SUSPENSION OF MEMBER

Mr Speaker: Honourable Members will recollect that during the debate on the motion moved by the then Member for Hong Lim inviting, inter alia, the Assembly to rescind my ruling which admitted the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister to condemn and to suspend the then Member for Hong Lim for alleged dishonourable conduct in the Assembly, I, in effect, opined that the issue before the Assembly seemed to have been confused and clouded and I wondered whether, in view of the conflicting opinions that had been expressed during the debate, it would not be in the interests of the House to obtain legal opinion in the matter. Honourable Members will recollect that the motion was taken to a division and was defeated by a majority vote.

As there was no unanimity and as the issue raised was, to my mind, one of utmost importance in the orderly and proper conduct of the business of this Assembly, allowing of no doubts, especially in the mind of the Speaker, I prepared a memorandum on the matter and requested the Clerk to seek an opinion thereon from the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table in the House of Commons-a senior officer of that House primarily charged with the special duty, when asked, of assisting and advising legislatures in the Commonwealth on matters referred to him by the Clerks of such legislatures.

A reply has been received and it would, I think, be of interest to place on record the views of the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table on the specific points raised.

The motion by the then Member for Hong Lim was in the following terms:-

`That the ruling of the Speaker admitting the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the Member for Hong Lim be rescinded and that this Assembly has no jurisdiction to deal with the matters raised therein.'

I stated in my memorandum that the arguments put forward in the debate in favour of the motion urged, in effect-

(a) that the Assembly had no power either to condemn or to suspend the Member for Hong Lim in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the constitutional and statutory provisions extant in Singapore;

(b) that, therefore, the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister sought to request the Assembly to do something which was ultra vires;

(c) that, consequently, the Speaker ought to have ruled that the notice of the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister was inadmissible and the motion could not therefore be placed on the Order Paper for debate.

The questions I posed were as follows:-

(a) Is the Speaker justified, under the provisions of Standing Order No. 31(5) and having regard to section 54 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, to direct that a notice of motion be returned if he is of the opinion that, or entertains some doubt whether, the motion seeks to request the Assembly to do something which is ultra vires?

(b) In the light of the inherent powers of the Assembly, and the provisions of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958, the Standing Orders and the Legislative Assembly (Power and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955:

Firstly: Has the Assembly power to proceed against a Member by way of condemnation (or censure, reprimand or admonition) in the circumstances enunciated in the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister?

Secondly: Has the Assembly power to suspend a Member for dishonourable conduct of the nature alleged in the motion of the Deputy Prime Minister: and if so, to what extent?

Reference is made in question (a) to paragraph (5) of Standing Order No. 31 and to section 54 of the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council, 1958.

Standing Order No. 31 deals, inter alia, with the manner of giving notices of motions and paragraph (5) thereof reads as follows :-

'(5) Any such notice shall be submitted to the Speaker or in his absence the Deputy Speaker who shall direct-

(a) that it be printed in the terms in which it was handed in; or

(b) that it be printed with such alterations as he may direct; or

(c) that it he returned to the Member who signed it, as being in his opinion inadmissible for reasons stated.'

Subsection (1) of section 54 of the Order in Council reads as follows:

`(1) Subject to the provisions of this Order and of the Standing Orders of the Assembly, any Member may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to, the Assembly, and the same shall be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of the Assembly.'

Paragraph (2) of that section specifies when the recommendation of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara must be signified before the Assembly can proceed inter alia upon any motion.

On question (a), the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table had, inter alia, this to say-

'...the Speaker would not be justified in directing that a notice of motion be returned. even if he is of the opinion that the motion seeks to request the Assembly to do something which is ultra vires. He has in my view no right or status to prejudge the issue in this way; it is for the Assembly to decide.'

The Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table goes on to make two further points, namely:-

`(i) To the best of my knowledge no Speaker of the House of Commons has ever ruled out of order a notice of motion on the ground that it suggested a course of action which was ultra vires.

(ii) Section 54 of the Constitution Order in Council puts the matter fairly clearly. If a motion does not conflict with the constitution itself or with the Standing Orders (which it does not appear to do) and if it does not impose a charge, etc. (which it does not), it may be moved.'

On the first part of question (b), that is to say, whether the Assembly has power to proceed against a Member by way of condemnation (or censure, reprimand or admonition), the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table states that he would be fairly certainly of the opinion that the Assembly does have such power. He adds-

`There seems to be nothing indeed to prevent any deliberative body (such as for example the Council of a Trade Union) doing this, provided that the motion does not contain a libel. In the case of the Legislative Assembly, the question of libel does not arise in view of Section 3 of the Powers and Privileges Ordinance, 1955. Furthermore the words "except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose" contained in Standing Order 46 (10) would appear expressly to envisage the moving of a motion condemning a Member for his personal conduct.'

For clarity, let me quote section 3 of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, and paragraph (10) of Standing Order No. 46.

Section 3 of the Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955, reads as follows :-

`3. No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any person while a member of the Assembly-

(a) in respect of words spoken before the Assembly or a committee thereof; or

(b) in respect of words written in a report to the Assembly or to any committee thereof or in any petition, bill, resolution, motion or question brought or introduced by him therein.'

Standing Order No. 46 deals with the contents of speeches and paragraph (10) thereof reads as follows:-

`(10) The personal conduct of Members of the Assembly shall not be referred to except upon a substantive motion moved for that purpose.'

On the second part of question (b), that is to say, whether the Assembly has power to suspend a Member for dishonourable conduct of the nature alleged in the motion by the Deputy Prime Minister and if so, to what extent, the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table states —

`The real crux of the matter, as Mr Speaker Oehlers realises, is whether the Assembly has power to suspend a Member otherwise than in accordance with paragraph (1) of S. O. No. 56. My own opinion is that it has, but I would hasten to add that my answer is not given with as much certainty as I would wish.'

The Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table continues—

`The key to the problem seems to lie in Standing Order No. 56 (5). I think that this paragraph can be taken to confer a power upon the Assembly to suspend a Member otherwise than in accordance with paragraph (1) of the Order. The parallel provision in the Commons Standing Orders, as was noted in the course of your debate, is No. 22 (6) which reads "nothing in this order shall be taken to deprive the House of the power of proceeding against any Member according to ancient usage". It is clear that the Commons may still suspend a Member otherwise than as a result of his being named by the Speaker. The Commons practice in this regard is, relevant to the interpretation of Singapore SO. No. 56 (5) by virtue of Singapore S.O. No. 103 (1)...'

Honourable Members will no doubt recall that under the provisions of paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 56 a Member may be suspended on a motion moved after he has been named by the Speaker in regard to certain acts of disorderly conduct; and paragraph (5) of that Standing Order reads as follows:—

`(5) Nothing in this Standing Order shall be taken to deprive the Assembly of the power of proceeding against any Member according to any resolution of the Assembly.'

Paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 103 reads as follows:—

`(1) In cases of doubt the Standing Orders of the Assembly shall be interpreted in the light of the relevant practice of the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain, and Northern Ireland.'

In regard to the extent of any suspension, the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table states, inter alia, —

`I cannot help thinking that a conditional suspension of the type in question may be wrong since it in fact disenfranchises the constituency for an unlimited period.' The Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table, however, mentions the case of a Member of the House of Commons who was in fact suspended during the pleasure of the House, and in any event, he goes on to say that it is doubtful whether the Commons possess the power to suspend a Member beyond the end of a Session.

The Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table also touches on the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law in these matters.

He points out that if this Assembly had wished to pursue the matter raised by the Deputy Prime Minister to a conclusion, it would have had to vote on the Deputy Prime Minister's motion after listening to the arguments for and against the vires of its proposed action, bearing in mind that its action — if it resulted in suspension of the then Member for Hong Lim — might be tested in a Court of Law.

It is further pointed out by the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table that any decision of this Assembly that a matter is intra vires cannot be regarded as final insofar as there may exist an opportunity for testing its legality in a Court of Law. This would be so even if, as suggested during the debate, the Assembly had sought and agreed to abide by the opinion of so eminent a constitutional lawyer as Sir Ivor Jennings; but the fact that the Assembly acted on that opinion would not in itself persuade the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council if the issue came before them that the Assembly's action must have been intra vires. And, of course, Honourable Members are aware that there is judicial provision whereby a decision of a Court of Law in Singapore could under certain circumstances be taken on appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

In regard to any decision which may have been taken by this Assembly to condemn the then Member for Hong Lim, as distinct from any decision to suspend him, the Fourth Clerk-at-the-Table is of the opinion that the question of a test as to the legality of that decision in a Court of Law does not seem to arise, for there is nothing for which a Member who has been condemned by resolution could sue. He cannot sue for libel, since there is a statutory bar to this, and no other right of his has been infringed.

To my mind, and perhaps, I venture to state, to the minds of some if not all Honourable Members, the difficulties, procedural and constitutional, which faced this House in the whole proceedings stemmed mainly from the present Ordinance declaring and defining certain of the powers, privileges and immunities of this Assembly. This Ordinance was passed in 1955 before our present Constitution came into operation, and does not, as I think it should do, truly reflect the plenary authority which a legislature in an internally self-governing State, such as ours, ought to possess.

The dignity and prestige of this Assembly demands that it should always be in the position to assert itself positively and it should never, on any occasion, find itself in an atmosphere of uncertainty and indecision in matters affecting its powers, privileges and immunities.

These powers, privileges and immunities are matters concerning the whole House, and I would, if I may, suggest that consideration be given to the setting up of a Sessional Committee of Privileges with the primary duty of enquiring into, considering and making recommendations on all matters relating to or affecting such powers, privileges and immunities, including the question of the revision of the present Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, 1955.