CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT NO. 3) BILL

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Order for Second Reading read.

The First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

On 29th July 1988, some four years after the Prime Minister first broached the subject, I introduced in this House a White Paper on "Constitutional Amendments to Safeguard Financial Assets and Integrity of the Public Services". It proposed that the President be elected by the people, and be vested with the powers to undertake these twin tasks.

On 11th August, Mr Lim Boon Heng, Member for Kebun Baru, moved:

'That this House supports the principles set out in the White Paper .... as the basis for preparing a Bill for the Elected President'.

The motion was adopted, after an extensive debate over two days, in which more than 20 MPs participated, including Ministers and the Opposition MP. That debate was helpful in focusing minds on the principles of the proposal, and in helping us to finalize the scheme. Many of the comments made during that debate by MPs had been taken into account, as you can see from the second White Paper.

On 27th August this year, we published the second White Paper setting out the changes we have made to the original proposal. The Bill we are debating today is based on the second White Paper.

We have taken a long time to finalize this Bill. That is as it should be since we are making a fundamental modification to our parliamentary system of government. We want to be sure that our proposal for a safeguard mechanism for financial prudence and public sector integrity is workable and the best. And we are ready for further suggestions to improve on our proposal.

I intend to submit this Bill to a Select Committee so that members of the public can give their views. After we have heard their views, we hope, if possible, to have the Bill enacted before the end of this year.

Objective of the Bill

The Bill provides for an Elected President to safeguard the reserves and integrity of the public services. Specifically, the President will have:

(a) the right to veto the annual budgets of the Government, statutory boards and key Government companies, if they draw down reserves accumulated during the terms of previous governments;

(b) the right to veto key public service appointments; and

(c) safeguard roles with respect to the Internal Security Act, the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, and CPIB.

Philosophy of Government

I do not propose to elaborate on the rationale for the concept of an Elected President as this is clearly spelt out in pages 2 and 3 of the White Paper dated 27th August 1990, and as Members have already debated and endorsed the two-key concept to safeguard our reserves and the integrity of the public services last year. Nor do I propose to go into those aspects of the Bill which have been thoroughly debated in this House in that same debate. Instead, I want to highlight the underlying philosophy of government which this Bill reflects, and the new aspects which were not in the original proposal.

My Cabinet colleagues and I believe that a good system of government must have checks and balances. There are inadequate checks in our present parliamentary system of government. Of course, where the Government acts unlawfully, ultra vires the Constitution or the laws, one can have recourse to the courts. But our Constitution does not provide any checks on lawful Government decisions or conduct which are excesses against the best interest of our nation. There is no Upper House, no Council of Rulers, or the equivalent of the United States Federal Reserve Board, to debate and consider, and if necessary, to restrain or even veto the activities of a government which are clearly detrimental to national interest.

Ours is a unicameral system of government, which is this House. A political party which holds the majority number of seats in this House forms the government.

It can do practically anything it wishes, provided it acts lawfully, with the financial assets and reserves of the country, and the appointment of officers to key civil service positions. So long as the Government has a majority in Parliament, even if it is a majority of one, it can pass any Supply Bill, ie, the budget, it wants. The Opposition can query, but it cannot stop an extravagant budget from being passed, one which draws down on reserves. The Government can also stop practising meritocracy in the appointment and promotion of public officers, and instead practise nepotism and cronyism. There is nothing to stop or prevent the Government from doing that. It is entirely within the right of any government if it wants to change the system of promoting officers in the public sector. But if it does so, it will very quickly bring down the high standards of competence and integrity which we have diligently built up over the years. Of course, the Opposition can and should expose all these misdeeds of the government and have the government thrown out at the next general election. But one term of bad government is enough to bankrupt the country.

We are singularly lucky that able and honest men were in charge of Singapore for the last 31 years. They have not abused their powers. They have worked the parliamentary system very well. And because they have worked the system very well, this has caused some people to conclude that there is nothing wrong with the present system and that we should therefore leave things alone - do not make any modifications to the Constitution or to the system. But in my view, the marvellous working of our parliamentary system is due less to the merits of the system than to the integrity and quality of the people working it. And while honest men are still in charge, it is prudent for us to institute a system of checks and balances in our political system, instead of banking on good fortune to throw up good governments for the next 30 years. Dishonest men who aspire for power will, I believe, never propose this Bill. They will never propose any amendment to our Constitution to safeguard our financial assets and reserves and the integrity of the public services. They will not want any check and balance to the present parliamentary system of government.

Our view is different. We feel that as an elected government, we are no more than trustees of the people's wealth. We are custodians of their future. We are not here to exercise powers for our own interest. We are here to exercise them judiciously and always in the best interests of those who have elected us. That is why we are putting right a flaw in the political system which we think may tempt an unscrupulous government to exploit for its own benefit. It is fatal naivety to believe that we will always have good and honest governments merely because we have not encountered a bad one in the last 31 years.

Bear in mind that in introducing this Bill, the present Government is in fact clipping its own wings. Once the Constitutional amendment is effected, this Government will have some of its powers checked. The new Prime Minister will need to seek the concurrence of the President in certain key areas of government. I will be the first Prime Minister to be subject to these new checks and safeguards. And I am the one introducing these safeguards. True, the idea of an Elected President came from Mr Lee, but the concept and details were worked out by my Cabinet colleagues and me. We took many years of intensive discussions to thrash out the details and I can say that the Bill that is before this House represents the unanimous view of my Cabinet colleagues.

We have to work this new system of check and balance, not Mr Lee. And it is therefore important that we are the ones to settle the details of the Bill, not Mr Lee.

This Bill will not diminish my capacity or freedom to govern Singapore because when I take over in November, my Government has not the slightest intention of using the financial reserves accumulated by Mr Lee Kuan Yew's government to finance wasteful, unproductive programmes and projects. Neither will my Government depart from the cherished principle of appointing the best officers to key jobs on merits assessed by an impartial Public Service Commission. So long as any government abides by the principles of financial prudence and meritocracy in governing Singapore, this Bill will not have any real effect on it.

Additional Checks on Government

It is this same desire of wanting to check potential abuse of power which prompts us to introduce additional checks on the Government in three new areas, not mentioned in the first White Paper. These relate to ISA, the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and CPIB investigations.

In 1989, the Government amended the Internal Security Act to make it clear that the judgment of whether a person was a security threat rested with the Executive and not with the courts. In other words, such judgment of the Government is not justiciable. During the debate, some MPs while agreeing with this, nevertheless were concerned over possible abuse of the ISA powers by the Government. I replied that the solution cannot be judicial review but having another political body to exercise judgment and provide the check and balance.

The Bill provides for the Elected President to play this safeguard role. At present, ISA detainees are entitled to appear before an Advisory Board, chaired by a Supreme Court judge. The Board recommends to the Minister whether the detainee should be further detained, but the Minister legally is not obliged to follow the Board's advice. With the Constitutional amendment, if the Board recommends that a detainee be released, but the Minister still wants to detain him, he will need the agreement of the President. The President serves as a check on the Minister. He will have to exercise political judgment on the merits of the case and over-rule the Minister if he thinks that should be done.

The President will have a similar role with respect to any Prohibition Order which the Minister may issue under the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, to restrain persons from causing ill-will between religions, and from mixing religion with politics. This Bill provides for a Presidential Council on Religious Harmony which functions like the Advisory Board under ISA. The Council advises the Minister on the Prohibition Order. The Minister cannot simply disregard its advice. If he wishes to act contrary to the advice, he must seek the concurrence of the President. Again, here the President provides a check on the powers of the Minister.

The Constitution Amendment Bill also enables the Director of CPIB to deal direct with the President on complaints of corruption against a Minister should the Prime Minister withhold his consent for the CPIB to mount investigations. This direct access of CPIB to the President is another check against possible abuse of powers by a corrupt government.

Let me stress here, however, that the Bill does not transfer the power of govern- ment to the Elected President, nor vest in him absolute veto power. Firstly, even though the President is elected by the people, he is not the Head of Government. He is the Head of State. He is not the Chief Executive of the country. The Prime Minister is. The initiative and responsibility of governing Singapore stays with the Prime Minister. Secondly, the President can override the government only in certain well-defined areas: use of reserves not accumulated by the Government, key appointments in the public services, detentions under ISA, Prohibition Orders under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill when it is passed, and certain investigations by CPIB. Thirdly, there are also checks on the Elected President.

These checks on the President are spelt out in pages 8 to 10 of the White Paper

The Bill provides for the establishment of a "Council of Presidential Advisors". The President, Chairman, PSC and the Prime Minister will each nominate two members, making a total of six.

The President must consult the Council when exercising his discretion to approve or veto budgets of the Government. On other matters he may consult the Council.

When the President disapproves of the budget of Government, ie, Supply and Supplementary Supply Bills, his decision is final only if it is supported by a majority of the Council members. If the majority advises against his vetoing of the Government budget, he can still do so, but in this case the Government can choose either to submit a new budget to him for approval or have the vetoed budget voted on again in Parliament. That means the old budget can come back to Parliament. And if Parliament supports the budget by a two-thirds majority, the President's veto is overridden.

This overriding mechanism by Parliament is confined only to Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills because these Bills originate from Parliament. It does not apply to the budget of a Government company or statutory board, or to appointments in the public services, because these matters do not come under the direct purview of Parliament. If there is a dispute here, the executive and the President will have to resolve it, through fresh submissions of budgets and nominees for appointments.

Now, let me deal with another amendment that is unrelated to the proposal to have an Elected President. Clause 7 seeks to amend Article 39A of the Constitution to change the number of candidates contesting in an election in a group representation constituency (GRC) from a minimum of three to a maximum of four. This change is made to provide for flexibility in dealing with a GRC whose population is growing rapidly. Take, for example, Tampines GRC. Tampines GRC has an electorate of 65,000 in the 1988 General Election. By 1993, the electorate is expected to grow to 76,000. Instead of breaking up such a GRC, this amendment will allow the GRC to be retained intact and yet allow it to be adequately serviced by an additional MP. That means four MPs serving this enlarged GRC electorally. Such flexibility will be especially helpful to town councils as there will be some permanence to the areas falling under their charge. Consequential amendments will have to be made to the Parliamentary Elections Act following this amendment to Article 39A.

Let me summarise the main points of my speech We are seeking to improve our Parliamentary system of Government by introducing a check and balance mechanism on the powers of the Government in certain key areas which are vital to Singapore's long-term prosperity and survival.

The key areas are Singapore's financial reserves and the integrity of the civil service.

Through prudent financial management over the last 31 years, the present Government has accumulated over $30 billion. These back the value of the Singapore dollar and the savings that we all have in CPF, POSB and the banks. If these reserves are frittered away, on unwise programmes and wasteful projects, the Singapore dollar will be debased, our savings reduced in real value, and confidence lost in Singapore. If the integrity of the public services is also compromised, by a government which places nepotism and cronyism above merit and honesty, the damage that that government inflicts on Singapore will be extensive, deep and permanent.

The possibility of a weak or bad government ruining Singapore for good is not a theoretical one. It can happen. It has happened to many other countries but it will be invidious for me to name them. We have not met such misfortunes so far, but let us not stretch our luck. Let us, while we have assets and reserves to safeguard, institutionalise a system of checks and balances, even if it means curtailing our own powers. A good government loses nothing with this amendment to the Constitution. But a bad government will find its harmful actions curbed. More importantly, the people lose nothing with this Bill to provide for an Elected President. Instead, they have all to gain, as it is their savings and future which this Bill seeks to protect.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr S. Chandra Das (Cheng San GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, my own view on this subject had been adequately expressed when I spoke in this House on 11th August 1988 when the subject was debated. I think it would be sufficient for me to restate that the case for a device to protect our reserves is watertight. However, this afternoon, I would like to take this opportunity to speak in my capacity as Chairman of the Feedback Unit and share with you the frank and candid and, at times, passionate views on what a number thought about the proposed changes to the Constitution. Sir, these views were gathered at a dialogue session with a cross-section of members of our population. Amongst them were lawyers, accountants, company directors, teachers, academicians as well as grassroots leaders. Sir, in fact, a number of them expressed reservations about this proposal.

Firstly, Sir, I am glad to report that all the people who spoke did not quarrel with the objectives behind the Bill. They do recognise the need to protect our hard-earned reserves and the integrity of the public service. They accept that there should be some form of checks and balances on the ruling government to prevent abuses which are possible. Sir, in the words of one participant, the present Government, which now holds more than 95% of the seats in this House, and to think of checks and balances on its own powers, is indeed very commendable.

However, upon examination of some of the specific provisions of the Bill, there is a general feeling that too much power is being invested in the hands of one person. Even though the Elected President cannot initiate executive powers, his veto powers will be enough, in a situation when he disagrees with the Government, to lead to a deadlock in the administration. This could end up in turmoil and political instability and this would affect business confidence which will be detrimental to our economy as a whole.

The system proposed is based on the premise that there is a possibility that the electorate will vote in a bad government, hence the Elected President to check on this bad government. On the other hand, some felt that it is also possible, though less likely, that the electorate will vote in a wrong candidate also for an Elected President. The wide-ranging powers vested in him could then gravely damage the system. What could also happen is that the Elected President and the Prime Minister could also collude with each other for mutual benefit. There is a real fear amongst some that in spite of the elaborate process of selection, a wrong candidate can be selected. The criteria to be adopted to shortlist the candidates do not, in their view, generally guarantee that the right candidate will always be selected.

Sir, given the wide-ranging powers that the Elected President will be given and the scope they cover, the Elected President in fact will have to be very knowledgeable and experienced in many fields, from law to economics to religion, notwithstanding the fact that he is having an advisory council. This may lead one to wonder whether there will always be a suitable candidate for the post. There is no doubt, many felt, that our Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, will be an ideal candidate. But what about in the longer term? This worried a number of participants. The Chief Justice, some felt, may be an expert in law but his understanding of Supply Bills and for him to apply his judgment correctly would be in doubt when he gets elected as Elected President. Hence, some people have the opinion, and some felt quite strongly, that this Bill has been designed specifically for the benefit of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

It was also felt by some that the criteria for selection would invariably narrow the choice of candidates to those who have been through the top echelons of the establishment. Being from the establishment, it is unlikely that the candidate would stand in opposition to the ruling party. It was felt that there could be candidates from outside the establishment who would have the moral fibre to fill the post and may be able to act as a more effective check on the Government. Sir, a person of great moral conviction would be needed as Elected President to stand up to the present PAP Government.

Sir, while the candidate must have the necessary experience and qualification for the job, several members felt that what is more important is that the candidate for Elected President, apart from technical competence, must possess moral courage to stand up against the Government when required. Many felt that the qualifications listed do not spell this out quite clearly. Also, as the President is a symbol of unity for the nation, he must not belong to any political party as this would erode the prestige and respect accorded to the post.

Mr Speaker, Sir, some felt that it is unfortunate that this Bill is introduced at a time when the transfer of premiership to Mr Goh Chok Tong is imminent. There were comments that either the new leadership is not confident of itself or that our older leaders have doubts about the capability of the new generation leaders and the electorate. The Bill seems to indicate to some people that, apart from the Prime Minister, there is no one else equally capable of running the country. It also gives some the impression that the ruling Party, through the Elected President, is trying to prevent an opposition from establishing itself since the potential candidate for the Presidency will be coming from the ruling Party. Hence, pushing the Bill through at this time would be bad for the image of the new generation leaders.

Sir, while there were those who did not favour the Bill, I must also say that there were others who supported it and even felt that the Bill did not go far enough. They felt that for the powers of the Elected President to be limited to only withholding assent would neither be here nor there. More specific veto powers could be given in some areas if there is unanimous agreement of the Presidential Council. The President could also be allowed further powers to prevent the Government from suspending elections or re-drawing constituency boundaries for its benefit.

Sir, since the Bill introduces a fundamental change to the Constitution, and which will have wide-ranging implications that will bind future generations, many felt that this Bill should be debated very thoroughly in this House. Some members of the legal profession also felt that the Law Society should be invited to comment on this Bill. I have since discussed this with the Minister for Law and he is quite happy to receive representations from the Law Society. I think other professional bodies, like the Society of Accountants and so on, should also be invited specifically, since there are financial implications on this Bill, to give their views on this subject. Some also suggested that maybe the First Deputy Prime Minister should lift the Whip so that Members can vote without restraint. Sir, there was also a strong request for a national referendum, since the Elected President will be empowered to call for one in the future.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am gratified to note that the First Deputy Prime Minister will be committing this Bill to a Select Committee. The Feedback Unit will encourage as many Singaporeans as possible to make direct representations to this Select Committee as this is an important Bill. Many have got away with the impression that maybe at the Select Committee it will only be looking at the full-stops and the commas. I am sure if substantive contributions can be made, the Select Committee would be quite prepared to make whatever changes that will improve the Bill.

Dr Arthur Beng Kian Lam (Fengshan): Mr Speaker, Sir, I agree with the First Deputy Prime Minister that good government is one where there is always a good system of "checks and balances". Checks and balances will indeed be the cliche of this system. This allows the government of the day, duly elected by the people, to function decisively and effectively. However, any government, once it is in power, may abuse its powers. Here is where a system of checks and balances is to be encouraged. This is the more significant in Singapore where we have a unicameral system of Parliament with no Upper House. The fact that we have had clean government to this day does not mean that we should be blinded, and not take steps to put in place a system of "checks and balances". This Bill seeks to do just that. Thus, it is the Elected President who will be entrusted with the duty of protecting the Republic's financial assets and preserving the integrity of the public services. Mr Speaker, Sir, I fully support these principles which will set in place a "two-key safeguard mechanism".

As the Chairman of the Feedback Unit has said, coming at this time of political transition and being introduced by those who will be subjecting themselves to this system of checks and balances is the best testimony to the credibility of the new team. However, some cynics see this as a slight or mistrust of the new team. This comment, in my view, is most unfair and uncalled for.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the first question that I would like to address is how this legislation will affect the system of parliamentary democracy that we have been accustomed to. Under our present system, we have three pillars or institutions of State: Parliament (the legislative arm), Cabinet (the executive arm), and the Judiciary (the Courts). With this legislation, we will introduce a fourth pillar - that of the office of the Elected President with the Council of Presidential Advisors. The Elected President will not be a mere ceremonial figure, but he will have real, but limited, executive powers. However, his role will be a custodian role, that is, he can refuse to give his concurrence to the Prime Minister under certain circumstances. He can refuse to concur or agree, but he cannot be the initiator. This fourth pillar, I believe, will enhance and strengthen our present system, yet not dilute the parliamentary process.

Sir, this new White Paper and Bill also extend the President's role to cover the Internal Security Act and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill. Both these legislations are not subject to judicial review, and thus the Elected President will be another check on ministerial powers. Likewise, the powers of the Elected President will extend to the CPIB. This is yet another additional check. I support these additional checks on our system.

What of the role of the Council of Presidential Advisors? It is my contention that the Council of Advisors has a very important role to play. It is to advise and act as a balancing force between the President and the Prime Minister. Under the earlier proposal (the 1988 White Paper), if the President disapproves of the executive's proposed expenditure and this impasse is not resolved, an election either of the President or the Government would be forced. The new proposal is less drastic. There is now a conditional Presidential veto over-ride mechanism in the form of the Council of Presidential Advisors. The Council is now intended to be a check on the Presidential veto power. In the event of a difference between the President and the Prime Minister, it has a "casting vote" or "casting veto". If the Council votes with the President, the Presidential veto carries the day. If not, the Prime Minister can refer the matter to Parliament to be ratified by a two-thirds majority.

In this regard, the Council is vested with more powers than was envisaged earlier in 1988. A body with such potential power of influence over events affecting Singapore should be made up of competent, honest and responsible persons accountable to the populace. Other than the safeguard in the form of minimum qualifications for membership, its members should satisfy the litmus test of Parliament's approval. The Chairman of this proposed body should be someone nominated by the President but acceptable to this House.

Mr Speaker, Sir, you will recall in the 1988 White Paper, the Chairman is the Vice-President who is elected. The Chairman's tenure of office should also be secured. This mechanism can only give effect to the views expressed in the 1988 White Paper, and reaffirmed in the 1990 White Paper, that "The President's exercise of his custodial powers therefore ultimately cannot prevail if both the government and the electorate clearly demonstrate they want to spend the assets".

Sir, some people believe that the legislation is inadequate as it does not bar the President from remaining a member of a political party. Let us examine this further and remind ourselves that the President has to be elected. Mr Speaker, Sir, we have all gone through the election process and up to this day - there is no nominated MP here - all of us have been elected and we all know the mammoth task involved in elections in a constituency. Now, let us extrapolate this task to the Presidential Election. If there is not a political party to provide this mechanism, can anyone stand for election as a "one-man show"? It is possible of course. Everything is possible, but I think most improbable. If we now demand that after the Presidential Election, he cuts off ties from the party, will it be a change of substance or form? It is my view that it will be a purely "cosmetic" front. If the Elected President is the man that we expect him to be, a man able to stand in disagreement with the Cabinet, he must be a man of strong convictions.

What is it then that will be the best safeguard for this system? An informed and intelligent electorate who will be able to select a Presidential candidate who will be best able to safeguard the national interests. That is the answer. The answer is not in legislation to divorce the Presidency and politics. That will be extremely difficult. Of course, if one works on the premise that you cannot trust the electorate to vote wisely, then the answer will be different. But I disagree with this.

Finally, Sir, I would like to end by asking the First Deputy Prime Minister to elaborate to this House on the make-up of the Presidential Elections Committee. This is an important Committee which will help decide who is qualified to be an Elected President. We must ensure that this will be a fair and objective committee made up of persons who will give all contenders for the office of Elected President a fair hearing.

Mr Chin Harn Tong (Aljunied GRC): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill.

The concept of an Elected President was first mooted by the Prime Minister in his 1984 National Day Rally speech. Since then, six years have elapsed and both inside and outside this House many people have discussed and debated this issue, and now is the time for the matter to be settled.

The first White Paper on the Elected Presidency gave certain powers to the Elected President to safeguard the national assets and the integrity of the public services. This is a very important role which is crucial to the development of Singapore. Now, the powers to be given to the Elected President will be expanded. Apart from supervision over the implementation of the Internal Security Act, they also cover the implementation of the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and the supervision over the work of the CPIB. Therefore, we must be very cautious and careful in selecting the candidate for the Elected President and we must also set very stringent conditions for the candidature.

Recently, the Prime Minister accepted an interview by the Ming Pao Daily of Hong Kong and he indicated that the new generation had its own new problems. And perhaps because of differences in opinion, there is a possibility of some fractionalisation and, therefore, we feel a bit concerned and should be alert to the development of the future.

Mr Speaker, Sir, not long ago, two Parliamentary colleagues of mine had queried whether the colour of the uniform of the PAP, which is completely white, should be changed. Although this is just a small matter on the change of colour, it does give me a very great shock. I feel that this is a question of basic principle. Perhaps the PAP's uniform may change in pattern and design, but the spirit can never be changed at all. If we disregard this principle, then what I would worry about is that in future there may be people who want to propose a change to the emblem of the PAP. There may be even people who want to make use of the reserves which we have accumulated through hardship over the past years.

According to last year's report of the Ministry of Finance, our reserves have reached over $30 billion. Twenty years ago, we had just a mere $2.5 billion. This is of course a very large and sizeable asset. I believe that our new generation of leaders has the capability to protect this asset. I have confidence in them. I also have confidence that they have the capability to develop further and increase our assets. But what about the future? This is a common area of concern to all of us. In this light, the election of the President is a very important matter. Our achievements that we have made today are attributed to one of the main factors, and that is, we are able to select the best people to serve in the most suitable positions and to give maximum play to their capabilities and achieve the best results. According to an old saying, "to do a job well, we must select the wise and the capable". Not only should we select the wise and the capable, we must select the wisest and the most capable. The Elected President is a very, very important office and we must, all the more, handle this matter in a very serious manner.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Prime Minister Lee has great talent, wisdom and a good wealth of experience. He has far-sightedness and good judgment and he is also a very pragmatic person. He has not only been acclaimed by the whole of our country but also great praise from all over the world. He is a world-class political leader. If we look around our political circles, our enterprises and so on, we find that the Prime Minister is the most suitable person to be the Elected President.

Mr Speaker, Sir, when the idea of the Elected Presidency was first officially taken up, many people said that this was all tailored for Prime Minister Lee. I feel that we should not brush aside this kind of talk. We should not be influenced by this kind of talk so as to change our consistent policy. We should be prepared to step forward and explain that the Elected Presidency is not tailored for Prime Minister Lee. This institution is being taken up to ensure that our future generation will continue to enjoy stability, social harmony and the rich assets that we have had, in future. We should also indicate that, in the present context of Singapore, the Prime Minister is the best candidate for the Elected Presidency. If the Prime Minister is prepared to serve in this office, then it will be most fortunate for the country and the people.

Mr Davinder Singh (Toa Payoh GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill because of its message to our investors as well as the second chance that it gives to the people of Singapore. We are heavily dependent on foreign investments. They are our life-blood. A stable political climate attracts the best of these investments and the success of these ventures by the creation and distribution of wealth in turn contributes to that stability.

Investment decisions are based on a number of factors. One is the integrity, prudence and economic orientation of the Government. Another is the support which the Government enjoys from its people. Investors always have an eye out for the next general elections and they tend to keep themselves well informed about the moods of the electorate. So long as there is stability, so long as the government of the day creates circumstances which are right for investment and for business, and so long as the system is sound, honest and effective, investments will stay and more will come. But these are, if you like, big "ifs". There is no certainty, because the system has to be renewed as it were every four to five years. It must have the mandate of the people. And if the government of the day which has created or continued that system, whether it be this Government or any other government, is voted out, then I believe that foreign investors will transfer their assets elsewhere, and together with them, will go our economic future.

There may come a time in Singapore when the government, which is voted into power because of its different priorities, may have an economic orientation which is not identical to that which this Government boasts of. And that may be a PAP Government, it may be a non-PAP government, it may be an alliance. One of two things will then happen. The people will be happy with the result or the people will not. If they are happy with it, then the incumbent President, who is obstructive, can be voted out in favour of one who is supportive of the policies of the government of the day, or in fact with the requisite majority, even legislated out of existence. However, if the people are not happy with the government which they have voted into power, then what this Bill does, in my view, is to give them a second chance, a chance to force fresh elections, by voting in a President who is likely to block the policies of that government. In my view, if you have a President, who does not see eye to eye with the government, a deadlock must ensue with the result that the government must call for fresh elections for a bigger mandate.

The Bill, therefore, gives the people of Singapore a chance to either confirm or revoke the mandate that has been given to the government during the general elections. I accept that this process will cause some disruption. But balance that against the loss of investor confidence which will come about, if investors perceive on the horizon a risk of political instability because the people, who are unhappy with the government, cannot do anything about it for at least four to five years.

To give optimal effect to this Bill, I would, therefore, recommend that instead of the scheme of Presidential elections every six years, we ought to consider elections within a stated or fixed period after the general elections, six to twelve months, for example. The reason is this. It gives Singaporeans sufficient time to consider whether they wish to stand by their decisions during the general elections or whether they wish to revoke it. And it should not be a long time either because it limits the time within which any damage can be done. I support the Bill.

Mr Chew Heng Ching: Sir, I asked a young Singaporean lawyer for his opinion regarding the plan to give more powers to the Elected President. He told me frankly that he did not see the need for an Elected President in Singapore. I asked him why. His immediate reaction was: why change the system that had worked so well for the past 31 years? When I asked him if he realised that the amount of reserves which the PAP Government had accumulated through prudent government in the last 31 years could vanish overnight by a future irresponsible Government, seeking short-term popularity, squandering the savings built over the decades, by turning Singapore into a welfare state. When I asked him this question, he raised his eyebrows.

Sir, I believe the view of this young Singaporean lawyer reflects the complacency among many a young Singaporean today. He seems contented and tends to take success for granted. He assumes good, honest, effective Government will be here to stay, in perpetuity.

Sir, I support the Bill before us. To me, it is a very important Bill because it involves a fundamental change to the system of government here. The proposed change serves as a safeguard for the future. It is also an insurance against bad or irresponsible Government. To me, it reflects an on-going effort by the present PAP Government to build in checks and balances and to preserve and strengthen our political institutions for the long-term benefits of Singapore and Singaporeans.

Sir, under the Bill, the President will be advised by a six-member Presidential Council, two of whom are to be appointed by the President himself, two by the Prime Minister and two by the Chairman, PSC. The President, as the First Deputy Prime Minister had said, must consult the Council when exercising his discretion to approve or veto budgets of the Government, statutory boards and key Government companies. In practice, the President will also consult the Council on all other matters where he has discretionary powers, such as key public service appointments, the Internal Security Act, CPIB investigations and religious harmony.

Sir, this Presidential Council has, therefore, a very important role to play. It is indeed a very powerful Council. It, de facto, acts like a Senate or an Upper House of Parliament. The Members who form the Council must, therefore, be able and well-qualified men or women of the highest standing and integrity. Article 37D in clause 6 of the Bill only states that they must be Singaporeans of not less than 35 years of age.

Sir, the Bill contains stringent criteria for any Singaporean aspiring to be an Elected President. But it is seemingly silent on the criteria for any Singaporean aspiring to be an advisor to the President. Sir, I think the Bill should be more specific and to state clearly the qualification criteria for Singaporeans wanting to serve in the Council. We could argue that, in practice, members appointed to serve in the Council would be Singaporeans of good standing since they would be appointed by the President himself, the Prime Minister and the Chairman, PSC. But should we take the chances? I think it is better to state in the Constitution some specific qualifications for Singaporeans aspiring to serve in the Presidential Council. To me, these people must have certain qualifications and experience. They must be well versed in banking, finance and monetary matters and with a good knowledge of Government's fiscal policies, state affairs, internal security and religious matters. They must also not belong to any political party. These qualifications and experience should be clearly spelt out in the Constitution. This will ensure that only Singaporeans of the right calibre and qualifications are appointed to the Council.

Sir, because the power conferred upon the Elected President is quite diverse, ranging from protecting the nation's reserves to internal security and religious harmony, it may be difficult in practice to find six wise men who are equally well versed in these various fields. My point here is: should we not provide in the Constitution for a greater number of Council members? Do not limit it to six members, but allow for, say, a minimum of six and a maximum of 12. This will allow for greater flexibility and also ensure that more capable and well qualified Singaporeans can be appointed to the Council.

In summary, Sir, I urge the First Deputy Prime Minister to consider including in the Constitution more specific criteria for Singaporeans aspiring to serve on the Presidential Council and a provision for the Council to have up to 12 members.

Encik Ibrahim Othman (Bedok GRC): ( In Malay): Mr Speaker, when Parliament debated the White Paper on the Constitutional Amendments to Safeguard Financial Assets and the Integrity of the Public Services in August 1988, I supported the principle behind the idea of the Elected Presidency. I gave my full support because the Elected President will be charged with safeguarding our national reserves and ensuring that the public service is headed by qualified and competent people of integrity. Parliament has accepted the principles set out in the White Paper as the basis for preparing a Bill on the Elected President.

During the past two years or so, the public has given their views and suggestions. Indeed, this became a major issue in the General Elections of September 1988. I am impressed by the way the Government sought the views of the public, including the Members of Parliament in this House. The Government's openness in this feedback process is something we can be proud of.

Mr Speaker, the outcome of the lengthy discussions on the issue is the present Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill. Besides his primary powers of safeguarding the national reserves and the integrity of the public services, the Elected President is to be given additional powers, ie, to prevent abuse of the Minister's powers under ISA and the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and in relation to the CPIB.

I support the Bill for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Bill enables the President to stop an irresponsible Government from squandering the reserves in extravagant programmes, such as providing excessive subsidies, not to ensure the survival of the people in times of adversity but simply to win votes in an election. The President will be given veto power and in this way he would be able to prevent the country from losing its reserves and falling into bankruptcy.

The people of Singapore should know that almost all our national reserves stand as a guarantee of our CPF savings. The funds belong to all the workers of Singapore. With the powers vested in the President, these funds will remain secure and when the time comes for us to withdraw our CPF savings, the money will still be there and will still have its value.

Secondly, the Bill enables the President to reject the appointment of key personnel in the public service if there is nepotism or where the appointment is made for political reasons. In other words, where the Government appoints candidates to key positions in the public service to serve its own political interests or where leaders place their own relatives to fill these appointments. We can see examples of this in many Third-World countries, where an excellent civil service was inherited from a former colonial ruler but as a result of nepotism and appointments on the basis of political connections, the country suffers a breakdown of its administrative system and falls into ruin.

We are fortunate, Mr Speaker, and we are proud that, in Singapore, appointments of key personnel in the public service are made on the basis of meritocracy and that this has produced a public service that is clean, capable and trustworthy. We must defend this policy because it is an important factor in ensuring justice in the public service. We must maintain it in order to ensure the integrity of our civil service. Through this Bill, the Elected President will be able to play a role as a check and a safeguard on our civil service.

Thirdly, the Bill gives the President the power to prevent any abuse of the powers of the Minister under the ISA and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and in relation to the CPIB. The President will be able to act as a check on the powers of the Government in these three areas. This is necessary to prevent Ministers from acting arbitrarily and abusing their powers. For example, under the ISA, the Minister for Home Affairs can detain anyone involved in subversive activities. If the Advisory Board chaired by a Supreme Court judge advises that a detainee be released, the Minister will have to abide by the advice. Otherwise, he will have to get the concurrence of the President. Thus, the President will have the power to either release or detain a detainee under ISA. The granting of wider powers to the President is a wise move and is in the interests of the country and the population. This would certainly ensure the stability of the nation.

Fourthly, the Bill provides for the setting up of a Council of Presidential Advisors. This is an advisory body comprising qualified individuals who will act as a check on the President. The President will have to consult the Council in the exercise of his powers to reject or approve the Government's budget. Thus the Council in turn ensures that the President does not abuse his own powers.

Mr Speaker, I would like some clarification from the First Deputy Prime Minister as to how the Elected President will be elected. Will he be bound by the regulations of the Elections Department? I ask this question as I am concerned that the Presidential elections might involve massive use of funds and that we might then be heading towards a system of Presidential elections that thrives on money politics. We have to be careful about this. Perhaps we could limit the amount of funds to be used by each candidate, like under existing election laws.

Finally, Mr Speaker, the Bill is important as the Elected President will serve as a check and balance that will ensure that Singapore will be administered capably and honestly. The Bill will effect a fundamental change to Singapore's Constitution and our system of government.

I support the plan to commit the Bill to a Select Committee, in order that we may refine it further. The people must take this opportunity to discuss it and give their views, in the interest of Singapore and in the interests of our future generations.

Dr Ong Chit Chung (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill.

Sir, years from now, the Elected Presidency Bill will be considered as a landmark or turning point in the constitutional and political history of Singapore. The question is: will it be for the better or for the worse? I am convinced that it will be for the better and history will bear this out. It is a double safeguard against possible squandering of our national assets and reserves, lest we become a bankrupt or broken-back country. It is a check against unwise judgment or cronyism in appointments to senior positions in the public service and statutory boards. It acts as a handbrake on Ministerial powers in respect of the Internal Security Act detentions and prohibition orders under the proposed Religious Harmony Bill.

Further, it allows the Director of CPIB to proceed with investigations against a Minister with the concurrence of the President, even if the Prime Minister had withheld such consent. This, in my view, is the most significant of all provisions as an honest and upright government or public service is the greatest of all our national assets. If we lose this anti-corruption philosophy, we as a nation will go down the drain.

People may have occasions to criticize the Government for any number of issues, but I hope the day would not come when the people condemn the Government for being corrupt or self-serving. In a nutshell, the Elected Presidency will help in some ways to ensure that we stay clean and above board, as well as wise in the conduct of public policy, especially in the making of senior appointments and in the exercise of Ministerial authority and powers.

I have, nevertheless, some queries for the consideration of the First Deputy Prime Minister. Sir, the Council of Presidential Advisors has six members. Would it not be better to have odd numbers, rather than even numbers in a case of a tie in voting? Why not seven wise men or women, instead of six?

The eligibility criteria for the Elected President are in my mind far too restric- tive. It gives the impression that it is loaded in favour of the establishment and has an elitist bent. Will the Elected President still be a President of the people? Will he lose the common touch? Will he lose touch with the feeling of the people?

Once elected, will the Elected President be obliged to resign from his political party, if he were previously a member of such a political party, and henceforth will he dissociate himself from any partisan or party activities in public?

On the Elected President's power to authorise the CPIB Director to proceed with investigations into a Minister, even if the Prime Minister had withheld such consent, should this provision be extended to all persons, and not just Ministers, as the Prime Minister might conceivably block investigations against himself or against his cronies in both the public and private sectors?

I must also say that I am a bit uneasy about the Elected President's power to go against the advice of the Cabinet and withhold consent for the declaration of a state of emergency. Sir, in times of crisis or impending war, such difference of judgment between the President and Cabinet may prove to be the undoing of our republic, as time is the essence. It may not just be a matter of constitutional showdown, but a matter of life and death for both our nation and our people.

Overall, Sir, I think this Bill deserves the support of all Singaporeans. Some have from time to time criticised the Government for being authoritarian and self-righteous. Here, you see the government of the day is actually giving up powers in critical areas. It is, in truth, sharing powers with the Elected President in the democratic practice of checks and balances. No one in such circumstances can accuse the Government of being undemocratic. All, I think, should support this Bill.

Dr Koh Lam Son (Telok Blangah): Mr Speaker, Sir, I can find no reason to renege on my earlier support for the Elected President Bill when it was first introduced in this House as a White Paper in 1988. My support then was based on the grounds that there was a need for such an institu- tion to provide the checks and balances to ensure that this country enjoys good government and sound economic policies long after our time.

Now, the second White Paper has introduced new elements to the Bill, some of which need close scrutiny. I believe Singaporeans generally support the institution of an Elected President. But they would like some clarifications regarding the powers that that office will be empowered with. There are questions that need answers immediately. Indeed, they would like to know why the need for an Elected President now when the present system has been working so well. Why is there this fear that the national reserves will be plundered and national security compromised by some government? After all, Singaporeans would like to think that they elect honourable men and women to office to run the country. If any government is bent on usurping the national treasures, then even the institution of President is not going to prevent the act. There appears to be thisassumption that good government is going to prevail for all the foreseeable future.

Mr Speaker, I know it is not some paranoia that has led this Government to suggest the constitutional changes. Some would say this is one way in which the PAP is ensuring that it remains in power in perpetuity. Rather, I would like to think that, with an elected President, the national reserves are protected, good government is not just seen to take place but also does exist.

There is also this notion that Parliament is abdicating much of its authority and it will no longer be supreme once the institution of Elected President is established. This is furthest from the truth. I think it would be extremely naive to even suggest that the supremacy of Parliament is being surrendered to another institution. It is Parliament that gives the President his authority and Parliament can remove him from office, if need be, as spelt out under new Article 22K of the Bill and under new Article 148D it can also overturn a Presidential veto with a two-thirds majority. So where does Parliament abdicate its power?

What really could happen is that a future Prime Minister will find his ability to function severely restricted if the President is of a different political persuasion. It could have then the French experience of cohabitation where the President was Socialist and the Prime Minister Gaullist. We all know that it was a short-lived marriage with very limited success. In the light of this, is the risk of creating such an institution of Elected President worth the while? Apparently it is, even though it would seem that the President would be granted far too much power to act on a whole range of issues. For instance, his approval must be obtained for senior civil service, judicial and other important Government appointments.

Now, to add to those extensive powers, the Bill states the Government's acceptance of yet another role or function for the Elected President as a check against the Cabinet's wide discretionary powers to detain without trial under the Internal Security Act. The Government has explained this as addressing the concerns expressed by some Members of this House when the ISA was amended to exclude review by the courts.

Sir, I am not too sure that the answer to not having judicial review is to have a political body in the form of an Elected President to exercise judgment on security cases. It would appear that one institution, in this case the Elected President, has far too much discretionary powers. This is especially so when it comes to dealing with the ISA. I think we should debate if the President should be empowered with such sweeping powers as to override the Government on such a sensitive matter. I know the Bill states that the Elected President can only act if the Cabinet ignores the Advisory Board set up under the ISA. The Advisory Board is headed by a legal expert, a Supreme Court judge. As such, he is eminently qualified to make whatever recommendations. The Cabinet may choose to ignore that advice for a number of national and political reasons known to itself. That being the case, I firmly believe that the power should stay with the Cabinet and not pass on to another higher political body.

I think this goes against the grain of the second generation's collective leadership style. We have heard that the cornerstone of the Government is continuity. Far too much power is being concentrated in one institution and I fear that this could eventually lead to a two-party system in that we would have the ruling party headed by the Prime Minister, on the one hand, and with the Elected President and his advisory board functioning as another party.

At this juncture, I would like to ask the Government why it has dropped the idea of having a Vice-President as well. Does this mean that there is the realisation that the Vice-President would have no role to play and so not having such an office would make sense? What puzzles me, however, is the fact that in the absence of the Elected President, the Chief Justice fills that role. How can the head of the Judiciary take on such a role? What happens if the Elected President is incapacitated for some period and the Acting President, in this case, the Chief Justice, has to decide on an important matter relating to the ISA? Does it not defeat the Government's original objective of removing the judiciary power to act on a political matter? If at all someone needs to fill the role of the President, I should think that it should be another elected person, and who is more qualified than you, Sir, the Speaker of the House?

What Singaporeans can do without is a political stalemate where the President and the Prime Minister hold differing convictions. It is well and fine to state that the President acts on the advice of the Presidential Council. That body will not be made up of elected officers. They therefore do not have the people's mandate. I am reminded of the Australian episode when Gough Whitlam was removed from office by the Governor-General for poor management of the financial and economic affairs of the state. An almost similar situation existed in Pakistan a few months ago. True, Whitlam never again made it in Australian politics. But can you write off Miss Bhutto?

Mr Speaker, I am not suggesting that anything like that will happen in this House. At least, it is my hope. I feel confident that Singaporeans would continue to elect honest men and women into office. I am all for checks and balances, but I think we need to fine-tune many aspects of the Bill before implementation. For instance, I firmly believe that the people themselves must judge and elect the President, not a Presidential Elections Committee. It is also my contention that eligibility should not be too restrictive. It would seem almost undemocratic if eligibility is confined to a select few, and not thrown open to a wider mass of Singaporeans.

I would like to suggest that some MPs of this House should be considered for the post of President. There are eminent Backbenchers who have been very involved in parliamentary affairs, Members like Dr Tan Cheng Bock, Mr Chandra Das and perhaps even Dr Hong Hai, after he has served a couple more terms in this House. Mr Speaker, after all, it is from the elected MPs that members of the Cabinet are selected and the Prime Minister is the one who commands the greatest support of the elected MPs. It seems therefore perfectly logical to me that anyone in this House should be eligible and qualified to hold the office of Elected President.

Mr Eugene Yap Giau Cheng (Mountbatten): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the intent and the spirit of the Bill to protect our country's reserves, safeguard the integrity of the civil service and maintain peace and harmony in Singapore.

The checks and balances in this Bill are well-thought out and they are in place. However, during my visits to PAP branches in City East District, some people have expressed concern over the curtailment process of the Elected President's powers. The curtailment process, they feel, is inconsistent with the appointment process of the Elected President's powers. Let me illustrate.

Currently, the Elected President's powers are being approved with a constitutional change by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, like what we are doing now. The powers will be conferred on the President when he is elected by the people with a simple majority vote. However, the current Bill requires a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament as well as a two-thirds majority vote in a national referendum for any amendment to curtail the Elected President's powers. The House can therefore see that we are giving the powers to an Elected President by a constitutional change approved by a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament and electing the Elected President to power with a simple majority. On the other hand, the curtailment of the Elected President's powers requires a two-thirds majority vote both in Parliament as well as in a referendum. This does not seem consistent. Would the First Deputy Prime Minister therefore like to enlighten this House on the logic behind this apparent inconsistency for, after all, you can never know, an unreasonable President may find a way to the office and it would be very difficult to curtail his powers. I do not think it is unfair to consider curtailing his powers in this House for, after all, as the First Deputy Prime Minister has said, his Government has been very generous in allowing its wings to be clipped.

Dr Lee Siew-Choh: Mr Speaker, Sir, time does not permit me to deal with all the points raised by the First Deputy Prime Minister or with the various undesirable and undemocratic provisions in the Bill before the House. Suffice it to say that though we in the Workers' Party agree that our national reserves and integrity of the public service should be safeguarded, we do not agree with the two-key safeguard mechanism that is proposed in the White Paper and the Amendment before the House.

We are particularly against placing too much power in the hands of one person, that is, the Elected President. We consider it most unwise and highly dangerous, as abuse of power is always possible and even likely. As has been said, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

The First Deputy Prime Minister has said that the checks and balances in the present system of government are inadequate. That is only partly true. I would like to point out, that although Government is all-powerful, and has ridden roughshod over the people for all these 30 years, nevertheless it is not really true that there are no checks at all on Government's power.

In parliamentary democracies, certain checks on the Executive may be exercised by the Judiciary, the Civil Service, the parliamentary Opposition, and sometimes even the Backbenchers in the ruling Party itself. But in Singapore, the PAP has undermined these checks by its violations of the norms of parliamentary democracy, and has either completely neutralised them, or even turned them into tools of the Executive. For instance:-

(1) The Court is usually the final arbiter of disputes concerning the use of power by Government, as can be seen in the United States and European countries. But in Singapore, recent amendments to the ISA, as stressed by the First Deputy Prime Minister, have effectively blocked off whatever checks the Court may have on such use or abuse of ministerial power of arbitrary arrest. The decision of the Minister is "final" and cannot be called to question in Court. Now the First Deputy Prime Minister says that the Elected President will do the checking. But that is only an argument to justify why Government wishes to have the Elected President.

(2) The Civil Service is normally supposed to be neutral and non-partisan. Civil servants carry out orders according to law, and they serve as some form of check on Government if they refuse to carry out orders that are not in accordance with law. But after so many years of continuous PAP rule, sometimes, Sir, it is difficult to distinguish the PAP from the Government, and the Government from the PAP. The check therefore exists no longer.

(3) An effective Opposition is often a very good check on Government's arbitrariness and wrongdoings. The PAP itself, when it was still in the Opposition in the late 1950s, exposed Chew Swee Kee's corruption and brought about the downfall of the Lim Yew Hock government in 1959. The Barisan Sosialis too, when it was an effective Opposition in the early 1960s, forced the PAP to tread carefully in pushing its merger proposals at the time. But since 1963 and the suppression of the Barisan Sosialis, the PAP has run riot with its one-party Parliament until 1981. Today the Opposition, with only two members, is too weak to offer any check on Government power.

(4) In other countries, Backbenchers of the ruling party sometimes rebel against unpopular measures introduced by government. In Singapore, this was also done in 1961 which led to a split in the PAP. But the PAP soon amended the Constitution to cause MPs to vacate their parliamentary seats if they are no longer members of the party, and thus subject them to very strict control. Nevertheless, I can see that some PAP Backbenchers are fairly vocal in their criticism of Bills they disagree strongly with. They may still put up some check on the Government's power in some other ways.

Sir, these are examples to show that there are certain checks on Government power. But as I have said, today in Singapore these checks have all been undermined or suppressed. Parliament has not been given a chance to function like parliaments in other countries. No wonder Prof Tommy Koh, Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, has suggested that there should be constitutional changes to make Parliament more representative and democratic.

From what I have said, it is clear that we do not need to amend the Constitution in order to provide for an Elected President so that he may check on the powers of Government. There are sufficient checks if Government would only allow these checks to work. All that the Government needs to do is to adhere strictly to the norms of parliamentary democracy, stop its suppression of the Opposition, allow it to have reasonable access to TV, radio and the press as in other countries, curb the arbitrary powers of its Ministers and allow the Court to be the final arbiter in disputes and appeals in political cases. These measures would serve as a better safeguard than a one-man Elected President. There is no need for a change of the parliamentary system for the time being. Nevertheless, if we must have a two-key safeguard mechanism, it would be more prudent to let the second key be held, not by one person, but by a broad-based committee, consisting of non-partisan, apolitical, honourable and trustworthy persons, or by some form of ombudsman which could be agreed upon.

Let me also say a few words on the financial reserves. I would say that it is both unreasonable and undemocratic not to allow an elected government to use some of the country's reserves (not the CPF which is sacrosanct) to provide for welfare services for the people. After all, the financial reserves have been accumulated by the people over the years. They belong to the people, not to any political party that has been elected to office, and a small part of these reserves could, and should, be spent in a reasonable manner according to need for the benefit of the people. Such expenditure should under no circumstances be blocked by an Elected President. Reserves should not be kept for investment overseas.

Thus, it can be seen that the rationale for the Elected President proposal given by Government in the White Paper is not all that convincing. Government probably knows that. Nevertheless, it has put forward the Elected President proposal which will no doubt be passed by Parliament.

The First Deputy Prime Minister has explained the philosophy and rationale behind the Bill. I will also do that, and try to explain the reasons why the Elected President proposal has been put forward.

So what are the real reasons behind the Elected President proposal?

To find out, Sir, why the Elected President proposal has been put forward, we must begin with the Prime Minister's announcement some years back of his intention to step down from office in favour of a younger generation of leaders, and some time later, his understandable concern that the huge reserves, accumulated over the years, should not be squandered away.

The question in his mind must have been: Could he trust the younger generation leaders to continue his stance and follow policies that would protect the reserves and not erode into them?

I presume that he could, but there were probably also doubts. However, I believe that what had alarmed the Prime Minister most, and probably given him some sleepless nights, was the fact that he could see, as other PAP leaders also could, soon after the PAP's defeat in the Anson by-election in October 1981, that the Singapore voters, especially those young ones, were beginning to see the need for Opposition MPs, and more of them in Parliament, and what was more important, that electoral support for the PAP was beginning to decline. The alarm soon developed into fear when it lost 13% of popular votes in the 1984 election. PAP votes dropped from 76% in 1980 to 63% in 1984. In the post-election press conference, the Prime Minister, both angry and fearful, threatened to change the one-man-one-vote system altogether.

Subsequently, every effort was made to spruce up the PAP's image, enlarge and strengthen its organisation, and change some of its unpopular policies. However, in spite of all its efforts, the PAP's popular votes did not go up in the 1988 elections. Instead, they went down another 1% from 63% to 62%. Some people estimate that the drop was probably 3% to 4%, as more seats were contested in 1988 than in 1984. Anyway, a trend was beginning to emerge. PAP leaders saw the danger clearly. They could see that, if the trend should continue, and the PAP lost more votes in the next election, in 1992 or 1993, then the continued rule of the PAP would be fraught with uncertainty and danger.

The PAP is therefore confronted with a most important and urgent task. It is to break the downward trend and stop a further decline in electoral support for the PAP. Only then would the PAP be able to remain in office and continue to rule in Singapore. That means, of course, the Opposition must be prevented from getting a firm grip on the reins of Government come what may. But how is that to be done?

In the past, the way to keep the PAP in power, and the Opposition out, was to put the Communist label on effective political opponents and detain them under the ISA. Recently, the Government could still use the so-called Marxist plot as an excuse to suppress some of those who were opposed to the PAP. But the Communist scare story is wearing thin. Very few people buy it nowadays. A new way has to be found - a way to make it extremely difficult, and well-nigh impossible, for an Opposition party to form the Government, or if it succeeded in doing so, to make its stay in office short and uncertain. And the way to be adopted, of course, has to be institutionalised so that PAP's interest would be protected for a long, long time.

For the PAP leaders, the Elected President with wide veto powers would seem to be the best answer. Hence, the White Paper, first in 1988 and again in 1990, and the Constitution (Amendment No. 3) Bill today before the House. Of course, the first prerequisite is that the Elected President must remain in PAP hands, or at least in the hands of its most loyal supporters. Otherwise the whole scheme would backfire to the disadvantage of the PAP. Qualification requirements as presidential candidates must therefore be strictly exclusive. Political opponents would have to be excluded in order to ensure that the Presidential election is an exclusive one-party PAP affair.

Like the British raj in colonial days, the Elected President is vested with wide powers to veto all spending of reserves, all borrowings as well as all the appointments of key posts in the State. The Elected President is then in a position to use veto powers to manipulate the political situation to the exclusive advantage of the PAP.

The Opposition presently is weak and disorganised. The PAP has nothing much to fear for the time being. But then there is no way to find out whether or not the voting trend unfavourable to the PAP will continue. So the PAP has to prepare for all contingencies. If the PAP should form the Government, then there would be no need for the Elected President to exercise any of those veto powers. He would merely sit pretty in masterly inactivity and watch over the situation to see that all goes well. But if an Opposition party should form the Government, then conflicts would develop quickly.

The Elected President's withholding of concurrence to the annual budget would certainly cause a total paralysis of the day-to-day administration of government. The newly-elected Opposition government would be unable to carry out its policies and live up to its promises made to the people. If the government cannot get funds from the reserves and cannot raise loans, then it will be forced to raise taxes. This must inevitably lead to loss of popular support for the Opposition government.

Indeed, with his other powers under the Constitution, the Elected President may even be able to manoeuvre events or create situations that will cause the Government to resign. That was how the Whitlam Government was dismissed from office in Australia more than 10 years ago, and also the Benazir Bhutto government in Pakistan recently. Thus, we see the hidden powers of the Elected President that could be used to destabilise an elected Opposition government and even dismiss it from office.

The Prime Minister has said and I quote, "They say an Elected President will block an opposition party that comes in. Quite right. Absolutely right." He let the cat out of the bag. Proof from the very horse's mouth itself. A PAP Elected President will make it well-nigh impossible for an Opposition party to form a government and continue in office for any length of time.

The six-year term of a PAP Elected President ensures that the five-year term Opposition government is in no position to cause it much trouble unless it can win another election for another term of five years. The Elected President's wide veto powers over the key appointments in the civil service will deprive an Opposition government from appointing the right people in the right place according to its political philosophy. That would facilitate destabilisation of an apposition government.

All in all, it can be seen that the Elected President is meant not so much to be a watchdog or custodian of our nation's reserves and assets, but as a watchdog over the electoral fortunes of the PAP and its continued rule in Singapore. Those who support the Elected President proposal will have nothing to lose and everything to gain, as the First Deputy Prime Minister has said. But those who oppose the undemocratic and callous policies of the PAP will have everything to lose and nothing to gain.

Let the people decide in a national referendum. The Amendment Bill for the safeguarding of reserves and the integrity of the civil service proposes radical changes to the Constitution and the present Westminster parliamentary system of Government that has been practised in Singapore over the past 30 years. With such radical changes, it is obvious that the people will have to be consulted. The PAP claims that it has more or less done that, and has been given a mandate in the 1988 elections to carry out such radical and sweeping changes to the Constitution. That is not true. The PAP has never been given a mandate on the matter. In the 1988 elections, the White Paper on the Elected President proposal was only one of the many issues brought before the people. And in the 1988 elections, the PAP obtained only 62% of the total votes cast, less than two-thirds and, what is more important, 1% less than in 1984. Moreover, the 1988 White Paper is now outdated. Additional powers have been given to the Elected President in the 1990 White Paper.

The Constitution Amendment Bill had not been published, and the voters had not been asked specifically to give an unequivocal answer of Yes or No to the Elected President proposal. In a general election, voters vote for candidates from various parties so that the party with the most candidates elected form the Government. Voters do not vote on any particular or specific issue in an election.

The proposed changes to the Constitution, as listed in the 1990 White Paper and in the Amendment Bill, are changes in the power structure and in the parliamentary system of Government, as has already been stressed by the First Deputy Prime Minister. These changes will affect not only the future of the people but also the future of their children and their children's children.

The Elected President proposal will, therefore, need to be placed before the people to be fully debated so that they may decide and vote on it in a democratic, free and fair national referendum. It must not be imposed on the people through a two-thirds parliamentary majority vote today. Neither should the Government try to pass it off by saying that the PAP does not believe in ruling by referendum.

We have to remind the PAP that when the Constitution which gave Singapore full internal self-government was negotiated and agreed upon with the British in 1957, it was negotiated and agreed upon by all the political parties then in Singapore, namely, the Labour Front, the Liberal Socialists and the PAP itself. That is, all the people in Singapore were represented in the negotiations through the political parties they supported.

Today, the PAP represents only 62% of popular votes. Other political parties representing 38% of popular votes have not been consulted at all. In other words, a parliamentary vote of all Government MPs put together represents at best 62% of the people of Singapore, not the true wishes of all the people. The only way to find out the true wishes of all the people of Singapore is to hold a national referendum.

The White Paper stresses, "The will of the people will prevail.". This can only be realised when the Elected President proposal is placed before the people for their approval or rejection in a democratic national referendum.

The Prime Minister also said in 1984, "First, a White Paper, then a proper debate, and then a referendum, and many other things besides.". The Government should now live up to its promises to the people, solemnly said, solemnly made. Let the people have the referendum.

Let me also summarise, Sir. Some undesirable and undemocratic amendments to the Constitution are proposed. There are certain checks on Government's powers in the present parliamentary system, but these checks have been undermined by the PAP Government. There is, therefore, no need to amend the Constitu- tion to provide for an Elected President. Government needs only to practise genuine parliamentary democracy as in other democratic countries and the checks will be in place and working well.

The real reason behind the Bill is the fact that, since its defeat in the Anson by-election in October 1981, a discernible trend of falling electoral support for the PAP has emerged. The PAP leadership fears that if this trend should continue, then PAP rule over Singapore might not last beyond the next election or two. The PAP has said that the one-man-one-vote could be unpredictable, and that "freak" election results are possible. Therefore, the PAP leadership believes that changes to the Constitution and the parliamentary system of Government are necessary if continued PAP rule is to be assured. Hence the proposal for Elected President.

Ostensibly to safeguard our financial reserves and the integrity of the civil service, a PAP Elected President, chosen from an exclusive PAP club, and not easily removed by Parliament, would be able to exercise his wide veto powers to destabilise any Opposition government and so protect PAP interests. With an Elected President, the PAP will no longer need to fear that the Opposition will become entrenched as an Opposition government for any length of time. Thus, the PAP hopes to have a firm grip on the Government and be able to continue to rule Singapore for years and years to come.

As the Prime Minister will be stepping down in November this year, the Elected President proposal would also appear to have been specially tailor-made to instal him as the first Elected President after the incumbent President steps down. Other PAP leaders would become Elected Presidents also after him. Everyone will have an opportunity. Hence, the Ministers' support for the Bill, though the Elected President takes away much of their powers.

The Elected President proposal, however, has many controversial and undemocratic provisions. The radical changes to the Constitution and to the existing parliamentary system of Government, if adopted, will have far-reaching effects on the politi- cal life and future of our people. It is, therefore, imperative that every person in Singapore be given an opportunity to express his or her views on the matter in a free and fair manner. The PAP Government has no mandate from the people to carry out such sweeping changes to our system of Government, and amending the Constitution with a parliamentary two-thirds majority alone is unrepresentative of the true wishes of the people. The only way to find out the true wishes of the people is to let the people decide in a democratic national referendum, in which a simple straightforward question is posed to the people requiring a simple answer of Yes or No.

So let the Government hold a national referendum on the question of the Elected President proposal as the Prime Minister, the First Deputy Prime Minister and others, at one time, had promised.

Dr S. Vasoo: Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to join in the debate. Sir, I fully support the Elected President Bill.

Sir, in assessing the merits of this Bill, Singaporeans will have to ask themselves a fundamental question. Will the Elected President system strengthen the political foundation of Singapore itself? Sir, good political foundation is a life line to any nation.

Sir, if we review political events in various countries over the last 10 years, we witness that in many of these places, men of straw have taken over, political conflicts have arisen, self-interested groups have arisen and many of these places where such self-interested individuals have taken over, these countries have become fractured and the people have become even worse, in terms of their welfare and well-being.

Sir, these are some of the crucial issues that we will have to ask ourselves and we cannot predict political events. We are just making guesses and assumptions on the various policies and issues that we plan to implement. But history has shown that these events have come about and in many places where selfish individuals and groups have taken over, these societies have fallen and it takes a very long time to bring about sanity and progress to these countries. In some of these countries, if you have seen around, they have not made any turn at all for the better. They have remained even worse. So we should ask ourselves whether, in the context of Singapore, we would like Singapore to go down as well. Sir, I am sure that every thinking and concerned Singaporean wants to ensure that our political future is well safeguarded. I think this is crucial and fundamental. If this does not happen, then I do not think we will survive economically and we will not be able to manage and push ahead as a nation.

Sir, I personally feel that the Elected President system will strengthen our political foundation for the following reasons. Firstly, the Constitutional change introduces a checkmate in our political processes. You may ask whether this is negative. Some people argue that it is negative. Some people say that this will in a way create more obstacles to future governments. It can slow down government decisions and plans.

Sir, looking at the other side of the coin, I see that this is positive itself. What is wrong in having a checkmate in our political system? Our people will be more likely to be alerted by the Elected President when the government of the day acts against the interest of our people and this is important for our survival and crucial to our nation. In fact, the Elected President will oversee that the interests of our people are safeguarded. There are arguments that having the Elected President is going to do us in and it is not going to be any better. But is this going to be the case? And if he is elected by popular mandate and he has got the support of the people, I think that very system endorses the aspirations and the will of our people.

Sir, the second merit that I see is that the Elected President system will enable Singaporeans to have more time to review future Government decisions which will have serious social and economic consequences on our survival. In short, the system can insure against any political risk taken rashly by subsequent governments consisting of self-interested individuals.

The third merit that I can see, Sir, is though our present Government set-up is doing fine, that does not mean that subsequent governments cannot go astray. Even under the very best system of the one-man-one-vote political democracy that Dr Lee Siew-Choh talks about, I think many of these democracies have also fallen. These democracies have gone down and under, simply because there is no basis for checks, there is no basis for people having the will to assert and to bring about what they feel would be in the interest of the collective majority. I think that the Elected Presidential system will provide this will of expression of our people as a whole.

Sir, fourthly, in terms of merits of this Bill, I see that the Elected President will add further political wisdom to the Government of Singapore and can act as an Ombudsman. We have discussed quite a fair bit in terms of an Ombudsman to a political system. And I see that the Elected President can play the role of an Ombudsman to ensure that our social institutions are efficient and non nepotic. What is worse is that in many of our institutions, if nepotic practices creep in and takes over, then I think that very institution will suffer and will be eroded. We do not want this to happen in the context of Singapore.

Finally, the Elected President system will not subvert our present or future political foundation. It is unlikely to create serious conflicts or stall good government plans. It will further strengthen our democratic institutions. The merits outweigh the perceived fears of uncertainty.

What I would like to bring up to the First Deputy Prime Minister is that the base from which the President would be elected is rather narrow and is confined to various corporate institutions. I think we should include various other community institutions and community groups. This would allow for a wider base from which an Elected President can be considered.

Sir, I see the merits of this Bill and I fully support it.