SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES (AMENDMENT) BILL

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SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES (AMENDMENT) BILL: Order for Second Reading read.

The Minister of State for Defence (Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng): Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The Bill before this House seeks to put in place two separate sets of amendments to the Singapore Armed Forces Act. The first set of amendments involves making refinements to the existing court martial system. The second set of amendments would allow for an external auditor to conduct an audit of the SAVER-Premium Fund.

Sir, I would like to highlight the major aspects of the Bill. I will begin with the proposed refinements to the SAF court martial system.

The Bill seeks to refine the SAF court martial system as follows:

(a) to replace the

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existing system of ad hoc general courts martial with a system of standing general courts martial constituted from a panel that consists of both legally-qualified servicemen and lay servicemen; and

(b) to establish a system of single-judge courts martial, to be called the "judge courts martial", to complement the existing system of general courts martial comprising three or more members. The existing system will be renamed as "panel courts martial".

Let me elaborate on the two proposed changes to the existing system. Currently, whenever a case is to be tried by a court martial, a three-member court martial has to be convened specifically to hear the case. This general court martial is automatically dissolved once the case is over. Thus, whenever a new case arises, a new general court martial has to be convened.

This practice of ad hoc courts martial was adopted from the British system that needed to dispense justice to its soldiers who were scattered throughout the reaches of the British Empire. Such a system allowed commanders to convene general courts martial on an ad hoc basis to punish errant soldiers wherever they were.

However, this system is not efficient for the SAF as effort has to be expended to convene ad hoc courts martial to try even the simplest of cases. Currently, the SAF Court Martial Centre hears about 450 cases a year.

This Bill therefore seeks to replace the system of ad hoc general courts martial with a system of standing general courts martial. The standing general courts martial will remain in operation for a predetermined period of time. The standing general courts martial will be convened by a single convening authority, who will appoint the members of the general courts martial panel. The panel will consist of legally-qualified SAF servicemen and SAF lay members.

The standing general courts martial will be competent to hear all charges that are referred to it. The selection of the president and members of the individual courts martial can be delegated to the

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Registrar of the subordinate military courts, or to some other person, and will be made from amongst the pre-appointed general court martial panel. This allows the selection process to be efficiently carried out.

Sir, I will now talk about the second major refinement to the SAF court martial system, namely, the establishment of single-judge courts. Under the existing SAF court martial system, each court martial must consist of at least three persons: one president and two members. Although it is not a legal requirement, the policy in the SAF today is that such a president is a legally-qualified, operationally-ready national serviceman, who is either a serving magistrate or district judge in the Subordinate Courts or an ex-judicial officer. The remaining members are SAF servicemen.

Such three-member general courts martial hear a variety of cases, both military and civil cases, and are ideal for cases which concern SAF values and practices. For such cases, the policy and operational perspectives of the SAF lay members complement the legal perspective of the president and enables a balanced collective decision to be reached.

However, a significant number of cases that are tried in the general courts martial do not involve such considerations. In particular, cases involving solely civil offences usually call for a pure judicial analysis of the facts and legal issues and an application of established judicial sentencing principles and guidelines by the judge. Such cases will be more efficiently and effectively dealt with by a single legally qualified judge.

Accordingly, the Bill seeks to establish an additional system of general courts martial known as judge courts martial, to

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exist alongside the present system of general courts martial. Each judge court martial will consist of a single legally qualified national serviceman judge. In line with current practice, he is likely to be a current or former judicial officer. As a result, the judge courts martial will closely resemble the Subordinate Courts in the civilian justice system in that the accused serviceman, like his civilian counterpart, will similarly be tried by a single legally qualified judge.

However, the default option is for offences to be tried by the panel courts martial unless the SAF Director of Legal Services directs that it be tried by a judge courts martial. Operationally, the Armed Forces Council will set guidelines for the Director of Legal Services on the types of offences that should be tried by the judge courts martial or by the panel courts martial.

In summary, the introduction of the standing general courts martial and judge courts martial would enhance the efficient use of manpower in the SAF without compromising the high standards of quality, justice and accountability that the servicemen and the public have come to expect from the SAF military justice system.

Sir, I will now move on to talk about the second set of amendments to the SAF Act, namely, the amendments to allow for the audit of the SAVER-Premium Fund to be conducted by an external auditor.

The SAVER and Premium Plans hold the retirement benefits of military servicemen. Currently section 205C(5) of the SAF Act provides that the accounts and annual financial statements of the SAVER-Premium Fund be audited by the Auditor-General. The Auditor-General only audits the fund on a cash basis for the purpose of parliamentary reporting. For the purpose of the Fund's annual investment performance and dividend

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declaration, MINDEF engages a commercial auditor to separately audit the fund on an accrued basis.

This results in significant overlap and duplication in the audit coverage by the Auditor-General's Office and the commercial auditor.

MINDEF therefore proposes to amend section 205C(5) to allow the audit of the SAVER-Premium Fund to be conducted by an external auditor. This auditor may be appointed by the Minister for Defence, in consultation with the Auditor-General.

Parliament is requested to approve the amendments.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Dr Ong Chit Chung (Jurong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I welcome the establishment of a permanent general courts martial panel, from which members could be drawn to hear court martial cases.

This Bill will make it easier for the convening authority to constitute the court martial. In this manner, it helps to institutionalise the system and maximise our resources. Members appointed will also know in advance that they will be called upon to serve on courts martial.

However, I have some reservations and questions on the institution of single judge courts, which will be presided by NSman judges. I urge MINDEF to think very carefully before putting aside the present three-member court in some cases, and substituting it with a single judge court.

The military law regime provides for the maintenance of good order and discipline amongst members of the Armed Forces. It supplements the ordinary criminal laws in Singapore with a special

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code of discipline and a special system for enforcing it. The idea of having a panel consisting of a presiding officer and two members on a general court martial, rather than a single judge court, goes back a long way in military history and military justice. It was indeed to ensure trial by your own peers, your peers who understand the military chain of command, your peers who understand military discipline, your peers who understand military convention, ethos and practices.

In the three-judge panel, the other two members are experienced military officers who will bring with them deep insights into military practices, regimental ethos and the understanding of how men behave and conduct themselves in the field. Such empathy and insights cannot be taught in law schools, or gained from experiences in civil courts or civilian life.

In the military chain of command, commanders are personally responsible for the men under their charge, in war as well as in peace. When their men are being charged, commanders or senior officers of similar background should sit in as members of the panel of judges. They may have better understanding of the situation of the soldiers. In contrast, in a single judge court, judges may not understand the military background or ethos.

In some of the single judge courts, judges may have served national service in a non-combat role or they could be holding junior ranks in service.

Sir, the existing general courts martial panel has worked very well over the years in the SAF. There is no compelling reason to change it. If it ain't broke, why fix it? We must not try to just go for administrative efficiency or expediency. Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done.

Participation of the officer in military justice also would help

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them understand the system and, very importantly, have ownership of the system. Even soldiers, who are being charged, will feel better if they are being tried by judges who are experienced military officers. They will feel that they are given a fairer hearing.

Sir, currently, NUSAF officers (non-uniformed SAF - today, they are called Defence Executive Officers) will be tried by a judge with two other NUSAF officers on the panel. The thinking is that this will give a chance for the NUSAF officers to be tried by their own peers. Now, the NUSAF officers may be tried by a single judge. Does this mean that the principle of trial by their own peers is being thrown out unceremoniously? If the reason for such a trial was valid, then why is it invalid now?

What do we save by taking out two officers from the panel of judges? We save the time and pay of two officers. I am sure that justice and the well-being and interests of our soldiers are worth more than that.

Further, who actually decides whether the soldiers will be tried in a single judge court or three-member court? What are the so-called selected classes of offences that will be dealt with by a single judge court? This is not spelt out clearly in the amendment.

May I also ask what is the role of the MINDEF Director of Legal Services in all these? Is the Director of Legal Services the one to recommend the appointment of the judges? Is he the one to recommend or decide on which cases go to the single judge courts martial and which cases go to the panel courts martial? He is also, I presume, the chief military prosecutor. It will be odd for the prosecution to determine the composition and type of

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tribunal. Will there be a conflict of interests, I wonder?

Sir, on the MINDEF SAVER-Premium Fund, it is stated that the Minister for Defence may appoint an outside auditor in consultation with the Auditor-General. What if the Auditor-General disagrees with such an appointment during consultation? Can the Minister for Defence still proceed with such an appointment? It was pointed out that the audit of the Fund by the Auditor-General on a cash basis and the commercial audit is on an accrual basis will lead to overlap or duplication of audit coverage. May I point out that such cross audit normally happens in business companies where we have external auditors and internal auditors, as well as the appointment of auditors for specific audit or for due diligence purposes.

To some extent, such duplications are unavoidable and sometimes it is good to have cross checks or cross audits. Again, here, I see that MINDEF is working on a change for a single audit on account of administrative efficiency and convenience. I doubt whether it is always the best thing to do. There is no harm in more audit. It may discover and surface interesting items.

Sir, more to the point, the Auditor-General can also do audit on an accrual basis. In fact, the Auditor-General has done such audits on a number of statutory boards. So there is really no need to appoint an outside auditor. The Auditor-General can do both kinds of audits.

Mr Sin Boon Ann (Tampines): Mr Speaker, Sir, the present Bill before this House to amend the SAF Act seeks to improve the administration of military justice and to allow for the appointment of outside auditors to audit the SAF SAVERS Scheme, a pension plan unique only to the SAF.

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While the amendment may be limited in scope, the issues that the Bill seeks to address may well be fundamental in nature.

This Bill addresses the process by which a court martial is constituted and further defines the types of court martial that may be convened. As a consequence, when approved by Parliament, the SAF (Amendment) Act will provide for the appointment of a panel of members from whom the convening authority, who after the Act will now be a single person, may choose, and will allow for a qualified person acting as a single judge to try cases. The amendment has provided the Government with much flexibility in constituting and convening a court martial from a panel.

While I can accept the need for flexibility, it is important for us to bear in mind that flexibility must not come at a price of unwittingly undermining confidence in the administration of justice.

Sir, the process of determining the outcome is as important as the outcome itself. This is particularly true in the administration of justice. It is for this reason that our Constitution goes through great lengths to ensure that the trial of any accused person is fair and just; and that question must equally be determined by looking at the process by which judges are appointed, who makes the appointment, whether there is security of tenure in relation to the appointment of judges. It is only when a perception exists that the whole process is seen to be fair, that we find a greater willingness on the part of the accused to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. After all, this is the process by which any demorcracy would set itself apart from any banana republic.

And so it is that when we look at this Bill, we ask ourselves these same

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questions, as these are just as relevant in our assessment.

First, the Bill, unlike the present Act, reposes the power to appoint and constitute members of a court martial in a single person who becomes the convening authority of the general court martial. For the purposes of the Act, the convening authority does not have to be a person whose rank is higher than a major.

The minimum rank required to qualify for the appointment of convening authority is a legacy from the present Act. When the Act was first drafted in the sixties, a major was of a relatively senior rank as there were not that many to begin with. Today, it is often said that almost every other officer in the SAF is a major. Unlike before, the SAF today has grown in size and, as a consequence, and with my utmost respect to the officers involved, a major in the SAF would not be considered to be a senior appointment.

Given the relatively junior rank required to qualify as a convening authority, it would not appear to be appropriate that such a legacy should remain. Even in the civilian context, the power and authority to appoint a High Court judge lies with the President of the Republic. What we have here is a situation where the law now allows the power of judicial appointment to be in the hands of someone whose rank is perhaps no more than a senior officer in the civil service. Is this satisfactory?

Sir, one may well ask: what is this fuss all about? The issue here is one of susceptibility to influence. There is little or no guideline within the Act or the Bill as to how a convening authority is to discharge his duty in appointing members to the court martial panel. Should he be allowed to appoint his friends? Should anyone, especially those in the senior military command, be allowed to have a

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say or even influence the choice of panel members? Sir, the truth of the matter, unfortunately, is that the lower you are in rank, the greater is the likelihood of you coming under such pressure not to exercise independent judgment, whether consciously or otherwise.

While I am not suggesting that the convening authority, if he was a major, would allow his independent judgment to be influenced by his seniors, I would suggest that the confidence of the public would be a lot stronger if the minimum rank for appointing the convening authority was raised much higher instead.

Secondly, while the Bill proposes to establish a permanent panel of members from which members of a court martial may be chosen, there is nothing unlike a civilian appointment which suggests security of tenure arising from the appointment.

Clause 6 of the Bill sets out a new section 80A which provides the power of appointment to the convening authority to appoint any number of panel members as he shall determine. The term of appointment of the panel member shall be for such period of time as he shall determine. Also, the convening authority may at any time revoke the appointment of any panel member.

Sir, on the face of it, it is clear that the court martial panel member does not enjoy any security of tenure in his appointment. This is clearly in sharp contrast to the civilian appointment of Judges. In its present form, a convening authority, who does not need to have a rank higher than a major, has complete powers under the Act to decide who gets to be judge, stay as a judge, or be removed as a judge of a court martial panel.

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What it does mean is that there is little in the present Bill that would serve as an institutional check against abuse by the convening authority. What is there, if the convening authority is so minded, that prevents the appointment to the panel, to be motivated by crony interest? How can the people be sure, other than out of pure faith and belief in the honesty and integrity of those involved, that a kangaroo court will not be set up or that those who serve the panel do so without fear or favour will be willy-nilly removed by those powerful officers higher up in the chain of command who are intent on covering up their misdeeds? Unfortunately, Sir, this Bill does not give us much assurance on this.

This Bill therefore would depend very much on the integrity of those who administer it. I would support it only because it helps to make our system more efficient. And I would support because I do not believe that this Government would, or that it would allow those who work for it, abuse the powers that it enjoys under the Act. Sir, that does not mean that future generations of those entrusted with such powers will not abuse it. I would urge the Government to consider strengthening the process to reinforce the public's confidence in the process.

Mdm Ho Geok Choo (West Coast): Mr Speaker, Sir, I note that the principal change, by way of introduction to the current system of general court martial, is per clauses 80A and 81.

The amendment specifies the introduction of either a judge courts martial (clause 81(1)(a) or panel courts martial (clause 81(1)(b)) and where only a judge courts martial would have a "qualified person" as defined by the Legal Profession Act. Does this mean any panel courts martial (convened under clause 81(1)(b)) would constitute entirely military

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officers with no training whatsoever in law or procedure?

Sir, I am of the view that this is inappropriate as it would be no different from a summary hearing by either the junior disciplinary officer or senior disciplinary officer sitting in camp, save for the number of officers present to determine the guilt and sentence.

Moreover, unless the Director of Legal Services otherwise directs (per clause 81(10)) that a "judge court martial" be convened whenever an accused is represented by counsel, it could mean that the charge to be filed by general court martial shall always be tried by a panel court martial, without any "qualified person" to determine on law or disputes on procedures as counsels may deem fit to address in court.

Sir, I am of the opinion that army officers, albeit as a team, would be inadequate to judge or determine on such legal arguments or points as addessed by counsels.

Where an accused elects trial by a court martial as opposed to summary hearings, very often, such decisions may be due to a strong belief, whether rightly justifiable or otherwise, that a court martial presided over by a "qualified person" or judge advocate is fairer or correct than an officer or team of officers untrained at law.

Such an introduction of "panel court martial" may undermine the quality of courts martial hearing, since it is being deprived of the benefits of having either a "qualified person" presiding or having the assistance of a Judge Advocate being present.

It would also be open to public allegations or give the perception that it is not objective enough - own Singapore

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Armed Forces personnel judged by their own officers.

As it is, the Singapore Armed Forces Court Martial Centre, though an open court, is situated within the premises of a camp and not many public members are aware of it being an "open court" as such.

To have a whole court's tribunal members consisting only of Singapore Armed Forces officers and without a "qualified person" currently, generally, being District Judges, as with the proposed "panel court martial", would be a move towards enhancing the public's notion that the military court martial is not necessarily a very objective tribunal. Justice, it had been said, must not only be done but seen to be done!

Sir, I would like to highlight the following concerns:

(1) Does the Director, Legal Services, of the Singapore Armed Forces, propose that all mentions and hearings of cases where the accused is represented by counsels be directed to be presided and adjudicated by a judge court martial?

(2) If the answer to point (1) above is affirmative, does it transpire that the accused who is too poor to engage private defence counsel, as a consequence of which the case would be heard by a panel court martial without a "qualified person" and as such he would be prejudiced by the case being determined by a tribunal of "lesser" quality?

(3) If the answer to point (1) above is in the negative, would a group of untrained, unqualified soldiers - officers no doubt - be adequate to understand and adjudicate over arguments on issues of laws or procedures or evidence, as may be raised by counsels from time to time?

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Should we not consider that where a panel court martial sits, that only officers, regardless of rank, with university degrees, be appointed to sit as members to better ensure their

comprehension of laws and legal arguments which may be placed before them by counsels for determination? While it seems that this suggestion does sound prejudiced and is biased against non-degree holders who concededly may be good officers, it is at least a starting point, as a line has to be drawn somewhere and, as we all know, legal arguments and applications are not necessarily the easiest of theory to understand at times.

Sir, I urge the Minister to consider my inputs before the Bill is passed. On this note, I would like to support the amendments in the Bill.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, I share the concern of Dr Ong Chit Chung. I would like to add one point to the concern on the single-judge court martial. Under the new section 88 as drafted, it covers the objection by the accused to the president of the judge court martial. Since the judge court martial is conducted by the president alone, subclause (4) provides that any objection by the accused will be considered by the president himself, and it is provided that the president shall give his reason for dismissing the accused's objection to the convening authority. But it appears that this is just for the record, as it is not stated in the Bill that the convening authority will do anything about it.

My question, Sir, is: how neutral will the president be in considering an objection about his own fitness to hear the case, and what recourse does the accused have if he has such a strong opinion that the president of the judge court martial appointed could be biased in the trial?

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Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Members for speaking on the Bill and for their interest in strengthening the military justice system in the SAF. I want to assure all Members that the Bill is indeed proposed to strengthen the justice system in the SAF, and the SAF has a similar interest to ensure that this is enhanced.

Dr Ong Chit Chung asked why we are introducing a system of judge courts martial where a single judge presides. Would a single judge, he asked, especially one who is not a regular officer, be able to deal with military offences committed by regular servicemen and National Servicemen? Sir, our general courts martial deal with SAF servicemen who commit both military offences such as absence without official leave (AWOL) and malingering, as well as civil offences such as theft, cheating, and drug consumption. While the majority of the cases involved military offences, a significant number (some 20%) of all the cases dealt with by the courts martial in the last three years involved civil offences.

As I explained in my speech earlier, such civil offences usually call for a pure judicial analysis of the facts and legal issues, and an application of established judicial sentencing principles and guidelines by the judge. Such cases will be more efficiently and effectively dealt with by a single legally qualified judge than a panel of three members. As such, the Bill sets up the judge courts martial to exist alongside the present system of general courts martial, that is, panel courts martial. It does not replace the panel courts martial. However, this judge court martial will deal essentially with civil offences. The judge courts martial will really be no different from the civilian criminal courts in the civilian justice system where the accused person is also tried by a single judge.

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Sir, Dr Ong also asked about the role of the Director of Legal Services in determining whether a judge court martial or a panel court martial will be used in hearing cases. As I said in my speech, the default position will be that charges are automatically tried by a panel court martial unless the Director of Legal Services directs that they be tried by a judge court martial. While the system of having a single judge to try an accused person is the norm in the civilian justice system, it will still be a new practice in our military justice system. Moreover, the majority of the charges that are tried by the general courts martial are likely to continue to involve strictly military offences.

As such, MINDEF feels that rather than establishing the default position as one where cases will automatically be tried by a single judge, it may be more prudent, as Dr Ong pointed out, for cases to be tried by a panel court martial, unless the Director of Legal Services decides otherwise. And as I said earlier, the cases that will be heard by the single judge court martial will essentially be civil cases. In making his decision, the Director of Legal Services will not be acting on his own accord but according to the operational guidelines set by the Armed Forces Council. Over time, after the new system has been successfully implemented, the Armed Forces Council could possibly allow more types of cases to be tried by the judge court martial, if this should suit the needs and policies of the SAF at that time.

Sir, Dr Ong also asked about a situation where the Auditor-General disagrees with the appointment of an external commercial auditor. I would like to report that the AGO's advice has been sought on the proposed amendments to the SAVER-Premium Fund and it has not stated any objection to the proposal.

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Dr Ong also proposed that the Auditor-General conduct both the cash as well as the accrual accounting audits rather than having a commercial auditor to do both of these. Sir, the SAF SAVER-Premium Fund invests in a wide variety of equities and bonds, and they are traded worldwide by fund managers who have operating presence around the world. Therefore, the advantage of engaging a commercial auditor with a global reach, as opposed to the Auditor-General's Office which does not have a global reach, is a compelling one. And we believe that an external commercial auditor would be able to do the job more efficiently in this respect. The selection of an external commercial auditor will be done in a careful manner and it is likely to be one of the big four auditing firms.

Sir, I move on to address the questions raised by the honourable Member, Mr Sin Boon Ann. He asked about the measures to ensure the independence of the general courts martial panel since the members are appointed by SAF and MINDEF. Yes, the appointment or removal of the members of the general courts panel by a body independent of MINDEF is another safeguard. But we feel that it is not necessary as the rights of the servicemen are ensured by many other safeguards during the trial as well as the post-trial process. Let me cover some of these.

This Bill has indeed strengthened these safeguards as it expressly provides for the setting up of the judge courts martial, each presided by a single legally qualified judge, and the employment of a legally qualified president or member or judge advocate in a panel court martial. Existing safeguards in the courts martial system will also be preserved, and there are a few of them. Firstly, the independence of the court is enshrined in the SAF Act, and anyone who influences

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or attempts to influence the court would be committing an offence. Secondly, the proceedings of the courts martial are open to the public and, thus, any alleged unfair conduct of the trial would quickly be discovered and publicly exposed. Thirdly, an accused serviceman may object to any member of the courts martial. Fourthly, primary jurisdiction over all civil offences rests with the Attorney-General, and the Attorney-General may transfer such cases from the military courts to the civil courts. Fifthly, all military prosecutions come under the direct supervision of the Director, Legal Services who is a legally qualified person and who, being a member of the Singapore Legal Service, is independent of the military command structure.

Furthermore, there are robust and independent appellate and review processes to right any possible wrong or unfair decisions of the courts martial. The appellate process involves allowing appeals against any finding of a court martial to the military court of appeal (or MCA). The MCA is a superior court of record. It is presided by a person qualified to be a Supreme Court Judge who has to be specifically nominated by the Chief Justice of Singapore for this purpose. Two other members of the MCA would also have to be legally qualified persons.

As for the review process, this is undertaken by the Armed Forces Council and the reviewing authority can quash the finding or sentence of the court martial. The reviewing process can be initiated by the aggrieved serviceman himself or by the Armed Forces Council acting on its own. In coming to its decision, the AFC can also seek the independent advice of the Judge Advocate-General, who has to be an experienced judicial or legal officer or a lawyer of not less than five years' standing. The Judge Advocate-General is also outside the military command

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structure and is currently the Solicitor-General of Singapore. Finally, beyond the appeal and review processes in the SAF, and similar to the practice in our civilian justice system, a convicted serviceman can also petition to the President of the Republic of Singapore for a pardon or for a remission of his sentence.

In summary, there is a comprehensive and multi-faceted system of legal protection put in place to safeguard the interests of our servicemen. This extends from the actual conduct of the trials by the courts martial to the various post-trial appeal, review or petition processes. This system will continue to remain robust and, in fact, will be further enhanced by the provisions in the Bill.

Mr Sin Boon Ann also asked about security of tenure and whether this can be applied to the general courts martial panel. Sir, the general courts martial panel can be made up of regular or National Servicemen. In view of the new provisions in the Bill, the panel will also have to include a significant number of legally qualified persons who will almost invariably be NSmen. As such, it is expected that the membership of the general courts martial panel will have to change from time to time, depending on the potential candidates available, because NSmen do move into MINDEF reserves. Thus, the Bill does not seek to tie down the exact term of the general court martial panel or the exact period of office of its members. This is not unlike the practice in the Subordinate Courts where the magistrates or district judges are also not necessarily appointed for a fixed or definite period. Separately, there is no necessity to require security of tenure for the panel members just so as to ensure that they will not be subject to improper command influence. Let me elaborate.

For the panel members who are National Servicemen, panel membership

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will not influence their career advancement in their civilian lives. Hence, there is no reason for them to be improperly influenced just so as to remain on the panel. As for the panel members who are regular servicemen, being a member of the panel is also not a primary or career appointment since such servicemen will continue to retain their regular appointments, whether they remain a member of the panel or not. Further, neither members who are National Servicemen nor regular servicemen who serve on such panels will receive any additional pay or benefit for being a member of the panel. Instead, their pay or service remuneration will remain the same, whether they serve on the panel or not. There is, therefore, no need to put in place security of tenure for the panel members since many safeguards are already in place.

Mr Sin Boon Ann also questioned why the SAF Bill does not specify who the convening authority will be. He said that the Bill specifies that it should be an officer of or above the rank of a major, and he felt that a major may not be senior enough. The minimum rank set out in the SAF Act is only a guide and the convening authority need not necessarily be a major.

The Bill does not seek to tie down the specific appointment or the rank of the convening authority as this is unnecessary and may be overly restrictive.

The SAF Act instead requires the Armed Forces Council to make a specific appointment of the convening authority from officers from or above that minimum rank. Thus, the Armed Forces Council itself would have to specifically consider who is capable of assuming that appointment. In practice, the AFC is likely to appoint the Chief of Defence Force to be the convening authority. Our practice is in fact similar to that employed by many other militaries, such as those in Australia, United Kingdom and the United

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States, where the ranks of the persons convening the general courts martial are also not tied down in their respective laws. Depending on the particular military, the general courts martial can be convened by an officer, commander or designated person specifically appointed to perform this task.

Finally, Sir, let me take the questions raised by Mdm Ho Geok Choo, who has raised various issues, and I would address them in turn. The issues stem from the concern that the introduction of panel courts martial may undermine the quality of courts martial hearings since the panel courts martial may be deprived of the benefits of having either a qualified person presiding or having the assistance of a judge advocate being present. I wish to assure Members and Mdm Ho that the panel courts martial will be guided by legal expertise. In the new section 81(8) of the Bill, it is provided that if a panel court martial does not have at least one member who is legally qualified, then a legally qualified judge advocate designated by the convening authority shall officiate in any trial before that court. The effect of this provision is that every panel court martial will have either a legally qualified president or member or legally qualified judge advocate present.

Members of this House may also like to know that, as a further legal safeguard, we have a policy that the appointed legally qualified president or member of the court martial would in fact be a former or current judicial officer from the civil courts. Such a person would thus have actual experience with dispensing justice fairly and impartially in the course of his practice as a Judge in the civil courts. Such a member would bring his valuable experience with him to the general courts martial, further ensuring that the rule of law is as stringently observed in the military justice system as it is in the civilian justice system. Hence, whether or not the accused serviceman is repre

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sented by counsel, the panel courts martial would be adequate to hear the case.

Members may also like to know that all military officers would have been trained in military law as part of their officer cadet training. Thus, the lay members of the court martial would have relevant training and would be competent for their roles. With the guidance of a legally qualified president or member or judge advocate in the course of a trial, together with their knowledge of policy and operational perspectives, and their training in military law, the lay members of the panel courts martial would play an important part in ensuring that justice is achieved in accordance with the policy of the SAF, the welfare of its servicemen and the expectations of the public as a whole.

Finally, Sir, Mr Low Thia Khiang raised the question about judge courts martial. And since he is a single judge presiding over the case, how would objections to his fitness to being the judge be dealt with if it is raised by an accused? I would like to point out that this is no different from the civil courts where a single Judge presides over civil offences. And I would like to assure him that, at least for the beginning, the SAF would only put forward civil cases to such a single judge court - until we gain more experience.

Dr Ong Chit Chung: Mr Speaker, Sir, a point of clarification. I did not ask whether the Auditor-General was consulted in drafting this amendment. My question was: in the process of consultation between the Minister for Defence and the Auditor-General on the appointment of an external auditor, if the Auditor-General disagrees with the proposal, will the Minister for Defence proceed with such appointment? And, secondly, it is also a point of clarification.

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Of course, I agree that big auditors have global reach and they are desirable. But in this case, the Auditor-General could also, on his own, approach and somewhat pass some of the work to the big four or five international auditors who have global reach. So it is not necessary to be appointed by MINDEF. They could be appointed by the Auditor-General.

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, if the Auditor-General has reservations on being consulted by the Minister for Defence, I am certain that the Minister would take these reservations into account. And in drafting the Bill, the Auditor-General's Office has been consulted and they have so far not raised any objection. In addition to the global reach of commercial auditors, they have also acquired best practices in the sense that they have relevant experiences in auditing pension funds around the world. And this is opposed to the Auditor-General's Office which may not have as wide an experience in this particular regard. Therefore, it is more efficient and effective to propose a commercial auditor which is likely to be one of the big four accounting firms to carry out this particular function for the SAF SAVER-Premium Fund.

Mr Sin Boon Ann: The Minister, in his earlier reply, said that to require the appointment of a convening authority to be a rank higher than a major would be too restrictive. I would like the Minister perhaps to explain what exactly he meant by his remark that this is too restrictive on the SAF to require higher appointment as the minimum qualification for deployment of a convening authority.

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, indeed, the Bill seeks to improve this particular aspect of a convening authority. As it stands, ad hoc courts martial are convened to try each case, and they are convened throughout the year by different convening authorities. Therefore, to allow

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for such flexibility, a minimum rank of a major has been stipulated, and this has been carried forward to the Bill. However, under the Bill, only a single convening authority is required to appoint a standing (rather than an ad hoc) general court martial panel. Therefore, such a standing general court martial panel would likely hear cases of servicemen of many different ranks and from many different services, be it the airforce, the army or the navy. That is why, in practice, the Armed Forces Council expects to appoint the Chief of Defence Force, who is a two or three star General, to be the convening authority.

Mr Sin Boon Ann: That being so, and since the convening authority is just a single person, why does the amendment Bill not just make it simple by specifying that the convening authority shall be the Chief of Defence Force rather than leaving it to just being a person of minimum rank of a major?

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, there is another aspect to the SAF Act which deals with field general courts martial and general courts martial during operations. Punishment has to be meted out swiftly in order for the SAF to function in operations. Under such circumstances, one may not find the Chief of Defence Force available to be the convening authority.

Mr Sin Boon Ann: So be it. In such situations, you will provide for flexibility. But until you are faced with such situations, in the normal run of things, I cannot see why you cannot specify the rank higher than a major to be the convening authority.

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, the SAF, as I said before and the Minister has said in this House many times before, 'trains as it would fight'. So even in the administration of military justice, we would have to have a system which

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would apply both in peace time as well as in operations.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Clarification, Sir. Does the Minister of State agree that there is always a difference between the courts martial and the open court? I would like to know whether or not he is going to have a judge in the same way as a case is being tried in the Subordinate Court. The fact is that in an open court, any accused person could object if he raises objection to the judge in trying him - I think it is public opinion - whereas in a court martial, it may not be so. So how sure are we that the Act, which does not provide for a change of the judge or the convening authority, will actually be fair to the accused if, in his opinion, the judge so appointed to try him may be biased?

Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng: Sir, just like the civilian justice system, the general court martial is an open court and a court of record. And if a single judge presiding over a judge courts martial is objected to by an accused, he is required to record why he sees himself fit to continue to preside over the case. And if indeed the accused feels that the trial has not been fair, the accused has the right of appeal to the military court of appeal which is then presided by a person qualified to be a Supreme Court Judge with two other legally qualified persons, or he has recourse to the Armed Forces Council for review and, finally, he has the right of petition to the President for final remission.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

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Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take the break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 4.50 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.27 pm until 4.50 pm .

Sitting resumed at 4.50 pm

[

Mr Speaker in the Chair: ]