CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Third Reading read.

The First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."

The Report of the Select Committee as well as the Bill, as revised by the Select Committee, was presented to Members on 15th March, 1990. I am sure all Members have read and studied the Report and the reasons given for the decisions taken by the Select Committee. I therefore do not propose to make a lengthy speech, but only to highlight the main points.

I propose to separate my comments into two categories: areas where changes were made to the original Bill, and other areas where the Committee decided not to make any change. There are four areas where the Select Committee decided changes should be made to the Bill.

The first concerns the "sunset" clause concept to the Bill. Members will recall that during the Second Reading, I suggested the idea of weaving a "self-destruct" or "sunset" clause into the Bill. I did so in order to accommodate the reservations expressed by some MPs over the Bill. My main objective was to urge them to try out the concept of NMP for the remaining period of this parliamentary term. The amendment to the Constitution will lapse automatically, unless it is re-enacted.

During the Select Committee hearing, one representor graphically pointed out that such a "sunset" clause was like casting a "death wish for a new born baby". He was strongly against having such a clause in the Constitution which he regarded as the supreme law of the land. He argued, quite correctly, that if the system of NMPs was found unworkable, a future Parliament could always amend, or abolish it altogether. While I agreed with him, I nevertheless felt that we should have a mechanism which did not permanently and automatically require all future Parliaments to have NMPs.

I therefore suggested that instead of a "sunset" clause, each Parliament should be given the discretion to decide if it wished to have NMPs for the term of that Parliament. It would determine this by a resolution; if it did not so resolve, then there would be no NMPs in that Parliament. This approach will give us some flexibility in trying out the NMP scheme. While the NMP provisions can be set out in the Constitution, they will not bind all future Parliaments to appoint NMPs.

The Select Committee agreed with this variation. Accordingly, the Bill as revised by the Committee provides each Parliament with the discretion to determine whether it wishes to appoint NMPs. This is to be found in section 1 of the Fourth schedule. This discretion will be exercised by a resolution adopted by each Parliament within six months of its first meeting after a general election. NMPs will be appointed within six months of such a resolution. If no such resolution is adopted, no NMP will be nominated during the life of that Parliament.

Now, I move on to the procedure for selecting NMPs. The Committee weighed the pros and cons of various proposals to change the procedure for selecting NMPs, for example, whether there should be open discussion and voting by all the Members of the House on the nominees or whether there should be secret voting. The Select Committee did not accept these ideas and has given its reasons in its Report.

However, the Select Committee did recognise that there was value in the Special Select Committee obtaining the views of other MPs before it made its final recommendations to the President. Accordingly, a change has been made to the Bill whereby the Special Select Committee will be obliged to consult the general body of Members of Parliament, individually or otherwise, before deciding on the names to be submitted to the President. This is provided for in section 2(3) of the Fourth Schedule.

This change enables the Special Select Committee to benefit from the views and comments of the Members who may have specific knowledge of particular nominees, without the whole House having to meet and publicly debate or vote on individual names. The details of the manner of consultations have not been spelt out in the Bill. It is best we leave these administrative details to the Special Select Committee to decide. Such consultation should, of course, be to the extent possible or practical for it may not always be possible to consult all MPs, for example, MPs who are abroad.

Thirdly, on the criteria for selecting NMPs, the Select Committee decided that the Bill should incorporate some criteria. This will not only guide the Special Select Committee in its deliberations but will also help members of the public when they propose nominees for consideration of the Special Select Committee. The criteria are spelt out in the amended section 3(2) of the Fourth Schedule, which reads:

'The persons to be nominated shall be persons who have rendered distinguished public service, or who have brought honour to the Republic, or who have distinguished themselves in the field of arts and letters, culture, the sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or community service or the labour movement; and in making any nomination, the Special Select Committee shall have regard to the need for nominated Members to reflect as wide a range of independent and non-partisan views as possible.'

The final change the Committee made to the Bill is that an NMP should vacate his seat before contesting a by-election where he contests on a party ticket. The original Bill did not require him to do so. The reason for the change is that it is not possible for an NMP to contest a by-election on a party ticket without his non-partisan image being affected. This requirement will not apply to an NMP standing for a by-election as an independent candidate as the same reason does not apply to him.

Let me now turn to certain aspects which were raised during the hearings of the Select Committee but where the Committee decided to make no change to the Bill.

First, concerns the question of whether NMPs should be permitted to hold political office. The original Bill does not prohibit an NMP from being appointed as Minister or other office holder. The Select Committee decided not to change this. Now, Members may recall what I said during the Second Reading and I quote:

'... it is not the intention of Government that nominated MPs should be eligible to become Ministers or other office holders. The principle that office holders must come from the ranks of elected MPs will remain. If the provisions of the Bill are not specific on this point, suitable amendments can be made.' [Hansard, Vol. 54, No. 8, Col. 698].

This is still my intention. The Government does not intend to appoint NMPs as Ministers or other office holders. But when I looked into the future, I wondered whether it was necessary or desirable to expressly prevent a future government from appointing an NMP as Minister. Many established democracies can and do regularly appoint Cabinet Ministers from the non-elected members of their legislature. Notable examples are the United Kingdom, France and Malaysia. If these countries, which have a bigger population and a bigger Parliament, need to appoint non-elected members as Cabinet Ministers from time to time, the reason is even more cogent for Singapore which has a Parliament of only 81 Members.

In coming to this decision, my guiding principle is what is in the national interests. For a country to be well run and the people to enjoy growth and prosperity, it must have effective government. This means having suitable people to do the specialised complex jobs like Finance, Trade and Industry and Law. If there is no elected MP who can do such jobs adequately, it is in the people's interest that a competent person is appointed to do so from the non-elected MPs.

A government may also consider it useful to appoint a Minister in charge of the Arts. The best person need not necessarily be a politician and a government may wish to draw upon the very limited talent pool in the arts to appoint such a Minister, rather than have a politician without a real interest in the arts to do the job.

The Select Committee is convinced that regardless of the intention of the present Government on this matter, it would be wrong to deprive future governments of this element of flexibility of appointing some NMPs as office holders.

The Select Committee also deliberated on whether NMPs should sever ties with political parties. It decided that it was unnecessary to specifically require an NMP to do so. It felt that it was far better to leave to conventions and practice to evolve.

On voting rights, the Committee decided to make no change, ie, NMPs will have the same voting rights as NCMPs. The reason was simple. The absence of voting rights would reduce the status of NMPs and discourage serious-minded persons from serving as nominated MPs.

As Members can see, the Committee has made certain important changes to the Bill. It may not have made all the changes which all Members or representors to the Select Committee would have preferred. But I believe that Members will agree that we have been as accommodating as possible. I hope that Members will view the revised Bill more positively than the original Bill. Like all new proposals, people have their reservations. When I first pro- posed the concept of Medisave in this House, some sections of the public and also some MPs had their reservations. Likewise, when we introduced the concept of GRCs. Both Medisave and GRCs have worked, to the benefit of the people. Suppose we lacked foresight and the courage to propose and implement them. Would we be better off today?

Again, I say, give the NMP scheme a try. If we do not try, we will never see the merits of the scheme. This Bill does not bind every future Parliament to have NMPs. If the demerits outweigh the merits, the next Parliament need not carry on with the scheme.

Finally, let me thank all those who made contributions to the work of the Select Committee through their written representations and appearance before it. They made many valid points which, together with the views expressed in this House, have helped the Committee to improve on the original Bill.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Dr Arthur Beng Kian Lam (Fengshan): Mr Speaker, Sir, when the NMP proposal was first raised in Parliament, I was totally unhappy with the whole concept. After the First Deputy Prime Minister suggested a "sunset" clause or a "self-destruct" clause and proposed to call NMPs "Parliamentary Counsellors", I took time to reconsider the proposal. I consider these major concessions made by the First Deputy Prime Minister, concessions that are made by a listening leadership. I thought I could come on board, as called by the First Deputy Prime Minister. But having read the Select Committee's Report, and here the First Deputy Prime Minister is very right, I still have reservations and must state them at the outset.

Since this House has already accepted the proposal and is now debating only on the merits and demerits of the scheme and on its details, I shall have to deal with these points as raised in the Select Committee's Report. Firstly, the recommendation that each Parliament should decide for itself whether it wants NMPs. My question to the First Deputy Prime Minister is: what does he mean by Parliament should decide for itself? If the Whip is again not lifted, then the answer is a foregone conclusion. This amendment is thus in effect a non-event, and we must realise that Parliament is in actuality left with no choice. We are back to square one. Perhaps the First Deputy Prime Minister will comment on this.

Secondly, selection of NMPs. I am for a secret ballot. I am for this idea. Why? Because we do not want to embarrass potential NMPs. On this, I agree with the Select Committee. Discussing the merits and demerits of an individual will be unacceptable. I guess here the implication is that MPs are expected to be thick skin and NMPs are supposed to be very sensitive people. However, with a secret ballot, the result need only be made known to you, Mr Speaker, Sir, and the list of successful candidates as announced. The counter argument is that a secret ballot is not a usual or normal procedure. To quote the Committee's Report, "a radical departure from the established procedures." In answer, let me say that we have been amending procedures in our House to suit our own unique situation. Unusual measures and proposals call for unusual procedures. Let us move on and not be held back by tradition for its own sake. As the First Deputy Prime Minister has mentioned, the Medisave and GRC schemes have proved successful. So we are moving in this direction, let us go and take another brave step. Move on to a secret ballot.

On the question of whether NMPs should be permitted to hold political office, my answer here is a categorical no. A party aspiring to form the government must ensure that it has the necessary candidates. A major factor in the electorate's mind when they go to the polling box is whether the party that he or she is voting for can form the next government. By allowing this, we may inadvertently be telling the electorate, "Do not worry. After the election, I will find you a good Law and Finance Minister, even though at this present time I do not have one to offer you." The art and politics of fielding candidates should be able to provide the leeway to ensure that Ministers for specialised port- folios be elected. There are constituencies or wards that are marginal and there are also so-called "safe" constituencies.

Office holders must be accepted by the public and must work to win the public's trust and confidence. Trust and confidence of the public, how is this reflected? Except at the polling box by votes.

Ministers cannot be merely able technocrats. They must be much more than this. They must have the confidence and trust of the public. However, if the fear is that "effective functioning of government" may be affected if we do not have a good Law or Finance Minister, then I feel that the amendment should in good faith categorically state that this Bill will only allow for the appointment of the NMP as Law or Finance Minister to the exclusion of all else.

I find the argument for the appointment of an NMP as a Minister in charge of the Arts very difficult to accept. We were not a nation that used to sing, but now we are a singing nation. "Sing Singapore" is an overwhelming success. And the Minister for Communications and Information and the Minister for Community Development are by no means artistes at singing. We have often stated that we have an able and efficient civil service. I am sure that all our Ministers give due cognisance to the advice of our senior civil servants. The civil service is complementary to the politicians. It is not as if we do not have any fall back position. We have this.

After listening to the First Deputy Prime Minister, I am still a little bit confused. He says that he does not intend to appoint NMPs as Ministers or other office holders. I await further clarification. That means he is making the provision now to allow them to hold political office but he does not intend to appoint them. Maybe he can clarify what this means.

Next, coming to the point whether NMPs should sever all ties with political parties, the Report states:

'NMPs should be, and be seen to be, non-partisan with no affiliation with any political party.'

Indeed, if an NMP is to give views that would help this House make better decisions, then this principle must be closely adhered to. I could not agree more with the Select Committee. Thus, on appointment the NMP should formally resign from membership of a political party. This is in line with the statement that the NMP should be required to be seen to be non-partisan. While it is also true that the act of resignation will not change the NMP's political philosophy or his sympathy for his party, resignation is still important, so that the NMP will not feel obliged to take his party's stand in Parliament. He will not be answerable to his party or beholden to his party. This very problem of finding non-partisan persons with no affiliation is one of the arguments against the NMP concept. However, as it has been accepted, the Special Select Committee will now have to seriously consider ways to overcome this. Then only will the NMP scheme gain credibility.

The NMP standing for elections

Sir, for the NMP to blossom as a respected person to be reckoned with and to be resected by both Members of this House and the public, we should not over protect him. Protect him from an embarrassment before appointment, yes, I agree. However, when he decides to enter the political arena in total, even as an independent candidate, he should not only resign his NMP position, but he should also be barred from ever being appointed again as an NMP. He has already made his position amply clear. He is willing of his own volition to enter the political foray and he therefore should no longer enjoy the protection of this House. The NMP who stands for election is no longer a member of an endangered species and thus he deserves no special privileges or protection.

In closing, Mr Speaker, Sir, may I add that this debate has far greater dimensions than merely discussing NMPs. It is about the role of Parliament, the responsibility of office holders and governing by consensus. PAP Backbenchers have often been urged by the party leadership to be constructively critical and not to be "yes" men. The party does not want this and neither does the electorate.

During the Second Reading of the Bill, the First Deputy Prime Minister said that he wanted to:

' ... encourage participation to build consensus, to accommodate alternative viewpoints and dissent.'

To go one step further, the electorate also does not want the Opposition to be "No" men, to disagree with everything that the Government does. However, after the last debate on this issue, there were some who expressed the view that if one disagrees with party line, then one should resign. I cannot disagree more. With a more educated generation, do we want to encourage this opt-out philosophy of life? Disagree with party, resign from party. Disagree with employer, resign from company. Disagree with Government, then what? Resign from Singapore? Emigrate? I believe that we must not become a generation or a nation of quitters. Out of discussion and disagreement may come out better ideas. Here I agree with the First Deputy Prime Minister when he said: "Do you agree or do you not agree with this intent of mine, ie, to do something which will allow us to forge consensus?"

I thus hope that at the end of today's sitting we can all go home more convinced, if not converted, of this NMP scheme. The First Deputy Prime Minister has said, "Give it a try." Do we have any choice? But I would like to reassure him that we will give it a try very positively and we will try to make it work.

Dr Lau Teik Soon (Serangoon Gardens): The Select Committee's recommendation that each Parliament will have the discretion whether or not to have nominated MPs, in my view, is a correct and wise move. If a resolution is passed in Parliament that there be Nominated MPs, then the nominated MPs would be made more welcome in this Chamber. The decision whether or not to have nominated MPs would be the decision of the Members of Parliament. Additionally, such a resolution means that the nominated MPs will have some kind of legitimacy. After all, if it is a new Parliament passing a resolution that they be nominated, then to that extent they do have certain status, legitimacy, in this Parliament. So in my view it is an appropriate move to make.

But, Sir, I have three questions which I would like to raise with the First Deputy Prime Minister and seek his clarification. The first is the procedure for the nomination of NMPs. I agree that it would be cumbersome to debate the qualities, the characters, the experiences of all the names which would be submitted by members of the public. That is not desirable. But if the Special Select Committee short lists from the nominations of the public, then I would suggest that the shortlisted candidates be made known to Members of Parliament and that their names and their qualifications be discussed in various forums. The Special Select Committee should shortlist more than the required number of NMPs. And this short list, in my view, should then be put to a secret ballot. I agree with Dr Arthur Beng that the shortlisted candidates should be put to the vote so that each Member of Parliament can then decide for himself or herself which of this list of candidates should be nominated NMPs in this Chamber. The Report mentioned that this would be a radical departure. But since we are making a Constitutional amendment, then there should be no problem if we think it is desirable that the shortlisted candidates be subject to a secret ballot by this Chamber.

The second issue relates to the information to be made known to the public concerning the shortlisted candidates. I think the public should know who these shortlisted candidates are, their qualifications, background, their experiences and so on. If members of the public through various forums would want to make strenuous objection for very strong reasons, then I think they should be given the opportunity to make known their objection. They are not voting on the shortlisted candidates. But if they have a serious objection and they have information which the Special Select Committee does not have, then it would be a useful exercise if we allow the public a say in the list of candidates to be put up. I hope this is possible.

Thirdly, the question of their political affiliation. The original intent of this proposal, Sir, was that non-partisan independent people would come into this Cham- ber to debate on various issues, to make recommendations, and they should not be constrained by any party or political affiliation. Here again, I agree with Dr Arthur Beng that the shortlisted candidates should resign from any party membership of any political party. Otherwise it would compromise their position. Party membership may be known to his friends or her friends and the word goes around that he is a member of this party or that party. He is no longer a non-partisan person. So the integrity and the non-partisanship of such nominated MPs must be maintained.

Dr Wang Kai Yuen (Bukit Timah): ( In Mandarin): Sir, during the Second Reading of the Bill I suggested that there are three points which should be considered. Firstly, we should consider the merits of NMP in the light of the ratio of Government MPs to Opposition MPs in future Parliaments. At present, the great majority of seats are occupied by the Government Party. Under these circumstances, I agree with the First Deputy Prime Minister's view that NMPs can help reflect the people's views because they are not like the PAP Members who are subject to the Whip's direction. But I feel that when Opposition MPs increase in number, the NMPs would lose their most meaningful justification and the number of NMPs should be reduced.

Secondly, I do not think that an NMP should have the right to be appointed as a Minister. This is so because our Parliament has vested in our Ministers very substantial powers. Presently the Ministers are like other MPs. They have to go and face the electorate every five years to find out what the people think of their policies. Every Minister has this concern in his mind when exercising his power. Therefore, I support the idea expressly stipulating in the Bill that NMPs should not be appointed Ministers, which is very appropriate.

The third point is how to prevent a future government from making use of NMPs to strengthen their political power. The Select Committee had several suggestions incorporated in the amended Bill. Here I have two points to highlight. First, allowing every new Parliament to decide on the question whether they want to have NMPs or not. Second, giving the right to NMPs to be appointed Ministers. On the second point, the First Deputy Prime Minister indicated at the last session he would not oppose the idea of a provision in the Bill that NMPs should not be appointed as Ministers.

Let us give this new system a trial. If the selections are not ideal or not desirable, or if there are enough Opposition MPs in Parliament, then by that time Parliament can decide how to deal with the situation. I had thought that if one day when there is a situation where the party in power may have a very slim majority in Parliament, then there is the temptation for that government to make use of the NMPs to consolidate their position and even appoint them as Ministers. Would it be against the will of the people? I think it is likely. But after careful consideration, I feel that under such circumstances, whatever the Government may be, whether it is the PAP Government or any other party in power, the most important question is the stability of the Government, and not the interest of the political parties. If at that time, the governing party does not have enough talents within its rank to be appointed as the Minister for Finance or other important ministerial posts, then under the premise of the interest of the nation, I would agree to appointing NMPs as Ministers. The government under those circumstances and the Ministers will be very careful in carrying out their policies.

Just now I mentioned that there would be a worry of Ministers having great powers. In such a situation, when NMPs are appointed as Ministers such worry would no longer exist and such appointments would be quite all right to me after all. The First Deputy Prime Minister has said that in the present circumstances, there is no need for our PAP Government to appoint NMPs as Ministers. After weighing the pros and cons, I no longer oppose the fact that the Bill does not provide that NMPs should not be appointed as Ministers. I am not quite sure as to whether any future government would make use of the system of NMPs or their votes to consolidate the position of the Government. On this question I should say that the NMP system is only a man-made system. If, in future, any government should abuse the original intention of the system, we cannot prevent it anyway. So the most important thing is that at the general elections, the electorate must vote for those candidates who are of integrity to form the Government. That, is the way to truly ensure our future.

Sir, I support the Bill.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, first, let me say that the Workers' Party is against the Bill in principle.

We disagree that there is any need for NMPs. Presently, the Constitution has provisions for up to six Opposition NCMPs. We have now one elected Opposition MP and one NCMP. If Government feels that there should be more Opposition MPs, all it has got to do is to increase the number of NCMPs, to make up the total number of Opposition MPs to six.

I will now deal with the recommendations of the Select Committee.

Procedure for Selection of NMPs

The Committee recommends that the Special Select Committee, wherever possible, consult MPs individually or in groups. Presently, Sir, the House has 80 PAP MPs out of a total of 81. If the PAP Special Select Committee should consult MPs in this House, it will mean consulting other PAP Members. This is hardly any change from the original provision in the Bill. It is still the PAP consulting the PAP, which is no consultation at all.

General Criteria for Selection of NMPs

The point is: who decides the criteria? The Report has suggested a list. In fact, the criteria recommended are linked to, and cannot be separated from, the procedure for selection of NMPs.

Paragraph 26(i) and (ii) of the Report emphasises, and I quote, "the need for NMPs to reflect as wide a range of independent, non-partisan views as possible". Therefore, is it not logical and appropriate that nominees be suggested by the profes- sional bodies themselves? For example, the Special Select Committee may fix the number of NMPs, and professional bodies like those from lawyers, architects, accountants, doctors, engineers, universities, may then recommend the exact number of nominees to the Special Select Committee. This would do away with the unsatisfactory and laughable procedure of allowing the PAP Select Committee to consult PAP members in the selection of NMPs.

Whether NMPs should be permitted to hold political office

Paragraph 30 of the Report refers to possible appointment of NMPs as Ministers of Government. The First Deputy Prime Minister has now changed his tune. And I would like to ask, Sir, why the sudden change? The Report, and the 1DPM both argue that the UK, France and other countries have appointed Ministers from non-elected members of the legislature. The examples given, however, are countries which have a second Chamber of Parliament. And I understand that this appointment of non-elected members to be Ministers has been severely criticised and regarded as an anachronism. Already there is a strong call for such undemocratic practice to be discarded.

We have a unicameral Parliament in Singapore. Our situation is entirely different. Why then do we need to appoint NMPs as Ministers? The First Deputy Prime Minister says it is for the national interests. First, is the PAP suggesting that with 80 out of 81 MPs in the House, there is no Backbencher who is fit and good enough to be a Minister? I cannot believe that, as I can see that a good number of PAP Backbenchers are most capable MPs who could easily serve as very good Ministers in the Government. So there is no need for the change.

Next, the First Deputy Prime Minister argues that there may be special knowledge needed for special portfolios. He quotes the example of a Minister for Arts. Sir, if you need an artist to be in charge of the portfolio for Arts, let me ask: what about health? Do we need also a medical officer to be in charge of the Ministry of Health? Or do we need an expert asso- ciated with the environment to be in charge of the Environment Ministry? What the First Deputy Prime Minister suggests is that the Government should staff itself with a full load of technocrats. If that is the case, I suggest that the First Deputy Prime Minister choose his Ministers from the Permanent Secretaries and also from the professors of the university. They have special knowledge, and I am sure the First Deputy Prime Minister will be able to benefit from all their expertise.

We must also remember, Sir, that the elections are held to choose political parties, because political parties follow special philosophies, hold special views about things and represent special interests. And from these political parties, Ministers are usually chosen. If we really need technocrats and people with special knowledge, think of the old PAP in 1959. There was hardly a handful, two or three people, who had tertiary education. Yet, we had a number of Ministers, and has Government carried on until the present day, of course, by suppressing us.

It is politics that decides how the interests and welfare of the people are to be looked after and represented. It is the politicians who decide on the priorities of how funds are to be allocated, so that the mahority of the people in the country will benefit. Therefore to ask for a person with the technical skill to look after a special portfolio is much against PAP's own political views and philosophy.

We must remember that politics is the key issue. But I suspect, Sir, that it is very possible that the Government already has someone outside the House, earmarked as an NMP, and would like to appoint that someone as Minister for a special portfolio. That is the very reason why the whole thing has been changed. Now I ask: is that the reason why the amount of the extra financial expenditure involved at present cannot be ascertained? That is what it says, "This Bill will involve the Government in extra financial expenditure, the exact amount of which cannot at present be ascertained." Sir, if they are only ordinary NMPs, the amount of allowances for the six of them could be calculated to the exact cent. But the whole trouble is that they may be Ministers or Ministers of State, or other appointments. Therefore, the exact amount cannot be ascertained. And is that why this Bill is being pushed through in such a hurry?

Whether NMPs should sever all ties with political parties

Paragraph 37 asks whether NMPs should be, and be seen to be, non-partisan with no affiliation to any political party. The First Deputy Prime Minister had said previously that he wanted non-politically affiliated NMPs. Now he has changed his views. And once more I ask: why then a change "to let these matters evolve naturally as constitutional conventions and practice"? As has already been mentioned by Dr Arthur Beng, just as justice must be seen to be done, so must NMPs also be seen to be non-members of any political party, or as people who have no close association or connection with any political party. Any form of association with a political party immediately puts the credibility of the NMP in question. He becomes seen as a member of that Party.

Whether an NMP should vacate his seat before contesting a by-election

Sir, to be fair to the NMP himself, he should vacate his NMP seat if he should contest any by-election. Whether he contests as an independent or as a member of any political party, he would certainly be seen as one holding strong political views, either similar to the viewpoints of the ruling party or to the viewpoints of an opposition party. He would hardly be seen as a truly independent candidate. If he should lose the by-election and still cling on to the NMP seat, he would be seen as an opportunist, and an NMP with very low credibility. That is not fair to the NMP himself.

Therefore, Sir, all in all, I feel that the recommendations of the Select Committee are not appropriate and should not be supported.

Mr Chiam See Tong (Potong Pasir): Mr Speaker, Sir, the First Deputy Prime Minister has said that he will allow Parliament to decide for itself at every new session whether or not to have NMPs, and this is supported by the Member for Serangoon Gardens. But as pointed out by Dr Arthur Beng, this would be a fictitious choice. There is really no choice. You can see it today. When we have got a Constitutional amendment, the Whip can readily gather nearly all Members in this House. We have noticed that during the past two weeks, the House was barely filled up. But today, with the exercise of the Whip, we see nearly all seats are taken up. [Interruptions.] I am not controlled by the Whip. My point is that without the lifting of the Whip, there is really no choice. So the question is one of choice, whether the Members can freely vote to have or not to have NMPs at this new session. If we do not have that free choice, then this question of decision by the new Parliament really has got no effect at all.

Sir, the important question now is: is there really a need to appoint more NMPs to improve the standard of debate in Parliament or to contribute to the proceedings in Parliament? I do not think so. There is no compelling reason at all. This is borne out by facts that during the Budget debates, it was demonstrated clearly that there was no need at all, because MPs in Parliament at the moment have risen to the occasion. All the main issues of each Ministry were thoroughly debated so much so there was insufficient time. The number of speakers was so many that during the debate on the allocations to the Ministry of Health, the time allowed for each speaker had to be slashed down from 10 minutes to four minutes. The debate in Parliament is of a high standard and there is really ---

Mr Chandra Das: So we don't need Opposition Members.

Mr Chiam See Tong: -- no need to get NMPs into Parliament. We do not need Cinderellas or ornaments in Parliament. That is what NMPs will eventually be. They will be out debated.

Parliament is a place of work, of serious State business. Such serious State business is dealt in Parliament. And I say that only the committed, the people who brave the vicissitudes of the electoral pro- cess have a right to be in this House to transact such serious business.

Sir, we must never make entry into this House an easy matter. Every Member in this Chamber has earned the right to be here, both morally and legally. Each Member must have a measure of support of the electorate. Without that support, the Member has no business to be here. Indeed, without the appropriate electoral support, an honourable Member will be thrown out at a general election or by-election.

Sir, the whole concept of the NMP is constitutionally wrong. By constitution, I do not just mean our own Constitution. We should also take into account the constitution of England because our parliamentary system is derived from that country. Our present parliamentary system is a legacy of the British and we should take note of the constitutional struggle in England from early times until what it is today. It was a struggle between the King and the common people. The King, of course, was reluctant to divest his powers, whereas the common people wanted more powers for themselves. It was a long arduous struggle and finally of course the common people won. So the House of Commons is a fully representative institution.

Sir, representation is the essence of parliamentary democracy. What we are doing is a retrogressive step. We are in fact going backwards. Instead of getting more representation, we are placing Members in this House by appointment. We are in fact not improving our parliamentary system as the Government tries to make it out to be. We are in fact making it less representative. So how can we say that we are improving it? In fact, we are removing the basic tenets to our democratic system.

Sir, I can even say that we are taking the initial steps towards totalitarianism. Almost the whole world is marching towards more democracy. We are in fact moving away from it.

Sir, I cannot support the Report although I am a Member of the Select Committee. I have not put my name to it. I have not initialled or signed it.

Mr Speaker: I just want to make a point of clarification on what the Member for Potong Pasir has stated. During the debate on the Ministry of Health, it was not the time for each Member that was reduced. It was the time per topic that was reduced to four minutes. There is a lot of difference in both.

Mr Heng Chiang Meng (Cheng San GRC): A point of clarification, Sir. The Member for Potong Pasir just said about the constitution of England. If I remember my history correctly, I believe that England does not have a constitution. Perhaps he can show us one.

The Leader of the House (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Mr Speaker, Sir, I just want to make a clarification on Mr Chiam saying that he did not sign or initial the Report. Under the procedures, there is no need for any Member to sign the Report. It is the Chairman's Report of the Committee that is presented to Parliament.

I remember that at the last but one meeting when this detailed Report was discussed, Mr Chiam was not present. Neither was I, but I applied for leave. He did not apply for leave. At the last meeting when we met to confirm the Report, it was only at the conclusion of our meeting that Mr Chiam appeared at the meeting.

Mr Speaker: Yes, Mr Chiam, do you want to respond to Mr Heng?

Mr Chiam See Tong: I thank the Leader of the House for his clarification in regard to the Report, ie, the Chairman's Report is presented to Parliament.

Sir, the hon. Member should surely know that England has a constitution. But its constitution is unwritten. It is called an unwritten constitution based on its customs, its traditions and all the precedents that go before it. So it is wrong to say that England has got no constitution.

Mr Heng Chiang Meng: Sir, if I may beg your indulgence, I think there is a lot of difference between a Constitution like, let us say, the United States, that has one, and England, that has an unwritten set of rules which they take it as a convention through history and customs.

Another point that I would also like to make is that in the struggle of powers between the King of England and the people, if you remember, it was not between the King and the people. The people were never involved at all. It was always between the King and the noblemen which led in 1215 to the signing of the Magna Cartar that started the erosion of power of the King.

Dr Koh Lam Son (Telok Blangah): Mr Speaker, Sir, the issue of nominated MPs is perhaps the most important single topic that this House has had to debate. It has seen strong views for and against and I believe many Members have made abundantly clear where they stand and in no uncertain manner. I would therefore like to express my sincere thanks to the First Deputy Prime Minister for allowing the incorporation of the very broad views of MPs.

The Select Committee in its recommendations has indeed provided us with a studied document that inevitably provokes further debate and discussion. While I express my general support for NMPs, I have, however, some reservations. Let me begin with the issue that has popularly become known as the "sunset" or "self-destruct" clause. It has been adapted at the suggestion of the First Deputy Prime Minister himself to allow each Parliament the discretion to determine whether it wishes to appoint NMPs. This recommendation I fully support. But because I consider this as an all important issue, I would like to ask if such a motion would require only a simple majority or a two-thirds majority. After all, it is a Constitutional amendment. And also like Dr Arthur Beng, I would like to know whether the Whip could be lifted so that Members can vote in good conscience?

I move next to the procedure of selection of NMPs. I grant that it would be cumbersome to have all MPs elect NMPs. I would like to request not for a secret ballot, but that as many MPs be allowed to participate in the consultation process and not limit that to the Members of the Special Select Committee. And I think that the list of possible NMPs should be circulated to all MPs for views and comments if they want to give. For instance, I may feel strongly for or against one nominee. But because I may not be a Member of the Special Select Committee or a Member approached by the Committee, does it mean that what I may have to say will go unheard? With regard to the Special Select Committee, which is going to be all powerful for it will decide who will take seats in this House, my hope is that it will be as representative as possible.

I next move to the issue of who should be considered for NMPs. I think it is laudable that distinguished citizens be invited to sit in this House to express their views. But I am not so sure about those that are going to be non-partisan or those having non-partisan views. I believe the idea is to have people who are not bound by party positions or intentions. But the Select Committee then goes on to state that even if a person has political affiliations, he need not necessarily be influenced or lose his objectivity. I find this a little difficult to accept. Surely a person who has joined a party must be influenced to some extent, otherwise he would not have sought membership of that particular party. The point I want to make is, everyone of us is going to be partisan at some time in our lives. So to avoid confusion, leave out the term "non-partisan" and seek only distinguished citizens to be considered as NMPs.

One further confusion. The Bill seeks to introduce NMPs who technically can hold office. For example, we might find a distinguished citizen from the world of finance who does so well during his tenure as an NMP that the government of the day invites him to become Minister for Finance. Again, laudable, we have a top brain. But how ironic, he will not be allowed to vote on the very Bills that he will be seeking to introduce into this House.

Finally, I come to what must be considered the most crucial aspect of this Bill and I ask Members of this House to ponder over this very carefully. We are inviting those distinguished citizens who for some reason do not want to go through the election process and become Members of this House in the elected manner. But they are capable of serving the country and we welcome their contributions. The Special Select Committee invites such a person to be an NMP and he accepts. That is a privilege that we Members of this House accord him. And he has all the rights of Members, except those which are spelt out. As it stands, he might even be invited to hold high office. But we provide him one more privilege that we ourselves do not have. We allow him, once he has tasted the powers and privileges of Parliament, to stand for a by-election as an independent without having to give up his seat. He loses the by-election but tomorrow both victor and vanquished are in this House. Why? Because we have allowed this NMP to have the cake and eat it as well.

Surely Members of this House must recognise this as a gross injustice to the whole parliamentary procedure. If an NMP wants to contest a by-election, he must accept the verdict of the people. If he wins as an independent, well and good. He is most welcome as a representative of the people. But if he loses, does he have a moral right to resume his seat in this House as an NMP? As it stands now, it will be perfectly within his right to return to this House the day after his defeat in a by-election. I strongly object to this in principle and I hope Members of this House will share my view.

Mr Charles Chong (Sembawang GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for giving me this opportunity to comment on the Select Committee's Report. I shall not go into the principles of the nominated MP scheme, because I feel that this issue has been more than adequately debated during the Second Reading. However, I would like to comment on details of implementation of the scheme and the Select Committee's recommendations. The Select Committee has recommended that the Bill be amended to allow each Parliament to decide if it wants to have nominated MPs. I support this recommendation as being more preferable to the "self-destruct" clause or "sunset" clause. The addition of a self-destruct clause would definitely imply a lack of confidence or a lack of commitment in the Bill. If the choice of having nominated MPs is left to each Parliament to decide, I can visualize three possible scenarios where future Parliaments may decide to have nominated MPs.

The first scenario is when the ruling party is returned with such a slim majority that it would feel compelled to appoint six like-minded nominated MPs in order to give itself a more comfortable majority. It is for this reason that I support the provision in the Bill that limits the voting rights of the nominated MPs to that applicable to the Non-Constituency MPs.

The second scenario is when the ruling party has such an overwhelming majority that it can afford to appoint six nominated MPs who hold independent or opposing views to that of the Government. If this is done, I think public satisfaction will be enhanced as no one likes to see unpopular Bills getting an easy passage through Parliament. It would also put pressure indirectly on the elected MPs to improve their performance because if nominated MPs are perceived to be out performing elected MPs in providing superior arguments and alternative views, then the standing and support for the elected MPs would be diminished. I do not think that any reasonable person could possibly be against the raising of standards in Parliament. Sir, I am of course referring to possible scenarios. Any resemblance to past or existing situations is purely coincidental.

Thirdly, a situation may arise where the ruling party loses a specialist Minister, such as the Finance Minister, Law Minister or even the Minister for Communications and Information. Sir, we should be aware that the most able and efficient among us need not necessarily be considered to be the most popular by the electorate. In situations like these where specialist Ministers are lost in a fit of voter passion there would be an irresistible temptation to appoint specialist NMPs to key positions in order to enhance the Government's ability to govern well.

It would be a sad day if any ruling party has to appoint an office holder who has not been returned by the electorate. However, in my opinion, it would be equally tragic and more damaging if we have to settle for the less competent only because the most able are less popular.

Sir, a precedent has already been established where losers in a general election can still get into Parliament. The Non-Constituency MP scheme allows people who have been rejected by the electorate to enter Parliament as NCMPs. These NCMPs may have a high number of votes but that does not diminish the fact that the majority in the electorate had rejected them. There is no provision in the NCMP scheme that prohibits them from being appointed to political office in Government. Consequently, if we have accepted the NCMP scheme, I can see little possibility of strong moral arguments that can be put forward to object to nominated MPs holding office. I therefore support the recommendation of the Committee that the Bill should not disqualify a nominated MP from holding political office.

On the issue of selection of nominated MPs, I am in agreement that the Bill should be amended to include criteria for the Special Select Committee when it considers the nominations. The criteria recommended by the Select Committee in paragraph 26 of its Report appear to be sufficiently broad to cover all areas where nominated MPs could be drawn.

Sir, it is also important that nominated MPs must have a strong and visible mandate to be in Parliament. The Nominated MP must be perceived by the people to have been selected by their elected representatives acting in their best interests. The elected representatives, of course, refer to MPs who have won a mandate from the people. I therefore agree that the Special Select Committee selecting nominated MPs should comprise solely of elected MPs who ultimately will be accountable to the people.

It is also imperative that the Special Select Committee be required, wherever possible, to consult all the elected Members of Parliament before it takes a final decision on the nominations to be submitted to the President. In order to give added weight to this selection procedure, I would suggest that a provision be written in the Bill stating that if more than 50% of the elected MPs were to object in writing to the appointment of a particular nominated MP, that appointment should not be made.

Sir, on the subject of a nominated MP having to resign or to sever all ties with political parties, I am persuaded by the argument that affiliation to a political party need not affect a person's objectivity. In my relatively short experience in this House I have witnessed occasions when PAP backbenchers have behaved more like Opposition MPs and also when an Opposition MP has sounded more like a PAP backbencher. Consequently, Sir, I do not see the need to require a nominated MP to sever all his political affiliations. The public will be able to make a judgment on the non-partisan character of nominated MPs by the views they express and the way they vote in Parliament.

In taking such a position I find myself at odds with the arguments put forward by the Select Committee for a nominated MP to vacate his seat before contesting a by-election as a candidate for a political party. The argument by the Select Committee was that it would be impossible for a nominated MP to maintain his non-partisan image if he had campaigned vigorously along party lines and that he would be indebted to his party for his nomination and for his financial and other support for his campaign. Sir, if we follow through with this non-partisan image argument to its logical conclusion, then it would be consistent to support the proposal that nominated MPs should sever all links with any political party and that a person who stood unsuccessfully on a party ticket for election should be disqualified from nomination as an NMP. The Select Committee has, however, specifically rejected such a proposal in paragraph 39 of its Report. Instead it expressed a preference to let these matters evolve naturally as constitutional conventions and practice rather than to make any express provision.

Sir, in order to maintain some consistency in argument, I would prefer to let natural evolution also take its course on the issue of an NMP contesting a by-election rather than make an express provision for him to vacate his seat.

Other than that reservation, I support the other recommendations in the Bill.

Encik Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin (Hong Kah GRC): ( In Malay): Mr Speaker, I observe that the nominated MP proposal, when it was first tabled in this House by the First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, drew a lot of attention from Members. The public too gave it a mixed reaction. And the usual argument against the proposal would have it that it is a ploy by the ruling party to augment its voice or reinforce its power, as if there is some ulterior motive behind this.

The GRC proposal and the NCMP scheme, it would be noted, got the same reception when they were first introduced. But once they were implemented, people realise how much advantages they offer in the long term. The lone NCMP in this House, Dr Lee Siew-Choh, must surely be convinced that being a Non-Constituency Member has enabled him to channel opinions on Government policies and convey the people's aspirations, notwithstanding that the Opposition parties had initially rejected the NCMP scheme.

Mr Speaker, the nominated Members of Parliament will have the same role as that of the NCMP, indeed, as that of the other MPs, to express their opinions for the good of society and the nation. More than that, the NMPs when appointed will be able to express their views independently. They must not, I think, align themselves with any political party in this supreme law-making body. I am confident that NMPs will also be vocal and candid, since they will not be obligated to nor fearful of any quarter. I believe this will be a demonstration of the Government's commitment to provide additional avenues for the people to express their sentiments and ideas in this House.

Mr Speaker, in order that the nominated MPs are effective and are truly representative of the people, their appointment must be conducted in a careful and systematic manner. I am very much in agreement with the idea that the appointment should cover people from all fields, individuals, grassroots activists, professionals, as well as activists in the arts and culture. The appointment of arts and culture activists would go towards the realisation of our aim, as stated in the National Agenda, to build excellence in various aspects of life. I think arts and culture can play its role here.

My other hope is that, if possible, at least one of the six NMPs to be appointed should be from a minority group. This NMP would then be able to convey the viewpoints of the minorities without being constrained by party interests, whether of the ruling or the opposition parties.

Mr Speaker, the NCMP scheme and the formation of GRCs demonstrate our political maturity. These amendments were made in the long-term interests of the nation and the society. Though initially they were viewed with reservations by various quarters, both have now been accepted by society, because of the sincere intentions we had when we implemented them. The NMP proposal, too, is in my view part of our process of gaining political maturity. It is meant to prepare us for the challenges of the future, and I believe it is consistent with the desire reflected in our Prime Minister's New Year Message to see the 1990s as the decade when Singapore comes of age as a developed nation.

Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Dr S. Vasoo (Tiong Bahru GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to speak.

Sir, I see the NMP scheme as a political innovation. We should not treat the scheme with despise. I feel that we should give it a try. Unlike the Member for Potong Pasir and the NCMP, Dr Lee Siew-Choh, they have said that it is a regressive step. But I feel that we do not know how it will work and we should in fact give a bold try to this new innovation in the context of Singapore. Sir, the taste of the fruit is by eating it and unless we take it we do not know what it is.

Sir, I support the Select Committee's recommendations for a number of reasons. The NMP scheme will provide a forum for non-partisan viewpoints. It encourages a non-alignment in terms of views and this should be encouraged. We must not forget that there are a lot of people who do not like to engage in party politics or adversarial politics in Singapore. But this does not mean that people do not have viewpoints or ideas. They simply think that politics is not for them. They would like to be allowed to pursue their livelihood without being hampered.

Sir, this silent majority needs to be represented. Their viewpoints must find expression. And I see that the nominated MP scheme will allow for expression of non-partisan ideas and viewpoints. I do not see how the status of Parliament would drop by introducing the nominated MP scheme. I think it will improve the quality of the debate because it will bring fresh faces, new ideas, and new debates to this House. I cannot agree with Mr Chiam or Dr Lee in terms of their viewpoints that it is a regressive step. In fact, I see it is a progressive step forward.

The scheme, as I see it, will enrich our discussion and allow more ideas to be brought into this House. We will be able to encourage more professional men and women of standing to be involved. This will add colour and provide a bridge between different viewpoints. Therefore, a consensus can be forged in this whole process.

Sir, with regard to the Select Committee's recommendations, I suggest that the following points be considered.

Sir, as I see it, in order to maintain the non-partisan nature of the NMP scheme, may I propose that the selection of NMPs be undertaken by Parliamentarians as a whole through a selection process or a secret ballot. This is important because it will be an endorsement of the House for the selection of an NMP. This is necessary, Sir, because Parliamentarians represent various constituencies and constituents, and therefore their endorsement, I would think, would be essentially necessary to provide the credibility for the NMPs to be represented in this House.

Sir, the other point that I would like to raise is NMPs should not be nominated from amongst people who are members of political parties. They should not be involved in party politics. If they do, then I think it becomes less credible because they will then take a partisan viewpoint. In this respect, I should think that they should maintain their neutrality and their non-aligned viewpoints, and to provide the real input that is necessary to the House.

Sir, the other question that I would like to ask the First Deputy Prime Minister is whether professional groups and associations will be allowed some ways in which they could select their potential candidates to be considered for NMPs.

Sir, in conclusion, I see that the NMP scheme is an innovative scheme. It will promote wider representation. It is not a positive step to provide an additional conduit for more viewpoints to find expression.

Mr Goh Chok Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank all Members of Parliament who have spoken this afternoon. I notice that some MPs still have some reservations over certain changes to the original Bill. The points which they addressed have been debated by Members of the Select Committee and I would try to use the points in the Report to persuade those MPs who still have reservations to come on board.

First, on the question of "sunset" clause, Dr Arthur Beng raised the point that if we do not lift the Whip in the next Parliament, it is as good as getting the NMPs accepted not just in this Parliament but also in future Parliaments because MPs who disagree will not have a choice. My approach in this exercise has been to try and persuade as many MPs as possible to come on board. If MPs are prepared to come on board on this issue, I am prepared to let them man the oar on this issue in the next Parliament. In other words, I am prepared to lift the Whip on this particular issue. I think it is fair that MPs should decide at the next Parliament whether they want to have NMPs or not. For this Parliament, I think once we have debated and decided, we should go ahead to appoint the NMPs.

On the question of procedure, I believe some MPs are making heavy weather of the issue. For example, they argue that there should be a secret ballot for NMPs. I do not think the procedure of a secret ballot is superior to the one which we have put in the Select Committee's Report, and that is, for the Special Select Committee to consult, wherever possible and practical, each and every MP, either individually or as a group. In the process of consultation with the MPs, if Members so desire, the Chairman of the Special Select Committee can always do a quiet tally as to their views on particular nominees. In this way, the Special Select Committee actually would be able to know the views of MPs in so far as their support for certain nominees is concerned. And I believe in the process of consultation, views can be made known to the Special Select Committee, whereas if you go through a process of voting, the views of MPs may not be known. It is only an "aye" or a "nay" on particular nominees. I believe the procedure which we have outlined is superior to a simple process of voting in Parliament.

Again, I believe we are over-arguing the point about NMPs having to retire or resign from political parties. I think the point is taken. If a person wishes to be an NMP, he should by convention resign from a political party. I prefer to leave it to convention because I do not want to load the Bill unnecessarily to legally require a person to resign from a political party. I think it is unnecessary. Anybody who wants to come into this House as an NMP, and who has been a member of a political party, should resign. Anyway, the PAP will make sure that if we have such a person who wishes to be considered, and who is in fact considered and selected by the Special Select Committee, that man should resign from the party, so that he can keep his distance from the party, and have his independence in voting and speaking on issues. I believe this convention should also apply to NMPs who wish to stand for by-election.

I do not think there is any purpose served in requiring an NMP who wishes to stand as independent from resigning his position. You can call him opportunistic, wanting the best of both worlds, so be it. But I think a certain convention will evolve over time. If an NMP wishes to stand for elections or a by-election, as a member of a political party, he should resign. But if he wishes to hedge his bet and stand as an independent, I do not think we need to require him to resign. It is entirely up to him. Again, I think convention will evolve over time. I see no real purpose served in requiring him to resign legally. Hence the Select Committee did not make this change to the Bill.

On the more important point of appointment of NMPs to office positions, I can sense the unhappiness of Members of Parliament over this change because it does mean that the Government is looking outside this House, not this Government but perhaps a future government, to appoint certain people into office positions. I can understand their reservations and their unhappiness. But my primary concern is for the good of the nation, and I am not referring to the present Parliament, a point which was missed by Dr Lee Siew-Choh. We have 80 out of 81 MPs in this House and we are going to have in the next Parliament perhaps just as many PAP MPs in this House as now. I see no need for the PAP to appoint a nominated MP into Cabinet.

But let us look further down the road. What are the possible scenarios - 20 years, 30 years? Can you assume that Parliament will always have 80 MPs from which to choose the Cabinet? I do not believe that 30 years down the road, we can still have the same situation. I hope we can, but I am not sure whether we can because success, I think, breeds certain restiveness in the population, and the population may want to vote in more Opposition Members. Or perhaps down the road, an alternative party can emerge and contest with the ruling Party and split the seats more or less half-half, in which case, whoever forms the Government in the future will have only about 40, 41 MPs to choose the Cabinet from. And you can count the number of positions in Cabinet from which such a ruling Party will have to select its Ministers.

There are certain key positions where we should not just have a politician to head the Ministry. We must have the right politician, the man who is capable of doing the job, and the most critical Ministry, in my view, is the Ministry of Finance. I would rather that a government has the flexibility to appoint the right person to be the Minister for Finance than to compel that government to select from whoever is available in the House to be a Minister for Finance, even though he is not the best person. Again, my approach is what is in the interest of the people. If you appoint a rather inadequate person to be the Finance Minister, after four or five years, the economy is mismanaged, your reserves are depleted because of incompetent management, are we better off as a people or are we worse off? I believe we are worse off. And I want to give this flexibility to a future government that may need to have recourse to such an option. This recourse is fair to both parties because we cannot envisage down the road 30 years from now, 40 years from now, who will form the Government and what kind of Parliament we would have. I think it is wise for us to have this flexibility for the future, for the good of Singapore.

I hold the view that what we do is not undemocratic because there are precedents for this. In Thailand, General Chavalit resigned yesterday so that he can be appointed a Minister, and he does not have to go through elections to be a Minister. Thailand is not the only example. In Japan, one can also be appointed as a Minister from outside the Diet, the equivalent of Parliament, and this is provided for in the Constitution of Japan. Its Constitution states that "the Prime Minister shall appoint a Minister of State [that is, Minister]. However, a majority of the number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet." In other words, in Japan which is a democracy, they can appoint non-Diet members to be Ministers, provided the majority still come from the elected representatives.

Those are the main arguments why the Select Committee decided on allowing NMPs to be considered for appointment as office holders. We can look to other countries, eg, the United States, which has a different system. It is not a parliamentary system. But the President has the right to appoint Secretaries of State to assist him. And NMPs do give a future government that additional flexibility which I think will be very useful for Singapore to have.

There were a few other suggestions by other MPs which related to the questions which I have dealt with, eg, by Dr Lau Teik Soon. He suggested that the public should be allowed a say on who should be nominated into Parliament. He asked for the opportunity to be given to members of the public to register their approval or disagreement. I want to remind the House that this is a scheme for nominated MPs. It is not a scheme for elected MPs. So I think we keep the public out. Just leave it to the Special Select Committee and leave it to the MPs who have been elected. Perhaps it is not in the Bill, but I think the Special Select Committee can also consult the Non-Constituency MP in this House. It is entirely up to the Special Select Committee to do so.

Dr Wang Kai Yuen suggested that whether we have NMPs or not should depend on the number of Opposition MPs in this House. It was the point which I think he made in the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill. The answer lies in giving Parliament the discretion to decide on NMPs.

He made the point that a party should not use the NMP scheme to consolidate its position. I have a different view on this. I think it is all right for the parties to consolidate their position by appointing the right people into Cabinet. If the NMPs can make a contribution to the government, that party does consolidate its position. But it does not help that party to have additional numbers to consolidate its position, because on matters of confidence MPs can move a motion of no-confidence against the government, but NMPs have no votes. So the additional NMPs do not help to consolidate the party in charge by having additional numbers in the party, because NMPs would have no votes on motions of confidence.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh again made wild allegations without facts that our mind has been made up on the appointment of somebody into this House. Otherwise why do we provide for this uncertainty in expenditure in the Bill. If he refers to all Bills, he will discover that those are standard wordings, because expenditure cannot be estimated. Yes, we can estimate the allowances that are paid to NMPs precisely, provided we have agreed what the allowance is. But we have not agreed what the allowance is. There will be advertisements, and the procedure itself will incur some costs and those are not at this moment known. But the main point which I want to make is that the NCMP is very fond of making wild suggestions without any basis of facts. I can assure him and this House that we do not have anybody earmarked to be an office holder.

Mr Chiam made some points which actually have been debated during the Second Reading and I do not believe we should go over the same grounds in the Third Reading of this Bill, eg, the essence of democracy is that you must have elected representatives and so on. I think this is the wrong forum for that debate.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe I have covered most of the main reservations or queries of the MPs who have spoken. Again, I urge, take a detached view, approach this from the higher interest of the nation and not on how the NMPs would affect us personally. And despite the reservations, I urge, give this a try and I believe you will see the merits of the scheme and the contributions of the NMPs when they come into this House. And if you are not convinced after trying out this scheme for the remaining period of this Parliament, in the next Parliament you decide. The Whip will be lifted and you can decide how you want the NMP scheme to go in the next Parliament.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, I have a clarification for the First Deputy Prime Minister. It would appear that there is an irreconcilable position. On the one hand, an NMP is said to be non-partisan and, on the other hand, he is allowed to be appointed as a Minister. Once he is appointed as a Minister and he gets into the government, how can he be non-partisan? It is not possible.

Mr Goh Chok Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, there is no real conflict. When an NMP is appointed into Cabinet, it means that the government of the day values the convictions, the judgment and the expertise of that particular NMP. And of course from the government's viewpoint, there must be certain overlapping interests. In other words, the government believes that the NMP's viewpoint coincides with its own generally and can contribute to good government. So the government will appoint him as a Minister. That Minister would not be a member of the political party which runs Singapore. That Minister therefore has more leeway than the other Ministers. He contributes as a Minister but he is not like the other Ministers and he cannot be disciplined or have the Whip imposed upon him. It is entirely up to the NMP who is appointed as a Minister.

It is like a Cabinet where you have a coalition, two or three parties forming a Cabinet. And because the coalition government comes from two or three different parties, they have different viewpoints in Cabinet and one party cannot impose its viewpoint on the other party. There has got to be a compromise. Likewise, when an NMP is appointed into the Cabinet, we would expect that kind of debate or compromise to take place before a policy is accepted. So it is non-partisan in the sense that it is not politically affiliated to a particular party.

Dr Arthur Beng Kian Lam: Mr Speaker, Sir, it is really magnanimous for the First Deputy Prime Minister to allow the Whip to be lifted at the next session. I welcome it. The clarification I would like to ask is this. Besides the Whip being lifted, will we also have an opportunity to review the mechanism? That means if we decide we want to make an amendment so that NMPs will not become Cabinet Ministers, will all these be rediscussed again?

Mr Goh Chok Tong: May I answer that point? I think in Parliament if Members feel strongly over certain issues, Members can always move a motion and have the matter discussed.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Can I have some clarifications, Sir?

Mr Speaker: All right, Dr Lee.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Sir, the First Deputy Prime Minister is very farsighted. He looks 20 or 30 years down the road. I wonder if he can see anything down that far! If he really could, Sir, why the hurry to pass the Bill? In 20 or 30 years he may not be here.

The other thing, Sir, if I should make any so-called allegations, they are not necessarily wild. I only suspect. If the First Deputy Prime Minister disagrees with that and tells me that it is not so, then prove it. In fact, the wild men were the PAP Ministers. If you remember, for those people who are old enough, the first Straits Times photograph of the wild men of the PAP was splashed on the front page of the newspaper in 1959. And they headlined it "Wild Men of Singapore". In it was the Prime Minister.

Mr Goh Chok Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, on the first point why do we introduce the NMP Bill now, I think there is no need for us to go through old grounds. We have argued this point during the debate on the Second Reading on why we want to introduce the NMP Bill now.

I still maintain that Dr Lee Siew-Choh has an unnecessarily suspicious mind and worse, I think he is following the footsteps of his predecessor from the same party over here, going on fishing expeditions, making wild allegations, smearing here and there. And if he is not careful, I think he would go the same way as his predecessor.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Sir, I think the First Deputy Prime Minister should not intimidate Members of the Opposition. I think I have more political experience than Mr Jeyaretnam.

An hon. Member: So that he will be kinder to you!

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Yes, let him be kinder to everybody.

Mr Goh Chok Tong: Mr Speaker, Sir, his point is noted, that he has got more experience than Mr Jeyaretnam on this matter.

Mr Speaker: The Question is, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."

A Division will be taken to ascertain that the Third Reading of the Bill is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament, which is 54 Members, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitution. The Clerk will ring the Division Bells.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."

Division taken: Ayes, 77; No, 1; Abstention, Nil. Ayes Ayes (cont.) Abbas Abu Amin Ng Pock Too Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin Ong Chit Chung Abdullah Tarmugi Ong Teng Cheong Ahmad Mattar Othman bin Haron Eusofe Beng Kian Lam, Arthur Peh Chin Hua Chandra Das, S Seet Ai Mee Chay Wai Chuen Shanmugan, K Chen Seow Phun, John Sia Khoon Seong Chew Heng Ching Sidek bin Saniff Chin Harn Tong Sung, Peter Chng Hee Kok Tan Cheng Bok Ch'ng Jit Koon Tan, Augustine H H Chong, Charles Tan Keng Yam, Tony Choo Wee Khiang Tan Soo Khoon Chua Sian Chin Tan Tee Yong, Philip Davinder Singh Tang Guan Seng Dhanabalan, S Tay Eng Soon Goh Chee Wee Teo Chong Tee Goh Chok Tong Vasoo, S Goh Choon Kang Wan Hussin bin Hj Zoohri Heng Chiang Meng Wan Soon Bee Ho Kah Leong Wang Kai Yuen Ho Tat Kin Wong, Aline K Hu Tsu Tau, Richard Wong Kan Seng Ibrahim Othman Wong Kwei Cheong Jayakumar, S Yap Giau Cheng, Eugene Koh Lam Son Yatiman Yusof Koh Lip Lin Yeo Cheow Tong Lau Ping Sum Yeo Ning Hong Lau Teik Soon Yeo Toon Chia Lee Boon Yang Yeo Yong-Boon, George Lee Hsien Loong Yu-Foo Yee Shoon Lee Kuan Yew Zulkifli bin Mohammed Lee Yiok Seng Lee Yock Suan Leong Horn Kee No Lew Syn Pau Lim Boon Heng Chiam See Tong Lim Chee Onn Loh Meng See Low Seow Chay Abstention Mah Bow Tan Ng Kah Ting Nil

Mr Speaker: The Third Reading of the Bill has been carried by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament.

Bill accordingly read a Third time and passed.