CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT NO. 3) BILL

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Debate resumed.

Dr John Chen Seow Phun (Hong Kah GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, we have in front of us a very important Bill which will fundamentally change the political landscape of our country. I would like to examine mainly two aspects of the Bill. First, what powers the Elected President will be given and for what purpose; and second, whether these powers will result in a more stable or less stable political system for Singapore.

Sir, the custodial powers that will be entrusted to the Elected President are primarily aimed at providing adequate checks and balances on the government of the day. These powers enable the Elected President to protect the Republic's financial assets, preserve the integrity of the public services, and safeguard the abuse of powers by the Government with respect to the ISA, the proposed Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and the CPIB. Contrary to what Dr Lee Siew-Choh has said yesterday, these checks and balances are hitherto not available in our parliamentary system. They are therefore important in safeguarding the interests of our people. On the Presidential powers to check the Government, I support fully without reservation.

However, on the question of Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills which are passed by Parliament, the Elected President, together with the majority of the Council of Presidential Advisors, can effectively veto the decision of Parliament, even though Parliament may have a two-thirds majority agreeing to the Bills. Under these circumstances, the only immediate thing the Government can do to challenge the President is by introducing amendment to remove or modify the veto power of the Elected President. And that requires a referendum with a two-thirds majority of the total number of voters. Is this desirable?

Sir, I can understand the need to entrench the provisions relating to the President's custodial powers by requiring amendments to be confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum. It is to ensure that this part of the Constitution cannot be easily tampered with without the overwhelming consent of the people. But in a deadlock situation between Parliament and the President on the Supply Bills alone, requiring Parliament to amend the custodial powers of the President by a referendum of two-thirds majority may prove to be a destabilising factor in our political system and the governing of the nation. I share the same concern as Dr Aline Wong when she mentioned that when the President and the Government belong to separate political parties, a deadlock and paralysis of the Government can happen. May I suggest that, for the Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills, if there is a deadlock situation and if Parliament has a two-thirds majority, then either Parliament should prevail or the Government needs only to obtain a simple majority in a referendum on the Bills alone, not on the other custodial powers belonging to the President. A simple majority will do, because in the first place the President will probably be elected on the first-past-the-post basis.

Sir, Dr Lee Siew-Choh complained that it is undemocratic if an elected government is not allowed to use the financial reserves. But he knows that the election of a President with powers to check the use of reserves will be done within the framework of parliamentary democracy. Dr Lee also accused the PAP Government for introducing this Bill to continue its rule. But an objective person will tell you that if an Elected President is identified by the people as having the same philosophy as the PAP Government, there is every possibility that it will encourage more people to vote for the Opposition in a general election. Dr Lee claimed that the PAP Government is preparing for contingencies and the Elected President will cause problems for the Government when the Opposition comes into power so as to make them unpopular. He forgot that if a Government is incapable of ensuring financial prudence and the integrity of the civil service, the role of the Elected President is precisely instituted for checking such a government. At any rate, there are provisions in the Bill for the government to challenge the Elected President.

Sir, I now turn to some points regarding the implementation of the Bill. When the office of President becomes vacant prior to the expiration of his term, the proposed Articles 22M and 22N make provision for the temporary appointment of persons to fill the office until a newly Elected President assumes office. I feel that if there is an elected Vice-President, then he is the most suitable person to act as President. Perhaps the Presidential candidate should have a running mate for Vice-Presidency, and the elected Vice-President can then chair the Council of Presidential Advisors under normal circumstances. Under the present proposal, I feel that the Chief Justice and the Speaker should not automatically be in the line of succession for the temporary appointment of President. This is because, firstly, people have not elected them and, secondly, automatic succession does not guarantee that the appointee is capable of handling the wide ranging functions of the Elected President. These objections can be resolved by making it mandatory for Parliament to elect a qualified person to be the Acting President.

I would like to add to the point made by Dr Aline Wong regarding reserves and I would like the First Deputy Prime Minister to clarify. It is possible that the Government of the day collects large financial gains due to privatization of statutory boards, Government companies and valuable properties. Will these gains be considered as reserves accumulated by previous governments or will they be considered as newly acquired reserves?

Finally, Sir, the Elected President Bill on the whole will enhance the political stability of our country. Without the proposed Elected President, all you need is a bad government and Singapore will go to ruin. In the proposed two-key system, the chances of collusion between the Elected President and the Cabinet will be remote. In the event of a bad President being elected, the Government will always have recourse to the people. For these reasons, Sir, I support the Bill.

Dr Tan Cheng Bock (Ayer Rajah): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for allowing me to speak.

I rise to support the First Deputy Prime Minister's proposal. I have spoken at length on this subject at the last debate and I do not wish to go into all the points I have raised.

Sir, many Singaporeans prefer an apolitical President. This is because an apolitical President helps to jell our people of different races and political affiliations. He is seen as a neutral person and acceptance of him is easier. We have had this arrangement since independence. The idea or even the thought of changing the ceremonial role of the President to an "Executive" role begs a lot of questions. These questions were asked by many of my fellow MPs who spoke yesterday and today and I need not dwell on them.

People do not like to see change, especially when everything seems all right. This is more so if we have a kind fatherly figure of our present President, Mr Wee Kim Wee, as Head of State. Singaporean Chinese, Indians, Malays love his warm, friendly nature. He has indeed been a unifying force for all Singaporeans. It is therefore understandable why a fair number of Singaporeans do not want to see the Presidency change. But times change, views also change.

Mr Speaker, Sir, our country is getting wealthier, financial matters more complicated, legislations are also getting more complicated; people's expectations are more, demand to spend on our accumulated wealth is also tempting. How do we cope with all these competing needs and expectations? We have indeed gone about putting in place certain institutions, as informed by Prof. Jayakumar this morning, like the GRC, the Town Councils, the NCMP, the NMP, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, to cover but some of the areas of concern. Recently, there have been suggestions of the Ombudsman or the Parliamentary Commissioner to check on the civil service. Therefore, changes to our system have been going on or have been put in place.

Now, we are examining the role of the President and whether he should be given more powers to cover three more important areas - control of reserves, appointments of key personnel and check corruption. Like the other changes that were made, we must expect and accept certain changes, certain roles that go along with it. I am not sure whether these changes will be good or bad. But we have moved in this direction, we must be prepared for eventualities. For example, with the establishment of a new political base in the Presidency, because he has the powers to check spending and to make appointments, there will be inevitable conflict between the President and the Prime Minister, if not in the present, in the years to come. Is this bad? It could plunge us into aconstitutional crisis. However, conflicts need not necessarily be bad, because institutions must undergo the test for it to strengthen. Even in France, the Prime Minister and the President had conflicts, and these constitutional conflicts caused, I am sure, many problems, but could have brought about a strengthening, a better working, and a better understanding of the system.

Mr Speaker, Sir, at dialogue sessions that I had with my grassroots on the Elected Presidency, some had made this comment that the Elected President was mooted by the Prime Minister to suit him with the sole purpose of ensuring his continuity in office. It was as if it was wrong or not proper to have the Prime Minister as our President. Sir, I suspect that many who criticise along this line of argument also harbour a secret wish that the Prime Minister continues to serve Singapore as the first Elected President. They know that this is good for our country.

I support the proposal.

Dr Augustine H H Tan (Whampoa): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to support this Bill.

Sir, we have a rare privilege of belonging to one of the few countries in the world that can talk about safeguarding its reserves and preserving the integrity of its public service.

Sir, may I be allowed to make a few comments about the nature of our reserves and its relationship to exchange rates and confidence. Our reserves have been built up from three basic components: first, savings by the public sector - that speaks of the financial prudence of the Government; second, the CPF savings which belong to all of us; and third, the investment capital that has come into Singapore as a result of confidence in the Singapore economy.

We have about $42 billion worth of reserves today. But I want to show you the figures on money supply to show you the nature of these reserves and how sensitive they are. Money supply, as defined by M1 (that is currency in active circulation plus demand deposits), $13.7 billion; money supply, as defined by M2, $51.4 billion; money supply, as defined by M3, $64 billion. Why do I draw attention to these figures? Very simply, because if people lose confidence in Singapore, the reserves can disappear overnight. If MAS tries to defend the exchange rate when money is going up, that is how the reserves can be lost. If we do not care about our exchange rate and let the money fall to zero in terms of other currencies, then you can hang on to those reserves for what they are worth. But as long as there is a relationship between exchange rate and reserves, we see that the confidence is a vital factor.

Viewed in that light, I see this Bill as a good safeguard. But I wonder whether it is sufficient. The Bill seeks to prevent the government of the day from incurring a budget deficit which requires financing via a drawdown of reserves or borrowing money. But it does not cover the issue of money or the printing of money by the Government. I know that our system requires one unit of foreign exchange for one unit of Singapore dollar. But there are ways to create money without creating actual currency in circulation. You can increase bank deposits. And I see that the MAS is specifically exempted from the powers of the new President. Then a government could introduce a balanced budget at the beginning of the year, get the approval of the President and somewhere during the year give away money via tax reductions, and thereby incurring a budget deficit. That would force the hand of the President to finance the budget deficit that is actually produced. Or you could have an unforeseen circumstance of sudden recession, sudden loss of confidence whereby tax revenues are less than what they were anticipated and a budget deficit is created, in which case the President has again to step in to help resolve the issue.

But more importantly, Sir, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent a government from taxing and spending and maintaining a balanced budget. Theoretically, any government could just increase tax revenues and expenditures simultaneously. In other words, increase the size of the public sector to the point where the whole economy becomes totally inefficient. There is no limitation whatsoever on this score. I would like to see some such safeguard built into our system somewhere.

And of course any government of the day without touching reserves while maintaining a balanced budget can destroy confidence in Singapore altogether. Very simply, be xenophobic. Tell the foreigners we do not like foreign investments to be in Singapore. Money flows out of Singapore. MAS tries to defend the exchange rate, reserves are drawn down straightaway. In other words, we can elect the best President of the day but if we get a bad government, everything can be lost even with these safeguards.

To me, it is rather ironical that we spend so much time debating about the ideal qualifications of the Presidency, but there is no discussion of the qualifications of the Prime Minister who is a more important person even in the new set-up. There are no minimum qualifications for Members of Parliament, short of bankruptcy or having some jail sentence or other. In other words, any Tom, Dick and Harry could become Prime Minister under our new system. Perhaps at some stage, the Government might want to consider minimum qualifications for MPs and for Prime Minister.

The First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, first of all, I would like to thank all the MPs for their contributions and for their very clear support of the principles behind the Bill. I believe the Opposition MP, Dr Lee Siew-Choh, also supports the objectives of the Bill. Am I right, Dr Lee? Yes, I think he is nodding his head. In other words, if he supports the intent and objectives of the Bill, I think he should also support the principles behind the Bill. So what is at issue now is how do we safeguard our reserves and how do we safeguard the integrity of the civil service. That is the issue. It is not the principles of the Bill, because I think we are all agreed. Even Dr Lee Siew-Choh agrees with that.

Now, our proposal is the Elected President. I have not heard an alternative proposal from the Opposition MPs or from Dr Lee Siew-Choh. We tabled the White Paper before this House last year. They have been given more than a year to come up with an alternative that is more workable, that is better than our Elected President proposal. But up to now, we have not heard any. And neither have we heard better alternatives from people outside this House, members of the public who are unhappy with the Elected President proposal. There is no clear rival to this scheme that we have. It is not sufficient to criticise the scheme because that does not solve the problem. In criticising the scheme, one must also address the problem and try to come up with a solution. That is what we are here for.

Our proposal is to create a team that can help us to safeguard our reserves. In other words, have a goalkeeper together with a team of defenders. We are in a sense creating a de facto Senate, as pointed out by Mr Chew Heng Ching. And this perhaps, as some Members commented, could be an alternative to the Elected President proposal. So let us examine the merit of an Upper House to control our reserves, safeguard the integrity of our public services with this proposal and see whether there are arguments for our scheme or whether there are in fact differences between our scheme.

A Senate can comprise members who are elected by the people, that means, an all-elected Senate. Or you can have an all-appointed Senate, that means, all members to be appointed by the President or by the Prime Minister, but they are appointed into the Senate. Or you can have a mixture of appointees and elected senators. What are we creating over here with our proposal? We are proposing that there will be six appointed senators who form the Council that will advise the President. And we are proposing that there will be one elected senator, and that is the President. In essence, there is no difference between our proposal and the suggestion that there should be an Upper House to supervise or to comment on Bills debated in this House.

We think this scheme is more workable because when you have a Senate, and let us assume it is an elected Senate, first, you have the problem of finding a sufficient number of people to stand for elections to the Senate. You need about 20 to 30 people to make it effective. And secondly, how do we ensure that people who are elected into the Senate have the qualities which we are looking for? There is no control. It is an Upper House which in a sense duplicates the functions of the Lower House. In other words, we should be looking for 20 to 30 senators who are politically superior to Members of this House. Can you find them? If you can, and you are satisfied that these are people who can look after our interests much better than MPs over here, perhaps you can give it a try. But I suggest that for the time being, let us concentrate on a small Upper House, a small Senate with six appointed Council members to advise one elected Senator or the President. We have control over the quality of men or women who will be on the Council and there are certain safeguards to ensure that the person who stands for election as Elected President has the desired attributes.

Some Members of Parliament have commented that perhaps we should expand the Council from six to 12, that means, you set a minimum of six and then you add six more to make it a maximum of 12. I think we can consider that. But whatever numbers that we have, we settle for equal weightage, that means, the President will nominate a certain number, the Prime Minister will nominate an equal number, and the Chairman, PSC an equal number. But in essence, we can consider this proposal that we expand the Presidential Council to have a maximum of 12. But I will recommend that we leave it to the President to decide, if we do go for 12 if it is the maximum, on how many he needs to start off the scheme. But perhaps we can build in a proviso that whatever number that he chooses, there should be equal weightage - 3, 3, 3 or 4, 4, 4. That explains why we did not opt for an odd number of seven. I think it was Dr Ong Chit Chung who suggested that it should be perhaps an odd number - seven instead of six - because of this formula of equal weightage for three people nominating members for the Council.

The quality of members of the Presidential Council is very important. This point has been emphasised by some Members. Dr Ong suggested that we should perhaps have criteria to ensure that members meet with our expectations. Perhaps it is not necessary since these are appointed members and we must expect that the President, the Prime Minister and Chairman, PSC would know the kind of people that should be members of the Council. We should have faith in their judgement as to who they nominate on the Council. But they should be heavyweights, ie, people who are publicly known for their interest, their integrity, their ability to judge people and the ability to take objective views, read accounts and have the moral courage, if necessary, to ensure that our reserves are not ill-spent.

The criteria for Elected President are very important. Some Members have argued that perhaps we are not stringent enough. But I think more have argued that perhaps the criteria are too restrictive. They want the criteria to be widened so that more can stand for election as Elected President. The list that we have in the Bill indicating who are deemed to have the qualifications, such as Ministers, Judges, Chairman of statutory boards and Boards of Directors of big companies, are no more than a proxy for the attributes that we are looking for.

We are actually looking for people with competence. They must be competent people before they can stand for election. Secondly, they must be trustworthy. Thirdly, they must have sound judgement. That means, when they look at the situation they can come to the right conclusion. They assess people, they know who are opportunists, who are crooks and who are honest people. That is very important. They must have the moral courage because the President may come from the same party as the Prime Minister. But if he disagrees with the Prime Minister on the use of reserves for wasteful welfare programmes, then the Elected President must have the moral courage to tell the Prime Minister that he is not going to spend the reserves.

Lastly, and I think this is also an important quality, the President must have physical courage. Physical courage comes in because it is possible that a government could have won an election on the promise of spending the reserves with welfare programmes, and having been elected, that government has been stopped by the President from spending it. Can you imagine the groundswell that could be agitated, the intimidation that could be mounted on the President, the harassment that he will get, because the President is one man and he is not out there politicking? Intimidation can be exerted on the President, so you should also be looking for persons with physical courage.

On the suggestion that we should widen the criteria, if you read the clauses carefully, you will notice that, in fact, almost anyone is eligible to stand for election as President, provided he can satisfy the Presidential Elections Committee that he is a person with such experience and qualifications as are necessary for him to carry out effectively the functions and duties of the office of President.

The next clause states that a person shall be deemed to have the experience and qualifications referred to earlier. Now, these people who are listed in the pro- posed Article 18, sub-clause 3, will not have to satisfy the Presidential Elections Committee because they are deemed to have the experience. But anybody else who wants to stand for election as President will have to appear or will have to be vetted by this Committee. And if they are deemed to have the experience and qualifications, I think they can stand. If this is not clear enough, we can get the draftsman to refine this to have a catch-all clause to ensure that qualified people who are not listed in Article 18 can be considered. In practice, MPs can also be eligible to become President. But I would also make this practical point. If there is an MP with the potential to be an Elected President, you will find him sitting on the Front bench, long before he becomes an Elected President.

On details of the Presidential Elections Committee, this will be spelt out in a separate Bill. Who will be members of the Presidential Elections Committee? If I have to give you an indication, and I have not thought this through, mind you, on who should be on the Presidential Elections Committee, I would think the following would qualify: the Chief Justice, or someone from the Bench, or a retired judge, the Chairman, Public Service Commission or a member of the Public Service Commission, the Speaker, or former Speakers of Parliament, and perhaps former Ministers. I think thess people would qualify to be on the Presidential Elections Committee. But this is a matter which I want to spend further time on before we flesh out the Bill on the Committee and the procedures to elect the President.

Mr Ibrahim Othman asked how will the Elected President be elected. Let us wait for the Bill and see how he will be elected. I think we will follow generally the procedures that we have for electing Members of Parliament. He makes an important point that we should not allow money politics to enter into the elections. He wants us to cap the expenditure per voter. That is a good idea and we will follow the same criteria that we have for election of MPs. If we cap it at 50 cents per voter for electing an MP, we should also cap it at 50 cents per voter for electing the President, perhaps even less, because we are refer- ring to Singapore as a whole constituency for the election of the President.

We have dropped the Vice-President as a running mate for the President. This is because some MPs were opposed to the idea when we debated this issue the last time. Our reason for dropping it is the difficulty of finding a running mate for the President. He does not have a full-time job. Our original proposal was for a Vice-President who can be a Minister. If we have a Vice-President and you do not allow him to hold office of profit or a job, other than his particular position, how do you occupy his time? It is a practical problem. We do not want to have a very high-powered man who can be your President to be doing nothing for six years. We, therefore, decided to drop the proposal of Vice-President and make the proviso that should, for any reason, the President is not available, the Chief Justice will act. If the Chief Justice is not available, the Speaker will then act. It is debatable whether the Speaker should come first, or the Chief Justice. Dr Koh Lam Son prefers the Speaker to act as President, when the President is not available. Again, we can consider that.

Our preference for the Chief Justice is based on what we think may be a public perception that the Speaker and the President may come from the same party and when the Speaker moves up to the position of Acting President, he may, therefore, not be that objective. But this is a public perception we are taking care of, because I believe that when the Speaker acts as President, he is wearing a different hat and he should be functioning as Acting President. So, it is not a strong argument against having the Speaker acting as President. The argument against the Chief Justice acting as President is perhaps stronger because the Chief Justice is a very busy man. If he has to act as President for a long period of time, you are taking him away from the courts. We weighed the arguments for and against the Chief Justice or the Speaker and we settled for the Chief Justice. Between the two, if you want to have further debate on this and reverse the order, I think it is possible to take this up at the Select Committee.

Now, let us deal with the emotional issue, too much power in the hand of one person. To me, I think this is just nothing but an emotional reaction, a gut reaction that we are creating a position and investing too much power in one man. Let us examine this logically and objectively. Are we, in fact, giving absolute power to one man so that he will be corrupted absolutely, to address the fear of Dr Lee Siew-Choh? What powers are we giving to the Elected President? He has the power to veto a Supply Bill when that Supply Bill dips into past reserves. But there is an override mechanism to that. Unless members of the Council agree with him, his veto will have to be referred back to this House. In other words, he is not alone in exercising that veto power. And if he goes against the advice of the Council, the House can override him by a two-thirds majority.

On key appointments, what powers are we giving him? He does not appoint any member to the Public Service Commission or to the statutory boards. He merely has the power to withdraw consent, if he does not agree with the nomination of the Prime Minister or the Government. To weigh his power against the power of the Prime Minister, who has more power? I think it is clear that the Prime Minister has much more power than the President. The President's powers are limited to certain well-defined areas and even then there is a system of check on his exercise of power. We should not be taken in by glib remarks that we are giving too much power to one person. I think that is only an emotional reaction. It is not based on logic or facts. A more valid concern is when the President disagrees with the Prime Minister and there is an impasse, or sometimes, a constitutional crisis. I think that is a more valid concern because it is possible that the President will, from time to time, disagree with the elected Government and then you have an impasse. What do you do under such circumstances? We have also addressed that and I believe the way we have crafted this proposal allows for the Government to carry on without the whole country being paralysed.

The use of reserves. We have gone through this override mechanism. Let us say that the budget of the government is disapproved by the Elected President. Does governing come to a halt? Are civil servants not paid because there are no funds available? The proposal is, if the new budget is not approved by the President, the Government can fall back on the old budget which has been approved. So funds are available, governing can carry on whilst the Government submits a fresh budget for approval by the President.

On key appointments, yes, the President can withhold consent and the Government has no way to override that veto of the President, should he exercise it. Is it a situation different from the situation in the United States? You will remember that President Bush nominated Mr John Tower as Secretary of Defence. The Senate Committee, headed by Senator Nunn, rejected that nomination. Two reasons were given. One was Mr John Tower was a defence consultant and, as defence consultant, he dealt with defence industry contractors and, therefore, there was a conflict of interest in his becoming Secretary of Defence. The other reason was the private life of John Tower which the Committee found objectionable. Have you an actual example of an impasse between the President and the Senate Committee? How was that resolved? It was resolved by the President nominating somebody else and that somebody else is Mr Cheney, the present Secretary of Defence. Likewise, in Singapore, should the Prime Minister's nomination be rejected for the first time by the President, then he has to submit a new name for the second time. If he is again rejected, then he will do so for the third time, which was what President Reagan did in respect of judges.

The fear that there will be a real impasse that can paralyse the governing of the country, I think, is not based on genuine foundation. Go through the use of veto power or reserves and the appointment of people, how would that paralyse or freeze up government? Yes, I think the Chairman of PSC may not be appointed for a while, or a Chairman of a Board or a member of a Board. But how does that prevent governing from going on?

I want now to deal very briefly with this need for a referendum. This a separate issue. Whether we have a referendum or not does not in any way argue for or against the principles of the Bill. The merits of the case should not depend on whether you have a referendum or not. Do you have good arguments against the Elected President proposal? If you have, argue them here or argue them in the Select Committee, and not just create a smoke-screen for a referendum to replace your lack of arguments against the proposal.

I was prepared to consider a referendum when we debated the issue before the elections in 1988. At that point of time, I kept my options open. I was watching for an indication from the electorate on how the arguments would go, whether they have good arguments against us. If there are, and both sides can make out a good case for or against the proposal, yes, then perhaps we go for a referendum. And I was also watching the results of the elections. Had we lost maybe 15-20 seats, I would have taken that as a rebuff of our proposal to have an Elected President, because we had made it an issue in the elections. And had that been the result, my attitude would be different today. Yes, that was an indication handed out to me by the electorate. They wanted a referendum, because the Opposition was pressing for it and the Opposition wanted to deny us a two-thirds majority in Parliament. They failed. But, nevertheless, if 15-20 seats were lost, perhaps we go for a referendum, despite my stated position that I do not believe in governing through a referendum. But all those are so much water under the bridge.

Mr Chiam set out to deny the PAP two-thirds of the number of seats in the last elections. We won 80 out of 81. The Workers' Party, of whom Dr Lee Siew-Choh is a member, campaigned with the slogan that it was time for change. In other words, in the last elections, they were campaigning to be in this House as Government. What was the result? Not a single Workers' Party candidate was elected.

The Opposition looks at 62% of the votes for the PAP as a failure of the PAP. I find that very strange. Because if you look around the world, how many parties in the world can claim that they have this margin before forming the government? Australia, Britain, France, I believe, most of the time they did not even win more than 50% of the votes. So it is strange that to the Workers' Party 62% for the PAP indicates the imminent demise of the PAP. I would put it the other way round. You campaigned to form the government in the last elections, 62% said no to you. But this is just to address the point made by Dr Lee Siew-Choh. In fact, it is another red herring, another bone which he has thrown out for the electorate to chase. But I do not think we should make a mistake over here in chasing that bone, because to me it is an indication of a lack of counter argument against our proposal. So you throw out another bone, hoping that the dogs would chase it and you forget about the arguments for the proposal.

Mr Eugene Yap, along with some other MPs, argued that there is some inconsistency in creating this scheme, in having the President elected with a simple majority when you require two-thirds majority in a referendum to remove him. We did this on purpose. If I may use an analogy, if you have a house and you are trying to instal a security system, you want a system that is easy to instal and easy to operate. But you want a system that is very difficult for potential thieves, robbers or burglars to dismantle. You have your switch for the system inside the house. You do not put it in an easily accessible place, or put it outside, so that others can switch it off. So we have on purpose made it difficult for anyone to try and dismantle the system.

For him to be elected, I think we follow the procedure as for Members of Parliament. That means you elect him with a simple majority.

I want to address now what I think is the real reason for the vehement opposition to this scheme by Dr Lee Siew-Choh and members of the Opposition. I think Dr Lee unwittingly let it out when he said and I quote him, based on my scripting yesterday, which may not be his exact words:

'It is not democratic to disallow reserves to be used by Government for welfare programmes.'

In other words, they want to use reserves and they think if they are elected by the people, they have the right to use the reserves for welfare programmes.

Another remark of his:

'If the Opposition is in power, the Elected President's powers can cause total paralysis as the Opposition cannot use reserves to govern.'

I think these are very telling comments. They would want to go before the electorate, promise welfare programmes and they would use the reserves, spend them on free housing, free health, free education, and get elected. And if they are elected on that basis, they must spend our reserves, is it not so? Then what happens after one term? It is precisely for this reason that there may be such people going out to sell Singapore away and getting themselves elected that we have proposed the scheme of an Elected President, just in case we end up with a freak election result. Just in case that happens, we have a preventive measure so that the country cannot be bankrupted or ruined forever. I think that is the real reason why the Opposition parties are against this scheme, because they hope to be able to promise all kinds of popular welfare programmes in order to win votes and they are unhappy that we are putting a stop to this.

There are a few other points which MPs have raised, such as definition of "reserves" and a few technical details. I think we should leave them to the Select Committee to handle.

I want to end by thanking Members for their contribution and I want to again summarise by saying that we are creating a scheme to protect our future. And this scheme is to have an Elected President to safeguard our reserves, to safeguard the integrity of the public services. It does not mean that no government can use the reserves. There are instances when reserves should be used, but the govern- ment has to make a case to the President and if good arguments are used, the President is expected to concur.

I therefore end by asking you, as you have done in your speeches, to support this Bill with a very loud "Aye" when it comes to the vote. [Applause].

Mr Speaker: The Question is, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

A Division will be taken to ascertain that the Second Reading of the Bill is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament, which is 54 Members, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitution. Ring the Division Bells, please.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Division taken: Ayes, 69; No, Nil; Abstention, Nil. Ayes Ayes (cont.) Abdul Nasser bin Kamaruddin Ng Kah Ting Abdullah Tarmugi Ng Pock Too Beng Kian Lam, Arthur Ong Chit Chung Chandra Das, S Ong Teng Cheong Chay Wai Chuen Othman bin Haron Eusofe Chen, Bernard Ow Chin Hock Chen Seow Phun, John Sia Khoon Seong Chew Heng Ching Sidek bin Saniff Chin Harn Tong Sung, Peter Chng Hee Kok Tan Cheng Bok Ch'ng Jit Koon Tan, Dixie Chong, Charles Tan, Augustine H H Choo Wee Khiang Tan Keng Yam, Tony Chua Sian Chin Tan Soo Khoon Davinder Singh Tan Tee Yong, Philip Dhanabalan, S Tang Guan Seng Goh Chee Wee Tay Eng Soon Goh Chok Tong Teo Chong Tee Goh Choon Kang Vasoo, S Heng Chiang Meng Wan Hussin bin Haji Zoohri Ho Kah Leong Wan Soon Bee Ho Tat Kin Wang Kai Yuen Ibrahim Othman Wong, Aline K Jayakumar, S Wong Kwei Cheong Koh Lam Son Yap Giau Cheng, Eugene Koh Lip Lin Yeo Cheow Tong Lau Teik Soon Yeo Ning Hong Lee Boon Yang Yeo Toon Chia Lee Hsien Loong Yong-Boon Yeo, George Lee Kuan Yew Yu-Foo Yee Shoon Lee Yiok Seng Zulkifli bin Mohammed Lee Yock Suan Leong Horn Kee No Lew Syn Pau Lim Boon Heng Nil Lim Chee Onn Loh Meng See Abstention Low Seow Chay Nil

Mr Speaker: The Second Reading of the Bill has been carried by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Resolved,

That the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill be committed to a Select Committee consisting of Mr Speaker as Chairman and the following Members:

Mr Abdullah Tarmugi

Mr S. Chandra Das

Mr Chiam See Tong

Mr Davinder Singh

Mr S. Dhanabalan

Mr Goh Chok Tong

Prof. S. Jayakumar

BG Lee Hsien Loong

Dr Ong Chit Chung

Dr Ow Chin Hock

BG George Yong-Boon Yeo. - [Mr Goh Chok Tong].