do so even if he formally severs his links with his Party.'
I do not therefore think that actual party affiliation is so critical that it should disqualify a person becoming the President. The election of the President is about electing a man of integrity, experience and ability who will put national interests above all other interests, including his own, and those of his family and friends and those of his party during his term of office.
Why then did I propose amendments to accept the view of the representors? It is to make the proposal more acceptable to the public. As the Report explains on page IX,
'... the President must not only be above party politics but be manifestly seen to be so. If he continues to be a member of a political party there may be lingering doubts that the President is still subject to party discipline and is thus constrained to act in accordance with decisions of his party caucus. It may be more re-assuring to the public if the President stood for election in his own right and not on a party platform.'
The concept of an Elected President with safeguard/veto powers is a major innovation in our constitutional development. I sensed that many people who had reservations on the concept of an Elected President might come on board if we required the President to be seen to act indepedepently, in other words, to resign from political parties before or on nomination day. As delinking the President from his party makes the scheme more acceptable, I am happy to go along with the representors. But we should still allow campaigning by political parties. Political parties should be allowed to support any candidate, whether or not he belongs to that party. This point is stressed in the Report. Otherwise, Presidential candidates will not have the manpower and resources to campaign for their own elections.
Another change made by the Select Committee is to require the President to consult the Council of Presidential Advisors (CPA) when exercising its safeguard role on appointments. Originally, the Bill made it obligatory for the President to consult the CPA when exercising his discretionary powers only in respect of budgets of Government, statutory boards and key Government companies. On all other matters, the President had a choice whether or not to consult the CPA. I consider this change to be important for two reasons. Firstly, no President on his own will have enough knowledge about every individual appointee for key positions. Making it mandatory for him to consult the CPA ensures that he has additional comments, information and advice before he approves or vetoes the appointment. Of course, the final decision still rests with the President. Secondly, this change gives a greater role for the Council of Presidential Advisors. As pointed out in the Report, the Select Committee is "in favour of strengthening the CPA as an important organ of state, helping the President to carry out his functions".
I also share the Select Committee's hope that "The CPA will ... develop a continuity and identity of its own. Over time, it should grow in importance, perhaps evolving into a Council of State which several representors favoured."
Apart from these three changes, I would also like to draw the attention of Members to paragraphs 71 to 73 of the Committee's Report. This concerns the amendment to the Bill which will allow different provisions to be brought into operation on different dates. The Committee has pointed out that the changes we are making to our Constitution are novel arrangements unparalleled elsewhere in the world. They are unique. They will bring about fundamental changes to law and procedure for Government, the key statutory boards and for the key Government companies. Although many minds have worked out the concepts and later translated them into legal provisions, it will not be possible to anticipate every problem at this stage. No matter how thorough we have been, there will be unforeseen problems in actual implementation.
The Select Committee has quite rightly said that we should give ourselves a grace period for making amendments in the light of actual implementation. Such amendments ought not be subject to the strict provisions of a referendum set out in new Article 5(2A). Hence, new Article 5(2A) should be brought into operation only after this period of adjustments and refinements. I agree with this comment. But the Select Committee was probably too optimistic in believing that a period of two years would be enough to iron out all the problems. I favour giving ourselves more time, to avoid having to go to referendum on procedural and technical provisions. I suggest we give ourselves at least four years for adjustments, modifications and refinements to be made.
Let me conclude by putting this Bill in the context of the philosophy which my Cabinet and I have in governing Singapore. I have stated this before, but it is important that I re-state my position. We believe that a good system of Government must have checks and balances. Our present parliamentary system of Government does not provide adequate checks. A political party which holds the majority of seats in Parliament can do practically anything it wishes, provided it acts lawfully. It can take any decision on our reserves and on appointment of key civil service positions. We consider that no Government, present or future, should be allowed to do this without some form of check and balance.
I have steered this Bill through this House from start to finish. I have done so because I strongly believe in it. I believe it is necessary to safeguard Singapore's long term future, to prevent it from being ruined or bankrupted by an irresponsible or unscrupulous government. I am putting my money where my mouth is. I am subjecting my Government to these new checks and balances. We are prepared to have our powers audited by a President and a Council of Presidential Advisors for the good of Singapore. I commend this Bill to you as it strengthens our system of Government.
Sir, I beg to move.
Mr Speaker: Two minor amendments, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, need to be done.
In page 1, line 4, (i) to leave out "No. 3"; and (ii) to leave out "1990" and insert "1991".
These will be done.
Question proposed.
Mr Lim Boon Heng (Kebun Baru): Mr Speaker, Sir, when the concept of an elected President was debated in this House following the publication of the first White Paper, I spoke in support of it. Much has been done since then.
I rise today to support the Bill, as amended by the Select Committee. I do not wish to delve into the details of the Bill, as this has been amply done in the Second Reading, and during the hearings and proceedings of the Select Committee. What I wish to highlight to the House is that the process by which this Bill has been considered is a fine example of the practice of consultation and consensus.
Consultation and consensus is a mark of the style and approach of our new Prime Minister. It is befitting that in the early stages of his premiership, we have a fine example of this practice.
There had been two important reservations made on the practice of consultation and consensus. One is that it is a weakening of political leadership. Some would have preferred that Government, when it identifies a problem, or sets an objective, comes out with one solution to the people, and that it should be explained by the Government, and accepted by the poeple, without modification. The other reservation is that consultation and consensus is no more than a "wayang", because views are not accepted and no changes are made to the original policy. This Bill has proven both reservations wrong.
Government had seen the long term risks facing the country because the existing system of checks and balances is inadequate. Its objective is to correct this inadequacy. It considered various options, and provided the one it felt best meets the needs of the country. In doing so, Government has exercised political initiative. Government felt that the change intended to the Constitution was substantial and unique. It felt that we would benefit from contributions from the public. It provided for participation by the people through the Select Committee proceedings.
It is gratifying that not only did Members of Parliament voice their views, and those of their constituents, but that there were 40 written submissions from individuals and groups. Most of them were well considered submissions. I would like to single out one that impressed me most. It is the submission made by a group of university students Ž from the National University of Singapore Democratic Socialist Club.
The Democratic Socialist Club held an informal discussion, and produced a crisp, concise and valuable paper. This is how constructive debate on policies of state should be carried out. Youth has been no impediment.
I am particularly glad that the Select Committee called them up for oral discussion. They deserved to be called because of the quality of their submission. It augurs well for our country that we have young people like them who take an active interest in the affairs of state, who are willing and able to voice their considered opinions. Theirs is an example that should convince those who had reservations on the seriousness of the Government in encouraging participatory democracy.
Several proposals made by the Democratic Socialist Club were accepted by the Select Committee. The most important one, in my opinion, is that the Elected President should sever ties with his political party, if any, when he assumes office. The students shared the view held by many Singaporeans that this is necessary to ensure impartiality in the highest office of the land.
I am glad that the Select Committee has accepted this recommendation. It is one of the many suggestions put forward by various groups that was accepted by the Select Committee. I feel credit should also be given to the Feedback Unit. As a result of its discussions with the public, it recommended specifically that the views of the Law Society and the Society of Accountants be sought. These views were sought and both organisations gave serious and constructive views and some of the recommendations which they have made have also been included. No one can now say that all this has been a "wayang". The views of the people count, and they have been incorporated. As a result, we have a much better Bill before us.
The political leadership exercised by the Government is the stronger for having consulted the people, for having sought consensus. Sir, this is the way it should be in the future, Government working hand-in-hand with the people, for the people.
Sir, I support the Bill.
Dr Koh Lam Son (Telok Blangah): Mr Speaker, Sir, first, let me commend the Members of the Select Committee for being diligent in its proceedings, adapting and even changing to accommodate a wide spectrum of public views on the subject of the Elected President.
Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to give the Bill my fullest support, even though I feel compelled to raise some points on the Bill. I am going to confine my remarks to a few areas which I consider need further scrutiny.
Let me begin by saying that this Government first mooted the idea of an Elected President and, as such, I believe it will not allow any misuse or abuse of power. That being the case, we can accept the fact that members of the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) and the Council of Presidential Advisors (CPA) would not be open to "outside" pressures, even though they all have been appointed. They may on the surface appear to be biased towards the Government's point of view, but we can be assured that this present Government will not in any way force its views on members of the PEC or CPA. However, while this Government will not fall prey to such tactics, there is always the question: would some other government sometime in the future be tempted to cajole its appointees to make the Elected President unable to function?
The CPA functions like a "mini-Senate". It not only advises the President but also has the power to veto Presidential decisions. In my view, it would have been ideal if all the members of the CPA are elected members themselves. But this is not to be so under the present Bill. Under the circumstances, with two members appointed by the President, two by the Prime Minister, the fifth and final member, in my view, should not be the Chairman of the PSC, but a neutral and highly respected Singaporean. This person can in fact be appointed by the PEC so as to give the CPA a well-balanced look. By this, I mean this fifth member is neither a President's man nor a government man, but truly an independent person who in fact would have in himself all the qualifications to be an Elected President.
Mr Speaker, I would also prefer that the pre-qualifications be kept to a minimum so as to increase the pool of talented and capable men from which a President can be elected. I say this because it is the most democratic thing to do. This system has worked well for us, Members of Parlia- ment. The people must have the right and the choice to elect or reject a candidate.
I also feel that as the Bill presently stands, there is far too much emphasis on this expertise on financial management before a person can qualify to be considered a candidate for the post of Elected President. This, to me, is too restrictive. I feel that we would be depriving ourselves of many talented, honest and, in some instances, internationally renowned Singaporeans from standing for the post because of this proviso of financial expertise. As an example, Mr Speaker, a person with the international stature of Prof Tommy Koh would be excluded because of his non-financial background.
Mr Speaker, I am fully aware that among the prime reasons why the post of Elected President is being created is to help safeguard our financial reserves. But it is also true that in other countries, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and members of Cabinet routinely function to preserve their national coffers. And may I add, many Presidents who oversee their national reserves do not have financial background at all.
The point, Mr Speaker, is that a man of great leadership abilities with no financial background can safeguard our reserves -- the reserves which we have slowly built up over the years. So let the very stringent restrictions be removed, and let us allow Singaporeans their democratic right to elect a person they have confidence in.
As a final point, Sir, I would also like to add that the Chief Justice or even a High Court Judge should be included in the PEC. For if a judgment of candidate is to be made, surely a senior judicial officer will be in the best position to judge the worthiness or otherwise of a possible Elected President.
Mr Goh Choon Kang (Braddell Heights): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Select Committee has adopted quite a number of recommendations made by representors from members of the public. In general, this adoption has made the Bill more comprehensive. This is a good phenomenon. It has also brought about the realisation of the consensus-style of the new Prime Minister.
Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to raise two points on the Report of the Select Committee. Firstly, it is on the pre-qualifications of candidates for Elected President. One is the age limit. The Select Committee recommends that there should be no upper ceiling on the age limit. I would agree, because different people have different strengths in spite of age. But I do not agree that we set a minimum age of 45. Perhaps the age of 45 is the consensus opinion of the Members of the Select Committee. But there is no special reason or basis given in the Report that 45 is the best minimum age that we should accept. No special reason has been given. Just now, the Prime Minister said that the main reason was that the qualifications for candidates for the Elected Presidency should be more stringent than those applicable to the candidates for the Prime Ministership. That I can agree. But why should it be fixed at 45 as the minimum age?
If a person is below the age of 45, but he has all the capability to perform the duties of the Elected President, then he should not be denied the right to stand as a candidate. For example, if we impose the minimum age of 45 on the candidate for Prime Ministership, then our Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew who took the office of Prime Minister at the age of 35 would be affected. So if you had 45 as the minimum age, then we would have lost 10 years of the benefit of his service. The political scenario of Singapore could have been different.
Of course, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would agree that it is difficult to have a very objective standard or norm for the minimum age limit. If at all, a minimum age must be fixed, then according to Confucius, he said that a man could stand on his own at the age of 30 (in other words, he can establish a family), he would be non-confused or not perplexed at the age of 40 (in other words, he can think for himself) and at the age of 50, he would know his destiny (in other words, he knows the limit of his life). At the age of 60, he would know that his hearing will fail and then there will be no point for him to argue. So he will be less argumentative at the age of 60. At the age of 70, he would be able to do whatever he likes. He has reached the peak of his life. So if at all we find that age 30 is too low, because that is just the beginning of his career, then perhaps we should fix it at 40, that is, the age at which he will not be perplexed. We should not stick to 45. We can lower it to 40.
The second point I wish to raise, Mr Speaker, Sir, is that once the Bill is passed in this House, there may be unexpected problems surfacing after the passing of the Bill. The Select Committee thinks that there may be some unforeseen difficulties and problems emerging after the passing of the Bill. Then adjustments or amendments will have to be made. Such amendments and adjustments will not be subject to new Article 5(2A). In other words, such amendments need not go through the process of a national referendum.
So the Select Committee feels that the provisions should apply only after the Act has come into force and after the necessary amendment or adjustment has been made. But the Committee did not fix a time limit. There is some mention in the Report that perhaps there should be a grace period of two years. Just now, the Prime Minister said that we should have a grace period of at least four years. Whether it is two years or four years, which is better? What kind of standard should we adopt? Is there any objective norm or criteria on which we can decide on two years or four years? The Select Committee has not really dealt with this point and there is no clear definition of the time limit.
I personally feel that the very cautious approach taken by the Government in introducing this Bill is correct. After the debate on the Bill in Parliament and all the hearings in the Select Committee, the contents have been examined very closely and the various clauses have been properly amended, so the present Bill has become more comprehensive. But as pointed out by the Select Committee, this is a very new arrangement for which there has been no precedent anywhere in the world for our reference. Therefore, it is necessary for us to gain experience in the actual implementation of the Act and make necessary adjustments thereafter. I would agree with this point entirely. The question really is one on the time limit. Just now, the Prime Minister had mentioned four years. But what is the basis? Perhaps a better limit should be the remaining term of office of the present President. In other words, we should complete all the necessary adjustments and amendments within the remaining term of office of the current President.
We all agree that the present President is a patriotic President and he has the respect and love of our people. But he was elected as the Head of State under quite different circumstances. This very onerous duty is imposed on him in the midst of his term of office. Personally, I think it is not fair for us to do so, even though I believe he would accept the task to undertake this difficult job as best he can. Anyway, I feel that within the remaining term of office of the present President, we should have enough time to discover whatever problems and difficulties that we may come across in the actual implementation of the new Act and make the necessary adjustments and amendments. Then, the new Act will be fully implemented when a new Elected President has been elected into office.
Dr John Chen Seow Phun (Hong Kah GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to join hon. Members in commending the Select Committee for proposing some significant changes to further improve the Bill after considering the views of MPs and a sizeable number of representors.
On the proposed requirement that the presidential candidates should resign from their political parties, I have noted that, although both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister BG Lee have taken the view that there is no strong reason why it should be so, they have agreed to the proposed change because, in the view of the Select Committee, "it may be more reassuring to the public if the President stood for election in his own right and not on a party platform." This, I agree with Mr Lim Boon Heng, is an excellent example of consensus building. I would agree to the amendment although, unlike him, I feel that it suffices for the President to only take an oath of office and affirm that he will discharge his duties "without fear or favour, affection or ill-will." I do not think it will make much difference, in practice, whether the President resigns from his political party or not. The Elected President cannot be apolitical. He is expected to make political judgment when he exercises some of his powers. And when that political judgment is in conflict with the action of the government, nothing can prevent the government from accusing the President for taking part in partisan politics, whether or not the President is a party man or has been a party man, whether or not the President has taken an oath not to have regard to any previous affiliation with any political party in exercising his functions. What is important, therefore, is not whether the Elected President should or should not belong to a political party. It is whether, having been elected, he acts according to what he believes is in the best national interest, just as the Prime Minister who has to affirm that he will bear true allegiance to the State, no matter which political party he comes from.
Sir, I would like to make another comment regarding the pre-qualifications of candidates. I support the views of the Select Committee that they should fulfil exacting standards of competence, experience and rectitude, which should be spelt out in the Constitution. I welcome the amendments to make it clear that, in addition to the categories of people deemed qualified, the Presidential Elections Committee can also accept others whom they consider suitable as candidates. However, like Mr Goh Choon Kang, I feel that the requirement that the candidate must not be less than 45 years of age is rather incongruous and arbitrary. The other stringent qualifications and the role of the Presidential Elections Committee to pre-qualify candidates are, in my view, sufficient. Are we going to reject an extremely capable and good candidate just because he is 44 years of age? Is the figure "45" not arbitrary?
Furthermore, may I refer Members to new Article 22N regarding Presidential stand-in when the office of President becomes vacant. The Bill provides that the Chairman of the Council of Presidential Advisors or, if he is not available, the Speaker shall stand in. There is no require- ment here that he must be at least 45 years old. Mr Speaker, Sir, if I am not mistaken, I understand that you are younger than 45 years old. And I think you are amply qualified to be elected as the President. Therefore, it is possible that a Presidential stand-in is, in fact, not qualified to be elected as President. If a person is good enough to be a Presidential stand-in, he should be qualified to stand for election.
The Bill goes on to provide that if neither the Chairman of the CPA nor the Speaker is available, Parliament may then appoint a person to stand in. But it is required now that this person be qualified to be elected as President, which means he must be at least 45 years old. Therein, I think, lies the incongruity.
For these reasons, Sir, I hope, the Prime Minister will consider deleting the minimum age requirement set out in new Article 19, clause 2(b).
Dr Lee Siew-Choh (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Select Committee has accepted proposals that go to strengthen the Elected President's political and financial control over the State machinery. This control is seen in the fixed staggered-term arrangement of 3-year nominations instead of the earlier 6-year appointments. The Chairman and the CEOs of the key statutory boards and Government companies will now be required to declare whether the budgets will draw on the reserves. The Minister for Finance, the Auditor-General and the Accountant-General too will have to inform the President of estimates of expenditures and revenue or any proposed transactions which are likely to draw on the reserves. Thus, all possible loopholes in financial matters are plugged and in-built controls are instituted. With all the vital information provided, all that the President needs do is to make political decisions, as Dr John Chen has just said, on matters connected with the national reserves.
The amendments accepted by the Select Committee in the Report have, therefore, further strengthened Presidential control over almost every aspect of Government. The Select Committee has, however, rejected proposals that may in any way weaken or undermine Presidential control and which could defeat the PAP's main motivation behind the Elected President's scheme.
In last year's October debate, Sir, on the Second Reading of the Bill, I had explained how and why the idea of the Elected President came to be mooted, and how and why some of the provisions in the Bill have been made to meet the needs of the various contingencies, all in order to protect PAP interests. The amendments accepted by the Committee have confirmed what I had said.
Let me now comment on some of the more important amendments, rejections and omissions. I wish also to make suggestions to the Government to improve on the amendments, if they must be adopted. Article 19 is the most important provision in the Bill. Who should qualify to be a Presidential candidate? Only a selected group of elites, or all the citizens who qualify to stand as candidates in the elections in Singapore? The PAP has made it that only members of an exclusive PAP club may qualify as Presidential candidates. Is that fair and democratic? Against the strong arguments of representors, the Select Committee has stone-walled with cliches like: "exacting standards of competence, experience and rectitude", "the best man for the job" and now," more difficult to become the Elected President than the Prime Minister," and it has refused to open up the closed door to admit broader categories of people as possible presidential candidates.
The Committee does not seem to be concerned that such closed-doorism violates the very basic tenets of democracy as well as the basic right of every citizen to equal opportunity and fairness, as emphasised by Dr Koh. Neither does it seem to be concerned that this is, in fact, a form of discrimination practised in favour of a handful of the elite against the vast majority of the people in Singapore. The Committee harps on the need for the candidates to have the basic criterion of having the experience and ability of managing funds in a large organisation. Is that really necessary? On this basis, as pointed out by one representor, it would seem that all past Presidents of Singapore would have been disqualified as candidates. It would also have disqualified many of our Ministers who are now on the front bench and who are billed to qualify as Elected President Candidates.
The basic right to elect and be elected is a right which people all over the world have fought for with their blood. The people in South Africa are still fighting for that right. We, in Singapore, have fought against the British Colonialists for this very same right for many years. But now in the Elected President scheme, the PAP is trying to turn the clock back with its overwhelming Parliamentary majority, and take away from the people what they have won from the British Colonialists, by imposing all sorts of qualification obstacles before them. What a shame that our people should suffer this reverse, this loss, at the hands of our own elected Government. How does the PAP ensure that voters are given qualified and suitable candidates to choose from?
The Select Committee tries to justify the short-listing of candidates by side-tracking the issue, by saying that "the issue is not the right of every citizen to stand for election as President". This is what the Prime Minister has again said. " It is to ensure that voters are given qualified and suitable candidates to choose from. Only then will there be some guarantee that the right person is chosen to fulfil a most important role." So according to the Select Committee, Sir, all those who struggled for this basic right in the past have struggled mistakenly and in vain. But does not such a PAP argument remind us of the very same arguments used by the British Colonialists in the past, to deny the people of their right to self-rule and independence? And how does the PAP ensure that voters are given qualified and suitable candidates to choose from? Simply by putting up a few names on a slate, and the people must choose one whose name is on the slate? The people are not given a wider choice. Is this really an election then?
The Committee wants to guarantee that the right person is chosen. Guarantee, yes; by whom and for whom? By the PAP and for the PAP? Or by the people and for the people?
How different is this type of PAP-guaranteed election from elections conducted by certain Communist countries where the voters are given fixed slates of candidates, a system which has been strongly criticised by democratic countries all over the world, a system which the people in those countries themselves have risen against, and a system which is now being replaced?
Sir, we agree that, if we must have an elected President, the best man for the job should be a person of integrity, good character and reputation. But surely he need not be a past Prime Minister or Minister or a Chairman of a key statutory board or CEO of a big company with a paid-up capital of $100 million. Neither is it necessary, as Dr Koh has said,that he must have the experience and ability of managing funds of a large corporation. We have seen enough of ex-Prime Ministers, ex-Ministers and managers and directors of big companies who are corrupt and who have been charged in court in many countries.
What is needed is that he is honest, upright, reasonably competent and held in high esteem by the people, unbiased politically and truly serve the basic and vital interests of all the people. That is the one criterion needed, not the experience as a Prime Minister or Minister. After all, he has the expert advice of the Council of Presidential Advisors to advise him on matters connected with finance and other things. Moreover, the new amendments now require that "a key statutory board or Government company to submit to the President within 6 months after the end of its financial year, an audited statement showing the actual revenues received and expenditures incurred in the course of the year as well as an audited statement of assets and liabilities."
Sir, knowledge of financial matters is of course an advantage, but there is no absolute need for the Elected President to be so well qualified in financial matters as stipu- lated in the Report and the Bill. Therefore, anyone who is a citizen and who is qualified to be a candidate as an MP should be qualified as a candidate for the Presidency.
Fears that a person of unsound mind, or that one recently convicted of a serious offence might become a candidate and be elected, are PAP terror-tactic exaggerations intended to frighten people to support the PAP, as has been done in every Singapore election.
As one representor has said:
'The population of Singapore is highly educated and should be entrusted to vote in suitable people.'
And to quote another representor:
'The Presidential Elections Committee should not shortlist candidates or exclude those who in its opinion lacked the prerequisites for the job.
The prerogative to decide whether a candidate is worthy should be left to the electorate.' Well said. We fully agree.
Who then is the best man for the job? Not the candidate who has been shortlisted and is the choice of a small section of the people. But the candidate who is supported by the vast majority of the people and is their choice in a fair, democratic election, the man who fulfils the most important criterion of all, that of honesty, competence, rectitude, loyalty and service to the interest of the people and the nation.
Let me comment on the Presidential Elections Committee. To ensure that nothing goes wrong in the choice of candidates, the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) will consist of only three members: (a) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission; (b) the Chairman of the Public Accountants Board; (c) a member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights nominated by the Chairman of the Council.
Sir, of the three, the first is a nominee of the Prime Minister. The third is a nominee of the nominee of the Prime Minister. Only the second may be said to be a non-nominee of the Prime Minister. But as I am told, he is also appointed by the Minister. Thus, it may be assumed that all the candidates accepted by the PEC will not be unsympathetic towards PAP interests. For many people, this is of course most unsatisfactory. And it has prompted one representor to paint a "worst case" scenario in which "the Government practises nepotism and cronyism by placing its own people in the PEC who will in turn put up nominations of candidates who are Government sympathisers." This is in the Report.
With a clean, non-corrupt government, this may not happen. But we must think of other governments in the years ahead. In order to prevent such a "worst case" scenario, therefore I suggest the following:
(i) As the Select Committee has agreed to the principle that the Elected President should be non-political, whatever the arguments for or against, and that the "candidates for Presidential elections should not be members of any political party", then the PEC members should declare whether they are members of any political party;
(ii) Aspiring candidates should also declare whether they are members, open or secret, of any political party;
(iii) The number of members of the PEC should be increased to, say, 11 to include, as some people have suggested, the Chief Justice, Auditor-General, the Heads of professional bodies of lawyers, doctors, public accountants, architects, engineers, surveyors and, to be fair to everybody, the Secretary-General of the PAP, the SDP and the WP.
(iv) This is most important, Sir. Proceedings should not be held in secret. The Prime Minister has spoken of an open Government. There should therefore be public hearings telecast "live" as in the United States, so that the public will know why Mr X or Mr Y is found unsuitable, and a record of decisions built up of precedents for future reference. This will ensure that all proceedings are manifestly seen to be fair and democratic, as stressed by so many speakers in the House.
And related to this non-political issue and in consonant with this non-political party principle, when the office of President is vacant, or in the case of temporary disability of the President, the person temporarily exercising the functions of the President, after the Chairman of the CPA, should also not be a member of a political party. That would rule out the Speaker of Parliament, if he is a member of the ruling party. Similarly, the person appointed by Parliament, if the Chairman of the CPA and Speaker are not available, should not be a person affiliated to any political party.
The Bill specifies that the President may seek advice from a Council of Presidential Advisors in the exercise of some of his powers, those relating to finance. He is not obliged to seek the CPA's advice in other areas. Anyway, he may not act on the CPA's advice at all. But who are the advisors of the CPA? The President appoints two of the five, one for a term of six years, the other for a term of three years. The Prime Minister appoints two of them, one for a term of six years, the other for a term of three years. The President appoints another one for a term of six years on the advice of the Chairman of the PSC. A fixed staggered term arrangement ensures that the President has full political control through his own nominees in the CPA at all times. This gives the President virtually absolute veto executive powers. This is unhealthy. Who knows what further powers may be given to the President at some future date?
The Prime Minister has said that the CPA is a de facto Senate or a Council of State. It plays a very important role, but is not the number of members in the CPA rather small? Should not the number of a de facto Senate or a Council of State be increased, say, from 5 to 11? And instead of being appointed, would it not be preferable that they be elected? I suggest therefore that:
(1) if they are to be nominated, then they should not be nominated by the Elected President himself, but by the various professional bodies and institutions of higher learning;
(2) in keeping with the non-political party principle, they should all not be affiliated to any political party;
(3) proceedings of the CPA like those of the PEC should not be held in private, but be held in public, except maybe for certain special cases, and telecast "live" so that the people can see that the CPA is truly fair and impartial in its deliberations.
Let the people decide. There is a fundamental change in our system of Government. A representor has described the Elected President as a two-headed Executive scheme. The EP is like a driving instructor sitting beside the driver with his hand on the handbrake. The driver is no longer in total control.
The Prime Minister himself has also admitted that the Government's wings are being clipped, that the new Prime Minister will need to seek concurrence by the President in certain key areas of government.
We all agree that we should safeguard our national reserves and the integrity of the civil service. But to do so, it is not necessary that we change the political system and institute a new scheme of an Elected President with wide veto powers, an Elected President who could make, according to the Report, "irrational decisions" difficult to guard against.
So we must first accept in principle that all national reserves belong to the people, that they do not belong to any political party or government of the day. All decisions whether or not to use part of the reserves for national development or for the welfare of the people should therefore be made by the representatives of the people who have been elected to Parliament.
But the PAP pretends that there is no alternative to the Elected President scheme, when the alternative is right here in this very House. Parliament is the alternative and is in fact the only institution in the Government that has the powers to decide. If there should be fear that our national reserves may be frittered away by a profligate government, the proper safeguard is to make it necessary for the government of the day to first seek two-thirds, or even three-quarters, of Parliamentary support, as someone has suggested, before moves are made to draw on the reserves. If the government of the day cannot get such two-thirds or three-quarters support, then of course it has to resign and seek new support from the people in a fresh election.
Therefore, the question at issue is: will the PAP Government allow Parliament to play its proper role as the guardian of the people's vital and fundamental interests? As the PAP has 80 out of 81 seats in Parliament today, it has no difficulty whatsoever using the national reserves if it is so inclined. But confronted with a trend of declining electoral support, the PAP is fearful of losing its huge majority in Parliament, or even of seeing a Parliament with the Opposition in control in the years ahead. It is therefore preparing for the day of the so-called "freak election results".
In his summing-up address in the October debate, the Prime Minister admitted, perhaps inadvertently, and again today, that "it is precisely for this reason that the PAP has proposed the scheme of an Elected President, just in case there should be a freak election result". "The Elected President will remove the nightmare of freak results and an irresponsible Government," he says. What he means is that it will try to deny the opposition of all possibility of coming to power, or to continue in office for long, if it should come into power.
I wish also to comment on a couple of omissions in the Report. Nothing is mentioned, Sir, about the discretion given to the executive Elected President to choose the Prime Minister and to determine whether Parliament is to be dissolved or not. Under the Parliamentary system of Government, the people determine who is to be the Prime Minister. For example, the leader of the Party becomes the Prime Minister.
Dissolution of Parliament is also dictated by what happens in Parliament. For example, if the Government loses a vote of no confidence, then the Prime Minister is obliged to resign, and unless there is another party which can control and command the confidence of Parliament, Parliament has to be dissolved. And the choice will have to go back to the people. No comments have been made on this important issue and it is a regrettable omission.
The Committee has also not considered amendments to allow the Elected President to order the CPIB to investigate any Minister of Government upon any information of alleged corruption or misconduct, even though the Cabinet of the day should consider that the information should not be pursued any further. This opens the way, Sir, for an Elected President, who is bent on mischief, to play havoc with an elected Government that is formed by an Opposition party. That would be most undemocratic.
Let me also say that the Select Committee has not accepted the proposal to limit a president to a maximum of two terms. The reason given is that this would deprive the country of the services of someone who has in fact a proven track record of being a good President. Such an argument does not appear to have much merit. If the idea is to have the services of someone with a proven track record, then there should not have been any handover of premiership recently by our former Prime Minister, with 31 years of experience, to one who is a comparative tyro. In most countries, Sir, for example, the United States, the President is limited to two terms. This is a very good democratic practice. One reason, as given by one representor, is to provide a line of succession. It gives a chance to the younger generation to come up. But a more important reason, to my mind, is that the longer a President is in power, the greater the danger of autocratic rule and corruption of power. We should avoid that. A two-term President should be ample for any person, unless he claims a divine right to rule.
To conclude, Sir, if it is to safeguard our national reserves and the integrity of the civil service, we believe that a genuine parliamentary democracy will serve as a better check than an Elected President with veto powers. But if the PAP insists on changing the system, in spite of what the Prime Minister has just said, then it should at least first let the people decide in a referendum.
Dr S. Vasoo (Tiong Bahru GRC): Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir, for allowing me to join in the debate.
Sir, I had earlier supported this Bill. I now rise to support the Bill in its amended form.
Sir, I am sure many Singaporeans would share with me that the amended Bill is more relevant now, as it has captured the interests of many Singaporeans. There are many persuasive and cogent views that have been put forward. These views have been widely supported by many Singaporeans. More Singaporeans are now aware of the long term value of the Bill, after the public hearings and much public discussions. However, there are some sceptics who still feel that there is no necessity for such a significant constitutional change. They argue: why bring about such a change when the current constitutional system is working well? Is there a necessity for change? Why in such a hurry to bring about so many constitutional changes? Sir, these are some sceptics who do not have the long term interest of Singapore at heart. Sir, for these sceptics, time will help them to see the positive aspect of the constitutional changes that we are making.
Sir, as I assess it, the Bill does not deny any rights of Singaporeans but provides further safeguards for our social and political institutions. There are a lot of things that we cannot predict in life, and many political changes that may come that we cannot predict. Therefore, it is essential that we implement place some safeguards that will protect the well-being of Singaporeans.
Sir, I am pleased that the amended Bill has accepted viewpoints and changes suggested by various representors and groups. This shows that useful ideas and recommendations are accepted by Government.
Sir, the Elected President is the highest public office. Should not Singaporeans deserve the best candidate with proven track record? I am sure, Sir, that Singaporeans deserve candidates of high calibre and with good proven track records. And if this is to be the case, then there should be some form of screening and the Presidential Elections Committee, which comprises notable people from the public, would be able to gauge and assess and do the screening that is necessary, and to put forward a slate of candidates of the highest calibre that Singaporeans can choose from. I do not see there is any wrong in selecting candidates of the highest calibre.
Sir, I have a few clarifications to seek of the Prime Minister. Under new Article 19 (Qualifications and disabilities of the President), I would like to know how is the Presidential Elections Committee going to be satisfied with the good character and reputation of potential candidates. Is the candidate required to get a certificate of good conduct to present to the Committee? Or are there other means and infallible aspects in the assessments that are going to be conducted to establish the reputation of such persons?
Sir, the Elected President's office is to be held with the highest decorum. I see no reason to encourage political parties to campaign for the candidates. To allow political parties to campaign for the candidate would mean that one would encourage partisan politics. When partisan politics are being involved, it could bring about a lot of repercussions and other social political implications.
Sir, in the light that the Elected President's post is held with the highest decorum, I should think that we should have a regulation to deny political parties to campaign. Although one may argue that it is very expensive for the candidates to mount and mobilize funds to carry out a campaign, in many countries presidential candidates have been able to solicit support from various community groups and to draw on such support to conduct their campaigns. So if campaigns are conducted by the candidates themselves, it will make the presidential candidate more detached from future problems or from future affiliations with his past political party. So I hope that the Government will be able to look at this aspect more critically.
The other question that I would like to raise is the requirement of a minimum period of not less than three years in high office. The period held in high office is rather short for assessing the past performance of the candidate for Elected President. For a three-year period, one is unable to judge his performance because one is not able to assess his track record. So I feel a minimum five-year period would be perhaps useful.
The other concern that I have is that the Elected President would have tremendous powers. In the light of this, we cannot anticipate that there is no likelihood of future problems between the Elected President and the Government. So in the event that there are serious conflicts between the Elected President and the Government of the day, how are such differences going to be mediated and resolved? Ultimately, the country would be affected because of an impasse. I would like to hear from the Prime Minister how such differences would be mediated in the event of a serious conflict between the Government and the Elected President.
Mr Speaker: Are there any other Members who wish to speak?
Hon. Members indicated none.
Mr Speaker: Order. I suspend the sitting and will take the Chair again at 2.30 pm.
Sitting accordingly suspended at 1.58 pm until 2.30 pm Sitting resumed at 2.30 pm
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
Debate resumed.
The Prime Minister and Minister for Defence (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, first, may I thank Members for their further contribution to the debate today. Many points have been raised by Members, but these points were also debated during the public hearings on the Elected President Bill and also when the Select Committee deliberated on the suggestions raised by members of the public. Obviously, it is not possible to have 100 percent agreement on all points. The Select Committee's Report is a consensual report. In other words, there are some issues where we can still have a difference of opinion. But, in my view, the recommendations are good ones and they have the support of most people who appeared before the Select Committee and also of the Select Committee Members themselves.
I sense that the key issue, judging from the debate this afternoon, is whether we should or should not pre-qualify Presidential candidates. I stated my view in my Third Reading speech that the President is an important position. We are not just electing anybody to be the President. He has very important functions and for the scheme to work, we want to pre-qualify candidates so that the voters are given a choice.
The argument by Dr Lee Siew-Choh is that in a democracy, you should allow anyone who meets the minimum qualifications to stand for elections. If it were that easy to govern a country, throwing open the doors to all candidates and in the process you have a good government, I am all for it. But I do not think that is the experience of democracies in new nations, in Third World countries. It is invidious for me to name names, but you can just cast your eyes around the world, look at countries which have practised democracies, in particular new countries in Africa, in Asia, in Central America, in South America. Have they succeeded in producing a good government which can deliver a better life for their people? I think the answer is that most of them have not done so, and they have experimented with all forms of democracy. The facts speak for themselves.
What we are trying to do here in Singapore is to evolve a Singapore-style of democracy, one that suits our circumstances, one that will be workable for us, one that is practicable and efficient. We have practised this parliamentary form of democracy for many years. Do we change or do we not change the system? We have gone through the arguments and we have argued that if we look down the road, it is better for us to add a further check on the present system. Because given the nature of our electorate, a party is either returned overwhelmingly or it is not. And it is better for us to have another institution which can serve as a check on the Government. We have specified two key areas which we think the Government should be checked by another body. That is one innovation which we are introducing to our system of government.
One can even argue that to further strengthen our Parliament, we should pre-qualify all candidates to Parliament. I am not suggesting that we want to do so, but I am suggesting that one can argue a case of pre-qualifying candidates to Parliament. If you want the system to work, and you want to have a two-party system of government, you must have good people standing for elections. You may not realise it. But the PAP practises pre-qualifications of candidates. We screen all our candidates, we put them through medical tests even, and we subject the candidates who are earmarked for high offices to psychological and psychiatric tests. I do not think the Workers' Party does it.
Let us assume that the PAP does not practise pre-qualifications and we follow the Workers' Party's method. Do you think we will end up with a workable government, a workable Parliament? If you run through the list of candidates who stood for the Workers' Party, in every election one can find many candidates with very obvious character flaws who should not be standing for elections in the first place.
So what is democracy all about? It is not the right to stand for election. It is giving the electorate the right to choose good candidates to Parliament. If you do not give the people a choice, then they are choosing between two bad candidates. But if you pre-qualify them, and you allow good candidates to emerge and be chosen, you can be sure that only good ones will be chosen returned to Parliament.
Now, the question is whether the criteria are too stringent or whether we should not lower them to widen the pool, as some Members have argued. I think the present criteria as spelt out are sufficient to draw in good people. They are not so high as to limit the numbers to four or five potential candidates. I think a large number of Singaporeans can meet the criteria. I would not want to mention any name. But Dr Koh Lam Son suggested that Prof Tommy Koh will not be qualified under the criteria. I do not think we should pre-judge the issue. If Prof Tommy Koh chooses to stand for election as a Presidential candidate, I think he can appear before the PEC. He can prove that he has ample experience in dealing with the Law of the Sea, very complicated and complex law with financial provisions, and I think the PEC would, in my view, find him eligible to stand for election as a candidate. In other words, the criteria drawn up do not exclude a person like Prof Tommy Koh, which was the argument used by Dr Koh Lam Son that we are so stringent that a person like him would be disqualified.
We place great store on financial knowledge and expertise because this is one key area in which we expect the President to exercise judgment. Unless he has knowledge of finances and is able to evaluate reports, he will not be able to perform his job well. So you have got to ensure that Presidential candidates do have the ability, first, to read accounts; secondly, to understand them, to evaluate them and, most importantly, to make a judgment whether to exercise his veto power or to agree with the government of the day should they wish to draw on reserves for certain well-argued cases.
Again on these pre-qualifications, I would like to ask Dr Koh Lam Son and also Dr Lee Siew-Choh Ž both of them are doctors Ž whether anyone should be allowed to become a doctor and how long it takes to become a doctor. Compare the position of the President with that of a medical practitioner Ž which is a more demanding position, which is more critical, which affects people's life more? The answer is obvious. The President has a greater impact on Singaporeans' lives than a doctor. To be a doctor, first, you have got to get through your "0" level, "A" level, and then enter a medical school (five years, 1 year housemanship Ž six years altogether) and then you have got to satisfy the Medical Council that you are a person of integrity. There are stringent tests for a person to become a doctor and for him to remain a doctor. Why is it we require these of a medical practitioner when we do not think it necessary for the position of President which, in my view, is a far more important position than being a doctor to patients?
On a less important issue, but still coming under this question of pre-qualification, is the one on minimum age. Mr Goh Choon Kang suggests that 45 is too high a minimum age, and it should perhaps be lowered. The question is: should we or should we not have a minimum age? If the answer is yes, then it is a question of judgement what be the minimum age should be. And there must be a minimum age because you cannot go down below 21 or 18. To be an MP, the age is 21. There is a minimum age. So it is purely a question of judgment. The Select Committee believes that 45 is a good age. At that age a person is sufficiently mature, has gained sufficient experience in life, has seen the world and should be able to judge people. One can argue that at 44, you too can have them, but I think 45 is a convenient cut-off point.
If you have an exceptional candidate below 45 who is eminently qualified to be a President and he cannot under the rule, I would say that is not a bad thing because that man should, in fact, as a start, stand for elections and become the Prime Minister or a Minister. I think there is no loss to the system. The Elected President's position is an important one but it is a less active role than that of a Prime Minister. If we have a young man or a young lady who can become a President, I think that person too has got the potential to become a Prime Minister. So let him serve through the other route. And when he is above 45, if he chooses to be a President later on, he can still be.
Let me deal with the various points raised by Members this afternoon. Dr Koh Lam Son suggested that the Chairman of the Council of Presidential Advisors should be appointed by the Presidential Elections Committee. The PEC is structured to perform a very specific role and, that is, to vet candidates for election as a President. I do not think we want to widen that role to include nomination of Chairmanship for the CPA. The CPA is already so structured that it is balanced. The Elected President nominates two, the Prime Minister nominates two, and the Chairman, PSC nominates one. Let us try out the system of five members for the CPA and, if need be, we will have a grace period of four years to revise this composition.
Mr Goh Choon Kang made a point that the grace period should be confined to the remaining period of President Wee Kim Wee's term. I think the President's term allows us time to work the system. But it is wiser for us to extend the period of working the system to the time when we have an Elected President. Because when you have a President who is elected, further problems could be thrown up and we lose nothing by extending it by another two years. In other words, stretch the grace period to four years instead of limiting it to two or three years.
I am all in favour of moving cautiously, as you can see from the way I have taken this Bill through Parliament, and I would argue for a longer period of four years so that the technical provisions can be dealt with. Otherwise, once we invoke that Article on referendum where provisions have to be changed, it becomes quite messy for us to change the provisions.
Dr Vasoo raised a number of points which he wanted an answer but I am not sure whether we want to go into the details of the points he raised, because in working the system, if we need to revise the rules, we can do so. For example, he asked: how does the PEC intend to satisfy itself that a Presidential candidate is of good character? Do we need him to be issued him with a good conduct certificate? This administrative arrangement we can leave to the PEC. When the PEC is formed, I am sure it will work out its own rules and work out its own method of evaluating candidates.
He argued that there is no need for political parties to campaign on behalf of the Elected President. The Select Committee has gone through this point - whether we should or should not allow parties to campaign. We think they should because, although the President's position is an important one and although the public thinks it should be non-political, we have got to be clear that the President's position is in fact a political one. The President is elected to oversee two areas of government. It is a political position. We can require him to sever his links with the political party but that position requires a man of political experience, and ability, to judge matters politically. If there is a good candidate, and the parties are going to campaign for him, I do not think we should disallow them from doing so. And because we now require him to delink his ties with his particular political party, he owes no obligation to whoever wants to campaign for him. But parties, like citizens, should be allowed to campaign for the Elected President.
Dr Lee's speech reveals nothing unusual. It is his usual tirade against the PAP. It is a political speech, but full of contradictions. If I may just point out one or two contradictions. One, he argued that the Government is turning the clock back in pre-qualifying candidates and in reducing the number of people who can be eligible to become candidates. Far from turning the clock back, he will realise that his presence in Parliament is the result of the Government turning the clock forward, because under the old system, he would not have been in Parliament. We have changed the rules so that he is in Parliament even though he was not elected. That is one contradiction in his speech.
Another contradiction is when he wants the PEC members to declare whether they are members of any political party. I sense that he would want the PEC to be non-political, that means, no nominations, no nominees from political parties. But as he argued that we should expand the number of PEC members from the present number to 11, the truth came out. He wanted to include the Secretary-General of the Workers' Party in it. He also wanted to put in the SDP and the PAP, but I am sure he would rather keep out those two. But that is the contradiction. He wants to depoliticize the PEC in the first place and, in the next breath, he argues for the inclusion of Secretary-Generals of political parties. I need not go into other examples. The important point is that the opposition parties have not come up with a better alternative to the system that we have. They have agreed that there should be a check and balance to the system but there is no viable alternative to the one which we have proposed before this House.
The other smaller points I can leave them to time, that means, work the system and, in the light of experience, we can change the provisions to accommodate further viewpoints and further changes, as necessary.
I just want to conclude by thanking Members once again for their contributions. I am gratified by the scale of participation and by the depth of analysis shown by Members as well as those who had appeared before the Select Committee. They have made very useful contributions to a very important Bill, one which will secure our system, one which will make our system works much better in the future.
But we should not run away with the conclusion that because we now have an Elected President, who functions like a goalkeeper, we can now be freer with our vote in electing a government. The Elected President can only prevent the reserves from being drawn down and can only prevent a bad government from appointing wrong people to important jobs. But there are many ways to bankrupt a country. A bad government can have, for example, a wrong foreign policy which antagonizes our neighbours and causes Singapore to lose respect among the international community of nations. A bad government can begin to run down your defences, and diminish the importance of the SAF in securing Singapore's future. A bad government can spend funds, which should be rightly spent on education, on an necessary welfare programmes which will weaken the very pillars of our society. There are many ways in which a country can go wrong if we have a bad government. So do not go away with the impression that now that we have the Elected President in position, we can be freer with our votes, it does not matter, just return any government and the Elected President there will function as a safety net. That is the wrong approach.
For our system to work, the voter must again exercise wisdom in casting his vote. He must cast it in a manner that will return the best party to form the government and in a manner that will ensure the best man is returned when there is a Presidential election. When you have a good government and a good President, then there is a safeguard for the system, a safeguard which will ensure that a high standard of government can be maintained. If you have a bad government and a good President, that is only half a safeguard. If you have a bad government and a bad President, I think everything is gone for the country. So my advice is: settle for the best, both in Government as well as in the Presidency. [Applause.]
Mr Speaker: The Question is, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."
A Division will be taken to ascertain that the Third Reading of the Bill is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament, which is 54 Members, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitution. The Clerk will ring the Division Bells.
Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."
Division taken: Ayes, 75; No, 1; Abstention, Nil. Ayes Ayes Abbas Abu Amin Lau Ping Sum Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin Lee Boon Yang Abdullah Tarmugi Lee Hsien Loong Ahmad Mattar Lee Kuan Yew Beng Kian Lam, Arthur Lee Yiok Seng Chandra Das, S Lee Yock Suan Chay Wai Chuen Leong Horn Kee Chen, Bernard Lew Syn Pau Chen Seow Phun, John Lim Boon Heng Chew Heng Ching Lim Chee Onn Chin Harn Tong Loh Meng See Chng Hee Kok Low Seow Chay Ch'ng Jit Koon Mah Bow Tan Choo Wee Khiang Ng Kah Ting Chua Sian Chin Ng Pock Too Davinder Singh Ong Chit Chung Dhanabalan, S Ong Teng Cheong Goh Chee Wee Othman bin Haron Eusofe Goh Chok Tong Peh Chin Hua Goh Choon Kang Shanmugan K Heng Chiang Meng Sia Khoon Seong Ho Kah Leong Sidek bin Saniff Ho Tat Kin Sung, Peter Hong Hai Tan Cheng Bok Hu Tsu Tau, Richard Tan, Augustine H H Ibrahim Othman Tan Keng Yam, Tony Jayakumar, S Tan Soo Khoon Koh Lam Son Tan Tee Yong, Philip Koh Lip Lin Ayes Ayes Tang Guan Seng Yeo Toon Chia Tay Eng Soon Yeo Yong-Boon, George Teo Chong Tee Yu-Foo Yee Shoon Vasoo, S Zulkifli bin Mohammed Wan Hussin bin Hj Zoohri Wan Soon Bee No Wong, Aline K Wong Kan Seng Chiam See Tong Wong Kwei Cheong Yap Giau Cheng, Eugene Abstention Yatiman Yusof Yeo Cheow Tong Nil Yeo Ning Hong
Mr Speaker: The Third Reading of the Bill has been carried by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament.
Bill accordingly read a Third time and passed.
Source: Singapore Parliament Official Report (Hansard) for 3 January 1991. Republished on SGParliament.