HEAD J - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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** Head J - Ministry of Defence **

The Chairman: Head J - Ministry of Defence. Mr Ravindran.

Defence Security

Mr R Ravindran (Marine Parade): Sir, I beg to move,

That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100.

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Sir, South East Asia is increasingly on the horizon of all major powers. The vital maritime routes and the huge market provided by South East Asia make it important for all big countries to take an interest in the evolving security architecture of the region. There are, however, trouble spots in the region that still remain. The Taiwan Strait, North Korea, maritime boundary dispute in the South China Sea and Japan Sea, global terrorism and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca are all of concern.

Sir, India and China are actively pursuing diplomacy and strengthening their military capability by increasing their defence spending and expanding their blue water navy capabilities. Their energy needs and a strong economy will inevitably push them to new corners. The enthusiasm shown by these two major powers in ASEAN, ARF and the new East Asia Summit clearly shows that ASEAN and Singapore are high on their economic and strategic considerations.

Sir, the US in its February 2006 quarterly Defence Review highlighted that the rise of China, as an emerging global military power, is a matter of concern. The US maintains an active military presence in the region and in North East Asia. It has shown its commitment to the region by entering into the SFA with Singapore last year. It has recently resumed IMET with the TNI in Indonesia. It has various facilities and military arrangements with other countries in the region. The recent decision by the Bush administration to enhance US partnership with ASEAN clearly shows the strategic importance of South East Asia for the US in the coming years.

Sir, Japan is also taking an active role in redefining its military role. It has started to relook at its constitution and has already started deploying its SDF for peaceful and humanitarian purposes overseas. The ongoing North Korea

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nuclear issue, the hot and cold relationship between Japan and South Korea and between Japan and China, and the rise of a strong China with a big economy and a strong military, will clearly push Japan to define a new role for the SDF in the long run.

Russia, with its huge land mass in Asia and energy reserves, intends to stay engaged in Asia and will seek to play a role in the security of the region. It will also provide a balance of power in the region if it seeks to play a part in this region.

Sir, within ASEAN, member countries have their own strategic calculations and national interests. Some welcome the presence of all major powers to ensure that the region is engaged with all, with no one superpower or major power dominating the region. But there are some others who are suspicious of some of these powers for historical, strategic or economic reasons.

Sir, all these make for interesting times and an unpredictable future for the region. I would like to ask the Minister what is MINDEF's regional security outlook and for the Minister's take on the evolving security architecture. I would also like him to address the developments towards the ASEAN security community and what are the realistic prospects of achieving these goals.

Defence Policy

Dr Ong Chit Chung (Jurong): Sir, after 911, the strategic landscape in South East Asia has changed significantly. New challenges emerged. There could be more low-intensity operations, anti-hijack operations, search and rescue operations and targeted strikes against terrorists. There are also potential threats in chemical and biological warfare. While preparing itself for conventional warfare, is the SAF also geared up for these new

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threats? As these operations would involve other Government agencies and civil resources, how is MINDEF coordinating and managing these issues?

Sir, the Straits of Malacca is another strategic point of concern. Clear passage in this sea lane is of crucial importance to the trade and security of Singapore. May I ask what is the outcome of the multi-national patrols of the Straits of Malacca? And are there any additional measures to ensure safe passage in this vital sea lane?

Sir, the SAF has good relations with the armed forces of neighbouring countries, and this defence diplomacy helps in times of crisis. May I ask if the SAF will further strengthen the defence ties and use the goodwill to promote more bilateral training and exercises?

Sir, all Singaporeans, I am sure, will agree that we should recognise the contributions of our National Servicemen, including those who have completed full-time National Service while still doing in-camp training. RECORD IV has made a series of recommendations. What is MINDEF's response to these recommendations? Are the recommendations being followed up and acted upon?

The Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education and Minister for Manpower (Mr Hawazi Daipi): Sir, I would, first, like to thank the Prime Minister for having decided to give our NSmen a Special Bonus in conjunction with the 40th Anniversary of National Service. Both full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) and those who have completed their ORNS training cycle will enjoy the $100 and $400 bonus respectively.

NS bonus sends a signal - an important signal - that Singapore values the men who have been there to ensure our national security and safety through their services in the Singapore Armed

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Forces, the Singapore Police Force and the Singapore Civil Defence Force. It is therefore important that we share the benefits of our prosperity with our NSmen.

The Special Bonus also demonstrates the importance that is placed on our national defence and the concept of Total Defence, which has gained greater currency and relevance, as the sources of threats have changed from largely military aggression only to also the scourge of maritime terrorism and piracy, as well as the need to respond to disasters.

While our large spending on defence has been justifiable, the question that will always be asked is how ready is our Armed Forces for any eventuality, in terms of weaponry edge as well as operational readiness of our men to action. This must be viewed against the different sources of threats to us.

Sir, may I ask the Minister to give us his assessment of the security environment around Singapore, in South East Asia, as well as in the adjacent regions of East Asia and South Asia, in particular, the potential flashpoints in the Strait of Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. How are we working with other countries to enhance peace and security of our nation and that of the region?

In the case of terrorism, can the Minister inform the House of the potential threats to Singapore and our neighbouring countries? How does the Minister assess the change of leadership in Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and the region, and the problems in Southern Thailand? Is the SAF, along with the SPF as well as SCDF, operationally ready for the possible first terrorist threat and attack in Singapore?

It is also important to ask about our post-operation plans for the period when

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psychological defence - a component of our Total Defence - would be tested.

Defence Diplomacy

Mr Ravindran: Sir, the SAF has always enjoyed good relations with the military forces of many countries. In fact, even at difficult times in our relations with other countries, the SAF continues to have good working relationship with the respective defence forces in these countries.

Sir, the SAF's defence diplomacy has yielded good results in many countries. When I visited Aceh during the tsunami disaster, I was able to recall that many of the Indonesian officers were able to call many of our senior officers by name, and they enjoyed very good relationship. And I think this special relationship enabled us to be a key coordinator with other relief agencies who came to Aceh to help. In fact, at times, I am sure that the defence forces and the key players in the defence forces in other countries do influence their political masters to consider our requests and needs with greater sympathy.

Sir, in many instances, our defence forces have also played other important roles by providing local assistance, doing local projects and even working with local people to ensure that the good image of the SAF and Singapore is projected. I would like to take this opportunity to ask the Minister to provide an update on the SAF's defence diplomacy and perhaps to share with us some of the fruits of such diplomacy.

The Chairman: Dr Tan Cheng Bock is not here. Mr Steve Chia.

Defence Budget

Mr Steve Chia Kiah Hong (Non-Constituency Member): **** Sir, I understand and recognise the importance of national defence and our armed forces' role in

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providing peace in Singapore. But I cannot help feeling that we are over spending a bit too much on our defence budget allocation. Considering the total estimate of $10.05 billion is due for defence alone, that is a whopping 32.8% of our total budget allocation of $28.6 billion, and 4.86% of projected GDP for FY2006. Compared to other developed countries like the US (3.6%), Britain (2.59%), Japan (1%) and France (1.98%), I think we are spending a tad too high on defence.

Sir, I think the Government should cut it down to below 30% of our budget allocation, and free up more money for the other social sectors, like education. I would also like to hear from the Minister whether we are seeing any increased security and sovereign threat towards Singapore and in Asia, except for Taiwan.

Prof. Ivan Png Paak Liang: Sir, the International Institute for Strategic Studies publishes Military Balance. **** This publication reports military expenditure of 19 countries in East Asia and Australasia. In 2004, we spent 4.7% of GDP on defence. Parliament staff are now distributing a chart which I have extracted from Military Balance . Members will see that our military expenditure at 4.7% of GDP places us fifth out of 19 countries in the region. Who were ahead of us? North Korea, Myanmar, Vietnam and Brunei.

Sir, let me give another perspective by comparing us with other developed countries in stable regions. These are all similarly sized. Finland spends 1.3% of GPD on defence; Sweden spends 1.5%; and Switzerland spends 1.0%. Note that these are not NATO countries.

It is easy to spend a lot on defence. Few will challenge defence expenditure, as it sounds like compromising national security. In the current Budget, defence expenditure will increase by 8.5% relative

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to 2005, and consume one-third of the entire budget.

Sir, Prime Minister Lee has likened our defence expenditure to an insurance policy - the more we are worth, the more we should spend. Let me offer a different analogy - a bank. If a bank holds twice as much money, it does not double the number of security guards. The reason is economies of scale. As the economy grows larger, surely, we can reap economies of scale from defence like every other Government function.

Further, let me echo hon. Members, Dr Ong Chit Chung and Mr Hawazi. Have we drawn the implications of changes in the threats to Singapore? Today, our most dangerous, imminent threat is global terrorism. Yet, we are adding more heavy artillery - a new squadron of F15s. How do these help us to combat Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah? Indeed, Sir, have we reviewed our force structure accordingly? For instance, last year, the US Army was busy converting artillerymen into MPs - not Members of Parliaments, but military policemen.

Given our tax revenue and investment income, if we spend more

on defence, we must be spending less on something else, for instance, R&D. The Government is aiming to emulate Finland and Sweden in R&D spending. Finland spends 3.5% of GDP on R&D, Sweden spends 4%. We spend just 2.25%, aiming to increase to 3%.

Sir, let us be judicious in defence spending. Let us be very sure that every additional dollar spent on defence provides us good value as every additional dollar in education, healthcare, housing and R&D.

3G SAF

Mr Ravindran: Sir, as we move towards the 3G SAF, I beg to differ with

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the comments of the Opposition Member, Mr Steve Chia. When somebody calls us "a small red dot" or "a little red dot" and somebody threatens to cut essential supplies to Singapore and one looks at the history of Kuwait, how it was overrun by a huge military in a short space of time, I think it bears lesson to us that we must always invest well and invest adequately so that when the time comes, we can all sleep in peace and rest assured that we have a strong defence force to protect us.

Sir, S3G is the way that our armed forces have gone along because that is where the warfare plans are all going. I am proud that we have adopted the right strategy to implement and operationalise the 3G concepts. As I visit our SAF component units, I can see the fruits of our investment. In fact, one clear dividend of the 3G SAF is the ability of our SAF to cut the NS tenure of our NSmen from 2 1/2 to two years.

Sir, with the bigger budget this year, I expect the SAF to accelerate the conversion of the SAF to 3G. Can the Minister please provide us with an update on the transformation of SAF into a 3G force?

Mr Leong Horn Kee (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Sir, under this cut, I wish to raise with the Minister for Defence the following queries: (1) to enquire with the Minister on the further progress made by MINDEF on the advancement made on the effectiveness and the sophistication of our defence forces under the 3G SAF; (2) to ask the Minister to give an update on the changes, impacts and improvements made in SAF following the implementation of the new two years NSF, as compared to the previous 2 1/2 years NSF; and (3) to request the Minister whether he can assure the House that the SAF has implemented measures of internal control and checks and balances to ensure that

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funds used by SAF for upgrading and purchase of new equipment and weapons are based on cost-effectiveness and value for money.

I understand that MINDEF's defence budget is based on 6% of the GDP, correct me if I am wrong. As our current GDP is about $160 billion, therefore, the annual budget for defence is nearly about $10 billion. I do not agree with Mr Steve Chia that this amount of money spent is not worthwhile and should be cut. In fact, I think in principle I am in favour of spending sufficient funds to ensure that we are extremely combat effective in the defence force which serves as a strong deterrent against any potential intruders. It also helps to comfort our people and foreign investors to sleep well at night.

As MINDEF is asking our young men to spend two years of their lives to do National Service, I would like to ask the Minister whether the time spent by the NSmen while in service is employed fully and meaningfully. For us to have an effective and modern 3G SAF, MINDEF is spending billions of dollars annually on the defence budget. I wish to know whether there are checks and balances to ensure that our generals do not go out and buy weapons and defence systems as toys and playthings, and which may not be best suited for our use, or great value for money. I would like to know what has been done by MINDEF to ensure that the above control measures are in place.

I understand that MINDEF is not under the normal annual budget allocations and controls of the Ministry of Finance. If this is so, what internal checks and balances are in place to ensure that proper spending procedures are adopted? I wish to let the Minister know that we do not just want to be dazzled by promises and visual impact of the new weaponry. We want to be sure that these new weapons costing billions of dollars would be effective. The Minister may wish to clarify.

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Dr Teo Ho Pin (Holland-Bukit Panjang): Sir, the changing landscape in security and dynamic technological advancement has made it necessary for many armed forces to rethink their doctrines and fighting strategies. New security threats, such as terrorism, or new fighting environment, such as heavily built-up cities, have posed new challenges to fighting forces.

In Singapore, the Ministry of Defence is presently transforming our SAF into a third-generation (or 3G) fighting force. The purpose of this transformation is actually to enhance the fighting capability of our soldiers through harnessing advanced technology. In today's environment, we can exploit information, command and control technologies to integrate and enhance the fighting capabilities of the SAF. In terms of hardware, modern weapon systems can be procured and modified to suit the defence needs of our country. At the same time, our SAF soldiers are better educated and trained to handle more sophisticated fighting system. Thus, the combination of both modern weapon systems and better trained soldiers will provide a good platform for our SAF to build a strong and capable integrated fighting force.

Sir, I wish to ask the Minister the following questions: (1) What is the status of transformation of the 3G SAF? (2) What are the key deliverables of the 3G SAF? (3) How are we going to train the NS operationally ready men to fit into the 3G SAF? (4) How effective is the 3G SAF against terrorism and chemical warfare?

Mr Sin Boon Ann (Tampines): Sir, the transformation of the SAF in recent years into a 3G army has been dramatic and represents a quantum leap in the capability of our armed forces. Following the transformation, the SAF would be a leaner and more potent force employing new operating concepts and systems

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while maximising our limited manpower resources. In particular, the 3G SAF will be chiefly characterised by its ability to use the state-of-the-art technology to gain an asymmetric edge over its potential adversaries in areas of precision strike, advanced network and unmanned systems. This transformation of the SAF into a 3G army, as I understand it, mirrors the transformation of the US Armed Forces as well. However, despite the deployment of advanced technology, we have seen in Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq, how a technologically superior armed forces can be bogged down by low intensity and unconventional warfare. I refer in particular to the challenges faced by the US Army on the ground in dealing with the security threats posed by guerrilla fighters and terrorists. Indeed, we have seen in Iraq that technological superiority has limited protection against suicide bombers and snipers. I would therefore like to ask the Minister whether the transformation of the SAF into a 3G army would take into account these developments and whether we are observing the situation in the Middle East closely to see how lessons can be learned which may be applicable in our context.

The Chairman: Mr Chay Wai Chuen is not here. Mr Ravindran, another 2 minutes.

Training and Training Safety

Mr Ravindran: Sir, the SAF has excelled as one of the best organisations in Singapore. Whether it is National Day, SAF Day, or even the State funeral of the late Mr Rajaratnam, or the tsunami relief effort, we can always count on the SAF to deliver with the highest level of efficiency, organisation and propriety. It makes us proud and I am confident that the SAF can deliver when called upon. This, they have been doing well due to their planning, good deployment of resources and trained manpower. But

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training soldiers is no easy task. Every minute details must be practised, every scenario taken into account. Having our soldiers prepared for all contingencies is no easy task. Every soldier is different. Some are timid and must be pushed to maximise their potential. Some are risk-takers and always want to push their limits. Some set very high standards for themselves to have a sense of achievement. Some, at times, do pure heroics just to have fun during training. To manage and provide training to all such men and yet avoid any injury is asking for the impossible in any serious-minded defence establishment.

My biggest worry, whenever serious accidents take place in the SAF, is whether the SAF will go soft due to public backlash or negative comments. Sir, training must be realistic to make sure that our soldiers are well prepared. It is easy for the SAF to go soft and take no risks, but we will all pay dearly when the crucial time comes. Even during football training, I recall, instead of 10 rounds, sometimes, the trainer made us go 20 rounds or 25 rounds and sometimes to train in mid-day, and I wonder why. All because there will come a time when the team has to play that extra 30 minutes or even beyond to win the game. All this training only comes when the critical time for us to play the game and stay there on the field after the critical 30 minutes. I think it is critical that the SAF provides safe training but, at the same time, realistic training. I would like to ask the Minister how the SAF intends to provide for more safety.

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong (Tampines): Sir, year after year, families have to send their sons for National Service, believing that a strong SAF is necessary for this country's continued survival. They do this knowing that there are inherent risks in military training and operations. Given

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the spate of training deaths in recent years, we need to reassure parents that adequate safety measures are being put in place even as their sons go through tough and realistic training. Sir, I am for tough and realistic training but we need to make sure that there are safety audits being put in place, being done, and that there are actions being taken when there are lapses. Can I also ask the Minister what has the progress been since two years ago, when the Minister told us that the SAF would benchmark their safety standards against those of other armed forces?

Sir, we realise that no military in the world, not even the best armed forces, has a zero training death rate. Indeed, it has been documented that since the SAS British elite force was formed in 1957, it had lost more men in peace time practice manoeuvres than in combat. The tougher the training, the higher the risk, and the same goes for our SAF. In Singapore, we have NSmen who have never fought in a war, but we have men who have lost their lives in training accidents while in service. They were training for the sole purpose of defending this country. Their deaths are not a loss to their families but also to the country. We should not allow their sacrifice to be just another accident statistic. I would propose to the Minister for Defence that as the SAF celebrates its 40th anniversary next year, we consider building a memorial to recognise the sacrifice and to commemorate them, to honour all those who had died while in service, including those who had died while training.

Sir, RECORD IV has proposed a slew of measures to recognise the sacrifices of NSmen who are still alive. But I think we would be remiss if we do not also think of those who have sacrificed their lives - it can be through training, it can be through other operational exercises. During MINDEF's visit to France last year, led by the Defence Minister, I noticed that its

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elite anti-terrorism troop commemorated their comrades who had died in training on a memorial plaque, and it did not matter how they died, under what circumstances they died, but the fact was that they died while they were in training, in service to the country. While the commander stopped to show us that plaque, I could not help noticing that he had this moment of reverence and respect, and it shows that he remembered those who had died, his comrades who had fallen while training. And it also signifies a higher value, the sacrifice for the nation.

Sir, we have several war memorials in Singapore - Kranji War Memorial and the Cenotaph - and they are there to commemorate our war-time sacrifices, mainly World War II, World War I. And most of those who had died are not Singaporeans who had fought for the country, but the British troops, Australian troops and New Zealand troops, foreigners. But we have yet to have a memorial for NSmen who have died. Sir, I would hope that the Minister would consider this. It is not too late and it is not too early, and I think the 40th anniversary is a good time for us to start this ritual to do so.

4.30 pm

Mr Tan Soo Khoon: Much obliged, Sir. Sir, two training-related incidents resulting in the deaths of our armed forces personnel in 2005 compel me to, once again, raise this issue of training safety in the House again. Sir, in June, last year, a serviceman died at sea while training under the supervision of four officers. In July, two commandos were killed after falling from a helicopter while undergoing rappelling training.

Following the dunking incident in 2003 when a serviceman died, the SAF did an extensive audit of training procedures, tightened regulations and

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conducted surprise audit checks. Sir, we have been regularly assured that the procedures are in place and that the safety of SAF personnel is of prime importance. But it puzzles me as to why such incidents do happen.

The helicopter incident, for example, was a repeat of a similar incident that actually happened in 1990 when three persons were killed. In the training incident at sea, there were four supervisors looking after six men, and yet not one of them noticed that the poor man had slipped under the waves. When he was sent to a medical centre at Changi Naval Base, what was even more surprising to find out was that there was no medical officer at the Changi Naval Base. So, what is the point then, if we have a medical centre and the most important personnel, a doctor, is not available?

Sir, I think our safety consciousness is still not sufficiently instilled amongst the SAF personnel. It is good to tighten rules to have all the proper training procedures in place, but I think we need to do more, and that is, we have to ensure that this safety culture is properly instilled in our men. I do not doubt that at the very top of the command chain there is an urgency to maintain this safety consciousness. But, I think, somewhere down the line, there is what we call a lack of the safety culture and it is probably that which says, "Oh, don't worry, it won't happen to me." But then it has happened once too often.

Dr Ong Chit Chung: Mr Chairman, Sir, this House has debated on numerous occasions on training and safety in the SAF. When a tragic accident occurs, we grieve for the loss of a precious life and ask if the incident could be prevented. MINDEF has continuously reviewed the procedures and tightened the safety measures. The General Staff Inspectorate has been strengthened for more safety audits. Yet, the incidents occur. Why?

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A recent case was the drowning of Second Serjeant Ong Kia Hwee off the Changi Naval Base. The AG's Chambers has found that there were no legal grounds for proceeding against the four instructors and the case is referred back to MINDEF for review under military law. May I ask MINDEF on the outcome of the review? More importantly, could such an incident be prevented and lives saved?

Sir, over all, MINDEF faces the dilemma of walking the tight rope, trying to balance the concern of safety and the operational requirement of training our National Servicemen for war. It is a tough act. I would like to ask MINDEF how does it overcome this dilemma. Are there better measures to enhance safety in training and to improve the culture of safety in our units? How does the SAF fare in terms of casualty in training when compared to other armed forces?

The Chairman: Mr Chiam See Tong is not here. Mr Teo.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr S Iswaran) in the Chair]

4.35 pm

The Minister for Defence (Mr Teo Chee Hean): Mr Chairman, Sir, I would first like to thank the hon. Members for their comments and questions, and for their support and robust commitment to defence.

Mr Ravindran, Mr Hawazi Daipi and Mr Steve Chia have asked for an assessment of our regional security environment. Sir, the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific region is in a state of flux. The shifts which are now taking place will lead to significant changes in the geostrategic balance. The US remains pre-eminent, with its superior military power, economic strength and political influence. But

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alongside this is a new reality - China and India, the two Asian giants, are now on the rise. This is reshaping the strategic contours of our region. What is less clear is what shape our region - and indeed the world - will take in the future. The situation will be made more complex by the greater assertiveness of Japan, and perhaps also a resurgent Russia, in the coming years.

China and India have both abandoned autarky and are seeking economic linkages with the world. They are now both major trading and energy importing nations, and their search for foreign sources of raw materials and markets, as well as their dependence on them, can only grow. As a consequence, both China and India now have an interest in the security of sea routes, and of their energy sources.

Southeast Asia is situated at the confluence of major sea routes, and at the crossroads between India and China. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are now vital lifelines for these two emerging powers, as they are for the US, Japan and the countries in our region. Our region is also a major source of oil and gas. So we can expect that the issues of maritime security and energy security will loom larger in our region and become more critical for the major powers. Singapore, therefore, must have the wherewithal - military and diplomatic - to play a role to contribute to regional security and stability, and also to protect our national interests and ensure our security as the geopolitical landscape evolves.

Singapore and the SAF have, therefore, been playing active roles in multilateral efforts to enhance maritime security. Over the past year, we contributed to developing a consensus among the three littoral states of the Straits of Malacca that while we, the littoral states, have the primary responsibility for the security of the

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Straits, major user states and other stakeholders have a role to play as well. Also, whatever measures are undertaken to enhance security must be in accordance with international law and respect the sovereignty of the littoral states. Dr Ong asked about the measures to safeguard the Malacca Straits. In the last two years, the littoral states have jointly launched air and sea patrols to demonstrate our commitment to safeguard this strategic waterway. We are also working with the international community through, for example, the IMO and member states, to focus on maritime security in straits, such as the Malacca Straits.

Another major threat to our security is - as Mr Hawazi has noted - that of trans-national terrorism. The list of countries hit by terrorist attacks continues to grow. The danger is by no means over. In fact, with the terrorists exploiting modern technology to their advantage and organising themselves better to evade detection, the fight will be a long and arduous one. This is a fight that may take many generations, for it is an ideological war that they are waging. The fact that Azahari Husin was killed in Indonesia does not change that. The personalities might change, organisations might morph, but the ideology and objectives remain the same, and there are others, eg, bomb-makers like Nordin Top and their disciples, those who have learnt from them these dark arts, who are still at large. So we still have to remain on our guard.

Sir, Dr Ong Chit Chung has asked if new security threats have brought any changes to our defence policy, and Mr Ravindran asked about the state of our defence relations and defence diplomacy. The fundamentals of Singapore's defence policy are determined by our geography and environment. We are a small island with no strategic depth. We have no hinterland to absorb an attack, and there is no natural buffer between the external

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environment and our populated areas and economic infrastructure. We are also a maritime nation, critically dependent on the security of sea lines of communications and the freedom of navigation. Our geography - both in the contours and size of our island and in our location in a sometimes turbulent region - is immutable.

Given these realities and the uncertainties of the regional environment, we continue to pursue deterrence and diplomacy as the twin pillars of our defence policy. We have invested considerable resources into building up a defence force that can deter aggression. And, should deterrence fail, the Singapore Armed Forces must be able to defeat the aggressor swiftly and decisively.

At the same time, we have also been enhancing our security by pursuing active defence diplomacy. The objectives of our defence diplomacy are to develop positive and mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed forces, to contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment and international order.

On the bilateral level, good defence relations also enable us to overcome our land and air space constraints. Today, the SAF trains in about a dozen countries around the world. We are very grateful to our friends for extending this assistance to us. These overseas training facilities, along with the exercises that the SAF conducts with foreign armed forces, bring significant benefits in terms of enhancing the SAF's operational and professional skills, improving inter-operability with friendly forces, and offering opportunities to benchmark ourselves. Our defence diplomacy also affords us valuable technology cooperation.

The Strategic Framework Agreement we signed with the United States last year provides the framework for

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Singapore and the US to expand the scope of defence cooperation and work together to enhance regional stability and peace.

We are also nurturing newer defence relationships. Having signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003, we have since been expanding interactions with the Indian Armed Forces. The regular naval exercises over the past decade have now been augmented by air and land exercises for the last two years. With China, my visit last November at the invitation of my Chinese counterpart provided a useful opportunity for developing a better understanding of each other's perspectives on security issues of mutual concern, and it was agreed that we would step up defence interactions.

Bilateral defence cooperation with our ASEAN partners, Thailand and Brunei, continues to be substantive and strong, and from which both sides benefit. We look forward to strengthening the mutually beneficial defence cooperation with Indonesia when the Defence Cooperation Agreement is concluded. This will stand as a strong symbol of cooperation between two close neighbours.

Singapore also continues to play an active role in regional groupings which enhance security, such as ASEAN, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ASEAN Regional Forum and, more recently, the East Asia Summit. We support the creation of the Asean Security Community and will work together with our ASEAN neighbours to realise it.

As Asia opens up, multilateral engagements will become even more important for confidence-building and facilitating dialogue, not just among

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regional parties but also to engage countries beyond the region which have a stake in the stability and prosperity of Asia. Open platforms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, will become increasingly important, now that greater cooperation is required to deal with transnational security issues like terrorism, counter-proliferation and maritime security. The Shangri-la Dialogue, held annually in Singapore since 2002 and which will be held again in the middle of the year, brings together defence ministers and strategic thinkers from around the region and beyond to discuss security issues, to create greater understanding and, hopefully, better consensus as to what can be done.

Singapore has also been an active participant in such multilateral efforts as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and we work closely with other countries in the fight against terrorism. The SAF organised the first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia last August, which involved 13 participating countries, sending ships, plans and observers. The RSN organised the first sea exercise and other professional exchanges on maritime security issues involving 19 navies of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Last year also, the Army hosted a Special Forces conference involving 19 Asia-Pacific countries to enhance regional cooperation in counter-terrorism.

Sir, the SAF has also continued to participate in humanitarian relief and peace support operations. We have deployed KC-135 tankers, C-130 transport aircraft and LSTs to support the reconstruction of Iraq. Right now, one of our LSTs is in the Northern Arabian Gulf - she is on patrol - I just read her report

before coming here - protecting the largest Iraqi oil terminal. Closer to home, SAF monitors are working alongside their ASEAN and EU counterparts in support of the Aceh peace process.

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4.45 pm

The SAF has also kept up a high operational tempo with various relief missions. After assisting in post-tsunami relief in Aceh and Phuket at the beginning of last year, the SAF deployed again for relief efforts in Nias in March, and when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August. Last October, an SAF medical team was sent to Bali after the terrorist attack, and two C-130s delivered aid to Pakistan after the earthquake.

In all these missions, the SAF demonstrated its operational readiness and professionalism. Their swift response and effectiveness in executing these missions were the result of years of steady investment in our people and equipment, and in building up a robust system capable of rapid and flexible responses.

Sir, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions are roles the SAF undertakes to enhance Singapore's national interests and contribute our part as a responsible international citizen. But the SAF's core mission remains the defence of Singapore's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and our vital interests.

Both Prof. Ivan Png and Mr Steve Chia have pointed out that the defence budget takes up a significant proportion of national expenditure. That is so because the Government considers it vital that we have a defence capability which can effectively deter potential adversaries. The Government's strong commitment to ensuring Singapore's security, the calibre of our defence force, and the determination of Singaporeans to protect what is theirs, is the key to our security and survival as an independent country.

A strong defence allows us to pursue the best interests of our country and our people, and to chart our own course steadily and confidently. It is, unfortu

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nately, the lot of small nations to come under external pressure - as we have from time to time. We would not want to have to succumb to such pressure. When there are loud voices raised against us, we must be able to take them in our stride and remain quietly confident. The SAF gives us the political space to chart our own destiny.

Prof. Png has asked why our percentage of GDP expenditure on defence is higher than most other countries in Asia. As I had pointed out last year in response to a similar question, numerical comparisons of defence expenditures are not particularly meaningful. For instance, to say that Vietnam spent almost 7% of GDP on defence while Japan allocated only 1% tells us very little, almost nothing, of the relative defence capabilities of these two countries. And, most importantly, no two countries have exactly the same strategic circumstances. There is geography and history to consider, the surrounding environment to look at. Finland, Sweden and Switzerland believe that they should reap the peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The situation in Europe today is very different than it was in the 70s and 80s. At the end of the day, each country has to forge its own path, taking into account its security environment and the unique combination of resources and attributes that geography, demography and history have conferred on it.

I should also point out that military expenditures in Asia have been rising steadily. According to the US Congressional Research Service, Asia is now the largest arms market in the developing world. From 2001 to 2004, five of the top 10 buyers, according to the US Congressional Research Service, were from Asia, namely, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia and Pakistan. Since 2000, some countries have doubled their military spending to modernise their armed

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forces. Western European and Russian defence companies are finding that the Asia-Pacific is a significant market, not just in terms of quantity, purchasing power but also for increasingly sophisticated hardware.

Prof. Png has made the point that there is no need to spend more money simply because the economy is growing. Indeed, MINDEF does not take a feast and famine approach. We do not suddenly ramp up spending just because we have a good year nor do we squeeze it down sharply when the economy turns downwards. Our policy has been to put in consistent investments, both in good times and lean years.

It would be too late to start buying weapons and to raise and train forces only when an obvious threat confronts us. Building an effective defence force takes many years and cannot be done in fits and starts. It takes more than a decade to bring a major new capability into service - from conception to bringing the system into operation with fully trained servicemen and supporting infrastructure. MINDEF draws up long-term multi-year plans so that the SAF is built up as a coherent and integrated force. There are checks and balances in the system to make sure that the money is well spent.

Sir, the development of our defence capabilities cannot be directed only at what appears to be the most imminent threat. We should not lose sight of the fundamentals of our geostrategic circumstances just because terrorism is the most obvious threat today. We must remember that our most critical need is still to have a defence force which can deter threats to our sovereignty, enable us to withstand external pressure, and prevail over the aggressor should there be a conflict.

I wish to assure Dr Ong, Mr Hawazi and Prof. Png that at the same time, the

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SAF has also been strengthening its capabilities for homeland security, and we will continue to do so, working closely with the Home Team to deal with terrorist threats. Among these capabilities, let me mention two. One is the Island Defence Headquarters and, the second, our Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives (or CBRE) units. It is important to know that both these units are not new creations. We did not create them after September 11, 2001. Both have been in existence or development for some two decades. The possibility of low-intensity, unconventional attack was one which we never dismissed and, hence, we prepared for it. We made contingencies to deal with them. When the threat of catastrophic terrorism reared its ugly head in 2001, we were able to build on the existing Island Defence Headquarters, augment it with certain capabilities, and stand it up quickly as a 24/7 headquarters. We had started building up our CBRE capability in the late 1980s - almost 20 years ago. This included seeking the expertise of some of Prof. Png's colleagues in NUS so that we painstakingly built up a complete capability with operational units suited to operate in our climatic conditions, backed up by laboratories and experts, and based on a solid scientific foundation. This goes to show how important it is to take a long-term view when it comes to developing our defence capabilities; we cannot afford to wait until a threat is upon us. If we had not built up the ID HQ and CBRE units over a long time span, when September 11, 2001 struck us, we would have been scrambling around trying to get things put into place. And I am not even sure that today, just four or five years later, whether we could say that we were satisfied with what we have when we have just spent three or four years doing it .

Sir, MINDEF is fully conscious of our responsibility to use the money allocated to defence prudently and stringently.

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MINDEF has rigorous checks in our budget process. Acquisition programmes are carefully scrutinised at various levels to determine need, evaluate options, and decide on the most cost-effective solutions.

The rigour and integrity of our system is widely acknowledged by defence analysts. Singapore has acquired a hard-earned reputation as a reference customer. This was why our decision on the RSAF's Fighter Programme was watched so closely around the world. Let me quote a recent observation in the 21st February 2006 issue of Flight Daily News , which says, "Singapore's evaluation was widely praised as being thorough, in-depth and comprehensive." In fact, a number of countries, who are considering fighter purchases, have come to our procurement agency to ask us about the processes by which we went through our evaluation. Another article, in the 23rd February issue of Aviation Week , noted that for the contenders in the current competition to supply the RSAF a trainer aircraft, "a win . . . will be valuable not only in financial terms. Singapore's preference may well go on to influence other prospective customers worldwide." We could not have gained such a reputation if MINDEF did not have the highest standards of prudence and stringency in our expenditure.

Sir, history has no lack of examples of nations which have fallen to aggressors because they were not prepared or not prepared to be prepared. We all know what happened to Kuwait in 1991. Singapore has no buffer. If deterrence should fail and the SAF is called into battle, it cannot afford to fail in its mission. We will not have a second chance. This is what we mean when we say that our defence spending is our insurance policy. We have to maintain a strong defence now so that we will not have to pay a much higher price in the future. At another level, as the Minister

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for Defence and, I am sure, this is true for all Singaporeans, we should make sure that if our soldiers, sailors and airmen ever have to go into battle, they have the best equipment and training that we can provide them.

Sir, Mr Ravindran, Mr Leong Horn Kee, Dr Teo Ho Pin and Mr Sin Boon Ann have asked about the progress of the SAF's transformation efforts. I would like to report that we are well on the way to developing the capabilities of the 3rd Generation SAF. The SAF has been experimenting with new operational concepts, capabilities, technologies and training methods.

As I pointed out last year, transformation is a journey and not a static goal. This ensures that the SAF is always ready to face new challenges and can fight and win the wars of tomorrow, not get stuck in the fighting concepts of past wars. As one set of capabilities is delivered, there will be a spiral development to deliver the next set of capabilities. These are the demands of the modern battlefield as armed forces leverage on technology to enhance their edge over potential adversaries. We are fortunate that MINDEF and the SAF have the science and engineering resources in our Defence organisations and industries; and that more than 80% of each cohort coming into National Service are tech-savvy soldiers with A-level, Polytechnic, or ITE qualifications. Our National Servicemen in our reserve forces are also very well qualified and have no difficulty converting to these new equipment and concepts.

Mr Leong Horn Kee asked about the impact of the reduction in full-time NS to two years, for those who previously had to serve 2 1/2 years. As Members are aware, the transformation of the SAF was the key driver that made this feasible. The two-year NS system has been implemented smoothly since December 2004.

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Incidentally, the drive to a 3G SAF also allows us to reduce the ICT call-ups for our NSmen from 13 years to 10. So, it is not just the full time NSmen; but also our Operationally-Ready NSmen have benefited from it.

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The training of our commanders and for our units has been adjusted to factor in the shorter deployment period of our National Servicemen. Our transformation efforts also mean that more of our National Servicemen will be deployed in positions which are more challenging and make better use of their education and training in utilising the capabilities of the 3G SAF.

Sir, I have sought the Speaker's indulgence, so please allow me now to share with Members a video which illustrates one of the key capabilities of the 3G SAF. This shows the integrated sensor-shooter network which was exercised in two major exercises the SAF conducted just last year in November - Forging Sabre in the Mojave Desert in California, and Wallaby in Shoalwater Bay in Queensland. In these exercises, the SAF linked a series of sensors - manned and unmanned, airborne and ground - to form a tight network to watch over the battlefield.

As you can see, once a sensor detects a target, the information is sent to the HQ in real time. A UAV can track the enemy and relay a continuous stream of target information to the HQ and a network of shooters. The most appropriate shooter is quickly assigned to take out the target, or a suite of shooters can launch a synchronised attack. Fighter aircraft can come in quickly with precision bombs. The Apache attack helicopters, which can detect more than 200 targets with their Longbow radar, can take out many tanks

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rapidly with Hellfire missiles, rockets and guns. The artillery guns will wipe out what remains of the enemy. Multiple sensors can confirm the effects on the enemy forces and the HQ can quickly decide what follow-on strikes are necessary. With information technology and networking, the SAF has brought the sensor-to-shooter cycle down to a matter of minutes.

I will show it to you again so that you can have another look, if you have missed some of it. As you can see, we can find the target by multiple means and we can attack it by multiple means as well. This makes it difficult for the enemy to hide or run. It also makes it difficult for him to counter-attack effectively as there is no single point of vulnerability that he can hit and cripple our systems. In conventional warfare, the commanders are often faced with a dilemma, the trade-off between dispersion and concentration of forces is a key challenge. Networking allows us to disperse our forces so that we are less vulnerable, and yet be able to bring together a concentration of fire, force and effects to deliver a massive blow to the enemy.

You can see that the strength of the 3G SAF is not from superior platform numbers or specific platform capabilities alone. Rather, the strength of the 3G SAF will be multiplied by the ability to network our various systems and capabilities together to achieve a quantum leap in total capability. For example, the way to combat tanks is no longer by fielding more and bigger tanks. These are necessary, but this is not the only way to solve the problem. Our anti-tank capability will comprise a network of unmanned sensors, precision missiles delivered by Apache attack helicopters, smart bombs delivered by fighter aircraft, and armoured forces on the ground. The whole, as the saying goes, will be greater than the sum of the parts. I have distributed a DVD and some MINDEF and SAF publications

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showing Exercise Forging Sabre and Exercise Wallaby to give Members a clearer concept of networked warfare.

Mr Sin Boon Ann asked what the SAF has learned from the US experience in Iraq. First, let me say that the SAF is constantly learning from many other armed forces and not just the Americans. In doing so, we do not merely copy, but apply what we learn to our own circumstances. Technologies will not solve all the problems in the urban environment or, for that matter, any environment. But we will equip our soldiers with technologies that can make a significant difference to their fight in the urban environment.

I have here with me an example of such technologies. This surveillance ball was developed by ST Engineering for fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA). It has embedded sensors, and our soldiers can roll it round a corner or throw it into a room so they can see behind walls. This will improve situational awareness and minimise casualties. 3SIR, our urban operations battalion, is now conducting trials with this FIBUA surveillance ball. The SAF will be fielding more of such technologies to help our soldiers overcome the many complexities of the battlefield.

As the SAF continues its transformation journey, it will continue to maintain a high state of operational readiness. The operational readiness of the SAF may not make headlines everyday. But the SAF is constantly at work quietly behind the scenes - whether conducting regular naval and air patrols in the Malacca Straits, securing major international events like the International Olympic Council meeting, or escorting high value ships through our sealanes.

Sir, the operational readiness of the SAF requires sustained hard work and rigorous training. The training has to be

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rigorous, as pointed out by Mr Ravindran, and it has to be realistic. We have to prepare our servicemen well because military operations are very demanding and victory or defeat hangs in the balance. We also owe it to our servicemen that we prepare them adequately so that they have the ability and confidence to fight, survive and win, should they ever have to go into battle. Training has to be tough and realistic, but it also has to be in strict accordance with safety regulations and safety procedures. There is top-level focus on safety in the SAF, as Mr Tan Soo Khoon has pointed out, and we do expect the highest safety standards from our commanders, all the way down the line. Safety requirements are systematically integrated into all SAF activities, and safety systems and processes are continually being improved. The SAF has also strengthened its safety inspectorates and, in addition to safety officers, formations have been augmented with Formation Safety Warrant Officers who have extensive experience and knowledge of safety and risk management. There are regular safety audits of the units, including surprise audits. The previous work year and the last work year, there were about 1,000 such audits per year. It works out to about 20 such audits by the various groups per week.

High-risk activities are audited more frequently. The results of the audits are reported to the respective Service Chiefs.

Whenever there is an incident, whether or not it involves injury, the safety inspectorate of the particular Service will review what happened and draw lessons, and these lessons are then disseminated to all personnel. The SAF also reviews near-misses as valuable lessons can be drawn from them. We want to develop an open culture where people are encouraged to report near misses and share the lessons. This requires a change in mindset. We are working on that. The SAF is also drawing lessons from the safety practices of other

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established armed forces like the US, UK and Australia.

Ms Irene Ng asked about comparisons with other armed forces. Yes, we do benchmark against them. We compare the systems and the procedures which we have in place against those in other armed forces and we are comparable, if not better than best practices. We are not able to compare data because the basis of collecting the data, the numerators and the denominators are different and there is no standardised basis for this, except for the air force, where air forces use the number of incidents or accidents per 100,000 hours as the norm by which they compare against each other. On that comparative basis, our air force does as well as, if not better than, the air forces of advanced developed countries. Our safety systems are there and in place.

There are two dimensions to safety, both equally important - the system and the individual. We must have rigorous safety systems and processes and there must be strong command emphasis and command responsibility. Our servicemen must also have a high level of safety consciousness and alertness, so that the entire safety chain remains strong and unbroken. We will do our best, but even with the best efforts, it is not possible to entirely eliminate training incidents. However, we must ensure a rigorous system, minimise human errors, and learn from the mistakes and not repeat them and reduce to an absolute minimum and eliminate, if possible, such incidents.

Sir, Mr Tan Soo Khoon and Dr Ong Chit Chung asked about the training deaths last year. There were four training incidents last year that resulted in fatalities. In the first incident in June 2005, a regular serviceman in training for the Special Operations Force drowned during maritime counter-terrorism training.

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This is very demanding training to carry out the extremely difficult mission of approaching a ship which may be in the open sea, and then taking it over, by force if necessary, with minimum casualties to any hostages. Only specially selected regular troopers who volunteer for this Force undergo such training and they are rigorously prepared in a step-by-step progressive training in order that they may be able to conduct such a mission. It is a very, very demanding mission. These are things which ordinary human beings do not do and these are very special men and, Sir, I am certainly and deeply grateful, and the nation should be deeply grateful that there are Singaporeans who are prepared to volunteer for such missions and to put their lives on the line at any time, 24-hours a day, if they are called upon to undertake a rescue hostage mission.

The Attorney-General's Chambers, after reviewing the facts of the case, the investigation reports by the Police, and the findings of the Coroner's Court, found no legal grounds for proceeding with criminal charges against the four servicemen who were conducting the training. AGC has now referred the matter to MINDEF for possible action under military law. MINDEF will conduct further investigations before we decide on the next course of action. If our investigations show that any of the four servicemen has failed to perform his duties as required, we will take the appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the serviceman under military law.

The second incident in July 2005 involved two servicemen - an SAF serviceman and a foreign serviceman. They were doing helicopter rappelling training when they fell after their ropes disengaged from the rope attachment device on the helicopter. The Police investigation is still in progress. This training has since been resumed after a thorough review has been done and

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improvements were made to the rope attachment device and dispatch procedures.

The other two cases were of two servicemen who collapsed while taking part in runs and subsequently died. The autopsies revealed that these were cases of Sudden Cardiac Death. Our investigations showed that the medical responses in both cases were appropriate and adequate. The SAF has a regime for screening for cardiac risk factors, starting before a serviceman is enlisted. But it is not always possible to detect a heart ailment before a person suffers a heart attack. Over the last five years, there were six cases of Sudden Cardiac Death in the SAF that occurred during training.

Sir, the SAF will continue to strengthen its safety systems and procedures, as well as its safety culture. Even as we proceed with tough and realistic training - as we must, to enhance the SAF's capabilities and operational readiness - MINDEF will continue to make sure that we do so without compromising safety.

On Ms Irene Ng's suggestion to erect a memorial to commemorate servicemen who lost their lives in the line of duty, MINDEF recognises that the servicemen who lose their lives have made the ultimate sacrifice while serving the country. We will consider her suggestion. During the SAF Day Parade on the 1st of July each year, a minute's silence is observed to pay tribute to the servicemen who lost their lives in the course of duty. This is a deeply significant segment of the annual parade. MINDEF believes that this is a meaningful and solemn recognition of SAF servicemen who lost their lives during training.

Sir, technology is critical for the 3G SAF. But the human spirit in any fight is perhaps even more critical. Our soldiers must be well-trained and disciplined, and

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they must have in them the fighting spirit to overcome adversity and defeat the enemy regardless of the conditions or odds. I fully agree with the observation that ultimately it is the people who make the difference - people who are well trained and who have the determination to fight and win.

Singaporeans should be grateful for the commitment and sacrifices of our National Servicemen. They form the backbone of our defence. Our nation is fortunate that Singaporeans understand the need for National Service, and that our NSmen are committed to their duty to the nation and their families give them their support as they do so.

It is only right that we show our appreciation for the efforts and contributions of our NSmen.

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I am, therefore, pleased to inform Members that after careful study of RECORD IV's recommendations, MINDEF has accepted all the recommendations. The recommendations are comprehensive, benefiting all NSmen and recognising their contributions, with a good mix of broad-based initiatives, such as the 40th Anniversary NS Bonus, and targeted initiatives, such as the proposals to recognise our key command and staff appointment holders. Dr Ng Eng Hen will be elaborating on the recommendations.

Sir, security is the very basis of our existence as an independent nation, free to chart our own destiny. Without security, we will not have a firm foundation for the prosperity and social harmony which have made Singapore a good home - the best home - for all Singaporeans. Without a defence force capable of safeguarding our sovereignty and our vital interests, we may well be nothing more than a state subservient to some bigger country or - worse - cease to exist as a nation. Singaporeans understand the need for a

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strong SAF and they are committed - as National Servicemen and the family members who support them - to playing their part in ensuring that the SAF continues to anchor the peace and security we have enjoyed for the last 40 years.

Mr Chiam See Tong (Potong Pasir): Sir, I missed my cut just now.

The Chairman: The Minister has responded to the issues. Can you put it as a clarification? Please do not read your speech.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Yes, a clarification. Sir, some NS trainees are injured and they continue to suffer the injuries, because these injuries cannot be diagnosed. I would like the Minister to clarify whether the following factors caused such a situation: (1) system pattern; (2) a culture of silence; (3) the MOs are young and inexperienced, and sometimes they are impatient and they treat those who are injured as if they have committed a crime and also treat them as malingerers.

The Chairman: Is that a clarification, Mr Chiam? A clarification is on what the Minister has responded.

Mr Chiam See Tong: As I said just now, I missed my cut. I do not know whether the Minister would like to reply whether they are true or not.

The Chairman: All right. I will leave it to the Minister's discretion.

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Sir, the medical services and doctors in the SAF are like doctors who are in practice anywhere in Singapore. They are well qualified. We have specialists and, if necessary, we call upon the specialist services of the entire medical community in Singapore, both in

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Government hospitals as well as the people in private practice. So, all the doctors - whether they are in the SAF or practising in the private hospitals or the public service - maintain the same oath and commitment to the health and well-being of the patients they treat. So, from that point of view, there is no difference in the treatment of soldiers or civilians.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, can I have another clarification? The doctor is unable to diagnose this problem. And for six months, this soldier suffered and was in pain. Not only that, he had to do heavy duties like carrying heavy jerrycans.

The Chairman: Mr Chiam, put your clarification or question.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, I would like to ask the Minister to clarify.

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Sir, if Mr Chiam has any specific case that he wishes to bring up, I think there is an appropriate way of doing so, and the specific case will be reviewed by the medical officers, as is done routinely in the SAF. I will be happy to do so if he can refer the case to me.

The Chairman: Mr Chiam, one last clarification.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, the Minister has not answered my question. I will put it direct to him. Does the SAF have a radio isotope scan to detect this kind of injury?

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Sir, I am not a doctor and I think Mr Chiam is not one either, but we have doctors in the SAF. We have doctors in the public service and we have doctors in private practice whom we can call upon to assess a soldier when the need arises. Rather than raising the issue here in Parliament, if Mr Chiam has any specific issues - in fact, if anybody has any specific issues - they can raise it

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with the appropriate chain of command in MINDEF. We have, all the time, soldiers who have difficulties here or little problems there and they are reviewed by the medical officers and we will be happy to do so. It is done regularly and all the time.

Sir, I am not sure what issue Mr Chiam is making right now.

Mr Tan Soo Khoon: Sir, with due respect, this is a debate and there is actually no need for a Member just to seek clarification, but he can actually speak.

The Chairman: Yes, if it is related to the topic.

Mr Tan Soo Khoon: May I just seek your indulgence and the Ministers for me to raise a little clarification?

I raised the point about the absence of a medical officer at Changi Naval Base when the incident at sea happened last year. I would like to find out from the Minister whether it is the practice to have doctors on call or on standby at the medical centre. In this case, where the incident was one with high risk, would it not have been prudent to ensure that there was a doctor on standby?

Mr Teo Chee Hean: Certainly, Sir, I agree with Mr Tan that if there is a high-risk activity taking place, there should be a doctor on standby. In fact, if there is a high-risk activity taking place in the field, sometimes we have doctors out there in the field as well. So, I agree with Mr Tan.

National Service

Mr Leong Horn Kee: Sir, I wish to ask the Minister to consider the following:

First, to provide clarity of rules on early disruption from full-time NSF, on NSF deferment and deferment on NSF

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reservist training. Secondly, more specifically, to allow early disruption of up to three months from full-time NSF for servicemen to proceed for their tertiary education.

As MPs, we constantly receive appeals from our residents to assist them in matters concerning NSF deferment and disruption. May I suggest that it will be a great help and very useful all round and to all parties concerned - MINDEF itself, the SAF, the combat units, the servicemen and their families as well as to the MPs - if MINDEF can spell out very clearly the rules concerning deferment and disruption. At the moment, we do not know very much about the rules ourselves.

Sir, I have the impression that such matters are not clearly explained by MINDEF to the servicemen and their families. Otherwise, they would not have a need to refer to their MPs for help. Often, the rules are general and appear to be more like "hit-and-miss" to the servicemen. Therefore, I would like to suggest that MINDEF publish a handbook or at least some form of written explanation or guidelines for reference by servicemen and their families regarding the application for NSF deferment, early disruption and reservist deferment.

Allow me to quote a few examples. For NSF deferment, generally, it is known previously that a young man can be approved for NSF deferment if he could gain entry into a recognised university before he reaches 17 years old. However, I understand that this rule has now been changed some while ago to a lower limit of 16 1/2 years old. This is probably not very well known. And there are constant requests to allow students for NSF deferment if they could gain entry into very prestigious universities like Oxford, Cambridge or Harvard, which may not hold the places for them if they cannot get deferment, since the universities can only hold the places for one

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year. Therefore, if they can get NS deferment, they could save time and can enter such prestigious universities and have a good career after graduation.

Sir, why such hide-and-seek game and guess work for the people? Why not be clear, direct and open about such rules?

Another example is early disruption. I had a resident who appealed very earnestly for two months early disruption for his son to enter a local university. If approval is granted, his son could save 10 months of waiting time. However, MINDEF had disapproved his son's request on the ground of equitability to all other students in his son's cohort who could not gain entry into a local university at the same time as him. But why such a need to be equitable? In the end, why do we make some of our servicemen wait around for 10 months, if we can give them an early disruption of two months?

Sir, I wish the Minister could clarify such matters.

Dr Ong Chit Chung: Sir, National Service has been shortened to two years. This is much welcomed by National Servicemen and their families. I wish to ask MINDEF whether there are any hitches in implementing this two-year policy; in particular, whether it has affected the operational readiness of the SAF.

Sir, does this two-year policy lead to any consequential changes in the granting of deferment or early disruption for further studies? We have come across many such requests and problems at the meet-the-people sessions. I understand that it is now more difficult to get deferment or early disruption.

Sir, I watched the HBO series "Band of Brothers" recently, which vividly portrays

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how a company of paratroopers fought in Europe during World War II - how they bonded together as brothers in arms and how they overcame all odds. This, to my mind, Sir, is what National Service is about. It is the bonding that will stand the test of time. It is this camaraderie that will hold the unit together in times of war and operation. I, therefore, believe this series should be viewed by all National Servicemen and be used as a training tool.

Dr Loo Choon Yong: Sir, I commend the Government for giving the 40th anniversary NS Bonus as well as accepting all the recommendations of RECORD IV. But, from time to time, I also hear people saying that $400 is too little. I agree it is not a very big sum. It cannot be equated to the sweat, blood and tears or the climbing, jumping, crawling, and sometimes, humiliation. But I think it is a great gesture. I think it can never be enough. So people should not look at the numerical value, but this is a token on behalf of the nation to say we thank them and we recognise their efforts. Sir, I hope some National Servicemen out there will understand that it cannot be a decimal equal compensation for all their years in NS. It is meant to be a gesture.

Second, women in NS again. Sir, from time to time, in this House, outside this House, people call for enlisting women into NS. I understand and accept the Minister's explanation in a previous debate. He will use the Enlistment Act only for critical missions.

Can we then have a volunteer corps for women? For instance, we have women in SAF hospital units. We have the Special Constabulary, where women serve as policewomen. I think this will be good because it is a common experience serving the nation, nation building objectives and, of course, bonding with peers - male and female - and it might

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even help us procreate and have more Singaporeans. I wonder whether the Government will look at this with a fresh pair of eyes and see whether there is scope to enable people either in the gap year or working women - professionals and non-professionals - to volunteer for various activities within the Armed Forces or the Police Force, and perhaps, later on, they may even sign on. Let us not forget that many women are taking leadership positions in industry and commerce, and they all become mothers at one time or other. So I think we should look at this issue carefully and we study the situation.

Research and Development

Dr Teo Ho Pin: Sir, in technology-driven and knowledge-based battle field, we must constantly build capabilities to explore technologies to multiply the fighting capabilities of our Armed Forces. Research and development can not only put our Armed Forces into the frontiers of defence technology world wide, but also provide opportunities for our SAF to be more effective and efficient.

Sir, I wish to ask the Ministry the following questions:

(1) What are the key achievements of the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) since its formation in year 2000?

(2) In what ways has DSTA multiplied the fighting capabilities of our SAF? and

(3) Are there plans to commercialise the output of our R&D efforts?

The Second Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen): Sir, let me thank Members - Mr Leong Horn Kee, Dr Ong Chit Chung and Dr Loo Choon Yong - for raising various issues on deferment, disruption, flexibility on call-ups for incamp training and the role of women for full-time

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National Service. MINDEF welcomes this opportunity to clarify our policies.

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As a starting point, there are

clear fundamentals in which we base our policies on these issues. Recently, this House debated the issue of NS defaulters following the Melvyn Tan episode. It was a useful debate because it allowed MINDEF to explain the fundamental basis for National Service. It also caused Singaporeans to examine what right we have to call NS-liable men to service and under what terms do we implement the Enlistment Act. To refresh Members' memories, let me summarise what Minister Teo then articulated. There were three fundamental principles. First, National Service must be for meeting a critical national need of national security and survival. We repeat it, but it should not be largesse. Because we recognise, and Members of this House often say, that NS imposes considerable cost, both to the individuals and the nation. So it is not something that we call upon our Singaporeans to do unless it is for a critical national need of national security and survival. The second and third principles are universality and equity in implementing the liabilities and duties of NSmen. Why universality and equity? Because, otherwise, it is very difficult to impose these liabilities on Singaporeans. These same three principles also govern our approach to issues related to deferment, disruption, flexibility in call-ups and women in NS.

Let me first touch on deferment and explain the basis. For deferments that we have previously allowed - Mr Leong alluded to them - and the recent changes that have been put into place, under the Enlistment Act, any NS-liable male can be called up for NS as soon as he turns 18 years old. There is a reason for this enlistment age. We should be clear that the SAF must be able to maintain and

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project a credible force to achieve the critical need to ensure our security and survival at all times. This is the raison d'etre . And it has to do so with a conscript army because of our small population. In other words, when the button is pushed, who do we depend on? We depend on operationally-ready (OR) NSmen. They form the backbone of our SAF. Therefore, not only do we require them to be trained to be soldiers and leaders within the two years of NSF, they also play a critical role as operationally-ready soldiers during their remaining NS liability. For many, this would mean that they are required to serve up to the age of 30-plus. By enlisting them around 18 years of age, we optimise the ability of the SAF to fulfil its mission with an energetic and able-bodied defence force.

Despite the legislated enlistment age and operational requirements, MINDEF had exercised flexibility in the past by allowing some groups of students to complete their studies before serving their national service full-time (NSF). We were not rigid. MINDEF had granted deferment to those who could start their full-time course of study before the age of 18 for local courses and before 17 1/2 for overseas courses, and this was assuming that such courses would not last more than three or four years. Similarly, pre-enlistees are granted deferment for 'A' level and polytechnic diploma courses if they are below 19 years old as at 1st January of the year of the commencement of the course. Such exceptions are workable if the majority of NS-liable males entered into a few institutions with fixed starting terms. We could predict quite reliably the proportion and number of students that would be deferred. But educational opportunities have expanded exponentially in the past few years. We now have a proliferation of institutions with a variety of modules in Singapore. New compressed integrated courses have

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also been introduced so that students could theoretically start any time within the year. The opportunity to study abroad and at different times of the year have also increased as Singaporeans have become more affluent. Many Singaporeans would be able to start universities or other courses before ages 17 1/2 abroad or 18 locally.

It is, therefore, no longer tenable to grant deferments based on past criteria. MINDEF has therefore decided to get back to basics, rationalise our deferment policy based on operational needs and the primary goal of National Service. This is the starting principle, and it is a fundamental one. In rationalising our policy, it is understood that NS is a sacrifice which may mean that Singaporeans have to defer their university studies till after they have completed National Service. We apply the key principles of universality and equity to ensure that everyone within the same cohort could receive more or less the same treatment in allowing them to attain their educational qualifications. Therefore, MINDEF will only grant deferment for pre-enlistees to gain their basic educational qualifications. Let me define "basic". Basic is 'A' levels, polytechnic diploma, or below. This is reasonable as most of our 18-year-old NS enlistees would either have completed their basic qualification programme or about to complete it. As university degrees are considered high educational qualifications, deferments for university studies will no longer be allowed. This new policy for deferments has been in place from the end of last year.

The vast majority of our enlistees will not be affected by this rationalisation. Our past records showed that under the old previous deferment policy, less than 100 a year were granted deferment for university studies in the past. This was a special 100 in that sense. Moving forward, this will no longer be allowed.

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For those who are affected, what it means is that they have to serve NS like the rest of their peers before going for university studies. This is, indeed, the norm. Even for those who do their pre-university studies overseas, more than 75% of those granted deferment for pre-university studies in the past returned to serve their NS before proceeding to university.

As part of our rationalisation, ITE students will now be able to proceed to undertake a polytechnic diploma course - a basic educational qualification - before enlisting for NS. Even then, we will only allow such deferment if they are below 20 years old as at 1st January of the year of commencement of the course. I know there are many National Service full-time men with ITE qualifications who are already currently serving in the SAF. We will allow early disruption to all those who have completed their BMT to pursue their polytechnic diploma in April 2006 or April 2007, provided that they qualify for the deferment under the new policy.

Let me talk about disruption. Mr Leong, Dr Ong and Dr Loo called for greater flexibility in granting disruption from full-time NS for tertiary studies; in other words, someone is enlisted for National Service and then allow him to disrupt to enter university. I have previously spoken on deferment. Some Members have asked that disruption be granted for all scholarship holders, or for some people who can enter into prestigious universities. Let me clarify that disruptions not only affect the training and operational readiness of the individual but it also impact the unit as a whole, because the army fights as a unit. It will compromise unit standards and its operational readiness. This is especially so because the duration of NS has been reduced to two years. MINDEF therefore allows disruptions only in selected cases, based on the same three principles. First, it must be subject to the operational

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readiness of their units being compromised. For equity, we will allow disruptions for those who are enlisted for NS in later intake batches so that they are able to start university in the same year as their peers, or of the same school cohort who were enlisted earlier.

Let me give some examples so that Members can understand what I am saying. For example, National Servicemen serving full time, belonging to the same 'A' level or polytechnic cohort, are typically enlisted over two intakes. We cannot bring them all over because there is the problem of the flow. So they are typically brought over two intakes, due to capacity constraints at the training schools. 'A' level holders are typically enlisted in December and March intakes - there are basically two intakes - while diploma holders are typically enlisted in the June and September intakes. In each of these cases, MINDEF will allow disruption of up to two months to those who were called up in the later intake so that they could enter university in the same year as those who were enlisted in the earlier intake - the principle of equity.

Allow me to illustrate this with an example because it can get quite confusing. An 'A' level NSF enlisted in December 2005 will complete his two years' NSF liability in December 2007 and will be able to commence his university studies, if he wanted to, say, in February 2008 if he starts, let us say, in an Australian university. But his classmate, who was enlisted in April 2006, will only complete his NS liability in April 2008. In other words, the classmate was enlisted late and his peers now start university in February 2008. For such cases, because it was due to a different call-up date, MINDEF may grant a two-month disruption to pursue his university studies. However, MINDEF does not allow disruption to those who are trying to start an overseas course or a local course one academic year ahead of their male peers

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within the same cohort. This is the very example that Mr Leong brought up.

Mr Leong suggested that we disrupt them to allow them to enter the university. Using the same example, we would not allow disruption for an 'A' level NSF enlisted in December 2005 to start university in September 2007. This would be unfair to his peers of his cohort in Singapore who can only commence their studies in 2008. It is, in fact, untenable because of the expanded choice of universities, both here and locally, where almost all students could find a place to start at some university earlier, and apply for disruption.

As for disruption for scholarship holders, only PSC scholars have been given special consideration for disruption, after serving six to 10 months of NS to do their university studies before returning to complete the remainder of their full-time NS. Annually, only about 30 are granted such early disruptions. This is not extended to other scholarship holders as early disruption has a significant impact, and this should be minimised. Such special consideration is only given to PSC scholarship holders as it is an important conduit for bringing key talent into the public service.

Dr Loo asked for greater flexibility with regard to deferment for in-camp training (ICT) for NSmen. There is already a high degree of flexibility and we have granted deferments for those who have just started a new job or getting married during the ICT. But for operational reasons again, such deferments cannot be free for all. Every NSman has a role to play and the unit is affected if he is deferred from in-camp training. There is thus a need to strike a balance between the inconvenience caused to the NSman by the in-camp training and the impact on the unit, if the NSman is granted deferment. The

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commander on the ground is in the best position to make the judgement, and rightly so, because it is the commander who is held accountable for the readiness of his unit. All requests for deferments are therefore decentralised and put up to the unit commanders for consideration.

Dr Loo, as in his perennial wish, also asked women to be called up for NS in non-combat roles. As stated by my Minister before, we currently have no operational need for women conscripts to serve in the defence force. NS, yes, must be for the critical need of security and survival. While National Service can help in national education and character building, these are not sufficient reasons in themselves to call up women for NS. Dr Loo will also be interested to know that, indeed, there are women volunteers in the SAF, as well as in the Civil Defence (CD). There are currently about 5,666 active CD volunteers, out of which 36% are women. So they do serve a useful role and they can volunteer.

Sir, let me now move on to RECORD IV, and I have spoken at length on how MINDEF balances its operational and training requirements. All male Singaporeans are called to serve National Service. Despite many competing demands for their time, our National Servicemen understand the need for NS and have remained committed in fulfilling this duty to the nation. I am therefore happy to note that the Government and MINDEF have accepted all recommendations put forth. We have circulated our report, but I will not go into all the recommendations. I would just highlight the key ones.

As Dr Loo eloquently pointed out, this is not a quid pro quo way of registering our thanks. It is a simple way of saying "thank you" for all their sacrifices and efforts. The key recommendation is to give more to NSmen in the next

surplus-sharing exercise. This additional sum is

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called the 40th Anniversary Bonus and is part of the Progress Package. The Prime Minister announced details of this in his Budget speech. This is a strong recognition of the role our NSmen have played in the defence of Singapore.

5.45 pm

We have also announced acceptance of various other recommendations, and this is the Operationally Ready NS (ORNS) Completion Award, where NSmen who complete their training cycle from 1st January this year will receive a monetary award of $300. The first payment will be made in April 2007. Thereafter, MINDEF will give this award on an annual basis to those who complete their training cycle in the previous work year.

MINDEF has accepted RECORD's recommendation to relax the MINDEF Notification Centre requirement. Currently, NSmen going overseas for more than 24 hours or less than six months are required to notify MINDEF of their trips. Henceforth, NSmen who have already completed their ORNS training cycle and have been phased into the MINDEF Reserve will now be exempted from this notification, even if they are below the statutory age. MINDEF has also agreed to relax exit control measures for full-time National Servicemen. Currently, NSFs are required to apply for an exit permit when they travel overseas, regardless of the trip duration. With the change, they will be required to apply for exit permits only for overseas trips of three months or more. MINDEF will also improve the convenience of other exit control measures recommended by RECORD, as these changes to exit controls take time to implement. Details will be announced in the next four months or so.

We will also strengthen the Total Defence effort and, as a start, the role of the Advisory Council for Community Relations and Defence (ACCORD) will be

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expanded to engage more Singaporeans in Total Defence.

In the area of recreation, RECORD IV has recommended a SAFRA clubhouse be developed in Jurong to cater to the needs of NSmen living in the west, and this has been accepted. In addition, the committee has also recommended that the existing Toa Payoh Clubhouse be upgraded. By fully accepting all the RECORD IV recommendations, we hope to underscore again the Government's and the people's appreciation of the role of National Servicemen and the contributions they have made. They are the bedrock of our defence, and they remain as critical as ever in the light of the changes in the security environment.

Sir, let me now address the comments raised by Dr Teo Ho Pin on defence research and development. Apart from its key function of acquiring systems to meet the SAF's requirements, the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) undertakes R&D in building protection and developing critical real-time command and control (C2) systems for the SAF. It also manages the defence R&D budget for MINDEF by investing in promising R&D activities with potentially high payoffs for defence in the DSO National Laboratories, our universities, defence industry and other research institutions.

It is the DSO which does the bulk of our front-end defence R&D. It undertakes R&D to sharpen the cutting-edge for our defence in areas such as sensors, electronic warfare, guided weapons, information systems, and chemical and biological defence.

An excellent illustration of how our R&D capabilities have multiplied the fighting capabilities of the SAF is in the development of the Combat Management System (CMS) for our frigates. The ship may have been designed and developed in France, but the CMS, which is the brain

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of the ship, was developed locally by our own defence scientists and engineers from DSTA and DSO. This Combat Management System fuses the information from a myriad of combat sensors, evaluates the threats faced by the ship and matches the appropriate weapons to neutralise any threats. The CMS enables the commander to make superior decisions to deal decisively with operational situations. Without it, the commander would have required a much larger crew, taken much longer to understand the situation and decide on the appropriate response, and thus put the ship and its crew at greater risks. The force-multiplying effects of a system like the CMS is therefore clear. And this explains why we have been able to reduce the ORNS full-time National Service from two-and-a-half to two years.

DSTA also works closely with our defence industry to produce platforms and capabilities to meet the unique requirements of the SAF. Some examples of such successes are the Bionix vehicle, the Primus self-propelled howitzer and the Pegasus Lightweight howitzer.

These products, together with the CMS of our stealth frigates, are some of the examples of high-payoff capabilities which have made possible the transformation of the SAF into 3G SAF. Such capabilities have resulted in sensors and weapon systems which are more effective and better networked, resulting in platforms and combat systems with better survivability, enabling our commanders to have better situation awareness and make better decisions, and our soldiers to enhance their combat effectiveness.

Sir, defence R&D is about building up expertise in our people and building up intellectual capital. It is a long-term investment. Therefore, we have

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committed about 4% of our defence budget to defence R&D and a further 1% to experimentation of new operational concepts.

Dr Teo also asked whether there are plans to commercialise the output of our R&D efforts. Let me just say that the primary purpose is to create knowledge and build up our defence capabilities. While there are dual-use technologies that we have built up and that have commercial potential, we will indeed exploit them. Such examples include a portable biochip system to detect pathogens which was originally developed jointly by DSO and NTU for biodefence, and an intelligent information search and analysis software developed jointly by DSO and a US research institute. A consortium comprising DSO, NUS and two A*STAR institutes have also successfully developed a multi-layer substrate packaging technology that can be commercialised. However, in pursuing such commercial spin-offs, we are mindful that our engineers and scientists must not be distracted from their primary mission of defence R&D.

We, therefore, rely upon our defence industries to produce the commercial spin-offs. Indeed, ST Engineering now earns more revenue from their non-MINDEF work than they do from MINDEF. But ST Engineering would not have the capability to successively win non-defence contracts if not for the core competencies they have built up in developing systems for MINDEF. For example, ST Engineering has made breakthroughs in selling C2 systems to customers in Hong Kong in recent years. Its C2 capabilities grew due to C2 work done for MINDEF.

In summary, we have strong R&D capabilities in DSTA and DSO to ensure that SAF's unique requirements are met. Commercial spin-offs will be generated when there are opportunities.

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Mr Leong Horn Kee: Sir, I would like to seek a clarification from the Minister on this issue of equitability of cohorts.

First, I would like to ask the Minister whether it is correct that MINDEF does allow two months of early disruption, as the Minister has just said that MINDEF does not allow two months of early disruption. But it does allow two months of disruption as a general rule.

Dr Ng Eng Hen: Sorry, "may".

Mr Leong Horn Kee: All right, "may" allow two months of disruption. But in terms of cohort, after the students have left school, they are no more in the same cohort. They actually enter enlistment at different times of the year. So this issue of relating cohort to enlistment period may not be valid. Therefore, why not just have a clarity of rule? As I said earlier, simply allow for two months' disruption, ie, whichever time of the year they are enlisted, and apply from there a two-month disruption, if it is possible, and let the NSmen plan their own careers and education.

Dr Ng Eng Hen: Sir, as I have explained, the rules are very clear. If we allow two months' deferment for NSmen, it would indeed be untenable, because, for example, if half the pre-university cohort who had finished their A-levels were called up in December, two years from then, all of them, that same cohort, would apply for two months' deferment to start university in September, ie, a deferment for the whole cohort. So, indeed, it is untenable. It means shortening NS and it does not make sense.

First of all, I have said that we need to base our deferment policy on a clear reason why we call people up for NS, and this is a strategic reason. This is for a critical need to serve NS. We had allowed disruptions or deferments for selected

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cases where the university landscape more or less had fewer choices and we could control the numbers. But now that the educational landscape is indeed open and students can find choices to start university any time of the year in essence, we have limited it to basic educational qualifications near 18 years, and the starting point is 18 years. In other words, by right, for operational needs, we should call up every one when he turns 18. But we have allowed some flexibility and will continue to allow flexibility, based on the aspects that I have explained earlier.

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong: Sir, I just want to ask about the deferment that is no longer allowed for university education. I am concerned whether this would increase the number of defaulters, especially Singaporean students who are doing their pre-university courses abroad. Can I ask the Minister to study and monitor the situation, especially since we have increased the penalties for defaulters and it might mean that they might not be coming back at all? It would be counter-productive because that will affect our operational readiness.

My second point is on disruption when the Second Minister made a very strong point about equity and universality. May I ask the Minister: why then is an exception being made for PSC scholars? If we want to apply that principle, should it not be applied equally as well?

Dr Ng Eng Hen: Sir, let me first address the point about disruptions. The disruptions for PSC scholars are confined to 30-odd scholarships, and it is a signal that these are key talents, they are limited, and this is a number that can be controlled. We are quite fixed on principles, but neither are we completely inflexible. And, as we have done, we have allowed certain groups a certain latitude, to pursue also other national policies.

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On defaulters, even as we have rationalised our policies on not allowing deferments for universities, I do not want to give an impression that it is a major shift which affects thousands of people. As I have said, from past records, this policy affected only about 75 to 100 people every year. As I have pointed out in my reply, for most students who did their pre-university education overseas, the majority of them actually came back in the past to complete NS here before going to universities overseas. So, I do not want to give the wrong impression when indeed it is not so, ie, that many students who went overseas for pre-university actually did pre-university education overseas before coming back to do NS. In fact, under the old policy, we have only granted deferments for about less than 100 students every year, which now means that this 100, the same numerical number, will have to do their NS first.

Mr Leong Horn Kee: Sir, on this issue of early disruption of two months, we should actually look at it not from the two months' point of view of early disruption, but from the 10 months of waiting time. The servicemen will have to mope around waiting for 10 months for his tertiary education. In the scenario that the Minister has painted, where there may be a whole batch of NSmen who have to ask for two months' early disruption, why not consider that as well?

Dr Ng Eng Hen: Sir, MINDEF recognises that, because certain batches will finish earlier and not synchronised with university timetables, there will be a greater lag before the next starting term. My sense is that the higher education landscape is quite competitive and the institutions will also change their timetables to accommodate.

As Members know, we have foreign universities which are setting up here, and

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some of these universities are used to the southern hemisphere timetable and they may very well decide to start their term in January or February. Singaporeans can do their calculations. Our local universities will be hard-pressed not to compete. So I am quite confident that our universities will adjust to this and also make allowance for students to start earlier.

But that is a different proposition from saying that we should disrupt them early, shrink our NSF from two years to one-and-a-half years, ie, 18 months, because they want to go and study. As we have said, we understand this is a sacrifice, something that we ask our young men to do and, therefore, which was one of the reasons why we said it must be only for a critical need. But it must be applied across-the-board. Otherwise, as I have said, you can easily find a university to start term any time before you finish your NSF liability. The education landscape now offers you that choice. And we cannot grant two months' deferment for this first batch and five months' deferment for a second batch. Then, it will just effectively mean that NSF has been shortened even further.

6.00 pm

The Chairman: Dr Warren Lee, can you take your two cuts together?

Prevention of Long-term Injuries

Dr Warren Lee (Sembawang): Sir, MINDEF has in place impressive programmes to manage military equipment and real estate on a lifecycle basis. Since our servicemen are our greatest asset, I would like to ask the Minister if we have also in place a programme to prevent degenerative joint problems and allow for rapid diagnosis and treatment of problems as they occur. Has MINDEF looked into this, in terms of primary and

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secondary prevention? How effective are these programmes? Besides the very welcomed improvement in servicemen's boots, has there been improvement in personal equipment and methods of training?

We have a system which produces very fit young men for our military service. But as happens worldwide, as people age, degenerative knee problems such as chondromalacia patellae will start to supervene. Others may tear ligaments and cartilages in training and on the playing field. Debussing from three-tonners by jumping down used to be a significant cause for knee injuries, ankle injuries and back injuries. Has this improved?

Sir, early arthroscopic surgery may save the torn meniscus cartilage and prevent later disabilities. But proper rehabilitation means eight weeks of limited mobility and intensive rehabilitative exercises. This represents a loss of valuable manpower and training time. Could we not include simple focused flexibility, agility and strength workouts to strengthen servicemen's knees? Have we looked into, for example, providing knee pads or modify our training regimens to include stretching and strengthening exercises that can prevent injury? Perhaps we can learn from specialised sports, such as skiing, which may not be popular in Singapore. I believe the US Army has tried service research studies looking into these areas and I hope our SAF would do the same.

Preparedness Against Infectious Diseases

Sir, during World War II, losses due to malaria and other preventable diseases among allied forces operating in the China-Burma and India theatre far exceeded the number of casualties inflicted by enemy action. Even in recent times, malaria outbreaks amongst United Kingdom troops in Sierra Leone in 2000 generated attack rates of 10% in certain

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groups. And attack rates in excess of 40% have been reported in the popular media concerning the deployment of US troops in Liberia as recently as 2003.

Sir, the appearance of SARS, bird flu, Nipah virus and virulent dengue epidemics underscores the importance of infectious diseases as it has disruptive influence on modern armies. Even more mundane, food poisoning, chicken pox and flu can cause great disruption to operational readiness. Sir, has the SAF prepared itself for coping with such diseases outbreaks during peacetime and in operations? What are we going to do about this and can we cope?

The Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence (Assoc. Prof. Koo Tsai Kee): Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Defence, I would like to thank Dr Warren Lee for raising these questions on injury prevention and the SAF's preparation against infectious diseases.

Mr Chairman, we fully agree with Dr Warren Lee that manpower resources are scarce and precious for a small military like the SAF. As such, the SAF adopts a multi-pronged approach to minimise training injuries, in other words, we look at the issue on a holistic approach and there are three parts to this holistic approach. The first part is proper categorisation, in other words, medical classification; the second part is progressive training, in other words, we put soldiers in jobs which they are fit, and also we train the fit to be fitter, and those not so fit to become fit for the job; and the third part of this holistic approach is proper equipping, giving them the right tools to do the job. Sir, let me illustrate and elaborate.

First, prior to enlistment, all enlistees undergo thorough medical check-ups to ascertain their medical status and medical history. Enlistees are assigned to different vocations according to their medical

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status. Over the years, Sir, the SAF has continually refined the medical classification process. For example, the category of combat appointments has been further refined to differentiate between combat forces and combat support functions. Over the course of the two-year National Service, if a soldier's medical status changes, for example, like injuries, the SAF will re-assign him accordingly to another appointment that allows him to best contribute to the country.

The second part of the holistic approach to injury prevention is progressive training. For example, enlistees who do not attain a Silver Award in their physical fitness test prior to enlistment will undergo a Physical Training Phase to condition their fitness prior to the start of Basic Military Training. Similarly, Sir, obese soldiers undergo a specially designed BMT programme to cater to their fittest level to minimise injury. This modified BMT package includes progressive training like aqua jogging to condition them before they graduate to more demanding physical programmes.

The third part of the holistic approach to injury prevention is the equipping of our soldiers. The SAF, DSTA and DSO work closely together to develop the systems that meet our soldiers' ergonomic demands. For example, the auto-loader of the new generation artillery guns have alleviated much of the strain on the artillery soldiers. For running shoes and boots, some MPs may recall that we used to only have very limited choices, very poor choices indeed. Nowadays, boots come not only in many different sizes, but also shapes and width to cater to the different needs of our soldiers. The new load-bearing vest is yet another example. It distributes load more evenly to minimise the strain on our soldiers' bodies.

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Beyond all these measures, Sir, the key to injury prevention must include personal responsibility to be physically and mentally fit and healthy. This is both an individual responsibility as well as a command responsibility.

We also have a comprehensive medical system including medical specialists, physiotherapists, exercise and fitness experts and rehabilitative equipment to help our soldiers recover fully and return to their training and duties as soon as possible. With these proactive measures, Sir, I would like to inform Members of Parliament that over the years, the number of soldiers that has to be medically reclassified due to training injury, especially for orthopaedic reasons, has remained stable.

Sir, let me now touch on infectious diseases prevention and management in the SAF. The SAF is constantly working with other domestic international health agencies to monitor any possible outbreaks of infectious diseases.

For disease like Avian flu, the SAF has put in place various levels of response according to the medical threat level. At the baseline, Sir, the SAF has issued directives to all our servicemen on the precautions to adopt for self-protection. The SAF is also closely monitoring the situation in our training areas to minimise the chances of our soldiers being exposed to these risks.

Once an outbreak has been identified, the SAF will implement the necessary active measures to safeguard the health of our servicemen. The SAF has stockpiled anti-viral medications and individual protective equipment. The SAF also has contingency plans to isolate and manage any outbreaks.

Besides safeguarding the health of our servicemen, the SAF also has plans to

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safeguard our operational readiness. Business continuity plans have been formulated to ensure that the MINDEF/SAF chain of command can continue to operate in any outbreak of infectious diseases. Likewise, critical operational units have also developed contingency plans to ensure that any impact on our operational readiness will be minimal.

Sir, the management of any infectious disease outbreaks or pandemic will be a national, if not international effort. To this end, MINDEF and SAF will work very closely with our domestic international counterparts.

Dr Warren Lee: Sir, may I seek clarification from the Senior Parliamentary Secretary? I was actually thinking in terms of lifecycle, ie, the maintenance of our soldiers, and whether the SAF would consider focused research. I know MINDEF has got beautiful new gymnasiums and so on as I read the Pioneer magazine. But could we develop short, sharp, simple, focused strengthening exercises which, I believe, are the preferred way of preventing long-term joint injury? We may actually learn a lot from specialised Olympics sports.

Assoc. Prof. Koo Tsai Kee: Sir, I have visited the DSO and DSTA. Part of their research is to improve the soldier-equipment interface. All the equipment that we either source off the shelf or we develop in-house are ergonomically designed. This helps to lessen the load on the soldier's muscles. At the same time, we build up the soldier's fitness, in other words, we train him to be fit in order to do the job. So with this man-equipment interface, we find that the impact on a soldier, in terms of injury, is very minimal.

Just now, Dr Warren Lee talked about training soldiers on ski machines but we have no ski machines here to minimise impact. Did I hear him correctly?

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Dr Warren Lee: May I clarify? I was not recommending that we all go skiing. What I am saying is that, if you think more laterally and look at the world of professional sports, we may learn lessons from sporting activities because they have developed ways to strengthen and go for peak performance in their athletes. I believe that is the way that we can look at lifecycle performance for our soldiers.

Assoc. Prof. Koo Tsai Kee: Dr Warren Lee talked earlier about the new gymnasiums. In fact, in the latest issue of Pioneer , which was just circulated by the Minister, on page 8, you will find these brighter, better gymnasiums. There are 12 of them, the latest ones, across the SAF camps. There are also the latest gymnasiums in the SAFRA clubs. Some of the machines emulate what Dr Warren Lee has been saying. There is one machine called the multiple movement machine, which allows the machine to simulate different exercise impact on army equipment. For example, this machine can emulate the movement on a soldier on artillery, so that helps him to build up his muscles that he needs to work on the machine. Certainly, the DSTA and DSO will continuously focus their research on how to further improve this man-machine interface. But we have never forgotten that the fitness of a soldier must be built up from the beginning.

Mr Ravindran: Sir, on behalf of all Members who raised various cuts under this amendment, I would like to thank the Minister for Defence, the Second Minister for Defence and the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for their detailed explanations. I would like to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The sum of $9,691,055,520 for Head J ordered to stand part of the Main Estimates.

The sum of $355,000,000 for Head J ordered to stand part of the Development Estimates.