PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read. 1.28 pm

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr Wong Kan Seng): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill proposes the following amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Presidential Elections Act:

(a) to introduce more efficient authentication methods;

(b) to have a common cut-off date to determine voter eligibility and change of address;

(c) to extend the powers of election agents to appoint polling and counting agents; and

(d) to modify the election agent system for the Presidential Elections.

I will deal with each of them in turn.

(A) Ballot paper authentication

Let me first explain the problems of the current system of authenticating ballot papers. On Polling Day, a voter is given a ballot paper by the Presiding Officer to mark a candidate or a group of candidates of his choice. The ballot paper is perforated with the official mark made by a perforator as proof that the ballot paper is an authorised one.

The perforator is a precision instrument which is delicate to handle. Those unfamiliar with its usage tend to jam it when attempting to perforate the ballot paper. This causes the ballot paper to be stuck to the perforator. In trying to remove the paper, it often ends up torn.

These perforators, belonging to the Elections Department, were purchased in the 1950s and are relics. With the passage of time, they are prone to breakdowns despite regular servicing. The Elections Department has therefore been looking at more efficient means to authenticate ballot papers.

The Elections Department is proposing that ballot papers be henceforth authenticated in the form of a pre-printed security pattern, rubber-stamping or other markings. Clause 4 of the Bill amends section 40 of the Parliamentary Elections Act to provide for the authentication of ballot papers by these new methods. Clause 9(2) amends the corresponding section of the Presidential Elections Act for the same purpose.

Clause 5 amends section 42(2) of the Parliamentary Elections Act to provide for an election official to either affix or stamp or mark the ballot paper to officially complete the authentication, if a ballot paper has not been fully authenticated. Clause 9(3) amends the corresponding section of the Presidential Elections Act for the same purpose.

Even with the change in the method of authentication, a ballot paper shall be rejected if it is not fully and properly authenticated by a pre-printed design, stamped, marked or initialled by the Presiding Officer. Clause 7 amends section 50(1) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and clause 9(6) amends the corresponding section of the Presidential Elections Act for this purpose.

(B) Common cut-off date to determine voter eligibility/address

Now, let me explain the rationale for aligning the cut-off date for changes of addresses with the cut-off date for voter eligibility.

Currently, the cut-off date for voter eligibility is 1st July or such other cut-off date as specified by the Minister. Following the cut-off date for voter eligibility, the Registers of Electors are printed and exhibited for public inspection for 14 days. However, the present cut-off date for changes of addresses is the last day for public inspection of the Registers of Electors. With two different cut-off dates, the Registers are therefore produced twice.

Let me give this as an example. In the 1996 Registers of Electors, there were two cut-off dates, ie, 15th April for voter eligibility, and 23rd May 1996 for the changes of addresses. In this instance, the Registers had to be produced twice. One set of Registers was produced on 9th May 1996 for public inspection on voter eligibility, and the subsequent set was produced on 27th June 1996 after the public inspection to incorporate fresh changes of addresses up to 23rd May 1996. This is unproductive and a waste of resources.

With the proposed amendment for a common cut-off date for both voter eligibility and changes of addresses, the same Registers of Electors will be printed, exhibited for public inspection, and subsequently certified for use. No reprinting will be done. Should there be any amendments as a result of the public inspection, they can be produced as additions or deletions to the same Registers of Electors. With one common cut-off date, the period between the production and exhibition of Registers for public inspection and certification is reduced, as there is no processing of address changes.

Clause 3 amends section 13(4) of the Parliamentary Elections Act to exclude alterations to the Registers of Electors on account of changes of addresses notified on or before the last day of inspection of the register prior to the certification. With this amendment, the Registration Officer will prepare the Registers of Electors based on the addresses of electors as recorded by the Commissioner of National Registration as of 1st July or the common cut-off date specified by the Minister. He will not be allowed to accept any change of address made after 1st July or the prescribed common cut-off date.

(C) Empowering Election Agents to appoint Polling and Counting Agents

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me now explain why there is a need to amend the Parliamentary Elections Act to empower election agents to appoint counting and polling agents.

Currently, in a Group Representation Constituency (GRC), there is a Principal Election Agent and a number of Election Agents. Only the Principal Election Agent can appoint polling and counting agents. This involves much administrative work, which could be done by other Election Agents. Clause 6 amends section 49 of the Parliamentary Elections Act to allow the Election Agent of any candidate in a group, in addition to the Principal Election Agent for that group, to appoint counting agents. Clause 9(5) amends the corresponding section of the Presidential Elections Act for the same purpose.

Similarly, the election agents of candidates in a group will be allowed to appoint polling agents. This will relieve the workload of the Principal Election Agent, who is currently the only one allowed to appoint polling agents. Clause 8 amends section 64(1A) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and clause 9(8) amends the corresponding section of the Presidential Elections Act for this purpose. Presidential Elections Act (Cap 218)

Sir, I now come to the Presidential Elections Act amendment. The counting of ballot papers is undertaken in counting places, which are usually located in schools and community centres. The results of the count at each counting place are tallied at constituency level by a number of Assistant Returning Officers. Once these results are tallied, they are transmitted to the Returning Officer who will then add up the results of all the constituencies.

For the first Presidential Elections held on 28th August 1993, only one election agent could be appointed for each candidate. This was found to be inadequate, as there was much administrative work to be done. Clause 9(7) therefore amends section 43 of the Presidential Elections Act to provide for the appointment of up to 20 persons as Election Agents for each Presidential candidate, of whom one shall be appointed the Principal Election Agent.

As there would be up to 20 Election Agents, one of whom is the Principal Election Agent, there is a need to differentiate or identify the main roles of the Principal Election Agent. These roles are spelt out in the relevant clauses in the Bill. Clause 9(4) amends section 31A(2) of the Presidential Elections Act to make it mandatory for the Returning Officer to inform the Principal Election Agent of a presidential candidate of the counting places. Clause 9(5) amends section 32 of the same Act to provide that only the Principal Election Agents or presidential candidates may be present at any principal counting place where the votes are eventually added.

Clause 9(14) amends section 49 to require personal expenses of the candidate exceeding $1,000 to be paid by his Principal Election Agent. This is a change from the current position where the sole Election Agent is responsible for paying such expenses. The same clause also amends section 56 of the Presidential Elections Act to impose on the Principal Election Agent the sole obligation to file the returns on election expenses. Section 64(2) of the Act is also amended to require the Principal Election Agent to inform the Returning Officer of the candidate's campaign offices in each polling district.

Mr Speaker, Sir, these amendments are necessary to further improve our election processes without compromising the security of the process. The amendments in this Bill are practical changes to enhance and fine-tune the current electoral processes, and hence make our elections, be it the Presidential Election or the Parliamentary Election, more streamlined and efficient.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Shriniwas Rai: Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir, for giving me this opportunity.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Minister has comprehensively dealt with the proposed amendment to the Bill. I would like to share some of the concerns which I have. First of all, we have had very fair elections from 1959 to now. There is no question ever raised as to the secrecy of the vote. The secrecy of the vote is protected and I hope the Minister will reiterate this position again today, that the changes will not affect in any way but will in fact improve the system.

Sir, another suggestion which I have is this. Although we have had fairly fair elections, in other countries (in Africa and Asia), the United Nations (UN) has to observe the electoral process. Here, we have been fortunate. May I ask the Government to consider whether it will be in the long term interest of Singapore to have an independent election commission, which is a practice in many other countries?

Sir, the Presidential Election is likely to take place this year. I am glad that the amendment is being made. And may I again urge political parties not to take part in the elections and leave the electoral process as non-partisan, which had been done in the last election.

Sir, before I end my speech, may I say that the reason why we have had very clean and fair elections since 1959 is because of what the political parties themselves have done and the people have taken the trouble to vote in fair and independent elections. Democracy is still young in Singapore. It is very important for us to have a system whereby the public is assured that the electoral process would always be protected.

Dr Lee Tsao Yuan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to focus on the amendment which provides for the authentication of ballot papers by new means, instead of by perforators. There are two larger issues or principles involved here. The first principle is that every vote should be genuine. In other words, that there should be no false votes by fictitious persons or votes by persons masquerading as other persons. The second principle is that every vote should be secret.

The Amendment Bill seeks to update techniques for providing for an official mark on the ballot papers for authentication. Since the authentication of ballot papers is precisely to ensure that the first principle of genuineness of the vote is upheld, I therefore do not see any problems on this score. The question, however, that I have is: do the new authentication methods uphold the second principle, that of secrecy of the vote? I note that section 40(3) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, which is just before the proposed insertion of the new authentication clause, states that, "Each ballot paper shall have a number printed on the back and shall have attached a counterfoil with the same number printed on the face." If this is the case, then it is technically possible to trace how an individual voted by matching his name and IC number on the counterfoil against the serial number on the ballot paper. Could the Minister please clarify whether this is indeed the case, and whether the vote is indeed secret? In addition, could the Minister please clarify the purpose of these serial numbers? This is in order to allay fears that those who vote for the Opposition could be identified and, therefore, possibly included in the black book of the Government which would be counter to the daily cherished democratic principle that elections should be free and fair.

In conclusion, to the extent that the Bill before the House does not in any way impinge upon the two principles: (1) that the vote should be genuine; and (2) that every vote should be secret, I support the Bill.

Mr Low Thia Khiang (Hougang): Sir, I only have three points to raise. Firstly, how does the Elections Department ensure that every ballot paper is fully authenticated and does not end up being void by default? Secondly, is there any procedure where it would ensure proper authentication of every ballot paper that is being issued? Thirdly, the question of serial numbers printed on the ballot papers, which was raised by Dr Lee. I would like to know whether it is necessary to have the serial number in view of the new authentication method. Would the Minister clarify why is there a need for the serial number to be printed on the ballot paper and what is the purpose of the serial number?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Sir, I thank the Members for their comments and questions. First, on Mr Rai's question on an election commission. I do not think there is any doubt that our Elections Department has carried out its duties faithfully, dutifully, and without any fear and favour. As he himself has said, our elections since 1959 have been clean and fair. So far, there has been no allegation that the Department has been unfair. At every election, a Returning Officer is appointed from among the senior civil servants who would ensure that the whole process is carried out smoothly. And there is no question that the whole process has been done properly. There had been very few election petitions to the courts to open up the vault to check the ballot papers or to question the whole election process. The results speak for themselves. Since the system works well and the Elections Department is doing a good job, I do not see any need for an election commission.

Sir, the next question which all our three colleagues mentioned here is the secrecy of the vote. This subject of secrecy of the vote is, I suppose, as long as we have elections in Singapore. Members may not know that this subject has been raised periodically and, every time, when it is raised answers are given. Sometimes, we forget the answers and sometimes we are still wondering whether the answers are indeed what they are. We want the people's fears to be allayed.

Sir, the Government has stated very clearly why we need to have the serial number on the ballot paper as well as to have a counterfoil. The counterfoil is to establish that indeed such a ballot paper has been issued. On the ballot paper itself, the number is to establish clearly that there is indeed such a ballot paper and there is a corresponding counterfoil to show that there is such a ballot paper. It shows the genuineness of the ballot paper. The writing of the person's number on the counterfoil is to show that that particular ballot paper is given to that particular voter so that in the event that there is a dispute, such a vote can actually be traced and that it is a genuine vote and not a forgery.

This numbering of ballot papers is not an invention of the PAP Government. I think people tend to forget that. The British introduced this in the late 40s. I am told that in Britain, New Zealand and Canada, they have similar provisions in the law for the numbering of ballot papers. One of the reasons for numbered ballot papers is to prevent crooked election practices, such as the stuffing of election ballot boxes. More importantly, after the election, all the unused ballot papers, as well as the counterfoils, are put into the boxes and sealed and they are then kept in the vault of the High Court. The boxes cannot be opened without an election petition and without the permission of the court, and permission will only be granted if there is a petition to show why such a process needs to be taken.

Six months after the polling day, these boxes are then taken out of the vault of the court and brought to the incinerator for burning. When they are taken out, anybody could go and take a look at them and see whether indeed the seals of the ballot boxes were broken, and anyone had seen the ballot papers to find out who voted for whom. That process is transparent and I am sure Mr Low Thia Khiang and Mr Chiam - I do not know about my other colleagues - have actually witnessed this process. The members of the press are very keen to see this. Every time, the Elections Department announces that the ballot papers would be taken out for burning, they would go to the High Court and look at the boxes to ensure that the boxes' seals had not been broken.

This controversy came out again in the 1976 general election and Dr Lee Siew-Choh, the Opposition leader then, had said that nobody, not even the Government, would know who voted for whom. He was trying to assure the voters not to worry and that their vote was secret. So if Dr Lee Siew-Choh has also said that the vote is secret, and we have been saying that the vote is secret, I think the people should not doubt that the vote is indeed secret. In the rally speech in Queen Street in December 1976, Dr Lee Siew-Choh told his audience not to be afraid to vote, I suppose not to be afraid to vote for the Barisan Sosialis, as the vote is secret and he also explained the elaborate process that had to be followed before the ballot papers could be taken out to be examined.

In 1991, my colleague, Prof. Jayakumar, also explained that the numbered ballot papers provided the means to settle allegations of election fraud. If voters alleged that the ballots had been switched with forgeries, the numbered ballots would then allow the charge to be settled conclusively. With the numbered ballot papers, no one can accuse the Government of rigging an election. If we do away with the numbering of ballot papers, as Mr Low's last point seems to suggest, I think we will also face a new problem. The new problem would be: how do we know that some of these ballot papers are genuine? How do you trace that they are genuine? Even with the mark, stamp or signature, it will not be easy to tell. But with the number in the counterfoil and the number at the back of the ballot paper, we can then compare the two and say, "Yes, indeed, such a paper was issued and the counterfoil is here, apart from the stamping, the marking and the perforation.".

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, the Minister has not answered my query about the authentication procedures. How do you ensure that every ballot paper is indeed properly authenticated and not void?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: I think Mr Low knows the process quite well. Just briefly, it is something like this. When the voter goes to the polling station, he presents his IC and his name is called. The Presiding Officer or his assistant will then check to make sure that he is indeed a registered voter. Once it is confirmed that he is, the Presiding Officer will then record on the ballot paper his IC number and give him the ballot paper. That ballot paper, before it is given to him, is perforated with a perforator, in the presence of everybody. But with the present system, sometimes when the Presiding Officer pulls out the perforator, the ballot paper is torn and when the vote is actually counted, there could be questions about that vote.

With the new system, it is the same thing. The Presiding Officer or his assistant will ensure that it is properly stamped in the presence of the voter that he is indeed the voter and that is indeed the piece of paper from the counterfoil, perforated, stamped, marked or signed. So that process is totally transparent. He will then take his ballot paper to the ballot box, mark it and put into the box. If there is any doubt at all, the whole process can be questioned there.

Mr Chiam See Tong: Sir, can I clarify with the Minister? The new authentication will not require a perforation, just only a stamp. Am I correct?

Mr Wong Kan Seng: Yes, he is correct. It could be a stamp or a marking.

Mr Chiam See Tong: But no perforation.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: What we are doing now is to provide for other methods of authenticating the ballot paper. What is provided for in the law now is perforation with a perforator. So we are making provisions for it to be also authenticated by a stamp, a marking or a signature.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, this may not be related to the Bill, but I would like the Minister to comment. I have received feedback that the booth for the marking of the ballot paper does not seem to be private in the sense that somebody may be able to see how you mark at the booth. I wonder whether the Elections Department will consider improving the booth with maybe a box-like enclosure where you have some cover at the back. Now it is quite exposed. You can mark, but people will know where you mark.

Mr Wong Kan Seng: If that is indeed a problem, I will ask the Elections Department to study it. From what I see, and what I have experienced, indeed there is enough space and privacy for the person to hide his ballot paper and mark it. So there is no need to worry about the secrecy of his vote. Nobody is going to peep at the other person and see what he does with his vote.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Mr Wong Kan Seng].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.