TERRORISM (SUPPRESSION OF FINANCING) BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Bill is to give effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CSFT) which Singapore signed on 18th December 2001 and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. As a member of the Financial Action Task Force, Singapore had adopted a set of Eight Special Recommendations, one of which was to take immediate steps to ratify and implement the Convention.

Sir, the terrorist threat that Singapore and the rest of the world are facing today is like nothing we have ever encountered before. The recent events of the past year have shown that terrorism has become a transnational phenomenon, one that no country is immune to. Given the indigenous resources and extensive reach of these groups, the threat of terrorism will continue for a long time to come. It is widely believed that many terrorist activities are funded through a series of money laundering operations. Hence, targetting the financial aspect of these transnational groups will be an effective way to cripple and disrupt their operations. The integrity of our financial systems must be prevented from being used by terrorist organisations. We already have a vigorous system of checks to detect and counter criminal use of the financial system. The Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Bill will further strengthen our ability to monitor such transactions and take appropriate actions. Let me now deal with the key provisions of the Bill.

Prohibition against dealing with Terrorist Property (Part II of the Bill)

Part II of the Bill covers prohibition against terrorist property. Specifically, we can target properties that may be used in connection with terrorist acts. Clause 2 of the Bill defines property as assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, including bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and letters of credit. Clauses 3 to 6 of the Bill make it an offence to provide or collect property for terrorist acts, provide property and services for terrorist purposes, use or possess property for terrorist purposes, and deal with property of terrorists. These prohibitions apply to every person in Singapore and any Singapore citizen outside Singapore who is dealing with terrorist property. These clauses give effect to Article 2(1) of the Convention. Besides giving effect to the Convention, these clauses also give effect to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. Clause 7 of the Bill empowers the Minister to exempt a person from the prohibition against dealing with terrorist property.

Disclosure (Part III of the Bill)

Part III of the Bill imposes a duty of disclosure. The Convention obligates Singapore to identify and detect terrorist property for purposes of possible forfeiture. To meet this, clause 8 of the Bill imposes a duty on every person in Singapore and every Singapore citizen outside who has possession, custody or control of terrorist property, or information regarding a transaction in terrorist property to disclose such information to the Police. Clause 10 of the Bill also provides that every person in Singapore who has information which can prevent the commission of a terrorism financing offence, or assist in the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a person for a terrorism financing offence to immediately inform a police officer.

Further, clause 9 of the Bill empowers the Minister, by order in the Gazette, to require any person or class of persons to continually determine whether they possess terrorist property. However, let me assure the House that this will not be invoked unnecessarily. We foresee that this provision would be used for a person who is suspected of having dealings with terrorist property or persons who had previously had such dealings without their knowledge.

Seizure, Freezing and Confiscation of Terrorist Property (Part IV of the Bill)

Mr Speaker, Sir, Part IV of the Bill also spells out in detail the manner in which a terrorist property may be seized, frozen or confiscated.

First, application for search and seizure. Clause 11 of the Bill empowers a High Court Judge to issue warrants for search and seizure of any terrorist property and restraint orders in respect of terrorist property. Clause 20 of the Bill provides that such warrants and restraint orders generally continue for six months but may be extended. Clause 14 of the Bill makes it an offence for a person to whom the order has been served contravene with a restraint order. Clause 21 of the Bill allows the Court to order the forfeiture of terrorist property. Clauses 12 and 22 of the Bill provide that the affidavit in support of the application for warrants for search and seizure of terrorist property, and for order of forfeiture, may be made by the investigating officer on his information and belief. Personal knowledge by the investigating officer that the property is terrorist property is not required. Clause 18 of the Bill further provides that the Attorney-General may apply to revoke or vary warrants or orders. Clause 24 of the Bill provides that if the Judge is satisfied that the property is linked to terrorists or that it will be used to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act, the Judge shall order the forfeiture of the property. Where the Judge refuses an application for forfeiture, clause 26 of the Bill provides that the Judge shall also identify the property and declare that the property is not subject to forfeiture.

Second, management of terrorist property. Clauses 15 to 17 set out the appointment of a manager of the terrorist property who can be the public trustee. Clause 28 of the Bill also provides that the property may continue to be seized, restrained or managed by the appointed person, pending any appeal. This is to prevent the property from being scurried away. Clause 29 of the Bill also empowers the Judge to nullify any transactions that have occurred after the property was seized or restrained, except where such transactions were carried out in good faith.

Third, safeguards. Clause 13 of the Bill provides that the Judge may require undertakings from the Attorney-General with respect to the payment of damages or costs for the warrant or restraint order.

Also, clauses 19 and 27 of the Bill provide recourse for a person who has an interest in the property that was seized, restrained or forfeited, to apply to revoke or vary the warrant or order, or set aside the order of forfeiture within 60 days of the order of forfeiture.

Mutual Assistance and Extradition (Part V of the Bill)

Part V of the Bill provides that the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism can be used as a basis for mutual assistance and extradition with another state party to the Convention without the need for a bilateral treaty. Specifically, clause 32 of the Bill empowers the Minister for Law to make an order to apply the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to a state party to the Convention so as to allow assistance to be rendered in respect of investigation or prosecution of a terrorism financing offence. Hence, all the requirements for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act will apply except for the requirement of a treaty. The assistance that is rendered may be subject to conditions or exceptions in the order that is made under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. The Convention can also be treated as an extradition treaty in respect of terrorism financing offences between Singapore and another state party to the Convention. This is similar to the Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Act.

Jurisdiction (Part VI of the Bill)

Sir, terrorism is essentially a transnational crime. We cannot deal with terrorism effectively if we do not cooperate with other nations, or if we have powers only to deal with offences committed within Singapore. The Convention thus requires states to prosecute offenders who cannot be extradited. Part VI of the Bill covers extra-territorial jurisdiction. Specifically, clause 34 provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for offences under clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill that are committed outside Singapore by Singaporeans or any person. Where a Singapore citizen commits an offence relating to the dealing with terrorist property or failure to disclose information, he may be dealt with as if the offence had been committed in Singapore. Miscellaneous (Part VII of the Bill)

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill also covers other miscellaneous areas under Part VII of the Bill, eg, clause 35 which is a standard provision on the commission of an offence by a corporation to prevent anyone from seeking refuge behind corporations.

Clause 37 of the Bill empowers the Minister to amend the Schedule by an order published in the Gazette. The Bill contains a Schedule on actions which constitute terrorist acts, such as an act constituting an offence under the Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Act. Singapore is not yet a signatory to all the treaties and Conventions relating to terrorism. As and when we become a party to these treaties and Conventions, we can add on to the Schedule.

Clause 38 of the Bill allows that the Minister may also make regulations for the purpose of carrying out or giving effect to the provisions of the Bill. This provides the Minister the flexibility to take quick action against terrorist financing.

Finally, clause 39 makes a related amendment to the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act to repeal and re-enact section 27A so as to empower the Authority to make regulations concerning any financial institution or class of financial institutions in order to discharge any obligation binding on Singapore by virtue of a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is testimony of Singapore's commitment to the international fight against terrorism. Once the Bill is passed, we will take actions in accordance with it. We are playing a cat-and-mouse game with the terrorists; they will be looking for loopholes to exploit, even as we take measures against them. We will monitor the effectiveness of the Bill, and fine tune it further if necessary.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Assoc. Prof. Chin Tet Yung: Sir, terrorism has to be fought on many fronts, not least of all, the financial front. To deprive terrorists of funds would ultimately lead to the saving of lives and properties. There is undoubtedly a great public interest to be served here, and I therefore strongly support this Bill. At the same time, there must be some care to ensure that people or institutions are not wrongly accused of supporting terrorism. Such accusations must only be made on the strongest evidence, as the consequences of a wrong accusation may have severe repercussions on individuals or institutions. This Bill must therefore be carefully scrutinised in this House.

Even defining what is a terrorist is not an easy thing. I would start by looking first at the definitions of "terrorist" and "terrorist act" in this Bill. Sir, the definition of a "terrorist" in clause 2 is tautologous, ie, the definition of "terrorist" contains the word itself. Thus, a "terrorist" is someone who commits or attempts to commit any terrorist act. The true meaning of a terrorist therefore has to be found in what he does or threatens to do, and why he wants to do such acts. This is defined in sub-clause 2. It involves nine types of actions and two types of intents.

First, with regard to the type of actions. They involve the use of the word "serious" as in "serious violence against a person", "serious damage to property", or "serious risk to the health or the safety of the public". I wonder whether this is too restrictive. Anyone planning a criminal act that would amount to a seizable offence, with the appropriate intent should, I would have thought, be enough to trigger this provision. The key difference between a criminal act and one that amounts to a terrorist act seems to be in the intent. If the act is one of the nine, done with the intention to influence or compel any government or international organisation to do or not do something, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, it amounts to a terrorist act. This is a good attempt at defining terrorist acts, but it requires a great deal of care in interpreting or using it. To take one example, where a gunman robs a goldsmiths shop, and puts all those around him in fear - shop assistants, members of the public nearby, customers - he can actually qualify as a terrorist under that definition, because he threatens serious violence to persons with the intent to intimidate a section of the public under the definition. Does that mean that his property can be forfeited? Of course, if he robs the shop, intending to benefit a terrorist entity, he is within the definition. I hope the Minister will ensure that the definition will be applied with care, and not misused.

Sir, one of the fundamental principles in criminal justice is the burden and standard of proof. Everyone knows that the burden on the prosecution is to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" is to ensure the public's confidence in the administration of criminal justice, that no one should be subjected to punishment without strong proof. The Bill has some provisions that seem to affect this fundamental principle.

First, let me say that I agree with the careful drafting of clauses 3 to 7, providing for the prohibitions against the collection, provision, possession or dealing of property to aid terrorist acts. Here, the burden on the prosecution is a heavy one, to prove beyond reasonable doubt. There are various types of intent - to collect, provide, possess or deal with property to support or facilitate terrorist acts. This is as it should be.

Having said that, I would like to make two other references to the standard of proof that may give rise to concerns. The first relates to the power of the Judge to forfeit property. The Judge only has to be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the property is one that is owned or controlled by the terrorist entity, or that it is used or about to be used by terrorists, given the seriousness of forfeiture orders, should the standard of proof not be higher? Forfeiture orders may result in the closure of businesses or the eviction of occupants in properties so forfeited. I would like the Minister to assure this House that the relevant authorities will ensure that the best proof be provided before an application for forfeiture is made. This is especially so as the application can be ex parte.

The second issue I wish to raise is that clause 35 provides that a partner, director or manager, and other types of employees such as the secretary, may be guilty of one or more of the offences if his company, firm or society, is proved to have committed one of the prohibition offences set out in the Bill. Sir, clause 35 provides that the accused then has to exonerate himself by proving that the offence was committed without his consent or connivance, and that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent such an offence. Sir, this reversal of the burden of proof is a serious one, affecting the presumption of innocence that our criminal justice system is based on. Departures from this principle must be fully justified. I would ask the Minister what are the reasons for imposing on directors, managers, partners, secretaries and the like, this burden of exoneration. Again, we would want to be extra careful in accusing anyone of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. I hope that we will receive assurances from the Minister that the utmost care will be taken to obtain the best evidence against individuals or institutions before proceedings under this Bill are commenced against them.

Sir, the September 11 incident has changed the world, and significantly affected the attitude of everyone when talking about the dangers of terrorist attacks. We must however not be paranoid, and we must guard against those who might take advantage of the current fear and paranoia to harm others by false accusations. I regret that while there is a duty on everyone to disclose what they suspect to be financial operations in aid of terrorism, there is no provision that would make it a criminal offence for someone to falsely and maliciously accuse another of such activities. The Bill does provide for the protection of those who made genuine disclosures, even if mistaken. But it does not provide for sanctions against those who might maliciously accuse their neighbours or business opponents of such activities. I would like to know what the Minister intends to do about such cases, if they do occur.

Sir, we now live under the shadow of the terrorists. This Bill is a necessary measure in the global fight against terrorism. I am sure that this Bill will be an important addition to the armoury of laws that would protect Singapore from the terrorists and ensure that we are not a safe harbour for those who are involved in supporting or financing such activities.

Sir, I support the Bill.

Mdm Ho Geok Choo (West Coast): Sir, September 11, 2001 has left an indelible impact in the minds of everyone of the evils posed by acts of terrorism. That terrorism has gone global is a fact and its very act is indeed a crime against humanity.

Terrorist threats to the public in Singapore are as real as the recent discovery of the network in Singapore and the neighbouring countries has shown. All these acts of violence can only operate with financial backing. The bigger the destruction, the bigger the financing involved. To deal with terrorism effectively, we must therefore strike at its very core, ie, the financing of terrorism. The financing of terrorist act is the lifeline that we will have to choke to disable any opportunity for such acts to be initiated. This Bill represents our contribution to global efforts to combat terrorism. I have no doubt that the Bill will have the support of the House. However, in making laws for this purpose, we need to balance the need for security and preservation of civil liberties. While in favour of the Bill, there are certain clauses that seem too wide or unclear. The Bill imposes strict guidelines on disclosures in two areas, and I would like to seek clarifications as they have implications on persons related to one another or to suspect. Take clause 8(1), accordingly, anyone in Singapore or outside Singapore who has information pertaining to any transaction or intended transaction belonging to a terrorist suspect is obliged to disclose such information. What this means is that any member of the terrorist's immediate family is charged with the obligation of disclosure. Such family members, like the spouse, children, parents or siblings, are more likely than not to have knowledge of the terrorist's affairs. Would such persons therefore be more likely to be subject to prosecution for breach of the duty of disclosure?

This reminds us of the chaos created during the Cultural Revolution in China, where family members were obliged to tell on one another. The distrust and discord sown as a result of such legislation could lead to a breakdown of the family system. Would Singapore be heading towards such an eventuality if this Bill were passed without a review on its implications? Would it not be better for us to work on the responsibility and conscience of persons to be discerning in these areas?

One other concern is that imposing a duty of disclosure on any Singapore citizen outside Singapore may be stretching the clause too wide. Would Singapore citizens overseas be exposed to peril? If a terrorist knew that a particular Singapore citizen, say, in London, had information about his transaction or proposed transaction regarding any property belonging to him or his terrorist organisation, what would the terrorist do with this Singapore citizen in light of this clause?

Clause 11 on `Search and Seizure' raises a concern. The proviso permits a Judge, upon the application of the Attorney-General, to issue a warrant authorising any person (usually a Police Officer) to search any building and seize any property which the authorised person reasonably believes may be the subject of an order of forfeiture. What is worrying is that the Attorney-General may make such an application based on mere information and belief. The question is, to what extent can the Attorney-General rely on mere information and belief?

The proviso in clause 21 authorises the Attorney-General to apply to a Judge to forfeit any property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist or a terrorist organisation, or any property that has been or will be used to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act. The concern here is that the Judge orders the property to be forfeited to the Government if he is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the property falls within clause 21(a) or 21(b). One would have thought that a higher standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt would be adopted.

There is an intervening period from the moment a property is seized, pursuant to clause 11(1), till it is forfeited, pursuant to clause 24(1). During the intervening period, a Judge, at the request of the Attorney-General, may appoint a person to take control of, manage or deal with the forfeited property accordingly.

It is disturbing to note that the person so appointed has the power to destroy property which has little or no value. Whilst we can appreciate the need to sell property that is perishable, I am of the opinion that no one should have the power to destroy property of little or no value unless it is ordered by the Judge to do so.

Clause 16(5) empowers a Judge to order the destruction of any property if he is satisfied that the property has little or no financial or other value. I beg to ask what constitutes the extent of satisfaction. Also, what constitutes a balance of probabilities and, for that matter, what is meant by "beyond reasonable doubt"?

I propose an amendment to clause 28 as follows:

After sub-clause (c), perhaps we could add a new sub-clause (d) as follows:

"(d) any property seized, restrained or controlled in accordance with sub-sections (a) to (c), which may bear interest shall be held in an interest bearing account; and the interest accruing on the property shall be added to it on its release or forfeiture."

Mr Speaker, Sir, the basic objectives of the proposed Bill are admirable and deserving of our support. However, we must not in our enthusiasm to deal with terrorism fail to guard against any provisions which impinge on the protection for the common folks. In other words, we ought to ensure that the provisions in the Bill must also give adequate protection to the common man.

On this note, I support the Bill.

Mr Ahmad Khalis Bin Abdul Ghani (Hong Kah): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Bill is the definition of the word "terrorism" or, more specifically, "terrorist act". Prof. Chin had earlier alluded to the definition and explained the meaning of the two limbs encapsulated under clause 2(2)(a). I take it from his comments, and even among us, that we have different ideas of what a terrorist act is. But I think we should not let this difficulty prevent us from making a decision, at least for the moment, on what we mean by terrorist act and what we should do about it.

Sir, we all do not condone terrorism. If I may say so, even as of now, a less severe form of terrorism - extortion - is an offence under our Penal Code. Terrorism, as defined in the Bill, is not the way any civilised entity promotes itself. If any of us wishes to compel a government to do something, we do it through the legitimate political process. If we seek to sway the opinion of people, then we have to appeal to their hearts and minds, not by using fear of harm or violence.

Sir, successful civilisations and nations are those which are able to muster the support of their people through a commonly accepted political process. The Mongols in the 12th century, for instance, were united under the leadership of Genghis Khan. As a nation, they shared a common vision for themselves, and maybe their common desire for power led them to conquer others. It would have been, I believe, very difficult for Genghis Khan to achieve so much, if he merely relied on instilling fear in his own people to achieve his aims. But, did he instill fear in other people? Yes and no. But the result showed the difference. By the time his grandson, Kublai Khan, reigned, the Mongol Empire covered almost the whole of mainland Asia and parts of Eastern Europe. In places where the Mongols embraced local political cultures, like China and in Northern India, the people continued to make progress. However, in places where they merely plundered in order to subdue, like in Baghdad or Central Europe, the contribution of Mongol rule was either miniscule or negative. If the people do not willingly accept a certain rule or ideology, very soon that rule will crumble.

The use of force and fear, Sir, to instill compliance is not mere ancient history. The totalitarian regime in the previous USSR was known to have used, quite extensively, force incursion so as to ensure acceptance of its ideas. Dissenters were sent either to the gulag or some other remote places or made to simply disappear from the records. More significantly, the fear of such reprisals caused a terror among the people. For some time, the people bowed and followed but, within 70 years, the USSR crumbled.

Control by the state must be pursuant to genuine consensus, not the other way round, where consensus is pursuant to genuine control. There may be groups of people who behave in a manner so repugnant to one's beliefs and values. But no one has a sacred right to impose forcibly on them one's own values and laws by the use of fear and threat of serious harm. Even if one does so, the effect is always superficial, as history has shown.

Thus, Sir, terrorism has no place in promoting any civilisation or the cause of any ideology or major religion in the world. There is thus a need to distinguish terrorism from other legitimate acts of war which, I think, the Bill seeks to do in its definition section. The Bill excludes from the definition of terrorist act, legitimate acts of war as governed by international law.

Sir, war too has its rules. And if we look at Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Han Wu Ti, Mohamed, Charlemagne, the wars fought by them were in accordance with rules accepted by the peoples involved. That is why no one ever accused them of terrorism before or now. For instance, acts which definitely would harm women, children and other non-military civilians were and are not legitimate military acts by the standard of any civilised society. It is therefore important that we do not allow any group, religious or otherwise, to be inspired or encouraged by terrorism.

Sir, the greater part of humanity abhors terrorism, and must seek ways to curtail it. I see that this Bill seeks to do just that, at least in contributing towards our common campaign towards terrorism. Though it may be argued that the cause of terrorism is political and social, one of the engines of terrorism is finance. Our effort to deal with the financial aspect of terrorism is one of the many prongs that we, as a nation, should apply to effectively deal with this issue. The Internal Security Act deals mainly with security aspects, particularly with the individuals directly involved in terrorist acts. But terrorism today involves international network. Funds and goods are transacted in the process. The ISA and existing legislation do not say much about this. So this Bill seeks to address this problem. In this regard, I suggest that the Hon. Minister and this House continue to formulate ways to address the political and social elements that breed terrorism, while we support this Bill to address the issues as promulgated therein.

Sir, I support this Bill.

Mr Andy Gan Lai Chiang: Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill.

It is timely for Singapore to act on suppressing the financing of terrorists' activities. Without access to funds or financial support, it would be more difficult for terrorists to conduct or sustain their acts of terror. We will be tightening the noose around their activities, which are most likely to involve mass destruction and hurt innocent lives.

This Bill should pose as a deterrence to potential would-be terrorists who intend to use Singapore to transfer funds or finance terrorists here or elsewhere in the world. Through this Bill, we will send a strong signal to those terrorists not to mistake Singapore as a safe haven for their funds. The Bill also reminds all Singaporeans to remain vigilant and not contribute innocently to any terrorist acts indirectly.

I do not want to go into the definition of "terrorism", which my learned colleague has so eloquently covered already. However, I agree with his definition. May I highlight that terrorist activities usually involve long-term planning and patience. Their activities may go unnoticed for years, and they are masters of substitutes, and might have assimilated into our society as tenants, neighbours, colleagues or friends. Singaporeans must realise that that is the playing field today, and be more vigilant.

We need not change our lifestyle, but it is important that we bring home the message that Singaporeans must not be complacent. Terrorism does strike at close range, in the region, and right here in Singapore. For example, it took years to plan the September 11 disaster that saw the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and the loss of thousands of lives in the United States. Unfortunately, the culprits had gone unnoticed and undetected for a while prior to September 11. There must be hundreds of innocent people who are now, on hindsight, regretting not paying more attention to the hijackers who had led lives along theirs.

During the years that terrorists planned their acts of terrorism, many innocent people may have concluded business dealings with them or may even have rented their properties or have contributed to their acts unknowingly. These innocent people should not be unreasonably classified as terrorist sympathisers, and have their properties confiscated under this Bill. They should not be penalised if they were ignorant of the on-going. In enforcing this law, Mr Speaker, Sir, I ask that we have to be firm and professional, so as not to unduly put stress on the business community.

Sir, I support the Bill. 4.15 pm

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Mr Speaker, Sir, Prof. Chin suggested that the use of the word such as "serious" in the definition of "terrorist act" in the Bill may be too restrictive. The reasons for this restrictive definition are as follows:

Firstly, this is a Bill which gives effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. As such, the Bill's definition of "terrorist act" therefore adopts the wording of the Convention, and they are totally consistent with what is being used in other countries as well. The Convention's definition of "terrorist act" includes an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian when the purpose of such act is to intimidate the population or to compel a government to do or refrain from doing any act.

Secondly, Singapore is not alone in adopting such a definition. Our definition is also consistent with the definition used in other countries' similar legislation on terrorism in the Commonwealth countries, such as the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000, Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act and the Australia's Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Bill. Since this Bill is to give effect to an International Convention, there is no reason for us to deviate from the international standards adopted.

Finally, this is also to maintain consistency with the definition of "terrorist acts" used in our own law, and that law is the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations. So, all those words we find in this particular Bill are exactly the same as what we already have in our United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations. We are not doing anything different.

Prof. Chin has suggested that anyone planning a criminal act which amounts to a seizable offence should be caught by the definition of "terrorist act". In my view, to define "terrorist act" to include any seizable criminal offence may be too wide and over-inclusive. We should target our laws against offences which clearly have a nexus with terrorism. Seizable offences, with reference to non-Penal Code offences, are offences which are punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

Prof. Chin has also raised the example of a gunman who had robbed a goldsmith shop, and asked if his property can be seized or forfeited. Let me reiterate that the main focus of this Bill is not about criminalising terrorist acts, but about criminalising the financing of terrorist acts. As such, whether the robber's property will be forfeited will depend on whether a person who has committed any of those provisions relating to the financing of terrorist acts. A mere commission of a robbery will not make his property liable to seizure or forfeiture under the law even if he had, in carrying out robbery, intimidated a section of the people around the shops.

Let me give a real life example of this. On 18th May 2001, members of the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), staged a robbery of the Southern Bank in Peninsular Malaysia. They were initially regarded as robbers. But investigations subsequently revealed that their actions were in support of the KMM, which aimed to wage a holy war against the Malaysian government to establish a purist Islamic state. Obviously, then they were more than just ordinary robbers. So, by our definition, they will be regarded as terrorists. And this is not the only example that happened last year.

In the mid-1970s, three gunmen robbed a bank of RM122,000 in Petaling Jaya. Later, it was found that they were also responsible for two murders. If these were all, then, of course, those who were found and convicted subsequently will be convicted as robbers and murderers. But when it was established that they were actually members of the CPM Marxist-Leninist Faction and had robbed to augment the CPM's funds, then, obviously, they were more than just ordinary robbers and murderers. The two persons they murdered under the CPM's instruction were the Inspector General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman in 1974, and the Chief Police Officer of Perak, Tan Sri Koo Chong Kong in 1975. So, again, by definition under our Bill, we will consider them as terrorists.

Prof. Chin is correct in asserting that the key difference between a purely criminal act and one that amounts to a terrorist act lies much in the intent or the motive established. But this is not unique to the current Bill. Intent is the key ingredient in determining culpability, even in purely criminal actions and offences. Often, in criminal cases, there may potentially be more than one offence in the laws which can apply to the same action and the same set of circumstances. Which one to proceed with requires not only interpretation, but commonsense and judgment. Let me assure Prof. Chin that there is no lapse in the handling of such situations in criminal cases. In determining offences under this particular Bill, the law will always be applied with care and due diligence. We will always be very careful, and not simply abuse the powers provided for in the Act.

On the question of burden, there is indeed a high burden on the prosecution, because the offences created by the Convention and the Bill are very serious in nature. For example, any person convicted of providing or collecting property for terrorist acts can be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 10 years, or to a fine of up to $100,000. Since the offences are serious in nature, then we have deliberately only targeted the provisions against persons who have knowingly or intentionally committed such acts. This will ensure that the innocent persons are not prosecuted for such offences. But if there is evidence to show that the person has turned a blind eye to the commission of such acts, then the same provisions will allow us to prosecute him, as these provisions also contain a lower threshold of "having reasonable grounds to believe" in cases where it is not possible to prove that the person has wilfully or knowingly committed such acts. So I think there is enough flexibility built into the legislation to enable us to deal effectively with the various types of offenders.

Prof. Chin and Mdm Ho, I believe, also expressed concern on the order of forfeiture and the Judge has to be satisfied on the balance of probability, and also the question about ex parte. Let me first clarify Prof. Chin's point on ex parte. The application for the issue of warrant of seizure or restraint order under clause 11 is made ex parte because there is a need to ensure that the offenders do not have a chance to dispose of their properties. But once the property is seized or restrained under clause 11, the forfeiture application, which is made under clause 24, is not made ex parte. The owner of the property will have a right to be heard before the Judge orders forfeiture of the property.

As for the use of balance of probability as a standard of proof for forfeiture, this is not something new that we are doing. The same standard is also found under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act in respect of forfeiture of proceeds derived from drug trafficking and other serious crimes. The Bill therefore maintains the same standard of proof for the purpose of forfeiture. Further, this standard on the balance of probability is also used in the Canada Anti-Terrorism Act. So, let me assure the House that, in conducting investigations into these offences, the enforcement agencies will strive to obtain the best evidence to support the allegations.

Regarding the onus imposed on corporate bodies, which is also a question raised by Mr Andy Gan, to make sure that we do not unnecessarily restrict the businesses of our companies, clause 35, as we have put it there, is a standard provision commonly found in the existing Acts as well. It is not something that we just created out of nowhere. A body corporate can only act through its officers. It is not unreasonable therefore to expect officers of a body corporate to be responsible for the acts of a company, such that the officers must give an account of themselves if the company commits an offence. Let me give Members examples of similar provisions in other legislation. They are the Electricity Act 2001, the Gas Act 2001, the Planning Act, the Civil Defence Act, the Building Control Act, the Control of Vectors and Pesticides Act and, finally, the Fire Safety Act. So, this question of duty of the corporate officers is also clearly defined in other similar legislation that I have just cited.

Prof. Chin is concerned about people who make malicious complaints, leading to unnecessary investigations and the accused party suffering anxiety and stress. Although the Bill does not provide for the offence of malicious accusation, this is not different from, say, defaming a person. The person so defamed or accused can always sue the person making the defamatory statement or accusation. If the accusation is made to a police officer, then the accuser can also be charged under the Penal Code. For example, section 182 of the Penal Code makes an offence for any person to give any public servant any information to cause such public servant to use the lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of any person. A person who is convicted under section 182 can be sentenced to imprisonment, as well as to a fine. So, if a person falsely or maliciously reported his neighbour for committing a terrorist act or activity to a police officer, he can be dealt with under the Penal Code, and there is no need to put this provision in the Bill. The Penal Code is adequate to deal with such offenders.

Let me now turn to some of the points raised by Mdm Ho. Mdm Ho's view is that we are placing too much onus on the family members, like the spouse, children, parents or siblings, because, she says, they are more likely than not to have knowledge of the terrorist affairs. But I think this is debatable. Let me give an example of the Jemaah Islamiyah group. Many of their family members actually claimed that they did not know. So I do not think it is fair to say that their spouse or immediate family members will definitely know, and therefore if they report the matter, it may lead to a break-up of families, like in the case during the Cultural Revolution. I think the problem of the Cultural Revolution is a totally different one. I do not think we should just simply leave things be and leave it to the conscience and the sense of responsibility of individuals to report a terrorist act or financing of such act, and not put this into the law. If everybody does behave responsibly and acts with conscience, I think we do not need any laws. We will then be living in utopia. But we know that we are living on the earth. So it cannot be done. Therefore, it is better that we provide for this in the legislation to ensure that if family members do know, and it can be seen and shown that they do know, then it is their duty to make such a report to the Police. But, of course, in the investigation, we shall be thorough about this.

Mdm Ho's suggestion to exempt information received because of privileged information, eg, in the case of lawyers, I do not think this is necessary because clause 8(4) of the Bill provides that it shall be a defence for a person charged for failure to prove that he has reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure and it shall be left to the court to decide on the merits of each case.

Mdm Ho also asked what extent the Attorney-General rely on information and belief to apply to a Judge to issue seizure and search warrants, and she asked if the burden of proof should be higher than the balance of probability, and whether a conviction of terrorism should be made first before forfeiture should take place. Her view is that no one should have the power to destroy property of little or no value unless it is ordered by the Judge to do so. She also proposes that seized property which may bear interest be held in an interest-bearing account.

Let me address her questions in sequence. Clause 12 of the Bill provides that an affidavit in support of the application for a warrant of search and seizure of terrorist property may be made by an investigation officer based on his information and belief, and such information and belief are the result of investigations conducted by the investigation officer, who would most likely be the police officer or a Commercial Affairs officer. He would not act just because he had a dream the night before and said, "I believe and, therefore, I act." They do not act like that. I do not think we can allow him to act like that too. So he must conduct an investigation and show that there are indeed reasonable grounds for his belief.

The Attorney-General, therefore, does not rely on hearsay or mere information received. He will ask the investigation officer, "What have you found in the investigation?" and satisfy him before he applies to the court for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant.

The House may wish to note that clause 11 of the Bill provides that the court may require undertakings to be given in respect of application for warrants or restraint order, and the undertaking is a form of check to prevent any abuse of powers. The indemnity is to ensure that the law enforcement agencies investigating a case must have sufficient grounds before applying for a warrant for seizure or a restraint order. So he does not just act on impulse.

Proof based on the balance of probability is the standard employed under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act for the forfeiture of properties or proceeds derived from drug trafficking and other serious crimes. The Bill, therefore, maintains the same standard of proof for the purpose of forfeiture.

Clause 21 of the Bill allows a Judge to order forfeiture of property owned or controlled by or on behalf of any terrorist or terrorist entity. The order of forfeiture may also be made if the property has been or will be used to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act. There is no requirement to have a conviction first of the offences of providing or collecting property for terrorist acts, providing property and services for terrorist purposes, use or possession of property for terrorist purposes and dealing with property of terrorists. This is because the intention is to ensure that terrorist properties can be confiscated by the Government. But let me assure Members that strong evidence will be adduced before the Attorney-General applies to a Judge for such a forfeiture order.

Clause 16 of the Bill also allows a person appointed to destroy seized properties that have little or no value. But the person must first apply to the Judge for the destruction order. In other words, he cannot say that, "I do not like this thing lying on my desk", and then he starts to destroy it. He will have to apply to the court for such an order.

Mdm Ho's suggestion that property which may bear interest should be held in an interest-bearing account may not reap practical gains. We may not seize large assets or properties which may bear interest. If a legal requirement is then imposed to subject all properties which bear interest to be held in interest-bearing accounts, this may result in generating more administrative work.

Sir, I believe I have dealt with all the points raised by the Members.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Mr Wong Kan Seng].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.