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Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker: Minister for Transport.

2.30 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Transport (Mr Murali Pillai) (for the Minister for Transport): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Transport, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill is before you because Singapore's maritime landscape has changed profoundly since the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act (MPA Act) was first introduced in 1996. Our legislation must not just keep pace with but allow us to apply vigilance and imagination to maritime scenarios in a new and fast changing reality.

The Bill amends the MPA Act in five main areas: first, enhancing MPA's powers to intervene promptly, to safeguard safety and operational continuity; second, providing for the safe use of new and emerging technologies; third, introducing cybersecurity requirements for the maritime sector; fourth, strengthening MPA's regulatory framework and powers over licensees; and fifth, strengthening MPA's investigative and enforcement powers. The first, fourth and last have to do with powers and rules; and the second and third to do with regulating technologies. I will cover the key amendments for each section in turn.

The first category of changes enhances MPA's powers to intervene promptly to safeguard safety and operational continuity.

Objects in Singapore's waters, like stranded or abandoned vessels and wrecks, can pose risk to navigational safety, the marine environment and the use or operation of the port. Today, MPA has powers to require the removal of vessels and objects in the port that obstruct navigation or pose a danger to port operations. However, these risks may also arise in areas outside the port, but within Singapore's territorial waters.

Clause 33 of the Bill, therefore, extends these powers beyond the port and its approaches to Singapore's territorial waters. It also expands the circumstances in which MPA may intervene, including where vessels or objects may harm the marine environment, damage the coastline or have been abandoned.

Clause 34 of the Bill allows MPA to respond more promptly to immediate risks. MPA may take direct action to raise, remove or destroy stranded or abandoned vessels or objects where there is an imminent risk to navigational safety, the marine environment or the coastline, without first requiring the owner to do so. MPA may also act where the owner cannot be identified despite reasonable efforts.

Collectively, these changes empower MPA to act more swiftly and effectively to safeguard navigational safety, protect our marine environment and coastline, and maintain the smooth functioning of our port.

The second category of changes provides for the safe use of new and emerging maritime technologies. These include autonomous vessels, underwater robots and remote operations centres. The Bill updates MPA's regulatory regime to accommodate these developments while maintaining navigational and operational safety.

Clauses 13 and 14 of the Bill provide for the regulation of maritime devices. MPA may, with the approval of the Minister for Transport, prescribe the circumstances and conditions under which these devices operate remotely or autonomously, and require device information from operators. The port master may also direct and restrict their movement where necessary to safeguard navigational and operational safety.

Similarly, clauses 26 to 28 provide for the regulation of remote pilotage and remote vessel operations. MPA may, with the approval of the Minister for Transport, prescribe the conditions under which the vessels may operate remotely or autonomously, and also regulate harbour craft operations and regulate their manning.

Clauses 25 and 29 of the Bill also update the definition of vessel master and pilot in section 2 of the MPA Act to adopt a technology and operation neutral approach. The amendments will empower MPA to regulate vessels operating in the port and our territorial waters, regardless of how the vessel is operated, whether conventionally crewed, remotely operated or partially or fully autonomous, and whether a pilot or master is physically on board or operating from another location.

These amendments lay the legal groundwork for Singapore to harness the benefits of these new maritime technologies, while enabling MPA to regulate their use in our port.

The third category of changes strengthens the maritime sector's cybersecurity posture.

As our port becomes increasingly automated and digitalised, the system supporting it are more digitally interconnected and more exposed to cyber risk. The Cyber Security Agency (CSA) administers our National Cyber Security Framework. It can designate computers or computer systems as critical information infrastructure under the Cybersecurity Act if the loss or compromise of these systems would have a debilitating effect on our essential services.

Some maritime systems may not meet the higher threshold for designation as critical information infrastructure, but are nonetheless important to the continuity of sea transport and port operations. Protecting these systems is therefore critical to Singapore's resilience as a maritime hub.

Clause 2 of the Bill includes oversight of the maritime sector's cybersecurity as part of MPA's functions and duties. This allows MPA to tailor maritime cybersecurity requirements to the sector's unique operating context.

To give effect to this new function, clause 4 of the Bill establishes a sector-specific cybersecurity framework under the new Part 13B of the MPA Act. Under this new framework, MPA may designate computers or computer systems as important information infrastructures. MPA will consider systems that are either owned or operated by maritime entities or are connected to MPA's own systems. These must be systems necessary for the continuous delivery of an essential transport service. Their loss or compromise would substantially affect or impair the availability of that service, port operations or Singapore's reputation as a provider of marine services.

Given that the provision of digital services can be conducted from overseas, the new section 89MA empowers MPA to also designate computers and computer systems that are located or hosted outside of Singapore.

The important information infrastructures framework is designed to complement and not duplicate the National Cybersecurity Framework under the Cybersecurity Act. Systems already designated as critical information infrastructure cannot be designated as an important information infrastructure. This ensures that the two frameworks operate in a complementary manner without imposing overlapping requirements on the same systems.

Having set out the scope of the important information infrastructures framework, I will now explain how the framework operates in practice.

To assess whether computers or computer systems meet the criteria for the important information infrastructure designation, the new section 18O allows MPA to obtain relevant information from their owners and operators. [Please refer to the clarification later in the debate.]

Where a system is designated as an important information infrastructure, its owners and operators will be notified. The designation will not be published in the Gazette due to security sensitivities. The principal cybersecurity obligation will fall on the notified operator responsible for the system. They must provide information on their designated important information infrastructures, report prescribed cybersecurity incidents, conduct regular cybersecurity audits and risk assessments, and participate in cybersecurity exercises when directed by MPA. They must also comply with applicable cybersecurity standards of performance and directions issued by MPA.

These requirements ensure that the important information infrastructures are adequately protected and are broadly similar to cybersecurity standards and guidelines by CSA, but with the level of regulatory oversight calibrated to the criticality of the important information infrastructure systems. MPA had engaged industry members of MPA's Maritime Cyber Assurance and Operations Centre on these proposed amendments and members were supportive of these measures to ensure that systems important to the continued delivery of essential sea transport services and port operations are effectively safeguarded against cyber threats.

The fourth category of changes refreshes MPA's licensing framework and strengthens its regulatory powers over licensees.

Clause 16 of the Bill replaces the existing Part 12 of the MPA Act with a more comprehensive licensing regime. I will touch on three key changes within this section.

The first change empowers MPA's licensing framework to be more responsive to evolving marine services and industry developments. The Bill allows other existing and emerging marine services to be brought under the new licensing framework in future through amendments to a new Fourth Schedule by order published in the Gazette.

Under the new Part 12, MPA may also, with the approval of the Minister for Transport, prescribe a particular regulated service as a capped service. MPA may limit the number of licences issued for that service and specify the period during which application for such licences may be made. In doing so, MPA may take into account factors, such as demand for that service, and whether that demand is already adequately met by existing licensees, impact on the viability of shipping and port industry in Singapore, and space and resource constraints.

This will allow MPA to pace the adoption of new technologies and services that may carry greater risk, including through running pilot schemes with a limited number of licensees. This also ensures that licensed operators can provide safe, reliable and viable services. To ensure transparency and fairness, MPA must publish the application period on its website when it decides to accept applications for capped services.

The second change strengthens MPA's regulatory oversight over licensees. At the application and renewal stage, the new Part 12 sets out administrative matters, such as the factors MPA may consider when granting or renewing licences. These include the applicants' financial capacity, suitability and ability to comply with regulatory requirements and provide the regulatory service. [Please refer to the clarification later in the debate.]

The new Part 12 also strengthens oversight of the persons responsible for or involved in a licensee's operations. Prescribed classes of licensees must seek approval before appointing key appointment holders. This ensures that individuals holding key positions are suitable to discharge their responsibilities.

MPA may also impose licence conditions relating to the oversight of employees and contractors. Where licensees fail to meet licensing requirements, the new Part 12 enables MPA to respond more effectively through a range of regulatory measures. These include issuing directions to address non-compliance, suspending licences, whether in whole or in part, and imposing financial penalties up to a statutory cap. In particular, the ability to suspend a licence in part enables MPA to target specific areas of non-compliance without affecting services where the licensee has been compliant.

These regulatory measures are accompanied by new procedural safeguards under section 85G. MPA must generally give licensees notice of the proposed regulatory action and an opportunity to make representations before taking regulatory action. Licensees may also appeal to the Minister against specified decisions under the procedure set out in the new section 85I.

The third change within this section provides a new statutory framework to facilitate access to facilities and infrastructure needed for marine services and port development under Part 12AA.

As our port grows, we will increasingly need infrastructure to support regulated services, such as electric charging facilities, pipes, cables and other systems, to be installed across premises operated by different licensees.

Today, MPA may facilitate access to these facilities through licensed conditions imposed on licensees under section 81(4) of the MPA Act. The Bill replaces this mechanism with new sections 85L and 85M. They empower MPA to direct relevant owners or occupiers to allow licensees to install or use facilities and infrastructure.

As a matter of policy, MPA will first explore voluntary arrangements with the relevant owners or occupiers. MPA may issue a direction under section 85L if voluntary arrangements cannot be reached and if access is necessary for public interest or to ensure that regulated services are provided safely, reliably, efficiently, in an environmentally sustainable or economically efficient manner.

There are safeguards to protect affected parties. The Bill provides a fair and transparent process for balancing the needs of marine service providers with the interest of affected owners and occupiers.

The new section 85P also enables MPA to enter a licensee's premises to install and maintain essential port infrastructure. MPA must provide at least 14 days' written notice before entry. Affected owners or occupiers may claim compensation for specified losses or damage as set out in the new Fifth Schedule. When an owner's rights are substantially impaired, the owner may also request the Government's acquisition of the premises under the new section 85U.

Taken together, the amendments to Part 12 of the MPA Act allow MPA to continue to ensure the safe and efficient provision of marine services and reliable port operations.

The fifth and last category of changes in the Bill strengthens MPA's investigative and enforcement powers.

Today, MPA already has powers to investigate matters under the Act, including requiring persons who may have relevant information to attend before an authorised officer, answer questions and provide information or documents for investigations. The Bill builds on this foundation in two ways.

First, clause 35 enables MPA to take action against individuals or companies who provide false information or hinder the provision of accurate information in the course of MPA's investigations. Second, clause 35 also inserts a new section 97AC, which strengthens MPA's investigative powers by allowing authorised officers to enter and inspect premises of vessels without a warrant in specified circumstances.

These powers enable MPA to gather evidence and verify information directly to better investigate offences and determine whether regulatory action is warranted.

These powers are targeted. For example, authorised persons may only enter: premises where records on regulated services are kept; premises where MPA has reasonable grounds to believe a regulated service business is carried out; or premises where MPA believes an offence under the Act is being or has been committed.

Beyond investigative powers, clause 37 also modernises the administrative processes under the MPA Act. For example, it allows documents to be served electronically with the recipient's prior written consent.

Mr Speaker, the amendments I have set out today are at their core about regulating emerging technologies and safeguarding our port's operations in a changed and geopolitically active world. This Bill ensures that MPA's legal framework keeps up with our evolving maritime industry so that we can continue to operate one of the world's busiest and most trusted port safely, efficiently and with confidence. Sir, I seek to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Edward Chia.

2.51 pm

Mr Edward Chia Bing Hui (Holland-Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, before I begin, I would like to declare that I am advisor to the Singapore Association of Shipsuppliers and Services (SASS).

The maritime sector has changed significantly since the MPA Act was enacted in 1996. Our port is more digitalised, operations are more interconnected, and technologies, such as autonomous vessels, remote operations, drones and artificial intelligence (AI), are becoming increasingly relevant. This Bill therefore gives MPA a modern regulatory framework. It strengthens licensing, introduces a maritime cybersecurity framework, provides for autonomous and remote operated systems, and updates MPA's intervention and enforcement powers. These are important changes.

My central point is that strong regulation should strengthen Singapore's competitiveness as a maritime hub rather than simply adding another layer of compliance. The framework should therefore be clear, proportionate, predictable while supporting competition, innovation and workforce transition.

Sir, I have four areas of clarifications.

First, on regulation, competition and the cost of compliance.

The Bill allows MPA to designate certain services as capped services, where the number of licenses may be limited. There may be valid reasons for this. A cap may be justified by safety risk, limited infrastructure capacity or other public interest considerations. But a licensed cap also restricts market entry. It can affect competition. It can also limit innovation and the crowdsourcing of new ideas because fewer operators have the opportunity to test different business models, technologies and approaches. If a cap remains in place longer than necessary, it may also favour incumbents and make it harder for new operators to enter.

May I ask the Senior Minister of State whether MPA will publish clear reasons and assessment criteria where a service is designated as capped, including the criteria used to award the limited licenses? I would also like to ask whether MPA will consider less restrictive alternatives before imposing a cap where these can achieve the same objectives. These could include higher technical standards, conditional licenses, restrictions on the scale or area of operations, enhanced monitoring or performance-based requirements.

Where a cap is necessary initially, it should also be reviewed periodically as experience grows and risks become better understood.

More broadly, we should consider the cumulative costs of regulation. Industry feedback suggests that the impact may flow through the maritime supply chain. Harbour craft and launch operators may be more directly affected by new requirements while shipsuppliers may feel the effects indirectly through changes in capacity, operating arrangements and service charges.

This matters because our maritime ecosystem includes many small operators and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The same fixed compliance requirements can impose a much heavier burden on a small company than a major operator. Where additional costs cannot be offset through productivity gains, they may ultimately be passed on to customers and increase the cost of servicing vessels in Singapore.

May I ask the Senior Minister of State whether MPA will adopt a risk-based approach calibrated to the activity, the level of risk and the systemic importance of the operator?

We should also use this opportunity to reduce administrative friction. In my consultation with SASS, members highlighted examples, such as bonded stores and pyrotechnics, where businesses may already undertake multiple levels of documentation and verification for the same delivery.

As new reporting requirements are developed, I hope MPA can apply a simple principle: tell the Government once, where possible. Where information has already been provided to a public agency, it should, where legally and operationally possible, be reused rather than requested again. Digitalisation should reduce administrative work, not simply digitalised duplication.

Second, on MPA's new infrastructure access powers. The Bill strengthens MPA's ability to obtain access to facilities and infrastructure needed for maritime services and port development.

I understand the policy rationale. There may be situations where essential infrastructure cannot be provided or maintained because voluntary access cannot be secured. But these are significant powers because they may affect property rights and ongoing business operations. I therefore seek clarifications on two safeguards.

First, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State what thresholds must be met before MPA concludes that voluntary arrangements have failed and statutory access is necessary. And will the affected operator or landowner generally be given reasonable opportunity to resolve the issue or conclude a voluntary arrangement, except where urgent intervention is required?

Second, on compensation. Where statutory access disrupts business operations, may I ask the Senior Minister of State whether compensation will take into account not only direct physical loss, but also operational disruption or economic loss? Clear thresholds and a reasonable remedy process and fair compensation will give businesses greater certainty.

Third, on maritime cybersecurity and supply chain resilience. As maritime operations become more digitalised and interconnected, cybersecurity is increasingly becoming an operational challenge. This Bill allows MPA to designate important information infrastructure and impose cybersecurity requirements on operators of those systems.

My first question concerns the threshold of designation. One consideration relates to the potential impact on Singapore's reputation as a provider of maritime services. That is broader than direct disruption to an essential service. I would like to ask the Minister whether MPA will provide clear guidance on how this criterion will be applied so that operators can reasonably anticipate where the systems may fall within the scope.

Cybersecurity does not stop at the boundaries of the regulated operator. Modern maritime systems depend on software providers, technology vendors, maintenance contractors, cloud services and remote access systems. A regulated operator can have strong internal controls and still be compromised through a vulnerable supplier. Industry feedback has highlighted this supply chain issue.

Even when smaller suppliers are not directly regulated, cybersecurity requirements may be passed down by larger customers through procurement channels.

A common baseline standard could help, but its benefit will be limited if every major customer requires a different questionnaire, audit and set of controls from the same SME. So, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether MPA could develop or recognise a common baseline cybersecurity standard for the maritime supply chain, with additional requirements only where justified by the supplier's system access, data sensitivity and operational risk.

Cybersecurity should not only be about preventing an intrusion. It should be addressing redundancy, safe fallback models, recovery capability and the continuity of essential maritime operations when an incident occurs.

Fourth, on technological transformation and workforce readiness. The Bill provides the regulatory foundation for autonomous vessels, remote operations, remote pilotage and other emerging maritime technologies. I support the use of regulatory sandboxes. They allow regulators and the industry to test technologies safely, understand the operational risks and build evidence before wider deployment.

But a sandbox should not become a never-ending loop of pilots and trials. For a company investing in new maritime technology, the important question after a successful trial is – what comes next?

Businesses need regulatory certainty on the pathway from experimentation to commercial deployment. They need to know what evidence must be produced, what standards must be met and what approvals are required to progress from a trial to regular operations. There are useful international examples.

In Norway, Reach Remote 1, a 24-metre unmanned vessel, was first given a temporary permit to operate under real-world conditions. After more than three months of testing and verification, the Norwegian Maritime Authority converted this into a full operating certificate in February this year. The lesson is that a regulatory sandbox is most useful when there is also a clear graduation pathway.

So, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether MPA will establish a transparent pathway from controlled trials to limited commercial operations, and eventually to wider deployment once predefined safety and performance requirements are met? This will give companies greater confidence to invest in and commercialise new maritime technologies in Singapore.

There is also a workforce dimension. Some functions traditionally carried out onboard may increasingly move ashore. Other jobs will become more technology-enabled. And new roles will emerge in remote vessel operations, systems supervision, autonomous systems maintenance, maritime cybersecurity and digital operations.

We should therefore prepare our workers early. This should not only be about training new entrants. Our existing seafarers, harbour craft crew and operational staff already possess valuable maritime experience. The challenge is to help them convert these experiences into the new skills required in a more automated maritime environment.

May I also ask the Senior Minister of State whether MPA will develop a workforce transition strategy alongside the regulatory framework, working with employers, unions and training institutions to identify changing occupations and establish clear retraining pathways? Regulatory readiness should be matched by workforce readiness.

Sir, Singapore's maritime competitiveness has always rested on more than geography. It rests on trust, reliability, safety, efficiency and confidence in a clear and predictable regulatory environment. This Bill modernises MPA's regulatory toolkit for a maritime sector that is more digital, interconnected and technology-enabled.

I support that objective. As these new powers are implemented, I hope we can ensure that regulation remains proportionate and predictable; that we use the least restrictive regulatory tools that can achieve the necessary safety and public interest outcomes; that digitalisation reduces rather than adds administrative friction; that sandboxes provide a pathway to commercialisation, rather than becoming an end in themselves. And that our workforce develops alongside our technology.

Notwithstanding these clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Dennis Tan.

3.03 pm

Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang): Mr Speaker, before I begin, I declare my interest as a consultant in a law firm specialising in shipping and maritime matters.

As a practitioner, I have seen how technological change, digitalisation and growing regulatory complexity have transformed the maritime industry over the past three decades. It is therefore understandable that the Government seeks to update the MPA Act for a very different operating environment, from that which existed in 1996 – the year the MPA Act came to force, and the year I started work.

The Bill introduces significant changes, including a new cybersecurity regime, a framework for emerging technologies, stronger intervention powers and enhanced investigative powers. My comments today focus on a common theme: as Parliament modernises the law and grants MPA broader powers, we must ensure that accountability keeps pace with innovation.

Emerging technologies, autonomous vessels and remote operations. Mr Speaker, I begin with abuse treatment of autonomous and remotely operated vessels.

Few would disagree that Singapore must embrace innovation if we are to remain a leading global maritime hub. Autonomous vessels, remote operations and artificial intelligence have the potential to improve productivity, safety and operational efficiency. However, innovation should not create accountability gaps. Much of maritime law assumes that the master and crew are physically on board a vessel, exercising judgement and taking responsibility for navigational decisions. Concepts, such as negligence, fault, due diligence and sea worthiness rest upon identifiable human actions and decisions.

As autonomous system become more prevalent, the key challenge is not whether vessels can operate autonomously. It is whether our legal framework continues to provide a clear chain of accountability when decision making is increasingly distributed between masters, remote operators, remote operations centres and automated systems.

Part 4 of the Bill addresses this challenge. Clauses 25, 26 and 29, introduce a framework for remote operations centres, remote pilotage and vessels operated remotely or autonomously.

Mr Speaker, I understand that under the recently adopted non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Code, the master remains responsible for the vessel even where operations are conducted remotely from a remote operations centre. The Code also places significant emphasis on the human element, human oversight, risk assessment and the governance of remote operations centres. It seeks to ensure that autonomous and remotely operated vessels achieve a level of safety equivalent to that expected of conventional vessels.

May I seek the Senior Minister of State's assurance that the regulations to be made under clause 26 will draw upon these principles? This would be a sensible starting point as it would avoid any type of vessel or even maritime device operating without any identifiable person bearing responsibility.

An important issue besides legal responsibility is competency. Operating a vessel remotely requires far more than technical familiarity with a control system. Masters and officers today are expected to possess working knowledge of collision regulations, vessel traffic management procedures, port regulations and the wider body of international maritime rules governing vessel operations. Technological proficiency must not become a substitute for maritime competence. This is particularly relevant to remote pilotage which is also a subject of the Bill.

Traditionally, a harbour pilot boards a vessel and relies on years of experience handling different classes of ships in a variety of operating environments. The move towards remote pilotage therefore raises an important question of safety and competence. A pilot physically present on the bridge has direct situational awareness of the vessel's surroundings, immediate communication with the master and bridge team and first-hand appreciation of the traffic, weather and sea conditions affecting the vessel.

Studies on remote pilotage have consistently identified situational awareness as a key challenge, as shore-based pilots must rely on cameras, sensors and communications systems rather than direct observation of conditions around the vessel and inside the bridge, for which technology may not fully replicate.

The International Maritime Pilots' Association (IMPA) reported from its study on remote pilotage in September 2025 that important challenges relating to system redundancy, situational awareness and collision avoidance remain before remote pilotage can be safely deployed in mandatory pilotage areas. Studies by Scandinavian researchers examining remote pilotage operations and by IMPA, together with the Canadian Coast Guard, the National Centre of Expertise on Maritime Pilotage and the Lloyd's Register, have similarly highlighted concerns relating to bridge-team coordination, shared situational awareness and communications resilience. The above findings may be particularly relevant in a congested port environment, such as Singapore.

A recent study in Finland found that remote pilotage is cognitively more demanding and that, as visual and social information decreases, the significance of errors may be heightened. De Beke advised in a separate study that to ensure minimum safety, remote pilotage services should not be offered in fairways with high vessel traffic frequency.

Communications and connectivity, including time lag. also appear to remain key challenges. If remote pilotage is to be used in safety critical situations, how will MPA ensure sufficient system redundancy and resilience in the event of communications failures, degraded connectivity or equipment malfunction, including where this may be caused from the ship's end?

Remote pilotage may offer efficiency and manpower benefits. But I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State to first share with the House what are MPA's plans for remote pilotage? And I would also Iike to ask the Senior Minister of State to assure the House that taking the pilot off the bridge will not compromise pilotage standards or increase the risk of navigational incidents in Singapore's exceptionally busy port waters where vessels operate in close proximity around the clock?

Before remote pilotage is deployed more widely, what assessments, trials and safety benchmarks have MPA relied upon to satisfy itself that remote pilotage is at least as safe and effective as conventional pilotage in Singapore's exceptionally busy port waters?

Next, on maritime devices, drones and AI. The Bill also introduces the new concept of a maritime device under section 2A. According to the MPA press release dated 6 October 2026, the Bill seeks to provide the legal basis for regulating emerging technologies such as aerial drones and AI in maritime operations. Clause 9 defines "maritime device" and provides examples involving underwater inspection and hull-cleaning machines. However, it is not immediately apparent that aerial drones fall within this definition. Could the Senior Minister of State clarify which specific provisions of the Bill are intended to provide the legal basis for regulating aerial drones used in maritime operations?

This in turn raises an important issue of regulatory coordination. Aerial drones operating in the maritime environment may simultaneously engage MPA's interests in port safety and operational continuity, and the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore's (CAAS') interests in aviation safety and airspace management. Can the Senior Minister of State elaborate on how the respective regulatory frameworks of MPA and CAAS will interact? Will operators face separate approval, licensing or competency requirements, or do the agencies envisage coordinated approvals, shared safety assessments or some form of mutual recognition?

There should be no gap between maritime and aviation regulation. Equally, legitimate operators should not be burdened by duplicate regulatory requirements addressing the same risks.

Mr Speaker, AI raises a different issue. The MPA press release states that the Bill is intended to provide the legal basis for regulating the safe use of AI in maritime operations. However, unlike autonomous vessels, maritime devices and unmanned aircraft, AI does not appear to be the subject of any specific statutory definition or dedicated regulatory framework within the Bill itself. Can I ask the Senior Minister of State whether he can clarify which provisions of the Bill are intended to provide that legal basis and how MPA envisages regulating the use of AI in maritime operations?

Where AI is used in safety critical navigation or operational decision-making, investigators must be able to determine how decisions were made and whether meaningful human intervention remained possible. I therefore suggest that standards developed under the Bill address audit trails, human override capabilities and the preservation of operational data following incidents.

Next, on cybersecurity and maritime resilience. I next turn to cybersecurity. Mr Speaker, clause 4 inserts a new Part 13B establishing a cybersecurity framework for the maritime sector. Section 89K defines important information infrastructure by reference to the criteria in section 89N, the designation provision. Systems already designated as critical information infrastructure under the Cybersecurity Act 2018 are excluded.

Cybersecurity is undoubtedly critical. A serious cyber incident could disrupt trade flows and port operations just as effectively as a physical incident. The Government has explained that the aim is to safeguard the systems supporting the safe, reliable and efficient operation of our port. The challenge is to achieve that without imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller operators.

I therefore ask three questions. First, how will the section 89N criteria be applied in practice and how will this regime sit alongside the Cybersecurity Act 2018?

Second, as individual designations need not be published, will MPA nevertheless, report annually the aggregate number and broad categories of systems designated, together with the number of incidents reported, the audits conducted and directions issued, without disclosing security-sensitive details?

Third, what compliance burden does MPA expect this framework to impose on businesses across the maritime value chain, particularly SMEs and how has MPA assessed that burden?

Cybersecurity should of course strengthen Maritime Singapore, but at the same time, it should not create barriers for smaller businesses who may lack the resources of multinational corporations or bigger companies. This raises a broader question of proportionality.

Part 13B contemplates obligations, such as audits, risk assessment and reporting requirements, for operators of important information infrastructures. While such measures may be entirely justified for major port operators and other critical infrastructure, their impact may be felt differently by smaller maritime business. Smaller businesses may not have the cybersecurity resources available to larger multinational corporations. Besides compliance costs arising from audits and assessment, will there also be supply chain requirements imposed by larger entities dealing with designation infrastructure.

Can the Senior Minister of State clarify whether MPA intends to adopt a risk-based and scalable approach to compliance, taking into account the size, operational complexity and risk profile of different maritime business? Will support schemes, such as the Maritime Cluster Fund, be available to help smaller operators to build cybersecurity capabilities and meet regulatory requirements?

Finally, a jurisdictional question. Clause 3 extends information requirements to computer systems used on or in relation to vessels and section 89L even reaches owners of vessels intending to enter Singapore waters. How does MPA intend to enforce these obligations against foreign owners and operators with only a temporary presence here? The effectiveness of this framework will depend not only on its scope but also on its enforceability.

Next, on port development powers and property rights. Mr Speaker, I would also like to address the new powers relating to port expansion and development. I do understand why such powers may be required as Singapore develops, for example, as Singapore develops Tuas Port and modernises supporting infrastructure. Nevertheless, these powers may affect other private landowners, occupiers and facility operators, whose premises become subject to statutory directions. While the Bill provides compensation appeal mechanisms, can the Senior Minister of State elaborate on the safeguards that will ensure such powers are exercised proportionately and only where genuinely necessary?

Next on enforcement powers and safeguards. Finally, I turn to the Bill's enhanced investigative and intervention powers. The Bill strengthens MPA's ability to obtain and verify information, conduct inspections and intervene where abandoned vessels, wrecks, or other hazards threaten navigational safety, the marine environment, or port operations. These powers serve an important public purpose. However, stronger powers should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, review mechanisms and standards of proportionality.

Can the Senior Minister of State clarify who may authorise warrantless entry, seizure of electronic devices and demands for access credentials, and what internal safeguards and records will govern the exercise of these powers? Where commercially sensitive information is involved, how will MPA ensure that requests for information remain proportionate to the regulatory purpose being pursued?

The Bill also strengthens MPA's powers to intervene where abandoned vessel wrecks and other objects create risk to navigation, port operation or the environment, marine environment. I can understand why MPA may require broader powers to act quickly without waiting for disputes over liability or ownership to be resolved. However, where intervention costs are substantial and the responsible owner is a foreign entity, insolvent or otherwise difficult to pursue, what practical mechanisms does MPA have to recover these expenses? What has been MPA's experience in recovering such costs in practice, and to what extent does it rely on insurers' security posted by ship owners or claims against the vessel itself? What are the practical difficulties under the existing statutory framework which have led MPA to seek these enhanced powers? Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, I support this Bill because the maritime industry is facing new challenges such as autonomous vessels, remote operations, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. If Singapore is to remain a leading global maritime hub, our legal and regulatory frameworks must also keep pace with the times. However, I have four concerns.

First, the issue of liability. If an accident or system failure occurs, or if AI makes an erroneous judgement, who should ultimately be held responsible? The lines of liability must be clear. Second, the qualification requirements for remote operators and remote pilots. Operating a vessel requires not only technological knowledge, but also seafaring experience and professional judgement. We must ensure that remote pilotage does not compromise navigational safety. Third, the transparency of AI. If AI is involved in navigation or operational decisions, can we establish how the system arrived at its decisions after an accident? And can humans step in in time? Fourth, cybersecurity. While the new requirements strengthen cyber resilience, they must also avoid placing an excessive burden on SMEs and safeguard the security of commercial information and data.

In summary, while innovation is important, accountability, safety and transparency must also keep pace with technological developments.

Mr Speaker, innovation must go hand in hand with accountability, and development must go together with safety. On this basis, I support the Bill.

( In English ): In conclusion, Mr Speaker, as we modernise the MPA Act, innovation must be accompanied by accountability and public confidence, cybersecurity must remain proportionate and commercially sensitive information must remain protected.

Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my concerns and clarifications, I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 3.40 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.21 pm until 3.40 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.40 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT) BILL

Debate resumed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

3.40 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I declare that I work at a global investment firm with investments in ports and shipping companies.

For four decades, my father cycled from our home in Tiong Bahru to Keppel for his Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) shifts. As an operations supervisor, he directed containers and crane operators in the sun and the rain. He was one of the port's eyes and ears on the ground; the link between a plan on paper and a container moving safely. He knew who had to act when something went wrong.

At Tuas today, automated cranes and guided vehicles are managed through control rooms, while algorithms optimise container movements. We should welcome this progress.

But a port does not become safer merely because it becomes smarter. An algorithm can move a container. It cannot own a decision when something goes wrong.

As work becomes less visible, responsibility must become clearer. Singapore handled a record 44.66 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2025. Tuas is planning to handle 65 million TEUs annually in the 2040s. Its scale and its reliance on systems operating at a distance will be extraordinary.

This Bill updates an Act enacted in 1996 for a port shaped by remote operations, automation, data and new energy. It consolidates licensing, strengthens cybersecurity, regulates remote and autonomous operations, improves removal powers and updates investigation. I support it.

But implementation must answer a simple question: as control is distributed across people, software and machines, who remains answerable?

I urge the Senior Minister of State to make three commitments: no automation pilot should scale without a credible people plan; every safety critical system should prove that it can fail safely; and Singapore must always know who or what is in control.

First, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, put people before scale. The Bill allows MPA to cap licences for new or higher-risk services. Limited pilots can contain exposure while technology and safeguards are tested.

But every successful trial carries a human consequence. When an automated service scales, some tasks will change and some may disappear. Workers should be part of the consideration in a successful trial. Where Government supports or regulates an automation pilot that materially changes jobs, it should be paired with a proportionate maritime workforce impact and transition plan. Developed through our tripartite institutions, it should recognise prior experience and provide paid bridging training, redeployment or conversion pathways.

A training place is not the same as a job pathway. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) and the tripartite partners should report periodically on whether affected workers have practically transitioned into durable roles with real progression, not merely whether they enrolled in courses. This is not about rigid quotas or a veto on innovation. No publicly supported automation pilot should scale without a credible plan for the workers whose jobs it will reshape or endanger.

Second, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Bill creates a sectoral cybersecurity framework for important information infrastructures. It enables risk assessments, exercises and recovery planning. The next step is operational proof.

MPA should require regular, risk-calibrated digital port fire drills, using the Bill's exercise and performance standard powers. Higher-risk systems should be stress-tested more frequently. Each drill should test whether the system reaches a safe state where trained people can take over and essential services recovers in time. The drills should include simulation trials or controlled live exercises where appropriate. MPA could publish aggregated assurance on whether systems were exercised, recovery objectives were met and material weaknesses were remediated, without disclosing sensitive details.

We do not wait for a fire to discover that the emergency exits are locked. We should not wait for a cyber attack to discover whether automated systems can fail safely when the screens go dark.

Third, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Bill enables MPA to regulate remote pilotage, remote operations centres and autonomous vessels. MPA and PSA are already seeking proposals to test autonomous inter-gateway feeder operations. That is the right direction. But in a congested port, a change in operational command cannot be invisible.

Before wider deployment, regulations should require an auditable log identifying whether the onboard master, remote operator or autonomous system had operational command at each material stage. They should also require monitoring of communications, a tested minimum-risk condition if the link is lost, and a recovery or removal plan backed by adequate insurance or financial security. MPA's removal powers should be a backstop, not an operator's recovery plan.

Operational visibility is necessary, but not enough. Will the Senior Minister of State clarify the hierarchy of authority when the onboard master, remote operator and autonomous system point in different directions? If third party software contributes to a failure or the remote centre or vendor is overseas, who bears the primary legal responsibility and how will Singapore enforce it?

Accountability must also govern MPA's expanded powers. As maritime work goes electric, essential infrastructure may touch private jetties and smaller operators. I note that compulsory powers are a last resort. Will MPA publish the criteria for concluding that voluntary arrangements have failed and ensure that compensation, business disruption and urgent appeals are addressed before irreversible harm occurs?

I support stronger investigation powers against materially false or misleading information, and to preserve evidence at risk of destruction, subject to the Bill's limits on residential entry. Authority is strongest when both its powers and boundaries are clear. In crowded waters, no one should have to guess who is driving, who is legally answerable or who will bring a vessel home if it cannot move itself.

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, my father cycled from Tiong Bahru to Keppel to help a physical port run safely. In his day, accountability was direct – if an issue arose on shift, the supervisor on the quay owned the problem and took charge.

At Tuas today, the chain is more complex. The person monitoring safety may sit behind a console miles away, a vessel may be steered from ashore and critical choices may originate in software. But the standard of human accountability cannot change.

My three proposals are straightforward: give workers a real path into the jobs automation creates; make every critical system prove that it can fail safely; and ensure that, however control is distributed, responsibility remains visible, enforceable and human.

This is not a demand to slow technology. It is the condition for trusting it: more automated, not less accountable; more connected, not less resilient; more ambitious, not less human.

I once thought automation meant that my father's job was disappearing. I was wrong. Tuas may no longer need his hand signals. It needs the essence of his job – someone who sees the whole system, exercises judgement when plans change and answers for the outcome.

No algorithm should obscure that duty. No remote centre or chain of vendors should dilute it. At Tuas, the hands may be further from the crane, but responsibility must be closer and clearer. My father's tools may not survive, his standards must. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

3.50 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Changi): Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir. Singapore has built its reputation as one of the world's leading maritime hubs through efficiency, reliability and connectivity. But we cannot assume that this competitive advantage will endure.

Today, we face growing competition from Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, and emerging maritime hubs, such as Cai Mep in Vietnam. And in 2025 alone, Tanjung Pelepas handled over 14 million TEUs, growing by approximately 14%.

As these ports expand their capacity and capabilities, Singapore must continue to differentiate itself. I believe one of the greatest opportunities lies in establishing Singapore as a global leader in maritime innovation; not merely adopting new technologies, but pioneering the next generation of port operations.

We are already making progress. During a recent visit to Tuas Port, I witnessed firsthand how automated guided vehicles and cranes are transforming port operations, delivering unprecedented levels of productivity, efficiency and safety. MPA is also pushing the boundaries of maritime innovation through autonomous vessels, remote pilotage, maritime robotics and AI-enabled operations while enhancing workforce capabilities, upskilling our workers and creating good, quality jobs for Singaporeans.

These technologies present tremendous opportunities to fundamentally transform how ports operate; reducing manpower dependence, improving vessel turnaround times, strengthening safety and driving productivity. More importantly, Singapore has an opportunity to become a global testbed where these technologies are developed, validated and eventually commercialised for ports around the world.

In this regard, I welcome the provisions in this Bill that support new maritime technologies and strengthen our cybersecurity framework. However, I would like to seek clarification on three areas.

First, on cybersecurity and the complexities of our international maritime ecosystem. Mr Deputy Speaker, clause 4 introduces the new Part 13B, allowing MPA to designate important information infrastructures and impose cybersecurity requirements on designated systems. This is a necessary step. However, the maritime sector presents a unique cybersecurity challenge. Unlike a power station or a telecommunications network operating largely within Singapore itself, our port interacts with thousands of vessels from different countries, operating different technologies, under different regulatory requirements.

Let me illustrate this with a practical example. Imagine a foreign-registered container vessel arriving in Singapore. Its onboard systems may include navigation software, cargo management platforms and operational technology supplied by multiple international vendors. Some of these systems may be managed remotely by service providers overseas.

As the vessel enters our port, it needs to exchange information with our port digital infrastructure; whether for berth allocation, cargo manifests, terminal coordination or other operational requirements. What happens if one of these foreign systems has been compromised by cyber attackers? Could malicious data or a compromised digital interface potentially affect our port systems?

And conversely, what if we require every visiting vessel to undergo extensive cybersecurity verification before connecting to our digital infrastructure? We could inadvertently create additional costs, delays and operational friction. This is the fundamental challenge – how do we maintain a secure maritime ecosystem when so much of that ecosystem operates beyond our direct control?

I note that the proposed section 89M provides for extraterritorial application, while section 89N allows the designation of certain computer systems, including connected systems, as important information infrastructures. However, having extraterritorial legal powers is one thing. Enforcing cybersecurity standards across different international jurisdictions is another.

I therefore have two clarifications. First, how does MPA intend to manage cybersecurity risks from foreign vessels and overseas systems connecting to Singapore's port infrastructure, particularly where these systems are not themselves designated as important information infrastructures?

Second, will MPA adopt internationally recognised cybersecurity standards and risk-based controls, so that we can protect our infrastructure without imposing unnecessary or duplicative compliance requirements on visiting vessels, something which I heard fellow Member of Parliament Mr Edward Chia, highlighting earlier. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) already requires maritime cyber risks to be addressed through companies' safety management systems. We should consider how our requirements can complement international frameworks. Our cybersecurity framework must be robust enough to protect us, but agile enough to keep Singapore an efficient and attractive port of call.

Second, on autonomous maritime operations, accountability and systemic risks. Mr Deputy Speaker, I welcome the provisions under Parts 2 and 4 of the Bill that provides for the regulation of emerging maritime technologies and remote operations. Autonomous technologies could fundamentally change how our ports operate. Imagine, fleets of autonomous harbour craft transporting supplies, unmanned vessels conducting inspections or autonomous feeder vessels transferring containers between terminals. These systems could operate around the clock, improve productivity and reduce our dependence on manpower.

But as we move from individual autonomous vessels towards entire fleets of autonomous systems, the regulatory challenges become significantly more complex. Consider an autonomous vessel involved in a collision. Traditionally, maritime responsibility is assessed through the actions of the master, the crew and the vessel operator. But when a vessel navigates autonomously, who bears responsibility? When an autonomous vehicle makes a decision that results in an accident, who bears responsibility? Is it the vessel owner, the remote operator, the software developer or the organisation maintaining the autonomous systems?

And as we introduce increasingly sohiticated AI agents capable of learning and making decisions independently, how do we audit and validate what these systems are learning, ensuring that their decisions remain safe and explainable, and establish clear accountability when something goes wrong? And how would insurance respond to an accident caused by an algorithmic failure, a communications breakdown or a cyber attack? We cannot allow autonomous decision making to become autonomous accountability.

The challenge becomes even greater when multiple autonomous vessels operate as a coordinated fleet. Take a hypothetical example. A company operates 30 autonomous harbour crafts, each equipped with independent navigation systems. These vessels may not be connected to MPA's central control systems; and hence, not a designated important information infrastructure. They may operate using onboard computing, with only limited communications with a fleet management platform.

Yet, all 30 vessels could depend on the same navigation software or technology provider. Imagine a cyber attack compromises that common software, causing the vessels to lose navigation capability or behave unpredictably. If these vessels are operating in our busy harbour, they could obstruct shipping lanes, disrupt vessel movements and potentially bring parts of our port operations to a standstill. Thirty independent systems, none necessarily designated as a critical infrastructure or important information infrastructure, however, could collectively create a critical disruption.

This is where I believe we must look carefully at the scope of the proposed important information infrastructures framework. Section 89N allows designation based on ownership or operations by a maritime entity, or the systems being a connected computer system, subject to the statutory criteria. But what about autonomous systems that are not connected to designated infrastructure, yet whose collective failure could severely disrupt maritime operations? And what about common software vulnerabilities that affect an entire fleet, even when the individual vessels operate independently?

I therefore seek two clarifications. First, does the proposed cybersecurity framework adequately address these distributed and fleet-level risks, particularly where the individual systems may not qualify for important information infrastructure designation? Second, as we develop regulations for autonomous maritime operations, will MPA establish clear requirements covering liability, insurance, emergency intervention, fail-safe capabilities and fleet-level cybersecurity resilience?

For example, should autonomous vessels be required to demonstrate that they can enter a fail-safe state when communications fail? This is something in which fellow Member of Parliament Mr Yip Hon Weng has also addressed. Should fleet operators maintain the capability to intervene remotely and should there be limits on how many vessels one operator can supervise?

These are not merely technical questions. They go to the heart of whether Singapore can establish a trusted regulatory environment for autonomous maritime technologies. If we get this right, Singapore can do more than regulate autonomous vessels. We can help establish the safety standards, operating frameworks and technologies that other ports around the world adopt.

Third, on balancing innovation, resilience and global competitiveness. Mr Deputy Speaker, the proposed amendments strengthen our cybersecurity framework and prepare Singapore for the next generation of maritime operations. I support these objectives. But I believe we must also examine the economics of these changes.

Under the proposed sections 89S, 89T, 89W and 89X, designated operators may face additional requirements including cybersecurity audits, risk assessments, exercises and performance standards. These requirements come with costs; investments in technology, specialist manpower, external audits, system maintenance and ongoing compliance.

Similarly, autonomous technologies may require substantial upfront investments in sensors, communications infrastructure, remote operations centres, cybersecurity and insurance.

Of course, many of these investments are necessary. Indeed, they may ultimately generate significant productivity improvements and cost savings. And the cost of a major cyber incident or maritime accident could far exceed the cost of preventing one. But that is precisely why we need to understand the full economic equation. How much additional cost are we introducing, and how much additional value are we creating?

Singapore competes against ports that are investing heavily in infrastructure, automation and digitalisation. Shipping lines make decisions based on connectivity, reliability, turnaround time and ultimately the total cost of using a port. We cannot afford to assess each new regulatory requirement in isolation without understanding its cumulative impact. I therefore have three questions.

First, has MPA conducted a cumulative regulatory impact assessment of these new requirements, including the additional compliance costs borne by port operators, maritime service providers and shipping lines?

Second, has MPA benchmarked these costs against competing ports, such as Tanjung Pelepas, Port Klang and other major international maritime hubs?

And third, as we invest in autonomous technologies and cybersecurity, can we establish clear measures of the productivity and economic benefits including vessel turnaround time, manpower productivity, operating cost per container and operational resilience? This will allow us to determine whether our investments are genuinely strengthening Singapore's competitive position. Mr Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): Singapore must continue to lead in maritime innovation, not merely by adopting new technologies, but by taking the lead in developing technologies, such as autonomous vessels, AI and automated port systems. These technologies have the potential to increase productivity, reduce reliance on manpower and strengthen Singapore's position as a global maritime hub. However, technological advancements must deliver tangible benefits, not merely making our operations more sophisticated, but also more efficient and competitive.

Singapore's port receives vessels from around the world, with different digital systems and levels of cybersecurity. How do we protect our port systems from cyber threats that may originate overseas? The same applies to autonomous vessels. If a cyberattack disables an entire fleet of autonomous vessels, our port operations could be disrupted. The question is whether our laws are comprehensive enough to address these emerging risks, including issues of safety, insurance and liability in the event of an accident.

As we strengthen cybersecurity and introduce new technologies, we must also consider the additional costs to port operators and shipping companies. Singapore faces intense competition from ports, such as Tanjung Pelepas and Port Klang. Have we assessed the cost implications of these new regulations on Singapore's competitiveness?

We must ensure that every investment in technology and security leads to productivity gains. Our goal is clear: Singapore's port must not only be more modern and secure, but also more efficient, resilient and globally competitive.

( In English ): Mr Deputy Speaker, our ambition should not simply be to build the world's most technologically advanced port. It must be to build a port where technology makes us safer, more resilient, more productive and ultimately more competitive.

Innovation must not become an additional cost of doing business in Singapore. It must become a reason why businesses choose Singapore.

If we can pioneer the next generation of maritime technologies, establish trusted global standards and deliver world-class efficiency at competitive costs, Singapore will not merely retain its position as a leading maritime hub. We will help define the future of the global maritime industry. Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim.

4.07 pm

Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim (East Coast): Thank you, Deputy Speaker. Like Senior Minister of State Murali, I too am an adviser with Seatrium Employees Union; and like my hon friends Mr Yip Hon Weng, I grew up with parents who worked hard in the maritime and offshore industry.

Over time, I saw how draughtsmen went from drafting on A1 size tables to stylus and tablets, to mouse and software like AutoCAD to AI and apps.

While I welcome the amendments to strengthen cybersecurity and support the safe use of new maritime technologies, today, I will reiterate the importance of focusing on the people these amendments may impact – like my own mother, who at a youthful 65 years old, is still working, flying the flag daily at Tuas Port.

First, Deputy Speaker, how automation affects our maritime workers. Second, how to help SMEs in the sector meet the new cybersecurity requirements. And third, what happens when something goes wrong with an autonomous or remotely operated vessel.

Sir, first, the impact of automation on maritime workers. Some existing jobs will inevitably change. For example, MPA and PSA have been exploring the use of autonomous vessels to transport containers between terminals. This may create new jobs in remote vessel monitoring, systems maintenance and maritime data analytics.

These are exciting developments. But we also need to think about the workers whose jobs may be affected. Some have spent 20 or 30 years working at sea or in port operations. They have years of experience and knowledge that cannot simply be replaced. But they may not have the digital skills needed for the new jobs being created.

Could the Senior Minister of State please share, which jobs are likely to be affected, and how these workers will be assisted to be upskilled and move into new roles? Would the MPA consider incentivising training and supporting new role transition with career coaches for the workers? Would employers be incentivised and supported to redesign jobs and retrain their existing workers, beyond hiring new talents? In particular, what are some efforts to support senior workers to smoothen the transition?

We should not overlook the experience these workers bring to the industry. The question is how we help them remain part of it as the industry changes.

Second, Deputy Speaker, supporting smaller maritime businesses with cybersecurity requirements. I support stronger cybersecurity safeguards. A cyber attack on our port operations could have serious consequences for Singapore's economy and maritime safety. But meeting these requirements may not be easy for smaller maritime businesses. Unlike larger companies, they may not have their own cybersecurity teams or the resources to engage external specialists. Could MPA provide financial assistance, technical advice, secondment or shared cybersecurity services to help these businesses meet the new requirements?

We should recognise that smaller operators may need more help to build up their capabilities. We want them to be secure, but we should also make sure they are not left to manage these new requirements on their own.

Third, clear accountability when autonomous or remotely operated vessels encounter problems. Earlier, my hon friend Mr Sharael Taha also touched on this point.

As we introduce more autonomous and remotely operated vessels, Deputy Speaker, we must also think who is accountable when errors occur? For example, if a vessel loses communication with the control centre, if navigation systems are compromised by cyber attacks, who will be responsible for taking control of the vessel? And if an accident occurs, who will be held accountable?

Has the MPA set out clear procedures for such situations, including back-up communication systems, authority to intervene, how a vessel can be brought to safety when remote operations fail, and of course cost recovery?

These are questions I have asked in the House when we debate automation. The responsibilities of vessel owners, operators and personnel at remote control centres must also be clear. We should take a preventive approach and preparing for when things fail, not if they do.

Mr Deputy Speaker, as our maritime sector moves forward, we must remember the workers who have helped build it. I hope the Government will continue to work closely with employers and unions to help workers, especially older and lower-skilled workers, upgrade their skills and move into new roles.

We should also give smaller businesses the support they need to adapt, while making sure that new technologies are introduced safely and responsibly. Mr Deputy Speaker, in Malay.

(In Malay): Mr Deputy Speaker, the maritime industry is important to Singapore and to our community, which has long been involved in this sector.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to highlight three points as we discuss the amendments in this Bill.

First, we must ensure that our maritime workers are not left behind as the industry increasingly adopts automation and new technologies. Workers must be given opportunities to upgrade their skills and move into new jobs and competencies. More importantly, the training provided must lead to real employment opportunities. Will the Ministry provide financial support if workers are affected, for example?

Second, smaller maritime companies may face difficulties meeting cybersecurity requirements due to a lack of expertise and resources. They therefore need financial assistance, technical guidance and appropriate support. Could the Ministry provide support by bringing in skilled workers?

Third, as autonomous and remotely operated vessels become more widely used, the responsibilities of all parties must be clearly defined. Hence, if a problem or emergency arises, we need to know who should act and who is accountable. We must prepare for a rainy day.

( In English ): Deputy Speaker, Sir, our maritime industry must have a strong future ahead. But as we bring in new technologies, we must never forget the people who have brought us this far. Our talents in maritime have contributed years of hard work and experience. They deserve the opportunity to grow with the industry and not be left behind by it.

I particularly once again appeal to the Government to work closely with employers and unions to ensure that our workers are well supported into their new roles and to enjoy better career prospects. This is how we can build a maritime sector that continues to advance and create good opportunities for our talents in Singapore.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Nadia Samdin.

4.13 pm

Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, Singapore waters are among our most intensely used spaces. In 2025, our port handled 44.66 million TEUs. Our connections to more than 600 ports across 120 countries make these waters a vital link between producers, businesses and consumers around the world. Ours is a port of call known for our regulatory clarity, safety standards and reliability.

These waters also sustain life. They support aquaculture farms and kelongs, producing food for Singaporeans, coral reefs hosting more than 250 species of hard corals and places where families swim, boat and discover our marine heritage.

I have in this House spoken about island city identity. Here, shipping, anchorage, aquaculture, conservation and recreation co-exist within a limited sea space. Protecting the seascape is therefore protecting Singapore's economy, resilience and quality of life. Decisions about one activity can have consequences for all of the others.

As maritime operations become more intensive and digitally connected and with the advent of AI, our systems must have sufficient protection to safeguard against more sophisticated threats – and I will touch on three points in this Bill.

Sir, the amendments under sections 33 and 34 strengthen MPA's powers to address sunk, stranded or apparently abandoned vessels and other objects that may pose navigational or environmental hazards.

I welcome this preventive approach, particularly the ability to intervene where harm is likely to arise rather than waiting for it to materialise. A stranded vessel, for example, may damage a sensitive maritime habitant. Similarly, a sunken container or other maritime debris may obstruct navigation or cause physical damage to the seabed.

However, removing these objects may itself involve risks as salvage operations can disturb the seabed or further cause damage to the surrounding habitats. In this regard, I have two areas for clarification.

First, when exercising its expanded powers under the proposed section 57, where interventions are allowed based on a risk that has not yet materialised, what considerations will MPA evaluate to assess the likelihood and severity of future harm?

Secondly, how will MPA determine when and how removal should take place? In particular, the proposed section allows MPA to specify the time within which the owner must act upon notice. How will these removal deadlines be calibrated according to the urgency of the risks, especially when the likelihood of environmental damage increases exponentially over time?

In the event of environmental damage arising from either the presence of the object, vessel or the activities required for its removal, how will MPA pursue compensation for the environmental damage incurred, including the costs of ecological restoration and remediation? Further, how will relevant marine expertise be consulted?

My second point, Sir, is that our maritime operations are increasingly dependent on interconnected digital systems to support vessel movements, cargo handling and port coordination. A serious cyber incident for the industry could disrupt physical port operations and the movement of essential supplies, including food imports.

For example, cybersecurity incidents in a shared terminal system may become a point through which disruptions spread. Even a defensive shutdown to contain such an incident can disrupt operations. This can have enormous economic impact and also affects the safety of all vessels navigating our crowded sea space.

I note that the Bill introduces a sector-specific framework for important information infrastructure. I have two clarifications.

In relation to the Cybersecurity Act, how will MPA coordinate with CSA to ensure effective oversight without duplication? Will the designation of certain computer systems as important information infrastructure require operators to detect unauthorised changes to operational data and misuse of legitimate credentials? How will operators detect a system that appears to function normally but is issuing false or unauthorised instructions?

I would also like to ask how MPA has expanded the Maritime Testbed of Shipboard Operational Technology system capabilities to address evolving cyber threats and conduct regular training exercises since it was first commissioned.

Second, where critical maritime systems are hosted overseas or managed by foreign technology providers, how will MPA exercise its powers and retain relevant authority to adequately address related concerns? This includes oversight of these systems, particularly where access to information or incident response may be constrained by foreign legal or operational requirements.

Further, will guidance be provided on the allocation of cybersecurity responsibilities between operators and technology providers, and will MPA identify common technology providers whose compromise could affect several operators simultaneously?

Thirdly, Sir, autonomous vessels, remotely operated maritime devices and remote pilotage offer opportunities to improve maritime safety, efficiency and productivity. However, they also introduce new risks.

To this end, I would like to ask how often the Government undertakes hydrographic, habitat and ecological surveys to accurately map our seabed. Will operators have access to these maps and be responsible to ensure that their navigation systems use the latest information? Will sensitive habitats such as coral reefs and seagrass meadows be reflected in route planning and appropriate exclusion zones, alongside real-time sensing to minimise grounding and physical damage to marine life?

Also, what operational safety requirements will apply to remote pilotage centres and autonomous operations? How will responsibility and decision-making authority be allocated between remote operators, personnel on board vessels and other relevant parties? Where AI-enabled systems support navigational decisions, how will adequate human oversight and accountability be maintained?

Sir, in my final point, I would like to make a broader note on environmental sustainability and stewardship of our waters.

Singapore sea spaces are not simply shipping corridors. For example, when the long-term plans for reclamation around some parts of the western islands were announced, many of our marine scientists highlighted the crucial ecosystems that lie beneath, from reefs to seagrass meadows and more visibly, mangroves and intertidal zones.

Different use of our waters and shorelines are governed by different agencies and regulatory frameworks, for example, MPA, the National Parks Board, Sentosa Development Corporation, the Singapore Food Agency, the National Environment Agency, the Police Coast Guard and PUB. Yet the consequences of maritime incidents do not always fall neatly within these boundaries. Recent oil spills have demonstrated how maritime pollution such as oil spills can affect multiple users and ecosystems and why effective inter-agency and cross-border coordination matters.

I welcome MPA's continued efforts to strengthen its operational capabilities and preparedness, including the October trilateral oil spill response exercise. As MPA's powers are enhanced as part of this Bill, how can MPA continue strengthening coordination with agencies responsible for our coastal and marine environments and other sea space users?

Next, as countries discuss climate adaptation and transition to cleaner energy and alternative fuels, including in the maritime space, there will be new infrastructure, operating practices and safety standards. In this regard, does MPA envision incorporating environmental sustainability into its regulatory decisions more holistically, including licensing conditions and directions to maritime service providers, for example, in terms of clean energy.

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, as we modernise our maritime regulatory framework, we must ensure that our waters remain safe and reliable for the many activities that they support while recognising our shared responsibility to protect them for the longer term and next generations. Notwithstanding these clarifications. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Lee Hui Ying.

4.22 pm

Ms Lee Hui Ying (Nee Soon): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (Amendment) Bill.

Singapore is small, but the role of our ports on maritime trade surpasses our land size. We are the world's busiest transshipment hub, handling over 44 million TEUs in 2025. So, our ports are not merely an economic asset. They are closely linked to our history. Even before independence, we have always been an important trading hub. But historical success does not guarantee the future.

Recently, Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong highlighted the growing competition from other ports. We cannot and must not be complacent, and must keep up with changes in technology while retaining the trust of the Singapore brand.

This Bill responds to that challenge. I therefore support this Bill, which gives MPA the powers and the tools needed to manage our ports at greater scale and prepare for the fast-changing maritime industry. This Bill updates our licensing framework, strengthens powers to ensure continuity of port operations and prepares ahead for new maritime technology.

I have three sets of clarifications for the Senior Minister of State: first, striking the right balance between regulatory powers and safeguards; second, putting in place the right amount of human intervention to ensure autonomous vessels can be safely deployed; and third, ensuring accountability of the safe use of autonomous vessels.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I agree with the new regulatory powers in the Bill, which will allow MPA to ensure the effectiveness of our port operations. But a world-class port must also be attractive to the businesses that operate in it. Certainty and fairness are just as important as capability. Our regulatory powers must be balanced with fair and transparent safeguards.

I would like to focus on the new powers under section 85L to section 85ZA.

Section 85L allows MPA to direct owners to allow MPA's licensees onto their premises. If parties cannot come to an agreement for access and reasonable compensation to give effect to the direction, they can request the Minister to establish an Appeal Panel. It is important that this Appeal Panel has the legitimacy and trust of both sides as a fair forum.

This is a welcomed move. However, the only statutory requirement is that the panel is independent. What is the benchmark for this and will there be guidelines or a code of independence?

The panel's powers are similar to a District Court. Will the Minister publish criteria for appointments, including relevant legal, industry and technical expertise, to ensure the correct use of these powers and guide the decision? Further, can the Senior Minister of State clarify why in an appeal relating to section 85Y(1)(a), there is no requirement for the panel to provide reasons, only notification, for its decision?

This part of the statute has a second set of powers under section 85P. This allows MPA to enter premises to install critical port infrastructure. Although MPA is required to compensate the owner, section 85Q states that there is no compensation for business interruption.

Given the time-sensitive nature of maritime trade, business interruption may lead to large losses. Will MPA use its best efforts to engage with businesses and minimise any potential interruption? This can include early engagement with affected businesses, a clear works plan, reasonable scheduling, service continuity arrangements where feasible.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I have described two different powers, with different processes for safeguards. Section 85L disputes go to an Appeal Panel while section 85P disputes are referred to the Court. Why do we need two different processes? Similar protections are also found in other laws like the Electricity Act and the Public Utilities Act. Can the Ministry consider if these should all be consolidated into a single special tribunal, reporting to the judiciary, so that our regulatory safeguards are streamlined and not fragmented into multiple different processes?

My second point relates to the requirements for human intervention in autonomous vessels.

Clause 14 expands the port master's powers to regulate, direct, restrict or prohibit the movement and use of maritime devices in or approaching the port. These powers are important as new technologies become more common in maritime operations. Autonomous surface vessels, underwater inspection robots and remote operation centres are no longer just futuristic concepts. They are increasingly becoming part of how the maritime industry operates.

Section 43(e)(i) expressly allows maritime devices to be controlled or operated independently of human intervention, whether fully or partially. Clause 29 also addresses the operation of fully autonomous vessels. Section 43(e)(ii), on the other hand, gives the port master powers to direct maritime devices operating without human intervention to be remotely operated by a human operator.

Can the Senior Minister of State clarify whether section 43e(ii) limits section 43e(i) by requiring all vessels to have some option for human intervention even if designed not to be? And if so, what degree of intervention is expected?

Finally, I seek clarification on accountability when autonomous vessels cause accidents or create safety and environmental risks. Technology cannot be allowed to dilute accountability. Clause 27 provides for penalties where pilots leave vessels without consent or fail to begin or complete their pilotage services. These provisions recognise that failures in pilotage can create serious risks to navigation and port safety.

However, autonomous vessels raise a different question: when no human is directly controlling a vessel, who is legally responsible if something goes wrong? Consider a situation where an autonomous vessel causes a collision, damages port infrastructure or results in an oil spill. The cause might be a software defect, a failure in the vessel's communication systems, a poor operational decision or a combination of these factors.

In such cases, responsibility may not rest with one obvious individual. The vessel's owner, operator, software developer and remote operations provider may all play a role. Establishing who should bear responsibility can therefore be much more complicated. Is MPA considering a documented responsibility matrix, clear event and system logs, and an auditable chain of decision-making?

This is not simply a theoretical concern. It is an issue that international regulators and maritime legal scholars are already examining.

The international direction is instructive. In May this year, IMO introduced a new global Code for autonomous ships, bringing greater attention to how these vessels should be designed, operated and regulated. IMO’s work points towards a risk-based approach to safety. This could include restricting operations in unsuitable weather or sea conditions, setting standards for reliable communications with remote operations centres and strengthening environmental safeguards.

An important question is also whether a designated master should retain overall responsibility for a vessel, even when that person is not physically on board. Singapore should consider how these principles can be translated into clear and enforceable domestic rules.

Research by the National University of Singapore Centre for Maritime Law has also highlighted the legal challenges posed by autonomous shipping. One issue is whether our traditional approach to liability remains adequate. Under a fault-based system, a person generally needs to be shown to have acted negligently or breached an applicable duty before being held responsible on that basis. But what happens when an accident results from a software limitation, rather than an identifiable person’s negligence?

One possible approach discussed in academic research is strict liability, under which responsibility may be imposed without first having to prove negligence, subject to the applicable legal requirements and defences. This could possibly provide greater clarity for victims seeking compensation when harm is caused by autonomous systems.

Another related issue is ownership and control. Research has also raised questions about how responsibility should be allocated when autonomous vessels are monitored by independent contractors rather than the shipowner’s own employees. Where several parties contribute to the operation of a vessel, it may be difficult to establish who is responsible for a particular accident, especially when the damage results from a series of events rather than a single failure. These are important questions for Singapore to address as we seek to remain a trusted global maritime hub.

I have two further questions for the Senior Minister of State. First, how does the Ministry intend to align Singapore’s regulatory framework with the IMO’s developing standards for autonomous ships? Second, how will Singapore establish legal responsibility when an autonomous vessel causes an accident or environmental damage? Sir, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Singapore is small, but the role of our ports in international maritime trade goes far beyond our land size. We are the world's busiest transshipment hub, having handled over 44 million TEUs in 2025. Our ports are not merely an economic asset; they are also closely intertwined with our history. Even before independence, Singapore was already an important trading hub. However, past success does not guarantee future glory.

This Bill responds precisely to this challenge. It gives MPA the necessary powers and tools to manage our ports at a greater scale and to prepare for the fast-changing maritime industry.

However, I would like to ask: when autonomous vessels cause accidents, or create safety or environmental risks, what is the mechanism for accountability? We cannot allow technology to weaken the legal responsibility that should rightly apply. Autonomous vessels raise a very different question: when no human is directly controlling a vessel on board, who is ultimately legally responsible if something goes wrong?

In such cases, the answer may not be so clear. The vessel's owner, operator, software developer and remote operations provider may all have played a role. Establishing who should bear responsibility can therefore become much more complicated. May I ask if MPA is considering drawing up a clear allocation of responsibilities, keeping clear event and system logs, and establishing an auditable chain of decision-making?

International regulators and maritime legal scholars are already examining this issue in depth. In addition, another key question is whether a designated Master should retain overall responsibility for the vessel even when he is not on board. Singapore must consider how to translate these principles into clear and enforceable domestic rules.

( In English ): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, a thriving maritime hub is built on two forms of trust: the confidence that goods will keep moving and the confidence that power will be exercised fairly. Autonomous shipping offers significant opportunities to improve efficiency, reduces operational costs and strengthens Singapore’s maritime competitiveness.

But innovation must be matched by clear rules and effective safeguards. Singapore should move quickly to deploy technology, but never so quickly that responsibility disappears into a black box. The industry needs to know what is permitted. The public needs to know that safety and environmental risks are being managed. And when something goes wrong, those affected need a clear and fair path to accountability and compensation.

I hope that my clarifications can add to this development, ensuring that we remain able to anticipate and take responsibility for matters pertaining to our territorial waters.

As MPA marks its 30th anniversary, this Bill is an important step in keeping our ports safe, competitive, future-ready and a smooth sailing one. So, happy 30th anniversary to MPA. Notwithstanding these clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Ng Shi Xuan.

4.36 pm

Mr Ng Shi Xuan (Sembawang): Mr Deputy Speaker, have three sets of clarifications for the Senior Minister of State concerning the regulation of emerging maritime technologies, the electricity infrastructure required for maritime electrification and the coordination of infrastructure works along our coastlines.

First, I support the intent of the Bill to better assess and secure our ports’ cybersecurity protections. As our ports become increasingly connected, cybersecurity is no longer confined to shore-based systems. It is increasingly relevant to technologies operating in, on and beneath our waters. Separately, the proposed section 2A recognises autonomous and remotely operated maritime devices, reflecting the growing role of such technologies in our port operations.

In rolling out these changes, we should consider that a large part of Singapore’s technology frontiers is buoyed by companies still developing them. Startups and deep tech research projects rely on the same certainty our ports depend on to budget, build, test, deploy and certify their technology for our ports. Companies spend years developing and fine tuning their technologies, based on existing regulatory and compliance requirements. Regulatory certainty is therefore important for these companies to plan, develop, test and commercialise their technologies.

Therefore, I would like to ask if the Senior Minister of State can share if there will be further communication on the compliance pathways for such technologies, timelines as well as the support that can be extended to startups and technology adopters. Will the compliance requirements take into consideration the scales, function and capability assessment of different companies who are providing these services?

Additionally, will the Senior Minister of State be able to provide any details on commercialisation support pathways for future new technologies to ensure that while we prioritise the safeguarding of our ports and waters, that we do not unintentionally stifle technology development and adoption in our maritime sector?

Deputy Speaker, my second point is in relation to our ability to support the electrification of harbour craft fleets. The Early Adopter Scheme for Electric Harbour Craft starts on 1 January 2027 for two years, with a battery system grant of up to $250,000 per vessel. On charging, the pilot charger at Marina South Pier delivers 150 kilowatts and takes about three hours to charge a 500-kilowatt-hour battery. A second charger and four more at Loyang Offshore Supply Base are coming within months, and public chargers at Jurong Port and West Coast Pier are planned for 2027.

The increasing electrification of harbour craft will add to our electricity demand. A recent study by Transport and Environment, and the Centre for Strategic Energy and Resources estimates that, under a fully electrified port scenario covering port equipment and shore power for vessels, peak hourly electricity consumption could reach 790 megawatt-hours by 2035, more than three and a half times current levels. While this scenario extends beyond harbour craft electrification, it illustrates the significant additional demand that maritime electrification could place on our electricity grid.

In this regard, I would like to ask whether MPA, together with EMA, has assessed the additional peak electricity demand arising from maritime electrification by 2030 and 2035, and whether the necessary grid capacity improvements have been incorporated into our infrastructure planning. Beyond installing more charging stations, will MPA also consider demand management strategies, including smart charging, battery swapping and battery energy storage systems, to reduce peak demand and make more efficient use of our electricity infrastructure?

Sir, some of our regional partners have already started developing support infrastructure for electric fleets. China, for example, has progressively developed shore power infrastructure alongside the adoption of electric vessels, including the deployment of a 2,000-tonne electric cargo ship in 2017. Its experience demonstrates the importance of planning electricity infrastructure alongside fleet electrification, rather than treating the two developments separately.

Singapore has an opportunity to learn from these experiences and accelerate our own transition. May I ask whether MPA has studied international approaches to coordinating fleet electrification, charging infrastructure and grid readiness, and whether there are lessons that Singapore can adopt to strengthen our position as a port of choice for greener vessels?

Third, proposed sections 85N to 85P provide for the installation of essential port infrastructure, including charging stations and infrastructure for energy generation and storage. Much of this infrastructure may be located along our waterfront, where it will also have to coexist with coastal protection measures and our coastal environment.

Following the discussions this House had during the Coastal Protection and Other Amendments Bill reading in March this year, owners of prescribed places must put coastal protection measures in place, obtain PUB's approval before building or altering them, and ensure that these measures are properly connected with those of neighbouring premises. These obligations are expected to take effect from the early 2030s.

In effect, we now have two legislative frameworks and two agencies working along the same shoreline, with a third, the Energy Market Authority, responsible for electricity system planning. Without sufficient coordination, the implementation of these requirements could create unintended costs and disruptions for affected licensees. For example, if MPA installs cable ducts, pipes or charging stations through or beside a future sea wall, these installations may subsequently need to be relocated or modified to accommodate coastal protection works. If separate infrastructure projects affect the same premises several years apart, the licensee may have to endure repeated construction works and operational disruption.

In this regard, may I ask whether MPA, PUB and the Energy Market Authority will establish a coordinated framework for planning and sequencing infrastructure works along our coastlines? In particular, will agencies consider common infrastructure corridors, compatible design requirements and coordinated construction schedules, so that waterfront premises are not repeatedly disrupted by separate works undertaken by different agencies?

More importantly, how will the relevant Ministries and Statutory Boards manage overlapping regulatory requirements and responsibilities? Will there be a common process for coordinating approvals and infrastructure plans, including reference to PUB's coastal protection planning requirements before MPA undertakes new installations? Will the Ministries also consider joint stakeholder engagements with affected licensees, so that businesses have sufficient notice and can plan around these works?

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill gives MPA the powers it needs for a port that is becoming more automated, more connected and more electric. As we develop these capabilities, we must ensure that our regulatory frameworks support innovation, our electricity infrastructure keeps pace with demand and our agencies coordinate infrastructure works effectively. With these clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Lee Hong Chuang.

4.45 pm

Mr Lee Hong Chuang (Jurong East-Bukit Batok): Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of this Bill. When the MPA Act was first enacted in 1996, the maritime industry faced a very different technological landscape. Today, we have autonomous vessels, underwater drones, interconnected port systems and increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.

This Bill updates our regulatory framework to address these challenges and I support that objective. However, I would like to highlight how the new requirements will affect not just major port operators, but also the many SMEs that form an essential part of Singapore's maritime ecosystem.

Although the new licensing regime names five regulated services – cargo terminals, passenger terminals, pilotage, towage and water supply – the Bill's reach extends beyond these categories. The Minister may add services to the Fourth Schedule, the cybersecurity framework covers connected systems, and MPA has the power to direct the use of privately-owned premises and facilities. My focus today is on ensuring that smaller businesses can understand and comply with these new responsibilities.

First, on licensing and the expansion of regulated services. Clause 19 allows the Minister to add services to the Fourth Schedule. Once a service is included, its providers may face licensing requirements, regulatory approvals and significant financial penalties. These requirements may be manageable for large operators, but could impose substantial costs on smaller businesses.

May I ask whether services, such as harbour craft operations, bunkering and ship supply, are being considered for future inclusion? If so, will MPA provide public consultation and a reasonable transition period before extending the licensing regime?

I also hope that the Government will ensure that financial penalties are applied proportionately, taking into account the size and circumstances of the business.

Second, on cybersecurity and designated infrastructure. I welcome the introduction of stronger cybersecurity requirements. The designation test under new section 89N focuses on whether a computer system is necessary for an essential transport service, and whether its loss would substantially impair that service. However, section 89K also covers connected computer systems linked directly or indirectly to MPA's systems.

Could the Senior Minister of State clarify that simply using an MPA digital platform does not, by itself, make a company an operator of designated infrastructure? For designated operators, regular cybersecurity audits and annual risk assessments will also involve additional costs. Will existing SME cybersecurity support be extended to these businesses? And can MPA work with CSA to provide a coordinated reporting process, so that operators are not burdened by overlapping requirements?

Third, and most importantly, on section 89Q and the 30-day reporting requirement for material changes. This is particularly important for SMEs that outsource their IT maintenance. Under section 89Q, a designated operator must notify MPA within 30 days after a material change is made to its computer system. This includes changes made by the operator or by another person on its behalf. In other words, outsourcing maintenance does not transfer the operator's reporting responsibility.

The Bill defines a material change as one that affects, or may affect, the cybersecurity of the system or the operator's ability to respond to a cyber incident. That is deliberately broad. It means the judgement call falls on the operator every time.

Let us consider a practical example. A small company operates designated infrastructure and engages an external service provider to maintain its systems. During routine maintenance, the provider updates software and changes the access rights of a remote administrator. But the work order simply states: "Routine maintenance completed." How is the company supposed to know whether this is a material change requiring notification? Could MPA provide practical examples and guidance on what businesses should check, including changes to the access rights, system connections and security settings?

Next, what happens when the company identifies a reportable change, but the service provider delays providing the technical records? For example, the detailed change log may only arrive two weeks after the maintenance work. This leaves the operator with much less time to prepare its notification. Can the operator submit an initial notification within 30 days, setting out the verified information available and subsequently provide outstanding technical details within a timeframe specified by MPA? If so, what minimum information must the initial notification contain?

The offence under section 89Q applies only where the operator fails to notify "without reasonable excuse". Can the Senior Minister of State confirm that where an operator has acted diligently but its service provider has withheld or delayed the necessary records, that would be treated as a reasonable excuse? Also, what records should businesses retain to demonstrate that they have properly assessed whether a change requires notification? For changes assessed as not reportable, would the service provider's work order, internal approval and a written explanation of the company's decision be sufficient?

I suggest that MPA provide a simple standard change record template, covering the date and nature of the change, the assessment and reasons, the responsible personnel and any outstanding information.

There is also a contractual issue. Could MPA work with the industry to develop optional model clauses for maintenance agreements? These could require advance notice of planned changes, promote notification of emergency changes and timely access to technical records. They could also identify a technical contact who can explain changes to system access and security settings. The operator would remain responsible for its own assessment and reporting, but the service provider would have a clear obligation to provide the information needed. This would give smaller businesses a practical way to fulfil their responsibilities.

Fourth, on the use of privately owned premises and facilities. New section 85L allows MPA to direct owners of premises, facilities or computer systems to allow a licensee to install or use equipment there. While the Bill provides for compensation, section 85Q excludes business-interruption losses for certain works. For a small business, even a temporary interruption can have a significant financial impact. Could the Senior Minister of State explain this exclusion and whether MPA will schedule such works to minimise disruption to smaller businesses?

Fifth, on enforcement and regulatory certainty. New section 97A covers information that a person knows, ought reasonably to know, or is reckless as to whether it is false or misleading. There is an important difference between deliberate misrepresentation and an inadvertent administrative error by a small business with limited resources. Will MPA adopt a graduated enforcement approach, allowing genuine mistakes to be corrected where appropriate, while reserving prosecution for deliberate or repeated misconduct?

I also hope MPA will exercise its inspection powers under section 97C proportionately, providing notice wherever practical.

Finally, under section 84B, a composition sum accepted for a previous false-information offence may have implications for a future licence application. Will MPA clearly explain these consequences before offering a composition, so that smaller businesses understand the implications of accepting it?

Mr Deputy Speaker, Singapore's maritime sector is built not only by major terminals and shipping companies, but also by thousands of smaller businesses providing essential supporting services. The success of this Bill will depend not only on the strength of its regulatory powers, but also on whether businesses of different sizes can understand and comply with their obligations.

I would like to conclude briefly in Mandarin, especially the practical significance of this Bill to SMEs.

(In Mandarin): In our port, there are many SMEs. Some operate barges to ferry crew; some supply fuel, fresh water and provisions; others provide ship repair and other support services. Many are family-run businesses, started by one generation and taken over by the next. They may not have a dedicated legal department, nor a cybersecurity team of their own.

Imagine a second-generation business owner. He does not object to the Government strengthening regulation, and he understands the importance of port safety. What he truly worries about is whether, once the new rules take effect, he will be able to keep up.

A new form or a new notification requirement may be just one department's work for a large company. For a small business, it may mean the boss and his family having to work late into the night to complete it. What they need is not just legal provisions, but clear and practical guidance.

First, the Government must let businesses know whether they are regulated, and what responsibilities they need to fulfil. Second, businesses need to know clearly how cybersecurity audits, risk assessments and notifications of system changes should be carried out, and whom they can approach for assistance. Third, if a business outsources its system maintenance, the service provider must also provide the necessary information promptly. Businesses should not be made to bear the responsibility, yet be unable to obtain the information needed to discharge it.

I hope that, in implementing this Bill, MPA will regard SMEs as important partners in the port safety system and not merely as subjects of regulation. Rules should be clear, implementation should come with a reasonable transition period, and when businesses make unintentional mistakes, they should be given appropriate opportunities to correct them.

Only when both large and small businesses are able to fulfil their responsibilities in practice can we together build a maritime environment that is safer, more resilient and more competitive.

( In English ): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill and its objective of strengthening Singapore's maritime regulatory and cybersecurity framework. I hope the Ministry will take these practical concerns into account, particularly the needs of smaller operators. A stronger maritime sector is one where no businesses are left behind, and every business is equipped to move forward.

As they say in Mandarin, "真正强大的海事领域， 不只是只有大企业走得快，而是让大企业和小企业都能跟得上，走得远。". ( In English ): A real maritime industry is not when only the large companies can move forward quickly, but that both large and small businesses can move forward together.

A secure port is not built by regulation alone. It is built when every operator, regardless of size, understand the responsibility and has the practical means to fulfil them. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Gho Sze Kee.

4.58 pm

Ms Gho Sze Kee (Mountbatten): Mr Deputy Speaker, I declare my interest as a maritime lawyer. I have also spent several years of my professional career with one of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs. The 12 members of this group collectively provide P&I cover for approximately 90% of the world's ocean-going shipping tonnage. I am also an adviser to three maritime labour unions in Singapore.

My speech will thus focus on the Bill from the practical perspectives of maritime liability, insurance and the people who work in the maritime industry.

Back in July, during the Transport Motion debate in this House, I spoke of how and why Singapore is a global maritime hub. A maritime hub is so much more than a thriving port. It is an ecosystem of shipping companies, shipowners, insurers, salvors, and the many maritime professionals and workers who keep the industry running.

Our position as a leading maritime hub depends not only on the quality of our infrastructure, but also on the confidence the international maritime community has in Singapore. That confidence is built on trust in our institutions, our legal framework and the way we regulate the industry.

Sir, good regulation must serve several purposes. It must provide predictability and coherence, so that businesses understand their obligations and can plan with confidence. It must also be flexible enough to accommodate new technologies and ever-changing operational realities.

At the same time, we must be mindful of the costs that regulation imposes. This goes beyond direct compliance costs. They include the costs of oversight and audits, mandatory insurance, and the effect on businesses' ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances. We want a framework that manages risks effectively without unnecessary burdens on the industry or undermining its commercial agility.

As maritime technology evolves and the risks facing the industry change, our laws must evolve with them. The challenge is to ensure that our framework remains clear, coherent and workable in practice. This matters not only to the regulator, but also to shipowners, insurers, workers and other stakeholders across the maritime industry.

Sir, let me start off with the provisions for wreck and marine obstruction removal. There are actually three pieces of legislation on our statute books that deal with wreck removal. They are the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act, which this Bill seeks to amend, and the Merchant Shipping (Wreck Removal) Act 2017, which gives effect to the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks. In this regard, the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks provides a framework for removing hazardous wrecks and holding shipowners responsible for the costs, backed by compulsory insurance.

The current Bill extends the MPA Act’s removal powers across Singapore’s territorial waters. However, the two Acts differ in their approaches and procedures. In practice, the MPA act imposes stricter duties and timelines to owners and insurers. The MPA Bill broadens the circumstances in which MPA may require removal or intervene directly.

The existing procedure allows MPA to issue a written notice requiring the owner or agent to raise, remove or destroy a vessel, aircraft or other object within a specified time. The Bill makes abandonment a separate ground for issuing such a notice. Where an object in Singapore’s territorial waters is or appears to MPA to be abandoned, MPA may require its removal without separately establishing a risk to navigation, port operations, the marine environment or the coastline.

The Bill allows MPA to intervene directly where a removal notice has not been complied with, where there is an imminent risk to safe navigation or the marine environment or to damage to the coastline or where the owners remains unidentified after reasonable efforts. The existing offence and penalties for failure to comply with a removal notice remain unchanged.

In contrast, section 161 of the Merchant Shipping Act empowers the Receiver of Wreck to remove a sunken, stranded or abandoned ship outside port limits but within Singapore’s territorial waters, where the receiver considers it an actual or likely obstruction or danger to navigation. No prior removal notice to the owner is required. Abandonment alone is insufficient under that provision, which contains no equivalent offence for failure to comply with a removal notice.

Both Acts also approach cost recovery in different ways. Section 58 of the MPA Act provides for MPA to recover a shortfall in wreck removal expenses from the owner as a debt if the sale proceeds from the wreck are insufficient. Section 161 of the Merchant Shipping Act, in contrast, provides for the Receiver of Wreck's expenses to be reimbursed from the proceeds of sale, but does not contain the same express provision for recovery of a shortfall.

Currently, there is no significant overlap because the MPA Act covers port limits and its approaches, while the Merchant Shipping Act covers our territorial seas outside port limits. But this amendment will extend the MPA Act’s removal powers into our territorial seas as well.

I must note here too, that much of Singapore’s territorial seas are already designated as port limits. I would therefore invite the Senior Minister of State to clarify the circumstances and conditions in which the authorities would exercise their removal powers under the Merchant Shipping Act. More fundamentally, I would like to ask whether, and in what circumstances, these powers would still be relevant after this amendment.

Before I move on, Sir, allow me to commend MPA from the perspective of a maritime industry professional. Responding to marine casualties can be very expensive. These operations require careful judgement about the actual risks and the measures needed to address them. In my experience handling maritime casualties, including oil pollution and wreck removal, MPA has always been fair and practical. It works with shipowners and insurers to achieve an effective response, while recognising the operational challenges and costs involved. It requires what is necessary to protect safety and the environment, without imposing unnecessary burdens. For wrecks, this means recognising that not every object on the seabed needs to be removed. Where the risks can be adequately managed through marking and monitoring, leaving a wreck in place may be the safer and more proportionate option.

This balanced approach matters beyond the maritime industry. As insurance costs rise, the higher costs borne by shipowners and operators will ultimately be passed on to consumers. While this Bill gives MPA broader powers to act, I am confident that it will continue to exercise these powers with the same balance, fairness and with good sense.

Next, I would like to commend the Government for taking a forward-looking approach in putting in place a legislative framework for future technologies such as remote and autonomous marine systems. The technology is evolving rapidly and it makes sense to establish the necessary powers for future regulations now, while the detailed requirements continue to develop. Using subsidiary legislation to regulate these rapidly developing technologies will allow MPA to respond more nimbly as the technology evolves and new regulatory challenges emerge.

The technology is no longer purely experimental. Even though fully autonomous and remotely operated vessels are not yet commonplace in international shipping, we are already seeing a gradual transition from trials to commercial deployment.

In Japan, autonomous coastal cargo vessels have entered commercial service, while in the offshore sector, uncrewed vessels operated remotely are already being used for commercial projects.

The international framework is also evolving. IMO has adopted a non-mandatory Code for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships. Work continues towards a mandatory code, with entry into force expected in 2032. This is part of the wider effort to bring these new technologies within the established international maritime safety framework, including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

The industry is adapting too. The International Group of P&I Clubs has confirmed not long ago that third party liabilities arising from autonomous surface ships can be covered within its existing pooling arrangements.

Not every future vessel will be fully autonomous. Many will operate using hybrid systems, where some functions are autonomous, while others remain under human control. I personally think we will see widespread requirements for a human in the loop, rather than fully autonomous systems in the near to medium term. It will be some time before insurance underwriters, governments and lawmakers learn to be entirely comfortable with completely autonomous systems.

These new arrangements will raise complex questions about responsibilities when something goes wrong. If a collision results from an interaction between an autonomous system and a human decision, how do we assess whether the incident arose from the system's design or operation, or the actions of the remote operator, or the decisions of the ship's master and crew?

What if the human operator is expected to intervene, but the system does not provide sufficient warning or time to do so? If an intelligent system glitches and causes a maritime incident, who bears responsibility? And if the vessel's owner is held liable, might the owner have recourse against the system developer?

It is clear that responsibilities may not rest neatly with a single party. The challenge is therefore to develop a regulatory framework that accommodates this range of technologies and operating models, without creating uncertainty over responsibility when an accident occurs. This will be very important not only for safety and accountability, but also for the continued insurability and commercial adoption of these vessels.

Sir, Singapore is a maritime nation. Our lifeblood flows from the sea. We must embrace the opportunities presented by these new technologies, while maintaining the high standards of reliability and confidence that underpin our position as a global maritime hub. That starts with our laws and regulations. There will be interesting times ahead, not just for us involved in the maritime sector, but also for MPA as well. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Mariam Jaafar.

5.11 pm

Ms Mariam Jaafar (Sembawang): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill. I first declare that I am a managing director and senior partner at a management consulting firm that does work in the maritime and port sectors.

Growing up, we learned that Singapore had few natural advantages except our deep harbour and strategic geographic location. But Singapore's maritime success has never been simply a consequence of geography alone. It has been built on our ability to anticipate shifts in global trade, invest ahead of demand, and build the capabilities that make us a trusted global hub.

In 2025, our port handled a record 44.66 million TEUs. But our maritime strength extends well beyond containers into shipping logistics, marine services, engineering, finance, insurance and technology. These activities support businesses, create jobs and connect Singapore to the global economy.

Now, the expectations of their customers are changing. Shipping lines, freight forwarders and logistics companies are digitalising and building AI into their own operations. They expect ports and terminals to keep pace, to offer greater connectivity, data integration and operational responsiveness. Our competitiveness will depend not just on how efficiently we move cargo, but on how well we connect to the wider trade system.

The current regulatory framework has served us well for three decades. This Bill should not simply be a technical modernisation of a thirty-year-old Act. The larger opportunity is to use the legislative modernisation to strengthen Singapore's position, not only as a leading global maritime hub, but across the maritime value chain, a place where next generation businesses, technologies and expertise that serve global shipping and trade and create more value right here in Singapore. But many of the consequential choices will come after this Bill's passage, when MPA translates these new powers into regulations, standards and operating requirements.

So, I ask the Senior Minister of State to publish an implementation roadmap covering not just the port, but the ecosystem around it. I will come back to what it should contain later in my speech.

I would first like to make three points about what the implementation should achieve: (a) regulate for reliability and to protect the integrity of our port while preserving competition and investment; (b) maintain trust and accountability as operations become digital, and; (c) ensure our people and businesses participate in the opportunities ahead.

First, regulate for reliability without closing off competition and investment. The Bill consolidates the licensing framework for the five key maritime services: cargo terminals, passenger terminals, pilotage, towage and water supply to vessels. It also gives MPA broader powers to issue directions and where necessary, limit the number of providers. This makes sense. Our port is an interconnected system. A failure in one essential service can affect many others.

But licensing decisions also shape who can participate in the market. A limit may be justified by operational capacity or safety considerations. But the reflection that is appropriate today could entrench incumbents or discourage new entrants tomorrow. The test should therefore be whether restriction is necessary, not simply whether existing players are compliant.

MPA should explain the basis for significant restrictions and review them as technology and market conditions change and new business models emerge. The objective should be to protect the reliability of essential services without unnecessarily limiting competition or innovation. This matters because competition is not just about the number of companies in a market, it is also about the incentive to innovate, improve services and develop new business models.

Infrastructure investment raises a related issue.

Tuas Port, when fully completed, is expected to have an annual capacity of 65 million TEUs. But it also changes how a port can be designed and operated, with greater automation, digital integration and new operating models.

Infrastructure investments involve long lead times and significant capitals. Those responsible for providing and maintaining essential infrastructure need sufficient certainty to commit.

First, infrastructure planning and regulatory requirements must evolve together so that the rules keep pace with technology the port is being built to use.

The Bill strengthens MPA's ability to facilitate essential port infrastructure development and expansion. This can help address practical coordination challenges in an interconnected port. The exercise should be guided by clear criteria and timely engagement with affected parties so that infrastructure can be delivered without unnecessary disruptions to existing operations.

The same principle applies to MPA's expanded regulatory and enforcement powers. Businesses need to understand the requirements they must meet and how those requirements will be applied. MPA's expanded powers to obtain information, conduct inspections and investigate potential contraventions should be exercised predictably and proportionately.

I would encourage MPA to provide clear guidance on how these powers will be used, give reasons for significant regulatory decisions and consult affected industry participants when developing important technical standards. The objective is not less regulation, it is regulation that gives businesses the confidence to invest, innovate and compete.

Second, keep accountability in step with technology. I welcome the dedicated maritime cybersecurity framework. As port operations become more interconnected, a cyber incident in one part of the ecosystem can affect the wider network.

The Bill allows MPA to designate certain computer systems as important information infrastructure. The designation can extend to connected systems, including those located or hosted outside Singapore, where the statutory criteria are met. Once designated, MPA may notify the owner and operator of the system. The Bill allocates responsibilities between them, with important operational cybersecurity obligations falling on the notified operator.

The Bill defines an operator as a person who has effective control over a system. This is a sensible starting point. But in practice, control may be distributed between the system owner, operator, technology provider and cloud or hosting provider, sometimes across different organisations and jurisdictions. And how will MPA determine who has effective control where responsibilities are shared, and how will it ensure that obligations fall on parties that have the practical ability to manage the relevant risks? This matters because cybersecurity obligations must be effective but also proportionate. A smaller technology provider should not be held responsible for risks that it has neither the authority nor the capacity to manage.

Clear guidance on how responsibilities are allocated and how affected parties can understand and discharge their obligations will help build confidence in the framework.

Remote pilotage and operations raise a related question. The Bill extends the definition of master to a person-in-charge, whether or not onboard, and updates the regulatory framework to provide for remote operations. This can improve safety and productivity while creating opportunities for specialised maritime services. But it also changes the relationship between command, control and physical presence.

When something goes wrong, responsibility may involve the person-in-charge, the vessel owner, operator and technology provider. How will MPA ensure that the respective responsibilities of the master, owner, operator and technology provider are properly understood?

For remote operations, in particular, operational records will be important. These should allow investigators to establish what information was available, what decisions were made, what system alerts were issued and when human interventions took place. The regulatory framework should provide clarity not only on who is accountable but also on how accountability can be established when something goes wrong.

Clear accountability is what lets innovation scale. It gives businesses certainty, operators clarity and the public assurance that safety and accountability will keep pace with technology.

Third, ensure that our workers and businesses share in the transformation. The success of this transformation should not be measured only by productivity improvements or the number of new systems deployed. It should also be measured by the opportunities created for our people and the capabilities developed here.

Remote pilotage and increasingly automated operations will change the skills required in vessel operations, pilotage and terminal operations. They may create new roles in remote control, cybersecurity, data analytics and systems management.

But these opportunities will not be automatically accessible to existing workers. But a worker with twenty years of experience in vessel operations or marine engineering brings something that simply cannot be taught in a technology course. They understand the rhythm of the ports, they have operational judgement. That experience can be invaluable in supervising automated systems, recognising abnormal situations and making decisions when technology does not behave as expected. We should hold on and build on that experience, not discard it.

How will MPA work with employers, unions and educational institutions to translate emerging requirements into recognised competencies and career pathways with realistic opportunities for mid-career and older workers? And how will we measure whether these efforts are making a difference, not simply by training numbers, but by actual redeployment, wages and career progression?

There is also a wider economic opportunity here. A regulatory Bill cannot by itself create globally competitive maritime companies, but it shapes the conditions in which they can emerge, develop and grow. The licensing framework will influence whether new service providers can enter the market. Infrastructure planning will influence whether businesses have the facilities to develop new capabilities. The provisions on remote operations will influence whether new operating models can be developed and deployed from Singapore.

The opportunity is not simply to adopt new technologies. It is to develop the businesses and expertise that make those technologies commercially valuable. The economic gains come when technology is integrated into business operations, improve services for customers and enables companies to develop capabilities that others are willing to pay for.

So, we should ask not only whether a technology can be trialled here, but whether it can be deployed commercially here, whether Singapore-based companies can build the capability to support it and whether those capabilities can eventually be taken to other ports and shipping companies around the world. We should measure our success not only by how efficiently we run our port, but by the value, expertise and intellectual property that our maritime ecosystem creates.

As MPA develops the regulations and implements this new framework, I would encourage it to consider not only how we safeguard the safe and reliable operation of our port, but also how we create the conditions for new maritime businesses to emerge, grow and compete internationally.

Sir, let me return to implementation. I began by saying that many of the consequential choices will be made after this Bill is passed. That is why I asked the Minister to publish an implementation roadmap, with clear timelines and opportunities for industry, unions and training institutions to contribute before the key regulations are finalised.

I also asked that MPA report periodically, including through its annual report, on a small set of outcomes, such as competition and new market entry, the provision and the resilience of essential infrastructure, the deployment of new technologies and operating models, and workforce redeployment and career progression. That would allow this House and the public to see not simply whether the new powers have been used but whether the framework is delivering what it was meant to or can do.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, Singapore must remain a place through which the world's trade flows. We should also be a place where the next maritime companies and good jobs are created. The generations who worked at our ports and shipyards helped build the industry we have today. Our responsibility is to ensure that the next generation has an equally meaningful place in the one we are building for tomorrow. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Senior Minister of State Murali Pillai.

5.24 pm

Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, before I deliver my wrap-up speech, I would like on a point of clarification, correct two minor errors I made in my earlier speech.

First, Sir, I said to assess whether computers or computer systems meet the criteria for important information infrastructure designation, the new section 18O allows MPA to obtain relevant information from their owners or operators. It should be section 89O.

Next, Sir, I made reference to the new Part 12, which sets out administrative matters, such as factors MPA may consider when granting or renewing licenses. This includes the applicants' financial capacity, suitability and ability to comply with regulatory requirements and provide, I said, the regulatory service. It should be regulated service.

With that, I move on to my wrap-up speech, Sir.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr Murali Pillai: Sir, I thank hon Members for their support of and thoughtful comments on the Bill. In my opening speech, I said that Singapore's maritime landscape has changed profoundly and this Bill allows us to keep pace with these changes. The hon Member Yip Hon Weng's moving story about his father's contributions as a PSA operations supervisor at the Keppel Terminal brings to focus how profoundly our maritime sector has evolved.

Over his four decades in the maritime sector, Mr Yip's father witnessed first-hand the transformation of our port and dedicated his working life to its success. His story reminds us that Singapore's success as a maritime hub is due to the blood, sweat and tears of generations of maritime workers, and our sisters and brothers of our unions. Thanks to the firm foundation that they laid, our maritime sector now contributes more than 6% to our gross domestic product and provides in excess of 140,000 jobs.

As we adopt new technologies and respond to new shifts to retain our competitiveness, our people will remain at the heart of our transformation plans.

I thank hon Members for their suggestions pertaining to the operationalisation of the Bill, once passed and enacted. I do not propose to deal with all the suggestions in my speech, save to assure them, including hon Member Ms Mariam Jaafar, that MPA will closely study them.

Sir, I will now address the key points raised by them in their speeches.

Hon Members Mr Edward Chia, Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim, Ms Mariam Jaafar and Mr Yip Hon Weng emphasised the importance of supporting workers amidst the adoption of new maritime technologies. I agree with them.

Our maritime workforce is the backbone of the industry and we must equip workers to capture the opportunities that technology brings. New technologies can enable safer operations, longer careers and greater prospects for progression. For example, underwater robots allow operators to conduct underwater surveillance remotely, reducing the exposure to hazardous conditions. Experienced seafarers can apply their expertise to monitor, manage or remotely operate vessels in new onshore roles.

To support our maritime workers as they upskill or undergo redeployment, MPA has put in place a suite of programmes. This includes the career conversion programme for the sea transport sector, which has redesigned, and trained workers for roles such as cargo officer and operations manager. It also provides salary co-funding to ensure that the workers continue to be paid throughout the training.

Beyond job redesign, MPA also supports continuous upskilling through the Maritime Cluster Fund, which subsidises up to 50% of course fees for a wide range of courses open to maritime professionals across shipping, port operations and related services. We will continue to closely work with our tripartite partners to support our workers so that all share in the benefits of technological adoption.

Apart from creating new opportunities for our workers, technological transformation also drives innovation across the maritime sector. MPA will support this on two key fronts: facilitating technological adoption and providing regulatory clarity.

Hon Members Mr Edward Chia, Ms Mariam Jaafar and Mr Ng Shi Xuan had asked how MPA supports the adoption and commercialisation of emerging maritime technologies.

MPA adopts a progressive and calibrated approach to foster innovation while upholding safety and regulatory standards. We assess each technology's maturity, safety and risks within its operational context. At the same time, MPA actively supports innovation that advances the maritime sector.

This can be seen by how MPA supported innovation in relation to the electric harbour craft; an example that Mr Ng Shi Xuan raised in his speech. MPA first launched an Expression of Interest for electric harbour craft designs in July 2023 to validate and improve early designs, recognising that this would help drive the sector's net-zero transition by 2050. As the technology matured, MPA announced the Early Adopter Scheme for Electric Harbour Craft, last month which incentivises owners to acquire e-harbour craft through a grant, with the aim of creating a scale for the nascent market.

MPA is also working with agencies to develop an electric harbour craft charging masterplan to progressively scale charging capacity. We will leverage the expertise and experience within the MOT family in building up charging infrastructure for electric vehicles on land. Studies on the required infrastructure upgrades are ongoing, and we will share more details when ready.

Hon Members Mr Yip Hon Weng, Mr Dennis Tan, Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin, Ms Gho Sze Kee, Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim and Ms Lee Hui Ying asked about how maritime devices and their operations in our port will be regulated.

The Bill provides the legislative foundation to ensure the safe adoption of maritime devices in our port by enabling MPA to regulate them. The detailed regulations will be promulgated subsequently as subsidiary legislation.

Mr Dennis Tan, in his speech, mentioned that the Bill reportedly was supposed to provide a legal basis for regulating the use of AI by reference to a press release issued by MPA. I checked the press release and it does not go so far. It basically mentions that new technologies, such as autonomous surface vessels, aerial drones and AI, are increasingly being used in maritime operations.

What we are doing here is to regulate vessels or maritime devices that are operated remotely and autonomously, so the regulations focus on the remote use and autonomous use of vessels and maritime devices. These are the areas for regulation, which include the use and navigation of these devices, the circumstances and conditions under which they may be operated and requirements for human supervision, where necessary.

To address Ms Lee Hui Ying's question on whether all maritime devices must allow for some degree of human intervention, the Bill does not impose a blanket requirement for human intervention in the operation of maritime devices. Instead, the amendments empower MPA to require interventions, when necessary, under the circumstances and the conditions which the device is permitted to operate. For example, a device that is approved for both autonomous and remote operations may be required to operate remotely if necessary.

The development of regulations for new maritime technologies and devices will be an iterative process, informed by close industry consultations and will keep pace with international developments.

On hon Members Mr Dennis Tan and Ms Lee Hui Ying's questions on alignment with international standards and best practices, MPA is actively involved in the IMO's development of a regulatory framework for autonomous vessels, including the non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships, or "MASS Code", which was adopted earlier this year.

In drafting the regulations, we will review the principles agreed upon at IMO, including standards and requirements, to provide a framework suitable for the unique operating conditions in our port. I would like to underscore the point that safety will remain the foremost consideration guiding the formulation of these regulations. We will carefully consider hon Members' other suggestions, including emergency-response arrangements and human oversight, while enabling the industry to realise the benefits of emerging technologies.

Turning specifically to the operation of autonomous or remotely operated vessels, Mr Dennis Tan, Mr Yip Hon Weng, Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin, Ms Gho Sze Kee, Mr Sharael Taha, Ms Mariam Jaafar and Ms Lee Hui Ying asked how we would deal with responsibility for their operations that may give rise to incidents causing injury or damage. This is an important question.

Discussions on liability for the operation of autonomous vessels are ongoing at IMO, as with similar discussions across other transport sectors. At present, the IMO's MASS Code establishes clear requirements for a human master to remain responsible for autonomous vessels, with the means to intervene, when necessary. This principle will continue to be applicable here. This means every vessel will continue to have a human master, retaining authority and command.

MPA's existing regulatory requirements will continue to apply to vessels operating within Singapore's waters. The Bill also does not change the existing principles for civil liability arising from maritime incidents.

MPA will monitor developments at IMO and in other jurisdictions closely to develop the appropriate regulations in consultation with industry. Our central principle is that autonomy must not create a lacuna in liability or diminish accountability, regardless of whether the functions are performed onboard, remotely or by automated systems. We will also ensure that technological adoption moves in step with workforce training and readiness.

In this regard, in response to the hon Member Mr Dennis Tan's question on how remote pilotage would be dealt with, MPA will take reference from international developments from other ports, such as the Scandinavian ports mentioned in his speech. As requirements for remote operations, evolve, we will develop new training assessment and certification standards for the conduct of remote pilotage.

To Mr Tan's question about regulation of drones or unmanned aircraft, CAAS will remain the lead agency regulating safety and navigation related matters. MPA will work closely with CAAS on the use of drones in the port for the provision of services to ensure vessel navigational safety and manage safe interactions between vessels and drones in the port.

We recognise that both regulatory clarity and targeted support are essential to enable the safe deployment of emerging technologies in our port. As regulations are put in place, MPA will ensure that the requirements and how to meet them are clearly communicated.

Let me now turn to the proposed important information infrastructure framework and the corresponding cybersecurity requirements.

Hon Members Mr Edward Chia, Mr Lee Hong Chuang and Ms Mariam Jaafar asked about the process of designating a computer or computer systems as an important information infrastructure system. As I mentioned in my opening speech, the threshold question for designating a system that is owned or operated by a maritime entity as an important information infrastructure is whether it is necessary for the continuous delivery of an essential transport service and whether its loss or compromise will substantially affect or impair the availability of that service. Simply using an MPA digital platform does not warrant designation.

Prior to designation, MPA will engage the owners and operators to better understand their systems and risk profiles, and may, if necessary, require them to provide information about their systems to determine whether they meet the criteria to be designated as an important information infrastructure.

At the point of designation as an important information infrastructure, MPA must notify the owner and operator of the designation and give them at least 14 days to make representations against this designation or their status as a notified owner or operator. If there is more than one person who is the owner, operator or owner-operator, MPA will determine the person who has effective control over the given system.

To the question posed by Mr Sharael Taha about overseas systems and foreign vessels, the proposed amendments also empower MPA to designate systems located or hosted overseas as designated important information infrastructures, if they meet the criteria. While this can potentially include computer systems onboard foreign vessels that are in or intending to enter Singapore's territorial waters, it is ordinarily unlikely that they would meet the threshold for the designation.

Mr Dennis Tan, Mr Lee Hong Chuang and Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin raised concerns about the potential for cybersecurity regulations imposed by MPA and CSA to be duplicative. The intent is to avoid duplication. The important information infrastructure framework is designed to complement the existing cybersecurity regulatory framework under the Cybersecurity Act 2018.

The critical information infrastructure regime safeguards systems that are necessary for the continuous delivery of essential services, or the very "core" of Singapore's digital systems. MPA's important information infrastructures regime safeguards systems that are essential to the maritime sector that may be linked to, but are not part of, this "core" – the penumbra, if you like.

The thresholds for designation therefore correspondingly differ. CIIs are systems whose loss or compromise would have a debilitating effect on the availability of an essential service in Singapore. For important information infrastructures on the other hand, the threshold level is lower; whether the loss or compromise would substantially affect or impair the availability of an essential transport service.

Hence, both frameworks are intended to be complementary and not duplicative. In fact, the Bill provides that the same computer system cannot be concurrently subject to being regulated under both the MPA Act and the Cybersecurity Act. MPA and CSA will also establish standard operating procedures to coordinate future designations.

Mr Dennis Tan, Ms Nadia Samdin, Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim, Mr Lee Hong Chuang and Mr Edward Chia also asked about the requirements expected of an operator of an important information infrastructure.

Notified operators of important information infrastructures have various obligations including putting in place measures to monitor and detect abnormal behaviours that may indicate possible cyber attacks on important information infrastructures. They are also required to report cybersecurity incidents to MPA and comply with Standards of Performance for Cybersecurity issued or adopted by MPA.

To Mr Sharael Taha's question on whether the cybersecurity standards and controls that MPA adopts will be internationally recognised, this will indeed be the case. MPA's standards will be benchmarked against standards, such as the IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management. The proposed amendments also provide powers for MPA to periodically conduct cybersecurity exercises on important information infrastructure systems to test business continuity and systems recovery plans. Mr Yip Hon Weng, in his speech, highlighted the value of holding regular drills to test readiness. I fully agree.

In designing the cybersecurity requirements, MPA adopts a risk-based and proportionate approach. This approach takes into consideration the potential impact to business costs while maintaining appropriate safeguards. MPA will also support owners and operators of important information infrastructures in meeting these requirements.

For example, the Maritime and Cyber Assurance and Operations Centre provides subscribing companies regular cybersecurity threat information and advisories for timely implementation of protection measures. This is especially useful for SMEs, a concern of the hon Member Mr Lee Hong Chuang, as these enterprises may not be, on their own, able to independently monitor cybersecurity threats.

I appreciate Mr Lee Hong Chuang's suggestions to help SMEs fulfil the requirements. We will consider them, in close consultation with important information infrastructure operators. MPA will continue refining the cybersecurity requirements to improve the sector's preparedness to manage cyber threats over time.

I now turn to the proposed licensing framework under the new Part 12 of the MPA Act.

Mr Sharael Taha, Mr Edward Chia, Ms Mariam Jaafar and Mr Dennis Tan raised concerns that the new Part 12 licensing framework will increase the compliance burden on the maritime companies. We will be mindful of this potential to safeguard the competitiveness of our port. Should there be any new requirements or changes to future renewal processes, these will be carefully calibrated to balance regulatory oversight with compliance costs.

To Mr Lee Hong Chuang's question on whether other services, such as bunkering, are being considered for future inclusion under the new Part 12, MPA will consider the merits in due course. Should there be any new inclusions to the licensing framework, MPA will carry out the necessary industry consultation prior to implementation.

To Mr Edward Chia's suggestion for information reporting to the Government to be consolidated, I agree with the underlying principle. To this end, MPA has rolled out initiatives to streamline clearances across agencies, such as the digitalPORT@SG.

However, doing so may not always lead to net efficiency gains if frontloading reporting ends up creating a bottleneck. We will study where such an approach would be applicable and beneficial. I also invite Mr Edward Chia to separately share any proposals he may have based on his engagements with the trade association of which he is an adviser to.

Mr Edward Chia and Ms Mariam Jaafar raised concerns that setting "capped services" risks may unduly restrict competition and asked how MPA will ensure that the incumbents are not unnecessarily entrenched or new entrants impeded.

MPA will be guided as follows. First, "capped services" will be prescribed selectively. For instance, emerging marine services may be prescribed as capped services to manage the entry of operators into emerging marine service markets in a calibrated manner, ensuring that supply keeps pace with demand.

We may also decide to cap the number of licences to avoid the duplication of services and to increase the efficiency of resource allocation. As certain maritime services require substantial infrastructure, scarce land and sea space must also be allocated judiciously.

In determining whether to impose a cap, under the new section 84A, MPA may consider relevant factors including whether existing licensees are able to meet the market demand and the availability of space and other scarce resources.

Second, MPA will regularly review whether the number of licenses for each capped services can be increased to allow more entrants. Where it is no longer necessary, MPA will remove the cap. These reviews will not only consider market conditions, but also the potential for new entrants to introduce innovative solutions, improve service quality, enhance operational efficiency and bring greater value to port users.

Industry stakeholders may provide feedback to MPA on the need to increase the number of licensees. This will ensure that the framework remains responsive to industry needs while maintaining a competitive and sustainable operating environment.

Mr Edward Chia and Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how MPA would assess that voluntary arrangements to gain access into facilities and infrastructure needed for port development have failed, and that statutory powers under the new Part 12AA should be exercised.

I would like to emphasise that MPA will only exercise the statutory powers as a last resort. We will first engage affected parties and seek to facilitate voluntary arrangements where possible. Whether statutory intervention is necessary will depend on the circumstances of each case, including the availability of alternatives, the progress of negotiations and the implications of further delay. Where statutory powers are exercised, the aggrieved persons will have avenues of recourse.

Should MPA temporarily occupy a licensee's premises for the purposes of installing essential port infrastructure, the licensee may claim compensation from MPA. If the occupation results in substantial impairment of rights, they may also request that the Government acquire the premises under the Land Acquisition Act.

Similarly, in the event MPA issues directions to a person to allow licensees on to their premises, the affected owner can seek compensation from the licensee for losses suffered because of the licensee's installations or use of its facilities. Affected parties may also request for the Minister to establish an Appeal Panel to hear appeals against MPA's decisions or determine reasonable terms of agreements between parties.

In response to Ms Lee Hui Ying's query on how the panel can also be perceived as a "fair" tribunal, the Minister may determine the terms and conditions of memberships and the procedures to be adopted by the panel. This allows the Minister to place safeguards to ensure the panel's independence and impartiality, including measures to address potential conflicts of interest.

I would also like to highlight that the Appeal Panel performs two different functions under section 85Y, a point that Ms Lee raised. The requirement for publishing the reasons for the panel's decision differs based on the nature of these functions. Under section 85Y(1)(a), the panel hears appeals against specified regulatory decisions made by MPA. The Bill does not expressly require the panel to provide reasons, but they may nevertheless provide reasons, depending on the circumstances of the case.

However, under section 85Y(1)(b), the panel determines reasonable terms of an agreement where the contracting parties have been unable to reach an agreement. Here, the Bill expressly requires the panel to provide reasons for the basis of the terms determined by the panel to ensure clarity of the contracting parties. This approach is modelled after the Electricity Act.

Mr Edward Chia and Mr Lee Hong Chuang also asked how compensation from MPA's occupation of a licensee's premises would be considered. The licensees would be compensated for specified losses arising from MPA's temporary occupation of their premises. These include losses due to displacement, repair or replacement costs for damage to buildings or land, and reinstatement costs or loss from the removal of objects or structures in the land, as set out in the proposed Fifth Schedule.

Financial losses arising from business interruptions and interferences, such as loss of output, are not covered. However, where the operator is displaced from part of its premises, reasonable expenses incurred in relocating its operations or equipment may be compensable as displacement costs. This is consistent with other similar legislation.

I would like to assure Ms Lee Hui Ying and Mr Ng Shi Xuan that MPA's intent, in such matters, is to engage affected licensees early and closely coordinate with them to schedule works conducted on their premises and minimise the disruptions to their operations. We will also ensure that necessary infrastructural works are coordinated across Government agencies.

I now turn to queries on the proposed wreck removal powers in the Bill.

Ms Nadia Samdin asked how MPA will assess if immediate action is required to remove a wreck, when the risk to navigational safety and the marine environment have not yet materialised. These powers will not be exercised based on remote or hypothetical risks. MPA will consider both the immediate- and long-term impact of the sunken object to the marine environment and the safety of navigation. If the sunken vessel or object poses an imminent risk to navigational safety risk or to the marine environment, MPA will take proportionate preventive action.

Ms Gho Sze Kee also asked how the wreck removal powers under the Merchant Shipping Act interact with the proposed amendments to the MPA Act. The provisions in the MPA Act deal with removal of ships, as well as aircraft or other objects that may be sunk, stranded or abandoned in Singapore's waters. This is broader in scope than provisions in the Merchant Shipping Act, which are limited to ships.

The powers under the Merchant Shipping Act continue to be relevant. The two Acts empower MPA to respond to different situations. The MPA Act, as amended, empowers MPA to act on risks to the marine environment and coastline, and not only to navigation. The Merchant Shipping Act empowers the Receiver of Wreck to step in immediately where a stranded ship outside port limits endangers navigation, even if the risk is not imminent.

As both Acts are administered by MPA, the exercise of these powers will be coordinated within MPA and the appropriate statutory power determined based on the circumstances of the situation. Regardless, the aim remains consistent: to remove the hazard safely and expediently.

To Mr Dennis Tan's question on the cost recovery, the owner of the wreck is to bear all costs for its removal. However, should the owner be unable to bear the costs, including if the owner cannot be found or is insolvent, section 58 of the MPA Act allows MPA to use the proceeds of the sale of the wreck to reimburse itself for expenses incurred. If proceeds from the sale are insufficient, MPA may recover the balance as debt from the owner. These are existing powers set out in the Act and are not proposed under this Bill.

Turning to a final point on MPA's enhanced investigative and enforcement powers, the hon Member Mr Dennis Tan asked about the safeguards that are in place to accompany these powers.

There are clear limits on when and how MPA's expanded powers may be exercised. They may only be used to investigate offences, determine whether regulatory action is warranted or verify information is provided to MPA.

More intrusive powers are subject to additional safeguards. For instance, entry into premises or vessels requires reasonable grounds, while entry into a residence requires the occupier's consent or at least six hours' prior notice.

These powers are in line with best practices across other legislation and ultimately, give MPA officers enforcement tools that are comparable to other regulators' regime.

Sir, please allow me to conclude by returning to the aim of this Bill. The proposed amendments in this Bill will lay the regulatory foundations to support the next chapter of Singapore's maritime development. They empower us to keep pace with emerging technologies and continue to thrive as a safe, trusted and competitive global maritime hub that generates good jobs for the next generation of Singaporean maritime workers. For these reasons, I commend this Bill to the House. Sir, I seek to move. [ Applause. ]

Mr Deputy Speaker: Are there any clarifications arising out of the Senior Minister of State's round-up speech? None? Ms Mariam Jaafar.

5.57 pm

Ms Mariam Jaafar: I thank the Senior Minister of State for his very comprehensive round-up. I just have one clarification. I did mention in my speech about the possibility of publishing an implementation roadmap. I think that part of the impetus behind this is that these are long long-term investments that are going to be, particularly in the sector.

I hear that you will consulting industry, but consultation is not the same as providing visibility in a bit of a forward-looking manner. So, will this be considered?

Mr Deputy Speaker: Senior Minister of State Murali Pillai, would you like to respond?

Mr Murali Pillai: Sir, obviously, my wrap-up speech is not comprehensive enough for the hon Member. She has invited me to commit MPA to publishing the information. I would say at this point in time, we are not able to commit. But I understand the thrust of her reasons for doing so and we will consider it very deeply.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Are there any further clarifications? None.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Murali Pillai].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.