BUKIT PANJANG LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT (Service disruption)

Mr Gan Kim Yong asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether he will give an update on the status of the service level of the Bukit Panjang Light Rail Transit; (b) what were the causes of the major service disruption on 21st October 2002; and (c) what measures are being undertaken to prevent recurrence of the same problem.

Dr Teo Ho Pin asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether he will consider shutting down the Bukit Panjang LRT system for a period of time so as to conduct a thorough investigation and testing of the system; and (b) what are the key safety features of and the performance standards specified for the LRT system.

The Senior Minister of State for Transport (Mr Khaw Boon Wan) (for the Minister for Transport): Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, I would like to take Question Nos. 8 and 9 together, please.

Mr Speaker: Yes.

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Until the service disruption on 21st October 2002, the Bukit Panjang LRT had overcome its initial difficulties and has begun to meet our service expectations. In the four months preceding the recent incident, it had met the service availability standard of 99.7%, ie, a delay of not more than 4 minutes over each 20-hour operating period.

The 21st October service disruption occurred at around 6.40 am. Service was partially restored on 24th October. Full service resumed on 26th October. While the incident caused commuters a lot of inconvenience, at no time was safety of commuters compromised.

What happened? Each LRT vehicle has eight guide-wheels to help position the vehicle centrally on its track. Guide-wheels are not the same as the running wheels on which the vehicle travels. On 21st October, one of the eight guide-wheels got dislodged and fell off. The spindle that held the guide-wheel grated against the rail, damaging about one kilometre of it before the vehicle came to a stop. SLRT had to replace the damaged portions of the rail. It was a major repair, and it took them several days to complete.

Immediately after the incident, the Land Transport Authority directed SMRT, the parent company of the operator, to set up a Panel of Inquiry. The Panel's findings were released just last week. Let me highlight the key points.

First, why did the guide-wheel drop off? A guide-wheel is normally held in place by a castle nut and a cotter pin. A cotter pin is about five centimetres long and is inserted through a castle nut to prevent the castle nut from loosening as a result of vibration. It is an important component of the guide-wheel assembly. Without the cotter pin to hold it in place, the castle nut may turn loose and, in extreme cases, can result in the guide-wheel falling off.

After the incident, SMRT and SLRT staff searched the entire site. They could retrieve all the components of the guide-wheel assembly, but not the cotter pin. This has led the Panel to conclude that the most likely cause for the guide-wheel to be dislodged was a missing cotter pin in the guide-wheel assembly.

So, the second question was: why was the cotter pin missing? The Panel considered the possibility of the pin breaking or dropping off through wear and tear. But it ruled out such a possibility as neither the pin nor its broken parts were recovered. The Panel concluded that the cotter pin was probably never inserted during the last overhaul maintenance in August 2002, two months before the incident. This is despite the fact that the maintenance procedure does require the maintenance staff to sign off after inserting the pin, and the maintenance record did contain their signatures.

This finding would suggest to me that the quality of preventive maintenance is not up to the mark. First, the failure to insert the cotter pin, an important component of the guide-wheel assembly, should have been noted at the time of the overhaul in August. Second, daily checks for excessive free play of the guide-wheel assembly by an experienced team could have detected the loosening of the guide-wheel before it became completely dislodged.

As a result of this incident, there are several actions being done.

First, LTA is conducting an audit of the maintenance regime of the BPLRT. The objective is to identify the shortcomings so that they can be corrected.

Second, SMRT and SLRT will follow through the various recommendations put up by the Panel of Inquiry. These were technical matters and were already announced by the Panel last week. I would not repeat them, except to highlight one key recommendation.

The Panel has recommended that SMRT and SLRT should work closer together in cross-training their maintenance staff so that they can reinforce each other in the event of any major service disruption. This will speed up service recovery and minimise inconvenience to commuters. This is a good arrangement.

In fact, I see value in integrating and centralising the maintenance functions of SMRT and SLRT, to achieve economy of scale and, more importantly, in raising professionalism of the maintenance team at the LRT level. But this is really an operational matter that the operator should think through and decide.

Dr Teo proposed that the BPLRT be shut down for a period so that a thorough investigation and testing can be carried out. But this is not necessary. This incident is not due to a flaw in design. Neither does it point to a safety risk. It is caused by a lapse in maintenance. It is human error. The way forward is to tighten up on maintenance and to prevent such human errors.

Dr Teo also asked about the key safety features and performance standards that we impose on the LRT. Let me assure Dr Teo that the BPLRT is safe. It has adequate safety features, and one example is the Automatic Train Protection System that regulates the distance between trains to prevent any collision.

As for performance standards, they are set out in full in the Licence and Operating Agreement between LTA and SLRT. They relate to service quality, safety and operations of the system.

Sir, I share the disappointment of Members and commuters affected by this latest disruption. But this recent incident is not quite similar to the earlier problems. The earlier teething problems of the LRT have been largely resolved. That is why it was able to achieve 99.7% service level for several months. This did not happen by chance. I know that SMRT has seconded significant engineering resources to SLRT and has engaged Bombardier, the train supplier, to provide technical training. As a result, the maintenance standard of the operator has improved significantly in recent months. But the 21st October incident shows that it still has some way to go. We will continue to press the operator to improve its standard of maintenance.

Mdm Ho Geok Choo: I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether there are any specific reasons for the less than satisfactory performance and vigilance of the maintenance team.

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: As I have said, it has to do with the quality of maintenance. I have been very much involved in looking at this project over the last few months since our last Budget debate, and I have seen the quality improving. It is quite a different team now. They are serious about what they are doing. But like all things, it cannot be fixed overnight. Until the October 21st incident, indeed, the quality has improved. They have put in significant engineering resources, at great cost, from the parent company into the subsidiary. But the October 21st incident shows that they are not quite there yet.

My own take-away is this. I have been involved in running hospitals for many years and was helping Minister Yeo Cheow Tong at that time in restructuring the various hospitals. Initially, when we started restructuring hospitals and splitting them up into individual hospitals, the immediate reaction was to go independent on everything - maintenance was split up, PR, HR, CFOs, and so on - all decentralised. And what was the result? The result was that for large hospitals, like the Singapore General Hospital or the National University Hospital which I was running at that time, they had enough critical mass. They were able to accumulate a very professional team. But it was the smaller hospitals that suffered because of their lack of scale of operation. They were not able to recruit a giant team as they needed to, as in the large hospitals.

My own observation about this whole BPLRT incident is this. As they split up into SMRT running the larger system and, inevitably, you have a much smaller team running SLRT. With a smaller team, it is not just budget constraint, but also career development for the staff. It is harder to recruit top maintenance staff. In fact, I was at a conference this morning and met the SLRT management there. My suggestion to them was: why not consider seriously, as in my own experience in hospital management, centralising their maintenance so that they have one team that runs both the MRT and LRT? Of course, from the financial point of view, we have to split up and account their operation separately. But that does not prevent us from running certain supportive operations centrally. And that goes with maintenance, human resource management, training, etc. That would be my advice to them but, of course, it is a decision for the company to take.

Mr Gan Kim Yong (Holland-Bukit Panjang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether he could assure the residents that the operation of the Bukit Panjang LRT is safe, given the fact that such an important component like a cotter pin can go missing despite stringent maintenance procedures. How could we be sure that there are no other critical components that affect the safety that might also be missing?

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Mr Speaker, Sir, in my main reply, I have assured Members that LRT is safe. Even in the case of the guide-wheel where it dropped off, it was in the central trough and there was never a safety concern. I do not know whether it is necessary for me to go beyond this. The system is safe and that is an assurance that I can give Members.

Dr Teo Ho Pin (Holland-Bukit Panjang): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I ask the Senior Minister of State whether the frequent breakdowns of the LRT since day one were due to design fault, construction fault or maintenance or operation fault, and whether the SLRT or the Ministry will be taking any legal action against the designer, suppliers, contractors or the operator?

Secondly, I understand the Ministry is doing an independent audit of the system. May I know what is the scope of work of this audit and whether the findings will be presented to this House?

Thirdly, the Senior Minister of State mentioned just now that we need a giant team to maintain the system, so that would increase the cost of maintaining and running the LRT. Will the cost be passed to the commuters in the long run?

Also, on the measurement of 99.7%, is it measured over a one-month, three-month or a three-year period? Maybe the Senior Minister of State can give us the exact formula and how we measure the performance standard of the LRT.

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member has asked four questions. I hope my memory can hold. Let me answer in reverse order.

The last question was: how is the 99.7% measured? As I have said, 99.7% is measured on a daily basis. In other words, over a 20-hour operating period - it runs a 20-hour operation period - any disruptions, cumulative or a single incident, cannot exceed four minutes. So it is a very, very stringent service level. And the system has been able to deliver that until the October 21st incident.

The third question was on the giant team and the cost of maintenance and whether it would be passed on. I think the cost of maintenance has to be part and parcel of running the BPLRT system, both the LRT as well as the SMRT. Fare revision is a separate issue and that is why we have the Public Transport Council (PTC) to review what is the cost and whether there are justifications to revise fares. That is a separate issue altogether. But as we have always maintained, safety and reliability are key priorities. When you provide a public transport system, if it is not safe, if it is not reliable, every other day it breaks down, exceeding the four-minute disruption standard, it is a terrible system. But whatever is the right level of cost, you just have got to float up to that level. Of course, there is no reason for us to pad up the maintenance crew so that the cost is higher than necessary. It is the job of the operator to make sure that they deliver that level of safety and reliability at minimal cost. And as I have outlined just now, my thinking is, to deliver that optimum level, there is a case for centralisation rather than splitting up. Splitting up will inevitably raise costs.

BPLRT has a life of about three years now and I think it is useful to break it up into various stages. People always criticise the LRT about the 50 disruptions, much of it were teething problems in the earlier period. If you look at this year's performance record, it is quite different. We were not responsible for the earlier opening of the BPLRT. If you ask me, as an engineer, I would have preferred to test the system thoroughly before we opened it up because, like all complicated systems, there will be problems. There are bound to be teething problems. For example, the Esplanade has roofs that leak. When I opened hospitals, I remember that for the first six months, we have to fix several leaking roofs. This is normal for any sophisticated project. And for a public utility like transport, my preference would have been to: test, test and test again, until we are very sure, then we open it. And that is the approach we are taking to the Sengkang LRT and that will be the approach we are taking to the North-East line.

On hindsight, perhaps BPLRT should not have been opened prematurely. If they had done that, I think all those 50 disruptions probably would have happened during the trial period rather than when the system was open for revenue service. Anyway, that is history now.

What is more important is to focus on the way going forward. My point is this. Until the October incident, for four months, they have been able to deliver on the very high standard of 99.7%. Let us not demoralise the existing management team. They are working their guts out. I know because I have seen them working. They are serious people. I think they are not proud of what happened on October 21st. The lapses could have been avoided and I think resources will now be pumped in to make sure that those mistakes do not crop up again.

What is the scope of audit by LRT? It will be as wide as necessary. The key question to answer is: are there faults in the maintenance regime? Are there shortcomings there which can be fixed? Preliminary, looking at things, for example, looking at this guide-wheel incident, the procedures are correctly worded. In fact, because cotter pin is such an important piece of component, the SOP in the maintenance requires two signatures - the one who inserts the pin signs it off; the one who supervises it signs it off. Both signatures were there. But what happened? We discovered that the one who supervised, the second signature, did it without actually looking at it. That is bad and that has to be fixed.

I do not think that there is any design problem. This is not the first time Bombardier installed an LRT. There have been many Bombardier systems all around the world. I do not think we can say that that was a design problem. I did make a comment when I toured BPLRT that I would have preferred not to retrofit an LRT into an existing town because I have travelled on BPLRT. Two weeks ago, I took a trial run on the Sengkang LRT. The Sengkang LRT is planned and built together with the new town. When you do so, you get a simpler system. The tracks are by and large, level. Whereas if you take a ride on our BPLRT, not quite a Disneyland roller coaster, you get ups and downs, twists and turns. As an engineer, I know that such twists and turns, ups and downs exert a lot of stresses on the system. It causes much more wear and tear. It does not mean that it cannot be made to work, but it means that your maintenance must be top-class. If your maintenance is not top-class, then occasionally, there will be lapses and disruptions crop up. Having built the system and run it, let us now focus on the operation and make sure that maintenance is top-class. Today, it is not quite there yet but there is no reason why they cannot achieve top-class if they put their hearts and souls into it and we intend to make sure that they do.

Mr Charles Chong: Mr Speaker, Sir, we have heard the Senior Minister of State confirm that the most likely cause is due to a maintenance lapse. Could the Senior Minister of State at least confirm that inspections have been carried out on all guide-wheels on all trains to ensure that more cotter pins have not been inevitably left out?

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Yes, indeed. That was almost the first task that was done.

Mr Steve Chia Kiah Hong (Nominated Member): Can the Minister of State give the assurance that after the extensive testing of the Sengkang and North-East MRT lines there would be no teething problems and service disruptions when the lines are operational?

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Mr Speaker, Sir, there is a Chinese proverb, "mou shi zai ren, cheng shi zai tian". It is for human beings to design and plan but, like all things, you cannot guarantee success. I cannot. I will be dishonest to say that no incident will happen. This morning, I happened to have to officiate at a seamless transport conference and as a habit that I acquired when I was in Istana, I always make sure that I am there five minutes before a function. But, today, I was four minutes late. So, there was a nine-minute disruption. Why? Because, half way through my journey, I noticed that the temperature of my 7-year old car was rising beyond the normal level. I had no choice but to stop, and I discovered that the radiator almost ran out of water. So, I had to find some water to top it up, and that accounted for the nine-minute disruption. As Members can see, even in private transport, I cannot assure 100% that there will be no incident, but we will do our best. If everybody plays his part, there ought not to be such incidents.

Dr Teo Ho Pin: Sir, if I understand from the Senior Minister of State, he was saying that the Bukit Panjang LRT was not tested properly before it was put into operation. Does that not warrant a total shutdown now, so that they could do a total investigation and testing before it is actually put into operation? If the system is not tested properly and it is put into operation, is that not gross negligence on the part of the operator?

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would not use such strong words. Like all things, you can test and test and test, and never start the system. And what is the limit for testing? At the end of the day, someone has to make a judgment on when to stop testing. You are satisfied and you proceed. A decision was made three years ago to open at that point in time. On hindsight, everybody is now wiser. The more important thing is that after the Bukit Panjang LRT incident, we decided, and to use Singlish, to be more kiasu here. So we tested a lot more, which is what we are doing with Sengkang.

Mr Steve Chia Kiah Hong: Sir, based on the Senior Minister of State's explanation earlier, how can we take the assurance that the LRT is safe when they cannot actually predict that it will not break down? They cannot predict that it is actually safe. How can we take the assurance that it is safe?

Mr Khaw Boon Wan: It is just like flying or driving on the road. You know that they are safe, but you cannot eliminate or nullify accidents. There will still be accidents. Like in the case of the Bishan MRT, a boy decided to jump in front. There is nothing we can do to prevent such kind of incident. But like all things, we do our best. There are procedures and our job, as human beings, is to minimise errors, and processes are put in to minimise errors. And that is what we will do.