MALFUNCTION OF SINGAPORE FLYER

MALFUNCTION OF SINGAPORE FLYER

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(Safety measures): **

16.

Dr Fatimah Lateef asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs in view of the recent malfunction of the Singapore Flyer (a) which agency/department provided safety clearance for the Singapore Flyer to commence service in February 2008; (b) what was the time lag for activation of the rescue department, SCDF and the police; (c) whether there was any communications delay; and (d) what will be the course of action taken to ensure future safety.

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17.

Mdm Cynthia Phua asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) what safety processes and requirements did the Singapore Flyer operator have to comply with before they were granted a licence to operate; (b) why a manual cranking installation is not required to be installed at the Flyer; and (c) at what point in any incident is the operator required to call in the Singapore Civil Defence Force.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: The Singapore Flyer is required to obtain a Public Entertainments Licence under the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act from the Police. This Act ensures that commercial operators who provide public entertainment are responsible for and have in place measures to safeguard public safety and prevent indecent, offensive or improper activities from taking place on their premises. In February 2008, the Licensing Officer issued a licence to the Singapore Flyer to operate.

Apart from obtaining a Fire Safety Certificate from the Singapore Civil Defence Force and a Temporary Occupation Permit from the Building and Construction Authority, the Licensing Officer also required that the Singapore Flyer be certified to have met relevant technical and safety standards. Certification of safety for public use is done by a Conformity Assessment Body, or CAB for short, composed of foreign technical experts recommended by SPRING Singapore, as there is no such technical expertise in Singapore. This approach is to ensure that an independent and objective body provides sound assessment on safety standards that the Singapore Flyer has implemented. This is similar

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to the regulatory regimes in Germany and the UK where CABs and third party assessment bodies are also used to certify the safety of amusement rides.

CAB based its assessment on a safety standard known as the EN13814 Standard which is widely used in Europe. CAB's technical experts are from the company TUV-SUD, an established German company which is a leading global provider of technical services. The safety standard covers the workmanship of the essential steel and machine components of the Singapore Flyer, and the operational safety performance of the Flyer, such as the adequacy of the locking device on the cabin doors, normal and emergency operations, and braking mechanism.

Mdm Cynthia Phua asked why a manual cranking device was not required to be installed on the Singapore Flyer. As we understand from the management of the Singapore Flyer, such a manual system was not made part of its design given the size of the wheel. The Singapore Flyer is the largest of its kind in the world today and its design was approved in accordance with international standards.

As a contingency, the Flyer put in place a back-up system to operate the wheel in an emergency. The back-up system kicked in and enabled the wheel to resume operation on three previous occasions namely on 4th December, 11th July and 18th June 2008, when the Flyer stopped for an hour on each occasion. However, if everything fails, the Flyer management has contracted a professional body to conduct a physical passenger evacuation protocol. This was tested and exercised by the Flyer.

In the incident on 23rd December 2008, a fire broke out at about 4.50 pm in the Flyer's control room. The fire caused extensive damage to the equipment in the room. This caused the Flyer to stop. Its back-up system also failed as its equipment was also damaged by the fire. This is a scenario that the Flyer management and engineers had not anticipated before.

The Singapore Flyer management then activated its emergency protocol which involves bringing in the Flyer's vendor engineers and putting the vendor rescue team on standby. The first priority is to resolve the problem technically so that the Flyer can re-start to allow passengers to evacuate in the usual way. In this instance, the vendor engineers tried to re-start operations but failed.

The Singapore Flyer informed the Police of the Flyer's stoppage at about 5.08 pm. When the Flyer management failed to resolve the technical problem, the management contacted the SCDF and Police for assistance. This was at about 7.25 pm. Police arrived at 7.44 pm while SCDF representatives arrived at the Singapore Flyer at about 7.54 pm. On arrival, the SCDF officers observed that the Flyer management had already activated their evacuation protocol to winch passengers down from the capsules located lowest to the ground level. Two passengers had already been evacuated in this manner. Removal of another batch was ongoing. The SCDF officers then went on stand-by to provide rescue assistance and prepared to take command of the operations. After the second batch of passengers was evacuated, the Flyer's engineers managed to re-start the wheel. The engineers had created an ad hoc by-pass to the control system and managed to re-start three of the six motors of the wheel. This was something the engineers had not tried before.

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The Police and SCDF have completed their investigations into the cause of the incident. We have found no evidence to suggest foul play. The cause of the fire was accidental and due to an electrical malfunction.

The Singapore Flyer has said that it will develop two new independent backup systems which would be located in a completely separate location from the existing control system and which will further strengthen the wheel's ability to rotate. The Singapore Flyer has also said that it will install new emergency supplies such as water and glucose tablets in the capsules.

The Flyer management was reported to have said that they would require time for the backup systems to be put in place and request to reopen only when they are confident that such a situation as occurred on 23rd December 2008 will not happen again. The Police will authorise the reinstatement of the operations when the changes made by the Flyer have been inspected and certified safe by CAB. The certification report would also need to be submitted to Police. The Police will also require to be satisfied that the Flyer has put in place adequate contingency plans, and the Police will work with the relevant technical experts including CAB, SPRING Singapore and SCDF in this respect.

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