SECURITY LAPSES AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

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SECURITY LAPSES AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE: 3.35 pm

Dr Teo Ho Pin (Bukit Panjang): Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore is a safe and secure place. Being one of the cities with the lowest crime rate in the world, Singaporeans and visitors alike feel safe and secure walking around our city at any time of the day. All these do not come about by chance. It is due to the continuing commitment and dedication of the Home Affairs Ministry, its Home Team and their community partners in planning our security system and conducting strict enforcement to make Singapore a safe haven for all.

However, the safe and secure environment in Singapore has also created a false sense of security among Singaporeans; and thus resulted in a certain level of complacency among our staff and officers in the Home Team.

Sir, the recent security lapses, namely, Mas Selamat Kastari's escape; the attempted escape of two detainees from the lock-up facility of the Subordinate Courts; and the passport mix-up incident at Changi Airport, have revealed certain weaknesses in our security system. The lapses have also affected public confidence in our security system; dampened the morale of our Home Team; and dented Singapore's reputation. Although the findings from these security lapses have identified a confluence of factors and human errors as contributing causes, we should not take comfort that our security system is sound.

Sir, security lapses are security lapses. Whether it is due to systemic faults or human errors, the outcomes are the same

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and could have serious consequences. In Mas Selamat's case, we now have one terrorist leader at large, which might pose serious security threats to our country. I am indeed very concerned that the recent security lapses are attributed mainly to human errors.

Sir, very often, systemic failures could be addressed once and for all. But human errors are more challenging to avoid or prevent as it would involve recruiting good people, providing quality training and changing the mindsets of existing staff. The Ministry must seriously look into these aspects to further strengthen and instil greater discipline in our security force.

Sir, a more disturbing phenomenon is the confluence of factors leading to the security lapses. It shows that our lines of defence are not robust and independent. Every security officer at each line of defence thinks that somebody is doing his or her job in the other lines of defence, and thus slips into complacency. This situation is unhealthy and requires urgent attention. We must ensure that all officers at all lines of defence take responsibility and exercise due diligence to carry out their duties professionally. These lines of defence must be regularly "stress tested" to reduce possible breaches.

Sir, I would like to highlight the lessons which we could learn from these security lapses, and urge the Ministry to update the House on the follow-up measures taken after these lapses.

Sir, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are useless if they are not properly carried out by the respective officers at various security positions. First, the officers must understand the rationale behind these SOPs and adhere strictly to the procedures. Second, they must use their common sense and exercise more caution when faced with unusual or

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deviant situations. For example, the detection of a mismatch of fingerprints at the immigration counter should have prompted the immigration officer to conduct a more thorough check of the passenger.

Similarly, the guard who accompanied Mas Selamat to the toilet should have detected that he was taking too long at the urinal and checked on him immediately. Our officers must be trained to stay alert at all times and follow SOPs to avoid security lapses. To stay vigilant at all times requires discipline. I would urge the Ministry to take concrete measures to instil discipline in our Home Team.

Sir, the toilet at the Whitley Road Detention Centre's visitation block is poorly designed. The folding door for the urinal, window without security grilles, failure of CCTV system, and covered linkway linking to the perimeter fence reflected the lack of security design in our facility. Similarly, the design and layout of the Subordinate Courts' lock-up facility allows easy escape from detention. Sir, in view of new and emerging security threats, we should consider setting up a Security Design Audit Team in the Ministry to provide independent checks and balances on the design of both new and existing security facilities. Good design plays a significant role in enhancing our security system and facilities.

Sir, our security system can only be sound if our officers who run the system are well trained to stay vigilant at all times. Top management and commanding officers must be more "hands on" to ensure that ground officers are performing their duties properly. Sir, security work is a 24/7 job. It requires officers to be alert at all times. This can be challenging if the vehicle or human traffic is high, especially in airports, ferry terminals or customs checkpoints. For practical reasons, we

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need to adopt a risk-based approach towards security in certain places such as airports and customs checkpoints. But we can always use appropriate technology and deploy relevant manpower to reduce human errors and security lapses.

Sir, any security system would fail if left unchecked or untested for a long period of time. Therefore, it is crucial that independent security audit checks are carried out frequently to identify potential weaknesses so that remedial actions can be taken.

I would propose that the Ministry consider setting up an overall independent Security Audit Committee to conduct checks and balances frequently on our security system, including the Internal Security Department.

Sir, the recent security lapses have sparked off much debate among Singaporeans, especially on the Internet. Instead of pursuing a blaming game, I would urge all Singaporeans to rally together and play a role in further strengthening the security and safety of Singapore. In these trying times, we need to show our support for the Home Team officers who are guardians of our safety and security. We must learn from these mistakes, and work closely with the Home Team to make Singapore a safer home for all.

Sir, it is impossible to have a 100% safe proof security system. But we can always make sure that our security system works 99% of the time.

3.39 pm

Ms Indranee Rajah (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, Dr Teo Ho Pin has highlighted three areas for improvement. I would like to highlight one more which is

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the need to increase the robustness of the mindset of our security personnel and for them to improve upon, what I would call, an antenna for danger. The Ministry of Home Affairs had indicated that the lapses occurred as a result of human error and security personnel not following procedure. If it was the case of just one incident caused by an error on the part of one individual, there would be less cause for concern. However, what we have seen in recent months is a series of several errors committed by several individuals across three different departments. That seems to me to be an indication of a wider problem. So the deeper question we have to ask is: what were the cause of these errors on the part of these individuals? It seems to me that if we analyse the underlying causes of each of these incidents, it would be seen that there is a common thread that runs through each incident and, that is, that the individual in question all acted on the assumption that nothing would go wrong.

Let us take the Mas Selamat's incident first. The first failure was on the part of the Superintendent of the Detention Centre who thought that sawing off the handle of the ventilation window was sufficient as a security measure to prevent him escape. In the Minister's Report in the COI findings, it was reported that the Superintendent thought that this measure would be adequate because he assumed that the guards would always have sight of the detainee. The second failure though was the failure by the guard to keep Mas Selamat in his line of sight. He allowed Mas Selamat to close the urinal cubicle door. He apparently did this because he assumed that the urinal cubicle was a secure facility and that Mas Selamat could not escape from the Detention Centre. So the Superintendent was lax because he assumed that the guard would do his job and the guard was lax because he assumed that the Superintendent would do his job. Then there is also the question of delay caused

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by hesitation. When the first guard felt that Mas Selamat had taken too long, he referred the matter to a fellow guard. This officer in turn turned to the Special Duty Operative of the STO. She in turn hesitated to break down the toilet door because it was a male toilet, so she referred it to the Assistant Case Officer who eventually took a decision. Throughout the series of hesitations, however, it was indicated that at no time did the guard or the STO become concerned that Mas Selamat was taking too long because he did not think that he might have escaped. So, again, there was another assumption.

Now, the Subordinate Courts' case. In that case, the first failure was on the part of the policeman who obliged when one of the detainees asked for water. The policeman opened the door to give the prisoner a cup of water which was a breach of procedure. No doubt he was trying to be helpful but, again, there appeared to have been a failure to appreciate the potential danger in coming into close proximity to prisoners that way. He assumed that the prisoners would be cooperative and well behaved. And having got out of the cell, the two detainees got out of the building because of a second failure, and this was the failure of the policeman or security officer who did not look up to check the CCTV when the two escapees buzzed for the door to open. He again acted on an assumption – he assumed that whoever was on the other side of the door would be a person who was allowed to come through. Again, the antenna for danger was not up.

In the case of the immigration lapse, Mr Ang, the passenger, cleared all the security checks, he cleared the airline counter, he got past the CISCO officer, he then ran into problems at the ICA counter because he was not able to clear his fingerprint scan at the Immigration Automated Clearance System. The immigration officer then directed him to a

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lane for manual clearance. Once again, the failure here was an assumption rather than asking why the system was rejecting the scan. The immigration officer proceeded on the assumption that the person in front of him was the right person and that the machine must therefore be wrong. He ignored the red flag when it went up.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in the security arena, two factors are of critical importance – the system and the people – and these particular instances were not incidents of the system failure or failure in SOP. It is not about the system. This was about the quality and robustness of the mental attitude of our security personnel. The lack of alertness and sense of danger appears to be a result of living in a society which has been safe and secure for so long and which there has been no major security disaster. In fact, it is the success of very good work done by the Ministry of Home Affairs that, in a sense, has perhaps led to our sense of infallibility and a certain softness and complacency appear to be creeping into our mindset. Ironically, however, it is when our security officers feel most secure that we are the least secure. In order to be effective, our security agencies cannot proceed on the assumption that nothing will go wrong. Instead they should proceed on the assumption that if something can go wrong, it will. This mental robustness is something that needs to be addressed, and quickly. I would urge the Ministry of Home Affairs to look into this aspect.

Mr Speaker: Mr Siew Kum Hong, we have some time. I will give you two minutes.

Mr Siew Kum Hong: Mr Speaker, Sir, we have been repeatedly told that the three security lapses this year were due to human error and that no system can completely eliminate human error. That may be so. But this seems to imply that human error is unavoidable and hence

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inevitable. This is difficult to reconcile with the Government's previous calls to Singaporeans to be ever vigilant because we have to win against the terrorists every time but they only have to win once. The inescapable fact remains that we have had three lapses across three different departments within a short span of four months or so. One would have expected the Home Team to be extra vigilant after the escape of Mas Selamat and that there would at least have been no more human errors in the period immediately following his escape.

As we all know, that was not the case. I dare say Singaporeans' confidence in the Home Team has taken a serious knock.

Sir, I think there is a very legitimate question as to whether three lapses in three different agencies in four months are enough evidence of a wider problem in MHA. The Ministry has consistently focused on individual officers' omissions and how even the best-designed systems are susceptible to human error but has not acknowledged any fault as an organisation. If there are human lapses in different agencies within the Ministry, then there is a valid question as to whether the Ministry itself has done enough to inculcate a culture of zero-tolerance for human errors across the entire Home Team as a whole.

Furthermore, in the month or so since the Changi Airport slip-up, there has, to date, been no apology from MHA to Singaporeans for these lapses. The public would be forgiven for thinking that MHA is in denial, at least publicly. I think an apology is the least that the Ministry could do, and I believe a clear, unreserved, unqualified apology is a necessary first step towards the restoration of public confidence in the Home Team because it demonstrates that the Ministry is squarely confronting the issue. The failure to apologise suggests

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that it is downplaying the seriousness of these incidents and denying responsibility. Unless and until this happens, it would be difficult to expect public confidence in the Home Team to be restored.

Ms Sylvia Lim: Sir, Mas Selamat's escape is an embarrassment and, together with the recent lapses, this has actually led some members of the public to ask whether MHA is breaking down.

However, for each of these breaches, there are many other times when security was successfully provided. The nature of security is such that successful security operations are unnoticed, precisely because nothing eventful happened.

Accordingly, we must not lose our perspective. At the same time, the Government owes a duty to the public to account for these lapses honestly and holistically. What I think is constructive in the long run is to step back and have a thorough review of the increasing demands on MHA, the resources needed and how to ensure that the public interest is protected.

There are three questions which come to mind:

(1) Are these incidents signs that MHA has work overload? I am aware of how heavily deployed the Home Team has been in recent years. Ever since 911, many Home Team officers have been deployed for counter-terrorism activities. While we seek to promote Singapore as a centre for meetings, conventions and exhibitions, every IMF meeting, every F1 Night Race is an added strain. Meanwhile, the public continues to seek police assistance every minute. We can try to leverage on NSmen, reservists or private-sector partners, but there are limitations to this.

(2) The population has expanded to 4.7 million and is expected to breach the

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six-million mark. This will surely strain our social services, including those under the Home Team. We need more police officers, more firefighters, more immigration officers. What has been done to ensure that recruitment is keeping pace with the increased population?

(3) Outsourcing of Home Team functions to auxiliary police and private security companies has become necessary. As jobs become divided and farmed out, coordination of security operations becomes more complex. There will be differences in organisational culture and mindset between a regular Home Team officer, auxiliary police and private-sector guards. Just as we have seen in Mas Selamat's escape, will each person be so focused on their area of work to the detriment of the final outcome? How smooth is the interface between the different agencies and how is this being monitored?

Mr Speaker: Mr Shanmugam. We have about 12 minutes left.

The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Sir, I thank the Members who spoke and gave their views.

When a security lapse occurs, it is natural to ask what and why it happened and what do we do, going forward, to avoid future lapses. These appear to be straight-forward questions. But the answers cannot and should not be simplistic.

I need not go into detail about the recent three cases. Ms Rajah and Dr Teo have pointed out that the common thread running through them was a failure to comply with SOPs. We acknowledge that. However, in considering these lapses, we should not oversimplify the issues. If we look at the three cases within their operating contexts, we can see that one type of mistake is not the same as

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another, even if the common thread is persons failing to comply with SOPs.

For example, in the passport misclearance case, the officer’s focus was on security. He rightly conducted a face-to-face clearance when the automated gates failed. Terrorists are known to use real passports and in their own identities. Thus, such an assessment is important in our counter-terrorism security clearance system.

The officer in question is quite experienced. He assessed Mr Ang by examining if Mr Ang fitted a terrorist or security-risk profile; whether he exhibited any suspicious behaviour cues or indicators; whether the passport tendered was tampered or a forgery.

Up to that point, the officer did everything right. The officer, however, made a mistake in not pursuing Mr Ang’s failure to clear the automated gates. He was satisfied that Mr Ang was not a security risk, and assumed that it was just a technical glitch. He will be penalised for that error. But we must also be fair to the officer in question. He exercised most of the security protocols correctly, but made an error in not checking the passport against the boarding pass. To equate this case as the same as that of the Mas Selamat escape would be quite wrong.

Why is this distinction important? I make it not to excuse any mistake or to trivialise one over another. But we need to highlight it because such a distinction is built into the design of all risk-based security systems. Such systems are designed to minimise not just failure but also to mitigate the magnitude of specific failures. This is inherent in any risk-based approach to security. We have to prioritise our resources and focus according to the risks. More resources are focused on high risk, high-consequence areas, and less resources on lower-risk, lower-consequence areas.

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Will there be a misclearance case in future? More than 140 million travellers pass through our checkpoints annually. Five cases of persons carrying the wrong passports are detected every day by ICA officers. Can we guarantee that we will pick up all of these and that there will never be one which we might miss? While the Home Team will certainly work to avoid such an instance, it would be foolhardy and unrealistic to assume this. What we can assure you is that we continuously work to minimise such lapses because we take them seriously. What we can assure you also is that the security system is layered and robust and is structured to minimise serious consequences.

What should be done going forward? We will certainly review lapses and seek to learn from them. We are doing so. Officers who make mistakes or who are liable must be taken to task. But we must also not over-react and be unfair to the officers. We have to ensure that, in our judgment, there will be fairness, a sense of proportion and justice, and adherence to established due processes.

Dr Teo has spoken about the need for more discipline, more audits and more checks. Ms Rajah has made similar points. The question perhaps is really: how much more is enough? We do regularly conduct audits and checks, and they are important and useful. But these audits cannot prevent episodic individual failure to comply with established procedures. In respect of the lapses which have occurred, the systems and processes were found to be sound.

So more checks and more compliance audits may not be the total solution. What we have done in MHA is to develop and implement a programme to test operational effectiveness. Since January

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2007, there is in place a Red Teaming programme with the help of expert external consultants. This programme is designed to evaluate the actual level of competencies, alertness and vigilance of frontline security forces. Such tests help us identify operational blind-spots, weaknesses and the level and quality of vigilance of the frontline officers. The results allow us to then develop appropriate and practical interventions, including special training, for our frontline officers and their supervisors.

But even such tests cannot stop the individual officer opening a gate without looking at his screen, nor can it help to prevent an officer failing to check the passport against the boarding pass. These, as stated earlier, are individual episodic lapses. They are not systemic practices.

Strict compliance or active empowerment?

I agree with Dr Teo and Ms Rajah that ground commanders and supervisors have a responsibility to ensure compliance by frontline officers with established procedures. However, in doing so, we want to also ensure that we do not dis-empower our frontline officers.

Systems and SOPs are inherently dated. They are designed based on known experiences and scenarios. Just as we learn and improve, our adversaries, be they terrorists or criminals, learn and improve all the time as well. Ultimately, when confronted with something new, we depend on the frontline officer to meet such a challenge through his experience, judgment and initiative. How can we do this? One practical approach we have taken is to invest heavily on scenario-based, hands-on, front-liner training at the Home Team Academy. We want our officers to internalise knowledge and understand their SOPs rather than just

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comply blindly. We want them to develop good situational awareness and to cultivate good reflexes and instincts.

There is no 100% security

The reality is that no system can be completely fail-proof, either now or in the future. The aim must be to minimise failures and maximise success but also recognise that there will be failures and no absolute 100% success.

For example, we have a zero-tolerance philosophy for drug abuse and death penalties for drug trafficking. Our drug abuse and trafficking numbers are low, but they are not zero. That does not mean that CNB has failed or that our policy has failed.

In 2007, ICA cleared some 143 million travellers through our land, sea and air checkpoints, or close to 400,000 travellers each day. With stepped-up security measures, ICA detected 37,800 cases of smuggling at the borders and more than 2,200 foreigners who attempted to enter Singapore fraudulently. Yet, we know that despite ICA’s best efforts, there will be some illegal immigrants and contraband smuggled into Singapore. To expect otherwise is completely unrealistic.

So when Mr Siew Kum Hong makes his points, I think he has got to bear these perspectives in mind and not take all three cases together and lump them together and then say, therefore, there is a serious situation.

Perfection is the ideal to aim for. But imperfection is the reality we have to work with each day. We face security challenges with incomplete, elliptical information of the evolving threat. Even so, we must act and make the best judgment we can. Our officers must not be made to become risk-averse and avoid making judgements for fear of being wrong.

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Is the Home Team over-stretched?

Sir, questions have been raised as to whether the Home Team is over-stretched. The core functions of the Home Team have not changed. But the volume and scope of work have greatly expanded, with increased population, tourist arrivals and more international events which require higher security coverage.

We have a smaller Police force per 100,000 population when compared to Hong Kong and New York. But our crime rate per 100,000 population is lower than Hong Kong’s and three-and-a-half times less than that of New York City’s.

The new security landscape post-911 has raised significant demands on the Home Team. Unlike in the past, Singapore is today a target for terrorist groups.

A fundamental question which MHA is exploring is whether we can continue to operate with the current level of resources. Our Home Team officers at the front line are stretched and strained over a high alert that started since end 2001. The total number of overtime hours ICA ground officers at the checkpoints have to put in every month to cope with the volume of work varies between 23,000 and 28,000 overtime hours.

To consider the impact of this, the Ministry has directed that a human factor study be conducted. The study will look at issues of operational fatigue within the Home Team. The study will also look at resources and manning levels and see if there are sub-optimal areas which need urgent attention.

Look at security in perspective

Security must always be viewed in context. For instance, the Subordinate Courts is a place which the public must

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have free access, given the critical function it plays in the justice system. Any Police lock-up facility within the premises cannot undermine or compromise this function. We can enhance the lock-up security there. But it cannot be at the same level as Changi Prison.

On the ground, security needs to find a balance between efficiency and expediency on the one hand, and effectiveness of security measures on the other. As much as we should maintain our security levels at our checkpoints, we also need to facilitate tourism, trade and social activities across borders.

We need to look at security as always operating in a context where there are competing imperatives of economic, political and social interests. This is not a bad thing. Indeed, a completely security-sealed country is one which will suffocate enterprise and liberty. It is a cure worse than the disease it is trying to prevent.

We need, therefore, to understand that security is not an absolute end. It is always achieved at a trade-off. And risks are always relative, to be managed, and not something we can eradicate completely in any human system operating in a living society. If we over simplify a complex subject like security design and operations, we may create unrealistic expectations of these systems and of the people who will man them. In the end, we only fool ourselves.

The mistakes which have occurred recently cannot be dismissed. We should

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confront them, take ownership and take proper action to deal with them. But let us do so always with a sense of balance and on an informed basis, understanding the context and the complexity of the issues involved.

Let me assure Members of the House that the officers of the Home Team are committed to their work and mission and view the lapses which have occurred seriously. No one is more critical of these lapses than the officers and everyone at Home Team.

Ultimately, we need to look at the generalised outcome of security in terms of the quality of life we have today. The real test of security must be whether there is a sense of safety, whether people can walk about freely and without fear that they would be robbed or assaulted and whether our police force is trusted, and generally free of corruption and nexus with the underworld. On the score-card, whether for crime, drugs or terrorism or for neutralising hazards or even in rehabilitating prisoners to give them a second chance, any objective and honest assessment will conclude that the officers of the Home Team have done a good job compared to their counterparts in other parts of the world, despite the difficult operating environment they face every day.

Resolved,

"That Parliament do now adjourn."

Adjourned accordingly at

Four minutes past Four o'clock pm

to a date to be fixed.