CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT NO. 3) BILL

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Order read for Resumption of Debate on Question [4th October, 1990],

"That the Bill be now read a Second time." - [First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence].

Question again proposed.

Mr Ng Kah Ting (Punggol): Mr Speaker, Sir, yesterday, in moving the Second Reading of the Bill, the First Deputy Prime Minister disclosed to the House that he had unanimity in the Cabinet in introducing this amendment Bill. To me, it clearly shows that his new style of political leadership and government indicates a clear confidence that it can convince the people of Singapore that it is a caring government but, more importantly, Sir, it shows the First Deputy Prime Minister's vision for Singapore beyond the nineties.

His ability to convince his Cabinet to go along with this idea of Elected President came through after much thought and rumination, although the idea was attributed to the Prime Minister but the details were worked out by his team. This augurs well, Sir, for the future of Singapore when he takes over as the next Prime Minister of Singapore sometime next month.

Sir, I have been in this House since 1963 and out of seven general elections, I fought six of them. So I know what it is like to go to the people time and again at each general election to secure their mandate. I can tell you, Sir, that even you will not disagree with me that that was not easy.

But we must all look ahead. Not many human beings can live 100 years or so. A human being must die. He must go away, and the power he holds cannot last very long. One day, someone will step into his shoes. So when I see this new generation of leaders, confident of their ability to govern Singapore and to make it a better Singapore in the nineties and beyond, I feel reassured. They know that one day they too will have to go.

When they introduced the idea of the Elected President, I participated in the debate on the motion moved by the Member for Kebun Baru on 11th August 1988. I put in my contribution in the debate and I would not want to bore the House with what I had said. What I said on 11th August 1988 are still relevant today.

The evolution of a political system is not one that is easy to come by. It is ever changing and evolving. When I was leading a parliamentary delegation to Japan in 1987, the Japanese parliamentarians told me that it took them 80 years to evolve their kind of parliamentary system - the DIET and the House of Concillors. But we introduced our system based on the British Westminster parliamentary system. We adopted it, changed it, and sometimes we made Constitutional amendments. It may interest the House that at one time the two-thirds majority required for the Second and Third Readings of the Amendment Bill to the Constitution was simply put aside to allow for a voting by a simple majority. I was one of those who said, "Look. It is an important piece of legislation on which the political system and government will have to work. Therefore, we have to take it very seriously." Therefore, any amendment to the Constitution must require a two-thirds majority. In other words, the two-thirds majority for any amendment to be made to the Constitution has been adhered to.

Sir, I can understand the younger generation leaders' concern when they come to the question of sharing political power. I am very happy to note that they are confident that they can build upon what the old guards had built in the last 31 years. We have a credit balance of not less than $30 billion, as disclosed by the First Deputy Prime Minister in this House yesterday. This amount does not take into account all the infrastructural facilities, such as the 6,000-7,000 blocks of HDB flats, the airport, port, PUB and Telecom. Surely, Sir, these will add up to a bigger sum and we must realise that about 87% of our people are housed in HDB flats. This is indeed an achievement which I think very few countries in the world have attained. But for the younger generation leaders to come and say that they want an Elected President and to vest in him certain veto powers, that kind of power sharing is not easy to come by. It is political maturity being manifested.

Sir, I was reminded of a comment by Lord Acton who lived in the 19th century, 1834. He was a British liberal historian and moralist and was known to be the first great modern philosopher of resistance to the evil state, whether its form be authoritarian, democratic, or socialist. And he made a comment that, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." He said this in a letter.

Members of the House can see that the Government has a lot of power and yet it is prepared to vest it in another person -the Elected President plus his Council of Pre- sidential Advisors - powers in certain areas. This power-sharing is indeed a very welcome move and it shows once again that the second generation of leaders has got the guts and gumption to say, "Yes, under the present system, we can do better but with an amended system where certain powers are to be vested in the Elected President, we can do even better."

Think again of the billions of dollars that we have accumulated. That was not easy to come by. On average, it is about $1 billion per year since 1959. But to "fritter it away" - to use the term mentioned by the First Deputy Prime Minister - through bad government is easy. If there is extravagance, wastefulness, unnecessary expenditure, then what happens? The country goes down. If the country goes down, I do not think there is any hope for Singapore. Therefore, the Elected President's job is to make sure that it does not happen.

Sir, yesterday, I heard several of my colleagues in the Backbench spoke. I am happy to note their contributions. Some voiced their concerns, some made comments, but all these would definitely be taken into consideration by the Select Committee which will be set up after the Second Reading of this Bill. However, Sir, I was not present in the House to hear the speech from the Non-Constituency Member, Dr Lee, except gleaning through the newspapers today. I can understand his comments because he has been long in politics. But I think I would not be too unkind to him nor too critical of him when I say this because I happen to be around for so long. He was also in the PAP government of 1959 when he served as Parliamentary Secretary until he and his group broke away in 1961 to form the Barisan Sosialis. Perhaps he can now tell the House and throw some light on what happened in those years, especially when I look around, most of the Members of this House are quite young. I would not say they are "new". He could tell us why he and his group left the PAP to form the Barisan Sosialis and to contest in the 1963 general elections with some 44 candidates, if my memory serves me right, and wanted to capture political power through the ballot, the one-man-one-vote system, and they were very confident of winning the elections.

What would have happened if they had won? Yesterday, in the Members' Room, after I had a cup of tea with Dr Lee I asked him this. But if he could spare some time, he could tell us what happened. Sometime in 1965/1966, when he was Chairman of the Barisan Sosialis, he told his Barisan Sosialis MPs to resign from Parliament and to take to extra-parliamentary struggle. As a result, the Barisan Sosialis boycotted the 1968 general elections. Acts of vandalism were committed. But strange enough, after some years, the Barisan Sosialis decided to come back and participate in the general elections. That was something interesting, but they did not win any seat at all until the 1988 general elections when Dr Lee himself went over to the Workers' Party. Now, he is an NCMP and making contributions in this House.

I treat him with a great deal of respect because he stands firm on his convictions. But that is altogether a different matter when we come to look at Singapore as a whole. How we want to chart the course of our destiny? Are we for the future of Singapore? Are we for the people of Singapore? Are they going to have a better life? Better opportunities? That is what counts.

He mentioned that the Elected President works against the Opposition. If I were to take a different scenario, the Elected President is in position to ensure the continued survival of Singapore. He has veto powers and he is there to make sure that Singapore continues. But then there comes a group of people who says, "Change." Then what happens? There is no guarantee. A fresh election may result. All the billions of dollars can be frittered away in no time through electioneering promises. The value of properties would just simply plummet because of a weak, inept Government wanting to play to the gallery and please the people with soft options in their policies.

But, Sir, at the end of this debate on the Second Reading and the Bill committed to a Select Committee, I sincerely hope that all those who have the interest of Singapore at heart should come forward and make their contributions, be they critical or ways and means on how better we can improve upon this Bill. At the same time, I say that there is no damage done, political damage or otherwise, if we go through the Second Reading and make it a reality when it comes to the Third Reading. In place, we have the Elected President that would help, in my view, make Singapore a much, much better place for all Singaporeans.

On that note, Sir, I would like to compliment the First Deputy Prime Minister and his team for the confidence in being able to carry out this paramount duty to ensure that Singapore lasts as long as time.

Sir, I support the Bill.

The Minister for National Development (Mr S. Dhanabalan): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill. The arguments in support of an Elected President were quite exhaustively stated by the First Deputy Prime Minister yesterday in the Second Reading on this Bill. They are also set out quite clearly in the White Paper and I do not intend to repeat these arguments. I would really like to just underline one main point made by the First Deputy Prime Minister yesterday, and that is, our present system lacks checks and balances.

We have, of course, operated this system for the last 25 years and this system is one where power is very highly concentrated, I would say even entirely reposed, in one institution. There is not the same diffusion of power or the sharing of power that we have in many other nations with a parliamentary democracy system, such features as two Houses of Parliament, Councils of Rulers, State Governments, Local Councils and so on. In these countries, power is in fact shared among many institutions. In fact, offhand, I cannot think of any other nation that has power as highly concentrated in one institution as we have here in Singapore. And the power is in fact concentrated in the Cabinet. We have, of course, Parliament, but in a system with strong party discipline, it is in fact the top leadership, ie, the Cabinet, that exercises real power. Even in the United Kingdom with its very long parliamentary tradition, there is a strong view emerging that the ability of party leaders to appeal directly to the public through the mass media, coupled with strong party discipline, has in fact resulted in a very significant and marked shift of power from Parliament to the Government leaders, ie, the Cabinet. If this is so in UK, with its very long tradition in operating the system, it should not be surprising that it is so in Singapore and that power is so very concentrated in one group. We have a much shorter experience of parliamentary democracy and with few, if any, non-Government institutions which have any significant influence on our society and nation.

The First Deputy Prime Minster pointed out that the system has worked and worked very well, not because of the quality of the institution but because of the quality of the people and quality of the leadership. We cannot assume that our past experience will be in fact projected into the future, that what has happened in the past will continue to be the case in the future. I think it will be tempting fortune beyond prudence to continue a system that depends so overwhelmingly on having persons of integrity and competence in political leadership. There must be a combination of good people and sound institutions. I think I need not elaborate on this. Members must be aware of many countries which have very fine constitutions but have, nevertheless, come to grief. So we must have a balance of both good constitutional provisions, good institutions and good leaders.

The institution of an Elected President with only veto powers is one way of introducing some check on the power of the Government. When we in Cabinet considered this subject and we have in fact thought about it for a very long time, we were very conscious of the problems and dangers of giving too much power to one man. We were conscious that we should not tilt the balance and make the Elected President an executive President. The Bill has been very carefully crafted so that the elected Government is not fettered unduly. It is not a sharing of power in the normal administration of the nation's affairs. The elected Government can conduct its business without interference from the President. It is only a sharing of power in certain special and exceptional circumstances and these are laid out in the Bill as well as in the White Paper.

Since we became independent, we have changed our Constitution a number of times in order to meet our own peculiar circumstances and needs. This particular Bill that is before the House today is one way of shaping what we have inherited to meet our needs as we see them today and as we see them developing over the next few decades.

Mr Chay Wai Chuen (Brickworks GRC): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for giving me this opportunity to speak.

I wish to speak in support of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill. This amendment is a constitutional landmark for Singapore. After more than 30 years of executive rule under a Prime Minister, the question is often posed: why do we need an Elected President? It is not that our institution of Government has failed us in its period of history. On the contrary, this institution has grown and its modus operandi has worked to the visible progress of Singapore. However, there is one institution in my mind whose modus operandi has hinged very crucially on the outcome of a collective decision in which the extraneous and the extrinsic can play havoc with any consideration of rational decision-making in constitutional government. What do I mean?

The Westminster style first-past-the-post system of our parliamentary democracy is uniquely devised for a strong parliamentary government. A governing party can win a big majority of seats in Parliament and yet obtain only a small majority of votes. For example, in the 1963 elections, only 47% of the total votes went to the PAP and yet it won 37 out of 51 seats, ie, 72% of the seats. The example of Britain under Margaret Thatcher in the last few elections is also a good pointer. While the Opposition always decry against this, yet in another time when they are more ready, it can also work to their advantage. The knife can cut both ways.

What is wrong with the opposition having majorities in elections and forming the government? Obviously, in our parliamentary system of government, there is nothing wrong. What is wrong when the PAP loses its predominance but maintains its majority in government and the Opposition gains ground? The hon. Member for Punggol has given you some background to what could have happened in 1963. The danger in this scenario is that factionalism will develop in the PAP and in the Opposition. Various interest groups and pressure groups, skilled by the experience of participatory democracy and finding new levers in the political balance, will exert influence on parliamentary government, and parliamentary politics will find new directions in compromise and the lobby. The interest of the nation may very well degenerate into an aggregation of interests of the various interest groups and pressure groups, and the Opposition will swing the balance to affect the decision of government. This is not a far-fetched scenario. It is not a scenario of political decay.

There are many examples in present-day democracies with this compromise and lobby system of representative government. The best example is the United States. For a big country like the US, through a federal framework of government, the country needs this bargaining system simply because the country is too big for power to be concentrated at the epicentre in Washington. America and her people can walk many ways and arrive at their destiny.

But for a small country like Singapore, such a case will lead to compromised politics for the city state, lacking in clear direction and purpose. With only a small margin of error between success and failure, it is important to ensure that the correct long-term policies for stability and prosperity for the city state are adopted at the right time. Hence, it is important that we explore new institutions to ensure continuity and stability that can add longer term perspective to our choice and determination of policies. Such an institution is the proposed Elected Presidency.

First, it is important to remember that the proposed Elected President does not initiate policies. To that extent, the Execu- tive arm of the present parliamentary representative government is not affected. He can only put a stop sign in certain safeguarded areas if he does not concur with the policy decisions put forward by the Government and by Parliament. Thus, it is important for the public to bear in mind that he does not usurp the power of the Prime Minister and Parliament. The Elected Presidency enables us to tackle directly and openly a second order problem in our parliamentary system of government -one that we have all along conveniently swept under the carpet in our discussion of parliamentary democracy - the problem of maintaining the integrity of government and government institutions.

Because the PAP under Mr Lee Kuan Yew has been able to maintain the integrity of government institutions does not mean that under changed circumstances, such will always be the case. In fact, parliamentary representative government is basically confrontational and dissentious. Because of the need for representation, the views and interests expressed are often parochial and short term. A very good example recently was when we hear of rice farmers in Japan demonstrating in Tokyo for greater protection with powerful parliamentary lobbyists behind them. One wonders why the Japanese pay so dearly for their rice.

Voting by Members of Parliament of the party in power and the Opposition is governed by the Whip in true Westminster style. But for stability, the integrity of government and government institutions must prevail even in the midst of a parliamentary tussle. That we do not have much of a tussle these days does not mean there will be no parliamentary tussle in the future. The Member for Potong Pasir would surely agree. Such integrity can better be guaranteed with the institution of the Elected Presidency who does not have to partake of the parliamentary fray. The Elected Presidency is a new milestone in our political development. For the past 30 years, Singapore has achieved much in the way of economic development. We must also match our economic development with the necessary institutions in political structures to support our long-term overall development.

I believe we should evaluate this proposed institution under the following criteria:

Firstly, does the Elected Presidency add to the system of checks and balances in our representative democracy? The Elected President can only withhold his assent. He does not initiate policy which rests with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It provides power to the President to withhold assent for the drawdown of the reserves of the statutory boards and the government-owned companies, not accumulated by the current government. It provides protection for the trust money held by the Central Provident Fund. These are very strong institutions held closely by our people. The Elected Presidency will be able to safeguard the integrity.

Secondly, does the Elected Presidency take away from the safeguard of civil liberties of Singaporeans under the existing constraints? Nowhere in the proposed legislation does it take away these civil liberties from the people. In fact, it provides additional safeguards that the integrity of the CPIB and the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony should protect the civil liberties of Singaporeans because the Elected President can disagree and withhold his assent.

Thirdly, does it provide a stabiliser to any factious parliament and any unstable parliamentary government that may arise? As I have explained earlier, I think it does.

Finally, does the Elected Presidency take away the excessive burden of responsibility on the Prime Minister which our system has been operating up to now? The answer is yes. Such an innovation may not be a disadvantage. It represents a more politically mature society that we are now, with power sharing to a new institution to safeguard the integrity of State.

I believe this is good for three reasons:-

Firstly, it provides potentially more room for a more balanced approach by the Prime Minister, especially when he is committed to building consensus in a partici- patory democracy. He is also, by the presence of the Elected Presidency, forced more to consider the potential bottleneck because of the need for assent and thereby to persuade and to find more middle ground among various sections of the populace.

Secondly, the people will be assured that the Government by meritocracy will always prevail because of the second level check on the integrity of the civil service and the statutory boards.

Thirdly, I believe this additional institution will lend stability and assurance which will enable and ensure that Singapore will continue to attract foreign investment and that Singaporeans will find it worthwhile to save and invest. Because of the safeguards in the Elected Presidency, Parliament and the Government cannot easily run a deficit or draw down the accumulated reserves. This virtually guarantees the long-term external value of the Singapore dollar. By this control measure, foreigners will always have faith in the long-term stability of our Singapore dollar, and the worth of assets owned by Singaporeans will not fall due to a depreciating currency.

Finally, Sir, the proposed Elected President does not exercise his decision and his prerogative in splendid isolation. It is important to repeat that the Elected President is elected by the people. His constituency is Singapore.

There is also a provision for a Council of Presidential Advisors whose members include ordinary citizens nominated by the Chairman of the Public Service Commission from the civil service and by the Prime Minister. This body which advises the Elected President is another institution which allows for the non-partisan scrutiny of Supply Bills and issues pertaining to the responsibility of the Elected President. These Advisors are in touch with the mainstream of development of Singapore and will be able to advise the Elected President accordingly.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Amendment Bill.

Mr Charles Chong (Sembawang GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill moved by the First Deputy Prime Minister.

Many of the points in support of the Bill have already been addressed and elaborated upon by the many speakers before me. I shall try not to repeat them but to comment on a few of the issues raised.

First of all, I would like to commend the Government on its far-sightedness in introducing a Bill that would ensure better government, even though such a Bill may effectively dilute its powers at a time when the Government controls nearly all the seats in Parliament and there is no urgent need to give up any of its powers.

I remember during the previous general election campaign, calls were made by the Opposition parties for more checks and balances on the PAP Government. This Bill, if passed, will provide significant checks on the Government's actions on issues pertaining to the ISA, CPIB investigations, religious harmony, key appointments in the civil service as well as to provide an additional safeguard on our reserves. I was therefore a bit surprised to hear the NCMP express his party's strong opposition to the Bill. Sir, I suspect the main objection to the Elected President proposal is because the current Prime Minister appears to be an ideal candidate. The prospect of having another PAP man elected by the population as the President probably makes them feel a little bit less enthusiastic about the Bill, despite the desire to have more checks and balances on the Government.

Mr Speaker, Sir, as the President has to be elected by the people of Singapore, whatever the outcome of the election, the choice of the electorate would eventually prevail. However, a situation may arise where there may be only one candidate standing for President. The electorate may not have much of a choice in this instance if the sole candidate is returned unopposed. In order that there can be no doubt that the choice of the people will prevail, I would like to suggest that in cases where there is only one candidate, the electorate should be given a choice of either rejecting or endorsing the candidate. If more than 50% of the eligible voters were to reject the candidate, then fresh nominations should be called.

Sir, I support the stringent conditions that Presidential candidates must satisfy before qualifying as candidates. The responsibilities of the President require specialist knowledge and experience. Consequently, it would be prudent to limit the candidates to only those who have proven track records. I agree with the views expressed yesterday that no matter how stringent and careful the selection process might be, the less competent can still occasionally sneak through. However, if there are no stringent criteria in existence, then the possibility of the less competent sneaking through would invariably be very much higher.

Sir, I do not think that we need to feel apologetic if the conditions for qualifying appear to be difficult to achieve. Singaporeans deserve the right to choose from the best a Head of State that would be most competent to safeguard our assets and to provide a check on the elected government.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I find it difficult to go along with the view expressed yesterday in this House that the Bill, if passed, could be used as a second chance for the electorate to change their minds about the government they have put into power. I would like to think that the role of the Elected President is to act as a safeguard against bad decisions by the Government and not as a means by a fickle electorate to prematurely throw out the Government.

Finally, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to comment on the proposed Article 22J of the Bill which appears to imply that the President, while in office, is above the law and is immune from prosecution for any action done by him either in his official or private capacity. Sir, I am aware that there are provisions in the existing Constitution that give the President immunity from prosecution and I can go along with the rationale for providing the President with immunity for his actions in his official capacity. However, I am unable to see the requirement to extend this immunity to cover all his actions accomplished in his private capacity as well.

With that, Mr Speaker, Sir, I am glad to note that the Bill will be referred to a Select Committee where more views and comments can be heard and discussed.

Encik Othman bin Haron Eusofe: ( In Malay): Mr Speaker, the commitment of this Bill to a Select Committee will enable the members of the public to have an opportunity to come forward and offer their views and feedback. As we know, the Bill will introduce a fundamental change in the Constitution of Singapore. The people must take this good opportunity to discuss this Bill thoroughly and to contribute their views and suggestions, in the interests of Singapore and our future generations.

Mr Speaker, I support this Bill as it will introduce a system of checks and balances which, once implemented, will be of great benefit to the future of our nation. Our security will be enhanced through the institution of an Elected President with effective powers to examine the Government's administration, particularly in five vital areas. One, protecting the national reserves from being squandered by an incompetent or irresponsible Government. Our national reserves belong to all citizens, all the workers of Singapore. This is a vital responsibility as it will safeguard the value of the Singapore dollar. Second, ensuring the integrity of the public service. The appointment of key officials in the public service must be made on the basis of meritocracy. This policy has resulted in a competent and honest civil service. Third, ensuring that the Government will not abuse its powers in enforcing the Internal Security Act. Fourth, checking the powers of the Government under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and finally ensuring that the CPIB will not be prevented from carrying out investigations into any complaint of corruption, particularly, against those holding senior appointments in the Government.

Mr Speaker, may I reiterate here that with an Elected President with the powers outlined above, the security of Singapore will be more assured. We can never be sure that the one-man-one-vote system will always give us an honest and capable Government. With this system of checks and balances, we can improve and strengthen our Constitution, and this will ensure the long-term peace and progress of our nation and will help to increase confidence in our country.

Mr Speaker, I would like now to comment on certain points that have been made in respect of the Bill. First, the question of whether the Elected President would have such vast powers as to be able to obstruct the Government from carrying out its responsibilities. I do not think that will be the case, because the Government can still find a way to achieve its objectives. For example, in the case of the Supply Bill or Supplementary Supply Bill, the Elected President must consult the Council of Presidential Advisors in order to exercise his veto power. If a majority of Council members disagree with the Elected President, the Government can table the Bill back before Parliament and carry it with a two-thirds majority. But if a majority of Council members concur with the Elected President, his veto will stay. However, in such and other matters where the President is empowered to act, if the Government feels that the President has not discharged his powers in a reasonable manner and is unhappy with his decision, the President's and the Government's decisions, together with the grounds thereof, can be referred to the people, either in the next Presidential elections or in a referendum to change the Constitution, for a final decision. In the process, the people will of course get a true picture of the problem between the President and the Government and, in the final analysis, will decide what is good for them and the nation. This means the people will have a chance to examine the problem and the underlying issues and make their decision. And this will strengthen our system of democracy.

Mr Speaker, with regard to the qualifications of candidates for the Elected Presidency, I agree with what is proposed in the Bill. We must be able to elect someone who can perform the functions of the Elected President effectively and curb the Government if it fails to act responsibly and honestly. Otherwise, despite the moral authority that he holds by virtue of being directly elected by the people, the Elected President will not have the confidence to stand up against the Government. High qualifications must therefore be required of candidates. In this regard, I hope the First Deputy Prime Minister will introduce as early as possible the mechanism for his election.

Finally, Mr Speaker, I would like to comment on the point that has been made about the Bill, ie, that it should be referred to a referendum. It must be noted that the Elected Presidency proposal has already been debated in this House in August 1988. I am aware that the proposal then was for the Elected President to be charged only with protecting the national reserves and integrity of the public service. Nevertheless, Parliament has accepted the principles behind the proposal as a basis for the preparation of a Bill on the Elected President. Furthermore, during the 1988 General Elections, this proposal became one of the hot issues and the people then gave the Government a strong mandate to prepare the Elected President Bill.

Mr Speaker, when this Bill becomes law, we must have assurances that it will not be easily amended to remove the President's powers. To safeguard the President's powers, any government wishing to amend this aspect of the Constitution must be required to put the question in a referendum, and no change should be made without the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the electorate. We must make sure that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the Elected Presidency will be an effective institution.

Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

The Minister for Education (Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill which we are now considering in this House is an important Bill. It marks a change in our Constitution which will have ramifications and implications for many years. It is, therefore, not surprising, Sir, that there has been much debate on this Bill and much discussion both within and outside Parliament. And this is as it should be. We should not take such a major change lightly. Many of the points have already been covered by other speakers in this House and I do not want to waste Members' time by repeating them.

All I want to do, Sir, is to make one very simple point, and that is, Sir, for a country, whether in Singapore or any other country in the world, to prosper and to provide a good life for its citizens, two things are necessary. First, you must have good people to run the Government. Second, you must have strong institutions, a point made by the First Deputy Prime Minister yesterday, and spoken on at some length by BG George Yeo in a speech which he made to Pre-University students in June this year.

Sir, we have been exceptionally fortunate in having able people for the last 31 years who have governed Singapore well and honestly. As a result, we have been able to build up our reserves. We have ensured high standards of integrity and performance in our public services. All Singaporeans, Sir, whatever the Opposition may say, have benefitted as a result of this happy event. But Members will realise that if they look at the countries which have gone independent since the Second World War, I think it is not far-fetched to say that the success of Singapore is the exception rather than the rule. In fact, Members will remember that when Singapore first became independent in 1965, there were any number of commentators who predicted or who expected Singapore to fail. I do not think, Sir, that we can fault them for their views. In fact, I believe at that time, given the circumstances, their views were quite well founded. That their views have not come true, fortunately for us, and that instead of a broken-back, not viable Singapore, we have a stable, prosperous Singapore today, is due to the fact that we were fortunate in having a group of people at that time who, despite the adverse circumstances, were determined to make a go of Singapore. And the result today is for all to see.

Good people in Government are more important than strong institutions. Good people are fundamental. With good people in Government, the present system can work. I would even go further to say that if we can be sure that we will always have good people in government, any one of a number of systems can be made to work, including the present system. But I think we have to ask ourselves one fundamental question. Just because we have had the good fortune to have had in Government good people for the last 31 years, can we be sure that we will be lucky enough to have good people in Government for the next 31 years? People who will run the system honestly and will not seek to run down our reserves in order to secure their popularity and their own elections. If we can be sure that there will always be good people in Government, then this Bill is not necessary. But if there is no guarantee that we will always have good people in Government, is it not our responsibility now to take steps to build up our institutions, so that if, for whatever reasons, an irresponsible government should come into power, that government will not be able to cause irreparable damage to Singapore? To me, this is what this present Bill is all about.

Sir, it is a difficult Bill and it may not be a perfect Bill. After this sitting today, the Bill will be sent to a Select Committee which I think is a very good idea. We will hear representations from the public. As with the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, I am sure that it will help us to polish up the Bill and to make the Bill more effective. And when the Act is in operation, we may from time to time even have to make amendments. But just because we do not have a perfect Act today does not mean that we should do nothing. Let us proceed with the best draft that our draftsman can come up with today, send it to Select Committee, polish it up, and work it. If we need to make amendments later on, we shall do so.

Therefore, Sir, in summary, on balance, despite all the difficulties and complications, I support the Bill. I believe that prevention is better than cure. We must realise that the institution of the Elected President cannot by itself ensure that we have a prosperous Singapore. But I believe that the institution of this Elected President will enhance our prospects of having in future years a prosperous, peaceful and secure Singapore where people of all races and all religions can live in peace and harmony. I think, after all, this is what should concern us most in this House.

Much obliged, Sir.

Dr Aline K. Wong (Tampines GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I stand in support of the Bill.

I would like to begin by noting that a nation's assets and reserves belong to the people. They belong to the people of Singapore, and not to any government, past, present or future. In democracies, the government is elected as representatives of the people to manage such assets judiciously and, hopefully, profitably as well. We have had the good fortune of having a good Government for the past 30 years, and I have no doubt the next Government is a good one also. Good governments will have no problem with the proposed Constitutional amendments, provided that a good President is elected, and a good Council of Presidential Advisors is appointed.

Sir, the direct election of a President is to provide him with the moral authority or legitimacy to act in the entire nation's interest. The President is expected to rise above party politics. However, as the Bill stands, a Presidential candidate is not required to drop his membership in any political party. Sir, although the Elected President does not have executive powers, nevertheless, he is given tremendous discretion in blocking the Government's annual budgets. Therefore, an Elected President can cause a crisis of confidence in a government. The most worrisome scenario is where an Elected President belongs to a different political party from that of the ruling government. The President will be under pressure from his own party to block the government's budgets, force a general election, thereby giving his own party an early chance of forming the next government. I am aware of the arguments behind allowing the Nominated MPs to keep their political party affiliations. But the Elected President is not like the Nominated MPs. The Elected President has extensive powers and he will make a great difference to the process of government. So I disagree with the views expressed yesterday by the Member for Fengshan that the political party affiliation of the Elected President does not matter. In my view, I think the candidates for the Elected President must be free of any political party affiliation first and foremost.

The powers of the Elected President are extensive in that he will have the discretion to block the Government's annual budgets as well as those of the key statutory boards and Government-owned companies. If the majority of the members on the Presidential Council agree with the President to veto such budgets, the decision is final. But if we look at the composition of the Council, the Chairman and one other member are nominated by the President, two members are nominated by the Prime Minister, while the remaining two are nominated by the Chairman of PSC. But the appointment of the Chairman of PSC himself must have the concurrence of the President. Thus, there is a possibility that the President will approve of a Chairman of PSC whose views are like his own, hence ensuring that he will always have the majority view on the Presidential Council behind him from the very beginning. If the provision for the Chairman of PSC to nominate two members onto the Presidential Council is to allow members of the civil service to be nominated, then, which master are the two civil servants serving, the President or the Prime Minister? There may well be a conflict of interest. If the purpose is to have two members outside the civil service, then I see no reason why the Chairman of PSC should be involved in nominating them. I think we should look at this provision again. And I also feel that the number of Presidential Advisors should be enlarged somewhat, in order to provide for a broader range of views for the Elected President's consideration.

I agree that the Elected President's power to approve the Government's budgets and those of the important statutory boards and Government-owned companies is necessary, because this is the more direct way of scrutinizing and preventing the Government from dipping into the reserves or warning the Government against the likelihood of dipping into the reserves should its way of spending continue. However, I believe the list of statutory board budgets that come under the President's purview should be limited only to those which have to do with the original purpose of the Elected Presidency proposal, ie, the protection of the nation's assets and reserves.

During the August 1988 debate on the former White Paper, the House went down the list with the First Deputy Prime Minister. There were grey areas, such as the POSB, PSA, PUB and Telecom, SBC, CAAS. Some of these have now been struck off the list, but PUB and Telecom are still on; so are HDB and JTC. Are there not moves to privatise PUB and Telecom? Why the need to retain them on the list? With regard to HDB, do the flats not belong to the individual owners already, who have the right to sell their own flats for their own purposes? Maybe the First Deputy Prime Minister could clarify for us what constitute HDB's assets which are not privately owned, and which are not already included in MND Holdings which falls under the Elected President's purview in any case? Sir, the point is: Yes, the Elected President must be given the power to scrutinize Government expenditures. But if he has too much power, such as having too broad a portfolio, he may strangle the ordinary running of Government by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

The Elected President can exercise his veto only where Government expenditures draw down the reserves accumulated during the terms of previous governments. Here, I think a crucial problem arises. How does one define the reserves accumulated by previous governments? It may appear to be a simple matter at the beginning. When a new government takes over, whatever it inherits from the previous government cannot be touched unless the Elected President agrees. But if he does not, then the government has to raise its own money. However, there will be arguments over whether some of the profits or savings generated from on-going projects, projects which were started by the previous government, belong to the new government, or cannot be touched still.

Some projects started by a previous government cannot be self-financing from the beginning. It will take some years during which time the government subsidies are necessary. Will it mean that the next government would abolish such projects because they will be a burden to it? Examples that come to mind include restructured hospitals, independent schools, extensions of the MRT, the airport, new parks and public recreational facilities, new cultural centres, and so on and so forth. Of course, the Elected President is expected to act in the long-term interest of the nation. And long-term projects which are beneficial to the country will meet with his approval, and he will not block the spending of reserves for such purposes.

The blocking mechanism will encourage the government to spend prudently within its term. This is good. But the result is, the government is also likely to pursue conservative, even deflationary fiscal policies, which may not be appropriate at certain times, such as during recessions.

Perhaps, there is also a philosophical problem involved in the continuous accumulation of reserves. No doubt we must take precautionary measures to guard our reserves. We must save for a rainy day. If every successive government turns out to be good and prudent, the amount of reserves will keep accumulating. The inter-generational transfer of wealth will keep going on. Which generation of Singaporeans will be able to benefit from all the previous generations' hard efforts? I have heard some remarks by our own citizens saying, "Singaporeans are like poor little people who live in a rich country." No doubt such remarks tend to come from people who wish for more Government subsidies and less taxes, and this would not do. But the question is still this: Do governments spend money or dip into reserves only to gain popularity with the electorate? Is there no possibility for governments to spend money in order to shape the society in directions which are in genuine accord with the population's deeply held values?

In addition to his vetoing powers over budgetary matters, the Elected President can veto nominations to key offices within the civil service and the key statutory boards. I think this is good. It will prevent a Prime Minister from appointing his own cronies. The CPIB would take care of corruption cases. So the question is the possibility of a future Prime Minister appointing incompetent civil servants. I support the safeguard. However, there is something that we should bear in mind. The effectiveness of any government depends to a very large extent on how it can move the civil bureaucracy along with its policies. Civil servants are supposed not to have personal pet ideas of their own, but are supposed to conduct themselves in the best tradition of the British civil service, ie, to work strictly according to the direction and policies set by Ministers. But is this always the case in reality? Anyone who has read the popular novels or watched the popular TV series on "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister" would have had a good laugh. But are these satires not somewhat close to life? Now, with the top civil servants' appointments being subject to the Elected President's approval, a troublesome scenario can be developed, if the Elected President holds very different views on policy matters from the Prime Minister. Perhaps we could think about putting a maximum on the number of times that the Elected President can reject the Prime Minister's nominations of the key civil service positions.

Sir, one of the crucial things on which the success of the Elected Presidency mechanism hinges on is the question of whether there could be differences in policy viewpoints. In standing for general elections, a political party and its candidates will have to make known its views on policy matters. Does the same apply to candidates standing for election to the Presidency? Or is it sufficient already for the Presidential candidates to emphasise their personal integrity and financial prudence? Given the high qualifications which all the Presidential candidates must satisfy before being nominated, how can the people choose between which candidate to vote for? At the end, they may have to choose between personalities? Is this good or bad? It all depends on the personalities involved.

Therefore, it is most important that Presidential candidates must be of the highest calibre. I agree that qualifications for Presidential candidates must be very stringent. There are broadly two types of qualifications as prescribed by the Bill. One is personal integrity; the other is financial management experience. The two are not mutually exclusive. In fact, as seen from the list of eligibles, these qualities are expected to come together in the same person in most cases. However, this list seems to be too restrictive. In fact, has the government tried to estimate how many Singaporeans altogether can qualify to be Presidential candidates? Just now we heard from one Member of the House who speculated that we might be faced with a situation where there might be only one nomination. So along with others, I think there may be a need to include a larger pool, for example, to include prominent citizens who are known to have made contributions to our society but who may not have had the requisite experience with financial management, just as in the case of the Chief Justice, Speaker of Parliament, Attorney-General, High Court Judges, with due respect to the present ones. After all, the President will be assisted by his Council of Advisors.

This brings me to a related point, nominees to the Presidential Council. At least, the majority of them should have the requisite financial experience in order to play their crucial role in advising the President on the matter of reserves. I should think this requisite financial experience is of more importance for the Presidential Council members than perhaps for the Elected President himself.

Before I end, I like to join other Members of the House in applauding the safeguarding roles of the Elected President vis-a-vis the Internal Security Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and CPIB investigations. These features are widely welcomed as additional checks and balances on the Executive body.

Finally, Sir, the Bill proposed before us, as Dr Tony Tan pointed out, is a very complicated Bill. It is a very important Bill and it has tremendous consequences for the entire process of government in future. We must examine the Bill most thoroughly and I also hope that members of the public would come forward to present their views at the Select Committee stage. I am a little disturbed by the widespread lack of interest in the Bill at the grassroots level. These two days we also saw a very empty Strangers' Gallery. But ordinary Singaporeans must not forget that once these amendments are passed, they will be firmly entrenched. Any future amendments will take not just a two-thirds majority in this House to change, but also two-thirds of all the electors' votes in a national referendum. Thus, we must exer- cise the greatest care and introduce refinements to this Bill. I admit that some of the points I raised cannot be addressed by the Bill as such because some of the points are not procedural matters. I think we should give the system a trial and during the interim period I should hope that definitions and boundaries would become clearer in our minds.

Dr Ow Chin Hock (Leng Kee): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill which provides for an Elected President and I understand the objectives and background of this Bill.

From among the developing countries, there are many examples of government spending in an extravagant manner to attain short-term political objectives by providing subsidies and free services, thereby causing their economies to be ruined. Even among the developed countries there are many governments which have to face budgetary deficits because of their welfare policies. However, these countries have very rich natural resources which could be relied upon in times of economic crisis. But if we look at our country, our financial reserves can be said to be the only asset that we can rely upon in time of crisis. Therefore, we must have a safeguard so that our assets will not be spent away by any government through extravagant spending. Our Elected President will provide such a safeguard.

When the Government's expenditure exceeds its income, there are three alternatives to finance its deficits: (1) by borrowing, (2) by withdrawing from reserves, and (3) by printing more money. Under this Bill, the first two alternatives would require the concurrence of the Elected President. As for the random issue of currency notes or printing more money, it would be more difficult to do under our Currency Board system. However, we must have people of high integrity to be the Chairman, Directors and Chief Executive Officers in our Currency Board and the Monetary Authority of Singapore. These two institutions are very important financial institutions. They are just like the Central Bank in other countries. For this reason, the consent of the Elected President is necessary for their budgets and key appointments in these two institutions. Similarly, the CPF Board manages the savings of our people and therefore it should also be included in the list of functions under the Elected President.

However, I feel that, apart from these three financial institutions, the concurrence of the Elected President will not be necessary for key appointments in the statutory boards and the Government-owned investment and holding companies. I do appreciate that we must have capable and honest people to hold key appointments in our civil service. The second function of the Elected President is to make sure that our public service will not be undermined by nepotism or political appointments. For this reason, I support the provisions under the proposed Article 21 whereby the concurrence of the Elected President will be necessary for key appointments in the civil service, judiciary and the armed forces, etc.

However, the appointments in statutory boards and Government-owned companies are different from that of the civil service, judiciary or armed forces, etc. Let me elaborate: (1) The statutory boards have specific duties and functions in our economic or social development, such as providing infrastructure and public utilities. They enjoy great autonomy and flexibility in financial and operational management. So under the proposed Articles 22 and 22A of the Bill, will the function of the Elected President diminish the flexibility of these statutory boards, thereby affecting their efficiency? Similarly, apart from being owned by the Government, the Government-owned companies operate in the same way as the private companies and are subject to test of the market. Why must the President interfere with their key appointments, thus affecting their operations?

Secondly, as the function of the Elected President is expanded to the appointment of key positions, the powers of the Cabinet will diminish. It would also mean the possibility of more friction and confrontation between the President and the Cabinet. Assessment and appointment of people are difficult taks and they always involve some subjective elements. Someone who is considered to be "cautious" by the Prime Minister may be considered to be "indecisive" by the President. Similarly, one who is thought to be "decisive" by the Prime Minister may be thought to be "rash and arbitrary" by the President. Of course, if the President and the Cabinet disagree about the appointment of the Chairman, PSC, it may be worth the while. But if they argue over the appointment of a director of Telecom, then I think it is not necessary. From among the statutory boards listed in the 1988 White Paper, SBC and CAAS have been deleted. However, I note that under the proposed Article 22(4) of the Bill the Elected President can declare by order in the Gazette that any statutory board with reserves of more than $100 million be subjected to the jurisdiction of Article 22.

Thirdly, the 1990 White Paper pointed out that a substantial part of the assets of the Government is held in statutory boards and Government-owned companies. For this reason, the concurrence of the Elected President is required for key appointments and budgets of statutory boards and Government companies. But on the other hand, if the Government, through privatisation and reorganisation, reduces the reserves in any particular statutory board or capital in any particular Government company to below $100 million, then Articles 22 and Article 22A, 22B and 22C will not be applicable to them. In that case, will these Government-owned companies or statutory boards be subjected to the powers of the Elected President?

This Bill also gives the President three additional powers, ie, to oversee the implementation of the ISA and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill after it becomes Law so that the power of the Minister will be subjected to some checks and balances. As for the power of the CPIB to carry out investigations, it is an extension of preserving the integrity of our public service. All these additional powers should be welcome. This Bill gives the President some extra power, but it also provides for some checks on his power.

Generally speaking, this Bill is worthy of our support for three reasons: Firstly, it provides a safeguard for our national reserves and assets and to maintain the integrity of our public service. Secondly, it provides a check and balance on our political system. Thirdly, it does not contravene or violate the spirit of democracy and will not affect the operation of our parliamentary system. Of course, no system can be said to be perfect and flawless. The Elected President will further institutionalise our political system and will provide an additional level of safeguard to the future of our country. But it is not an absolute safeguard because the destiny of our country is determined largely on the quality of our people and the values upheld by our people. If we do not maintain our spirit of diligence and prudence, and continue to strive for better standard of living, and if we keep on thinking of how to dip into our more than $30 billion of reserves, then no system whatsoever will prevent our country from going down the hills. Therefore, I wish to reiterate that while we are discussing this Bill on the Elected President, we must reaffirm the importance of qualities of our people in nation building.

Mr Leong Horn Kee (Thomson): Mr Speaker, Sir, it is obvious that this Constitutional Amendment Bill and the accompanying White Paper have been prepared with much care and attention, and also after much deliberation. It has to be, as the consequences are extremely far-reaching, especially for the Government and the people.

Sir, I support the principal concept of the proposal, which is to provide additional safeguard against the indiscriminate use of the reserves and preserve the integrity of the public service.

Having a good government is very critical. Nepotism and flagrant disregard of the use of public funds will lead to the ruin of a nation. Examples of countries which have suffered under such mismanagement are abound. The impact of bad government affects everybody. The confidence in the country is reflected very much in the stock market which is an excellent barometer of the health of a nation. Government can do cover-ups but no government can cover up market forces. For example, in the Philippines, Sir, the average Price Earning Ratios, commonly called P/E ratios, of the listed companies in the Makati Stock Exchange are between 3 and 4, which means that local and foreign shareholders would be prepared to invest in stocks with a three to four year pay-back period. Whereas in comparison, the P/E ratios of Singapore companies are now in the range of about 12 to 15, which is about three or four times those of the Philippines. If you compare to Japan, the P/E ratios in Japan were in fact in the high 50s, but the Gulf crisis brings it down to the 30s now.

It was often described that the concept of an Elected President allows for checks and balances against the Government. The phrase "checks and balances" connotates that there are a few opposing forces counterbalancing each other, such as the President, the Senate and the Congress in the US. I do not think this is the case here. The Prime Minister and his Government are obviously in charge. Executive powers rest essentially with the Government. There are some safeguard powers which will be vested in the Elected President, but the balance of power is clearly in the favour of the Government, and I think this is right. The analogy I would like to use would be the Chairman and the Managing Director of a company called Singapore Inc. The people are the shareholders of this Singapore Inc. They elect a President who is wise, experienced and highly respected as a non-executive Chairman, that is, the Elected President. Then they separately choose a Managing Director who will be the Chief Executive Officer, someone who is dynamic, energetic, visionary, has guts, etc. - all the critical and good points of leadership. He will be the Prime Minister.

The aims and objectives of this concept of the Elected President are very honourable and well-intended indeed. In fact, it is extremely laudable of the Government to want to voluntarily give up powers to create a better and more stable political system in Singapore. If I may articulate my only main concern, Sir. I am concerned that the new format of having an Elected President may lead to a paralysis of the Government in situations of conflict. To avoid this, it should be spelt out clearly with no tinge of doubt, that executive powers rest solely in the hands of the Government. All operational and executive powers are under their charge. The Elected President's role is to exercise, where necessary, and hopefully very sparingly, the veto powers.

Based on the concept that the Government should have full operational and executive responsibility, and as the final details will be scrutinised by a Select Committee, may I request the First Deputy Prime Minister to consider some of the following comments.

First, on the appointments in statutory boards. Among the proposed statutory boards where the President will be having veto power, I feel that the following should not be included. I agree with Dr Aline Wong that these boards are non-financial institutions. They are: Housing and Development Board; Jurong Town Corporation; Port of Singapore Authority; Public Utilities Board; and the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore.

Sir, as I said, these boards are non-financial institutions. They are basically operating organisations to take charge of the provision of key services and facilities for Singapore. I feel that therefore they do not need to be overseen by the Elected President. Their assets are mostly immovable which cannot be easily liquidated or sold. They may have some revenue surpluses but these are not substantial and there is no reason for them to accumulate substantial reserves. In fact, if they do, they are probably overcharging the consumers. Hence, to avoid paralysing these statutory boards in the provision of essential services, I feel that there is no need for a Presidential veto on the appointment to these boards. Moreover, as was said by Dr Wong earlier, some, if not all of these boards, would eventually be privatised to become listed companies in the future.

Second, on the key public service appointments, I would like to suggest that there may be a conflict situation to accord the President veto powers in the appointments of some of the following key public service personnel:

(i) Members of the Armed Forces Council;

(ii) Chief of the Defence Force;

(iii) Chiefs of the Air Force, Army and Navy; and

(iv) The Commissioner of Police.

Sir, I feel that these appointments should be the prerogative of the Government, particularly as they pertain to internal and external defence which are very critical operational matters. In the event of emergency, I do not think we can afford an ambiguous situation where the President has veto control over the key appointments in the defence and police forces. Just imagine, how chaotic it would be if our defence forces are immobilised by squabbles between the Prime Minister and the Elected President on such critical appointments during a national crisis.

The third area is in the size and composition of the Council of Presidential Advisors. The current proposal is to allow the Chairman of PSC to nominate two members while the Elected President will nominate two members and the Prime Minister two other members. Under this structure, we are making the Chairman of PSC a very important political factor, in fact, a power broker. I presume it is not the intent to make him so, nor is it desirable. I would like to suggest that instead of the Chairman, PSC nominating two members, we perhaps should have four members who, by definition, would become Members of the Council of the Presidential Advisors and they are quite independent persons. The four persons I have in mind, Sir, are Chairman PSC, the Chief Justice, Mr Speaker yourself, and perhaps the Auditor-General. In this way, I think we will have eight members of the Council, four of whom are independent and the other four nominees, consisting of two who are nominated by the President and two by the Prime Minister. I think the proposed arrangement will add more representation, prestige and independence to the Council.

Sir, I would like to conclude by just stating once again that it is commendable for the First Deputy Prime Minister to voluntarily shed some of his powers so as to provide a more stable political system in Singapore. We are entering uncharted waters. We must therefore tread with extreme care. In putting together the various pieces, I hope the First Deputy Prime Minister, in his generosity to share powers with the Elected President, and also in introducing the checks and balances, will take note that: "It will be wonderful if the Elected President and the Prime Minister can be playmates, that means they can play and work together; but I think it will be difficult if they get into a stalemate; and it will be disastrous if the Prime Minister gets checkmated!"

The Minister for Law and Minister for Home Affairs (Prof. S. Jayakumar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to speak in support of the Bill. What I would like to do is to make my comments on the context in which I would like to view this Bill, and that context is that this Bill must be seen in the perspective of the evolution of our Constitution, how we have over the years developed and evolved our Constitution to suit the special needs and to meet the peculiar circumstances and situations which we face or which we can face in the future.

My starting point in developing the context is to ask what kind of a Constitution we had when we separated and became independent. Sir, when we entered Malaysia, we received a new Constitution which was the Constitution of the State of Singapore. It was a Constitution for a constituent unit in a larger Federation. When we separated from Malaysia and became independent, all we had was this Constitution - the 1963 State Constitution - totally inadequate for a country which is an independent and sovereign nation. It lacked many provisions such as provisions on public services and provisions on fundamental liberties. In other words, on Independence, we did not have an adequate and comprehensive Constitution.

So the first milestone in the evolution of our Constitution was that the Government on its own took immediate steps to rectify this gap and, shortly after Separation, the Government enacted a law to meet the gap and one of the solutions which the Government decided was to adopt certain of the constitutional provisions from the Malaysian Constitution and to make them applicable as part of our constitutional law. Included in this adoption from the Malaysian Constitution were the fundamental liberties provisions adopted for our purposes. In other words, the Government on its own took the initiative of imposing on itself certain constitutional constraints, because once you have the provisions in the Constitution on fundamental liberties, all Organs of Government are to that extent duty bound in law to observe the requirements of those provisions.

From that starting point, in 1965, over the years we have evolved our Constitution and today, what we refer to as our Constitution is an amalgam of the 1963 State Constitution, the provisions which we borrowed or adopted from the Malaysian provision and subsequent amendments made over the years. I would like to trace some of these other milestones.

The second milestone was in 1969, when we amended the Constitution to provide for the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, arising from the recommendations of the 1966 Constitutional Commission. This Council has to scrutinise all Bills and subsidiary legislation to ensure that there are no provisions which are discriminatory and no Bill can be submitted to the President for his assent until the Presidential Council has reported on the Bill. Is that not a fetter, an obstacle to Parliament's supremacy? It clearly is. But in our multi-racial society, clearly that was a wise move. All sectors of our people must have confidence that no government can quietly slip in discriminatory legislation.

The third milestone was in 1972, when the Constitution was amended to provide for the protection of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic. Under this amendment, it was provided that no government could surrender or bargain away our independence in a clandestine manner, or surrender, or relinquish control over the Police or the Armed Forces without having raised the issue squarely and getting the support of two-thirds of the voters in a referendum. That too may be considered an important safeguard.

The fourth milestone was in 1984 to ensure that there is always Opposition presence in Parliament. In 1984, we amended the Constitution to provide for the concept of a Non-Constituency MP. It is purely because of that amendment that we have Dr Lee Siew-Choh in this House today. He considers it his duty to take on the Government, criticise, and use whatever unrestrained language in attacking and picking holes in Government policies and Bills. If we take a purely selfish and parochial view, it surely must be a Government with suicidal tendency which amends the Constitution in this way to enable the defeated Opposition candidate to have a seat in this House!

It is yet another example of self-imposed constraint on the Government to ensure that our Parliament will not be totally deprived of Opposition representation where one party has most or all of the seats. The Opposition attacked the amendment but are we now better or worse with Dr Lee being here to raise issues, taking on the Government even if he uses language which other Members of Parliament from the PAP side, while making the same point, may put it in a different way? I think we are not worse off. It is good that he brings up the issues in his own way and makes his own points. It is a unique provision. As far as I know, I know of only one other country which has provision for a defeated candidate to have a seat in Parliament. But it is a wise move for our own circumstances.

The fifth milestone was in 1988 when the Constitution was amended to provide for Group Representation Constituencies, the objective of which was to ensure that whatever happens in the polls, there would always be in this Parliament a minimum number of representatives from the minority groups, whether from the Government Party or Opposition Parties. Is that good or bad? Obviously, it is a plus. But it does place a fetter on the Government because it will make it that much more difficult to ensure that we have the candidates for fielding in an election.

Now, the sixth milestone was earlier this year, when the Constitution was amended to provide for Nominated MPs. Again, as a result of this amendment, not only will we have Opposition MPs, NCMPs, but yet another group of MPs. I would say this is yet another example of a self-imposed burden on the Government. It is a burden because you will have another group in this House who, on some occasions, may agree with Government, but I have no doubt, if they are men of convictions, they will also criticise the Government. But I think it is a useful innovation in the long-term interest of our country as it helps to provide greater ventilation of constructive views in Parliament.

I have traced this contextual development, Sir, to show how our Constitution has evolved, how we have shaped and moulded the Constitution, and these major milestones have been guided by what is necessary in Singapore's long-term interest. These changes which I have described show that many of the changes resulted in imposing restrictions or Constitutional constraints on Government itself. The Government need not have made theseamendments. But I think they were necessary and they were useful.

The latest amendments now before us for the Elected Presided, in my view, must be seen in this context. Our Constitution must evolve in a way that takes into account our special circumstances and our special problems, including problems that we may have down the road, which have been pointed out by the First Deputy Prime Minister and many Members. The test must be not whether it is unusual or unique, but whether it is an amendment that will serve the long-term interest of our nation.

In my view, the Elected President concept is a good check and balance, a safeguard in the form of a blocking mechanism. It is really an insurance against disaster from which we may not recover. Do we know of any big corporation which operates without taking insurance? Is there any big corporation which takes pride in telling its shareholders that they are unique in facing pitfalls in the future without any insurance? What more when it comes to the future of our country? I would, therefore, strongly commend the amendments, but I am sure this being a novel and unique legislation, it can be improved in many respects. And I am sure the First Deputy Prime Minister and the Select Committee, which will be set up, will consider not only the views which have been expressed in the House, but other views which will be submitted to the Select Committee.

Finally, Sir, in response to Mr Chandra Das, Chairman of the Feedback Unit, who mentioned yesterday that the Law Society probably ought to be invited, I wish to assure him that my Ministry will be writing to the Law Society to invite its views on the specific provisions of the Bill. Members will recall that in 1986, the Legal Profession Act was amended and one of the purposes was to provide that the Law Society would assist the Government and the courts in all matters affecting legislation submitted to it. After the Second Reading vote has been taken, we will submit this legislation to the Law Society. I will point out to them that this legislation, being technical, new, and unique in many respects, I think we can benefit from the views of the legal experts, especially Constitutional law experts in the profession and we will invite views on the specific provisions and whatever improvements they have on the Bill. But I must make it clear that obviously we are not inviting political pronouncements on the issue whether to have an Elected President or not. That is a matter for the Government and Parliament to decide. I think I should clarify that, because Members will recall that some years ago, the then Law Society leadership took on itself to make political pronouncements on the amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act and we made it clear that this was a matter for Parliament and the Government to decide. But I am sure, and I am confident, that the legal experts in the legal fraternity can contribute to improvements and strengthening of the provisions of the Bill.

Dr Low Seow Chay: ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, I support this Bill.

We are practising a unicameral Parliamentary system. Under the Constitution, a Government with a majority of seats can do practically anything it desires, although it may have to face queries by Members of the House. The policies of the Government need not be blocked or examined by any party at all. Fortunately, over the past 31 years, the Singapore Government has not been doing things according to its own whims and fancies or abusing its powers. So, in this respect, it is the good fortune of the people of Singapore. But good fortune may not stay foreever. If at any time, should there be a bad government winning a general election in future, and in order to fulfil its promises of welfare services and other benefits made during the election campaign to win votes, it will have no alternative but to draw down the reserves of the country. By do doing, all the reserves that we have built up over the years will go and vanish into the air. But with the veto power of the President, we will have some safeguard for our people's savings. So, I feel that this is a major change for the protection of our people's savings. It is a proposal in the interest of the people and, therefore, worthy of our support.

All this while, the Government has been adopting a policy of meritocracy. Only those who are talented and capable are selected to head the various Government departments. These Government departments, in coordination with the development of the other sectors of our economy, enable us to progress steadily in our economy, security and maintenance of law and order. In order to pave the way for its own convenience and in order to reward those who had contributed to its well-being, a bad government may make radical changes to the departmental heads. As a result, it will be detrimental to all that we have achieved in the past. The damage to our economy, security and stability may be far too great to be described in words.

Having a President with a veto power over such matters, we could, at least, prevent a bad government from commiting all kinds of outrages. It would serve a useful purpose.

If we have a good government which is always acting in the interest of the people, then this kind of government will not require any form of supervision. But if it is a bad government, then very often this kind of bad government will abuse its powers for their own political or personal interest. Under these circumstances, this kind of bad government may abuse the laws and powers where the Ministers have the absolute power without being subject to review by the court. For example, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, the Internal Security Act, and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill which has been read a Second time. So, if part of the functions of the President is to supervise over the implementation of these laws, then the Government will be unable to abuse its power. Here, I would like to ask the First Deputy Prime Minster why the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act is not included in the functions of the Elected President.

What I mentioned above gives an indication as to the advantage of having a good President against a bad government. If we have a good government but, at the same time, we have a rather uncooperative President and a Council of Presidential Advisors, what would the situation be like? In that kind of a situation, we can expect the President to frequently go against the Government, and then the country and the people may suffer in the end. Under this Amendment Bill, there is no mention as to what kind of solution can be provided to deal with such a situation. This may be the inadequacy of this proposed Bill. I hope that the First Deputy Prime Minister can explain this to the House.

Under the proposed Article 148D of the Bill, if the President blocks the budget of the Government, against the advice of the Council, then by a two-thirds majority, Parliament can reverse the President's veto. However, if we look at the Council of Presidential Advisors, there are six members. In a case of three votes against three votes, the Council will not be able to advise the President. Under such circumstances, bearing in mind the number of members in the Council of Presidential Advisors it would seem to be a conflict with Article 148D of the Bill. I would like to seek a clarification from the First Deputy Prime Minister on this matter too.

Under the proposed Article 5(2A) of the Bill, if there is any need to amend the powers given to the Elected President, then there are two ways of doing it. One is to amend it with the consent of the Presi- dent and a two-thirds majority of Parliament. The other way is to get a two-thirds majority of the general electorate voting in favour of such an amendment at a national referendum. Between the two ways, I feel that the former is much easier than the latter. For this reason, I suggest that the second way be altered by providing that the amendment be made by a two-thirds majority in Parliament followed by a simple majority in the national referendum.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill. 2.30 pm

Mr Lew Syn Pau (Tanglin): Mr Speaker, Sir, this subject was first debated in August 1988 after the introduction of the White Paper on Constitutional Amendments to Safeguard Financial Assets and the Integrity of the Public Services. Since I was not in the House then, I spent some time reading the Hansard of 11th and 12th August 1988 in order to get a better idea of how far we have gone in this debate. Mr Lim Boon Heng who summed up the debate then said:

'In summary, I think we can say that the House agrees that there should be safeguards for our reserves and that we agree that there should be safeguards for the integrity of our civil service. We all agree that we should find some form of mechanism to build these safeguards into our Constitution. Most Members agree that an elected President is one method of achieving this objective whilst some may prefer to explore other means further.'

The First Deputy Prime Minister, in moving the Second Reading of the Bill in the House yesterday, reiterated that the underlying philosophy or purpose of the Bill is to provide for the safeguarding of the financial reserves of Singapore and the integrity of the public services. He felt that the existing Constitution does not provide adequately for this purpose.

All my parliamentary colleagues who have spoken before me have supported the underlying philosophy of the Bill. I support likewise. From the feedback I have from the public, I believe they too accept the need to provide for an institution to safeguard our financial reserves and integrity of the civil service. However, since August 1988, I have not seen enough information being released to convince the people that the Elected President is the best institution to achieve this. Dr Lau Teik Soon in his speech during the debate on the first White Paper in 1988 advocated the introduction of an upper legislative body such as an elected Senate to perform this custodial role. I feel that this suggestion has not been given enough serious consideration and study. If it has, then certainly the reasons for discarding other options have not been made known adequately to the public. An Upper House or Senate need not be too big, say, 10-20 members so that it can respond quickly when the need arises. I think it would not be too difficult to get candidates for this Upper House, as such Members need not shoulder the onerous task of looking after constituents. If their functions are mainly custodial as contained in the Bill, they need not meet as often as Parliament. I believe we have enough prominent politicians, senior civil servants and eminent professionals and businessmen who are capable and willing to discharge these functions with objectivity and dignity. In the long-term, I am not convinced as yet that 10-20 such distinguished members would be inferior to a lone custodian.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill before the House contains very important amendments to the Constitution which would affect our children and perhaps our children's children. We should therefore spend more time examining other possible options before proceeding. The issue before this House today is not one of ascertaining whether there is a need to have a second key to safeguard our financial reserves and integrity of the public services. That need has been ascertained and accepted. The issue that confronts us today is one of finding the best long-term institution to hold that second key. The Elected President is one such institution which may work very well in the near term. It is certainly an improvement over the existing system. But the question we have to ask ourselves is whether it is the best institution in the long term.

I am pleased to note that this Bill will be referred to a Select Committee. I hope the Select Committee will continue to examine other options in greater depth.

Mr Speaker: Order. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 3.00 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 2.36 pm until 3.00 pm Sitting resumed at 3.00 pm