Hansard Explorer

Mr Speaker: Minister for Sustainability and the Environment.

2.27 pm

The Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien): Mr Speaker, Sir, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Singapore has just experienced the most severe haze episode since 2015. For weeks, Singaporeans had to contend with unhealthy air quality, disrupt their daily routines and limit outdoor activities. Businesses and workers were affected, and we saw hundreds more people visiting the doctors each day. Singaporeans were understandably concerned about their health and well-being.

Transboundary haze is not simply an act of nature. It is driven in significant part by human activities, including irresponsible land-clearing and management practices such as slash-and-burn and peatland drainage.

We recognise that the agro-forestry sector plays an important role in supporting economic development and providing jobs and livelihoods for millions of people across the region. However, these economic activities must be carried out responsibly and sustainably.

Irresponsible practices may generate considerable commercial benefits for the companies responsible, while leaving millions of people across Southeast Asia to suffer and bear the consequences of haze pollution.

More than a decade ago, we enacted the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA) to hold those responsible for transboundary haze accountable. But enforcing laws against activities that take place overseas is complex. We need effective powers to protect Singaporeans and hold errant entities accountable, while respecting the sovereignty of other countries, upholding international law and avoiding extraterritorial overreach. This was the balance we sought when we enacted the THPA Act in 2014.

Following the recent haze episode, it is clear that the status quo is not tenable. Many Singaporeans want to see more effective action to prevent haze and hold those responsible accountable. The Government shares these concerns.

Importantly, our experience in investigating haze incidents has given us a much better understanding of the practical challenges involved and the changes needed to make our laws more effective.

We need better ways to obtain and verify information, trace complex corporate relationships, and impose meaningful consequences on errant entities, even where criminal prosecution proves difficult. We also need to be able to intervene earlier, before haze pollution reaches Singapore.

We therefore have to strengthen our laws. And we must act quickly. Investigations into the recent haze episode are already underway. Evidence may be lost or altered, business arrangements may change, and the longer we wait, the harder it may become to establish responsibility.

And this is why we are introducing this Bill now, under a Certificate of Urgency. Our objective is to give our agencies stronger and more effective tools to investigate irresponsible burning, establish accountability and impose meaningful consequences on those responsible.

Ultimately, our purpose is to protect Singaporeans from the harmful effects of haze pollution. Hence, the powers under this Bill will be directed at activities that cause or contribute to haze pollution or a risk of haze pollution in Singapore.

At the same time, we should be realistic. The haze episode this year reminds us just how complex this problem can be to resolve. Haze is inherently a transboundary problem. Fires can occur throughout the region. Our ability to act against those that are responsible will continue to be constrained by the limits of our jurisdiction.

Addressing the underlying causes of land and forest fires will require sustained efforts by governments, businesses and communities across the region.

The changes we are proposing will not guarantee successful prosecutions, nor will legislation alone solve the transboundary haze problem. But they will strengthen our ability to act to protect Singaporeans, including by imposing economic consequences on errant entities even where criminal prosecution remains difficult.

The Bill proposes two sets of amendments.

The first involves a fundamental change in our approach to investigations and enforcement under the THPA. It will give us a larger set of tools to investigate commercial links, and impose restrictions across business arrangements and supply chains to hold entities accountable.

The second group of changes enhances the original provisions under the THPA. These changes build on the lessons learnt from enforcing the THPA. They are meant to remove legal barriers to taking action, while remaining aligned with international law.

Let me start with the first set of amendments – to provide us with a larger set of tools to investigate commercial links and hold entities accountable. There are three key shifts at the core of our approach.

First, we will enhance our ability to establish the facts. This is critical because obtaining reliable evidence is one of the main challenges in enforcing the THPA.

Our investigations may delve into complex corporate structures, supply chains and business arrangements. The entities involved may have multiple layers of ownership and control. Establishing who is responsible and how different parties are connected to the burning can be difficult.

To address this, we propose to empower the Director-General of Environmental Protection to require entities with suspected links to haze pollution in Singapore to appoint expert private sector assessors.

This gives legislative backing to the panel of assessors that we have announced. The Director-General will specify the assessors and terms of the assessment in the direction to an entity. The entity receiving a direction must engage the assessors at their own expense.

To be clear, a direction to appoint an assessor does not necessarily mean that the entity has committed or is suspected of having committed an offence. It is meant to establish the relevant facts.

The assessors will submit their evaluation reports directly to the National Environment Agency (NEA). These reports will help NEA establish the relevant facts and decide what further action, if any, is appropriate. An entity may be cleared of wrongdoing or may be subject to further enforcement action. The assessors do not determine guilt; decisions on enforcement remain with the relevant authorities, and our courts will determine liability.

These changes will not remove all the challenges of tracing overseas activities. But they will provide us with another important avenue to obtain information, understand complex business relationships and hold responsible entities accountable.

Next, we will expand the tools we have to hold companies accountable by going beyond the immediate concessionaires to their supply chains, related corporates and financiers.

We propose to do so by giving the Minister the power to designate errant entities or individuals who have been convicted of an offence under the Act, whom the Minister knows or has reason to suspect have engaged in conduct constituting an offence, who have failed to comply with relevant directions or notices, or who have gotten an adverse assessment report.

Designation will enable the Government to impose orders restricting business dealings with the designated entity or individual. These may include the supply or purchase of goods and services, or the provision of loans and other financial support.

It will be an offence for entities or individuals to do business with designated entities in contravention of such orders, with a maximum fine of $1 million for each contravention and an additional fine of up to $100,000 each day the contravention continues.

These restrictions will not be administered by the Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment (MSE) alone. Where restrictions concern services provided by financial institutions, the Minister-in-charge of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will determine and administer the relevant orders to hold designated entities accountable.

The power to designate and impose restrictions is meant to impose economic consequences on those responsible for irresponsible burning or with established links to irresponsible burning. At the same time, the prohibitions ensure that others do not deal with such designated entities, including through complex business arrangements or corporate structures.

Designation, however, will not be sufficient. It may not be practical for the Government to identify every entity involved in burning, or every company involved in its supply chains. Instead, we may want to take action against the larger corporate entities above these individual entities directly.

For this reason, we will also introduce a power to put certain entities on notice not to deal with entities that cause or contribute to fires posing a risk of haze pollution in Singapore. This will apply to entities that have relevant connections to activities associated with burning, including large corporations operating in the forestry and agricultural sectors.

Entities put on notice will be required to take appropriate steps to ensure that their supply chains and business arrangements do not involve entities that cause or contribute to such fires. Failure to comply without reasonable excuse will be an offence.

These obligations are intended to strengthen due diligence and responsible business conduct across the supply chain. Companies will be expected to take reasonable steps to identify and address the risks within their business arrangements. The objective is not to impose an impossible guarantee that no risk will ever arise, but to ensure that companies do not turn a blind eye to irresponsible forestry and agriculture practices.

In addition to these changes, we will also provide powers for NEA to publicise lists of entities that have not complied with notices or directions issued under the Act, or who have been given a direction to appoint an assessor, among others. This will ensure transparency on the use of these powers, and where wrongdoing or non-compliance has been established, strengthen public accountability.

In parallel to our expanded approach to investigations and enforcement under the THPA, we will also enhance the existing powers we have.

First, we will modernise the statutory requirements for serving documents under the Act. In addition to the existing modes, the amendments will provide for electronic service and specified forms of substituted service, including publication through public media or on NEA's website.

This will help address practical difficulties in serving notices and initiating formal processes involving foreign entities. It will also enable us to serve notices for information and notices to attend court more effectively.

These changes do not guarantee that overseas entities will cooperate all the time. But they will remove procedural obstacles that have constrained our ability to proceed with investigations and legal processes.

Next, we will also give the Director-General and authorised officers the power of arrest in Singapore, to enable them to secure the cooperation of persons of interest more effectively, where necessary, and in accordance with the law.

Third, we will make explicit that THPA offences may be heard in court in the absence of an accused person in specified circumstances. This is consistent with existing court procedures where the Court is satisfied that the relevant summons or notice has been duly served, the accused person was duly informed that the matter can proceed in his absence and that there is no sufficient reason for the matter to be adjourned.

Some examples where this existing procedure has been used include prosecutions against a company for failure to file annual returns under the Companies Act, or against an employer for failure to pay Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions.

These amendments will help ensure that entities cannot frustrate enforcement simply by being difficult to contact or by remaining outside Singapore.

Fourth, we will expand the scope of our provisions to include "risk of haze", so that an entity may be held liable when its conduct causes or contributes to a land or forest fire overseas that poses a risk of haze pollution in Singapore, even if the haze has not reached Singapore.

The intent of this change is to give us the option of taking preventive action before the haze reaches Singapore. It does not change the territorial nexus we use in scoping the original THPA.

We do not intend to direct our powers at every fire in the region. We must focus our resources where there is a credible risk of haze affecting Singapore. It would not be realistic or prudent to investigate every fire across the region.

NEA will therefore continue to maintain indicators to assess whether fires pose a risk to Singapore. This is no different from what it already does today. These will include factors such as their distance from Singapore, the duration and extent of burning, and prevailing wind directions and meteorological conditions. The Bill also provides for a committee to advise the Director-General on the assessment of risk.

These changes will give us the flexibility to act in a wider range of circumstances. However, we will continue to be focused in terms of which fires we will look into. We will be measured and proportionate in how we use the powers under the Act.

Fifth, we will tighten the statutory defences within the Act to make clear what responsible behaviour entails.

The current THPA affords entities three key defences. First, if the fire was due solely to natural disaster or an act of war. Second, if the fire was caused by another person acting without the accused's knowledge. Third, if the defendant demonstrates that they have taken reasonable measures to prevent and fight the fire.

We will amend the THPA to tighten these statutory defences. Those seeking to rely on a defence will now need to prove that the fire was caused by another person acting without their knowledge, and that they have taken reasonable measures to prevent and fight the fire.

This recalibrated defence sends a strong signal of our expectations. Entities are expected to take sufficient care to avoid burning on their land. It will no longer be sufficient to simply claim that another person caused the fire.

Lastly, we will enhance the penalties under the THPA, to achieve a stronger deterrent effect.

The original penalties under the Act were comparable to prevailing penalties for domestic pollution offences. As we amend the THPA, we recognise that the serious harm of transboundary haze needs to be deterred by stronger penalties to underscore the gravity of such offences.

We will therefore be increasing the fine for the main offence of causing or contributing to land or forest fires with a risk of haze in Singapore from $100,000 per day to $1 million per day. The maximum aggregate fine will also be increased from $2 million to $20 million. Other penalties within the Act will also be increased proportionally.

This increase was calibrated with reference to existing legislation and the financial scale of the companies involved. The maximum fine of $20 million is double the $10 million maximum under the Online Criminal Harms Act, which was recently increased from $1 million.

In addition, we also propose to introduce a provision allowing the Court to assess the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of committing the offence, and to impose this as an additional penalty on the entity convicted. This will enable the Court to disgorge any benefit obtained from the offence.

I have already explained the challenges of gathering evidence outside of Singapore. We will therefore also introduce a civil penalty framework into the THPA, so that there is another route to take errant entities to task. This will give NEA more flexibility in deciding how to deal with contraventions and to deal with those who seek to hide from our criminal jurisdiction.

Under this framework, NEA may, with the consent of the Public Prosecutor, bring an action in court seeking a civil penalty for a contravention of the Act, with a maximum penalty of $10 million. There are clear provisions to ensure that the entity is not doubly punished – the civil penalty framework cannot be used in tandem with criminal prosecution in any single case.

Mr Speaker, Sir, transboundary haze remains a difficult problem that Singapore cannot resolve alone. We will continue working with our neighbours to strengthen regional cooperation and prevent fires at source. The Foreign Ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have agreed to establish a Joint Task Force to strengthen information sharing and ensure closer coordination. We welcome the steps taken by Indonesia on the ground to prioritise fire prevention as a long-term solution.

But we must also do what we can within our own jurisdiction, to protect our people from the harmful effects of haze. The amendments in this Bill will strengthen our ability to establish responsibility, intervene earlier and impose meaningful consequences on errant entities. Mr Speaker, Sir, I seek to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Ms Poh Li San.

2.49 pm

Ms Poh Li San (Sembawang West): Mr Speaker, allow me to begin with what Singaporeans went through in recent months. In September and October this year, the Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) shot up to close to 300 points, into the very unhealthy range, in many parts of Singapore, particularly in the central and western regions. The haze took a real toll on the health of our people, especially our seniors, our children and those with underlying respiratory conditions.

Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments and medical clinics were packed. Residents and co-workers shared with me how they suffered migraines, asthma attacks and eye irritation. Air purifiers and masks were sold out, and many had no choice but to stay indoors.

The impact went beyond health. Businesses were affected too. ActiveSG outdoor sports facilities had to close. Restaurants with alfresco seating suffered losses. Construction firms had to shorten work cycles and increase rest periods to keep their workers safe. Platform delivery workers had to take more breaks or reject job orders and suffered income reductions as a result.

Major outdoor events, such as the Purple Parade and the 20th Anniversary Great Eastern Women's Run, had to be cancelled.

These are just a few examples of how the recent haze episode affected the lives and livelihoods of Singaporeans.

Singaporeans are frustrated and they are worried. What troubled them most was the uncertainty – during the haziest period in early October, no one could tell them when or even whether the air would clear.

Yet, our neighbours in Kalimantan had it 10 times worse. PSI there skyrocketed to more than 3,000 points and the skies turned orange. Many people, especially young children and frail seniors, were in critical condition. In fact, the number of deaths in Indonesia in August and September jumped to an all-time high of more than 5,000 deaths due to the impact from air pollution from wildfires. Behind each of these numbers is a family, a community and a livelihood affected.

Mr Speaker, hazy skies are not new to us. For almost three decades since the 1997 Southeast Asian haze, Singaporeans have endured repeated episodes of severe haze. But this latest episode is by far the worst in terms of duration and intensity, stretching over more than two months.

To be fair, Singapore and Indonesia have worked closely over these two decades to prevent and mitigate the haze problem. Just this June, both governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on environmental cooperation to contain hotspots.

We have also acted on the legal front. In September 2014, the THPA came into force. The following year, six Indonesian companies were issued legal notices over fires on concession lands linked to them. In recent years, Singapore has also developed satellite imagery capabilities at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Specialised Meteorological Centre to detect hotspots in Kalimantan and Sumatra.

So, the question is this: after so much effort, after several years of relatively clear skies, why did the haze return with a vengeance this time? Could we have done more to prevent it and protect Singaporeans?

The warning signs were there. As early as July this year, meteorologists warned of a worsening haze situation, given the twin impact of a super El Niño and the Indian Ocean Dipole. That same month, I filed a Parliamentary Question asking the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment how the Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment (MSE) was working with its counterparts in Malaysia and Indonesia to step up upstream haze prevention in view of the expected return of severe haze in the second half of 2026.

The Minister replied that the bilateral and regional haze mitigation measures Singapore has in place with ASEAN member states, including Malaysia and Indonesia, were ongoing and continue to be relevant. She also noted that Singapore and Indonesia had recently signed a MOU on environmental cooperation, which covers transboundary pollution, among other areas.

Why then, with all these efforts and a newly signed MOU, did the haze get so much worse this year? Clearly, the companies holding land concessions in Indonesia are not onboard the team. Perhaps, they simply do not feel the heat. Maybe they think our Transboundary Haze Pollution law does not have enough teeth.

Consider this. Of the six companies issued legal notices in 2015, NEA has said that investigations into four of them remain ongoing, for more than a decade. Clearly we must do more, and we must do so urgently. We need to give our haze law sharper teeth and a stronger bite. Otherwise, the haze may just return year after year. Mr Speaker, please allow me to say a few points in Malay.

(In Malay): Mr Speaker, Singapore has suffered repeated haze episodes since the 1997 Southeast Asian Haze crisis. However, this latest one is the worst yet, lasting more than two months. This is happening despite years of effort.

Singapore and Indonesia have worked closely together to tackle this issue. In June, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on environmental cooperation. Singapore has also built satellite capabilities at the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre to detect hotspots in Kalimantan and Sumatra.

The THPA came into force in September 2014, and in the following year, legal notices were issued to six Indonesian companies. Yet the haze situation continue to get worse. This suggests that the companies holding land concessions in Indonesia are not fully engaged in the prevention efforts and perhaps they view the law as lacking teeth.

Therefore, urgent action is needed to give sharper teeth to the THPA. The legislation must provide for stricter enforcement, including financial penalties that have a real impact and a more effective deterrence mechanism. Such measures are important to shift companies' behaviour and ensure that they take greater responsibility for the impact of their activities. Otherwise, we risk facing the same haze problem year after year.

( In English ): Over the past few weeks, the teams at MSE, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Attorney-General's Chambers have acted swiftly and decisively to propose amendments to the THPA. In the past two weeks alone, based on the data collected by NEA, 10 Singapore-based companies have been issued legal notices. Their senior executives have been summoned to meet Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong, Senior Minister Shanmugam and Minister Grace Fu, and were told to fully cooperate with investigations.

I commend the teams for their swift efforts and their commitment to bring to justice these companies suspected of land clearing activities that caused forest fires and widespread haze across the region.

More importantly, where the current provisions of the Act have not been wide enough or severe enough to change behaviour, the amendments will now impose much stiffer penalties on companies found guilty.

Let me highlight three key changes, which in my opinion, will strengthen our haze law, inflict painful financial penalties and create effective deterrence to shift companies' behaviour.

First, the amendments will broaden the scope of the Act. It will cover not just actual haze events, but also conduct that creates a risk of haze pollution. It will also explicitly target conduct that causes or contributes to any land or forest fire outside Singapore, including the risk of haze. This means companies holding land concessions will have to review and revamp how they clear land to eliminate the risk of fires and haze pollution. Traditional methods, such as slash-and-burn, which tend to cause wildfires and haze, will likely be considered an offence if deployed.

Second, the penalties will be much heavier. The financial penalty will be raised tenfold, from $100,000 per day capped at $2 million, to $1 million per day capped at $20 million. Additional penalties will apply for a failure to comply with preventive measures; and where they can be ascertained, profits gained or losses avoided from offences must be surrendered as a penalty. The amendments will also introduce specific civil penalty provisions for breaches, separate from criminal proceedings, with penalties of up to $10 million.

These heftier penalties should serve as a much stronger deterrent to land concessionaires who might otherwise be tempted by cheaper and faster land-clearing methods that may cause wildfires in the forests and peatlands.

Third, every offence will now be explicitly arrestable and the new provisions will allow for trial in the absence of the accused. Some may view this as draconian. But I believe it may well prove to be the most effective amendment of all, because no senior executive or business owner would wish to end up behind bars.

Mr Speaker, I think the amendments are targeted, impactful and timely. However, I do have one clarification for the Minister.

If the amendments come into force, will the amendments also apply retrospectively to the six Indonesian companies that were issued legal notices back in 2015? If not, how can they be brought to justice as the case has been ongoing for more than a decade? Mr Speaker, please allow me to make a few points in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, for almost three decades since the 1997 Southeast Asian Haze, Singaporeans have endured repeated episodes of severe haze. But this latest episode is by far the worst in terms of duration and intensity, stretching over more than two months. Clearly, we must do more and we must do so urgently. We need to give our haze law sharper teeth and a stronger bite. Otherwise, the haze may just return year after year.

In the past two weeks, the authorities have issued legal notices to 10 companies set up in Singapore and required the senior management of these companies to cooperate fully with the investigations. In my opinion, three key changes will shift companies' behaviour.

First, broaden the scope of the Act. The amended Act will cover conduct that may create a risk of haze pollution, or cause land and forest fires outside Singapore. Traditional methods such as slash and burn which tend to cause wildfires and haze, will likely be considered an offence and cannot be deployed.

Second, penalties will be much heavier: fines rise tenfold to $1 million a day, capped at $20 million; and separate civil penalties of up to $10 million. These heftier penalties should serve as a much stronger deterrent to land concessionaires who might otherwise be tempted by cheaper and faster land-clearing methods that may cause wildfires in the forests and peatlands.

Third, step up criminal enforcement. Every offence will be arrestable, and the accused can be tried in absence. It may well prove to be the most effective amendment of all, because no senior executive or business owner would wish to end up behind bars.

The Bill amendments are targeted, impactful and timely. I believe that, through stiff financial penalties and effective legal deterrence, companies can be made to truly change their business conduct, and haze pollution can be reduced at its source.

( In English ): Mr Speaker, the Bill's amendments aim to close enforcement gaps, strengthen corporate accountability and enhance Singapore's ability to investigate and take decisive action against those responsible for transboundary haze.

But we must also be clear-eyed about the potential backlash, both on our relations with our neighbours and on our pro-business environment. After all, the land-clearing activities take place outside Singapore's jurisdiction, and the companies under investigation may have significant business interests within our neighbouring countries. If found guilty, they will be taken to task according to Singapore law.

Regrettably, the haze has already led to diplomatic tensions, with Indonesia cutting its natural gas exports to Singapore amid concerns over regional air pollution from the wildfires. Over the past few weeks, our leaders at the highest levels, including Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan and Environment Minister Grace Fu, have met and engaged their counterparts to secure a shared commitment to tackle the haze together, and to ensure our bilateral relations remain cordial and collaborative.

Also, a stricter haze law will inevitably dampen the business climate for companies operating land concessions in Indonesia. Some businesses may even pull out of Singapore as a result. But we must do what is right. Businesses incorporated in Singapore must take responsibility for actions that inflict severe environmental and health impact on millions of people, not just in Singapore, but also in Indonesia and in Malaysia.

The path ahead may be fraught with challenges. So, I hope Singaporeans will lend their full support to a stricter haze law for the greater good of society.

Mr Speaker, let me be clear: a stricter haze law is not a silver bullet. On its own, it will not completely eliminate haze episodes in the future. A few hundred companies hold land concessions on the forests and peatlands, and many of them may have contributed to the forest fires and haze.

While the THPA has extraterritorial effect and applies to companies incorporated outside Singapore, it will be much harder to bring these foreign companies to justice.

But an opportunity is opening up soon. Singapore will assume the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2027. I call on the Government to make multilateral collaboration on preventing and fighting haze a top priority on the agenda. Our efforts will be far more effective if our neighbours affected by the haze are aligned in cracking down on the companies responsible.

Mr Speaker, the amendments to the THPA are a step in the right direction. Our people deserve to breathe clean air. Notwithstanding my clarification, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms He Ting Ru.

3.08 pm

Ms He Ting Ru (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, yesterday I spoke about how we can work across sectors and borders to strengthen our efforts to tackle the haze and ensure clean air. My speech today extends that discussion along with raising some questions about the amendments table.

While we understand the importance and urgency of the amendments before us today, we must not forget that transboundary haze and its ill effects are one instance of a wider pattern afflicting modern supply chains. Harm created up and downstream of the chain, and sometimes far away from where goods are ultimately consumed. Our efforts to combat transboundary haze should be a two-way street. They must be informed by other attempts to address such harms across borders and industries, and used to feed into initiatives that encourage effective compliance and mitigate harms.

Transboundary haze takes place against the backdrop of the climate crisis. The same fires that choke our skies also release greenhouse gases and destroy forests and peatlands. Haze, climate and biodiversity are bound together. This falls squarely into the realm of planetary health and we should legislate with that in mind.

Many of us will note that the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air pollution in Europe offers a model of how neighbours can cooperate – shared scientific monitoring, annual public reporting of emissions and help for countries struggling to comply. Over time, particulate and sulphur emissions in Europe fell by 30% to 80%.

Traceability and affecting change on the ground works best when it supports the farmers who depend on it. As I mentioned yesterday, Ghana's Cocoa Traceability System has already mapped over 40,000 farms in its pilot, and another pilot in South Sumatra reports gains in yields and incomes for smallholders. Our policies must link enforcement with financing standards, support smallholders, share data with our neighbours and have a mechanism for review so that what we learn from haze can inform how we tackle it continuously alongside the next sustainability challenge.

Today, seven other Workers' Party colleagues will speak on wide ranging issues on this topic, such as using incentives to tackle the root cause of haze, urge more proactive action against peatland drainage, leveraging existing systems to target undesirable behaviour and better corporate accountability. We will also raise clarifications on technical questions relating to assessors and the updated penalty regime.

In my speech, I will look at how we can play to our strengths through a combination of existing tools and know-how to further strengthen responses. I also seek clarifications to certain proposed amendments.

Sir, Singapore is undoubtedly a preeminent financial hub with well-regarded corporate finance institutions based here, often servicing needs that extend well beyond our borders. Having both the institutions and the know-how located here within our own jurisdiction is a unique strength, and we should use this fully to our advantage. Allow me to expand on this while taking on board the amendments being debated here today.

The newly amended Part 2, section 5 states that an entity which engages in conduct that condones any conduct by another entity or individual which causes or contributes to any land or forest fire outside of Singapore is liable for an offence. While the accompanying illustration highlights a scenario when an entity that purchases products from a company found to have carried out slash-and-burn practises is rendered to have committed an offence, could the Minister clarify how we deal with the role of financial institutions funding companies that adopt slash and burn practises?

While the proposed new section 8E, relating to designated persons, gives the power to the Minister to issue a prohibition against dealing with a designated person, including giving loans and other facilities, this is but a start. As the Minister stated earlier, there can be other practical considerations that limit our ability to deal with it. The role of finances, therefore, still bear scrutiny on a more granular level. How would financial institutions therefore, be scrutinised or even held to account as indirect abettors of these burnings?

This is not a new concept. In previous United States (US) administrations, the Environmental Protection Agency could, under Superfund, go after lenders to make them pay for clean-up costs of contaminated sites. Of course, this was only used to target a handful of finances and the law has also since changed to afford greater protection to lenders, but of interest is how environmentalist then argued that it made lenders more cautious of funding environmentally risky firms, and that the Environmental Protection Agency also then encouraged pre-loan audits. This suggests that using language understood by enterprises, such as increasing risks and exposure, can nudge behaviour in more desirable directions.

Closer to home, research by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have uncovered the steady pipeline of funds flowing between local banks and firms behind the haze. As reported by The Straits Times, the NGO, Forest and Finance, as of mid-October this year, attributed US$5.91 billion to OCBC between 2010 and 2026, while DBS and UOB supported such firms to the tune of US$3.22 billion and US$1.85 billion, respectively, between 2013 and 2026.

Our local banks are no strangers to leading the way in setting environmentally conscious targets. In 2024, our three major local banks indicated their commitment to cease the financing of thermal coal projects. They were the first to do so in Advance Asia. Over the years, these banks, who together have well over $100 billion in sustainable finance commitments, have built sustainability linked loan frameworks and green bond monitoring mechanisms with externally validated targets.

Crucially, the banks already have some systems in place to monitor and ensure that borrowers and issuers maintain their information or environmental, social and governance (ESG) undertakings, and meet green covenants on a structured ongoing basis. It is not a stretch to think that these systems of monitoring on emissions or green targets can be improved and extended to verify whether an entity's fire risk is controlled.

While MAS has also recently urged banks to review their financing ties with companies linked to the haze, however, is it enough to act after the fact? It may be already too late, given that the fires have been started and damage already done. Banks should report, in aggregate, how many haze-linked clients they reviewed, and what is the follow-up action taken, such as conditions imposed, reduced exposure or ultimately exit. Moreover, many agri-commodity conglomerates carry out their operations via a complex web of contractors, different entities and convoluted corporate group structures, yet it appears that the illustration provided under section 5 only singles out employees of an errant entity instead of widening the scope to contractors and subcontractors hired by said errant entity to carry out their bidding.

Notwithstanding this, could the Minister clarify how the focus on enforcement efforts remains trained on the larger corporate bodies behind such actions?

In a similar vein, any responsible financing frameworks, including green financing, should also ensure that financial institutions screen the entire issuer or borrower group, not just a project or a specific purposed loan, to ensure that we do not end up in a dissonant situation where a green label can sit on a borrower with fires on its land.

Yesterday, I also spoke about how public monies through our Sovereign Wealth Funds can be applied to tackle the issue of haze. In 2016, this House was told that our Sovereign Wealth Funds had no investments in companies causing the haze and that the Government does not interfere with commercial decisions. While I agree that the Government should not be directing investments, we should not use this as a convenient fig leaf to dismiss the role that Sovereign Wealth Funds can ultimately play.

Norway's fund publishes its expectations of companies, now consolidated in a nature document released in March 2026, and says that where relevant, companies should adopt no deforestation, no peat, no exploitation policies. These expectations are the foundation for company dialogues, shareholder proposals, votes against the reelection of directors, and for companies that do not respond, possible divestment. It also asks banks in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil to adopt no deforestation lending criteria and expects companies to be transparent about their lobbying or nature issues.

Not every fund has gone as far. New Zealand's funds have preferred engagement over divestment, although they have been challenged to show evidence that engagement actually changes behaviour. This suggests that engagement is only credible when paired with milestone and consequences.

It may therefore be time for our own GIC and Temasek to publish a haze and earth stewardship policy, including a clear stance on fire. This should include annual reports on which holdings they engaged, what commitments they obtained and what they did when commitments were not kept.

And will these entities disclose their exposure to firms now under inquiry by our own authorities and the public? For example, Temasek published its first standalone sustainability report in 2024, which should be expanded to include the above points so that we can more clearly see how our own Sovereign Wealth Funds could be used to tackle the haze, if relevant.

Investing to choke ourselves makes little sense, even if inadvertently.

Next, I move on to some more discreet aspects of the Bill relating to enforcement and transparency.

We must also close any potential gaps that errant entities can exploit, given the defences available under the legislation. Under the new section 7(2), a firm or entity can claim a defence in engaging in conduct, whether in or outside Singapore, that causes or contributes to any land or forest fire through management of a second entity that is the owner or occupier of any land situated outside Singapore based on a balance of probabilities under the new section 5(3).

Likewise, an entity can also claim a defence against civil liability if a second entity managed by a firm or entity does not fulfil its duty in refraining from conduct or condoning conduct by third parties that cause or contribute to land or forest fires that give rise to or risk haze pollution in Singapore on the balance of probabilities under the new proposed section 6(2). In other words, they can claim that it is someone else's fault.

The balance of probabilities is the usual standard in civil suits and the standard applied to defences in criminal cases, so its use in the Bill is unsurprising. However, as we have seen, the companies involved or complicit in the land and forest fires behind the current and other rounds of haze can have complicated ownership and contractual structures.

Corporates could ultimately point to these to raise defences, which are weighed up on the balance of probabilities and ultimately, use them to avoid accountability. This might deny aggrieved parties proper recourse and justice, especially those without access to high-powered legal teams, on top of diminishing the punitive effect of the law to cut behaviour that causes or risks serious haze pollution.

Given the various difficulties associated with enforcement of our previous laws to tackle the haze, should there be consideration of how else we can introduce a more stringent application of proof, especially given the legal and regulatory complexities sometimes found in other jurisdictions?

For the law to be more effective and to achieve its intended purposes, it is important to further raise the costs of having complex corporate and contractual structures that obscure liability. This can ultimately disincentivise the use of such relationships to engage in activities that can risk or cause serious haze pollution.

Turning to transparency and public interest relating to the Bill, under the proposed new section 8C, Singapore's Director-General of Environmental Protection may require an entity suspected of involvement in the fires to appoint an assessor at the entity's own expense. The assessor must then report on, among other things, the extent of the entity's involvement in land or forest fires.

This is a welcome addition. Environmental protection laws in Indonesia and Australia already have provisions allowing the government to direct audits similar in spirit to the assessors envisioned in the amendments. But could we also not publish the assessor reports by default, with appropriate allowance for necessary redactions? Doing so is appropriate, given the immense public interest, and would also possibly have practical benefits.

For example, having such assessor reports in the public domain would increase the reputational costs for non-compliance or for contributing to land and forest fires. Consumers can use this to make more informed decisions about their purchases as well. Large clients and agencies who award standards and ratings may find the reports useful, and companies desiring to clear their name may be more inclined to cooperate fully with assessors if they know the report will be made public.

Perhaps, more importantly, Singaporeans would likely appreciate the additional transparency, especially when publicly available information is hard to come by, especially on the six cases that had been initiated by the NEA under the THPA 2014. Likewise, Singaporeans would probably also welcome public information regarding results from the joint task force to deal with firms behind the fires and haze.

While the range of enforcement levers at our disposal has been expanded, its effectiveness largely hinges on our authorities' abilities to obtain the necessary information to take action.

The revised proposal in section 10(6) to raise the maximum fine for individuals who fail to comply with requests for information to $50,000 is a start. However, is this amount sufficiently punitive to send a clear signal of accountability to senior decision-makers?

First, the gap with penalties on entities is jarring. Under the newly proposed section 5, entities face fines of up to $1 million for every day of haze pollution and $500,000 for every day they fail to comply with preventive measures noticed. Yet, a non-compliant individual faces a one-off fine of $50,000.

While we may argue that a refusal to cooperate is not of the same severity as failure to comply with a notice, companies are ultimately mere legal concepts that are run by people. If we believe that accountability rests with those who are directly involved in these decisions, there should be room to revisit the proposed penalty amount for non-compliant individuals.

Second, we must ask whether the $50,000 penalty is commensurate with the financial means and accountability of those it targets. The individuals envisioned to be charged under this provision probably are not field hands but senior executives with decision-making power. The annual reports of several of the 10 companies linked to haze causing fires summoned for investigation disclose executive annual renumeration well in excess of a million dollars. Against that, a $50,000 fine is little more than a tap on the wrist.

In view of this, could we not raise the maximum fine for individuals to maybe $200,000, a sum that reflects the seriousness of obstructing an investigation and sits closer to the scale of the penalties on the entities these individuals lead and ultimately control?

On my final point, traceability, we hear a lot about the difficulty of obtaining good data, of knowing who is responsible. Prior to the recent haze episode, the Government issued six preventive notices under the THPA. While two cases have since been closed, the remaining four are still, to my understanding, open to this day, highlighting the difficulty in bringing errant companies to task.

This roadblock in implementation could be attributed to issues on obtaining cooperation, especially from companies operating abroad. In particular, the Singapore Management University's Adeline Chong and Stefanie Schacherer, alongside other legal experts, observed that obtaining maps delineating the ownership and operation situation of each concession has proven to be difficult.

Amending our laws without strengthening our information gathering capabilities would make it significantly more difficult for our authorities to enforce them. Yet, we should also be sensitive to the sacrosanct principle of non-interference. With Singapore assuming ASEAN chairmanship next year, we should instead use this opportunity to strengthen information sharing efforts at the ASEAN level.

While the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control recently established its secretariat office in Jakarta, the centre does not appear to have the legal muscle to carry out its duties, which includes developing a dashboard, laying out the locations of hotspots over maps delineating the owner of each concession, enhancing haze and forest fire preparedness, as well as coordinating responses to requests for assistance. There should be a more concerted effort to address such limitations.

Smallholders might face difficulties adhering to traceability requirements, such as the European Union Deforestation Regulation due to a lack of technical expertise or resourcing. Nevertheless, there are NGOs helping to plug this gap. For instance, the Rainforest Alliance provides a streamlined certification programme for smallholders who adopt environmentally sustainable practices, including the use of satellite imagery to map out certified farmland. Working with them can help us plug an information gap in enforcement.

Just like how we work with NGOs, we can likewise share our know-how on dealing with haze pollution and its associated wildfires with counterparts worldwide who might be experiencing similar issues in different regions.

Mr Speaker, the amendments in this Bill are part of our effort to go after corporations that turn a blind eye to their environmental and public obligations. As we operationalise it, I hope we will act against those who finance the culprits behind the haze, close legal loopholes, improve transparency on investigated companies, increase penalties for uncooperative individuals, and leverage our strengths in research and corporate financial systems to tackle the problem.

This should and must not stop at haze. A "we tried our best" approach will only go so far in meeting our climate goals and protecting our citizens. I hope we carry this momentum into stronger oversight of businesses' environmental impact more broadly.

Notwithstanding the points I made above, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Jessica Tan.

3.27 pm

Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo (East Coast): Mr Speaker, I support the Bill. Clean air matters to Singaporeans. It matters to our health, our well-being and our daily lives. We value being able to step outdoors, send our children to school and enjoy our neighbourhoods without worrying about the air we breathe.

When the haze returns, it affects more than visibility. It affects public health, economic activity and quality of life. That is why Singapore cannot afford to be passive. We must act before haze reaches our shores, hold those responsible accountable and provide businesses with clarity of what is expected of them.

I therefore welcome the broad direction of this Bill, particularly its shift towards prevention.

For many years, our framework has focused largely on conduct that has already resulted in haze affecting Singapore. These amendments recognise that prevention should began early. We should not have to wait for the smoke in our skies before action is taken. The proposed provisions addressing conduct that causes haze or creates a risk of haze represents an important step forward.

At the same time, these are not minor obligations and the consequences are substantial. The Bill provides for penalties of up to $1 million for every day or part-day that haze or risk of haze persists from a relevant fire. In addition, breaches of preventive notices may attract penalties of up to $500,000 per day or part-day, subject to the aggregate cap.

These penalties reflect the serious harm that haze can cause to public health, livelihood and the wider community. I support the intent.

However, when obligations are significant and penalties are substantial, businesses must have clarity about what the law requires, confidence that decisions are based on sound evidence, and assurance that enforcement is fair and proportional. The stronger the powers, the greater the need for transparency, procedural fairness and clear guidance.

With that in mind, I seek clarification on four areas. These questions are not intended to weaken the Bill. Rather, they are intended to ensure that a framework carrying such significant consequence is effective, forcible and fair in practice.

First, how will haze risk be assessed and what safeguards will ensure fairness?

A central feature of this Bill is the ability to act where there is a risk of haze affecting Singapore. That is understandable. Prevention requires us to address risks before harm occurs. However, a finding of haze risk may carry significant consequences even before haze reaches Singapore. It may affect commercial relationships, financial arrangements and business operations.

Will the Minister elaborate on how haze risk will be assessed? And will the methodology and supporting evidence be made available, where appropriate, so that affected parties understand the basis of the decision?

The Bill also requires for a haze-risk certificate by the Director-General to be conclusive evidence of certain matters. Could the Minister explain why conclusiveness is necessary and what safeguards will exist against mistaken identity, inaccurate information or changed circumstances? Prevention must be swift, but accuracy matters too. The effectiveness of the framework will depend not only on the powers it provides, but also on confidence that those powers are exercised fairly and based on reliable evidence.

Second, what responsibilities will businesses have in managing supply chain risks? Prevention requires accountability throughout the supply chain. Today, many businesses are several layers removed from activities taking place on the ground. Supply chains can span multiple countries and involve numerous intermediaries. The Bill rightly seeks to prevent companies from turning a blind eye to environmental risks.

But businesses need practical guidance. What checks will companies be expected to undertake once they are placed on notice? What records should they keep? What level of due diligence will be required? How far will businesses be expected to trace products through intermediaries and complex supply chains? If a company conducts diligent checks but is unable to obtain complete information, what would constitute a reasonable excuse under the law? Will guidance take into account factors, such as company size, risk exposure and the degree of influence a business has over its suppliers?

Businesses will also need clarity on the operation of the proposed restrictions, including any permitted dealings and exceptions that may apply.

Third, how can businesses demonstrate improvement and have restrictions reviewed? The objective of this Bill is not simply to impose restrictions. The larger objective is to reduce environmental harm and improve corporate behaviour. For that reason, businesses should understand not only what may trigger action, but also what actions can lead to restrictions being lifted. Will affected parties receive clear reasons for designations or notices and what review mechanisms will be available? If new evidence emerges, an error is discovered or meaningful corrective action has been taken, will there be opportunities for decisions to be reconsidered promptly?

A credible review framework benefits everyone. It allows authorities to act decisively where necessary, while also creating incentives for companies to rectify problems and improve their practices. Ultimately, I believe that we want is better environmental outcomes, not simply more enforcement actions.

Fourth, how will stronger enforcement powers be exercised proportionately? I recognise the need for strong enforcement powers. But with stronger powers, as I have said, comes a greater need for safeguards. Given the scale of the penalties involved, enforcement decisions can have significant operational, financial and reputational consequences.

Could the Minister elaborate on how these powers will be exercised in a manner that is necessary, proportionate and consistent? How will authorities determine whether a matter is best addressed through criminal prosecution, civil penalties or composition? How will enforcement distinguish between deliberate misconduct and less serious compliance failures? Where multiple sanctions may apply, how will authorities ensure that the overall outcome remains fair and proportionate?

Relatedly, the Bill introduces an assessor framework that may play an important role in investigations and remedial measures. How will assessor's independence be safeguarded? How will conflicts of interest be managed? And where access to overseas land, records or witnesses is constrained by local laws or practical limitations, how will authorities distinguish between deliberate obstruction and a genuine inability to obtain information? Successful enforcement depends not only on strong powers, but also on confidence that the powers are applied fairly and consistently.

Mr Speaker, legislation alone will not solve the haze problem. Its success will depend on implementation. Businesses will need clear guidance, practical support and sufficient time to understand their obligations and adjust their practices. It would also be useful to understand how success will be measured. Will regular updates be provided on environmental outcomes, compliance efforts and the effectiveness of the measures introduced by this Bill?

We should ultimately judge success not by the number of notices issued or penalties imposed, but by whether environmental risks are reduced and harmful practices are changing.

Mr Speaker, Singaporeans should not have to choose between economic prosperity and clean air. Our health and our well-being should never become the price of someone else's commercial success. I support this Bill because it strengthens prevention, promotes accountability and reinforces the principle that environmental responsibility must be part of doing business.

The penalties proposed in this Bill reflect the seriousness of the harm that haze can cause. That is appropriate. But significant penalties should be matched by clear obligations, reliable evidence and fair processes. Prevention must begin before the smoke reaches us. Transparency must make responsibility visible. And accountability must ensure that those responsible answer for their conduct.

The true test of these amendments will not be in how many notices are issued, investigations conducted or penalties imposed. The true test will be whether businesses change their practices, whether fires are prevented and whether future generations experience fewer haze episodes. With these clarifications, I support the Bill.

3.38 pm

Mr Speaker: Order. We have been in the Chamber for over five hours. So, I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 3.55 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.38 pm until 3.55 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.55 pm

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE POLLUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL

Debate resumed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

3.55 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, every time transboundary haze returns, Singaporeans endure burning throats, stinging eyes and disrupted routines. Yet, the commercial incentives driving this public health hazard remain unchanged. For errant agri-businesses, draining peatlands without proper water management and cutting corners on fire prevention and suppression are often an expedient, low-cost operational shortcut, with fires and the occasional fines treated as an acceptable business risk.

I therefore welcome the long overdue overhaul of the THPA. If we want companies to stop these environmentally destructive practices, the commercial calculations behind them must be fundamentally upended. We must use the financial and legal levers available within our own jurisdiction to ensure our markets and supply chains are not facilitating such reckless and negligent operations. The Bill makes significant changes to the criminal penalties framework, including raising the maximum aggregate criminal fine tenfold from $2 million to $20 million. However, I remain sceptical about the real-world effectiveness of the enhanced criminal penalties. Would it simply be a paper tiger?

Since the Act was passed in 2014, the statutory criminal prosecution framework has produced a grand total of zero convictions. During the severe 2015 haze crisis, NEA served statutory notices on six Indonesian plantation companies. Two of those cases were closed in 2017 without any penalties levied. The remaining four cases remain open and unresolved over a decade later. The fundamental evidentiary hurdle is proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt across sovereign borders.

I acknowledge that the Bill does introduce important procedural upgrades that make enforcement and conviction more feasible in Court. Deeming all offences under section 14(a) arrestable and conferring powers of arrest without warrant may sound decisive but in practice, they will have little impact on foreign companies whose directors never step foot in Singapore. Even with the Bill's statutory presumptions and the Director-General's conclusive certificate, establishing the risk of haze, proving corporate culpability and ownership beyond reasonable doubt across borders is an exceptionally high bar and likely quite impossible without sufficient cooperation from the Indonesian government or any other foreign governments involved.

While the Bill attempts to tackle corporate layering and causation through expanded liability under section 5 and statutory presumptions under section 8, these legal mechanisms remain rebuttable in Court. They cannot unilaterally pierce offshore corporate webs, resolve contested boundary claims on foreign soil or substitute for ground level evidentiary cooperation from our neighbours. Back in 2013, before the principal Act was passed, I raised a Parliamentary Question on the sharing of cross-border concession maps to identify errant companies. More than a decade later, obtaining verified legally admissible data across sovereign borders remains an uphill battle.

Under the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, cross-border data gaps can still derail a prosecution. That is why the criminal track alone cannot carry the burden of deterrence.

The most critical mechanism in this Bill is therefore the new civil penalty regime under part 2D. This represents a much-needed structural shift, empowering NEA to shift to seek penalties in Court on the lower threshold of the balance of probabilities. This civil penalty mechanism did not emerge in a vacuum. It directly responds to the deep public frustration over the limits of relying solely on criminal prosecutions that have yielded zero convictions over a decade.

Informed by discussions with the experts on how our financial regulations handle corporate deterrence, I filed a Parliamentary Question on 22 October 2026, prior to the publication of this Bill, asking whether the Government would consider introducing amendments to the Act to establish a statutory civil penalty regime and empower NEA to seek civil penalties on the balance of probabilities. I am glad that the Government has listened to these collective voices and incorporated this pragmatic tool into the law.

Now that this framework is before us, how does the Government intend to operationalise it? What specific investigative capabilities and legal resources will be allocated to ensure the NEA is fully equipped to aggressively pursue civil penalties in court and recover these judgment debts against errant entities?

The procedural mechanics of this civil regime, from settlement frameworks to corporate floors, are drawn almost word for word from section 232 of the Securities and Futures Act, yet the Government conspicuously omitted the Securities and Futures Act's key deterrent, a dynamic penalty of up to three times the illicit profits gained. Instead, section 8A imposes a fixed $10 million ceiling.

For multi-billion dollar plantation conglomerates, where the cost savings of skimping on water management and fire suppression across vast concessions far exceed that figure, a capped $10 million penalty risk being priced in as an acceptable cost of doing business.

More fundamentally, the commercial upside extends far beyond short-term operational savings. By cutting corners on land clearing and drainage, companies can plant cash crops months ahead of schedule. That shortcut unlocks decades of lucrative oil palm and pulpwood for harvest, while leaving behind an extreme fire hazard.

Why should our civil penalty regime ignore these illicit economic windfalls? If we adopt the Securities and Futures Act multiplier, the formula should expressly define profit gained to capture the commercial returns and crop yields generated from cultivating land prepared through improper or hazardous methods. Stripping away the long-term commercial upside of that converted land is a critical way to destroy the underlying financial incentive, leaving profit disgorgement solely to the criminal track under section 16A, blunts deterrence by subjecting it to a far higher criminal standard of proof.

Even if the Government chooses not to adopt the Securities and Futures Act's dynamic multiplier formula, why cap the civil penalty at $10 million, which is half the maximum criminal fine under section 9? By setting the civil cap so much lower, we effectively offer errant conglomerates a 50% discount on their maximum financial exposure simply because cross-border evidential hurdles make a criminal trial unviable.

Because those cross-border hurdles are so steep, I anticipate that the civil track will effectively become our primary enforcement mechanism. Its maximum financial exposure should at least match the $20 million criminal ceiling.

Next, I turn to one of the primary root causes of the fires: peatland drainage. Peatlands are naturally waterlogged carbon rich wetlands. To prepare these lands for industrial plantations, agri-businesses excavate vast networks of canals to drain the water away. Once dried out, the organic peat soil becomes an underground tinderbox. Because subterranean peat deposits do not respect surface concession boundaries, fires burning deep underground are notoriously difficult to track, contain or attribute to a single landholder after they ignite.

That is precisely why enforcement cannot wait for open flames. The law must treat deliberate canal excavation that turns wetlands into tinder boxes with the same urgency as the fires that inevitably follow.

The Bill appears to capture this indirectly through sections 5, 6, 9, 11B and Part 2B.

However, indirect mechanisms leave room for legal contestation. Can the Minister clarify whether the legislative intent of this Bill is to treat commercial peatland drainage and canal desiccation per se as conduct that causes or contributes to fire risk under sections 5 and 6?

Will the Government consider expanding subsidiary regulations to require concession holders with a Singapore nexus to maintain mandatory water table baselines? These entities should be required to submit audited fire prevention plans directly to the NEA, backed by independent third party verification of their water management measures. If such canals are discovered, for example, using satellite triggers, is the Director-General prepared to proactively issue remedial directives under section 11B, to mandate canal blocking and peat rewetting to act well before fires break out?

Mr Deputy Speaker, Singapore may not be able to directly police overseas concessions, but as a major financial centre and commodities trading hub, we host the capital markets, trade financing pipelines and banking infrastructure that regional commodity groups rely on. The new designation powers under Part 2B and section 8E, allow the Government to shut off trade credit, working capital and commercial contracts for errant groups and their supply chains. We must actively use these financial and regulatory tools to ensure our markets are not facilitating environmentally destructive operations that cause severe personal and community health hazards, not just in Singapore, but for our neighbours as well.

Under Part 2B, the Minister can designate errant concession holders and their supply chain partners. Will MAS issue supervisory expectations requiring financial institutions to review and restrict credits to these designated entities? Furthermore, will MAS and SGX RegCo bar listed companies linked to these fires from raising capital in our markets until their fire risk management is independently audited?

Sir, agri-business conglomerates rely on trade facilities, letters of credit and working capital from Singapore banks to export their harvest. If local lenders provide unchecked credit, or if listed vehicles raise public funds while their subsidiaries desiccate peatlands, our statutory penalties become a trivial overhead.

We must put strict environmental conditions at the heart of commercial credit. As Singapore grows as a trusted green finance hub, our capital markets should reward genuine sustainability rather than bankroll environmental harm.

Finally, legal deterrence must be matched by constructive bilateral cooperation with affected countries to tackle this problem at its root. Like many Singaporeans, I shared a deep frustration over the persistent recurrence of this environmental and public health crisis over the past five decades since transboundary haze first affected our region in the 1970s.

Singapore must always be united and firm when defending our vital national interest, whether on cross-border pollution or the sanctity of essential energy contracts. However, managing cross-border environmental challenges between close neighbours is inherently complex and sensitive. There is a crucial difference between standing firm on national principles and letting public exchanges degenerate into counterproductive noise.

As we saw following remarks made in mid-October, public back and forth can quickly become amplified by vocal online commentators into acrimonious rhetoric that inflames bilateral sentiment. Such online polarisation generates unnecessary static risks, crowding out constructive dialogue and does little to clear the air.

I was therefore glad that the Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Jakarta from 27 to 29 October to engage directly with the Indonesian leadership. As he rightly pointed out: "You can't conduct diplomacy just by the phone or through the media."

The establishment of a joint task force with Indonesia to investigate companies linked to these fires is a constructive step forward. However, its success will depend on the sustained commitment at the highest levels, seamless inter-agency coordination, and a robust legal framework to translate bilateral findings into domestic enforcement action.

To ensure this joint task force delivers tangible outcomes, can the Minister share more details on the specific terms of reference? Which frontline and legal enforcement agency will represent both sides? Will this bilateral framework include formal protocols for real-time ground verification and evidential data sharing, so that joint findings can be admitted in court proceedings under this Act?

Diplomatic coordination must also translate into effective fire suppression at source. I recognise the immense scale and logistical complexity of peatland management across hundreds of thousands of acres, as well as the tireless efforts of Indonesian frontline agencies and local community fire crews working under perilous conditions.

On 10 October, the acting spokesman for Indonesia's National Disaster Mitigation Agency noted that ground personnel would be preferred over aircraft because thick haze impairs aerial visibility. Yesterday, I raised a supplementary question asking whether Singapore is equipped to deploy ground teams for peat fires. In response, the Minister reiterated that our assistance offer had not yet been accepted, though that left my central question on our ground readiness unanswered.

While respecting that deployment decisions rest entirely with our neighbours, operational readiness remains essential. Can the Minister clarify whether Singapore has the specialised ground capabilities required to complement local efforts against deep subterranean peat fires if a mutual request for assistance is activated?

Public funds spent mobilising fire suppression as assets should not be borne entirely by Singapore taxpayers when culpable corporate actors can be made to pay. Will the Government ensure that these public operational expenses are factored into the civil penalties sought under Part 2D, or the criminal disgorgement orders under section 16A, when taking action against errant companies?

Mr Speaker, statues are only as effective as their enforcement. Errant agri-businesses will only stop burning when doing so carries immediate commercial friction, when credit conditions tighten and when financial markets they depend on are closed to them. At the same time, domestic legal and financial levers must be paired with steady, constructive and mature diplomacy with our neighbours, working as collaborative partners rather than trading barbs through the media.

The true test of this legislation will be whether we have the ability to hit polluters directly in their wallets, sever their access to capital in Singapore and back that up with practical operational cooperation to douse the fires at source. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Dr Choo Pei Ling.

4.12 pm

Dr Choo Pei Ling (Chua Chu Kang): Mr Deputy Speaker, Singaporeans should not bear the consequences of fires caused by companies that evade responsibility. This Bill strengthens our ability to investigate and hold them accountable. Its success will depend on how well we turn stronger powers into changed behaviour.

I have three priorities.

First, strong powers must be exercised on a sound and transparent basis. The Director-General's certificate addresses the difficulty of establishing transboundary haze risk when evidence lies overseas. Could the Minister clarify how material new evidence or changed circumstances would be considered, without compromising timely enforcement?

Designation and person-on-notice measures can affect businesses before conviction. I suggest that the implementation framework provide for written reasons, periodic reassessments and a clear process for independent review. Fair process will strengthen confidence in enforcement.

Second, accountability must come with clear, workable expectations. Companies should not avoid scrutiny by placing intermediaries between themselves and risky activities. But smaller businesses may lack the resources to trace complex supply chains. Guidance on practical due diligence such as the checks expected, records to retain, warning signs requiring further action and when a business should disengage from a supplier would be helpful. This supports responsible businesses while making clear that turning a blind eye is no defence.

The revised section 7 defence also makes preventive and fire-control measures important. Guidance on reasonable precautions, including monitoring, early detection and firefighting, would help operators understand what is expected and how to demonstrate it.

Third, stronger investigative powers must translate into results. The existing Act has not resulted in a prosecution. Four investigations arising from the 2015 haze periods remain open. This illustrates the difficulty of obtaining evidence and cooperation across borders. How will MSE distinguish deliberate obstruction from a genuine inability to obtain overseas information? I encourage the Ministry to deepen regional cooperation and ensure assessors have timely access to information, with safeguards for their independence and costs.

I also suggest annual reporting on cooperation secured, investigations concluded, preventive action taken and penalties recovered. We should measure whether companies are improving supply-chain oversight and fire prevention – not simply the number of notices and investigations.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the measure of this Bill is whether companies change their behaviour before fires occur. We must be firm with those who act irresponsibly, clear with those who want to comply and determined in securing cross-border cooperation. For Singaporeans, success means fewer fires, less haze and cleaner air. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Kenneth Tiong.

4.16 pm

Mr Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill. I thank the Government for a strong Bill that comes down firmly on the side of protecting Singaporeans.

For weeks this year, parents checked the PSI before letting their children out and older residents with weak hearts and lungs were told to stay indoors. An economist's preliminary estimate is that this year's haze could cost Singapore more than the $1.83 billion of 2015, the costliest on record.

Yet in the 12 years since the 2014 Act came into force, not one company has been fined or sued under it. I think this Bill fixes many of the reasons why.

The cap for fines was $2 million, which was meaningless, less than 1% of the average earnings of the seven key agro-forestry companies in 2014 and roughly what one 10,000-hectare clearing saves by burning instead of using machines. Now the fine is a million a day, capped at $20 million and the court must also order the company to pay back the profit it gained or the loss it avoided.

The evidence and the cooperation had to come from abroad. A notice could only be served by hand or by consent and ignoring it cost $5,000. Four cases from 2015 stayed open for a decade. Now notices can go by email or website or to an address anywhere. Assessors are appointed at the company's cost, can enter the land and owe their duty to the Director-General and the reports count as evidence. Refusing them costs up to $20 million. The defendant had to be in court. Now there is trial in absentia.

The defences were wide. A company could escape by proving that the haze came solely from a natural disaster or they had taken reasonable care. Both escapes are gone. A company that says a stranger lit the fire must now also prove it took all reasonable measures to prevent the fire, and to put it out. And the only levers were a conviction or a lawsuit.

Now Ministers can designate a company and order banks, insurers and buyers to stop dealing with it. This is the biggest change in the Bill. It reaches the company's money and trade without waiting years for court.

Clean air is a pre-condition for the quality of life of everyone in Singapore. The Friday night of the Singapore Grand Prix, when the 24-hour PSI reached 192, brought global attention to this problem and renewed urgency, which we should not squander.

Sir, I have three clarifications.

First, contested maps. Prof Alan Tan of the National University of Singapore, writing on the 2014 Act, suggested making companies hand over the maps they themselves use. The Bill comes close. A document naming a company as concession holder or land manager makes it the presumed owner. But what happens when a company marks that map as contested? Can a company be designated while the dispute is live? Or would the dispute stall the process, the way four cases stalled for a decade?

Second, assets abroad. A judgment can still only be collected from assets in Singapore. Will the Government pursue reciprocal enforcement arrangements with regional partners?

Third, the new civil penalty. The agency can now go to court for a civil penalty, where it only has to show that its case is more likely than not, instead of proving it beyond reasonable doubt. But a civil action must stop once a criminal charge is brought for the same act and it cannot start after a conviction or an acquittal. So, the agency must choose which route to take first. What will guide the agency's choice between the civil and criminal route, given it cannot run both at once?

But it is entirely right that Singapore uses the full extent of its levers, legislative or otherwise, to enforce the duty of Singapore-linked companies to keep our air clean.

Yet, having said all of that, this Bill alone will not tackle the totality of the problem.

This Bill reaches companies with a stake in Singapore. But by one count, about half the land that burned in Indonesia from January to August lay outside any permit or concession, on community, state and abandoned land. Many of those fires are on smallholders' land.

The Bill is necessary but it is not sufficient. So, I want to speak about the ground in Borneo, and especially Kalimantan, because the incentives there are formidable.

Anyone who has set foot in rural Borneo has felt the power of its geography – the rugged interior and a jungle that reclaims fallow land in months. Its vast magnificence is unforgiving.

Why do the people resort to burning? Part of it is economics. Small oil palm farmers, without a company contract, often borrow cash or fertiliser from the middleman who buys their fruit, repay him at harvest when he deducts a loan from the fruit they sell him and they are paid 20% to 30% below the benchmark price. The dilemma is simple: "If I can't clear this land now, next year I'm bankrupt."

Machinery and fertiliser cost money they do not have, and roads into the interior are poor. Clearing by machine costs about US$150 a hectare. Fire costs about US$7 a hectare and the ash from burning acts as fertiliser. Leave a plot alone for six months and the jungle reclaims it.

In Kubu Raya, West Kalimantan, in 2016, about 30 farmers blocked a joint team of police, soldiers and firefighters from putting out the land they had burned. They said the ash would feed the soil before planting. Then, they asked two questions: "Why was burning banned? And what would the government offer instead?"

The second question deserves an answer built on incentives and not only on bans.

In Berau, East Kalimantan, this August, a man was named as a suspect for burning about 12 hectares for oil palm. In Ketapang, West Kalimantan, in September, officials found oil palm being planted on land where the smoke had only just cleared. In Kobar, Central Kalimantan, this September, crews were refused access near some buildings and the local disaster agency warned that obstructing firefighters can be prosecuted.

The burnt land was thought to have been cleared for farming. Part of it is tradition. Burning to farm is centuries old in Borneo. Hill rice has long been grown in burnt forest clearings. In the Kelabit Highlands, rice cultivation may go back between 1,200 and 2,800 years.

For rural leaders, ending burning outright has long been politically impossible and the law in both Indonesia and Malaysia makes room for it.

Indonesia's environmental law lets a household burn up to two hectares, planted with local crops and ringed by a fire break. Sarawak, in deference to these cultural and economic realities, has staggered its farmers' burning by schedule since 2003 and revoked permits when the haze came this July.

At our equator, there is no winter so farming seasons can be spread out. Both sides of Borneo share the idea of a small, controlled burn. But the yearly haze is man-made and recent. We need to decouple haze from burning.

Airport visibility records going back to 1960 show Indonesian Borneo turning from fire resistant to fire prone sometime between the droughts of 1972 and 1982.

The farmers did not change, the land did. From 1967, new laws opened Kalimantan's forest to logging companies. Population grew as more subsistence farms gave way to industrial plantations. When the drought of 1982 to 1983 came, about 3.5 million hectares of East Kalimantan burned. Four-fifths of it logged over forest.

Over the decades, canals were dug through Kalimantan's peat to drain it for timber, plantations and farms. West Kalimantan's rules are instructive. On top of the two-hectare allowance, household burning must be on mineral soil, never on peat.

Timing and place are the foundation of a controlled burn. That points at the problem.

In October, the head of Indonesia's disaster agency said about 90% of these active fires in Central Kalimantan were on peat. On peat, a controlled burn is very difficult. Peat is half rotted plant matter, soaked through like a sponge. While it is wet, air cannot get in so it cannot burn. Dig canals to drain it for crops, and the top dries into fuel. Once it catches fire, it smoulders underground like a giant mosquito coil – hard to see, hard to put out and full of thick smoke. In a long El Nino drought, like this year's, more of it dries out.

So, the physical culprits are two: drained peat, which is the fuel, and El Nino, which sets how dry the year gets.

We cannot change the weather. We cannot from Singapore change the tradition of burning or where it happens, but perhaps you can change the economics so that keeping peat wet pays off.

On mineral soil, Indonesia and Malaysia can and should lead on timing controlled burns. Singapore can support them with meteorological forecasting and scientific modelling.

On peat, the control that works is water. Indonesia's own law already draws a line. The water table on peat must stay within 40 centimetres of the surface. The science bears it out. One assessment found peat burnt only where the water table had fallen below 60 centimetres, with fire danger high mostly below 40.

The evidence suggests the crop can live with it. Oil palm has no tap root. On peat, most of its roots sit in the top 30 centimetres. On a plantation in Sarawak, photosynthesis peaked with the water 30 to 40 centimetres down, and on 41 smallholder farms in Jambi, the water level made no detectable difference to yield.

The realistic theory of change for smallholder behaviour is not to go from burning to not burning. It is going from uncontrolled burning on dry peat to controlled clearing on wet peat. Incentives shape behaviour and what a financial centre can help catalyse is a market in a type of carbon credit for Indonesia that pays smallholders to keep peat wet.

This is not new in spirit. Singapore has signed carbon credit implementation agreements with 12 countries, from Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Peru, Bhutan, Thailand, Vietnam and in September, Lao. Last year, the Government chose about 2.2 million tonnes of credits from projects in Peru, Paraguay and Ghana.

In July, we exchanged memoranda on carbon credits with Indonesia, but there is not yet an implementation agreement. And this year Indonesia cleared its forestry projects to sell credits again after a three-year freeze.

A credit pays for emissions avoided, so it must be checked. Buyers would pay the way a trader pays for cargo – on delivery after inspection. If the peat is dry, there is no payment. I believe the world will pay once they can see the water table.

The part Singapore can really help capitalise is the part every buyer needs – the readings. A water logger is a small sensor lowered into a pipe in the peat. It records the water levels at set intervals and sends the readings by mobile or satellite link. So, no one has to walk out to read it.

Singapore can help raise funding for a network of loggers, placed where Indonesia chooses, with readings the world can trust and buy against. Then, the money reaches the people who keep the peat wet on time.

It needs three things. First, accurate concession and land maps. So, the payment goes to whoever is keeping the peat wet. Second, a proper trial, how each centimetre of water table trades crop yield against fire risk. So, the price is right. Third, coverage and upkeep. The loggers run seven to 10 years on batteries. So, any physical network must come with a maintenance fund and local crews paid to keep the stations working.

Nor is the hardware too costly. At about US$2,000 a logger, maybe less now, equipping all 21,000-odd points that Indonesia estimates it needs would cost roughly what three maximum fines under this Bill comes to.

There have been earlier attempts. Norway has paid Indonesia for verified cuts in deforestation emissions and the World Bank pays East Kalimantan for verified emission reductions.

As a financial centre, Singapore can supply the readings and help catalyse such a carbon credit market while Indonesia and its people earn from genuine wet peat credits. It is in our interest to open new channels of investment into Indonesia in support of President Prabowo's aim that growth reach ordinary Indonesians.

For company land, the Bill already gives the Director-General a way to bring the readings in. An assessor must report on any matter the Director-General specifies.

My fourth question: will the Director-General ask assessors to report the water table on the land they assess? A company that says it took all reasonable measures should be able to show that it kept its peat as wet as Indonesia's own law requires.

And my fifth question to the Government: as we negotiate an implementation agreement on carbon credits with Indonesia, will we make wet peat projects with measured water tables a priority category? As a good neighbour, we want Indonesia and the five Kalimantan provinces and their people to come out of this stronger.

Sir, in conclusion, this Bill makes burning expensive for companies with a stake in Singapore. A lasting solution will likely also need controlled clearing on wet peat to be worth more to the farmers who live on it than uncontrolled burning on drained dry peat is. This year's haze has brought a new seriousness. Let us use it to spare the next generation. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Nadia Samdin.

4.30 pm

Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, some days the clearest indication of how bad the haze is comes through in the little things that we notice – an unusually crowded indoor playground versus outdoor parks, the chorus of chesty coughs in a preschool classroom, grandparents staying isolated at home and outdoor workers masked up in the heat as they go about their work.

These are the everyday consequences of transboundary haze that many of us are familiar with, but long before it reaches our shores, damage has already been done.

Last month, our team in Ang Mo Kio distributed some supplies to help residents cope with the haze. Over the years, we have become familiar with how to respond when haze returns, but we should not be resigned to its recurrence.

I welcome the Government's intention to strengthen the THPA. If companies linked to haze causing fires are benefiting from operations or supply chains that contribute to environmental harm, they should not be able to hide behind complex structures, incomplete disclosures or jurisdictional distance.

Sir, the practical difficulties of enforcement under the existing act are already well known. In many cases, satellite and geospatial tools indicate hot spots, burned areas and smoke plumes, but the harder question is establishing who is legally responsible. The relevant land may be held through concession arrangements and a complex network of plantation operators, contractors, intermediaries or suppliers. Corporate ownership is layered across jurisdictions, and documents and witnesses are located overseas.

At the same time, stronger legal powers alone will not solve this problem unless they translate into timely, proportionate and effective enforcement in practice. We must also address the wider challenges of fragmented information, misaligned incentives and the escalating environmental risk.

Even as we expand the scope of responsibility and influence, we should do so in a way that is consistent with Singapore's position as a trusted global business, trading and financial hub. Our strength rests not just on efficiency, but on the standards of corporate conduct, transparency and the reliability that we uphold.

I have three considerations. The first is on regional cooperation. In Malay, please.

(In Malay): Mr Speaker, the transboundary haze that has affected our region has affected the health and disrupted the daily lives of many people. However, our neighbours in Indonesia have borne a far heavier burden.

Not only are their skies shrouded in smoke, but their land is also being destroyed. They face multiple threats. Forests, wildlife and livelihoods, built and sustained over generations, can disappear in an instant.

These fires can be caused by various factors, including increasingly hot and dry weather conditions, as well as land and forest management practices. Therefore, our efforts must encompass not only law enforcement, but also prevention and environmental restoration.

I have two questions.

How can Singapore strengthen cooperation with other ASEAN countries to develop more effective information-sharing and evidence-gathering systems, so that those responsible can be identified and appropriate action taken?

How can regional cooperation be strengthened to address the root causes of forest fires, so that prevention efforts will be more effective?

( In English ): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, investigations require us to connect multiple layers and forms of information – concession maps, land tenure records, corporate beneficial ownership information and supply chain records, among others. The quality, availability and interoperability of these datasets matter greatly.

Better data sharing can strengthen enforcement, but it can also improve fairness. If investigations are based on better evidence, they can be more precisely targeted, which reduces the risk of overreach. Therefore, I welcome the indication of closer Singapore-Indonesia, cooperation, building on the relationships established over the years, including the proposed joint task force.

I would also ask how will this task force complement the THPA's expanded investigative powers, especially in facilitating access to mutually verified evidence? If evidence of misconduct is uncovered, are there plans to manage parallel legal processes? Can Singapore work with regional partners towards more systemic sharing of satellite data, land records and corporate ownership information? This would be helpful, not just at a government level, but to the extent such information can be shared for organisations, such as financial institution, which will increasingly need to carry out regular and reasonable due diligence.

Is there scope through ASEAN to develop more common data standards and protocols for timely cross-border evidence sharing? And how will existing ASEAN haze mechanisms utilised during this episode, including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control? Stronger laws must be supported by stronger systems that are coordinated to avoid duplicative efforts.

Second, on responsible business conduct. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, businesses must take responsibility for material environmental risks across their operations, commercial relationships and supply chains. This is where Singapore's position as a global business hub matters. Haze-linked harm is often not confined to a single concession holder or operating entity.

To that end, I understand why the Bill seeks to widen the scope of scrutiny. This is also broadly consistent with wider developments in responsible business conduct, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, the United Nation Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the European Union Deforestation Regulations; all of which increasingly emphasise due diligence across supply chains and commercial relationships.

Under the proposed law, identified companies may be required to engage specialist assessors from the panel at their own expense as part of a fact-finding exercise. These assessments may involve legal, forensic, financial and operational review across multiple jurisdictions. The costs involved could be substantial even before legal responsibility for environmental harm has been established.

May I ask the Minister to please share more about the assessment process, expected costs and timeline when a direction has been given? In particular, what safeguards will ensure that assessment costs remain proportionate to the risks and circumstances of each actor, and is there a cap on the fees to be incurred at this stage as wrongdoing may eventually not be made out? Will there be mechanisms for companies to seek clarification or review of the scope and cost of an assessment?

I would also be grateful if the Minister could clarify the intended effect or signal of such direction. If I am not mistaken in the Minister's speech, she mentioned that this alone does not indicate that the entity is suspected. But she also mentioned that after the fact-finding report, the entity may also be cleared of wrongdoing, which may lead one to infer otherwise.

Given that many of these investigations are likely to take place overseas, how will the assessors be supported and protected in their duties; for example, entering and inspecting land? How will the findings of these independent assessments translate into timely enforcement action? And beyond the THPA and accompanying guidelines, could the Government elaborate more on what other levers will the Government tap on to ensure companies meaningful participation in the process?

We should be firm with companies that obstruct investigations, but also ensure that companies acting in good faith are not subject to unnecessarily duplicative or burdensome requirements. I would like to ask how will the framework distinguish between companies that are deliberately obstructive and companies that are cooperating in good faith, but face genuine difficulties obtaining information from counterparties not under their control?

Sir, the Bill also significantly expands the framework beyond direct operators. It introduces the designation of persons under section 8(d), powers to make restricted dealing orders under section 8(e) and powers to place other persons on notice under section 8(h). These are significant because it will influence the wider ecosystem in which haze-linked activities are financed, supplied, traded and supported.

At the same time, strong accountability and proportionate regulation must go hand in hand. We should be mindful of unintended consequences. If the response of market participants is simply to exit higher-risk sectors, financing may shift to less transparent sources, rather than better practices. That could weaken the influence of institutions that are prepared to impose meaningful environmental safeguards and engagement conditions. In addition, companies operating on degraded peatland may require substantial investment to restore water tables and improve infrastructure. A purely withdrawal-based response may make such remedial investment harder.

I appreciate that the Government is tapping on more levers to effectively act against the entities which have been designated. I note that the proposed Bill confers certain discretions on the Minister and Director-General. For example, section 8 lists non-exhaustive factors and permits a range of restrictions on commercial dealings without limiting the possible measures to those which are expressly set out.

I recognise that flexibility is necessary and legislation which is too narrowly drafted may allow irresponsible actors to avoid scrutiny. Could the Minister please elaborate on other factors which may be considered prior to designations and the types of restriction orders envisioned beyond those listed in the draft Bill?

I also note that the Bill allows room for representations to be made prior to designation. However, this can be dispensed with if it is not practicable or desirable to do so. Given the serious reputational consequences that may follow, could the Minister share some circumstances in which this will be dispensed with? I would also like to ask how it is contemplated for the scope of these powers to be calibrated in practice?

How will they remain targeted at genuine risk exposure and material involvement, especially where entities may have indirect links rather than direct operational control. Schemes such as the round table on sustainable palm oil provide assessments against sustainability standards involving periodic reassessment and annual surveillance audit, which can be valuable for due diligence purposes.

While it cannot replace a company's own responsibility to identify and address environmental harms, and may not be conclusive, in the light of this Bill, how should credible third party certifications be recognised and relied on by those who have commercial and financial relationships with entities within the supply chain? It will be helpful for the Government to provide clear guidance on what reasonable due diligence constitute and what businesses are expected to verify. There is also a question of proportionality.

Finally, what timelines for compliance are envisioned for any restricted dealing orders, given that the practical steps required may vary significantly, depending on the type of restriction imposed. For example, what is expected where a financial institution is one lender in a regional syndicate and cannot unilaterally suspend or amend the facility. Clarity on these new powers in practice would be very welcome for businesses.

Sir, environmental responsibility must extend in practical terms to the management of material risks across supply chains. This is where haze should also be understood, not merely as an environmental incident, but perhaps as an acute climate-related risks. Transparency requirements under this Bill are not only enforcement tools. They reinforce a broader expectation that businesses should identify and where material, disclose climate-related and nature-related risks.

This aligns with Singapore's broader direction on sustainability reporting, including the proposed Singapore Sustainability Disclosure Standards and in particular, the Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (Climate-related Disclosures). May I also ask the Minister whether the Government envisions the enhanced transparency and accountability requirements under this Bill, complementing Singapore's broader sustainability disclosure framework.

Ultimately, the purpose of stronger accountability should be to reduce environmental harm. Burning carbon rich peatlands do not only create haze. It also releases significant greenhouse gases, affects precious biodiversity and damages ecosystems. As such, prevention efforts can deliver multiple benefits. This is why prevention and enforcement must go hand in hand.

I hope that findings from investigations, in time, will be used not just to determine liability, but to be made available to strengthen upstream prevention strategies.

I would also like to ask whether Singapore can do more, together with regional partners, financial institutions and philanthropic actors to support preventive interventions, such as peatland restoration, sustainable land management and technical assistance for small producers. The availability of such capital is not only relevant for prevention but also, for example, in section 11(b), which now allows the Director-General to give direction to take remedial action, requiring time, capacity and funds.

Finally, one brief clarification relating to the evidentiary presumptions based on satellite information and the conclusive certificate of the Director-General set out in section 22(a). I welcome the preventative shift of this Bill, but this also places considerable weight on how we assess and establish environmental risk. Could the Minister please elaborate on the basis as well as the scientific and procedural safeguards that will underpin the issuance of such certificates?

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, if these amendments are to succeed, they must deliver more than stronger powers on paper. I hope they will bring us closer to a future where clean air is not something we have to worry about, and where forests, ecosystems and communities of our region can thrive. More and more, environmental accountability and responsible business conduct should become part of Singapore's competitive strength as a regional and trusted hub. I look forward to the Minister's clarifications and support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Dennis Tan.

4.47 pm

Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the objective of this Bill. Mr Speaker, I support the objectives of this Bill.

Singapore cannot simply accept transboundary haze as a regular inconvenience. Haze has real consequences for public health, outdoor workers, schools, businesses and our quality of life. The recent haze episode and public concern have also reminded us that, despite years of regional cooperation and improvements, the underlying risks have not disappeared.

The Government is therefore justified in reviewing whether the existing framework remains sufficient. The economic and public health costs of haze are substantial and Singaporeans rightly expect that those responsible should be held accountable.

I note that the Bill seeks to strengthen the regime in three major ways. First, it seeks to strengthen Singapore's ability to obtain evidence and information. Second, it extends responsibility beyond direct landowners to related entities, financiers and supply chain participants. Third, it introduces new regulatory tools, including assessors, designated persons, persons on notice, civil penalties and remedial directions.

I broadly support these objectives, but I have a few questions.

First, the current Act has been in force for more than a decade. Yet, despite investigations dating back to 2015, no publicly reported prosecution, conviction or successful civil claim appears to have resulted under the Act.

The Government previously stated that investigations into four of the six companies identified following the 2015 haze episode remained open. This suggests that while the Act may have had some deterrent effect, significant enforcement challenges remain.

Can the Minister elaborate on the principal obstacles to successful enforcement thus far? Do they relate mainly to obtaining admissible evidence overseas or identifying beneficial owners and controlling parties, tracing corporate relationships, securing cooperation from foreign authorities, or enforcing against entities without a meaningful presence in Singapore? More importantly, how will today's amendments materially address those obstacles?

Second, some of the new powers appear to be triggered by a "risk of haze pollution in Singapore", rather than actual haze pollution. The Bill also provides that a certificate by the Director-General that such a risk exists is conclusive evidence. Can the Minister clarify what level of risk is intended under the Act? What objective criteria will be applied before the Government exercises these powers? Why does the Bill adopt a conclusive certificate instead of a rebuttable presumption?

I have a further question on how these new powers will operate in the context of Singapore's cooperation with Indonesia.

In recent weeks, both Singapore and Indonesia have reaffirmed our commitment to tackling transboundary haze through cooperation, preventive measures, information sharing and enforcement. Public statements from ministers on both sides have also emphasised the importance of working together to address fire risks before they develop into major haze incidents. Against this backdrop, can the Minister explain how the measures in this Bill are intended to complement these ongoing bilateral efforts?

Recent announcements by the Foreign Ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have referred to enhanced bilateral cooperation, including stronger collaboration in investigating entities linked to haze-causing activities. Can the Minister clarify how the powers under this Bill will interact with these new arrangements and whether the Government expects the Bill to facilitate or support them?

For example, where Singapore seeks to identify related entities, business arrangements or persons contributing to a risk of haze pollution, what forms of cooperation and assistance does Singapore hope to receive from the Indonesian authorities? Will there be enhanced arrangements for the sharing of concession maps, ownership information, corporate records, fire investigation findings and other evidence that may assist enforcement under this Act?

While this Bill strengthens enforcement, prevention remains equally important. Some fires may arise from land-clearing practices that are difficult to address through enforcement alone, as my hon friend, Aljunied Group Representation Constituency Member, Kenneth Tiong, has spoken on in much detail a moment ago. Can the Minister update the House on whether Singapore is working with Indonesia on practical fire prevention measures, including technology, monitoring systems, training programmes and alternatives to open burning? Are there opportunities for Singapore to support efforts that help reduce the incidence of land and peat fires at source?

Finally, where Indonesian authorities have already taken enforcement action against particular entities, how will this interact with Singapore's own enforcement framework? Will there be information sharing, mutual assistance or coordination mechanisms to avoid gaps, inconsistencies or duplication?

Third, the Government has explained that one purpose of the amendments is to address difficulties in obtaining evidence and information. The Bill introduces a new assessor framework under which companies may be required to appoint assessors from a Government-approved panel. Can the Minister explain how the Government determined who should be placed on this panel and what criteria were used in its selection?

Given that assessors may ultimately gather evidence, make findings and submit reports that could be relied upon in enforcement proceedings, what safeguards are in place to ensure their independence and impartiality?

If a company disagrees with an assessor's conclusions, will it have an opportunity to respond before those findings are relied upon by the authorities? And where evidence is located overseas, how does the Government envisage assessors overcoming restrictions arising from local laws or the absence of cooperation from foreign authorities?

I also have a question on section 23C. And I declare my interest as a consultant in a Singapore law firm.

Section 23C provides that duties of confidentiality or privacy or rule of professional conduct will not excuse a failure to comply with notices or requirements under the Act. Can the Minister clarify whether this provision is intended to affect legal professional privilege in any way?

In particular, would a lawyer served with a notice still be entitled to assert legal professional privilege on behalf of a client, or would a client remain entitled to withhold privileged legal advice or communications? If privilege is intended to be affected, what is the justification for doing so? Why is it necessary to depart from the usual protection afforded by legal professional privilege and what safeguards will apply to ensure that any intrusion into privileged communications is no broader than necessary?

Fourth, the Bill significantly expands its reach into supply chains and business relationships. A company may potentially face consequences not because it directly started a fire but because it is connected through procurement, financing or other business arrangements.

Can the Minister elaborate on how far down the supply chain the Government intends these provisions to extend? For example, what due diligence measures would be expected of a Singapore importer, trader, financier or manufacturer seeking to demonstrate that it has acted responsibly? Will there be published guidance so that legitimate businesses know what standards are expected of them?

Before I leave the topic of supply chains, I would also like to ask about stakeholder engagement on these proposals.

The Bill introduces significant new obligations and potential liabilities for companies potentially involved in agriculture, agri-trade, commodity trading, financing, procurement and other commercial activities connected to affected supply chains. Can the Minister update the House on the consultations that were conducted in developing these amendments? In particular, were any concerns or implementation challenges raised by industry stakeholders regarding the scope of the supply chain provisions, business arrangement restrictions, due diligence requirements or compliance costs? If so, how has the Government addressed those concerns?

Finally, I would like to ask about the new designation regime under Part 2B. A designation may carry significant consequences for an entity's business relationships, financing arrangements and reputation. Can the Minister clarify what principles will guide the exercise of these powers in practice? In particular, where an entity is connected through ownership structures, financing arrangements or commercial relationships, how will the Government determine whether designation is warranted? What safeguards are in place to ensure that the regime remains proportionate and focused on those genuinely responsible for haze-causing conduct? Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill to strengthen Singapore's ability to deal with transboundary haze. Haze is not just an environmental issue; it also affects public health, outdoor workers, the operation of schools and economic activity. I therefore support the Government's review of the existing framework to address new challenges. However, I have a few concerns.

First, the Act has been in force for more than ten years, but there appear to have been no successful prosecutions or fines to date. May I ask the Minister what have been the biggest obstacles to enforcement in the past? How will this amendment address these problems?

Second, the Bill extends the scope of enforcement to situations where there is a "haze risk". May I ask the Minister what level of risk would be sufficient to trigger these powers? Will there be clear and objective criteria?

Third, the Bill also extends to supply chains, financing institutions and business partners. May I ask the Minister what level of due diligence companies must undertake to be regarded as having discharged their responsibility? Will the Government provide clear guidance?

Fourth, in recent weeks, both Singapore and Indonesia have stressed that they will strengthen cooperation to tackle the haze problem together. I would like to ask how the new measures in the Bill will work with these bilateral cooperation mechanisms.

For example, will Singapore receive more support from Indonesia, including company information, land concession information and fire investigation findings? If Indonesia has already taken action against the companies concerned, how will Singapore coordinate enforcement efforts?

I would like the Minister to explain further what specific cooperation and support Singapore expects to receive, so that this Bill can be implemented effectively.

( In English ): In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the objectives of this Bill and the Government's efforts to strengthen Singapore's response to transboundary haze. Those responsible for conduct that threatens public health and the environment should be held accountable.

At the same time, as Parliament grants broader powers affecting businesses, financiers, supply chains and individuals, it is important that the thresholds, safeguards and avenues for review are clear, transparent and proportionate.

Ultimately, the success of this framework will depend not only on the powers we enact today but also on how effectively they are implemented and how closely Singapore can work with our regional partners in preventing and addressing haze incidents. I look forward to the Minister's clarifications on these issues. Notwithstanding my questions and clarifications, I support this Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

4.59 pm

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill. I declare my interest as a partner at a law firm that advises on environmental law.

The THPA came into force in 2014. Although there were no prosecutions under the Act, it sent a strong message that companies would be held responsible for conduct that contributes to the haze and that the Singapore Government condemns such action.

Since that time, the haze situation improved for many years. Much credit for the improvement in the haze situation should go to Indonesia, which ratified the ASEAN Haze Treaty and passed domestic legislation that prohibited use of slash-and-burn fire methods for land clearing.

Unfortunately, the situation has deteriorated once again and Singapore, like other countries in the region, has faced some of the worst haze in many years. Once again, cooperation with our neighbours will be key to dealing with this. But in the meantime, I think it is timely for Singapore to do everything in its power as well to deal with the situation.

The current Bill, in my view, gives the Government significant levers to impose economic penalties on companies whose actions may contribute to the haze. These levers are wide-ranging, limiting other companies having commercial dealings with such companies and financial institutions from providing financing. The penalties include the disgorgement of profits or payment of any losses avoided in addition to heavy fines and penalties.

Additionally, the Bill also creates a clear mechanism for assessors to be appointed and paid for, and for these assessors to have access to information to be able to do the fact finding work needed. I am also glad that the Singapore-based companies with land concessions in the relevant areas have stated they will cooperate with these measures in their meetings with the relevant authorities. Indeed, if they are taking measures within their power to prevent fires on their land and concessions, these assessments will vindicate them.

I have a few clarifications on some of the measures.

First, on the provisions dealing with service of process. I note that this has been simplified, because under clause 15 of the Act, it states now that email service will be adequate service for notices under this Act.

For lawyers, many know that service of process is a procedure as well. Of course, if one is able to do so by email, that will simplify matters significantly rather than having to serve notices personally. I will be grateful if the Minister may also clarify if this is intended to apply to service out of jurisdiction, because typically, different considerations apply when service takes place out of jurisdiction. But this legislation seems open enough to that interpretation. I would be interested to know if it is the intention for this provision to apply to service of documents on companies or individuals outside of Singapore and if those companies will be taken to be bound by all obligations that flow from such service within Singapore.

I would also be grateful for the Minister's clarification that these methods of service under clause 15 of the amended Act will apply to those seeking civil remedies under clause 6(3) of the Act, which effectively means that an aggrieved individual in Singapore may commence proceedings against a foreign entity by service of process by email on that entity. If so, this will also greatly simplify the process for seeking relief for aggrieved individuals and increase the potential risk of liability for entities that breach any obligations under this Act.

Second, I note that under the new clause 22A to the Act, a certificate by the Director-General that there is a risk of haze pollution in Singapore is taken to be conclusive of that fact with no room for challenge. This is potentially a very powerful provision because this means even if in the absence of actual haze, as long as there is a risk of haze, liabilities under this Act may follow, and a certificate by the Director-General will be conclusive of this matter.

This definitely has the benefit of reducing litigation on the issue. But as a matter of procedure, it is usually good for an accused party to have a right to defend itself. So, what options would be available if a company or individual disagrees with this assessment and wishes to present its case? Would the Director-General, for example, be expected to hear the accused parties before making a determination?

Third, under the amended clause 23C, it is stated that confidentiality is no bar to an obligation to share information under this Act. I understand that private contractual confidentiality obligations should not normally trump an authority's right to obtain relevant information. But this clause also goes further and says it does not protect confidentiality arising from rules of professional conduct.

I would like to clarify if legal advice and litigation privilege are intended to be overridden by this clause. These principles are typically sacrosanct to the administration of justice. They allow accused persons and companies to get legal advice, knowing that information shared with their advisors and advice received will be confidential. I think it will be important for legal advice and litigation privilege to continue to apply as the consequences under this Act are very serious and any party accused of wrongdoing or defending an action ought to be afforded the same right to legal advice and protection of that advice as everyone else.

Notwithstanding these clarifications, I support the Act.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Lee Hong Chuang.

5.05 pm

Mr Lee Hong Chuang (Jurong East-Bukit Batok): Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. Twelve years ago, this House passed the THPA. It was a groundbreaking law. For the first time, Singapore took action against activities taking place outside our borders because their consequences were felt by our people here. But the Minister at the time also made an important point – the law was a strong signal, not a silver bullet.

Twelve years later, the fires are still burning and the haze keeps returning. Why? Because the current Act has three major gaps.

First, it acts only after the haze has reached Singapore. By then, the damage has been done.

Second, it is difficult to prove who owns the foreign land where the fires take place. Much of the evidence is controlled by the companies themselves.

Third, it is difficult to reach companies that have no office in Singapore.

Just last month, NEA served notices on the largest group of Singapore-registered companies ever – 10 companies in the palm oil and forestry sectors. Yet under the current Act, the maximum fine for ignoring a notice is only $5,000. For companies of this size, that is hardly a deterrent. The Bill raises that to $50,000 and the overall cap on fines tenfold, from $2 million to $20 million.

This Bill addresses these three gaps.

First, we move from reacting to the haze to acting on the fires and the risk of haze before it reaches Singapore.

Second, we strengthen enforcement. Penalties will be increased substantially. There will also be a civil penalty route, with a lower standard of proof, and notices can be served on entities outside Singapore.

Third and most importantly, we follow the money and the trade. The Bill allows the Government to designate certain entities and restrict dealings with them, including financing. It also places responsibilities on companies in prescribed industries not to do business with those involved in burning. The fires may be overseas, but the ownership, financing and trade often have links to Singapore. That is where our laws can make a real difference.

I support these stronger powers. But stronger laws must also be implemented fairly. We must not place unnecessary burdens on Singapore businesses that have done nothing wrong. I therefore have three questions for the Minister.

First, which industries will be prescribed under the new person-on-notice regime and what level of due diligence will a person on notice be expected to carry out?

A Singapore trader or food manufacturer may be several steps removed from a plantation involved in burning. They need clear guidance on what reasonable checks they must make.

The Bill already allows restriction orders to specify exceptions and safe harbours and protects those who act in good faith with reasonable care. Will the Minister commit to using those provisions and to publishing the due diligence standard that businesses will be held to?

Second, when a company is directed to appoint an assessor, it must bear the cost. How will the Government ensure that assessors are appointed fairly and that their fees are reasonable?

The Bill provides for regulations to set up a dispute resolution process between an entity and the panel of assessors. Will fee disputes be expressly within its scope? Compliance costs should not become a punishment before any wrongdoing is established.

Third, these restrictions will affect banks and insurers. Under the Bill, orders restricting financial services are made by the Minister responsible for MAS. How will the Government ensure that financial institutions do not simply stop serving the entire agricultural commodities sector because that is the easiest way to manage their risks? We must avoid punishing responsible businesses alongside offenders.

Mr Deputy Speaker, 12 years ago, Singapore sent a strong signal. This Bill gives that signal real teeth. I support the Bill. But I urge the Minister to ensure that those teeth bite the right people – the companies responsible for the fires and not the innocent businesses or ordinary Singaporeans. Mr Deputy Speaker, I will continue my speech in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Mr Deputy Speaker, I will speak in Mandarin about what this Bill means for residents of Hong Kah North.

Last month, the haze returned. Residents know this very well: masks come out again, the elderly stay home as much as possible, and outdoor activities are avoided wherever possible. But some people have no choice. Construction workers, delivery riders, wet market stallholders and cleaners still have to work outdoors, and still have to breathe in this haze.

For them, the haze is more than a piece of news. It affects their health, income and the livelihood of their families. This is not the first time. From 1997, 2013, 2015 and 2019 to this year, over nearly three decades, the haze has returned again and again.

In June 2013, the PSI at one point exceeded 400. The following year, Parliament passed the THPA. At the time, residents had high hopes for the Act. They hoped that with the law in place, the haze would lessen and companies that burn land would think twice.

Twelve years on, residents ask me: the law has been passed, so why does the haze keep coming back? I must tell residents honestly that the problem is not that the Government is unwilling to act, but that the current Act has three gaps.

First, the Act can act only after the haze has drifted to Singapore. But by the time the haze reaches us, the fires may have been burning for days. Second, it is not easy to prove who the real owner of foreign land is, because key information is often held by the companies themselves. Third, many of the companies involved have no office in Singapore, so both enforcement and the serving of legal notices are difficult.

Last month, NEA served legal notices for the first time on ten Singapore-registered palm oil and forestry companies. However, under the current Act, the maximum fine for failing to comply with a notice is only $5,000. For companies of this size, such a fine is simply not enough of a deterrent. This Bill will raise it to $50,000, and the cap on total fines will also be raised from $2 million to $20 million.

Today's amendment Bill aims to close these three gaps. Simply put, the Government will in future not only follow the smoke, but also follow the fires, follow the money and follow the goods.

First, the Government need not wait for the haze to drift to Singapore; it can act when fires are likely to affect us. Second, the Government can step up enforcement against the companies involved, raise penalties, and serve notices on relevant entities outside Singapore. Third, and most importantly, we trace the money and the commercial transactions.

If the companies involved finance, trade or hold assets through Singapore, the Government can designate these companies and restrict dealings with them, including financing and insurance. Companies notified by the Minister in the relevant industry also have a responsibility to avoid doing business with those involved in burning. The source of the haze may be overseas, but many of the owners, the funding and the buyers behind it have links to Singapore.

This is where Singapore's laws can make a difference.

I support this Bill. However, on behalf of Hong Kah North residents, I would also like to make three requests.

First, the Government must be open and transparent. The Bill empowers the Government to designate and publicise the relevant companies. Clause 14B of the Bill empowers the Government to publicize the list of designated and notified companies. I hope the Government will make good use of this power, so that the public knows which companies are involved in causing the haze, what action the Government has taken, and what results have been achieved.

Accountability cannot remain only in the provisions of the law. Residents must be able to see the Government's actions before they can have confidence in the law.

Second, the Government must explain clearly. This Act involves complex matters such as designated persons, assessors and civil penalties. For ordinary residents and SMEs, these are rather unfamiliar concepts. I hope NEA can explain clearly the content and impact of the Act in languages that everyone understands, including English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil. Only when residents understand can we win their support.

Third, the work of protecting residents must not stop. Enforcing the law takes time, and so do investigations and holding parties accountable. But when the haze arrives, what residents need is timely protection. I hope the Government will continue to ensure an adequate supply of masks, release air quality information in a timely manner, and give special care to the elderly, young children, pregnant women and outdoor workers.

In Hong Kah North, our grassroots organisations will also play their full part to ensure that those who need help the most, especially elderly residents living alone and low-income families, receive appropriate support.

Mr Deputy Speaker, it is worth mentioning that our neighbouring countries have recently been studying Singapore's transboundary haze legislation and considering enacting their own related laws. This shows that the haze is a regional problem that no single country can solve alone. But if Singapore can get the law right, enforce it strictly and also be fair, other countries will have the opportunity to learn from our approach and strengthen regional cooperation together.

Finally, I would like to emphasise: clean air is not a luxury, but the most basic guarantee of people's well-being.

Twelve years ago, we sent a signal. Today, this Bill will give that signal real force.

I support this Bill, and I will go back and tell the residents of Hong Kah North: this time, the Government is not just waiting for the haze to arrive before acting, but will follow the fires, follow the money and follow the goods.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Andre Low.

5.18 pm

Mr Low Wu Yang Andre (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, I believe many parents of young children shared my family's relief when the haze finally dissipated over the last weeks. Finally, my daughter could once again run free outdoors.

The haze forces similar decisions on many of us. Parents have to decide whether their children can play outdoors. Older people weigh the risk of going out, and a worker whose job keeps him outside has much fewer options than someone who can close the windows and work from home.

I support the Bill's broad objective of strengthening corporate accountability for transboundary haze. Singapore's wider economic and environmental choices can also contribute to prevention, alongside the powers that we are considering today.

As Singapore invests in meeting its broader climate commitments, we should actively seek credible opportunities to reduce the risk of haze causing fires in our region. When choosing suitable forest and peatland carbon projects to buy credits from, I would suggest that we should, consider the potential to reduce haze causing fires that will directly affect Singaporeans.

I am sure many Members are familiar with the mechanism now, but when forests and peatlands burn, they release carbon and produce smoke that can travel far beyond our boundaries. For projects conserving these landscapes, preventing fires protects the carbon benefits that they claim, it can also help address a source of haze, affecting nearby communities and the people downwind. Peatlands show how these interests are connected. They naturally hold water, but drainage can leave the peat dry enough to burn underground. Maintaining water levels is therefore a practical part of protecting the stored carbon and reducing fire risk.

That protection requires constant continuing work. Water management measures require maintenance, and petrol and fire response teams need staff, equipment and training. These costs continue between haze seasons.

Therefore, a project, conserving these landscapes can earn income from carbon credits if it meets the relevant standards. That income can help cover these recurring costs and sustain the protection on which its carbon claims depend.

At the Katingan Peatland project in Central Kalimantan, an external verifier reviewed the financial analysis and identified carbon credit sales as a major source of project funding. The verifier also observed fire prevention and firefighting measures, including monitoring, training and community awareness.

The question for Singapore is how our carbon credit purchases can support the continuing protection of these forests and peatlands.

Singapore is already a buyer in the carbon credit market. In September 2025, the Government announced contracts worth around $76 million for nature-based carbon credits from projects in Ghana, Paraguay and Peru. I asked the Minister to take account of a project's credible potential to reduce haze causing fires when selecting suitable regional carbon projects for purchase. These projects must meet our carbon integrity requirements with price and project risk also taken into account.

It also matters how we buy these credits. Buying an already issued credit from an intermediary does not provide new money to the project. An agreement to buy credits from a project over several years can give its operator a clearer basis for planning the staff and maintenance it needs to protect the carbon.

Therefore, will the Government consider longer-term purchase agreements for suitable regional projects where greater certainty of income can sustain fire prevention efforts? This allows us to simultaneously tackle the complementary goals of environmental protection and haze prevention.

It should also examine how protection costs will be met between carbon credit payments alongside value for money and safeguards if the project fails to deliver. The people carrying out that work need a lasting economic stake in maintaining protection. Where project relies on local patrols or water management, its budget and agreements with communities should make clear how that work will be paid for.

These commitments also need to be checked over time. Existing carbon standards already provide for fire risk assessment and management plans. For relevant projects, it would be reasonable for the Government to assess whether prevention is adequately resourced and verify that measures are implemented and maintained – because the carbon benefits depend on that continuing protection.

Drainage on neighbouring land can also affect a project's water conditions. While operators should be held accountable for measures within their control, our assessment of a carbon project also needs to consider these wider risks and whether the necessary cooperation from neighbouring landholders has also been secured. My colleague, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, will discuss the wider question of prevention beyond concession boundaries further.

Singapore's developing carbon credit cooperation with Indonesia is also an opportunity to examine how these arrangements could work in practice. Our two countries signed an MOU in July of this year, with the aim of working towards an Article 6 implementation agreement under the Paris Agreement framework. I ask whether both countries can explore suitable forest and peatland projects with credible carbon benefits and the added potential to contribute to haze prevention.

Indonesian communities on the ground also suffer from the fires and smoke, and they should have a voice in project design and a clear understanding of the responsibilities and benefits being agreed. Their participation will be essential to making haze prevention last.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I now turn to a different point. Transparency also helps build public confidence in the Government's engagement with entities under suspicion. I commend the Government's resolve in meeting senior members of 10 companies, potentially linked to haze causing fires on 28 October. Since then, several social media posts have appeared, highlighting that several of the companies had former high ranking public officials serving as employees or directors.

Speaking to reporters after that meeting, Senior Minister K Shammugam said that the exercise was about establishing the facts and not finding scapegoats. I appreciate that fair-minded assurance. However, there will likely be many more engagements between the Government and well-resourced companies in the coming period with a great deal at stake. We would therefore do well to use this opportunity to reinforce our reputation for transparency and integrity.

OECD's Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence provides a useful reference. It calls for the public disclosure of information about who seeks to influence government decisions, on whose behalf which public authorities approach and what policy matters are involved. The Workers' Party has made the case for lobbying transparency in this House before. It was part of our party's 2025 manifesto as well. I would therefore ask whether Government has considered strengthening transparency requirements concerning lobbying activities, particularly on issues of significant public interest, such as the haze.

Mr Deputy Speaker, to conclude, the work of protecting these landscapes needs to continue between haze seasons. Singapore's future carbon purchases should take into account how a project will sustain that work and the credible contribution it can make to preventing haze causing fires. Our rider response to the haze should also uphold transparency and integrity in the Government's engagement with companies. These efforts should also serve the people living beside this forest and the families here who want their children to breathe clean air.

Notwithstanding my questions and clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Lee Hui Ying.

5.26 pm

Ms Lee Hui Ying (Nee Soon): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill, especially as PM2.5 hits its highest levels since 2015. The haze may have lifted for now, but our work to prevent its return and ensure those responsible are held to account must not fade with it. This is because transboundary haze affects Singaporeans' health and daily lives.

In September this year, we saw Singapore's air quality enter the unhealthy range and continue to rise. This prompted mask distribution, subsidised treatment and restrictions on outdoor activities. In Nee Soon South, we carried out mask distribution activities to complement national efforts. I also had the chance to speak to many residents about their concerns on how the haze affected their families and businesses.

The proposed amendments in this Bill therefore represent a significant strengthening of laws around pollution and the need for companies to do the right thing.

I welcome the move towards preventative enforcement, where actions can be taken against entities responsible for overseas fires that pose a risk of haze, even before the haze occurs. I also welcome the stronger penalties, enhanced investigative powers and measures to hold companies accountable for their involvement in environmentally harmful practices.

This is a milestone. It represents how strongly we care for the environment and public health, even against the backdrop of economic growth. On these points, I have four clarifications: first, timeliness of whole-of-Government response; second, legal certainty and fairness; third, supply chain matters; and fourth, environmental protection.

First, while the proposed amendments significantly strengthen Singapore's powers to address transboundary haze pollution, the effectiveness of these powers will depend on timely enforcement and public communication efforts. The haze episodes this year have dampened morale and raised questions about delays between the onset of unhealthy air quality and visible government action. While the authorities monitored the situation during this period, many residents remained uncertain and confused whether meaningful action would be taken as haze levels continued to rise into dangerous ranges.

Therefore, the proposed amendments to strengthen investigators' access to information, corporate records and business premises are therefore welcome. But stronger powers must lead to a clear result: investigations concluded, responsibility established and those responsible held to account.

Could the Minister share what work has been undertaken since the Act was passed in 2014 to review its effectiveness and address the practical challenges of investigating transboundary haze? It would be helpful to understand what the lessons learned from cases investigated under the Act, what options were considered over the years and how the proposed amendments will build on that work to support more effective enforcement.

Can the Minister clarify how the Ministry will ensure these enhanced powers translate into timely action, rather than prolonged investigation? More specifically, what operational thresholds will trigger investigations and preventative measures? And will the Ministry establish clear timelines or protocols to communicate policy changes when haze risks increase to minimise ground confusion and frustration?

Second, clauses 3F and 4 of the Bill expand the liability to situations where an overseas forest fire gives rise to a risk of haze pollution in Singapore. This is a big step for Singapore as we step from mitigative to preventative measures against polluters. However, for the new section 2 to be legally certain and enforceable, the concept of risk must be sufficiently defined, particularly where criminal liability and substantial financial penalties are involved.

While clause 9 establishes a rebuttable presumption of haze risk based on satellite and meteorological evidence, the new section 22A provides that a certificate issued by the Director-General constitutes conclusive evidence of such risk. Could the Minister clarify what scientific standards and safeguards will govern the issuance of these certificates?

Third, I would like to address the expanded responsibilities placed on companies and their supply chains. I welcome the recognition that companies are liable for environmentally harmful practices beyond their directly operated plantations. Commercial incentives, purchasing arrangements and investments can also influence how land is managed.

Singapore's strength as a global trading hub rests on both resilience and trust. Our businesses depend on reliable regional supply chains, and haze can disrupt workers, transport and commercial operations. Enforcement must therefore be firm, but also targeted and evidence-based, focused on those responsible, with clear procedures for those who are affected, that helps protect public health without imposing unnecessary disruption on legitimate businesses.

We should uphold accountability in a way that keeps business operations moving and confidence intact.

However, supply chains may be very complex. A company may have limited visibility or ability to surveil every upstream supplier. There is also a risk that companies may respond to the Bill by terminating relationships with smaller suppliers rather than helping them improve their environmental practices.

Clause 6 helpfully provides a list of illustrations for when companies would commit an offence under section 5(1). However, more clarity may help companies make better and effective decisions, following the Bill's enforcement. I therefore like to ask:

How will the Ministry assess the degree of responsibility of companies operating at different levels of a complex supply chain, particularly when companies have limited visibility over upstream suppliers or limited ability to influence their environmental practices?

Whether there would be standards imposed on supply chain monitoring and preventative measures to help companies more effectively with legislation.

And beyond the 14-day period for representations, will companies have opportunities to demonstrate corrective action and improved environmental practices before restrictions on their business arrangements are imposed?

Finally, I am glad that the Bill focuses greatly on preventing pollution, but I would like to also ask if it places emphasis on environmental restoration.

The new provisions are punitive and a strong deterrent to companies against intentionally engaging in polluting behaviours, but they do not solve the problem at the root. For example, when peatlands are drained and dried for agricultural purposes, they facilitate the spread of fire. Even though one third of wildfires are from peatlands, they have the worst smoke quality, contributing greatly to haze.

If we want our solutions to prevail long term, enforcement must and should be accompanied by measures that encourage sustainable land and water management, fire prevention and ecosystem restoration.

Clause 14 gives the Director-General powers to require remedial action. On this front, I would like to ask could remedial directions include measures such as fire prevention plants, improved land management and peatland restoration, where appropriate? How will the Director-General assess whether companies have undertaken effective remedial measures and/or sustainable sourcing?

Could the Minister also consider publishing indicators on the environmental outcomes achieved through this Bill down the line so that we can and may be able to better visualise its positive environmental impact? Sir, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Mr Deputy Speaker, over the past few weeks, Singapore has once again been shrouded in haze. Residents in Nee Soon South told me that for a while, it felt as if a rerun of the drama "The Awakening" was playing every day and now it has finally finished airing.

Although the haze has now cleared, responsibility must not disappear with the smoke. We cannot simply turn the page.

Transboundary haze has long affected Singapore's environment and public health. From September, this round of haze episode has also triggered measures such as mask distributions, subsidised medical treatment and restriction on outdoor activities. In Nee Soon South, we also complemented the national response by distributing more masks to residents. I spoke with many residents to understand their concerns about how the haze might affect their families' health and their business operations.

This Bill will better protect all of us. The proposed amendments strengthen the legal framework against polluting acts. That also means that companies must work harder to fulfil their social responsibilities. However, significantly strengthening Singapore's powers to address transboundary haze pollution is one thing. Whether these powers can be exercised effectively still depends on whether enforcement is timely and public communication is adequate.

This year's haze has dampened public morale and has raised questions about the time lag between air quality deteriorating to unhealthy levels and the Government taking clear action. Although the authorities monitored the situation during this period, as the haze continued to climb to dangerous levels, it was only natural for many residents to feel confused and anxious, not knowing whether the Government would take substantive action.

The proposed amendments are therefore welcome as they give investigators greater powers to access information and corporate records and to enter business premises. But stronger powers must lead to clear results, investigations concluded, responsibility established and those in breach held to account.

Could the Minister clarify how the Ministry will ensure that these enhanced powers translate into timely action rather than prolonged investigations? More specifically, what are the specific operational thresholds that would trigger investigations and preventive measures? When haze risk increases, will the Government establish clear timelines or mechanisms to strengthen communication and explain policy changes so as to reduce unease among residents and the community?

( In English ): Sir, this Bill is an important step in strengthening Singapore's ability to address transboundary haze pollution. I support the preventative approaches, stronger corporate accountability provisions and enhanced enforcement powers. These large steps will foster great comfort and confidence in the Ministry's and agencies' good work.

However, we cannot let this hard work go to waste. We must ensure the contents of this Bill are well enforced after this. Moreover, our objective must be to reduce fires, prevent haze pollution and improve environmental practices and conditions rather than simply imposing larger financial penalties.

Notwithstanding these clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

5.39 pm

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Sir, I have not physically visited the hotspots in Indonesia that have given rise to the transboundary haze that we have experienced. But here is my understanding of what is occurring on the ground.

The haze is the result of selective burning of Indonesian forests and peatlands which are cleared for subsistence and cash crop agriculture. In recent months, the problem has been exacerbated by strong El Niño conditions, as was the case in 2015. The burning is initiated by, among others, commercial plantation owners and smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers have a right under Indonesian law to clear up to two hectares of land by burning. In contrast, larger commercial operators are legally prohibited from clearing through burning and tend to clear land mechanically.

However, this prohibition is inconsistently enforced, and since operators frequently purchased the output of small farmers, they may still indirectly contribute to burning practices.

Independent studies reveal that the majority of hotspots have historically occurred in non-concession land, although overlapping land claims make attribution difficult.

Moreover, when fires start, they easily spread from non-concession land to concession ones, because these lands are often embedded within the larger holdings. And once started, fires tend to continue burning due to the presence of carbon-rich peat in the soil, which does not respect overground property rights and delineations.

If we accept this diagnosis, then any enduring solution to the problem of transboundary haze cannot simply target a single group, but requires aligning the incentive of all parties involved.

Economics provides two broad sets of solutions to environmental problems that impose uncompensated costs on others – what we call externalities.

One is negative. To help perpetrators internalise these costs, a government can impose sanctions, typically in the form of what is known as a Pigouvian tax, although this may include fines and other punishments.

The other is positive. When property rights are clearly assigned, parties tend to treat fire risks on neighbouring plots similarly to those occurring on their own, consistent with what is known as the Coase theorem.

Both of these approaches can and do apply to the case of forest fires in Indonesia as well as arguably abroad.

Much of the debate of this House has, along with the focus of this Bill, been on negative incentives. I will instead focus my speech on positive ones.

Without a long and boring digression into economic theory, let me explain the principle behind the Coase theorem, which helped its author win the Nobel Prize in economics in 1991, in terms of a situation many Singaporeans would be familiar with – airlines seats.

Just about all of us who have been seated in the economy class on the plane will be familiar with this conundrum. The person in front might choose to recline the seat, which invariably reduces the space available for the person behind, which makes the flight experience more uncomfortable. The question is, who has the right to the six inches of shared space between the two?

Typically, airlines say that those in front have the right to recline except during meal service. That is the end of the discussion. However, this outcome might actually not be ideal for all involved.

The person at the back may be tall and really appreciate the additional space. In contrast, perhaps the one up front does not mind being seated up straight in exchange for a small token of appreciation such as a gift bag.

The Coase theorem tells us that such a negotiated outcome is possible.

This may strike some as unfair. After all, the person has a right to recline, given to them by the airline. Why should he or she voluntarily accept a restriction on their movement? But by the same token, why should the other one at the back feel compelled to pay the other just so that they may be more comfortable on the flight?

But here is the nub. It may well be the case that both parties are better off accepting the bargain. The person in front may prefer the gift and not care much about reclining while the person at the back could really enjoy the extra space. We could argue about rights and responsibilities, liabilities and fairness until the cows come home, or we could actually do something that makes life better for all involved.

The same applies to forest fires in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region. We may strongly believe that we have the right to clean air within our country and that the perpetrators of burning should be held responsible for the actions that have robbed us of this right. Without dismissing how we can and should deploy any and all legal tools available for recourse, this might still be missing the big picture. If we insist on the pursuit of justice over an even better outcome – no haze – perhaps at some costs that we may well be prepared to incur to bring this to pass.

How might we do so in practice? Well, the principle amounts to how one might provide positive incentives for those engaged in burning to stop. I understand that this sounds counterintuitive. Contribute toward those creating the problem? Is this not the wrong way around?

Admittedly, this may seem unfair from a natural justice perspective, but frame this another way. If the pollution were to persist in the absence of such an exchange, would we rather have the clean air at some cost or continue to suffer the effects of the haze, which may well be in excess of whatever expenditures are involved?

I put it to this House that as long as we are assured that the haze will stop incurring some cost on our part, may well be an acceptable bargain to most.

Let me offer some concrete possibilities. First, we could insist that commercial enterprises, particularly those based in Singapore, clear neighbouring non-concession land in the vicinity of their holdings. This will relieve small landowners whose holdings are often abutting those of concession holders anyway, from the need to engage in burning for forest clearance. It would also focus liability more clearly on the firms themselves. Large corporations, rather than incurring the cost of extended litigation or potential fines, may well acquiesce to such an arrangement.

However, there are practical complications in moving forward with this approach. There will need to be a common arbiter to deal with legal and logistical considerations. Who holds the land rights, what the zoning of the land currently is, how much carbon stock or conservation value is associated with the land, and so on before the necessary trades may be realised in practice. This is ultimately the domain of the Indonesian government, but with our cooperation and coordination, especially when concession holders are registered in Singapore and hence, subject to local jurisdiction, we can bring to bear legal action that will compel forward movement on this front.

Second, we can provide support for improved policing and violator punishment. The inconvenient truth is that so long as there remains a patronage network of beneficiaries from indiscriminate burning, there will have to be ongoing efforts directed toward fire suppression and prevention.

Singapore has consistently offered firefighting support in the past. Recently, a joint haze task force aimed at facilitating information sharing that will hold those responsible accountable was set up. Yet we can do more.

Beyond information exchange, we can work together to push concession holders, especially those headquartered here, to undertake additional preemptive fire management measures, including doing so on non-concession lands adjacent to theirs. These include firebreaks and peatland rewetting, which have a proven track record in reducing fire occurrence.

The cost of such enhanced enforcement, especially set against our own economic losses, are small. We may easily justify the additional expenditures by appealing to how effective enforcement becomes more urgent when climate conditions exacerbate the situation. And enforcement also simultaneously becomes more complicated when dealing with a large swathe of ongoing wildfires.

Of course, this does not preclude pre-emptive actions even in other years.

Yet, even under the best of circumstances, the haze problem would never be resolved by enforcement alone. Fires persisted and in El Niño seasons, like now, this approach alone is clearly insufficient.

That is why, a third complementary angle is needed. We can target support through regions where burning is endemic. Since 2005, such support has typically been in kind. Firefighting, information sharing our hotspots and aircraft for cloud seeding, for haze-fighting purposes. Support has also not been limited to Indonesia but has also been extended in other instances to Malaysia and Thailand.

Indonesia has indicated that its National Disaster Management Agency will coordinate any recent offers of assistance. If possible, we should further focus on directing our assistance towards small landholders rather than concession land held by large corporations. This ensures that the ones with least means of clearing land by methods other than burning are also the most direct beneficiaries.

For prudence, we can deliver our support in tranches, making it conditional on verifiable cessation of burning activity. There is evidence that such positive incentives focused at the village level do help small landholders better comply with environmental regulations, and ideally we do so within the ambit of ASEAN. To the extent that haze is a common problem, we can work together with other affected countries, such as Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand, toward a coordinated solution. The Indonesian government must, of course, be the one that primarily finances and leads this initiative, but doing so within a regional forum significantly increases diplomatic and financial leverage.

As Singapore assumes the Chairmanship of the body in January next year, we could focus on regional cooperation to address transboundary haze and make it a priority focus.

In response to a Parliamentary Question filed by my hon friend Ms He Ting Ru yesterday, as well as earlier Parliamentary Questions on regional efforts, the Government has shared that Singapore works within the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution with the goal of establishing a coordinating centre. This is undeniably an important step, but we should not satisfy ourselves with haze monitoring and mitigation efforts alone. Rather, we can look to deploy instruments that focus on the protection of carbon stocks, which is something that my Workers' Party colleague, Kenneth Tiong, has mentioned. There is also a ready-made UN-backed scheme, the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) framework designed to work along these very lines. We should build on this instrument in our Chairmanship year ahead.

Of course, such direct support strategies will need to be accompanied by some accountability mechanism to limit leakage and ensure that any disbursements end up with the intended beneficiaries. This will require diplomatic finesse, cooperation and coordination with the Indonesian government, and the accountability and credibility that will be conferred by working within the rubric of ASEAN.

It will also require money. One may recoil at the thought of expanding taxpayer funds abroad, but we must remember that the present status quo is not costless to us either. One estimate points to losses of close to 1% of annual income due to the adverse effects we suffer in terms of health, along with disruptions to transport and tourism. Even lower-end estimates place the cost at close to half percentage point of gross domestic product.

It is clearly in our economic interest to consider how we may contribute, whether directly or indirectly, to permanently resolving the haze problem. And to be clear, I am not suggesting that we spend this entire amount or even anything close to it. Still, we need to ask the sober question of whether, on a purely cost benefit basis, whether it may be worthwhile spending a fraction of what we would otherwise lose anyhow, to help mitigate the problem at its root.

Mr Deputy Speaker, when we are harmed by the actions of others, it is easy, tempting even, to rely on the strong hand of the law to bring about compliance. This is a human reaction and understandable. After all, we have all been adversely affected by the ongoing haze, some of us more disproportionately health-wise than others. While I support the Bill, my speech has emphasised how incentives can be positive as well as negative. Rather than solely relying on coercion or compunction, we can also be constructive in our efforts to promote change.

The three mechanisms I have suggested: have corporations finance clearance on smallholders' lands behalf; expand the scope of support for enforcement; and to direct in kind assistance toward the small farmers, may seem on its face to reward undesirable behaviour. But I hope I have explained how vilifying one actor or another, while satisfying to some, is unlikely to solve the problem. Different groups are endowed with more or less means to tackle the problem head on, and genuine reform must look to how we can help those least able to choose a way forward, other than to burn the forest as a means of subsistence.

I believe that the proposals I have offered strike at the heart of the problem. They go beyond just settling for a short-term fix or wildly wielding and a questionable hammer of laws that extend beyond our own jurisdiction. Instead, these proposals offer a tantalising possibility of enduring solutions delivered with empathy so that we might finally return to the blue skies that we all deeply crave.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Dr Charlene Chen.

5.55 pm

Dr Charlene Chen (Tampines): Mr Deputy Speaker, clean air is not a luxury. It is a basic necessity. We know the health consequences of haze, particularly for vulnerable groups, such as young children, seniors and those with respiratory conditions. I commend MSE for moving swiftly to strengthen the THPA, even as the recent haze episode begins to subside.

I also welcome our continued cooperation with our regional neighbours, including Indonesia. Communities across the region have suffered from land and forest fires, and we share a common interest in preventing them. The haze may cross national borders, but so too must our efforts to prevent it.

Mr Deputy Speaker, transboundary haze has long been an environmental and diplomatic challenge. We also need to examine the economic incentives that allow these fires to persist. Irresponsible land-clearing practices can be cheaper than sustainable alternatives. Complex corporate structures and opaque supply chains make it difficult to establish accountability. Companies that invest in responsible practices may find themselves competing against others that cut costs through environmentally damaging methods.

I therefore welcome the Bill's stronger powers to restrict the commercial and financial dealings of designated companies and individuals, as well as the requirement for convicted offenders to surrender profits gained or losses avoided through their misconduct, where these amounts can be assessed. This last provision is particularly important. A fine must never become just another cost of doing business.

However, I would like to raise three questions about how these new powers will be exercised. First, on independent assessments. The Bill empowers the Director-General to require specified entities to appoint independent assessors at their own expense. I recognise the value of this provision in establishing corporate responsibility, particularly where complex corporate structures and overseas operations make investigations difficult.

However, such assessments could be extensive and costly. The financial burden could be considerable, especially for smaller companies, and may arise even before any wrongdoing has been established. I appreciate that the cost of an assessment would depend on its scope and complexity, making a fixed cost ceiling difficult to prescribe. Could the Minister clarify what safeguards will ensure that the scope and cost of assessments remain proportionate to the circumstances of each case, particularly where the company has not been found to have committed an offence?

Second, on cross-border investigations. Much of the relevant evidence and operations may be located overseas. How will the Ministry address the practical challenges of obtaining and verifying evidence, particularly where cooperation from overseas entities may not be forthcoming? And how will our bilateral and regional partnerships support these investigations, while respecting the sovereignty of our neighbours?

Third, on commercial and financial restrictions. Under the Bill, an entity may be designated even without a conviction, where the Minister has reason to suspect certain offences or non-compliance. I understand the need to act early, particularly when there is a risk of further environmental harm. However, restrictions on financing, trading and business relationships can have far-reaching consequences, including for employees and innocent business partners. Could the Minister clarify what considerations will guide the decision to impose these restrictions and how their severity will be calibrated to the evidence and risks involved?

Singapore is an important regional business and financial hub. We must ensure that our enforcement framework remains credible, proportionate and predictable, so that responsible businesses continue to see Singapore as an attractive place to operate.

Mr Deputy Speaker, as someone who teaches marketing sustainability to the next generation of business leaders, I am interested in how we can shape the economic incentives that drive corporate behaviour. The Government has considerable influence through regulation, financing and procurement.

I would like to suggest two areas for further consideration.

First, strengthening supply chain transparency while keeping compliance requirements proportionate. Greater traceability can help businesses identify environmental risks and demonstrate responsible sourcing. However, the requirements must be practical. SMEs may lack the resources and expertise to trace complex supply chains. Smaller producers and farmers across the region may face similar challenges.

We should be careful that well-intentioned requirements do not inadvertently exclude smaller players from the market or encourage businesses to relocate their activities elsewhere without improving environmental outcomes. Large corporations, with greater resources and influence over their supply chains, should take the lead in supporting smaller suppliers.

I would therefore like to ask whether the Ministry will consider issuing clear, proportionate due diligence guidelines, so that businesses understand what constitutes reasonable efforts to ensure responsible sourcing. Such guidance would help distinguish companies deliberately concealing irresponsible practices from those making genuine efforts to comply.

Second, using the Government's purchasing power to encourage responsible sourcing. Singapore already incorporates sustainability considerations into public procurement. Could we explore a zero-burn public procurement standard for products associated with land-clearing and forest-fire risks? For example, procurement criteria could give appropriate weight to credible evidence of responsible sourcing and land management. We would need to consider feasibility, compliance costs, international trade obligations and the impact on smaller businesses. But there is value in exploring how Government demand can encourage responsible practices without creating unnecessary barriers to trade.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the new enforcement powers are significant. Their effectiveness will depend on how they are implemented and on continued cooperation with our regional partners. Our longer-term goal should go beyond penalising offenders after the skies turn grey. We should use our regulatory and market-shaping powers to make transparency profitable and opacity economically unsustainable.

Let us make irresponsible practices costly, responsible practices competitive and sustainable choices the norm. Clean air is something everyone deserves. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Eileen Chong.

6.04 pm

Ms Eileen Chong Pei Shan (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill. It will help us make progress on investigations related to this year's haze. And it will let us act earlier in future, when there is a risk of haze, instead of waiting until the haze reaches us.

Companies can no longer simply ignore our letters. Notices can go by email, trials can go ahead in absentia and refusing to cooperate with investigators can cost them up to $20 million. NEA can seek a civil penalty with a lower standard of proof, as my colleague Mr Gerald Giam had called for. And banks, insurers and buyers in Singapore can be told to stop dealing with a company, without waiting years for a court case to conclude.

Now these amendments will not prevent every haze episode in the future, or remove all the challenges of conducting cross border investigations. But we take heart that they will improve accountability, increase deterrence, and strengthen the incentives for companies to do the right thing.

As the final Workers' Party speaker today, I would like to bring our points together in three parts: the timing of this Bill, how its new tools will work, and what we must invest in beyond it.

First, timing. We understand why the amendments come before us under a Certificate of Urgency. After waking up to grey skies for most of October with no idea when the haze will clear, Singaporeans want action now. The harder question is why it took the Government ten years to move these amendments.

In 2015, after one of the worst haze episodes in our history, we went after six companies. Two of those cases were closed. The other four are still open today. More than ten years later, there has been no prosecution, no conviction and no fine. This year, NEA issued notices to ten companies in Indonesia. Three of the 10 companies are repeat offenders who were also issued notices in 2015.

Various Members of Parliament had, in the past decade, filed parliamentary questions to ask how effective THPA has been in mitigating the haze and for progress updates on the ongoing investigations. Yet in 2019, in response to some of these questions, then-Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Minister Masagos Zulkifli confirmed the Government had "no plans to amend the THPA at this moment", even though by then, we had already seen that companies could fail to respond to THPA notices or cooperate with the Government's investigations.

Singaporeans deserve to know: why did it take 10 years? Was the problem the law, or our own ability to investigate complex cases across borders? If it was the law, why did it take ten years to table amendments to it? If it was capabilities, how have we invested in building it up in the past decade? Can the Minister also elaborate on when and how the four open cases from 2015 will be concluded, since the new and heavier penalties cannot be applied retrospectively?

Second, clarifications on how the new tools will work as intended.

One: penalties that actually bite, for companies and for the people who run them. Because criminal cases across borders are challenging to prove, the new civil route may become a key tool. Yet its maximum penalty is capped at $10 million, half the criminal maximum of $20 million. For a large plantation group, that can simply be priced in as a cost of doing business. As my colleague Mr Gerald Giam pointed out, for stock market misconduct our law lets the regulator seek up to three times the profit made. Why not here? At the very least, should the civil cap not match the $20 million criminal maximum?

Additionally, companies alone do not make decisions; people do. An executive who refuses to cooperate faces only a fine of $50,000, yet several of them make more than a million dollars a year. Will the Government review this?

Two: clear rules for strong powers. Much now rests on assessors: experts that companies must appoint from a Government-approved panel, whose reports can be used as evidence. As my colleague Mr Dennis Tan asked, how was this panel chosen, and what keeps the assessors independent? Can a company respond before their findings are used against it? And how will assessors reach evidence that sits overseas? Will the assessors' reports be made public? The same goes for the power to cut off a company's banks and buyers: what level of risk triggers it and can a company appeal? A hotspot on a company's land does not by itself prove who started the fire.

Third, this Bill helps us deter and punish. But to prevent future episodes of severe haze, we must also invest in addressing root causes, which lie beyond this set of amendments.

Sir, as a sovereign country, Singapore can choose many things: our laws, our partners, our solutions. But we cannot choose our geography. When fires burn in our neighbourhood, the smoke will reach us. So investing in our region is not charity. It is an investment in the quality of air Singaporeans breathe and our people's health.

Let us start with the land. Most of the fires burn on peatland that has been drained dry. Peat is like a sponge. While it is wet, it does not burn. Once drained, it dries into fuel, and when it catches fire, it smoulders underground for weeks, like a giant mosquito coil. Yet the words "peat" and "drainage" do not appear anywhere in this Bill. My colleague Mr Gerald Giam asked whether companies will be ordered to block drainage canals and re-wet their peat. My colleague Mr Kenneth Tiong asked whether assessors will check how wet the peat is, in line with Indonesia's own rules.

We should also invest in local communities. About half the land that burned this year lay outside any company's land, much of it on small farms. For these farmers, burning costs about 20 times less than clearing land by machine. Many of them have already borrowed against their next harvest. If they cannot clear the land now, they may lose everything next year. They want to know: what will they be offered instead? My colleague Mr Kenneth Tiong has offered one answer. As we work with partners, like Indonesia, on carbon credits, we can prioritise projects that pay communities to keep their peat wet and keep the water sensors running, with payment only when the results are measured and real. Then protecting the land pays better than burning it.

And this is where Singapore's strengths come in. We are a financial centre, and some of the money and trade behind these fires passes through Singapore. That part is our responsibility.

Singapore banks have led before by stepping back from thermal coal financing, and they already have systems to track the green promises in their loans. As my colleague Ms He Ting Ru pointed out, those same systems can check a borrower's fire risk before the land burns, not after, and also report how many haze-linked clients they have reviewed and what they did about it. Our banks should also look at a borrower's whole group, and MAS and SGX should expect clearer disclosure from groups under investigation.

As my colleague Mr Andre Low argued, Singapore's purchases of credits from suitable regional forest and peatland projects should take account of their credible potential to reduce haze-causing fires. The Government should consider longer-term purchase agreements to sustain fire prevention. Both Government purchases and recognition of relevant credits should also involve checks that prevention measures are adequately resourced, implemented and maintained.

None of the above is about telling our neighbours what to do. Clean air and good livelihoods are not opposites, and the families living closest to these fires breathe the worst of the smoke. Indonesia has said that growth must reach ordinary people. We share that goal. As my colleague Assoc Prof Jamus Lim had suggested, when Singapore chairs ASEAN next year, we should make clean air and better livelihoods a shared regional priority.

Sir, let me sum up. The Workers' Party supports the Bill. It gives us better tools, and Singaporeans will expect them to be used.

I look forward to the Minister's clarifications: Why did it take ten years? How will the penalties bite and the rules be clear? And will the Government invest in the root causes, not just in punishment?

And as the Bill comes into effect, we should also measure progress. This House should receive regular updates on what investigations find and what action follows. Singaporeans should not have to guess whether the law is working. They should be able to see it.

We cannot choose our geography. But we can choose to be a good neighbour. We can choose to invest in the region so everyone can breathe clean air and earn a good living. Our elders should be able to take their morning walk. Our children should be able to play outside.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Assoc Prof Kenneth Goh.

6.16 pm

Assoc Prof Kenneth Goh (Nominated Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, the recent haze has been deeply frustrating. And this frustration is not Singapore's alone. With our neighbours, we are all in this together. Singapore should do its part, not just for Singaporeans, but as a responsible neighbour and member of the international community.

This Bill is timely and I welcome efforts to strengthen accountability. But it is precisely when frustration is greatest that we must be especially careful to legislate calmly, rationally and proportionately.

I would like to reflect on what this law can realistically achieve, the standards and safeguards needed for fair enforcement and the opportunity to make Singapore a trusted hub for responsible business practices.

Let me begin with the nature of the problem we are trying to solve. Transboundary haze is a systemic problem. Fires arise from a web of land-use decisions, economic incentives, local livelihoods, regulatory capacity, weather conditions and supply chain relationships. A law necessarily identifies actors and assigns responsibility to entities or individuals. But the conditions that produce haze extend well beyond any one actor.

Consider where fires occur. According to Nusantara Atlas, an independent satellite-based environmental monitoring platform, approximately 1.9 million hectares of land in Indonesia were affected by fire between January and September this year. Of this affected land, around 10.6% were oil palm concessions; 8.5% mining concessions; and 6.1% pulpwood plantation concessions. These categories may overlap, so we should not simply just add them up.

Concession boundaries do not necessarily tell us who caused the fire, who is responsible for preventing it or who should be held accountable. Nor does the extent of burned area tell us how much haze reaches Singapore. Nevertheless, these findings remind us that a substantial part of the problem lies beyond the concession holders we can most readily identify.

So, even if enforcement against particular companies improves, fires may continue elsewhere. Hence, we should be careful not to present the law as a silver bullet.

Former Nominated Member of Parliament Prof Simon Tay has made the useful point that the value of haze legislation is not confined to securing convictions. Investigations, scrutiny and the prospect of consequences can deter harmful behaviour. I agree. But for deterrence to work, companies must know what is expected of them and have confidence that the law will be enforced consistently and fairly.

This brings me to the standards and safeguards that will govern the exercise of these expanded powers.

I have several questions for the Minister. What exactly constitutes a risk of haze pollution in Singapore? Under the proposed amendments, a risk may be presumed where a fire is detected and smoke is moving in Singapore's direction. A certificate from the Director-General can then serve as conclusive evidence of that risk.

I support the Government's intention to intervene before haze actually arrives. Requiring an unhealthy PSI reading before taking preventive action would defeat that purpose. But we need clarity on how that risk will be determined. Will there be clear, objective criteria for determining the risk of haze reaching Singapore? For example, will the assessment consider how likely the haze is to reach us, how severely it may affect our air quality and within what timeframe? If so, what scientific evidence, meteorological models and expert assessments will underpin these determinations? And what role will the proposed advisory committee play in this process?

Another important question is how we attribute responsibility for fires and the standards governing independent assessments.

The Bill gives the Minister substantial powers to designate persons and place entities on notice, without requiring a prior Court ruling that wrongdoing has occurred. Yet attributing responsibility for fires is not straightforward. A hotspot may indicate a possible fire, but it does not tell us who started it, whether reasonable precautions were taken or whether genuine efforts have been made to contain it.

Fires can spread across land boundaries and persist for days or weeks despite substantial firefighting efforts. A single fire may generate multiple hotspots and changing weather conditions can make containment exceptionally difficult. So, how will the Government distinguish deliberate burning, inadequate prevention and fires that persist despite reasonable preventive and firefighting efforts? What constitutes a single fire episode or incident for the purposes of investigation and penalties?

I recognise that the Bill provides for independent assessors to investigate these circumstances. But even assessors may struggle to establish what happened on the ground, particularly where evidence is incomplete or where several parties are involved. This matters because an adverse or qualified assessment report may itself provide grounds for designation. So, how will we distinguish uncertainty about responsibility from evidence of wrongdoing?

This is also the question of procedural fairness. While the Bill provides an opportunity for companies to make representations before designation, will they have access to the assessor's findings and a meaningful opportunity to challenge inaccuracies or respond to adverse conclusions before the Minister relies on those findings for designation?

Beyond the findings themselves, there is also the question of costs.

Companies directed to appoint independent assessors are required to bear the costs of assessments. What benchmarks and safeguards will ensure these costs remain reasonable and proportionate? Could assessors draw on organisations, like the Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil's existing hotspot monitoring and audits, rather than duplicate that work?

We should not create open-ended compliance costs. This could lead to responsible firms leaving Singapore while the fires and the haze remain.

I would also like to raise the consequences of public designation and being placed on notice.

I appreciate that public disclosure can serve legitimate regulatory purposes, including alerting financial institutions and business partners. But public identification can also carry serious reputational consequences, even before wrongdoing has been established.

The Bill can also extend designation to related companies and certain business partners, even if they were not directly involved in a fire. For example, a Singapore-based commodity trading company may belong to the same corporate group as an overseas plantation operator, but it may not have control over land management or fire prevention. Would the trading company also be designated even though it has no direct involvement in or control over the plantation's operations? What principles will guide how far these powers extend across corporate groups and supply chains, particularly where companies have no operational responsibility for the activities in question?

An allegation should not become a scarlet letter. A company may have taken substantial steps to prevent or contain a fire yet still find itself publicly named and its reputation damaged, even before responsibility has been established.

The Bill already requires both designations and their cancellations to be published in the Gazette. However, public identification of entities placed on notice is discretionary. And being placed on notice does not necessarily mean an offence has been established. What criteria will the Government use to decide whether to publicly identify an entity placed on notice? Will the reasons be made clear, so that the public can distinguish suspected wrongdoing from a precautionary regulatory measure? Will the status of entities placed on notice be reviewed periodically and what criteria will determine when that status should be cancelled?

And importantly, where the Government has publicly identified an entity as being placed on notice, will it also publicly announce when that notice is cancelled? If we publicly name a company when it is placed on notice, we should be equally transparent when that notice is lifted. Otherwise, we risk creating lasting reputational consequences even when no wrongdoing has been established. But, more importantly, we also risk undermining Singapore's reputation for fairness, transparency and the rule of law. Such uncertainty could also be exploited by commercial competitors or other interested parties.

This brings me back to a broader principle: the more serious the consequences for a company or individual, the stronger the evidence we should require and the clearer the safeguards we should put in place.

Beyond enforcement, I believe this Bill also presents an opportunity for Singapore to shape better business practices. Singapore is an important centre for regional headquarters, financing and trading. We should aspire for a Singapore presence to signal strong corporate governance and responsible environmental practices – a mark of trust that investors, customers and business partners can rely on.

That trust must be earned through credible standards, fair scrutiny and predictable enforcement. But if our rules become arbitrary or excessively burdensome, we risk pushing away responsible businesses, losing our influence over their supply chains without necessarily reducing fires.

We should continue working with other governments, communities and industry bodies to strengthen prevention, improve land management and reduce the risk of fires and haze.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the objective of this Bill. But we should be clear about its limits. It will not, on its own, eliminate transboundary haze. Our task is to build a regime that is firm against wrongdoing, fair in its application and effective in supporting wider efforts to prevent fires. The real measure of success is not how many people we can punish, but how much haze we can prevent.

6.28 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker: Leader.