LEGAL PROFESSION (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read. 4.43 pm

The Minister for Law (Prof. S Jayakumar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, this Bill has several objectives. Firstly, it enables the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee for the Supply of Lawyers, chaired by the Attorney-General, which were accepted by the Government in April this year. Secondly, it also makes amendments on provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the discipline and conduct of lawyers and legal officers and makes provisions for other miscellaneous matters. Some of these amendments were made at the request of the Law Society.

Let me deal first with the amendments relating to the recommendations of the Committee chaired by the Attorney-General. The Committee was tasked to consider the supply of lawyers for Singapore in the short-to-medium term and to recommend measures to achieve this, having regard also to the need to enhance the quality of future legal services. The number of lawyers had grown sharply in the last decade from 809 practising lawyers in 1980 to 2,402 by the end of October 1993. The ratio of 77 lawyers per 100,000 population identified by the Committee was a ratio higher than those in Japan, Hong Kong and Switzerland. In fact, Sir, the ratio mentioned by the Committee (77 lawyers per 100,000) has in fact been altered. It is now 82 per 100,000. The Government's concern with the growing number of lawyers was that if left unchecked, it could lead to a misallocation of valuable manpower resources and result in the creation of an over-litigious society with a consequential lowering of standards in practice.

Clauses 2, 3 and 5 of the Bill give effect to the recommendations of the Committee by amending sections 2, 7 and 16 of the Legal Profession Act to enable the implementation of the Committee's recommendations which have been accepted. Section 2 has been amended to redefine the term "qualified person", that is, persons who are qualified for admission to the Singapore Bar. The following broad categories of persons seeking admission will be affected:

Firstly, graduates from the Law Faculty, National University of Singapore. They will continue to be the primary source for practising lawyers in Singapore. In order to qualify for practice, NUS law graduates must obtain at least a second-class Honours degree.

Secondly, United Kingdom law graduates. In order to control this source of qualified lawyers for entry into practice, only law graduates from a list of 15 scheduled universities can qualify for practice. The list of such universities is not intended to be exhaustive and will be subject to periodic review. Such law graduates must also attain at least an Upper second-class Honours degree and obtain the Diploma in Singapore Law to qualify for admission to the Bar.

Thirdly, external law degree graduates. Holders of such external law degrees will no longer be recognised for purposes of admission to practise at the Bar from 1996. However, for those who have been accepted for their external courses before May 1993, a concession has been granted if they graduate by 1996.

Fourthly, a special scheme for exceptional graduates. It was also recognised that in order to enhance the quality of legal services in Singapore, exceptional law graduates from any University in the Commonwealth or elsewhere should not be denied entry to the Bar. This scheme will allow exceptional law graduates from the non-scheduled United Kingdom Universities, holders of external law degrees or law graduates from the existing gazetted Commonwealth Universities Scheme and the Hong Kong Practitioners Scheme to apply for admission to the Bar. Provision for the scheme is made in clause 3 in re-enacting section 7 of the Act.

Finally, the so-called gazetted Commonwealth Universities Scheme and the Hong Kong Practitioners Scheme are to be abolished.

Sir, with respect to the United Kingdom law graduates from the 15 scheduled universities, provision will be made for them to attend a course in Singapore at the NUS Law Faculty and to obtain the Diploma in Singapore Law. It will equip them with basic knowledge of Singapore law. They will no longer need to be called as Barristers or qualify as solicitors in England. Entry to the Diploma course will be based on the merits of each applicant and the number of places available. The intake of the Diploma course will be limited to 50 a year, subject to review. Current students in the United Kingdom Universities will not be required to take the course. However, between 1994 and 1996, such students will be given the option of taking the course in lieu of qualifying as a Barrister or Solicitor of England.

Sir, the recommendations of the Committee are not retrospective and will not affect adversely those students, including national servicemen, who have already been accepted for a course of legal studies in any university before the release of the Report and its acceptance by the Government. To avoid a plethora of complicated provisions and many details in the Act itself, including various deadlines, the detailed provisions implementing the recommendations on qualifications, education and training will be made by subsidiary legislation. It would also give us the flexibility should a need arise in the future to modify and review any of these recommendations.

Sir, in the longer term, the Government's intention is to work towards introducing a common competitive examination for all law graduates seeking to practise regardless of where they graduate from. Such a scheme can be run by the Board of Legal Education.

Let me now turn to the other major amendments relating to disciplinary proceedings against lawyers and legal officers. Clause 13 provides for a new section 82A setting out a new procedure for disciplining of legal officers (meaning members of the Legal Service) and non-practising lawyers. The Law Society henceforth will have no jurisdiction over such persons. This amendment results from a recent case involving a senior legal officer in the Service where the Court of Appeal ruled that the Law Society could take disciplinary proceedings under Part VII of the Act against such an officer if he had been admitted to the Bar.

Sir, that decision created an anomalous situation in that legal officers who are admitted to the Bar and non-practising lawyers are subject to the disciplinary control of the Law Society while those officers who are not admitted are not. To correct this, the Bill provides that both legal officers and non-practising lawyers will be subject to the direct disciplinary control of the Court and not of the Law Society, which means that the Law Society's control is with respect to those who are practising advocates and solicitors. There will be a special procedure for disciplinary action against such persons involving a show cause application to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may grant leave for the appointment of a Disciplinary Committee to look into the complaint. Only when a prima facie case of misconduct is established, would the case be referred to a court of three judges who are empowered to impose certain punishment against the errant legal officer or non-practising lawyer, for example, striking off the rolls, prohibiting him from applying for a practising certificate for up to five years, or censuring him or ordering a penalty of up to $5,000.

The other amendments relating to the Law Society which I should highlight are the following:

Clause 14 amends section 83 of the Act to increase the power of the court to suspend a lawyer found guilty of misconduct from the present two years to five years. At the same time, the amendment also deletes an existing clause which has created problems by requiring our courts to imagine the equivalent position in England in respect of a barrister or solicitor there. Instead, there is a new provision whereby the court may discipline a lawyer if he has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Next, clauses 15 to 26 and 29. These clauses deal with disciplinary proceedings against practising lawyers to further improve the procedures and also to increase the powers of the Law Society. For example, clause 15 amends section 85 to enable the Law Society Council, with the leave of the court, to inquire first into complaints against practising lawyers which are more serious in nature and defer the inquiry into other complaints. The complainant will be notified of the outcome at the conclusion of the proceedings. The restriction in subsection 85(1) and 85(2) is that complaints must be "in his professional capacity". The words "in his professional capacity" have been removed because it is clear from section 83 that the Act also envisages complaints about other serious misconduct on the part of the advocate and solicitor which brings into disrepute the profession. The removal of these words does not mean that frivolous complaints should be entertained. The provision must be read in the context of the instances of misconduct enumerated in section 83(2) or it must be "misconduct unbefitting the advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession".

Clause 16 improves the function of the Inquiry Committee, while clause 17 improves the function and increases the powers of the Council after it receives the report of the Inquiry Committee. The remaining clauses also relate to the function of the Law Society and the Council in relation to appointing of Disciplinary Committee to hear complaints against practising lawyers. For example, if the Disciplinary Committee (DC) recommends against a formal investigation and only recommends a reprimand, the Council, if it disagrees, can apply to the High Court in a show cause action.

There are several miscellaneous amendments, and perhaps I should mention the following:

Section 14 is amended by increasing the pupillage of a legal officer from six months to three years so as to retain good officers in the Service. In addition, a legal officer of the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) is allowed to act as a pupil master to his other legal officers to provide an incentive for fresh law graduates to join IRAS.

Clause 7 amends section 26 to enable the Attorney-General to issue a restricted practising certificate to an in-house lawyer employed by the Law Society so as to permit such in-house lawyer of the Law Society to appear in Court on behalf of the Society which will save legal costs for the Society.

Clause 8 amends section 34A to remove any doubts that sections 32 and 33 prohibiting unauthorised persons from practising Singapore law do not apply to a foreign lawyer in arbitration proceedings where the applicable law is Singapore law, who is also allowed to appear jointly with a legal officer in such proceedings, thereby extending the same privilege presently enjoyed by a local practising advocate and solicitor in such arbitration proceedings.

Clause 9 amends section 66 to empower the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General to require the Council to disclose any matter or information relating to any complaint of misconduct or disciplinary action against any lawyer. This is necessary because I am told that the present provision concerning confidentiality of proceedings causes an obstacle for the Law Society to disclose such information.

These provisions and the others relating to the Law Society are aimed at ensuring that the legal profession will be distinguished by honest and competent practitioners of the highest standards who will be able to meet the increasing expectations of the general public and the business community.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Davinder Singh (Toa Payoh GRC): Sir, I support the Bill. I would like to seek clarification from the Minister on a number of aspects of the Bill. My focus is primarily on the new provisions dealing with legal officers and non-practising solicitors.

As the Minister said, the proposed provisions on disciplinary proceedings have come about as a result of a recent Court of Appeal decision which extends the application of the present Act to legal officers and, in the words of the Minister, that has created an anomaly which this amendment seeks to rectify.

The rectification is that from the Law Society, disciplinary jurisdiction over these officers will now move to the courts. However, I would have expected that notwithstanding this move, the same standards ought to apply to both advocates and solicitors on the one hand, and to legal officers and non-practising solicitors on the other. But looking through the Bill, one gets the impression that there are different standards, some make legal officers better off; some make them worse off. For example, in the case of an advocate and solicitor, if he is hauled up for misconduct, he first appears before the Inquiry Committee where he has a right to be heard in his defence and, of course, if the Inquiry Committee determines that there is cause for further investigation, he is referred to the Disciplinary Committee. In the case of a legal officer, the amendment replaces the Inquiry Committee with the Chief Justice. What happens is that if there is an allegation that the legal officer has misconducted himself, a complaint is made by way of an application to the Chief Justice. But the difference and a very fundamental difference is that the application before the Chief Justice is ex parte, which means that the applicant appears before the Chief Justice and there is no necessity to serve the papers on the legal officer who is alleged to have misconducted himself. Unlike the case of an advocate and solicitor who has a right to be heard at the very first stage of the disciplinary process, a legal officer, or a non-practising solicitor against whom a complaint is made, is not given that right under the Act. I wonder whether the Minister can explain why that is so. While that puts the legal officer on a worse footing, there is an example of something which puts him on a better footing vis-a-vis advocates and solicitors.

A very simple example of that is that in the case of advocates and solicitors, if the disciplinary proceedings are founded on a conviction, the advocate and solicitor is not entitled, by reason of an amendment to the Act, I think, to challenge the validity of that conviction in the disciplinary proceedings. Whereas we do not have a similar provision which bars, or precludes, legal officers from taking up that challenge. Again, I wonder if the Minister would explain why there is a difference in the approach.

Finally, Sir, if I could ask the Minister to clarify the effect of the transitional provision. It says that the amendment would not apply to inquiries, investigations, etc, commenced before the date of commencement of the amendments. Because the disciplinary procedure takes many steps before it reaches the court, I would like to know whether the approach is that the amendments would only apply to inquiries commenced after the amendments come into force, or would they apply to any stage of the disciplinary procedure which is in existence on the date of coming into force.

Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon (Nominated Member): Sir, before I speak, may I declare my personal interest as Vice-Dean of the Law Faculty, NUS, and as a practising advocate and solicitor.

I support the Bill, but there are two major controversial things about this. Firstly, the cap on the number of lawyers and, secondly, the way that cap is being implemented. Paradoxically, these things are in the Bill itself. They are left to subsidiary legislation, as the Minister said. The first question is: Is there really a need to cap the number of lawyers? No one really knows for sure. But what we do know is that the Law Faculty is taking in 200 students per year, three times the number it used to take at the beginning of the 1980s. Three times the number of lawyers cannot be produced indefinitely, unless we are sure that the domestic legal services are going to grow indefinitely and I think no one, least of all the lawyers, wants litigation to grow indefinitely. So some sort of cap is necessary.

The other problem is that when we are talking about the domestic legal services, things like conveyancing, which are almost now fully computerised will, I think, be very difficult to retain as a lawyer's monopoly forever. So we may actually find the demand for domestic legal services shrinking. So I fully support the Minister's suggestion and the Committee's suggestion that a cap should be put on the number of lawyers. I think we should make it clear that this cap does not affect people who are already qualified. It does not affect people who want a law degree as an academic qualification because they want to go into business, they want to go into Government, politics, or whatever it is. It only affects those basically who want to do litigation, or who want to do conveyancing. Every year, when we do interviews, I meet a number of young people who tell me that their burning ambition is to be a lawyer and they found this out because they watched "Matlock" on TV. The only people who are really going to be aggrieved by this cap are those people who feel that somehow a law degree is a passport to wealth and riches and I think we can assure them that it is not really so.

Some people have said that this idea of capping lawyers is actually just a ploy by the legal profession to keep fees high and salaries high. I am not sure that is right. The market for legal services is not a perfect market. It is a very imperfect market. If I may draw an analogy. If you got a brain tumour, you don't go to the cheapest brain surgeon you can find. Is cheapness really something that you look for in a professional when you are looking for professional service? Paradoxically, you may find that no matter how many mediocre lawyers are in the market, the good ones will always have more work than they can cope with, and the good ones will always be able to command a premium. And if you go to a lawyer who does not seem to have any clients, is that really a recommendation? I very much doubt it. So these people who think that this is a ploy by all of us lawyers to keep our salaries high are perhaps looking at it a bit simplistically. Accepting that there should be a cap, the real controversial thing is the way the cap has been implemented because people said, "Well, you know, this is arbitrary. With 15 institutions from the UK, are you saying that second upper from Durham is better than the first class from, say, University of Sydney?" This is the kind of impression they get.

I think we have to look at this pragmatically. What we are talking about is turning off the supply of Singaporeans being qualified. So, in future, anyone who wants to practise law in Singapore knows that there are only 15 institutions outside where he can go to and have a decent chance of getting a degree. It is no reflection on the quality of the graduates of these institutions as such. We are merely making a signal to people who want a law degree that "Look, these are the 15 institutions." And the Minister has given the assurance that this list will be reviewed from time to time and I think we can be happy with that.

There are two small things that I would like the Minister's clarification, if possible. Firstly, the Diploma in Singapore Law which is going to be a prerequisite for foreign graduates. The Committee recommended a ceiling of 50. I hope that this ceiling is not going to be treated as a sacrosanct thing. Because if, for example, you have got more than 50 applicants from the 15 scheduled institutions, how are we going to make the choice? This is the problem. If some got first class and some got second upper, all right, take the first class. But I doubt we will get 50 first class from these universities. You might get, say, 60 second upper. 10 will be excluded if you have got an absolute cap of 50. So may I ask for a little bit of flexibility, just in case. It may be that the problem will be academic and that we will never get 50 applicants for the Diploma in Singapore Law. But if we do, I do not think it is fair that a person's future livelihood, that his vocation should depend upon something that is arbitrary as a ballot.

The second thing that the Minister said was that they would be looking into the question of a common professional examination. I think this is a good thing, something that we should all work towards. But I hope that the common professional examination will be in lieu of these rather arbitrary limits on institutions. Once you have got your common professional examination, you should not say, "Well, only those people from the 15 institutions can take that examination.", only two-ones or two-twos from NUS can take that examination. So I hope that when that is implemented, it is not treated as an additional hurdle but is treated as a long-term goal. And this restriction of institutions, this restriction on the quality of degrees, is going to be an interim measure until that can be done.

Having said that, may I express my support for the Bill again. 5.10 pm

[Mr Deputy Speaker in the Chair]

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, I understand that one of the main purposes of this Bill is to restrict the number of persons entering the legal profession every year and, at the same time, to give the Minister the power to prescribe the qualifications for entry, that is to say, to decide who will be allowed to practise law in Singapore. Clause 2 of the Bill serves this purpose. Is this in the interest of the public? I do not think so.

Firstly, it goes against the Government's own free market principles. The law is supposed to be an honourable profession, not a money-making machine. Instead of restricting the number entering the profession and thereby making it more elitist and remote, the Government should look at ways to expand the scope of work available to lawyers, for example, by channelling work to arbitrators, or allowing some form of percentage claims. This will increase court work and produce lawyers who are skilled in advocacy and, who knows, lawyers may even be encouraged to become orators and politicians.

Secondly, it is illogical to restrict the foreign graduates, I believe, to the first 50 per year of those who have gained second upper honours degree from one of the 15 favourite British universities. It is also elitist. Is the Minister in a position to say that the quality of legal education is clearly better in these 15 universities than in other institutions of higher learning? Can the Minister say for sure that the holder of a second upper class honours degree will make a better practising lawyer than one who holds a second lower, or even a third class degree from the same university? For a local graduate, a second lower class degree will do. Is the Minister saying that a second lower class law degree from NUS is equal to a second upper class degree from overseas? I do not follow the logic.

In my opinion, Sir, this is not being pragmatic and it is discriminatory and wrong headed. What about the non-academic qualities of the graduates? A lawyer is required to be a man or woman of honour and integrity. A high academic qualification is in itself no guarantee of honour and integrity. It could well be that exposure to other aspects of university life would help to give a man the necessary strength of character to turn him into a good lawyer and it may well be that if he spends too much of his time working to ensure that he gains his second upper, he may fail to gain the necessary exposure and experience.

Thirdly, this Bill is objectionable because it is arbitrary that the Minister should be given the power to decide the qualifications for entry and to change them from time to time. Basic things, like qualifications for entry into the legal profession, should be clearly set out in statute passed by Parliament, and not left to the discretion of the Minister. The same clause gives the Minister power to exempt any person or classes of persons from the provisions. I think the Minister should not be given this power to exempt. A man is either a qualified person or he is not. He cannot be a qualified person if the Minister says so.

Clause 3 empowers the Board to issue a person a certificate if, in the opinion of the Board, the person possesses such qualification or expertise as would enhance the quality of legal services in Singapore. I do not know what is the intention. Can the Minister give concrete examples of persons who might enhance the quality of legal services in Singapore? I think it is also too discretionary.

Clause 9 requires the Council to disclose information relating to complaints against lawyers to the Chief Justice or the Attorney-General. This, to me, breaches the principle that unless and until sufficient cause is shown to warrant that the matter be brought to the attention of the court, disciplinary proceedings are confidential, that is to say, it is a matter between the lawyer being investigated and the Law Society, and no one else. This is, as it should be, in the case of a self-regulated autonomous profession.

I also question the need for clause 13 for the court to be given power to discipline legal officers and non-practising lawyers directly, that is, on its own volition. Legal officers are, in any case, subject to the discipline of their employer, the Government through the AG, and the Public Service Commission. A lawyer, whether practising or not, is a citizen and subject to the laws of the land, like everyone else. If he breaks the law, he will be brought before the courts. There is no need, I think, to add burden on him just because of his professional status. People should be encouraged to learn the law and become lawyers, not warned that if they become lawyers they must or must not behave in a certain way, or indulge in certain activities, and if they do, they are liable to be struck off the rolls, even if their activities are perfectly legitimate, and they have not broken any law.

Clause 29 is to amend the principal Act by deleting the words "in his professional capacity" from the provisions of the Act. To me, the implication is to extend the powers given by the Act to the Law Society and the courts to discipline lawyers for misconduct which has nothing to do with the practice of their profession. For example, if a lawyer is caught spitting on the road, or dropping a litter, prosecute him by all means. But does that make him unfit to practise law, or to call himself a lawyer? It is true that such conduct does not serve to uphold the honour and dignity of the profession. But it has nothing to do with maintaining the standard of practice in the profession.

In conclusion, as fundamental changes are proposed to the qualification of persons regarded as being fit to enter into and to stay in the legal profession, I suggest that the Minister consider referring this Bill to a Select Committee and that the Law Society be invited to make representations.

Mr Davinder Singh: Mr Speaker, Sir, I inadvertently omitted to declare my interest as a solicitor, which I now rectify.

Prof. Jayakumar: Sir, I thank the Members who have spoken.

Can I first take Mr Davinder Singh's comments? I think most of his comments turned on the new provisions for legal officers and non-practising lawyers. I wish to assure him that it is not the intention to have double standards. As for the way the provisions have been crafted, there is a reason for this. The reason is that the Act particularises the various types of misconduct in detail for advocates and solicitors who are practising. Whereas for the legal officers and non-practising lawyers, there is a general provision concerning guilty of misconduct unbefitting a member of the honourable profession or unbefitting an officer of the Supreme Court. The second ground is the various acts of bankruptcy.

There is a good reason for this because we must remember that there are far more advocates and solicitors than legal officers and non-practising lawyers. There are more than 2,000. Next, bear in mind that they have client-solicitor relationship. They are practising lawyers. Non-practising lawyers and legal officers do not have client-solicitor relationships.

Thirdly, the number of complaints on practising lawyers is far more than for the special category of legal officers and non-practising lawyers. That is the reason why the procedure crafted for non-practising lawyers and legal officers is simpler. That does not mean that their interests or the safeguards will be lost sight of. For example, he mentioned the ex parte procedure. I think the main point, as I said, is that the number of complaints will be smaller and I do not think he will be at a disadvantage. I think the Chief Justice can be expected not to grant leave under this provision if the complaint is frivolous. In practice, I understand the court usually requires the application papers to be served on the defendant and allows him to be heard.

He also asked about the non-inclusion of the provision on convictions. Again, I would like to point out that for non-practising lawyers and legal officers, the approach is taken to have a simpler procedure and criterion of conduct unbefitting the legal officer or non-practising lawyer. The reason for the non-inclusion of the provision on conviction is that it is really not relevant under this new general approach, since a criminal conviction per se is not a ground for disciplinary action, although the circumstances and the acts which give rise to the criminal action can be a matter to be considered by the Chief Justice or the Attorney-General.

I would also like to remind Mr Davinder Singh another reason why we have to make a distinction between practising advocates and solicitors and this other category. For practising advocates and solicitors, the procedures which begin from the Inquiry Committee, DC and show cause, almost invariably will affect his right to practise. Whereas for the legal officer, whatever is the result of the actions which may result from the Disciplinary Committee for legal officer and non-practising lawyer, as to whether he is to be retained in the service, whether he is to be demoted or fired or whatever in respect of his career, that has to be the subject of a separate independent proceeding to be brought - Mr Low Thia Khiang referred to it - by the Legal Service Commission. Therefore, because of these differences, the approach has been crafted differently.

As far as his query on transitional provisions is concerned, I have looked at the transitional provisions and it is fair to say that the interpretation must be of a clean slate approach. In other words, all these amendments will apply only to new cases which have been commenced or referred to an Inquiry Committee after the commencement of this Act. I hope these clarifications are helpful to Mr Davinder Singh.

I thank Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon for his support. He is right that on the capping of lawyers, you can have different approaches. And I agree with his observation that the fact that 15 universities in the United Kingdom have been selected is not necessarily an adverse reflection on anyone who comes from another university.

He talked about the ceiling of 50 for the diploma course and whether there can be flexibility. I will discuss this with the Dean of the Law Faculty and the Chairman of the practical course. If there is flexibility, we must ensure that the flexibility is not implemented to such an extent that it will upset the projected growth rate. We cannot let it go totally askew, so to speak. But I will bear in mind his points and examine them with the Dean when they get to the implementation of the Diploma course.

Common professional examination. I would disagree with Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon. When I said common professional examination, what we have in mind is to avoid a situation now where you have the practical course separately organised and the Diploma course proposed for returned United Kingdom law graduates and whether we can craft a new course which will probably combine the elements and objects of these two courses into one. I think what he hopes is that once we do that, then we do not have any restriction. I think the basic philosophy must be retained. And the basic philosophy is that for the future, short-term and longer-term, our policy must be that the entry to the legal profession must no longer be dependent on foreign qualifications acquired abroad. The mainstay ought to be the Law Faculty at the NUS. If we take that philosophy, then whether or not we have a common professional examination, we must be careful not to open the floodgates to all foreign qualifications.

Mr Low Thia Khiang started off by saying that capping the number of lawyers cannot be in the interest of the public. He even talked about lawyers being allowed to work as waiters. That might have been tongue-in-cheek or he might have been serious. But when the day arrives that we have lawyers who cannot get employment and have to work as waiters ---

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Orators.

Prof. Jayakumar: Orators? I apologise. I thought I heard him say "waiters". I take it back. I am not sure how many vacancies are there available for public orators.

Anyway, if Members read the report of the committee, there are very good reasons stated there as to why it is necessary to curb the projected rate. We are already 82 per 100,000 population and other countries like Japan, Switzerland, Hong Kong have far less and these are also commercial centres. We do not want to reach a situation in Western countries where you have a high ratio and a large number of lawyers which leads to a litigious society and also a misallocation of resources.

He says "elitist". How do we justify 15 universities? He is not in favour of restriction on foreign law graduates. Here, I would like to take up the point I mentioned just now to Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon. In the early days when we did not have a Law Faculty or when our Law Faculty was developing, it was right that we had this dependence on foreign qualifications as an entry route. We even had part-time law courses, external law degrees. But we have to review this. Very few countries in the world recognise foreign law qualifications as an entry to their legal profession. The United Kingdom is moving in a different direction. Their legal philosophy is changing fast. They are now tied up with the European Economic Community.

Secondly, we have no control whatsoever over their curriculum, their standards, what they teach, and they certainly do not teach any subject on Singapore law. Thirdly, in Singapore, our Law Faculty has got very high standards. Entry into the Law Faculty is very difficult and we are getting very good graduates. We have control over the standards with the external examiner. There is close coordination between the Law Faculty, the Academy of Law, and the Board of Legal Education to ensure that the legal training in Singapore is the best possible for entry into the Bar. We cannot be assured the same for those returning from the United Kingdom. Therefore, there must come a time when we cut the apron strings from the United Kingdom.

I think the Committee's logical conclusion would have been to recommend a complete severance of ties. But they said that the primary source must be the NUS Law Faculty. And for the time being, allow a limited number to come from the United Kingdom. Once you decide on a limited number, then you must make a selection. And bear in mind, when you talk about foreign law graduates, law is different from other disciplines. In medicine, when we talk about appendectomy, if you have an appendicitis in the United States and a patient who has appendicitis here, we are talking of the same type of organ. But laws are different. Laws reflect certain norms, value systems, in a given society. And for the future, we must be sure that entrants to the legal profession are trained in the environment which they are familiar with and they are familiar with the laws which reflect the legal ethos and values of the country in which they are going to practise.

The other point raised by Mr Low Thia Khiang is whether we can be sure that the 15 universities are the best. The report makes it very clear that they are not implying that all other universities are bad, inferior, but a choice has to be made. And they made this choice with the best possible judgment that they could come to. I understand that they looked at the curriculum, they looked at the library resources, track record and, most important, they took into account that most of the returning Singapore lawyers from England traditionally come from these universities. So there is room for debate as to whether other universities should have been included. That is why they have recommended that this list should not be cast in stone and there should be periodic reviews because one of these 15 universities' standards may fall. So we must have the ability to review.

On the issue of second uppers or second lowers, we can have debating points on this. But really it comes back to quality. All these recommendations have, as their cornerstone, quality of the future legal practitioners. If you are interested in quality and, as I said, we have no controls over the standards and curriculum of these 15 universities, then you narrow it down to these 15 and from within the 15, make sure that we get the best. Sure, a second upper graduate does not necessarily guarantee that he is going to be better than someone else who has got a second lower. A second lower graduate may turn out later on to be a better practitioner than a second upper graduate. But we have to make decisions in the light of the information that we have before us.

He also brought up the issue of subsidiary legislation, a point also raised by Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon. Why do it by subsidiary legislation? As I have pointed out in my speech, if we are not to do this, we have a legislation which will be very cumbersome and complicated because there have to be various different cut-off dates for various different categories of persons mentioned in the report. Therefore, we have decided to follow the approach in the United Kingdom where for solicitors and architects, their requirements are spelt out in subsidiary legislation. That will also give us the flexibility to alter the list from time to time. So it is really to provide for flexibility.

He disagrees that legal officers must be subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in addition to the fact that they may be disciplined by the Legal Service Commission. But we need to take into account two different things. One is that he is employed by the Legal Service Commission. As an employee, there may be certain misdemeanours and disciplinary offences which may or may not duplicate the matters looked at by the Chief Justice. The Legal Service Commission has the authority to fire him or otherwise take action against him as an employee.

But such a person has a dual capacity in that he is also an advocate and solicitor. Now, who admitted him as an advocate and solicitor? It was the Supreme Court. As an advocate and solicitor, he is an officer of the Supreme Court. That is why it is right that if a complaint is made, which may warrant him to be struck off the rolls, the Supreme Court should do it. We have changed the position because it cannot be the Law Society. The Law Society's jurisdiction properly should be over practising lawyers who have client-solicitor relationship. Others do not have client-solicitor relationship. For example, I am a non-practising lawyer. It is right that my status as an officer of the court should be subject to somebody's jurisdiction. But I do not think it should be the Law Society because I do not practise law. But it is right that the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction over such non-practising lawyers. As I have pointed out, the legal officer, therefore, has two levels of possible disciplinary proceedings.

Why did we delete the words "in his professional capacity"? There is nothing sinister about this. The reason is that under the Act the list of offences which can be the subject of an investigation includes matters which do not relate to disciplinary professional matters. For example, one is convicted of CBT in respect of monies given to you by a relative. You can be convicted of criminal breach of trust but it may not be in your capacity as a lawyer, but the law has always said that in the legal profession that is a ground for taking action. So there is an inconsistency between the deletion of those words and other provisions. It is really to harmonise. But, as I have assured Members, it cannot mean that you can bring frivolous or irrelevant matters under the guise of this newly amended provision. For example, the wife of a lawyer should not be entitled to bring a complaint on the ground that she had some matrimonial problems with her husband because that is conduct which is completely unrelated to his being an officer of the court or being an honourable member of the profession.

I hope I have answered most of his points but if I have not, I hope he will remind me.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Prof. S. Jayakumar].

Bill considered in Committee.

[Mr Deputy Speaker in the Chair]

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 -

Prof. Jayakumar: Sir, may I have your leave to move the three amendments together as they are really drafting amendments and almost identical?

The Chairman: Please proceed.

Prof. Jayakumar: Sir, I beg to move,

(1) In page 2, line 22, after "(ii), to insert "was and still";

(2) In page 2, line 27, after "(iii)", to insert "was and still"; and

(3) In page 2, line 32, after "(iv)", to insert "was and still".

They are purely drafting amendments.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 3 to 31 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported with amendments, read a Third time and passed.