MAS SELAMAT KASTARI

MAS SELAMAT KASTARI:

(Account of escape from detention):

1.:

Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether Mas Selamat Kastari has revealed how he escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC); (b) if so, whether his account is consistent with the findings of the Committee of Inquiry; and (c) if he has also revealed how he managed to leave Singapore and make his way to Malaysia.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Sir, on 21st April 2008, I had given this House a detailed account of the findings of the Committee of Inquiry (COI) that was convened to establish, based on the facts available then, how Mas Selamat Kastari escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC) on 27th February 2008.

Mas Selamat is now back in our custody. He was handed over to ISD by the Malaysian Special Task Force (STF) on 24th September 2010. He was then arrested by ISD under the ISA and an

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Order of Detention for two years has just been issued against him.

There are two primary issues which investigators in this case are pursuing at present. A team of investigators from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has been assigned to question Mas Selamat on his escape from the WRDC. Another team of investigators and analysts from ISD is investigating the case from a security or counter-terrorism angle. This includes both determining the terrorist attack plans that had surfaced in investigations by the Malaysian security agencies and identifying the residual elements of the JI network, whether Singaporeans or others, with whom Mas Selamat had made contact and sought to regroup and collaborate to develop such plans. The CID and ISD teams work in parallel but keep each other apprised of key disclosures or discoveries.

Although the investigations into Mas Selamat's escape from WRDC in 2008 are continuing, to date what Mas Selamat has disclosed has not been very much more than what he has revealed to the Malaysian authorities. This version of his escape from the WRDC is essentially consistent with the findings of the COI which have been reported and made public.

Mas Selamat revealed to investigators that he had observed that there was renovation work going on in the WRDC. There was indeed significant renovation work going on at the WRDC at the time. The renovation work was done in order to enhance old facilities to accommodate and manage the detainees. Mas Selamat also revealed that when he was brought to use a toilet in a renovated and different block from the regular one used in the past for family visits, he noticed that the window to one of the toilet cubicles was not grilled. Members can see the photo displayed on the screens [ Photo A1* displayed ]. On his second visit to the

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toilet, he managed to open the window of this toilet cubicle by turning the lever even though the handle had been sawn off, as Members can see on the screens [ Photo A2 * displayed ].

Noting this critical security weakness, he then actively planned to escape. He began a routine to close the door of that toilet cubicle and turn on the tap in the cubicle on his next visits. He was trying to get the guards used to this routine during his family visits. He also started hanging his pants over the top of the cubicle door, so as to deceive the guards into thinking that if his pants were still hanging over the top of the door, he was still inside the cubicle.

He planned his escape during his family visit on 27th February 2008. On that day, when he was brought out of his cell to a changing room to change into civilian clothes in preparation for his weekly family visit, he did not take off his WRDC uniform but instead put on another two layers of civilian clothing over the uniform – he first put on a dark green baju kurung and dark blue pants, and then a light green baju kurung and grey pants. He claimed that he had put on three layers of clothing.

Mas Selamat was then brought by two Gurkha guards to the Family Visitation Block. He was first taken to the toilet before seeing his family. He went into the specific toilet cubicle which he knew had the unsecured ventilation window. One guard went into the toilet with him and waited outside the cubicle. Another guard waited outside the toilet. Mas Selamat then went through his routine of closing the cubicle door, hanging a pair of pants over the top of the cubicle door, and turning on the tap. He then pushed open the unsecured window and climbed out of the toilet cubicle window, as in the photo displayed on the screens [ Photo A3*

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displayed ]. He said that he threw two packets of toilet rolls that were in the cubicle out of the window to cushion his landing.

When he was standing outside the toilet, he observed that the fences to the left and in front of him were too high to scale. He made his way to the right hand side and came to a slope where two fences met. Members can see the photo [ Photo A4* displayed ]. One of the fences had a roof next to it; he climbed the fence and threw one of the packets of toilet rolls onto the roof, before climbing onto the roof. He made his way to the edge of the roof and threw the bag of toilet rolls onto the grass on the external side of the fence to cushion his landing, then jumped off the roof over the fence and landed on the grass outside of the WRDC. Having escaped from the WRDC, he headed into the forested area. Mas Selamat said that while he was in the forested area, he took off the light green baju kurung and threw it on the ground, as the guards had seen him in that garb and he did not want to be recognised or detected.

These disclosures were generally consistent with the findings of the COI which enquired into how Mas Selamat escaped from the WRDC. As to how he eventually escaped from Singapore to Malaysia, this is something which the current investigations are looking into. In this connection, Mas Selamat has not given a completely reliable account of how he evaded detection while a manhunt was launched to find him and how he made his way to Malaysia. As this is the part of his escape which is still under active investigation, I am not able to share any details at this stage other than to say that the investigators are not closing any option. The CID and ISD investigators are not taking anything for granted in this case. They will keep an open mind and persist.

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Sir, when Mas Selamat escaped, ISD officers never gave up and did not rest until they managed to track him down to where he was hiding in Malaysia. Likewise, I am confident that our officers will continue to persevere in what has been a difficult and challenging investigation. Underestimating Mas Selamat and the resilience of JI sympathisers and elements would be most dangerous folly. Indeed, it is people like Mas Selamat who underscore how persistently real the threat of terrorism continues to be for Singapore and Singaporeans.

*Cols. 1435-1436; 1437-1438; 1439-1440; 1441-1442.

Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): Thank you, Deputy Prime Minister for confirming that the manner which he escaped from WRDC is largely consistent with the COI findings. I would like to ask supplementary questions on MHA's assessment of his threat level to Singapore presently. Now that Mas Selamat has been detained, is the terrorism threat lower and is Singapore safer for it? Secondly, is there a greater threat, for example, a revenge attack posed by his network outside of WRDC? Thirdly, I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister what is MHA's present assessment of Mas Selamat's threat level to Singapore and how does this compare with MHA's assessment before his escape from WRDC?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: I thank Mr Christopher de Souza for asking those questions. In our assessment, the threat posed by Mas Selamat remains consistent following the operation against the JI in 2001. Mas Selamat was determined to retaliate and plan attacks against Singapore even while he was on the run. Having been trained in Afghanistan, he has the operational competencies to stage a terrorist attack, if given time and opportunity. His determination to do so remains unchanged. This is why Mas Selamat has to be held in preventive detention.

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Is the threat lower now and is Singapore safer now? Sir, holding Mas Selamat in preventive detention means that there is just one threat less. But there are others out there in the region, in Indonesia, for example. The Indonesian security forces have, over the years, killed major terrorist figures, like Azahari Husin, Noordin Mohammad Top and Dulmatin. But this has not put a stop to terrorism-related activities there. The ongoing counter-terrorism operations in Indonesia bear this out.

Sir, Singapore's security cannot be divorced from the security situation in our region and beyond. We are an open economy and society. The reality is that the current terrorist threat has proven to be a resilient one. Terrorist elements have adapted and evolved their organisation and network even as the security actions by the States are stepped up against them. So the threat remains real and significant.

What about the threat of his network? Sir, with Mas Selamat in custody, as I said earlier, there is just one person less in the leadership element circulating in the network. But Singapore has been and will continue to remain a target in the eyes of the terrorist network. The continuing discoveries of new plots and the disruptions by the security forces in the region tell us that the terrorist network is very much alive and resilient. The threats posed by the network therefore remains real and significant.

Mr Hri Kumar Nair (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Mr Speaker, I would like some clarifications from the Minister on the details of his escape. While I accept the investigations are not complete, have the authorities determined whether Mas Selamat was aided by others in his escape? If so, how was he able to communicate with them while in detention?

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Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, as I said earlier, the investigators are keeping an open mind and they will pursue all angles. But the investigations are indeed still ongoing and not complete. As such, I am not able to comment further on whether he was aided in any way by anyone in this escape. Even during the investigation into his escape in 2008, the investigators did not rule out the possibility that Mas Selamat could have received help from inside or outside the WRDC. But at this stage, it is premature for us to jump to conclusions.

Mr Low Thia Khiang (Hougang): Sir, I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister whether Mas Selamat is likely to escape again. Secondly, what has ISD learnt from the last episode of this escape?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Mr Low asked whether Mas Selamat is likely to escape again. As I said, after the COI had completed its findings and which I reported in this House, that the COI made many recommendations, including enhancing the security of WRDC. Over the last two years, this is what the WRDC has done. The ISD has taken a great interest and definitely has looked into the various possibilities that any detainee, not just Mas Selamat, could escape from the WRDC.

Besides the tighter procedural measures that were immediately implemented after the escape, significant physical security works were also carried out to address the key infrastructural weaknesses that directly contributed to the escape. So the weaknesses that I have just told Members about and which the COI found in 2008 – all those weaknesses have been resolved and they have been tightened. The protection of WRDC has also been strengthened. Both the security procedures as well as infrastructural measures have been audited by the Prisons Department. That was what the COI had also

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recommended after the findings in March 2008. There are also annual inspections by the Prisons Department. A revised regime for detainees has also been implemented. The detainees are now classified into three different risk categories, depending on the level of risk that they pose. Based on the categories of risk set by ISD, detainees are given different privileges and security assessment.

Mas Selamat is now placed on the highest category, which is the red category. Being a red category detainee, his movement will be closely observed and he is heavily shackled whenever he needs to be moved out of the cell. For him, we have a larger Gurkha guard escort team to ensure that whatever acts that he plans to have will not succeed. At the same time, as recommended by the COI, ISD has also planned to have a new purpose-built detention centre in the Changi Prison. The planning is now ongoing and we hope to complete the centre in four to five years' time.

Mr Christopher de Souza: Thank you, Deputy Prime Minister for giving us the assessment of the threat level of Mas Selamat. I would like to ask supplementary questions in relation to his escape to Malaysia. How was Mas Selamat able to leave Singapore when security had been tightened at the border controls, such as the Customs? If investigations are still ongoing, would the Deputy Prime Minister disclose to the House how he managed to get across to Malaysia when investigations are in fact concluded?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I will answer the second question first. Yes, we intend to share our findings when the investigations can conclusively determine how he had escaped to Malaysia and if it does not comprise our operational security. At this stage, I am not able to say when the investigation will complete. The duration will be determined by several

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factors, including how cooperative Mas Selamat is and the veracity of his disclosures.

Sir, as to the question of how Mas Selamat could have escaped to Malaysia, this is a matter still being investigated by the ISD as well as by CID. But we know that after his escape, we have deployed all available resources to check the various parts of Singapore, including our coast lines as well as the exit and entry points into Singapore. We have also received help from the SAF. But as we know, Singapore is an island. It is not possible to seal off every entry or exit point, whether these are ICA checkpoints or our shores. As we have seen from the examples of illegal immigrants who have managed to enter or leave Singapore and whom we have detected and arrested, it is quite possible that people could also leave or enter Singapore undetected.

Just within the last one week, the Police and ICA have managed to detect quite a few cases of illegal immigrants trying to come into Singapore. There were two cases of illegal immigrants trying to swim into Singapore. They are separate cases. There was also a case of two illegal immigrants hiding in a car boot, trying to leave Singapore.

There was also a case of a speed boat coming in from Malaysia and trying to offload a few illegal immigrants. Fortunately, in these few cases, the Police Coast Guard (PCG) as well ICA detected them and arrested the illegal immigrants. But, as I said, there are so many other possibilities that they could come in and there could also be many possibilities that we could have missed and they have entered or left Singapore.