REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 1966

6.58 p.m.

Mr E. W. Barker: Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the motion standing in my name,

That this House takes note of the Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966, presented to this House as Command Paper No. 29 of 1966, and endorses the Government's views thereon as set out in the Statement by the Minister for Law and National Development made at the sitting of this House on 21st December, 1966.

Mr Speaker, in my Statement made in this House on the 21st December, 1966, I set out Government's views on the recommendations of the Commission, and I do not propose at this stage to say anything further. I do hope that most Members of this House will speak on this motion and let their views be known. In particular, I hope that Ministers will also take the Floor.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

[Mr Tang See Chim in the Chair]

7.00 p.m.

Mr Ho Cheng Choon: (In Mandarin): Sir, the Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966, can be described as a very valuable and far-sighted historic document ever presented to this House since independence. Most of the recommendations contained in the Report have been accepted by the Government and are intended to be written into our future Constitution. The majority of the constructive recommendations will undoubtedly become the basis of the new Constitution of our independent country, and this Constitution will become an example, we hope, to independent countries in this part of the world.

I should say that the Constitutional Commission have lived up to the expectations of all the people. They have recognised our present situation and have recommended the constitutional provisions which take into account our ideal for a multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-cultural society, and have provided safeguards to be entrenched in the Constitution. This will provide for the peace and security and for the maintenance of law in this society and ensure the perpetuation of our independent Republic. Compared with other countries, ours is one that is standing on firm ground and our Government is one that is working for the benefit and in the best interest of the people, leading the country on to the correct path towards a better and brighter future.

Sir, I would not like to touch upon every aspect of this Report. I will merely touch upon several important points in the recommendations, namely, the setting up of the Council of State, the Ombudsman, and provisions to be entrenched in the Constitution.

Firstly, the Constitutional Commission, after considering all factors, have suggested for inclusion in the Constitution provisions for the setting up of an advisory body called the Council of State comprising 21 members to guard against the passage of any discriminatory legislation affecting the interests of any minorities with a view also to ensuring that, in the present situation where the House has no effective Opposition, the Council of State can provide some supervision over Government legislation. In other words, this Council of State may be able to exercise the duties that an Opposition Party should exercise in this House. This Council of State lies somewhere between Parliament and an Upper House. In our country, this institution will be something like the House of Lords of the British Parliament. As far as I understand, the British House of Lords is a characteristic monarchic institution in that it is merely an aristocratic Council for the purpose of emplacing people who have contributed to that country and providing them with a means of livelihood in their old age. The House of Lords actually has not much power or effect over the passing of laws. So there has been controversy over the need of the House of Lords. Some people have proposed its abolition, but without avail.

But the present situation obtaining in our country is different. Because of the inefficiency of the Opposition and their boycott of this House, a situation is created where we should have somebody to take their part, hence the Council of State. As to the merits and demerits of this Council of State, I will touch on several points. We find that:

(1) The composition of this Council of State, according to the Report, should be of citizens who have contributed to public service, and have distinguished themselves in their own walks of life. We have general agreement on this point. Inevitably there can be diverse views in the Council, and if their views differ from the views of the people, we doubt whether the views held by the members of the Council can be representative of the views of the people.

(2) The number of members in the Council is 21. With such a large number of members, it will be very difficult to arrive at unanimous agreement in any matter. I feel that if such a situation happens, then this House will be faced with various diverse opinions.

(3) The Government will incur additional expenditure by setting up this Council. For instance, if every Councillor were to draw $500 allowance every month, the Government would have to spend more than $100,000 every year. Whether this is worthwhile or proper will have to be considered.

(4) The Constitutional Commission, in considering the setting up of this Council, took into account the present situation in the House where there is no Opposition. When there is an Opposition in this House, what would be the position of this Council of State? This might be an interim measure recommended by the Commission. But nobody can guarantee that there will never be an Opposition in this House. So we should consider this point and see whether it is appropriate to have such an institution.

The next point I would touch upon is the system of Ombudsman. The tasks of this Ombudsman are, namely, to supervise the administration of various administrative institutions and deal with complaints against them. In principle, this system is laudable because the Ombudsman can supervise the various administrative organs and make them more effective and efficient.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

7.09 p.m.

Mr Ho Cheng Choon: This system has been in practice in Sweden for more than 100 years. In the British Commonwealth, Britain has only recently considered the adoption of this system. In 1962 New Zealand made use of this system. So far this system is still in an experimental stage there and the result is still not known.

Britain adopted this system by an Act in 1966. But so far it has still not put it into practice. Other Commonwealth countries like Australia, India and Canada, whose history of independence has been longer than ours, have not adopted this system. Singapore has been independent for not more than two years. It would be appropriate if we were to describe it as a baby. For a baby to learn every act of a grown-up is not logical. Therefore, the Government can only accept this suggestion in principle. This is the correct attitude. Let us look at the results of the countries which are implementing this system before we decide to adopt it. Let us see during the next five or ten years what contribution this system can make in other countries. If it is practicable, then we can consider whether the same results can be achieved in our country. This is another point that merits our consideration, not to say that our environment and our situation and position are entirely different from those obtaining in New Zealand and other countries.

Though at present we do not have the Ombudsman, yet we have the Central Complaints Bureau. People can lodge their complaints about administrative faults with this Central Complaints Bureau with a view to redressing their grievances, if they could not get their remedy at the courts. This Bureau would be something like an Ombudsman. The Director of the Central Complaints Bureau has powers and facilities similar to those provided for the Ombudsman, except the power to call for evidence and witnesses. When necessary, he can suggest to the Prime Minister to adopt certain measures.

In the fifth chapter of the Report, three methods are suggested in relation to the entrenchment of certain provisions in the Constitution. Firstly, a Bill altering the Constitution should not be passed unless it is expressly stated therein that it is introduced with a view to making such amendments only.

Secondly, the Bill amending the Constitution should, in the final voting, have received at least a two-thirds majority of the elected Members of Parliament before it can be passed.

Thirdly, any provisions amending the Constitution should be presented and approved by the majority of those who are qualified to vote, both inside and outside the House. The Government has adopted the second method, which is the most appropriate in our present situation.

7.15 p.m.

Mr Speaker: Order. Moment of Interruption. Mr Ho, this is a convenient point in your speech to adjourn. Mr Barker, will you move the adjournment?