SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (AMENDMENT) BILL

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Order for Second Reading read.

The Minister for Law (Prof. S. Jayakumar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, the Bill seeks to amend the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322) (SCJA) for two purposes:

(a) Firstly, to raise the claim threshold under which leave to appeal is required:

(i) in the case of appeals from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate's Court in civil matters to the High Court, from $5,000 to $50,000; and

(ii) in the case of appeals from a decision of the High Court in civil matters to the Court of Appeal, from $30,000 to $250,000;

(b) Secondly, to deem any question of law referred to the Court of Appeal by the Public Prosecutor arising from any criminal matter determined by the High Court to be a question of public interest.

Let me now deal with the first purpose.

Reasons for raising limits for Civil Appeals to High Court and Court of Appeal

Sir, on 1st August 1997, the District Courts' jurisdiction in civil matters was raised from $100,000 to $250,000. As a result, more than 1,500 (The exact figure, updated to 19th November 1998, is 1,544 cases.) claims exceeding $100,000 have been filed in the District Courts since August 1997. This has helped to reduce the number of claims filed in the High Court.

However, under section 34(2)(a) of the SCJA, appeals to the Court of Appeal from decisions of the High Court in civil matters can still be made as a matter of right, ie, without first obtaining leave of the Court, if the value of the subject matter exceeds $30,000.

In view of the enhanced District Courts' jurisdiction to $250,000 in civil matters, the Chief Justice has proposed that the existing $30,000 limit in section 34(2)(a) be raised to $250,000. In other words, bring its limit in line with the enhancement. If the limit is not raised to $250,000, District Court cases of less than $250,000 can first go on appeal to the High Court and then Court of Appeal. This would strain the limited resources of the Court of Appeal.

Likewise, the Chief Justice also proposed that the limit of $5,000 under section 21(1) of the SCJA, which covers appeals to the High Court from decisions of the District and Magistrates' Courts in civil matters, be increased to $50,000. The effect is that any appeal relating to a claim less than $50,000 would require the leave of the Court.

The purpose of the amendment is that in view of the increased jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts, there is a need to discourage non-serious appeals to the High Court. This is best done by raising the threshold limit from $5,000 to $50,000. Litigants who feel that their appeals have merit may still apply for leave to appeal. For flexibility, the Bill also provides that the President will be empowered to vary the new limits after consulting the Chief Justice. If necessary, these new limits can be increased or decreased after assessing how they work out in practice.

I should point out that the new limits will not have the effect of preventing meritorious appeals from being heard, even if they concern claims below the new limits. The requirement for leave is essentially a screening mechanism to sieve out non-serious and unmeritorious appeals. Appeals can still be brought with the leave of court in cases falling below the new limits.

Reasons for deeming a question of law referred by Public Prosecutor to Court of Appeal arising from criminal appeal determined by High Court to be a question of public interest.

Let me now deal with the second amendment which is to amend section 60 to deem any question of law referred by the Attorney-General to the Court of Appeal (CA) arising from any criminal matter determined by the High Court to be a question of public interest.

Presently, under section 60, when an appeal from a decision of a Subordinate Court in a criminal matter has been determined by the High Court, the Judge may, on the application of any party and shall, on the application of the Public Prosecutor, reserve for the question of the Court of Appeal any question of law of public interest which has arisen in the course of the appeal. However, the existing provision in relation to the Public Prosecutor is unsatisfactory because the issue of whether a question of law is one of public interest is determined exclusively by the High Court. The result therefore is that the Public Prosecutor may be prevented from seeking a conclusive ruling from the Court of Appeal on questions which the Public Prosecutor considers to be of public interest.

If the Members of the House are aware, under the Constitution, the Attorney-General, who is also the Public Prosecutor, is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of all criminal prosecutions and for advising the Government on legal matters. In order to properly discharge his constitutional duties, the Attorney-General feels, and the Government agrees with him, that he should be given the freedom to pose questions which he considers to be of public interest for a conclusive ruling by the Court of Appeal.

The proposed amendment to section 60 seeks to address this issue by providing that any question of law referred by the Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal should be deemed to be a question of public interest.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Assoc. Prof. Chin Tet Yung (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, Sir, in our legal system, there are two ways in which laws are made. The first is through Parliament and the other through judges who decide on individual cases. Uncertainty in the law may arise when there are gaps or when laws are given differing interpretations by judges, or when, in the case of judge-made law, judges disagree with each other.

In criminal law and procedure, it is important that there be avenues to correct any such uncertainties quickly. The proper administration of justice requires laws to be certain, especially when criminal laws are concerned. Amendments to statutes can only be done by Parliament, but judge-made law is always subject to a determination by the highest court of the land, namely, the Court of Appeal. Who can appeal, and on what grounds, all provided for in the various statutes and codes. Today, we are considering a particularly important aspect, mainly the role of the Attorney-General in the appellate process.

The current practice, as the Minister has indicated, under section 60, is that both party and Attorney-General can appeal from a High Court decision to the Court of Appeal. In the case of an application by the AG, the judge is under a duty for the decision of the Court of Appeal, any question of law of public interest that has surfaced during the High Court hearing. Under the present section 64, the Court of Appeal is under a duty to reserve, hear and determine the question reserved. There is a deeming provision that where there is a conflict of judicial authority on a point of law, the question shall be regarded as one of public interest.

How is the proposed amendment different from the current one? The key difference relates to the deeming provision, ie, whenever the Attorney-General makes an application under this section, the question of law is deemed to be one of public interest. That is in the proposed section 65. That this amendment accords more with reality, there is no doubt. It must be a rarity that when the AG raises the question of law, it is not in the public interest. This conceivably can only happen when the AG is personally involved in the case. There is, therefore, a difference between a question of law raised by the Attorney-General and a question of law raised by the accused in a case. The Attorney-General, the member of the Executive, is charged, as the Minister has pointed out, with constitutional duties relating to the legal affairs of the Government and the conduct of prosecutions.

Additionally, the Attorney-General Chambers also have a legislative division that in fact drafts all legislation laid before Parliament. It is therefore important to recognise this fact that accounts for the difference between the Attorney-General raising a question of law and the accused in the case raising a similar question. It would, of course, be tidier, if the Attorney-General's ability to raise a question of law for determination by the Court of Appeal is separate from the confines of any case. This is the situation, for example, in the United Kingdom where in the Criminal Justice Act of 1972, a procedure known as the Attorney-General's reference was created. This makes it very clear that the public interest is served every time the Attorney-General makes a reference for determination by the Court. Such references are for the purposes of determining the law in future and this clearly may be beneficial to both accused and prosecution.

It must be emphasised that it is not the case that when an accused raises a question of law, it is never in the public interest. But equally clearly, it cannot be deemed to be so. The accused is personally interested in the outcome of the case and is not usually concerned with the application of the law to others. As I mentioned earlier, it could have been better to separate the accused's right of appeal from the Attorney-General's right to ask for determination of questions of law by the Court of Appeal. Perhaps, this matter can be looked at again in due course.

Another merit, of course, of the reference approach is that the defendant's name is normally kept out of the appeal, so the Court of Appeal can fully consider the case as one involving prospective cases. At the same time, it reinforces the view that the Attorney-General cannot, in such a case, ask the Court to set aside an acquittal of the accused whose case is the subject of a reference.

These amendments can be supported in that the end result on either approach is to produce clearer rulings from the highest court of the land to govern criminal cases. No one, I believe, will dispute the need or desirability to have such a procedure.

Finally, there may be a case for considering, in future, a procedure whereby the Attorney-General can refer questions, de novo to the Court of Appeal in anticipation of legal difficulties and problems without direct reference to a particular case. If such a procedure exists, it may help in the development of law without the need to involve Parliament unduly in matters concerning the administration of criminal justice.

Sir, in the case of criminal evidence and procedure, there is always the argument made that the judiciary and the legal profession should be allowed to regulate such rules, especially as they are the ones practising in this area, and where a quick decision may be required. It may take too long to take such amendments to Parliament, too cumbersome and perhaps unnecessary. The power of the Attorney-General to refer to the Court of Appeal questions of law therefore remains a most useful and necessary power.

Sir, I support the Bill.

Prof. Jayakumar: I wonder if Prof Chin would clarify his second point when he says, "In future, the Attorney-General should have the power to raise questions." Is he advocating this, both for criminal and civil cases, or only criminal cases?

Assoc. Prof. Chin Tet Yung: Sir, the answer is that I would expect it to be restricted to criminal cases, simply because the Attorney-General, as the Minister mentioned just now, is charged with the duty of all criminal prosecutions in the land.

Mr R. Ravindran (Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill increases the lower limits for appeal without leave, ie, appeal as of right. The limits are changed under the Bill as follows:

(a) For appeals from the Subordinate Courts to the High Court, the subject matter must now exceed $50,000 (which increases it from $5,000 to $50,000).

(b) For appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, the subject matter must now exceed $250,000. (This is an increase from $30,000 to $250,000).

Sir, the effect of the present limits is that cases within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court are appealable as of right to the High Court, but are not appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. This is a two-tier system. This position is satisfactory, as there is no real need for a three tier-system for Magistrate Court suits.

Sir, cases within the jurisdiction of the District Courts are appealable as of right to the High Court and are also appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. This position is unsatisfactory as there is a three-tier system and it is not something that is really needed. Indeed, the proposed amendments may have been intended to do away with this anomaly.

Cases within the jurisdiction of the High Court are appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. Here again, there is a two tier system. This position is satisfactory and was consciously adopted with the cessation of appeals to the Privy Council.

Sir, the effect of the proposed amendments would be that cases within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court are not appealable as of right to the High Court. There will be a single tier system. This is unsatisfactory.

I will go on to elaborate later, Sir. Cases within the jurisdiction of the District Courts are not appealable as of right, if the subject matter is between $30,000 and $50,000. Cases with subject matter between $50,000 and $250,000 are appealable as of right to the High Court. The removal of the automatic right of appeal for cases below $50,000 is again unsatisfactory. Again, appeals to the Court of Appeal are also no longer as a matter of right.

Cases within the jurisdiction of the High Court are appealable as of right only if the claim could not have been brought in the District Court. While the right of appeal is curtailed somehow, the position under the proposed amendment is still satisfactory.

Sir, the main concern under the Bill is that there is only a single tier for cases with subject matter below $50,000.

Sir, one of the cardinal principles for appeal is outlined by a famous Judge, as he then was - Megarry Judge in the Erinford Properties v Chesire CC. Sir, judges must decide cases even if they are hesitant in their conclusions. At the other extreme, a judge may be very clear in his conclusion and yet on appeal be held to be wrong. No human being is infallible, and for none are there more public and authoritative explanations of their errors than for judges.

Sir, the setting of limits to automatic rights of appeal would streamline the administration of justice in that the number of cases heard in the High Court would be reduced, in particular what the Minister referred to as the non-serious cases. The time taken for the final disposition of a case would also be reduced if there is a single tier. However, it should be noted that there are already deterrents in the present system, and these are the disincentives:

(a) The appellant has to pay security for cost.

(b) He has to pay the cost of his own solicitors or lawyers.

(c) He has also got to pay the cost of the winning party if he loses his appeal. So there are inherent cost deterrents which are already in place.

Sir, the proposed amendments would run against the grain for the following considerations:

The current limit of $5,000 is a relatively small figure for most Singaporeans. Cases with subject matter of, say, $20,000 to $50,000 are not small to many litigants and indeed the outcome may be a matter of serious economic consequence for a fair number. Sir, from the labour statistics available as at end of 1997, more than 770,000 Singaporeans still earn less than $1,500 per month. The number increases to 1,288,000 earning less than $2,500 per month. Sir, for a large number of Singaporeans, the $50,000 cut-off amount is too large an amount. Perhaps the amount could be increased to $10,000 or $15,000. When this amendment came in 1994, even if one looks at the inflation figure, I think it does not justify such a large jump in the cut-off amount. Sir, we must avoid confirming the feeling of the people that justice is only for the rich.

The single tier cases, in addition, would be matters handled by a Magistrate or District Judge. They are all members of the Subordinate Judiciary. The Subordinate Courts are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, which is the repository of judicial authority in the Constitution and safeguarded with security of tenure.

Based on experience and wisdom, a Magistrate or younger District Judge is less likely to be infallible.

Sir, appeal and the right of appeal is intrinsic in the judicial process and ensures that justice is seen to be done. A litigant's right to have another higher tribunal review his cause should not be curtailed. If the problem is the increased workload for the High Court judges, let us then appoint more High Court judges or Judicial Commissioners to handle the problem.

Sir, the provision of fair adjudication to which all have access is the sine qua non in the administration of justice. The raising of the limit for appeals to the High Court from $5,000 to $50,000 is a ten-fold increase and will result in a large number of individual or small business litigants being subject to a single tier of dispute resolution.

The saving grace of applying for leave to appeal may be illusory and create problems of its own. Application for leave would require examination of the merits. Affidavits would have to be filed. The grounds of appeal would have to be identified. If leave is given, the appeal itself will again be determined on merits. So what happens here is that there is an additional step being created with the consequential increase in cost and usage of court time.

The Notice of Appeal also cannot be filed unless leave itself is obtained. Hence the grounds of decision will not be available for the purposes of the leave application. This would mean again that the judge hearing the application for leave would have to second guess the trial judge. Counsel, in advising the litigant wishing to appeal, would also have to second guess the trial judge, in formulating the intended grounds of appeal.

Sir, there are two possible ways to address the above issues. The limit can be increased from $5,000 but not to $50,000. It can perhaps be increased to $15,000. This would reduce the number of appeals but would allow litigants to whom a five figure claim is significant to enjoy an automatic right of appeal and access to the High Court.

Sir, the proposed limits can be retained, but the system can be modified. There should be an automatic right to file Notice of Appeal on current limits or on an increased limit to about $15,000. Leave is required to file the Petition of Appeal if the subject matter is below the proposed limit which, as I have suggested, is perhaps below $15,000.

Sir, another amendment that I would like to highlight is the amendment to clause 21(3). This clause allows for the President to increase the cut-off amount, after consulting the Chief Justice, and by publishing the same in the Government Gazette. Sir, justice is a matter of grave importance to the public. I disagree that a matter that determines the access to a right of appeal should be decided by the Chief Justice and the President alone. I think such an important matter must be debated and decided by this House. It is important that in the name of administration of justice, we do not introduce deficiency in justice.

On that note, Sir, I would like to support the proposed amendments.

Mr Simon S. C. Tay (Nominated Member): Sir, two intended amendments in the Bill are of concern to me. One is, I believe, something you can question in principle; and the second may in fact raise a constitutional question.

The first relates to the access to the courts. I wish to associate my arguments to that of the speaker before me, Mr Ravindran. I share many of the concerns he has expressed about the intended limits of access to appeal. If the amendments are passed, some cases would have no right of appeal. There would be a single tier only and this is something we should question in principle. The right to appeal to the Supreme Court is important. With respect, as compared to judges of the High Court, many judges in the Subordinate Courts are relatively inexperienced and they do not have security of tenure. Moreover, the nature of the Subordinate Courts is that written judgements are not normally issued with full grounds of decision, unless an appeal is pending. Therefore, if we limit the right to appeal, we limit the transparency and accountability of these courts, and the use of their decisions as precedents.

The focus on the quantum in each case is of concern. The new sums to be set are high, Sir. I believe that justice is about questions of principle, not quantum. Just because a case is worth less does not automatically mean that it is less important to those involved. One example illustrates this starkly. In the Small Claims Tribunals Act, the sums involved are well below $50,000. Yet section 35 of the Small Claims Tribunals Act (Chapter 308) states that any party may appeal to the High Court on any point of law or questions for jurisdiction. This is of right. To limit access now, as proposed, would seem inconsistent.

The proposed amendment might be justified perhaps if there were a backlog of cases caused by a flood of appeals. This, however, is not the case at present, as I understand it. Our courts have shown world class efficiency. This, we can be proud of. We should value the efficiency in the dispensation of justice. But we should pause and question before efficiency gives way to haste or expediency.

My second point refers to amendments to section 21(b) and section 34(b). These intend to allow the amounts to be varied by the President after consulting the Chief Justice. I wish to ask the Minister to clarify if the Cabinet or the Minister-in-charge, Minister for Law, is to first advise the President of the matter, or it would be left to the President to act after consulting the Chief Justice. This is not clear to me. The plain wording of the amendment suggests the latter, that it would be left to the President after consulting the Chief Justice. Article 21(5) of the Constitution of Singapore allows for legislation such as this to require the President to consult with any person, other than the Cabinet or Minister. However, Article 21(1) of the Constitution says that generally, unless otherwise provided, the President acts on ministerial advice. My concern is that if the President acts in consultation with the Chief Justice only and without ministerial advice, this raises a constitutional question. Will the Minister please clarify if the Cabinet or Minister will advise the President of any change, and by "advise" I mean in the constitutional sense of putting the question outside the discretion of the President. I assume the Minister will clarify at the end and I shall therefore proceed with the question that arises if no ministerial advice is required and the concerns that therefore arise.

If no ministerial advice is required, this raises the concern that it might be against constitutional principle. In raising this concern, allow me to make it plain that I do not question the august judgment of the Chief Justice and the President. Rather, it is question of the constitutional arrangements of power. The Constitution gives separate and different powers to the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. One institution should not intrude on another's domain.

Sir, the judicial power in Article 93 is to interpret law as applied in individual cases. The Chief Justice also has the power to supervise administration of the courts that the Constitution provides or this House creates by legislation. This House cannot make laws that are designed to apply specifically and specially to decide any singular or particular case. This would intrude on the judicial power as shown in the Privy Council case of Liyange. Judicial power, however, is set within its own limits. Judicial power is not a power to make law or to decide general rules on what kind of cases to hear by quantum or other general characteristics as these intended amendments provide. This is the power of the legislation and that power belongs rightly to the legislature and this Parliament. The power to make laws such as the SCJA belongs to this House. So does the power to vary it. It does not belong to either the Chief Justice or the President.

The power to make law can be, of course, delegated for subsidiary legislation. The power can be delegated to the Executive, Ministers. Parliament then plays its role by retaining the power to question Ministers over their use of the delegated power to hold them accountable to the House. This is possible because our Ministers are also Members of Parliament. The constitutional principle is that delegated legislation should be in the hands of the Executives who are accountable to Parliament. If we put the power in the hands of the President or Chief Justice, I wish to point out that the House cannot hold them accountable in the same way as Ministers.

Sir, this problem can, of course, be circumvented. The amendment can provide for the Minister for Law to act, after consulting the Chief Justice. This will accord the constitutional principles and accountability of this House, while achieving the wish to take into account the Chief Justice's views and to amend as necessary. This is a small change, but it is one that may be necessary to clearly observe the Constitution. I would urge the Minister to clarify these concerns before passing the amendments.

Mr Shriniwas Rai (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, I am obliged to you for giving me this opportunity. Sir, two previous speakers, Mr Ravindran and Mr Simon Tay, have touched on the question of section 34, ie, the power of the President. I totally agree with them, and may I add my own view.

As the matter now stands, it is this Parliament that decides the question of jurisdiction. And I see no need for this power to be given either to the President or to the Chief Justice. This is a very important constitutional issue. Question of jurisdiction should be within the hands of this Parliament and this Parliament alone. And I would urge the Minister to reconsider the position. As Mr Simon Tay has said, even if the Minister advises, I still think that this House should be the final body to decide.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to support the Bill. However, I must say that I have reservation that the quantum that is being asked in this Bill is indeed very high. As the matter stands now, anything below $5,000, you require leave. Now we are being asked to raise this limit to $50,000, which is 10 times. I am aware that leave will be granted if there is merit. But then it would lead to legal expenses and involve time. The Minister has not given this House any figure to indicate that because of this provision, there is a backlog in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Justice must be seen to be done and I think justice will be done if there is less restraint on the part of the litigant to seek justice. And I would like to assure this House, Mr Speaker, Sir, that members of the legal profession, who would normally advise on question of appeal, are very cautious. They would consider the merit of the case because time and legal expenses are involved and only when they think there is some merit, then only they will go to court. So I am asking the Minister to increase it by all means, but not 10 times, perhaps $20,000 (4 times) and come back to this House sometime in the future, if need be, as the previous speaker, Mr Simon Tay, has spoken.

As a practising member of the Bar, Sir, I am proud of the judicial system. In the last seven years, despite some criticisms from some quarters outside, I can say in this House that we have the most independent and capable judicial system anywhere in the world, and world bodies have reckoned this. But in the name of efficiency, we should not undermine the system to such an extent that the right to appeal is questioned.

Sir, I have also a related question which, of course, is not part of this debate, but I will pursue it, with your permission. The Court of Appeal is presently made up of only three permanent Judges. May I urge the Minister to consider in future to increase this to five permanent Judges. I know the Chief Justice from time to time appoints one of the senior Judges of the Supreme Court, but I think this arrangement is not practical. Even Hong Kong, Sir, I am told, has got more Court of Appeal Judges. With more Appellate Judges, there would be more views and our judicial system will benefit.

Sir, now I come to another issue which I think deserves mention - the right of appeal. The Attorney-General is the highest officer of the land and I am glad the Minister has brought this amendment. He should have the discretion. He should have the right to appeal in the public interest. And I share Prof. Chin's concern that even on hypothetical questions, he is the man who can foresee what are the problems that are going to face him. He could pose even hypothetical questions, so that the public at large will know what is the legal position. I think it will be a wise thing for us to do this now than to wait for things to happen and then introduce legislation.

Sir, as a practising member of the Bar, I would urge the Minister - I am supportive of the amendment - to please go slow. The perception and the signal we must send to the public is that we are interested in justice and we are not, in the name of efficiency, going to change the system to the disadvantage of the litigant.

Sir, with that, I support the Bill.

Mr Zulkifli Bin Baharudin (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to raise my concern on one of the two proposed amendments to the Bill, that is, the monetary limit for an appeal to the higher Court.

One of the main rules of natural justice is the quick resolution of disputes. The fat of the proposed Bill may be just that. But many cases may not be referred for appeal to a higher Court and therefore it removes potentially the backlog of appeal cases. But equally important is the accessibility to a right of appeal. The Bill, by increasing the limit from $5,000 to $50,000 for an appeal to the High Court from a District or Magistrate Court, and $30,000 to $250,000 for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, is, in my view, excessive. The public, whose disputes and claims may be small in quantum, may feel that they have no access to appeal to a higher Court simply because the claim involved is small. In fact, it may appear that commercial cases are more likely to qualify for appeal because of the higher limit as quite naturally, cases involving commercial disputes involve large sums of money. But the right of appeal, Sir, is for everyone, not just corporations. For an ordinary man, it is not just the quantum, it is the principle and the law that is involved that is equally important to him. For parties that go to Court, especially when they have used up all the avenues of mediation, his case and dispute could be the most important thing to him, whether the amount is big or small. A more accessible right to appeal also means the opportunity for any person seeking justice to have his case heard before a more experienced Judge, especially when many of our Judges in the District and Magistrate Courts are younger and less experienced.

Sir, money cannot be the main determinant whether a case is heard by a more experienced Judge. There could be cases where the amount involved is small but may have very important and wide implications to society. Are we discounting the fact that mistake in judgement and decision could be one of the possible outcomes and consequence of decision at the lower Court? Why make it difficult for parties to appeal? If any, we must make the appeal process accessible, convenient and affordable. I urge the Minister to review and clarify these matters, especially on the limits of appeal, so as not to make it excessive. Based on this qualification, I support the Bill.

Mr J. B. Jeyaretnam (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I say from the outset that I am most unhappy with the amendments proposed in this Bill. I do not support the Bill, and may I say that my Party does not support this Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I do not have to say in this House that justice lies at the heart of every human being. And he wants justice in his conduct of his daily life and in any action taken against him by the Government or the public prosecutor who is a member of the Executive. So, he must be given access to the Courts and to the highest Court, if necessary, if he feels that it is important enough to him. So he must have ready access.

Secondly, on which I have expressed my dissatisfaction and the Party's dissatisfaction, although it does not come within the scope of this Bill, is the increasing cost of justice to the ordinary man. We have had cost increases several times and many a man feels now it is too expensive to go to the Courts. This is a very unfortunate and regrettable feeling if it is shared by a great majority of the community.

As has been said here, Mr Speaker, Sir, the right of an appeal to test the decision of a single Judge has been with us for many, many years. It is an inherent part of the judicial system of many countries, almost every country I should have said, and not only do they provide a one tier appeal, they go on to provide a further appeal, a two tier appeal. We have seen recently with Malaysia setting up the Supreme Court of Malaysia to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal. And I shall be talking about this later. Instead of moving towards a two tier appeal system, we seem to be heading towards cutting out appeals altogether. Is that what we want in this country? There are other ways than bringing legislation before Parliament to discourage appeals, and which are also to be regretted.

Not very long ago, the Chief Justice, who hears Magistrates' appeals, said quite publicly at a hearing that he was going to discourage frivolous appeals by convicted persons who may have had long sentences of imprisonment or heavy fines, and he would discourage that, cut down the number of appeals by increasing the sentences. May I say that is a most unfortunate remark. And now what does the Government propose to do? As has been said by the speakers before me, it proposes to provide from now, with the passing of this Bill, and there is no question that it will become law, that a single magistrate be left to decide claims below $30,000. To the litigant, a claim of $15,000, $20,000 or $25,000 may mean a great lot to him. In that respect, this Bill is discriminatory. Mr Ravindran, I think, mentioned that, but I will go further and say this is totally discriminatory, and questions may be asked whether it does or does not violate the equality requirement in our Constitution. Why should you deny a litigant who has a claim of less than $50,000 any right of appeal from the decision of a single judge or magistrate? Why is it that only persons who have claims of more than $50,000 and $250,000 should have this right and not persons who have claims below the sum of $50,000? Of course, there should be a little restraint in the number of appeals to be allowed and the present limits are good enough.

Again, as has been pointed out, there are other restraints by way of requiring appellants to provide security for costs. If the appeal is thought to be frivolous, the answer is to ask for further security and the opposing litigants can do just that. If they thought an appeal was frivolous, they could make an application to the High Court for security for cost to be increased, particularly if there is some evidence that the person appealing will not have the means to pay the costs at the end. So we have the mechanism to prevent frivolous and useless appeals going up to the High Court or to the Court of Appeal.

The Minister was very brief in his introduction of this Bill and he says the Chief Justice had requested the amendments. May we know from the Minister whether it is because there are too many appeals and, if so, what is the present number of appeals that judges find difficult to cope with? As has been said before me, justice demands that even if it takes a little longer, that the person seeking justice should be accorded justice and be able to leave the court or tribunal with the feeling that justice has been done to him even though he may not agree with the decision. So what is the need? Is it because there are far too many appeals and we have not got enough judges, or we have not got enough court rooms and appeals are going to be lengthened out to two or three years?

Already, I am unhappy at the haste with which cases are processed through the courts. So I am, and my Party is, very unhappy with the proposal that we now increase the threshold for appeal from the Subordinate Courts to $50,000. It is not good enough to say they can still appeal because they can seek the leave of the magistrate. Magistrates are human and, like any other human being. More so because they are judicial officers and they have to decide on the merits they must feel that they are right in their decision. They would be reluctant to grant any further appeal saying, "This question is very clear to me. I cannot see that an appeal is going to help." So the decision is left entirely to the magistrate.

May I illustrate this by what the Privy Council said, and I am sure the Minister is aware of this, in relation to applications that were made under section 60 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. There were two applications made under that, one to the Chief Justice and one to another judge of the High Court. They were criminal cases because section 60 applies only to criminal cases. And in both instances, the applications to refer questions to the Court of Appeal were turned down summarily. The Privy Council which, as I have said before, was then the highest court in the land, pronounced their unhappiness over the decisions of the two judges not to refer the questions to the Court of Appeal. The Privy Council was in no doubt that the questions sought to be referred were questions of public interest and they said they should have been referred. So there is the Privy Council commenting, not on magistrates' decisions, but on the decision of the Chief Justice and a judge of the High Court. So if they can make mistakes, what about magistrates? Are they not liable to fall into the same error?

I would like to hear from the Minister the compelling reasons why this amendment is necessary at this stage. If it is speedy justice that we want, cases heard and disposed of immediately, perhaps we should try and take a leaf from what the Prime Minister in Pakistan is proposing to do. He is proposing to have cases heard immediately, appeal heard the next day, execution carried out within seven days. Is that what we want in Singapore - is that the whole aim and object of justice, that it should be speedily carried out and determined? Or is our aim to try and do justice between subject and subject and between the subject and the Government? These are very important questions of principle and cannot be shrugged off or shelved by considerations of time or convenience. Many a judge has said that administrative convenience has no place in the system of justice. However inconvenient it may be, it must be the sole aim and object of justice to do justice even though it may be inconvenient.

May I move on to the proposed repeal and re-enactment of section 60. This is again most unsatisfactory. I have raised this, not once, but two or three times in this House, after I returned to this House. The law as it now stands gives the Public Prosecutor the sole right without any hindrance to take up a question to the Court of Appeal. But the accused has to apply for leave and, as I have indicated, whether it reaches the Court of Appeal or not was left to the judge who heard the appeal and who quite clearly felt convinced of the rightness of his decisions. That itself was wrong in principle. Why should the Public Prosecutor be allowed to ride - I suppose I should not say his coach and six horses - his car through the courts? This Bill seeks to give him greater rights. I am sure the Minister is aware, and this comes from the pronouncements of the highest courts which have dealt with the question of Crown privilege. I am sure he is aware that the courts have decided again and again in England and Scotland that the question of public interest is not a matter for the Attorney-General or anyone else, but it is for the courts to determine after hearing both sides what is the public interest.

So what is wrong about that? The courts are the persons who should decide what is in the public interest, not the Executive. This amendment seeks to remove that question from the realm of the court to the Public Prosecutor, contrary to the decisions from other jurisdictions. We seem to be stepping out of line with the jurisdictions in other countries. I suppose then it can be said that we are unique, we are different, we do not follow what other countries do. Is that what we want? Or are we concerned with whether our present system serves justice or not?

I had proposed previously that under section 60 at least the right to take the matter up to the Court of Appeal should be left to the Court of Appeal itself and that litigants or the Public Prosecutor should make the application to the Court of Appeal and not to the judge who heard it. This was done by Malaysia many, many years ago. They substituted the decision of the judge with the decision of the Court of Appeal, requiring an application to be made to the Court of Appeal. What is wrong with that, instead of giving the Public Prosecutor greater rights? Reference was made to the right of the Public Prosecutor in the United Kingdom. As has been pointed out, in the United Kingdom, the Public Prosecutor has no right of appeal against the acquittal of any accused person by a court. But here in Singapore we do, and it is there that he takes up the questions to the Court of Appeal. In the United Kingdom, it is purely a question of law which would not affect the decision in a particular case. It is to govern the courts in any future cases coming before them involving that point of law.

I must also say a few words about the amendment proposed by clause 3 on the amendment of section 34 to add a new sub-section. This is again, may I say, very unsatisfactory. The right of appeal, as I have said, is an inherent part of the judicial system, and is a matter of great public interest. It should only be left to the legislature what limits should be put to it and not left entirely to the Chief Justice or the President. A very valuable point was taken by Mr Simon Tay that under the amendment if a decision to change the limit is taken by the President or the Chief Justice, it cannot be questioned in this House. I would ask the Minister not to move the Second Reading of the Bill but that it be referred to a Select Committee. At least then we will have the views of the public as to what they feel about the rights of appeal being restricted so severely.

May I say a few words about the present system of appeals in Singapore. At the moment, as I indicated, we only have a one tier appeal except where in civil cases, decisions go up from the District Court to the High Court. Then there is another tier of appeal to the Court of Appeal. I think it is time we thought of introducing a further tier of appeal, a two-tier appeal, which as I said, is in place in most of the other countries, certainly in the Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom. And in the United States, you will find that they have more than a two-tier system of appeal. They have three tiers and there may, in some cases, be a four-tier. I know criticism has been made particularly about the death row inmates in the United States. I agree that a person should not be left 10 - 12 years waiting to know whether he is going to be executed or not.

May I illustrate, if I have the time, Mr Speaker, Sir, why I think a two-tier appeal is necessary by referring to a case in Singapore where I think a possible miscarriage of justice was done to the litigants by the absence of a further appeal from the Court of Appeal. And this was the case of the three accused persons which I referred to in my motion on the appointment of a commission to look into the investigation of criminal cases. These three men were charged with murder when they should not have been charged. They were not even at the scene and the murder was committed by someone else as was proved later, and that man was convicted after the three men were acquitted. And that came about because the defence sought strenuously to bring that other man to justice. That is the criminal side of it.

When the men took their action to the High Court for damages, because they had spent three years in jail, the Judicial Commissioner dismissed the case without answering the question which was posed to him. He was asked to answer how is it that three innocent men could confess to such a gruesome crime as murder when they knew, at the end of it, they would be hanged. He did not answer the question. They took it up to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal was troubled with this question. The Court of Appeal felt that the presumption of innocence was very strong. The three men had been acquitted and someone else had been convicted. They felt there was this strong presumption of innocence in favour of the accused who were claiming for damages for malicious prosecution. But the Court of Appeal said in its judgment, "But we can find no evidence that they gave evidence before the Judicial Commissioner that they were innocent and that they were not there at the scene of the crime." That was an error. A total error. They had adjourned their decision and gave their judgment. But they overlooked the evidence the men had given. Yet, in their own affidavit of evidence filed, in the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner, every single accused had started his affidavit by saying, "I am totally innocent of this crime. I was never there. I knew nothing about this. I deny the charge right from the start." So the evidence was there and yet the Court of Appeal missed that evidence. If there had been a further appeal available to the three men, they could have gone up to the appellate court. But that was not possible.

Mr Speaker: Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, your time is up.

Mr Jeyaretnam: May I say those men have now been made bankrupt.

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to thank Members who have spoken and several comments, observations and criticisms have been made. I will try to categorise them in broad categories and deal with the issues that they have raised.

First, several Members have expressed the concern that this somehow will affect access to justice and there will be restrictions on justice. Much has been said by Members about the inherent right for litigants to appeal. Some have emphasised the importance of automatic appeal. Mr Jeyaretnam even thought that this amendment raises questions of equality under the Constitution. Before we get carried away in thinking that this amendment has come out of the blue, never done before, and that it violates some sacrosanct principles, I would like to inform Members of the background.

The background is that all these years, the principle that leave to appeal is required, coupled with a monetary threshold, is not new. It has always been there in our statute books. That is the first point I wish to make. I think Members should know that this system of leave to appeal, coupled with a monetary limit, has been an essential feature of our legal system. It has been in our laws since 1955. In fact, before that, in 1936, there was no appeal when the amount was below $100. At that time the jurisdiction of the Court was $500. So, in case Members did not realise it, the monetary limit is part and parcel of this principle of leave to appeal.

Secondly, periodic adjustments of the monetary limit is also not new, and it has never been argued before that having that limit and persons who do not qualify under the limit having to apply for leave - it has never been argued that justice has been denied and access to justice restricted. Because some of the speakers seem to be unaware of this background, let me remind them of how this has evolved.

Before 1986, the monetary limit was $500 in the Subordinate Courts, or with leave if the amount was less. This element of being able to apply for leave has always been there, if the amount was not reached. So the monetary limit was $500 and the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was $10,000 before 1986. In 1986, the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was raised to $50,000. When that was done, the appeal threshold limit was then raised from $500 to $2,000, a four-fold increase. I was then in Parliament. Of course, some of the Members who spoke were not there. But I do not recall any Member then arguing that this was curtailment of justice.

In 1993, seven years later, the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was raised to $100,000. The appeal threshold limit was then raised from $2,000 to $5,000, 2 1/2 times. Again, I stress, the element of applying for leave to appeal was always there.

Last year, 1997, the jurisdictional limit for the Subordinate Courts was raised to $250,000. But last year the courts did not propose that the appeal be immediately changed. It was kept at $5,000, and monitored for a year. Now, we are altering the appeal limit to $50,000. The element of leave being given is still being retained. So the point to be underscored is that with the increase in jurisdiction of our Subordinate Courts to $250,000, obviously more and more cases are going to be heard by the Subordinate Courts. Therefore, the threshold for appeals has to be adjusted. Then the question arises: what is the figure? $10,000, $15,000, $20,000? The Chief Justice has proposed it be raised to $50,000. I would, as the Minister for Law, accept the judgement of the Chief Justice who is in charge of administration of the courts and who has a good overview of the management of cases. That is the first point I would make. So let's be clear about the background. This is not something that has come out of the blue, it was never done before. These are periodic adjustments of jurisdictional limits and threshold limits for appeals. All along, those who do not meet the threshold limits did not have automatic appeal. But it does not mean that the right of appeal was curtailed because they could have applied for leave to appeal. If there were merits and they made a case, leave would be granted.

The second point I want to make to those who have suggested that it somehow conjures up curtailment of justice, some grave injustice is being done, is to say that that is a very narrow way of approaching the issue. They proceed on the narrow assumption that the more appeals you have, the more tiers of appeals you have, the more automatic appeals you have, that is justice. I do not think it follows. That is a narrow view of looking at the whole system of justice because looking at the administration of justice in totality, you have to view what the courts have done in the past many years. A whole array of reforms has been undertaken by the courts. Rather than conclude that automatic appeals, greater number of appeals, greater number of tiers of appeals equals better administration of justice, why not examine and inquire what the courts have done, which is a pro-active case management approach to administration of justice? In fact it saves time, cost and trauma and emotions for potential litigants, with lesser cases having to go to trial, and lesser cases going to appeal. Does that necessarily mean it is bad for justice?

The justice system in Singapore has undergone tremendous reforms and many initiatives have been taken by the courts. The quality of judgments, quality of judges improves and judges handle the cases and deal with them seriously and fewer appeals go up. Does this necessarily mean bad? I do not think it follows. Therefore, I would stress that we should look at the totality of our justice system. Look at the whole context of the proactive approach taken by the courts because they have indeed taken a wide variety of measures which have in fact benefited the public.

A notable example that comes to my mind is mediation of civil cases since 1994. The law did not require it. It was an initiative, an innovation of the courts, that all civil cases are mediated before trial, and the settlement rate is 92%. From 1995 to October 1998, only 1.6% of 125,000 civil cases proceeded to trial. If you proceed on the assumption that the more cases the better, obviously it is a bad system of justice! I would like to put it to colleagues here that this system of mediation, where so many cases have been settled, has in fact resulted in substantial savings of money, time, heartache, emotion, for potential litigants. None of the MPs have touched on this. In fact, the justice system as evolved by our courts under the leadership of the Chief Justice has in fact led to two bites at the cherry. One bite is to have the case resolved by mediation first. If that fails, then a second bite at the trial.

Look at the other proactive measures taken by the courts - mediation and counselling in matrimonial cases which can cause tremendous emotional trauma for the husband or wife and children. The number of cases now going to trial is very small. The courts have reduced the time lag between setting down the case and hearing in the High Court where they had a target of 18 months, and I am told the target has been reached. Even the Subordinate Courts cases are fixed within three to four weeks from the time that the parties are ready. Pre-trial conferences, electronic filing of cases, ability of people to pay fines through ATOMs without having to go to the Subordinate Courts. And the Subordinate Courts have now also had a recent soft launching of its innovative concept known as "Multi-door Hot House", which is a one-stop service centre.

Why do I mention all this? Because I am troubled by the approach taken by some of my colleagues who seem to focus just on this right of appeal. They have not been aware that a periodic adjustment has been done from 1986, and before that too. We have to do this because the monetary limit was increased in 1987 to $250,000. Do not take a narrow view. You have to look at the whole system of justice and it is because of all these reforms taken that our judiciary has been given top marks, not by me, speaking as the Minister for Law, but by independent international rating agencies.

Mr Jeyaretnam: By the ICJ.

Prof. Jayakumar: ICJ is not an independent rating agency! In the PERC study, August 1998, on the ranking of Singapore's Police and Judiciary among certain countries, Singapore was rated to have the best national institutions in Asia. In the ranking of the judiciary and the police, Singapore topped again with a score of 2.87 whereas the rating of the United States and Hong Kong was 3 and 3.11 respectively. Since an interesting debate is going to come later on, PERC commented:

"Surprisingly, for a country where the Government is often accused by foreign human rights activists (and if I may add, by somebody else) of using the judiciary to pursue politically-motivated libel suits, our American respondents living in Singapore even rated the island's judicial system as being superior to that of the United States."

Please bear in mind this total approach to the administration of justice, and I think colleagues should really join me in giving top marks to our judiciary, ie, the Supreme Court, the Subordinate Courts and our Chief Justice. I think they have done Singapore proud. Far from curtailing access to justice, they have in fact gone out of their way to deliver justice in a more user-friendly and more efficient way.

I think the statistics are interesting. When the appeal limit was $5,000 in the Subordinate Courts, in 1996 the total number of claims filed in the Subordinate Courts was 29,281. Of these, 425 went to trial. Of these, only 83 went on appeal. Of these, only 15 appeals were allowed, less than 1%. In 1997, 32,088 claims were filed in the Subordinate Courts. Only 462 cases went to trial. Of these, 87 went up on appeal, of which 14 were allowed. In 1998, up to October this year, 36,269 claims were filed in the Subordinate Courts. 469 went to trial, and 97 went up on appeal. The point I am making is that the system has just evolved shows that many cases have been mediated. Only the cases that deserve to go on trial, or fail mediation, went to trial. Of that, not many went on appeal. So the system of jurisdiction limits and threshold limits for appeals works.

In my view, the small number of cases that later went to trial shows the high quality of the Subordinate Court Judges. It shows that the regular adjustment of monetary limits ensures that only serious appeals go up. Otherwise, many other cases would have gone up and occupied precious High Court time.

Notwithstanding what I have said and the variation to the limits proposed in the amendment, colleagues have noted that the amendment provides for the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice, to vary the amounts so the Courts can monitor the number of appeals and the number of applications filed for leave to appeal. If necessary, in the light of experience of what happens, the amount can be decreased or adjusted. Several Members - Mr Simon Tay, Mr Ravindran, Mr Shriniwas Rai and Mr Jeyaretnam - took umbrage at this provision and said this is intrinsically wrong, it is Parliament which should decide, and Parliament should be the sole arbiter, whether this or other limit. We can argue this and debate it. But who is the best judge of what limit best works? We in Parliament?

Mr Jeyaretnam: Of course.

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Jeyaretnam says, of course. The administration of the Courts is really under the leadership of the Chief Justice. He has brought the Courts and developed the Courts to a situation which has today earned praise and kudos. I for one would have full confidence in the Chief Justice, and in the light of experience, depending on the number of cases, this figure can be adjusted.

Mr Simon Tay raised a question as to whether there are some constitutional principles involved here. But I must be careful not to give any authoritative pronouncement or purport to make any authoritative pronouncement on constitutional issue. With that caveat, let me say also that the Attorney-General is very careful when he drafts Bills that he would have taken into account the constitutional aspect of the Bill. But to answer Mr Simon Tay's question, I would think that this provision does fall within Article 21(5) of the Constitution which provides that, "The Legislature may by law make provision to require the President to act after consultation with, or on the recommendation of, any person or body of persons other than the Cabinet in the exercise of his functions other than . [the two provisos are not applicable here.]" But let me say to Mr Simon Tay that, in practice, the Chief Justice, on such matters, has close consultations with the Attorney-General who in turn also consults me for my views.

Some have suggested raising the figure to $10,000 or $15,000. This is a matter for judgement really at the end of the day. If you say the figure has to be raised, and has to be raised because of the upping of the limit last year to $250,000, then it is a relative matter, whether it is $10,000 or $15,000. I think $10,000 or $15,000, in fact, comes very close to the cases which the Small Claims Tribunal hears, ie, cases up to $10,000, and with the consent of both parties, up to $20,000. So to raise it to $10,000 or $15,000, which will come so close, and overlap with the Small Claims Tribunal, may be unrealistic.

Another argument was made by more than one speaker who suggested that this amendment gives the impression that litigants who have larger claims have better access to justice and better rights, and that this amendment may favour the rich. But they fail to look at it from the other point of view. Because you can have a "rich" plaintiff, big corporate plaintiff, suing a small-timer, small businessman. A small businessman wins a case, the plaintiff, if not for these threshold limits, because he can afford it, can take it all the way up the ladder to the different tiers of appeal where the small-time defendant, who has won the case, would not be able to afford. So it works both ways.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Legal aid.

Prof. Jayakumar: It works both ways. So it does not follow ---

Mr Speaker: Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, if you have anything to say, could you please get my attention first? Please continue, Prof. Jayakumar.

Prof. Jayakumar: Thank you, Sir. So the Members who made that point have failed to look at it from the other side of the coin.

Can I touch on the amendments to section 60? First, Prof. Chin Tet Yung has made some interesting observations. He agrees with the premise that there should be a difference between a reference or a question by the Attorney-General and application to refer by the accused person. I think he accepts there is a fundamental distinction. But as I listened to his speech, I think he made two separate points. First, he proposes that the Attorney-General's reference ought to be distinct from the reference by the accused convicted person. And he would want the Attorney-General to have the right to refer any question of law unconnected with the accused person. I think we can consider that. Of course, he would have noted that the amendment does make a distinction in a sense that for the accused person, the Court has a discretion whether to reserve the question for decision by the Court of Appeal. In the case of an application by the Attorney-General, the Judge must reserve the question, provided the other ingredients are met. He has referred to the United Kingdom's position. Of course, in the United Kingdom, the conviction and acquittal is not disturbed by the Court of Appeal's decision. Our existing provision, including the amendment that we propose to make, is different because in cases of acquittal, the Court of Appeal's practice is not to disturb the acquittal even if they agree with the arguments of the public prosecutor. But the Court of Appeal can set aside the conviction if the point of law is decided against the public prosecutor's arguments.

But he made a second and even broader proposal, which is that the Attorney-General should have the power to refer any question de novo without direct reference to any case, as I understand it. And he says it will help in the development of the law, and I believe he was supported by Mr Shriniwas Rai who has gone further and said even hypothetical cases could be raised. The significance of this proposal is that it would be delinking from the other elements which have to be satisfied in the existing provision, ie, that it must arise in a particular criminal matter and the determination of that question must have affected the case. But he has clarified that he is still talking about criminal cases. I am prepared to look into this and discuss it with the Attorney-General, and if we conclude that there is merit in this, we may well have to come to Parliament.

Mr Jeyaretnam, as he himself admits, has raised much of what he has said before. The first point he makes is that the public prosecutor ought not to have this special right distinguished from the application by the accused - application by the accused is discretionary; the Court can turn it down, but the application by the Attorney-General has to be approved, provided it meets these other elements.

Why is this so? Instead of giving a lengthy reply, since he raised it on 30th July 1997, my colleague, Minister of State Ho Peng Kee, gave an excellent reply which was as follows, and I quote:

"When the Public Prosecutor prosecutes cases, he prosecutes in the public interest. If there is a point of public interest that needs the clarification of a full Court of Appeal, then as Public Prosecutor he should have the leeway so that the point of law can be conclusively decided." But, then, Mr Jeyaretnam says on the question of public interest, we are out of line with other jurisdictions, and public interest must be determined by the Court. He even referred to Malaysia. He should double check the law in Malaysia because in the case of Public Prosecutor v Lim Joo Soon [1981] 1 Malayan Law Journal, page 107, this was what the Federal Court had to say:

". The Public Prosecutor's application coming as it is as from such an august officer of the law removes from the discretion of the court the right to decide on whether the question is of public interest. When the Public Prosecutor applies for a reference . it must be taken that any question posed by him is of public interest, unless of course it can be shown that the question is indeed of his own personal interest and of no one else."

It may be useful for me to explain to this House why is it that the Attorney-General's conclusion that the question he is posing or is applying to refer a matter of public interest must be taken to be a public interest. And the best I can do is to reproduce part of the judgement of the Court of Appeal in the Public Prosecutor v Bridges Christopher case (1998). In that case, the argument was made by the Attorney-General. But the court found that his submissions were "compelling" but felt that the existing provision was not appropriately worded. This is what the Attorney-General argued, and this is summarised by the Court in its judgement and I think it succinctly puts forward the rationale for this amendment to section 60. I quote:

"The Public Prosecutor is responsible for and represents the State in all criminal prosecutions. He is also the Chief Legal Adviser to the Government on what the law is. He has a duty to enforce what he believes to be the right law which no one has. Therefore if he does not agree with the law as pronounced by the High Court, he should be entitled to go to the Court of Appeal for a final ruling. Accordingly, the Public Prosecutor submitted in the case that any Public Prosecutor's questions which satisfy the three conditions would invariably be one of public interest based on the need to have a final ruling for future cases. He further submitted that a determination by the Court of Appeal advances the public interest in reinforcing the finality principle in the following ways: (a) the Public Prosecutor is thereafter able to decide on prosecutions in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision;

(b) the Public Prosecutor is able to advise the Government on whether or not it is desirable to change the law; and (c) where the Court of Appeal upholds the Public Prosecutor's case, all convictions and acquittals founded on that principle of law are likely to end at the Subordinate Courts."

Sir, since the Court of Appeal's judgement is that the Attorney-General's submissions were compelling, the Government has agreed to give effect to it.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Mr Speaker, Sir, may I raise a number of points with the Minister by way of clarification? As I listened to his reply, I noted that he was saying that the number of cases had decreased tremendously, not only by the transfer of the cases above $50,000 to the Subordinate Courts by the amendment made last year, but as a result of the mediation process introduced in this country. I am all for it. But to say that we have mediation and we do not need appeals seems to me to miss the point altogether. If that is true ---

Mr Speaker: Order.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I am asking him some questions, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Could you please ask your question but do not embark on a new speech and enter into a debate?

Mr Jeyaretnam: Yes, all right. Mr Speaker, Sir, I accept your ruling.

Mr Speaker: All right. Make your clarification now.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Yes, I have got questions to ask him.

Mr Speaker: All right. Ask your questions.

Mr Jeyaretnam: If the number of cases has been reduced, then what is the compelling need for this amendment? Are our judges overworked with appeals at the moment? May I ask all the questions so that Prof. Jayakumar does not have to jump up every few minutes. May I point out to him, by way of clarification, that I was not relying on the Malaysian Court for the proposition that public interest is a matter for the courts. I am sure he is aware of the decisions in the House of Lords, on appeals from Scotland and England, that public interest is eminently a matter that should be left to the courts, and he mentioned Christopher Bridges' case. I stand corrected of course, but the Court of Appeal there said that the question of public interest was a matter for the courts. It did. So there we have it, supporting what I said that it should be a matter for the courts and not for the Public Prosecutor.

Finally, may I ask the Minister whether it is the speedy administration of justice that is important in society? It is important. Or is it the perception in the public mind that every citizen will get the justice that is satisfactory and of which he can feel satisfied? Which is more important - the perception of justice by the public at large or the speedy administration of justice?

Prof. Jayakumar: Mr Speaker, Sir, on the first point, I did not say that, because there is mediation, there should be lesser appeals. I raised the point on mediation to make the broader point to urge colleagues to look at the total approach to the administration of justice which our courts have taken and that is a considerable development for which the courts are to be congratulated.

I have also not justified this amendment on the ground that there is a tremendous overload or flood of cases. The point I made here is that the main reason is because of the increase of the jurisdictional limit to $250,000, there will be more cases. And as we have done before, we will have to increase the appeal limit so as to be in line with the jurisdictional limit. As I conceded, we can have a debate on whether it should be $50,000, $40,000, $30,000, and so on. It is a relative matter. I am more than willing to defer to the wise judgement of the Chief Justice in this regard because he is dealing with the administration of the courts on a daily basis. Who are we to second guess and say, "Well, it should be $40,000 and not $50,000."

Next, Mr Jeyaretnam extols what is going on in the United Kingdom and what the courts have decided. I should point out to him that the provision in the United Kingdom which Prof. Chin Tet Yung referred to, would enable the Attorney-General there to refer a point to the court, if I am not mistaken, whether or not it is of public interest. So the United Kingdom's approach in an analogous provision delinks it from the public interest. Mr Jeyaretnam is shaking his head. But he may do well to look up section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1972.

It was Christopher Bridges' case indeed. If he had listened carefully to what I have said, I said that the Attorney-General argued and made a lengthy submission as to why there were very good reasons for interpreting the provisions in such a way that when the Attorney-General makes an application for reference of a question, it should be considered to be of public interest. The court found that argument compelling but the section, as worded, they did not feel it was appropriate to accept the Attorney-General's argument. Therefore, the law has to be amended.

The final question he asked is that he seems to imply that all the measures which I have praised the court are really for the speedy administration of justice, ie, speed at the expense of justice being done. Actually, if you examine what happens, the measures taken by the courts involve more time, effort, energy and work by the judges, the Registrars and everybody involved. They need not have done it. They can just say, "You have come to sue? A wants to sue B? Fine, let's have a trial." The amount of work it takes for counselling in family and matrimonial affairs and the amount of work it takes to have mediation is tremendous. So it is not speed in wanting to get rid of these cases. It is in fact with the desire to ensure that the parties are able to resolve the cases before they come to trial that motivates them. And I think that is a very important principle in the administration of justice which we should not forget.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I have another question. Is the Minister aware that, in some cases I know personally, a lot of compulsion is brought on litigants and even in criminal cases to either plead guilty or settle the cases?

Prof. Jayakumar: Since Mr Jeyaretnam says he knows personally that there is certain compulsion, he should raise it with the appropriate authorities, either with the Registrar of the court or the Law Society. This is not the place for us to determine whether he is right or wrong.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I would like my vote to be recorded as dissenting, opposing the Bill, and I would like to know from Mr Low whether he would oppose the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Let Mr Low speak for himself. So be it.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Prof. S. Jayakumar].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.