CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON

The Chief Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I have His Excellency's consent to this motion being considered by the Assembly, namely,

That this Assembly approves the stand of its delegation at the Constitutional Conference in London.

"We uphold the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice." The House will remember that humanitarian principle, quoted from the Washington Declaration to which the Prime Minister of England set his hand not so long ago - on the first of February, 1956. We, the people of Singapore, Sir, took this as a good augury of the possible success of our Merdeka Mission with its modest plan for limited freedom. It did not take us long in London, Sir, to learn that to the Colonial Office the Washington Declaration was a quixotic document for external decoration. "Liberate Singapore? Do not be infantile; we need Singapore more than ever now. Freedom? We will give them the freedom to serve our interests." This, as we saw it, was the attitude of the Colonial Office, matured in the tradition of the exploitation of human beings the world over. Whilst the Prime Minister of England seeks the welfare of Britain with humanity, the Colonial Office seeks the welfare of Britain at the expense of humanity.

We went to London, Sir, full of faith in the British people's liberal attitude towards colonial territories. Historically, we recognised the radical and humane difference between the British approach and that of other European imperial powers. We were conscious of the tragedy of the relationship of such imperial powers as France, Holland and Italy with their colonial peoples, tragedies which highlighted the genius of the English people in the past in transforming their colonies into friends and allies. The tradition started, Sir, many decades ago - nine decades ago. I think it was in 1867 when Canada was given self-government, and although until the end of the war that liberal tradition of humanity towards one's colonies was limited to the colonies which were peopled by British stock, nevertheless after the war the statesmanship and humanity of the British people found a government which also liberated such vast Asian territories as India, Burma and Ceylon. By these acts of statesmanship, Britain not only prevented a ghastly holocaust and a dreadful bitterness and antagonism in Asia, but the British people retained for their own welfare, as well as for the welfare of their former colonies, the very valuable friendship and co-operation of these territories.

What is it, Sir, that has brought about a reversal of this intelligent, humane policy - a reversal by this present Government? Why is the British Government going back to the policy of the days of the revolt of the American colonies? Why is Singapore being made an exception? I would say this, Sir: There is a reversal of policy as far as we can see, but it does not apply to Singapore alone. I am under the impression that it is a complete reversal of policy in respect of each and every colony which has any strategic or economic value to the United Kingdom. The action of the British Government now, Sir, is no longer inspired by an understanding of the necessity to make friends of those whom they can no longer keep as slaves. Their actions in respect of colonies now spring from a psychology of fear and hurt pride based on a feeling of weakness. "Many of us are tired of being kicked around," said a member of the British Government, drawing attention to Cyprus, Jordan and Ceylon.

Last night I read another statement, not reported in the local Press, by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary. I read from Time Magazine of 4th June, page 22. Mr Selwyn Lloyd stated at a Tory rally:

"We are an island dependent on our overseas trade and our overseas interests. It is essential that we should retain certain positions of strength at whatever cost."

He specified Cyprus and Aden and Singapore - "at whatever cost".

"We need Singapore now more than ever," said the Secretary of State for the Colonies at a public meeting; and because they believe they need Singapore and because they are tired of being kicked around, their hearts are hardened and they will not see the only fruitful approach is to trust the cooperation of a friendly people within the framework of practical guarantees, that we offered. In their present punch-drunk state, they must insist on overall colonial rule and control by force of arms. The Colonial Office, Sir, repeatedly sought to impress us with the vital importance of Singapore as a defence base for the free world. In the name of the free world, Singapore must remain unfree.

At the conference table, I pointed out, as an honest friend of Britain, the grave dangers involved in the British stand that the people of Singapore cannot be free so long as Britain needs to maintain a base in Singapore. This was not appreciated at the time, Sir. However, there seems to be an awakening to the effect on world opinion, and on the opinion of the people of Singapore, of the British Government's view that the people of Singapore must subserve the military interests of the free world - a live offering to their god of brass - S.E.A.T.O.

In the name of the people of Singapore, Sir, I welcome the news today that our brothers across the Straits have refused to join this organisation which seeks to keep the people of Singapore a subject people in the name of the free world. The realisation, Sir, of the effect that their attitude would have on world opinion has not changed their attitude; it has merely changed their propaganda slant. And now we have speeches by the Prime Minister and others that the breakdown of the constitutional talks was not on the question of external defence powers but for the protection of Singapore's internal security and population.

We note, Sir, that the Australian Prime Minister has hurried to the support of the United Kingdom stand. I would like to make this clear: though the Australian Government has representatives both in London and in Singapore, at no time has it sought to ascertain the views of the Singapore Government on the British proposals nor has it made any effort to obtain information as to our understanding of the facts.

Let me refer, Sir, to just one speech of the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and one of the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr Robert Menzies.

I read from Reuter's report of Sir Anthony Eden's speech at Norwich, dated 1st June, 1956:

"We have massive responsibilities in the island of Singapore, and not least to the ordinary people of Singapore. It is not just a question of defence bases, (please note - "not just a question of defence bases") important though these are to the whole of the free world. The liberty and livelihood of the island's teeming population are very vulnerable. We had to retain some safeguards to deal effectively with an emergency. I believe that many people in Singapore recognise this."

And now, Sir, I read from Reuter's report from Colombo dated 2nd June of a Press conference given by Mr Robert Menzies:

"Asked: Do you think Britain is justified in withholding even a modicum of freedom for Singapore on the question of internal security? Mr Menzies said: 'I do not agree with the implications of the question. The United Kingdom Government has not denied in its proposals authority over internal security. Instead it has put forward a series of proposals under which step by step internal security will become a matter for the local authorities as the local authorities become capable of dealing with it. It has declined. I think properly, to let the whole of internal security be given in one hit because it will be disastrous to the overall security of Singapore.'"

And finally, Sir, I read from Reuter's report from London dated 1st June, 1956, on the White Paper on Singapore's constitutional conference, tabled by the British Government in Parliament. This is how the final paragraph reads:

"A principal reason for the failure of the month-long London talks was Britain's refusal to give the final say in the control of internal security on the island to elected Singapore Ministers after the territory got internal self-government." And so, Sir, we now have the propaganda slant on internal security.

Let us look at what the Rt. Hon. Mr Alan Lennox-Boyd, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, and leader of the British delegation to the constitutional conference, says. Sir, I quote from Hansard, Vol. 552 No. 155, 16th May, 1956, Col. 2017 bottom, and top of Col. 2018 (this was the morning after the breakdown):

"Her Majesty's Government considered it necessary to retain, as a safeguard, the power to make Orders in Council for Singapore; but were willing to limit this power to matters affecting United Kingdom responsibilities for external defence and external affairs. This constitution was refused by the majority of the delegation."

Sir, that seems clear enough. Not one word on internal security, but fortunately there is a lot more, if you will permit me. In Col. 2018, Mr Aneurin Bevan asks:

"Do we understand that what has really happened is that there is a breakdown almost exclusively on the interpretation of where the frontiers lie between Her Majesty's Government's rights in the island and the rights of the local government in internal security, because there appears to be some confusion on this point?"

At Col. 2019, Sir, Mr Lennox-Boyd replies:

"The right hon. Gentleman's interpretation of the causes of the breakdown is not by any means correct. The conference did not break down on the limited field of internal security. It broke down fundamentally on two points. The first was the refusal to recognise that we must have some power in the field reserved to us in Singapore, of external defence primarily, and the wide measure of external affairs, that is, some power other than the power totally to suspend the constitution.

Secondly, it broke down on the fact that we could not accept a constitution for the Defence and Security Council which would put Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in a permanent minority on a body without whose authority we could take no action, save that of the suspension of the constitution, in the fields by agreement reserved for us and for which in our generation and historically we would be held responsible. We would, in fact, have been undertaking responsibility without the power to discharge it."

Still more, Sir. Mr Lennox-Boyd again to Mr Aneurin Bevan, who kept harping on this business - " "Is it not internal security?" At Col. 2020:

". . , the right hon. Gentleman is wrong in harping on internal security."

Now listen to this, Sir.

"Our interest in internal security has been in its implication and involvement in external defence."

"Our interest in internal security is only in so far as it affects external defence." It seems to me that that is clear enough, but I find, Sir, that I have one more quotation in this fascinating unravelling of British propaganda. I refer now, Sir, to Col. 2021 of the same Hansard. We have Mr Geoffrey Lloyd standing up. (You will remember Mr Geoffrey Lloyd, Sir - the Rt. Hon. Mr Geoffrey Lloyd, M.P., and leader of the British Parliamentary Delegation, who came but a few short weeks ago and was our guest.) Mr Geoffrey Lloyd:

"Am I right in understanding my right hon. Friend (that is, Mr Lennox-Boyd) to the effect that the difficulty which has arisen relates entirely to the retention of powers necessary for the carrying out of defence responsibility? If so, those of us who share his very deep desire to reach an agreement with the Singapore delegation will reluctantly conclude that breakdown at this stage is inevitable."

And Mr Lennox-Boyd puts the last nail in his coffin, Sir, when he says:

"Yes, Sir, I can assure my right hon. Friend that his interpretation is absolutely correct."

And what is his interpretation? Will you bear with me? It is "the difficulty which has arisen relates entirely to the retention of powers necessary for the carrying out of defence responsibility."

Now, Sir, it seems impossible, if language is to have any meaning, that there could be any misunderstanding of the stand of the Secretary of State that the constitutional talks broke down on the powers he required for external defence and internal security was merely a side issue and only in so far as it affected external defence, and yet we have the Prime Ministers of England and Australia speaking at radical variance with the Colonial Secretary's stand. What is the truth? And who is indulging in unctuous inaccuracies that seek to mislead decent people? This question is all the more pertinent when we come to consider the correspondence in the next motion passing between me and the Colonial Office, wherein it is clearly indicated that there are only two issues which separate the Secretary of State from me. One is the appointment of a Malayan Governor-General as distinct from a British High Commissioner. And let me make this plain: if we have a Malayan Governor-General, the British would still have the right to appoint a British High Commissioner as their representative; he would still preside on the Defence and Security Council. Your delegation, Sir, has at all times sought - we never gave this up - the appointment of a Malayan Governor-General as a representative of the Queen with the purely decorative functions of the Queen and as a symbolic Head of the State in whom we could coalesce the loyalty of a nascent nation; but the Secretary of State is of the opinion that the time is not ripe for His Excellency Sir Robert Black to walk out of Government House and for a Malayan to walk in. For the Colonial Office, Sir, it is a matter of British prestige in Asian waters.

The second question on which we are at issue - the only other one - is that I want the transfer of Singapore from the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office to another Ministry. I shall deal with this at greater length when we come to the question of the correspondence, but at this stage I think it is important that the people of England consider how, in the name of anything decent, in the name of elementary truth, can it be said that the appointment of a Malayan Governor-General or the transfer of Singapore from the Colonial Office in any way affects internal security or external defence. This is a cry for truth, Sir, and let it not be a cry in the wilderness.

Sir, there is one other matter before I come to the White Paper which I wish to touch upon, and that concerns the repeated statements in the local Press of the disunity amongst your delegation. Sir, disagreements there were - plenty of them - daily, as was natural and to be expected when you remember that the delegation consisted of many, many Parties; but let this he clearly understood: they were never brought out; all those disagreements took place at the private meetings of the delegation and the remarkable thing about your delegation, Sir, is not the disagreements behind the scenes but the almost miraculous unity with which it faced the Colonial Office. We quarrelled like cars and dogs behind the scenes. People threatened people with bashings on the head but when we came to face the Colonial Office, Sir, we were solid. That is something the people of Singapore do not seem to have realised, and surprising though this may sound to those of you who have been subjected to the full barrage of countless tales of disunity, I would like to place on record, with all sincerity, my pride in the way the Singapore delegation faced the Colonial Office and its panoply of experts up to the last day when the Secretary of State terminated the conference.

Sir, it is true that on the first day, the delegation was shaken - so was I - by the statement of the leader of the Liberal-Socialist delegates that his Party sought safeguards on internal security, and I still say for myself that I think the time was ill-chosen, but in fairness, Sir, let us admit that the Liberal-Socialists made their point gently and with moderation and throughout the remainder of the constitutional conference, for days and days, they conducted themselves with dignity and with restraint, honestly seeking to cooperate with us and going a long, long way with us, Sir, I am not speaking - I have no brief for the Liberal-Socialists - of the contemptible conduct of their President who, at the height of the constitutional conference, went round in Singapore saying, "Please, teacher, I can form a Government." I am not speaking of the defeated candidates. Sir,I am speaking of the successful Members who formed part of the delegation in London. They are my political opponents, it is true, but I consider it inherent in political democracy that there should be honest dealing between political opponents and respect for sincerity, even though there is disagreement on policy. On that principle, Sir, in fairness and in view of the attacks to which they have been subjected in the Press and in public, I say that the Liberal-Socialists have been wrongly blamed for the breakdown of the conference. On the contrary, Sir, they gave evidence at the most difficult times of their anxiety to avoid a breakdown by accepting majority decisions without insisting on their right to make reservations at the conference table. Theirs was a creditable performance in what must have been to them an acutely difficult time.

I am conscious, Sir, that there have been persistent reports on the part of the English Press in Singapore to make out that the differences within the delegation caused the breakdown of the conference. This is understandable when we realise that the Singapore English Press does not want freedom from colonial rule for Singapore and consequently it is a matter of policy that everything should be done to heighten the prestige of the Colonial Office and to smear the reputation of the Singapore delegation and any and every Singaporean who may prove to be a strong opponent of the Colonial Office. I would like to repeat, Sir, for the record and for the people of Singapore, who I trust know that they can believe me, that there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the differences within the delegation had no material effect in bringing about the breakdown of the conference. The Colonial Office is solely to blame and is solely responsible for this breakdown in insisting on overall supervision and control of future Singapore governments in the name of external defence and external affairs.

I now come, Sir, to the White Paper which is tabled before you this morning. Although this is a Government Paper, I think it is fair to make it known that the Official Members of the Council of Ministers who were in London did not and would not co-operate in its presentation, nor, since it was a document of the Council of Ministers, was it possible for me to consult the other Members of the delegation on its presentation. In the circumstances, Sir, the appointed Ministers who were in London take full and complete responsibility for this Paper. I wish to make two observations on it. I am informed by my friend and colleague the Chief Secretary that my statement that the British Government had repeatedly refused Singapore the formation of a Singapore battalion, although never challenged in London, is, in fact, inaccurate. He tells me that the Singapore Government - the former one - dropped the question of the formation of a Singapore battalion because of the difficulties and particularly because of the United Kingdom's refusal to agree that we should, out of our own money, pay adequate rates of pay in excess of what they paid. That is a wonderful distinction, Sir, and I hope it will be noted: it is very significant. They never openly refuse, they are merely obstructing. That is the way the Colonial Office works.

Mr Goode: They never.

The Chief Minister: When the Singapore delegation, Sir, pointed out to the British delegation that the overall imperial legislative powers which the British Government sought and which you will find at Annexure I, page 52 of the White Paper, would cover every field of public life, the Secretary of State told us that he was prepared to give us a letter assuring us that he would not exercise those powers unreasonably - the judge as to what was reasonable being, of course, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. We ought to make that clear.

Now, Sir, for the rest of the Paper, perhaps there is nothing new, but let me recapitulate very briefly. You are aware from the tenor of the debate which preceded the departure of the Merdeka Mission that we were deeply anxious to seek with Britain a friendly relationship for the foreseeable future within the framework of human dignity. We therefore asked for political freedom within the Commonwealth and planned to respect British economic and military interests. We were prepared to remain within the sterling area, and because we realised that Britain believes Singapore is of vital and strategic importance to her, we offered an agreement whereby the United Kingdom would have the right, at its discretion, to have such naval, military and air installations in Singapore as it deemed necessary, with powers of administration within the areas of those installations.

The British Government expressed the view that a treaty could be unilaterally denounced, as was threatened in Ceylon and, in the circumstances, we reluctantly agreed that within the Act giving us our new constitution, there should be retained the power to control external defence and foreign affairs other than trade, commerce and cultural relations. Finally, Sir, to meet the British Government's objection that it was all very well to have powers but what about the sanctions, we agreed that Her Majesty's Government should have the right, within the Act giving us our new constitution, to suspend our constitution whenever, in its discretion, it was satisfied that the Singapore Government was dishonouring its obligations to co-operate in the efficacious discharge of its external defence or external affairs obligations, whenever internal security so deteriorated as to affect the efficacy of external defence, and whenever the Singapore Government acted ultra vires. That right to suspend the constitution was not subject to the Defence and Security Council at any time. It was an absolute discretion of Her Majesty's Government. What more, Sir, can a reasonable people give?

We even agreed to a British Chairman of the Defence and Security Council which would advise both Governments on external defence and internal security matters and which would seek to iron out disputes in borderline case.

By conceding this much, Sir, we had gone well beyond our original intentions which we had expressed in this very House during the Merdeka debate, for the retention of these powers in the Act are of so vital a character that they mean that Britain retains ultimate control of our destiny and we had to admit that, in the circumstances, what we were prepared to agree to, although much more than internal self-government, was radically less than Dominion status.

Having pushed us back so far, Sir, the Colonial Office then indicated its complete dissatisfaction with the concessions and under the guise of seeking powers of external defence and foreign affairs - I use those words advisedly "under the guise", by way of pretence of seeking powers of external defence and external affairs - they asked that they should retain over-riding imperial legislative powers to be exercised, not on the recommendation of the Defence and Security Council, as they say in their White Paper, Sir, and say erroneously, but after considering a report of that Council.

Your delegation asked for a definition of "external defence" and "foreign affairs" which the Secretary of State was peppering the conference with, and finally, we got that written definition - a definition at page 52 - which I hope every public-minded citizen will read, because a cursory glance even to a non-lawyer will sufficiently indicate that the powers which they sought - these imperial over-riding powers - cover every aspect of public life. Sir, no government of Singapore could, under these provisions, be free from the constant coercion to comply with the British Government's directions on internal policy if the Singapore Government wanted to survive, and there are times, Sir, when, in order to have important social legislation, one seeks to compromise with one's own conscience and to accept these hateful directions. Under these powers, the Singapore Government would never be free to evolve policies in harmony with the people's wishes but must always be looking over its shoulders, always fearful of the threat of utilisation of these powers, always compromising. By this simple expedient, the British Government hoped to have full control over our political life and to slough off the odium of colonial rule on to the wretched Singapore legislators.

The majority of your delegation, Sir, fearing the dangers of a breakdown of the talks, explored every avenue to make the demands of the British Government acceptable to the people of Singapore. To this end, we stated we were prepared to accept the over-riding powers, if subject to the recommendations of the Defence and Security Council of which the Chairman should be a man appointed by the United Nations. Sir, we argued that since the British Government said. "We need these powers because we need Singapore as a base. We need Singapore as a base because of our international defence obligations;" our answer was, "In that case, why not have as an arbiter a person appointed by this international organisation of which you are a member and which you claim to respect?" That suggestion was rejected out of hand.

There were many efforts behind the scenes, Sir, to seek a possible solution. Many suggestions were made and, as a final offer at the conference table, we agreed that the British Government should have these powers if their exercise were subject to the recommendations of the Defence and Security Council of which the Chairman was a Malayan appointed by the Government of the Federation. This suggestion too, Sir, met with short shrift. I finally offered to accept these powers and a British Chairman of the Defence and Security Council if these powers, but not the right to suspend the constitution, were automatically to terminate in April 1959. Sir, why April 1959? It is because I wanted for the people of Singapore a fixed date. I sought to avoid the agitation which would make for political instability and racial antagonism and if I could say, "People of Singapore, be patient till 1959. There is no need to agitate," they may well have accepted the position, and furthermore, Sir, to the Colonial Office which fears the threat of Communism - as I fear the threat of Communism - surely it would have been adequate to have these powers for three years? Within the next three years democracy would either have taken firm root or it would have withered, and if it withers, Sir, the main responsibility is on the conscience of the Colonial Office - if it has a conscience. No, Sir, they were not prepared to accept April 1959 even though after April 1959 they would still have the right to suspend our constitution.

I can only say this, Sir, that during those last few days, when we were struggling and wriggling to find a way for some sort of an honest constitution, I gained the impression that the British Government and the Colonial Office were no longer really interested in reaching an agreement with us, and the conduct of the Secretary of State on the last Saturday of the conference, when he arrogantly sought to bring the conference to an abrupt termination, but confirmed this view.

We have returned empty-handed to you because we would not put our hand to an agreement which would make of future Singapore governments de facto stooges of His Excellency the Governor alias His Excellency the High Commissioner.

I know there are people in Singapore who are of the view that it would have been better to bring back something than nothing at all - it is better for a hungry man to eat something than to remain starved - but, Sir, I will never offer a hungry man a poisoned cake. It is better to remain hungry. If unadulterated, there were some ingredients of a fine cake in the British offer. But in the package form in which we had to take it or leave it, the constitution offered was a dangerously fraudulent one.

Not only did the British Government seek to retain over-riding imperial legislative powers but they also made it clear that, in their view, the time was not ripe for Sir Robert Black to move out of Government House and for a Malayan to move in. Our anxiety for a Malayan Governor-General, Sir, is not based on any personal considerations. Whatever the difficulties I may have had with His Excellency, I have always found him of the utmost courtesy and if we must have a British Governor or a British High Commissioner - call him what you will - we may as well have Sir Robert Black as any other. Our desire for a Malayan Governor-General, I repeat, is not based on personal considerations but it is to give reality to the change of status of the Colony of Singapore, but if there is only to be a change of name, I, for one, am not interested whether they call Singapore "Colony" or "State", if that means the same thing, and I am not interested in whether they call the Governor "High Commissioner" or "Czar" or "Fuehrer", if that means the same thing.

The Colonial Office also made it clear that, for the foreseeable future, Singapore would remain under the tender care of that dedicated band of men in the Colonial Office who have been matured in the traditions of authoritarian rule over more than 80 million abject subjects.

Since the 15th of May, Sir, when the conference officially ended, I have thought and re-thought over many aspects of it and particularly my repugnance to the over-riding imperial legislative powers and of the British offer as it was ultimately put before us, and I say to you, Sir, to hon. Members here, and to the people of Singapore, that I believe we were absolutely right in refusing a fraudulent constitution which sought to take away with one hand even more than what it gave with the other, because, Sir, it would have retained complete control but at the same time it would have hidden behind the local people, and colonial interference would not have been obvious and the local people would have carried the odium of Colonial Office policies.

I say that it is better to come back empty-handed, Sir, and still have hope that reason and justice and good sense will somehow shortly prevail than to tie the people of Singapore hand and foot for several years to a constitution which they will have learnt to revile. To have accepted this constitution would have dealt a death blow to the concept of democracy which has been gaining ground in Singapore in the past year's rapidly maturing political atmosphere.

Now, Sir, I come to a lighter side. Though the course of the constitutional conference was fraught with frustrations, I would like to pay public thanks for the courtesy and generous hospitality of the Secretary of State and the British Government, as well as the innumerable organisations and individuals, to the Singapore delegation and its individual members, and I know that all members of the delegation, and I hope Members of this House and the people of this country, would wish to be associated with the expression of appreciation for the way in which the Singapore delegation was received by the people and the Government of Britain.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks and that of the delegation to the very able constitutional advisers for their magnificent support and also, Sir, if I may, our sincere thanks to our devoted Secretariat from Singapore.

One last word, Sir, and one which I may expand in the next motion and that is: what of the future? I myself can see no worthwhile prospects except on the road on which we have just met a serious setback. Biased though I may be, I have sought, in all honesty, to assess impartially the true prospects for the welfare of the people of Singapore in the days to come and I repeat that, in my view, our long-term welfare requires close and friendly co-operation with Britain within the Commonwealth's framework. However bitter the ashes of our dead hopes, I say that we must, with Britain, as we are with the Federation, show our wisdom and our strength by patiently keeping the door open against the time when reason and justice and good sense can prevail.

Mr Speaker: This is probably an appropriate time to suspend. I will take the Chair again at 2.30 p.m.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 12.28 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. Sitting resumed at 2.30 p.m.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Consideration of Motion resumed.

Mr Lim Yew Hock: Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to second the motion of the Hon. the Chief Minister and reserve my right to speak at a later stage.

Question proposed.

Mr Lim Ching Siong (Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, the people of Singapore have asked again and again for freedom from colonialism. They sent their delegates to London with a clear mandate. The moderate claims put forward by the delegation on behalf of the people of Singapore were rejected by the British Government. There is no doubt now in the minds of the great majority of the people of Singapore that the blame for the failure of the talks lies with the British Government. What was the basic reason for the failure of the talks? The basic reason was the British Government's determination that the interests of the people of Singapore should always be sacrificed to the needs of Singapore as an imperial fortress. Because of this imperial aim, the British Government refused to grant complete internal self-government to Singapore, including the control of internal security by a democratically elected government of the people of Singapore. They even refused to accept a Malayan Chairman for the proposed Defence and Security Council and thus revealed the insincerity of their assurance that they desired the unity of Singapore and the Federation. They insisted that Her Majesty's Government should have over-riding powers to legislate by Order in Council and to institute Emergency Regulations through the British High Commissioner, affecting wide fields of public life.

In short, what the British Government hoped to do was to take away with one hand what they offered with the other. No self-respecting delegation claiming to represent the true interests of the people of Singapore could have agreed to such conditions. The people of Singapore can be proud of the rejection by the delegation of the offer of the British Government. By and large, the delegation did not let the people down.

The desire of the British Government to preserve Singapore as a fortress even at the cost of denying the people of Singapore their legitimate political aspirations has earned for it the odium of international opinion, and particularly of Asian opinion. This desire is not only against the interests of the people of Singapore but also against the interests of the people of the Federation of Malaya. It is also offensive to the aspirations and policies of our great South East Asian neighbours - the great and peaceful peoples of India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon. These great neighbours of ours strive to create an area of peace and democratic progress in South-East Asia. They are all therefore opposed to the activities of a S.E.A.T.O. base in this part of the world. A fortress of colonialism in Singapore surely runs counter to the policy of the great peoples of India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, which is to secure and extend the area of peace in South East Asia.

Mr Lennox-Boyd says that the Singapore fortress is necessary for the defence of the free world. This is strange, for India does not want it. Indonesia does not want it and neither do Burma and Ceylon want a S.E.A.T.O, base in this part of the world. For whose defence is it wanted? Is it for the defence of Britain? But Britain is 8,000 miles away. At whom will the guns of this fortress be aimed - at India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon? However, even from the military point of view, surely the hydrogen bomb makes Singapore useless as a fort. One hydrogen bomb on Singapore would spread destruction as far as Kuala Lumpur. In any case, of what use can Singapore be to Britain as a fortress when it is faced with a population hostile to colonialism and demanding freedom and democracy?

The whole attitude of the British Government during the talks proved three things. Firstly, it proved the insincerity of its professions to grant genuine freedom and democracy to Singapore. Secondly, by its rejection of a Malayan Chairman for the Defence and Security Council, it proved the insincerity of its repeated assurance and desire to see the unity of Singapore and the Federation. Thirdly, the British Government sought to continue denying the people of Singapore their aspirations by sowing dissension amongst them and by trying to throw the blame for the failure of the talks from themselves to other people. This is sheer hypocrisy which all genuine anti-colonial parties and groups must expose and condemn.

The Rendel Constitution has been proved unworkable and we have this now on the authority of no less a person than our distinguished the Hon. the Chief Minister. In the words of the Report on the All-Party Delegation to London presented to this Assembly, "the Labour Front-Alliance Government, from the moment it took office on the 7th April, 1955, had ample confirmation from experience that the diarchical rule of the Rendel Constitution was quite inadequate for the happy evolution of the people's political aspirations." The impossible nature of the constitution was again revealed during the constitutional crisis of June and July last year. Because of the proved impossibility of the Rendel Constitution, the people of Singapore sent the All-Party Delegation to London to ask for a new constitution which would give self-government to the people of Singapore. We all know now how these modest aspirations of the people of Singapore were treated. In view of this, this Assembly has no other alternative but to approve the stand of its delegation at the constitutional conference and, as a consequence, to condemn the insincere attitude of the British Government which was responsible for the failure of the talks.

This Assembly has also no alternative, if it wants to retain the confidence of the people of Singapore, but to instruct any new government that may be formed under the present constitution that their only justification for existence as a government is the reopening of the constitutional talks without compromising on the important issue of principle on which the talks broke down and towards that end the unity of all genuine anti-colonial parties and groups is vital.

The people of Singapore have taken the breakdown of the talks with great calmness. This is due to the extreme reasonableness and patience of our people, it is also due to their continuing confidence in the leadership of the genuinely anti-colonial parties of Singapore. But the British Government will be making a grave mistake if it takes advantage of the natural reasonableness and patience of our people. The patience of our people is not unlimited.

Mr Goh Chew Chua (Ponggol-Tampenis): Mr Speaker, Sir, when the talks were taking place in London, almost everybody in this country anxiously followed the progress as reported in the local Press. I, too, read my morning papers with great interest and I had hoped that some of the hopes and dreams of our people would be achieved peacefully. I am an old man, probably one of the oldest men in this House, and I had hoped, with thousands of people, that the British Government would be sincere to give us self-government and independence. But the British Government would not give us independence. The British Government just said that because Singapore is a military port and the Parties were not united, so they were not willing to grant us independence. I think that is wrong of the British Government when the people of Singapore want independence. I would say that they just take the people of Singapore as their enemies when all we want is friendship with the British people and the British Government. I think I am now mistaken for having thought that this delegation would succeed when they went to England to ask for Merdeka. The British have no desire or intention to change their old ways. They live too far away to understand Asia.

When I was young, we never thought of colonialism as a bad thing. We just accepted it; but now everybody knows that colonialism is really a bad thing. Even the British are forced to say that colonialism is bad nowadays. The reason why the British do not want to give up Singapore is because the British Government are making so much money in Singapore. They come 8,000 miles away; the climate is not suitable for them; and yet, why do they remain here? It is only to bring out the money from Singapore. So they continue to rule Singapore.

The London talks show us that the British say one thing and do something else. They say all sorts of sweet words to the people and some of them might think that the British are so good. I say that the delegation did a lot in London through the leadership of the Hon. the Chief Minister. I say that all credit is due to him for guarding the interests of our people. Britain wanted to give us something to show the world that she had given up her bad ways, but she wanted to take back as soon as she had given, by wanting over-riding legislative powers.

Sir, this is not the end of our fight. All the young people believe in freedom. They have convinced me that freedom will come and that, despite even an old man like me, freedom will come if we are prepared to work and fight for it. I know they are right; freedom will come. I am prepared to do my share and I ask everyone here to do their bit. Let us stop trying to show each other how good we are. Let us fight the British! They are the enemies of Singapore's freedom! Let us unite and fight on! Merdeka!

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Hear, hear, Merdeka!

Mr Speaker: I have already indicated that slogans, however commendable, will not be allowed in this Chamber.

Mr G. A. P. Sutherland (Nominated): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Hon. the Chief Minister said that he would resign after this sitting and I must congratulate him on a magnificent final, or perhaps I should say semi-final, performance in this House. I am glad Mr Lennox-Boyd could not hear him, though at times I feared he might - the noise was so great, issuing from the Hon. the Chief Minister's lips.

I suppose, Sir, there is some point in having this debate on a subject which, after all, is an endeavour to get the endorsement of the twelve people who stayed at home to the stand made in London. But for my part, I have learned nothing new this morning from the Hon. the Chief Minister's speech. We have all followed closely every phase of the talks. We have read the newspaper comments and we have listened to the Hon. the Chief Minister's broadcast. We have heard it all before.

I would not ordinarily have taken part in this debate but for the fact that I felt that no one else in this Assembly would dare to disagree with the Hon. the Chief Minister on his diatribe of the Colonial Office and, in my opinion, his unseemly criticism of that Office. Today's denunciation was an enlargement of the recent broadcast made by the Hon. the Chief Minister when he said, "The Colonial Office is a thing apart. The very essence of their philosophy is the exploitation of human beings. Theirs is a philosophy of Fascism." I think he went on to say something that no amount of written assurances or promises could make the leopard change his spots. That seemed to me to be a singularly unpleasant sentence.

Well, Sir, I do not believe personally that the Colonial Office is as all-powerful as the Hon. the Chief Minister suggests. I do not believe that it is an exploiter of human beings, nor do I believe for a moment that its policy is Fascist, and I am quite certain that there must be many people in Singapore who think in the same way.

Now, Sir, to my mind, the whole approach of the Merdeka Mission was premature. This is a line I have always pursued and I will still say it. That many non-Europeans think so has also been revealed by the vernacular Press round about the time of the failure of the Merdeka talks. The Hon. the Chief Minister made some reference to the English Press this morning but there was criticism too in the vernacular Press, and if you care to consult the Public Relations Office's translations you will find that this is indeed so.

Round about May the 19th, there were references in the local Press to the Hon. the Chief Minister having spoken of "the agony of the people of Singapore and of the people being stunned at the failure of the Merdeka talks". Well, now, I think, in all sincerity, that is an exaggeration and indeed it would be surprising if it were not, because just before the Hon. the Chief Minister left, he himself made a broadcast in which he warned the people of Singapore that the delegation might not meet with success with the Colonial Office and he said, "If that happens, take it like men." They did.

Sir, one Chinese newspaper on May the 19th - I hope I may introduce these references to the vernacular Press because we have heard so much against the wicked English Press - said:

"it saw the failure of the constitutional talks in London as a matter of course."

Whatever that may mean -

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Do you not know?

Mr Sutherland: I do not read Chinese. This was a translation by the Public Relations Office. It gave three reasons for the inevitability of -

The Chief Minister: What paper is this?

Mr Speaker: Order, please.

Mr Sutherland: I will supply the Hon. the Chief Minister with the name of the paper, Sir, if he would like me to do so.

The Chief Minister: On a point of order, Sir, is a Member permitted to refer to a document without specifying it? He seems to be running away!

Mr Sutherland: I will be very pleased to give the name, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Order, please. The point has been referred to me - whether a Member is correct in referring to a document without specifying it. I think it is proper parliamentary practice that if an hon. Member does refer to a document, he should specify it.

Mr Sutherland: Very good, Sir. The Chung Shing Jit Pao in its editorial on May the 19th. One of the reasons it gave was that the delegation was ill-organised, its Members were dreaming different dreams, and even attacking and running down one another. The second reason was that, in view of the strategic importance of Singapore as an anti-Communist bulwark for the free world, the question of Singapore's independence is not a local issue. Thirdly, the Hon. the Chief Minister failed to realise that he was dealing with an experienced, far-seeing Britain who would never submit to tall talks and threats. In short, the failure of the talks is due to the delegation's lack of political foresight. The newspaper then urged the Party in power to enter into further negotiations with the British Government, which seems to me very sensible advice.

Now, even the Member for Tanjong Pagar (Mr Lee Kuan Yew), whom this conveyed amusement to, and who in the past has always doubted the bona fides of the British Government, according to the Straits Times, when he returned to Singapore, said - of course, the hon. Member is free to correct me if this is not the Straits Times, but I copied it out - "Our failure is only a temporary setback and I do not think anybody, least of all the British Government, believes that this is anything more than a temporary halt." "least of all the British Government !" - that is pretty good, coming from the Member for Tanjong Pagar!

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: We are all reasonable people.

Mr Sutherland: He went on to say:

"They (the British) are ever anxious to open negotiations with one or more groups from Singapore."

And indeed they are, as it says in the final telegram to the Hon. the Chief Minister:

"We are committed unequivocally to leading the people of Singapore to full self-government within the Commonwealth."

The Chief Minister: On what terms?

Mr Sutherland: Now, Sir, you have had your say.

Mr Speaker: Order, please.

Mr Sutherland: Returning to the vernacular Press, Sir - I hope this raises a laugh too - the Tamil Murasu, an Indian newspaper -

Mr Lim Yew Hock: Wrong pronunciation!

Mr Sutherland: I beg your pardon! This paper, also in an editorial at about the same time, said:

"Conditions in Singapore are not suitable for complete self-government. The experience of the people to take over the responsibilities of the administration is very little."

And another one, Sir - I feel like spelling it, but can I pronounce it just as I see it, Sir - the Kerala Bandhu said:

"It could be deduced from the report of the talks that the Colonial Office had acceded to almost all the demands of the delegation. Therefore the failure of the talks can be considered only as a temporary setback.

Singapore should be led by capable leaders who act sensibly and calmly. Experience proves that it is foolish to think of winning over the British lion by furious and childish threats."

Sir, the Hon. the Chief Minister in his broadcast the other evening said that many people wanted his head. I do not want the Chief Minister's head. I would not know what to do with it if I had it, and I do not disagree with him when he said, "The people of Singapore have as much right to human equality as the British people." But he also said that his delegation recognised, however, that "the British people believe that they have strategic interests in Singapore vital to their survival" - yes, and to his and Singapore's survival, too. That is the vital point as I see it. Britain has an inescapable commitment in this territory to see that this island does not fall under Communist domination. We heard today all about Ceylon, India, Burma and Indonesia but we did not hear about the menace to the north. Certain powers are necessary for carrying out defence responsibilities and obviously the British Government, and rightly, in my opinion, is not going to relinquish them lightly.

The Hon. the Chief Minister also said, and the Member for Bukit Timah (Mr Lim Ching Siong) said this afternoon, that Singapore could be destroyed by a hydrogen bomb. I think any schoolboy knows that, but I would remind these gentlemen that a major war was fought in Korea where the Americans had nuclear weapons but did not use them. It does not follow that atomic weapons would be used. The British Government knows as much about atomic weapons as anybody in this House - you can be quite certain about that - but it still believes that it would be dangerous to desert this highly important and strategic fortress - dangerous in the interests of the free peoples of South-East Asia as well as their own.

Sir, in conclusion, the Hon. the Chief Minister is a Malayan and one thing I do not doubt is his sincerity, but when he says that he is right and Mr Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Office, Sir Anthony Eden, Mr Robert Menzies and everybody else are wrong -

The Chief Minister: Not everybody else is wrong.

Mr Sutherland: I beg your pardon. I will just stop at Mr Menzies - are wrong, in spite of his very powerful address - I felt like St. Paul myself, almost I was persuaded - I am not 100 per cent convinced.

The last time I spoke in this House, I said, "I will co-operate fully on whatever decisions were reached in the London talks." In the event, there was no decision and I will certainly not support a motion which is little more than a vote of censure on the Colonial Office of my country.

Mr William Tan (Tiong Bahru): Mr Speaker, Sir, before the arrival of the Singapore delegation in London, the British Press had already assumed an attitude of sarcasm and ridicule as to the aspirations of the All-Party Mission. Public opinion in London was that Singapore is not - yet ready and not strong enough to shoulder the full responsibilities of self-government.

Whilst members of the Liberal-Socialist Party, each and everyone of them, in London were doing their very best to gain the confidence of the Colonial Office, the members of the People's Action Party were doing their very worst to harden the minds in the Colonial Office.

Such untimely and provocative outcries in London - "Drive the white man into the sea! Drive the British into the sea! Asia for the Asians!" - immediately before the opening of the talks had certainly paved the way for the failure of the Merdeka talks. Just ask yourself: would any sane man, seeking a favour, tell his would-be benefactor that he intends to get rid of him soon and yet be crazy enough to expect and to believe that the favour will be granted? So unfortunately for us, even before the talks began, public opinion in London was biased against us. Now, let us come to the point -

Mr Speaker: Order, please. Will the hon. Member address his remarks to the Chair?

Mr William Tan: Now, let us come to the point where the inconsistent and the ill-tempered the Hon. the Chief Minister lost the confidence of his own Ministers and his Coalition colleagues. Blinded by his uncontrollable self-imagined disappointment and rage, the Hon. the Chief Minister could not see his way to accept Britain's offer of what was tantamount to full internal self-government which, in the first place, he had asked for. What over-riding powers Britain asked for was to be tempered by a rider in which Britain would undertake by a written guarantee not to abuse, and Mr Lennox-Boyd had said that. It is beyond the understanding of my Party and the people of Singapore why the Hon. the Chief Minister would insist on throwing away the talks by asking for an imaginary "full loaf". We asked for a full loaf with certain unpalatable ingredients.., but those ingredients are of the Hon. the Chief Minister's own making. He had publicly said that he would cede to Britain foreign affairs and external defence. He now throws away the pot of gold for the gossamer threads of the rainbow. In this, he was ably -

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Who has been teaching him all this?

Mr William Tan: - abetted by the People's Action Party who also previously said that they would be satisfied with a three-quarter loaf - to quote their own words: "as a workable and acceptable constitutional step". Perhaps that turnabout was brought on by Britain's acceptance in principle of Singapore's citizenship proposals. Under this agreement, which is now lost to us for the time being, a citizenship status would have been created for Singapore which would be the equal of that enjoyed by other members of the Commonwealth. The granting of a rightful place in Singapore for all aliens who take an oath of allegiance to this country would mean a tremendous increase in the number of electors capable of thinking for themselves. Maybe the People's Action Party are afraid of the country having a preponderance of thinking people on the rolls. Afterthoughts are often terrifying and we now can see the fears of those bent on playing to the gallery. I repeat what I have said on my return from London: I do not blame the Colonial Office for the breakdown of the Merdeka talks. I am sure the House knows by now where the blame rightly falls.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Mr Speaker, Sir, this sitting reminds me very much of my student days when at the end of the term, in the Students' Union, we wished the retiring President goodbye, wished him well and welcomed the new President. On such an occasion, we like to forget all those personal differences which have divided us and all the other unpleasant difficulties which have often bedevilled our relations in the past term. Well, this is really the end of the term. The session comes to an end and a phase in Singapore's political life comes to an end; and much as I regret the quite impolitic stand taken by the Liberal-Socialist Party, I think it adds that piquant touch of madness which has bedevilled this past year.

Sir, every schoolboy knows - what Mr Sutherland and those who agree with him including, unfortunately, the Member for Tiong Bahru (Mr William Tan) who happens to find himself on the same side as Mr Sutherland knows - why Britain does not want to give up Singapore. I would not myself be so unkind as the Hon. the Chief Minister was to have quoted with relentless vindictiveness every contradictory statement made by high-ranking British Ministers and even more high-ranking Commonwealth statesmen. But one thing sticks out a mile, and that is that the Britain we went to negotiate with in April this year was a Britain which was in no mood for dynamic and imaginative colonial policies. After the slap in the face from Jordan, when they kicked out the Chief of the Arab Legion, after the outburst in Nicosia airfield the day following a statement from a high-ranking British official that they could hold Cyprus, whether the people of Cyprus were friendly or unfriendly, and after the failure of British policy in Ceylon by the Left Wing election success - of course, the Prime Minister is now being invited to Chequers because he wants to drive the British bases into the sea - we arrived, as the Member for Tiong Bahru (Mr William Tan) had said, to face a hostile English Press. I have made a collection of these little articles and stories meant for British consumption and, at some suitable date, I think the people of Singapore should be told that what their statesmen and visiting dignitaries tell us is not what the people in England are being told.

As we flew into London Airport, I was reading the Daily Mail, and the editorial, I think, struck the keynote to the talks. On the front page it said: "We own Singapore. Let us have none of this nonsense of self-government. Here is a territory which, unlike any other colonial territory, we bought and we developed. Who are these little men who now come and say that they want the country from us? They are immigrants. They came here after Britain bought the place and we bought it for ever." That was the keynote of British public opinion.

We are always a reasonable people, particularly when we want to negotiate. Whatever may have been the failings of my Party, I think nobody can say that during the course of the talks, the P.A.P. was unreasonable. We were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the agreements arrived at between all the Parties before we left Singapore. So long as the principles agreed upon were maintained, we were prepared to be quite elastic in the forms and ultimate formulae of the final agreement. Far from hardening British opinion, as the Member for Tiong Bahru said, we, and a few Members on the Government side, were the only people who took advantage of the facilities offered by British organisations, such as the Labour Party, the Movement for Colonial Freedom, the Colonial Fabian Bureau, to try and get our point of view across. We did not try to cheat them by saying that we loved them and wanted the British for evermore. What we said to them and what we have already said here was that Asia is Asian, that we want to tie up the loose ends neatly and peacefully. We know that for the time being all we can get is complete internal control, and we want it. We tried to put across the point of view that, although we would do what Ceylon is doing when we became free and independent, it was in the best interests of Britain to allow that to happen peacefully rather than to have it happen violently. I quoted a British professor to the British people - of course, one who was disavowed long ago - who said that there were only two ways for revolutions - one was revolution by violence, and the other was revolution by consent. I exhorted them on innumerable occasions, and I am grateful to the Independent Television Authority for giving us an opportunity to tell the people of Britain that their ultimate interest lies in an Asia which, whilst not subservient, is at least uncommitted in a world clash of ideologies. We failed. We failed because the British Colonial Secretary could not carry his Cabinet, even if he wanted to, and because the Cabinet could not carry Tory public opinion, even if they wanted to, because the Tory Press and the whole climate of British public opinion was hostile. It was a revelation to me. I renewed many old friendships. It was astounding to find the change of political attitudes. On one occasion - and this was a fair barometer of the temper of the British people which we had to face and which the British Government has to pay closer attention to than the temper of the people of Singapore - a contemporary of mine for whom once upon a time I worked in an election, said to me, "Of course, we quite agree that ultimately you ought to be free. But if we get pushed out from all our little footholds all over the world, then we find ourselves more and more helpless without American arms and bases and our policy will be dictated by the Americans. There must come a point of time, and the point has come now, when we must say that we intend to assert ourselves in this world and we intend to stay put." That may not be what Mr Lennox-Boyd said to us across the conference table, but there was nothing which he said across the conference table, particularly after the breakdown of the talks when I tried to pursue the reasons why he had refused our proposal for a Federation Chairman, that contradicts my personal feel of the situation, namely, that Britain was not prepared to go any further with this policy of freeing subject peoples in order that they be friends with her. Britain did not believe it any more, not after Ceylon. Britain was going to make quite sure, whether subject peoples were friendly or unfriendly, that as long as the reality of power was with Britain, she was going to have her way.

It was an experience not easily to be forgotten - to go to these talks with a suave, polished, and a very much upper-upper class gentleman, putting across a very British point of view, extremely polite but extremely ruthless. He told our Chief Minister, and only once, in the crudest possible terms, what he thought of the aspirations of the people of Singapore. Much as I admired the polished sharpness of his barbed sarcasm, I left the conference table on the 15th May determined that one day we shall go back to that conference table and, from a position of strength, re-pay him the courtesies that he rendered us on this last occasion, in as polite and in, I hope, as refined and genteel a manner.

We are grateful for the little hospitalities of life which were accorded us - some of us enjoyed it more than others. In fact, some have not as yet returned from their journeys. A Negro friend of mine in London, who, for the last twenty years, has been meeting colonial delegations, came up to me one day and presented me with a book about a revolution in an African colony and he said, "Of course, you know, the British have been doing this thing for such a long time. They will wrap you up and bathe you in a warm glow of hospitality and hope that in the process you will forget all about the chaps you are coming over to fight for, and you will sign anything after that." I am glad to say that the Singapore delegation, in spite of the very warm glow of hospitality and friendliness and personal courtesies which we all enjoyed, decided that principles were principles, and when it came to the question of whether Britain's interest was paramount or the people of Singapore's interest was paramount, they decided that the interest of the people of Singapore was the last word.

Why did the talks break down? We had gone there and we had said beforehand that we would give up foreign affairs and external defence. I would not have done it that way myself because I never believed that the British people, being some of the most hard-headed businessmen in the world, would take that as a generous opening gambit and reply, "You can have the rest." However, after three weeks of beating about the bush, we came down to brass tacks. What the British really want is to make quite sure that while they allow all the trappings of internal self-government, the reality of power was to be with Britain. From Governor to High Commissioner, the withdrawal of the three ex-officio Members and the Nominated Members, and doubling the number in the Assembly - al1 the velvet glove. In fact, they were even prepared to give us international, cultural and trade relations which, although it might not have allowed us a seat in the United Nations, might at least have allowed us to maintain some sort of consular service. But the reality of power - the last word was to be with their Chairman on the Defence and Security Council. Mr Lennox-Boyd - I have a healthy respect for the gentleman's dialectical skill - put it over to the British public in an extremely simple and effective way. He said, "The people of Singapore had come and said beforehand that they would give us defence and external affairs. If they give us defence and external affairs, we must have the chairmanship of the Defence and Security Council. This is eminently reasonable, and the people of Singapore or the delegation were eminently unreasonable in refusing us the chairmanship of the Defence and Security Council. Therefore the talks broke down."

Sir, on the point the talks broke down on the 15th of May this year, I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that the final decision, to stand firm on our proposal of a Malayan Chairman, was right. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since that evening. The Hon. the Chief Minister will forgive me if, in what is after all an end of term sitting, I were to recall the evening at the Independent Television Authority when he and I both sloshed up Mr Alan Lennox-Boyd. I must say that the asperity of his tone then was completely unadulterated by any thought of trying somehow or the other to retrieve the position for the British. He stated our stand then and he stated it in more picturesque language than I ever can - "Christmas pudding and arsenic sauce" - and as we went down the lift, he turned around to me and asked me, "We did right, did we not?" I said to him then and I say to him now, "We did right. We could not have done otherwise." However much we may have wanted to settle, the moment we found ourselves in that corner where Britain said, "You have three representatives on the Defence and Security Council and I have three. Then I have the Chairman and the Chairman with a decisive vote. The Council can then recommend to me in London that certain laws and Ordinances are necessary and I can promulgate them", then we are already in a position where compromise would mean surrender.

I do not think anybody who really sits down to weigh up the political future would doubt that, on the whole, the conference was not a failure. It was not a waste of time because it brought out the issues into sharper and more immediate conflict than any correspondence would have done. When we faced each other across the table, despite all the gentility of good breeding and good manners, we came down to rock bottom, namely, the desire of the British people as interpreted by the Tory Government to maintain -

The Chief Minister: The Colonial Office.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Colonial Office? I make no distinction, Sir. Perhaps there is, but to my mind, the British Government runs the Colonial Office, the British Government runs the whole of Government. The Cabinet accepted responsibility for this particular step because they were convinced that their duty to this generation and succeeding generations of Britishers, let alone these natives in far away Singapore, was to see that Britain did not throw her possessions away. "Look at Ceylon. We were kind to them. We gave them freedom. They never had to organise any E.O.K.A, or 'Join Greece' organisation and the silly cussed little brown men threw out all their friendly leaders and put in a lot of silly people who wear this curious outfit instead of wearing striped trousers and tails and come round to tell us that they want to kick us out of Trincomalee. We then have to invite them to come to Chequers as we need them. And we are not sure yet that when they come to Chequers they will be reasonable because even before they leave Colombo they say that they are only going to talk about the procedure of how to get us out of Ceylon." Basically, that was the attitude of the British Government. I agree with the Hon. the Chief Minister that, whatever the many differences within the delegation, they were all within the confines of our delegation. Even if we had the most absolute unanimity we still would have failed. There was no escape, in the end, from the irresistible conclusion that Britain had decided that from now onwards, at least as long as this present Government is in power, she was going to stand firm on British rights. To suggest, as the Member for Tiong Bahru (Mr William Tan) suggested, that if we were only a bit more friendly we might have got somewhere, is wishful thinking. However friendly we could have been, and however polite and accommodating, British policy had already hardened before we arrived in London.

Sir, what was the thing which made the Federation talks more successful than the Singapore talks? I have never really believed that sweet words and reasonableness alone would get us freedom. I have always believed that the British are a reasonable, practical people and that they take a certain course of action because, for the time being, it is the best course that they can take. When confronted with two unpleasant alternatives, they have the knack of choosing the less unpleasant one. In the Federation they were faced, when the Tunku and his delegation went there, with the unpleasant alternative of saying "No" to a mass movement which was basically non-Communist, and running the risk of having that non-Communist movement coalesce with the Communist movement, which would have been fatal for Britain. Faced with that alternative, the British said to the Tunku and his delegates, "You can have Merdeka by August 1957, if possible." If August 1957 comes and it is not possible and that massive nationalist movement is still there and ready to make it unpleasant, not in a violent way, but in a quiet constitutional way, then Britain will say, "Yes, it is possible." That is the task that faces us today. If we had gone to London and (however disunited we were) we represented a movement basically non-Communist, then I say we would have succeeded. It was not because we did not have sufficient skill or tact or persuasive powers but because basically we could not confront Britain with a less unpleasant alternative than the Malayan Communist Party taking over by violent revolution. That is the task which we have before us.

I said when I returned that the British would always be ready to open new negotiations, and indeed they are. They are looking for a stooge group to sign an agreement with them. The duty here of all anti-colonial parties is to see that no stooge group is formed to sign this agreement. I think we shall succeed because when you rub an Asian down to rock bottom, he gathers together and says, "Down with the white man." He said that for hundreds of years and it takes a long time to get these things out of the system, particularly when the white man is still here. That is the challenge. We must redouble our efforts. We must build up a movement, non-Communist basically, with a chance, maybe for all times but anyway for some time, of running Malaya. I still believe in one Malaya because we cannot run one little colony or state of Singapore on a non-Communist or any other basis. The moment we have done that, we could go back and meet the Rt. Hon. Mr Lennox-Boyd, or whoever his successor may be. We could then in polite genteel language tell him that there would be unfortunate consequences for British prestige, power, trade and commercial relationships unless our fair, modest and reasonable demands are complied with forthwith. When that moment arrives, then we shall get Merdeka. That is the lesson of these talks: that, if we want to succeed, we must succeed on our own strength and not on the weakness of the other side. To a certain point, the British could be pushed. They could be threatened by our saying, "Well, all right, if you will not give it to me, I will do nothing and I will let something else happen." As long as the reality of power is with Britain, she can afford to ignore that sort of threat. But when the reality of power shifts to a nationalist movement, then the British people, being eminently the most reasonable and practical people, will be the first to recognise when it is time to make a graceful exit. That is the task of all those who wish to see a free, democratic, non-Communist Malaya: to build up that movement, so that however weak and friendly and accommodating our leaders may be, there are fierce men behind who will make clear in no uncertain terms what the needs and the wishes of the people are. This is a setback but it is a temporary one because no doors can be closed to our movement which is determined to fight on.

I do not know what the immediate future holds for us. If the British through their Governor are as democratic as they profess to be, then, of course, the sensible thing would be fresh elections. I have the feeling that they may not be as democratic as they profess themselves to be. Somehow or the other we must go on with this Assembly. If we have to go on, then let us go on in a manner befitting self- respecting representatives of a self-respecting people determined to seek their legitimate interests. Whatever Government which comes into power and pursues that policy will have the co-operation of my Party.

The Chief Minister: Another kiss of Judas?

Mr Lim Cher Kheng (Changi): Mr Speaker, Sir, I was one of the members who supported the termination of the Merdeka talks, but, in fact, there is very little for me to say especially after so many brilliant speakers have so clearly analysed the reasons for the breakdown of the talks. You have heard this morning, Sir, how the Hon. the Chief Minister tackled the question.

I support heartily the first part of the Chief Minister's accusation that the British Colonial Office was responsible for the failure of the talks, and I would like to place it on record; but I cannot agree with him when he said - I do not know whether it is because of party politics or whether he tried to be diplomatic - that there was unity in the Merdeka Delegation. When I think of the disunity that there was in the delegation, I feel disgusted and consider it a disgrace. I do not think it is fair of the Chief Minister to try to cover this up. There were reports of disunity in the local Press and even in the London Press after the arrival of the Merdeka Delegation in London. There were charges and counter-charges. Some members charged that a certain Party was supported by the Communist Party, which in turn invited the retort that "our leader is not an Asian and he cannot understand the Asian nationalist movement." On many occasions, at tea parties and public functions, speeches were made by members of the delegation openly contradicting each other. Members of one Party would say, "My Party is the best. The people of Singapore support my Party." Then members of another Party would reply, "No, the people of Singapore are led by us." The Hon. the Chief Minister tried to cover this up and said that the disunity within the delegation was not known to the Colonial Office. I think we should not do that. We must tell the truth that the Colonial Office knew very well that there were disunity and disagreement within our delegation.

Now that the true state of affairs is known, that there was disunity within the delegation, every Singaporean would naturally ask, "Who should be blamed for the failure of the Merdeka talks?" We have already heard some Members say that the British Colonial Office should be blamed. Others say that the Hon. the Chief Minister should be blamed. I wish to tell the people of Singapore the truth - that all Parties should be blamed, including myself. Filthy party politics and party manoeuvres created disunity in the delegation.

The Chief Minister: Did we indulge in party politics?

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: I am trying to explain. I am going to show up -

The Chief Minister: Did we indulge -

Mr Speaker: Order, please.

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: We have heard it said that the People's Action Party's stand had been firm from the start of the Merdeka talks, that they must have what they wanted, that they must have what they could get. They said that their attitude at the talks was firm and determined, but the records can prove that this was not so. Had it not been for a sudden switch in the stand of the delegation, I think my proposal to accept the Colonial Office's offer under protest could have been carried. With your permission, Sir, I will quote extracts from the Minutes of the 8th meeting of the All-Party Delegation held at No. 10, Carlton House Terrace, London, at 12.30 p.m, on Monday, 7th May, 1956:

"The meeting then considered the stand to be taken on the statement of the Legislative Powers to be retained by Her Majesty's Government as set out, in the paper attached to S.C.T. (56) 9.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew (the Member for Tanjong Pagar) stated that as he saw it these proposals forced the Delegation to return to the realities of the situation. It was clear that Her Majesty's Government would continue to remain in Singapore by virtue of force. The Delegation had therefore to condition its approach to meet that situation.

The P.A.P. view was to ask for internal self-government. Having conceded external defence and external affairs the sovereignty remained with Her Majesty's Government...

His (Mr Lee Kuan Yew's) view was that if the constitution provided for complete control of the Civil Service and internal security, that should be acceptable. His stand all along had been for a constitutional settlement. His attitude had been to find out how much they could get, and if it was politically acceptable, then the Delegation should take it.

The Chief Minister asked for confirmation that he correctly understood that the P.A.P. stand was that if Singapore could get complete control of the Civil Service and the Police they were prepared to allow legislative powers to be in the hands of Her Majesty's Government."

Then the Member for Tanjong Pagar confirmed that that was the position - that if we got Malayanisation, if we could get control of the Police Force, we could allow Her Majesty's Government to have the legislative powers. Of course, to be fair, he added more:

". . . if Singapore had control of the Police force and the Civil Service, it could in 18 months organise itself so that the British could be thrown out."

Was this any different from my last proposal - that we could return and ask for more powers in two years? So that was the P.A.P. stand on the 7th of May. Were they not prepared to accept the Colonial Office's offer? Even if I can tell you off the record - [Interruption.] This is what the Member for Tanjong Pagar said to the Hon. the Chief Minister: "David, why do we want to fool ourselves and fool the people? If we allow Her Majesty's Government full legislative powers to suspend the constitution, why cannot they make a partial suspension? It is just like offering a person four tyres. Can you stop him using only one tyre?" That was the actual position and hon. Members can check me if I am wrong. That was the practical example that the Member for Tanjong Pagar put forward to the head of the delegation - that we could allow Her Majesty's Government to have a partial suspension of our constitution. That was the controversial problem - over-riding powers over our Legislature.

Now I come to the question of citizenship which was one of the subjects discussed at the delegation's meetings. This subject has been going on for many, many years. Before our departure for London, we had an agreement that the question of citizenship should be included in the talks, but when it arose, the Member for Ulu Bedok (Inche Abdul Hamid Bin Haji Jumat), representing the U.M.N.O., strongly opposed raising it for discussion. Imagine my surprise when the Member for Tanjong Pagar stated that "he supported U.M.N.O.'s stand on this and added that this was a purely domestic affair which should not affect the negotiations." To make it clear, he emphasised that "This is a minor and domestic issue. Do not discuss it at this meeting." Sir, on, this point -

The Chief Minister: Sir, on a point of clarification.

Mr Speaker: Is the hon. Member giving way?

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: No, Sir.

The Chief Minister rose -

Mr Speaker: Yes, Mr Chief Minister?

The Chief Minister: Sir, are the Minutes that the hon. Member is reading the Minutes of the delegation meetings or the Minutes of the conference meetings? I think he should make that clear, Sir. If you will forgive me, Sir, I seek this device to make it clear in case of any charges of misuse of confidential matter - using delegation Minutes.

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: I think the Minutes of the delegation meetings are not allowed to be divulged. However, I feel that we are the people's representatives and we must not fail to let the people know exactly what we did in London. I do not like a different picture to be painted. I now come back to the question of citizenship. In view of the Member for Tanjong Pagar's stand on it at the meetings in London, I would like to ask him this: Is he afraid of letting this question of citizenship go through, which will mean that there will be added to the electoral roll a quarter of a million middle-aged and stable voters, and that he has no confidence in winning their support? That if citizenship goes through, his election machinery is not going to run smoothly? I hope not, but there is a doubt in my mind and I like to be sure, because suddenly the Member for Tanjong Pagar changed his attitude on this question and became so firm and would not want any compromise at all. I say that only the Hon. the Chief Minister was the one who, from beginning to end, wanted a whole loaf of bread, but not the Member for Tanjong Pagar. But we are now back in Singapore and the local people think that he was the only person who stood firm throughout the Merdeka talks, the only hero!

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Next to the Member for Changi!

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: I am not like that. I think it is my duty to tell the people the truth. Just now the Member for Tanjong Pagar has stated why we failed. He says we cannot expect to kow tow to the Colonial Office in order that they will give us what we want. We must be strong ourselves. Then we can get what we want. But I would like to point out what the Chief Minister has pointed out. There are many, many political Parties - too many, in fact - in such a small island as Singapore with such a small population, and our people are divided. We have Socialism and Capitalism and "Extremism". We have the Malays, the Indians and the Chinese. "Extremism", you see! [Interruption.]

Mr Speaker: Order.

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: Such being the case, I wonder how the idea of the Member for Tanjong Pagar can be carried out - to work for the unity of the people of Singapore to the point where we are strong enough to fight the British - if we have party politics playing such havoc in our nationalist movement. I, for one, feel this is wrong. Under the mighty call of Merdeka all political Parties should sink their party interests in favour of a nationalist movement. I do not think it is a healthy sign, when a country is struggling for independence, to have so many political parties divided on so many issues. I, for one, want to be sincere in my beliefs, and as a move towards this end, I now solemnly claim that from today onwards I belong to no political party in this House. [Interruption.]

Mr Speaker: Order.

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: I solemnly proclaim that I will have nothing to do with party politics and that I am going to be an independent Nationalist. I am willing to be the eyes and voice of the people, but not of any Party, which is not a healthy sign and does not agree with my political philosophy, until we fully achieve independence.

As a last word, I sincerely hope that we do not regard the Merdeka talks as a failure. I wish that all political Parties would still remain calm and united. The committee working for Merdeka should continue to work for the struggle towards independence. We must sink all our differences.

Mr Lim Choon Mong: Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to move an amendment to the motion. I move,

To leave out the words "approves the stand of its delegation at the Constitutional Conference in London" and to insert "is of the opinion that the offer of Her Majesty's Government should have been accepted by the delegation at the Constitutional Conference in London as an interim measure in view of the considerable constitutional advancement contained therein and in view of the urgent need to restore the feeling of confidence and stability to the country and to the people".

Amendment handed in.

The Chief Minister: On a point of order, Mr Speaker, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Can I just examine this amendment?

The Chief Minister: If it please you, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Yes, Mr Chief Minister.

The Chief Minister: Sir, it occurs to me that that is a negation of the motion that stands in my name and which I moved. In the circumstances, Sir, I would enquire whether it is permissible under our Standing Orders to allow an amendment which is a negation of the motion.

Mr Speaker: I did anticipate a move of this nature and I have examined the position. The rule is that if an amendment is a mere negation of a motion, then that is out of order; but if the amendment offers an alternative proposition, then it is sound parliamentary practice. It is, in fact, the practice adopted in the House of Commons and in other Legislatures. This amendment is in order.

Mr Lim Choon Mong: Mr Speaker, Sir, in moving this amendment, I would like to acquaint the people of Singapore with the stand of the Singapore delegation before it went to London. We should know what our demands were and then, after comparing those with what we got from London, we would then be in a position to say whether we were right in accepting the proposals from Her Majesty's Government or were right in refusing them. I do not want to be the sole judge of this whole matter. I think the people of Singapore should know everything about it and then judge the whole issue on its own merits.

Briefly, Singapore hoped to get the following concessions in London:

First, we were agreed that the Legislative Assembly of Singapore should have 50 fully elected Members. There should be no Nominated Members and no Official Members.

Second, since that was the case, we asked that the Chief Minister and the other Ministers should then be appointed in the same manner as in the case of the appointments of Ministers in Great Britain.

Third, we asked for citizenship rights. On this point, we agreed that people, who have been living in Singapore for a long time, although they were born outside Singapore, but owe loyalty to Singapore, and also if they would swear allegiance to Singapore -

Mr Lim Yew Hock: On a point of clarification, Sir. Will the hon. Member please clarify whom he means when he says "we" - the delegation or the Liberal-Socialists?

Mr Lim Choon Mong: When I say "we", I mean the whole Singapore delegation, and if you do want it -

Mr Lim Cher Kheng: Yes.

Mr Lim Choon Mong: All right, our friend the Member for Changi (Mr Lim Cher Kheng), I will dish it back to you!

The Chief Minister: No, no. We accept it.

Mr Speaker: Order, please. The Member for Serangoon is speaking to the Chair.

Mr Lim Choon Mong: Sir, the people who are living here in Singapore but who were not born here, should be given Singapore citizenship. That was one of our demands.

The fourth point was that the Civil Service should be Malayanised in accordance with the Majority Report.

These four points were, in actual fact, the substance of our demands. Of course, added on to that, we had trimmings. We said that probably we might want to walk through one door instead of through another door. We might probably have a Governor-General instead of a Governor -

The Chief Minister: Is that a trimming?

Mr Lim Choon Mong: I think that is, because no matter what you do, what really matters is the substance. If I am invited to a dinner and I am served with chicken, it is the chicken that counts and not the little bit of tomato or lettuce or one or two slices of chillies surrounding the chicken. What we want is the real substance, not all the other things. However, although those were our demands, we agreed amongst the delegation that we would cede voluntarily to Great Britain the responsibilities of external defence and foreign affairs, except for trade and commerce. Of course, later on, we demanded a slice back and said, "No, not only trade and commerce, but I think we will also include cultural relationships."

Mr Speaker: Order, order. Moment of interruption. Debate to be resumed, what day, Mr Chief Minister?

The Chief Minister: Tomorrow, Sir.

Remaining items on the Order Paper read and ordered for the next day.