[Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER (MR G. KANDASAMY) in the Chair.]

Then he described the various groups of men that he could use as dupes. He named six, but two would be of some interest.

`The third group consists of people in high positions, remarkable neither for their intelligence nor their energy, but who have wealth, connections, influence and power as a result of their position. We must blackmail them, ferret out their dirty secrets and make them slaves. In this way, their power, their position, their influence and their wealth become an inexhaustible treasure and a precious asset in our adventure.'

Then there is the fifth group who can also be used as dupes, and they are also equally expendable. May I suggest that some of the beer-hall revolutionaries pay heed to this?

`The fifth group comprises doctrinaires, conspirators, revolutionaries, those who orate away at meetings or on paper. They must be constantly driven into ambiguous positions, (that is, get them to betray their friends. That is an ambiguous position.) They must be compelled to come out into the open and assume real and dangerous tasks (that might be the next step, the next commitment.) When the revolution is over, the majority of these will disappear, but of the rest we shall make genuine revolutionaries.'. So to those who want to play at revolution with dedicated revolutionaries. I suggest they read the "Revolutionary Catechism" of Nechayev because, at least, they would know what is in store for them when the real revolutionaries have decided that these people have outlived their usefulness.

In fact, getting the tenderfoot revolutionaries to betray their friends is part of the technique of commitment. At least, under the Communist technique, if somebody wants to join the movement, they get them to do something which would commit them and thereafter there is no retreat. In fact, part of the act of commitment is to get people to do things which outrage their sense of honour, decency and which go against their conscience; and once the unfortunate waverers have been confused and persuaded into betrayal of friends and colleagues, then all self-respect is lost and all lines of retreat are cut off.

Sir, what was all this betrayal in aid of? It now turns out that all this betrayal was unwittingly to aid the super designs of the British. Let me state here, Sir, that I do not for one moment believe that Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends were consciously aiding and abetting the designs of the British. Our opinion of Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends is that they are not pro-colonialists, Right-wingers or even opportunists. I have no doubt they believe sincerely in the things in which they believe. We say that we in the P.A.P. stand for an independent, democratic, non-Communist, socialist Malaya. But what has happened is that Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends had hoped to manipulate the British. But as things have turned out, they have been manipulated by the British in the hope that they would come into open conflict with the P.A.P. and, if necessary, destroy the P.A.P. We in the P.A.P. might have fallen into this trap had we not been able to free ourselves of the ideological blinkers which obviously have been the driving purpose behind the thinking of Mr Lim and his friends.

Since our defeat in Hong Lim, when the bridge between us and Mr Lim Ching Siong grew wider, our first belief was that all the manoeuvrings were an attempt by pro-Communist elements to coerce the P.A.P. leadership into providing a favourable climate for the growth of Communist forces.

But we too have read the Communist theory and practice on united fronts. We have read how a united front should be tolerated by Communists only insofar as the non-Communist leadership was manipulable. For two years, the P.A.P. Government has steadfastly refused to be manipulated and we knew that the pro-Communist elements were getting fed up with us. Our initial analysis was that many of their manoeuvres after our defeat in Hong Lim, though rather irritating, were but usual manoeuvres to force the P.A.P. to steer off course. After all, these manoeuvres have been going on in the Party for many years and for us it has become a matter of routine to deal with these little pressures.

When on 2nd June, the six trade Unionists came out with a statement supporting the P.A.P. in Anson but asking the P.A.P. to fight for full internal self-government, we were a little angry but regarded this as no more than an aggressive manoeuvre to get the P.A.P. to depart from its line of independence through merger. When the six trade unionists and Political Secretaries issued this statement asking us to fight for full internal self-government when constitutional talks are started, we were not consulted, though what they asked was a complete reversal of what they and the P.A.P. had stood for for years.

Anyway, we dismissed this as another manoeuvre to make the P.A.P. leadership uncomfortable. However, we were reassured by the fact that the six trade unionists and their 43 unions had endorsed full support for the P.A.P. in Anson and extolled the P.A.P. as the leading anti-colonial force.

However, the Party Chairman on 9th June came out with a statement that the P.A.P. was going to fight for nothing less than independence through merger in 1963. It was no more than a strong and categorical reaffirmation of what has always been the P.A.P.'s stand. Also the thawing of opinion in the Federation about taking in Singapore had convinced us that merger was now practical politics. We expected that this categorical statement of intentions would be well received by the six trade unionists who had for some time been calling into question our anti-colonial sentiments.

Instead of a favourable reception, the six trade unionists and their friends came out with a vicious and open attack against the P.A.P. leadership and its reaffirmation of the policy of merger.

We did not then realise why they were so bitter towards merger. We could not then understand their repeated demand that we publish the details of merger, even though we for our own part reassured them that we had no details about merger or even super-merger. All that had happened was that the political units concerned - that is, the Federation, Singapore, Borneo, and so on - had more or less indicated that they were ready to endorse in principle the idea of a super-merger. The P.A.P. Government said that it endorsed super-merger in principle if that would speed up merger between Singapore and the Federation. We could not disclose details, because there were no details. What puzzled us was this reversal on merger by Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends. One would have thought that the Communists themselves would have welcomed a merger, if only to establish Communism on a pan-Malayan basis.

Even more inexplicable was the publication by the six unionists, not long after Dr Toh's statement on merger, of four demands - the release of detainees, the granting of citizenship to certain individuals closely connected with Mr Lim Ching Siong, the unification of trade unions and greater freedom of speech, assembly, and so on.

Sir, our understanding of the situation was that were the P.A.P. to act on these demands - that is, on the demand, say. of the release of detainees - then a constitutional crisis could be created leading to a situation where the Government might be confronted with the prospect of resignation, depending upon the reaction of both the Federation and the British. At least that was our expectation.

And yet the six trade unionists repeatedly asked us and in fact mobilised support to ensure that we did not resign. Now this was the puzzle. Why then were the six trade unionists suddenly, after the announcement of merger, asking us to do things which, in the normal course of events, could lead to the resignation of the Government? That was the puzzle. And again we thought, well, this is another obscure manoeuvre on the part of the pro-Communist elements to embarrass the P.A.P. leadership. In fact, in an editorial in Petir, we asked the unionists bluntly whether they wanted the Government to resign as a result of acting on their four immediate demands. Strangely enough, all we got was an evasive reply saying that the P.A.P. leadership had always been talking of resignation and that if it resigned the unionists could not be held responsible. Somehow they evaded the question. Why? Because up to 9th June, the whole resources of their propaganda and manipulations were to see that the P.A.P. stayed in power. But when on 9th June, the Chairman of the Party announced that there was going to be a merger, the same unionists were forcing us to do things which sooner or later must lead to a constitutional crisis, or to our resignation. All this was puzzling. Somehow we could not explain it. It was completely out of character. This was not what they had been doing for many years. Then just before Polling Day, Mr Lim and his friends opened fire against the P.A.P. and openly supported Mr Marshall in the Anson by-election.

It became clear to us then that what the six unionists and their friends were out to do was to bring about the defeat of the P.A.P.

Their last-minute intervention in Anson, through eight P.A.P. Assemblymen, was the act that helped the pieces of the puzzle to fall into a pattern which suddenly explained to us what it was all about.

It dawned on us that our analysis was all wrong, that the actions of Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends could not be explained away as the kind of manoeuvres they had indulged in all these years inside the P.A.P.

Mr David Marshall: Hear, hear!

Mr Rajaratnam: On the face of it, it suggested a recklessness on the part of Mr Lim and his friends which could, so we thought, lead them to disaster. And if the P.A.P. resigned or the Constitution was suspended, then the Communist elements would be the first to suffer.

Whatever the defects of Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends, they are not reckless men. They are not men who make calculations on pure intuition and guesswork. So we had to look for the key piece in the puzzle. It had to be an analysis which explained all the facts, which gave rationality to what appeared to be the reckless behaviour of Mr, Lint Ching Siong and his friends.

The key piece, it turned out, was the British. Sir, there is a short story by G. K. Chesterton where the detective almost failed to solve the murder mystery simply because he had overlooked one suspect - the postman. The postman is taken so much for granted that no suspicion is aroused by the fact that he visited the murdered man's place.

Similarly with the British. We were so preoccupied with thinking that this was a manoeuvre between the non-Communist P.A.P. and the Communist elements that we forgot that the British too-the postman-were somewhere around.

[Mr SPEAKER in the Chair]

2.14 a.m.

Mr Rajaratnam: Anyway, Sir, the Prime Minister has sketched out for you the role the British have played in all this. Now all the pieces fall into place. Mr Lim and his friends were not being reckless in working for the downfall of the P.A.P. leadership, simply because they had managed to persuade the British that they could - and we know for a fact - with the assistance of certain "young turks" take over the Government and the Party. Mr Lim and his friends had, I presume, some assurance that if they took over or if they created a new united front, nothing would happen. In fact, Sir, I may tell you this. When it looked as if the split between the P.A.P. and the so-called trade unionists was becoming more acute and growing wider, the editor of one of the English Sunday papers came to see me as mediator. He asked, "Why should the Left drift apart? Can't something be done?" I said, "Well, it is very difficult because since then they have made four new demands - internal self-government, the release of detainees, and so on - which are all completely contrary to our policy." For example, over the case of the release of the detainees, obviously there must be some crisis. This editor told me, with half a smile, obviously knowingly, "Raja, I think you don't know much because these boys [i.e. the unionists] have a good pipeline with the U.K. Commission." At that time it meant nothing. I took it as just one of those things. But after our defeat in Anson, when Mr Lim Ching Siong and his friends, for no rhyme or reason, went all out to secure defeat for the P.A.P. with which they were openly associated and were prepared to brand themselves publicly as betrayers and traitors - nobody can overlook that fact - then we felt that the reason why they were moved to commit a gross act of betrayal was that somehow or other they had been deluded by the British into believing that betraying the P.A.P. did not matter; they might suffer humiliation or lose the respect of many members of the Party, but a bigger stake was involved. Therefore, Mr Lim and his friends were deluded by the British into opposing merger because, somehow, they had been led to believe that merger was something which had been signed, sealed and delivered, which was a sell-out of them, and that the P.A.P. was somehow in cahoots with the Tengku to sell out Mr Lim and his friends.

Secondly, that if the P.A.P. could not release the detainees, then the British were prepared to release them and they could find another alternative type of government or Party which would be more liberal about these things. They felt that after the P.A.P. had lost Anson, that defeat could then provide the necessary fuel to oust the present leadership of the P.A.P. Government and the Party. The immediate plan was for the removal of the Prime Minister, and the whole fury of the attack was concentrated on one individual. Somehow it was believed that if one individual was removed, the whole organisation, the whole party, the whole machinery could be reformed. There was a purpose behind it. First, for Prime Minister, they could put in somebody else. Many names were mentioned - Dr Goh, Dr Toh. After three months they would say, "Well, there was not enough intra-party democracy. Out with Dr Toh." Then Dr Goh. "Out with Dr Goh." One by one. Then somehow other patterns fitted in. Why were they pressing for the granting of citizenship to certain people? If the design was this, then probably the Prime Minister could be pushed out and challenged to an election in Tanjong Pagar. Then somebody who had not got citizenship but who had great aspirations and who had probably managed to sell himself to Lord Selkirk as just a liberal Communist or a Liberal-Socialist would then contest if he could get citizenship. Then when the next leader of the Party, Dr Toh, was pushed out, a big offensive would be mounted - "No, there is not enough democracy in the Party. You (Dr Toh) must go." Then somebody else if he got citizenship would stand for election. In that way the hope was that perhaps in the course of time the Front-benches could be filled with new leaders who, at the moment, cannot get into the Assembly, either because they have not got citizenship or because of some other reason. Anyway, it is quite clear, and we know for a fact, that there have been in our Party for the last two or three months young turks plotting, manipulating, arguing who is to be Prime Minister, who is to be the Minister for Finance and so on. Some of these men, I think, have been duped into believing that they were doing the right thing. But there are five persons who are far more serious about revolution than any of us are. Therefore, Sir, we have today reached a situation where a lot of things have become clearer. A lot of the antics of and betrayals by Mr Lim and his associates are not so lunatic and reckless as they look because they have been led to believe that nothing untowards would happen.

Sir, the drama is not yet finished. This exposure now presents the British and Mr Lim with a dilemma - who will betray whom? Who is up the gum tree and how will be come down without running into disaster? Anyway, Sir, we of the P.A.P. will make our own arrangements and manipulate and manoeuvre as we think fit. But Mr Lim and his friends can thank us for one thing - that if we had been wrong, if we had not seen - what this manoeuvre was all about, then we might have been forced into a clash with Mr Lim and his friends. Fortunately we did not fall into the trap and we hope we will never fall into the trap or be made dupes of by the British.

2.24 a.m.

Mr A. P. Rajah (Farrer Park): Mr Speaker, Sir, we have been here since 2.30 yesterday afternoon - only 12 hours, Mr Speaker, but by your grace we have been allowed outside this Chamber for one hour in order that we might be more fortified to come and listen to the troubles and woes of the P.A.P., the Party in power. We have been told about dupes and people who are duped.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am quite innocent in politics. When people say something, I believe them. I take everything that is said at its face value. I do not analyse it in the way the Minister for Culture analyses it and reads into it things that are not read into by normal persons.

Sir, when I received the motion, "That this House expresses its confidence in the Government", I was a little uncertain as to what exactly it meant. The motion, as it stood, inevitably meant that this Assembly was being called because the public interest demanded it and that, therefore, a situation existed in Singapore which merited the calling of the Assembly which had been adjourned sine die by the Government. Now, the motion as it stands must mean that the Government is asking the House as a whole to express its confidence in all the work it has done to date, and all the work its hopes to do so long as it continues to hold the reins of the government. Therefore, Mr Speaker, it became pertinent to find out what exactly this motion meant. The work of the last, two years. Now I look at the Minister for National Development, who is well, and truly asleep at the moment, to find out exactly what his Ministry has done. So far as housing is concerned, very little. So far as promises are concerned, a great deal. I then turn to his neighbour, the Minister for Education. I will not say that his Ministry is a complete flop in the way the Ministry of National Development has been a complete flop, but at least the Ministry of Education has created a situation in Singapore whereby parents are, dissatisfied, pupils are dissatisfied, teachers are dissatisfied. So, Mr, Speaker, one cannot say that the Minister for Education has made a great success of his Ministry.

Now, we come to the redoubtable Minister for Labour and Law who has just come back after a conference on labour problems in Geneva and London. I hope the atmosphere there was more congenial to him than it would have been had he been here. So far as the Ministry of Labour is concerned, if I may deal with that side of the Honourable the Minister's Ministry, it has somehow not been a howling success. Neither do the people of Singapore think he has made a howling success of that Ministry. The way in which labour problems have been handled, from my point of view, is completely unsatisfactory. A Minister for Labour, seeking to bring about a settlement of a trade dispute, to my mind, Mr Speaker, must try and hold the balance equally between the employee and the employer. That is my understanding of how the Minister should behave. I know it is very difficult sometimes, but he must do his best to give that impression. Unless he is able to give that impression to both sides, that he is trying to be fair to both sides, inevitably he fails in his duty as Minister for Labour. Being Minister for Labour does not mean, to my mind, that he must advocate labour blindly and disregard whatever rights or equities the employer might have in such a situation. The result now is that in so far as the employer is concerned, he trembles when he goes to the Hon. the Minister's Office - not a very happy situation for Singapore. It could well be that that situation enables labour to get everything it wants - a good thing perhaps. But as the Government, it is the duty of the Minister for Labour to hold the balance equally between these two contesting claimants. I know he says his is a labour Government. His is a workers Government, but he must also understand that in the system of society in which he is working, capital and labour must play a part, and unless both of them work amicably, the economy of this country must suffer. And to that extent, the Minister for Labour has failed. So the Labour Ministry cannot get the vote of confidence which this motion seeks to obtain.

What about his Ministry of Law? Frankly he has been so engaged on the labour front that he has not had much time to devote to the law front. If he had devoted as much time to the law front as he had devoted to the labour front, I do not know what the situation with regard to the law front would have been. However, that is as it is, Mr Speaker.

Then we come to the Hon. the Prime Minister. The Hon. the Prime Minister, Mr Speaker, is the most dexterous politician that has walked the political halls of Singapore. How long he will continue to straddle both worlds which he hopes to keep under his control only time will tell. May I tell this to the Hon. the Prime Minister? We on the Opposition are really not interested in these domestic squabbles or on questions whether tie is fit to lead them or whether he has their confidence. But we, Mr Speaker, Sir, are interested in the Prime Minister of Singapore. The Prime Minister of Singapore does not belong to the P.A.P. He belongs to the country, and unless the Prime Minister understands that, we shall always have trouble in Singapore. Mr Speaker, Sir, the Prime Minister's failing has been that he has been a party mars first, jockeying for power in the Party first and letting the country go to the dogs. That is what history will write of him when history is written.

Now, the Deputy Prime Minister - the most peaceable man in the P.A.P. arena, the man who can keep peace betwixt the two warring parties. Therefore, I do not want to say very much about him. He deals with Ministries which are not political. He deals with the weather. The trouble is that we cannot get enough rain at the moment. Our reservoirs are dried up, but that is not his fault. That is the fault of the heavens and the gods. They are not in the P.A.P. That is not a matter which we can lay at the doors of the Deputy Prime Minister.

Now the Minister for Health. Doctors have resigned. There is a shortage of doctors, and there are very few specialists in the hospitals. Discontent in the medical service. Recruitment of Japanese doctors from abroad - further dissatisfaction in the service. Allegations that the Japanese doctors do not know what they are doing or what they are prescribing. A loss of confidence in the hospitals, and, therefore, inevitably, people go to private practitioners - not a very good state of affairs in a society where we have a socialist government which is governing us and which should, therefore, provide adequate and suitable hospital facilities for the people of Singapore. The hospital facilities today are at the worst possible level they have been in Singapore for a long, long time. So what confidence can we have in the Minister for Health? Although I like him very much personally - he is a gentleman and it is very difficult to find a gentleman in the P.A.P. - unfortunately he is one of them, and anything that is connected with the P.A.P. seems not to be able to get on in its human relationships with the people. Now might I tell the Hon. the Prime Minister this? However brilliant his Cabinet might be, the decisions of this brilliant Cabinet must be implemented by human beings who are paid by the Government, who work under the Government and below those servants. If the Government cannot command the respect and the loyalty of those people, however brilliant your policies may be, Mr Prime Minister, they must inevitably fail. They have failed because-

Mr Speaker: Order. I have not as yet aspired to the position of Prime Minister. The Member for Farrer Park must remember he is addressing the Chair.

Mr Rajah: I beg your pardon, Mr Speaker, Sir. Might I remind the Prime Minister then through you, Mr Speaker, Sir, that if he wishes to govern this place well, there must be humanity in his Government and not this inhumanity and driving people as if they were slaves or morons or machines?

Now, the Minister for Finance. The Minister for Finance, able economist though he may be, must translate his theoretical knowledge, his undoubted theoretical ability, bring it to the ground and make it work in the form of rice and work for the people of Singapore. Then, and only then, will the people of Singapore accept him as an able Finance Minister. His colleagues, I know, think a great deal of him, and so do I, Mr Speaker, for his undoubted ability to analyse a situation well and try to present something on the results of his analysis. Certainly he has great ability. But what use has that undoubted ability of his been to Singapore during the last two years of his tenure of office? As the Minister himself has said, Mr Speaker, Sir, the most pressing problem for Singapore is the question of the common market which is to be established between the Federation and ourselves. Naturally that is the only solution, and we have been waiting anxiously for the Hon. the Finance Minister to make some sort of statement on this common market. No statement has been forthcoming. No statement will be forthcoming, it would appear, for a long time. We have been patient enough, Mr Speaker, Sir, I think the people deserve a reply to this soon. Are you going to succeed, may I ask the Hon. the Finance Minister through you, Mr Speaker, Sir? What has happened to this common market? It has been mentioned in this House a long time ago. If we are to have a common market, Mr Speaker, Sir, we are not going to wait for it for another two or three years. We want it now. The people want it now. Then the Hon. the Finance Minister puts out his Four-year Development Programme. He tells the people of Singapore that this is the solution to their economic ills. What are the solutions in the Four-year Plan? What are his industrial development plans? His steel mill in Jurong?

Dr Goh Keng Swee: Coming up.

Mr Rajah: Coming up! His steel mill in Jurong, Mr Speaker, Sir?

Dr Goh Keng Swee: You want to take a bet on it?

Mr Rajah: He is bogged down at Kallang. It will take him four years to fill it up, and he will be out of office by then. And nothing has happened in Jurong yet. Steel mill? Now let us really analyse the position of the steel mill. He has not got enough water to work that steel mill, Mr Speaker, Sir. He has not got enough water to give the people of Singapore to drink, let alone run a steel mill. Do not forget it. He needs 10 million gallons of water a day to run this steel mill. That is what he has not told the people of Singapore; and the reservoirs at MacRitchie, Pierce and Seletar are dried up for the first time in 50 years, and the Prime Minister has the effrontery to tell the country that Singapore has not had it so good as it has under his Government.

The Prime Minister: You have just said that the gods are responsible.

Mr Rajah: Yes. Now that the Prime Minister has brought me back to it, I remember the Minister for Culture in one of his speeches during the 1959 elections said, "We do not leave anything to chance. We do not leave anything to the gods. We plan them ourselves and we see that we deliver the goods on our plans." And the Prime Minister was bleating the other day when he was faced with a water shortage, "What can I do? I have not had rain. The sky is against me. The gods are against me." Now is this the sort of cry a socialist Prime Minister lets out, Mr Speaker, Sir, I ask you, when he faces the country with a water shortage? More of that later, Mr Speaker, Sir, I will come back to that later. So much for the Minister for Finance.

Now, the Hon. the Minister for Home Affairs, who is happily married. He is one of the quieter Ministers of the P.A.P. Government, a very difficult gentleman to fathom, as all Ministers for the Interior should be. I believe he knows more about the Communist movement underground than any other Minister should, because it is under his portfolio, as the police are, and therefore he should know exactly what goes on on a lower level. Yet we get to the situation, Mr Speaker, where Singapore is in danger, where the non-Communist Left, with the Hon. the Prime Minister as the leader, and the Communist Left, of which Mr Lim Ching Siong is the leader, are about to clash, and thereby threatening the whole of the democratic fabric with ruin, and yet the Minister for the Interior, the Minister for Home Affairs, thinks that everything is all right. He is quite happy. Nothing has been done about the situation. He is even now quite content not to do anything about this Communist Left which he says is threatening the very existence of the Government, a situation which I find very difficult to understand. If it is true, then what confidence can we have in his Ministry? Now for the Minister for Culture.

An hon. Member: Nothing very much.

Mr Rajah: Nothing very much! I must say, Mr Speaker, Sir, that I enjoy listening to the Minister for Culture's speeches. They are very illuminating. They are the speeches of a well-read, cultured gentleman. Although my leader does not think the Minister is cultured, I have different views about him.

An hon. Member: You have not been to the same places!

Mr Rajah: We have not been to the same places, no. But we might have. So far as the Ministry of Culture is concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir, its effort to create a Malayan culture has been quite pathetic. No one, however sympathetic he may be to the Minister for Culture, will say that his Ministry has been a howling success. So, therefore, on that basis this motion meant nothing.

I really and sincerely thought, Mr Speaker, that to summon this Assembly, which had been adjourned sine die, at a moment's notice meant that the country was in danger. That was the only basis on which this House could be summoned. The country was in danger. Public interest demanded that the Assembly do meet in order that the Assembly do give guidance to the Hon. the Prime Minister to meet the country's perils, to solve the country's difficulties. So we came here expectantly, hoping to help the Prime Minister to solve his problems, because his problems are our problems, if they are national problems. But what do we hear from him? Nothing urgently national. All this trouble with his Party; all the troubles about the non-Communist Left and the Communist Left. They are all members of the P.A.P. though-this non-Communist Left and the Communist Left. So it seems a purely party problem. Somebody has stabbed the Prime Minister in the back in the Anson by-election, and he has lost the Anson by-election. Therefore, it is a national calamity. Therefore, we are brought into the House. So far as the Opposition are concerned, Mr Speaker, Sir, the P.A.P. can disappear tomorrow and we will not consider it a national calamity. The P.A.P. are entitled to think that it might be a great loss to the nation. That is their view. But to convene the House and say, "Somebody has stabbed us in the back. Six of our members are being difficult. One of our Parliamentary Secretaries is not being the gentleman we thought he was, in spite of his medical training," that is none of our business. But, Mr Speaker, Sir, when three Political Secretaries are alleged to have stabbed the Government in the back and are alleged to have attacked the Government in public, and when a Parliamentary Secretary, particularly the one attached to the Minister for Home Affairs, has disagreed with the Government openly and publicly, then it becomes our business.

Mr Speaker, Sir, these four issues have become our concern, and I ask our Prime Minister what he has done about them. He is playing a sort of game with these three Political Secretaries. Each one saying, "You resign." "No, I will not resign. You tell me to resign." It is as if a game is going on, Sir, each one waiting for the other to make a move. What is this, Sir? Are we playing a game in our backyard? Does the Prime Minister not realise that these are national matters? He is not playing parlour games at the moment. These men are being paid out of public funds.

Now, Mr Speaker, Sir, this document which the Hon. the Deputy Prime Minister has laid on the Table is a very interesting document. Mr Speaker, Sir, if you have the document, would you be good enough to take it and look at the date of it? The date is the 12th of August, 1959, two months after the P.A.P. came into power, and well before the Budget debate. This is what the secret document says about Lim Ching Siong. Paragraph 5 on page 2, Mr Speaker, reads as follows:

`Of the eight men released, the most important from the security point of view is Mr Lim Chin Siong for he was the person built up as the open front leader by the M.C.P. in 1955-1956.'

That was the report of the P.A.P. Government to the Internal Security Council on the 12th of August, 1959. The question of the Political Secretaries, Mr Speaker, Sir, was debated here at length during the Budget Session in December 1959. When questions were raised about the Political Secretaries, the need to appoint them and the type of persons that were to be appointed, the Prime Minister, with his tongue in his cheek - now that we know about this document - told the House, "Oh, they are good chaps. They will put across our policies to the people." What sort of a game was the Prime Minister playing with the House, Mr Speaker, Sir, I ask you?

Dr Goh Keng Swee: He was taking you for a ride!

Mr Rajah: He did not take us for a ride, Mr Speaker, Sir. He took the people of Singapore for a ride. And the people of Singapore will not forgive him for that. We might forgive him, but the people of Singapore will not. There are indications that they are not forgiving him. And if he goes on at this rate, there are sure signs they will not forgive him. We expect the Prime Minister to play the game by the country. When the Prime Minister puts out this document to the Internal Security Council and then comes and tells the House what a trustworthy man Mr Lim Ching Siong is, and then puts him in the Ministry of Finance, with the Minister for Finance, what may I ask did the Prime Minister intend? Did he intend Mr Lim Ching Siong to play chess with the Minister for Finance? What games did Mr Lim Ching Siong in fact play with the Minister for Finance?

Tun Lim Yew Hock: They do not talk.

Mr Rajah: They do not talk? I understand the Minister for Finance has played chess with the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs and so understands his game well. I suggest again through you, Mr Speaker, Sir, to the Minister for Finance this time that he might have a game or two of chess with Mr Lim Ching Siong. If he had played a game or two of chess with him, he might have found out what sort of a man Mr Lim Ching Siong is.

Then, Mr Speaker, Sir, when the Prime Minister made his announcement that there was a water shortage and asked the people to save water and not to waste it, the leader of the Alliance wrote a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister, as Leader of the House, suggesting to him that the shortage of water supply was of such a nature and of such importance to the public interest that it merited the recall of the Assembly. But, of course, the Deputy Prime Minister refused the request. He said it was not important at all. And yet the Prime Minister has brought us here, Mr Speaker, Sir, not because of any national calamity that is about to befall us or to beset us, but because he wants us to solve his little party personal problems. I entirely agree with the Member for Thomson that the question of the trial of P.A.P. members and the leadership of the P.A.P is not a matter for us. If they want an impartial Chairman, Mr Speaker, Sir, I venture to suggest they should go to somebody else, and not to you. Since they cannot trust the chairmanship to Dr Toh, I think they will have to go to somebody else. But to bring the whole House here in order to force a vote of confidence on the Government, because there are defections in his own party group, is, I regret to say, Mr Speaker, Sir, using the parliamentary machine to solve the Prime Minister's personal difficulties. It is a complete abuse of the process of parliamentary government.

Now, what exactly did the Prime Minister tell us? He spoke to us for about 55 precious minutes, and he said precious little. All he said were two things: "We do not intend to take repressive measures against the Communists. Our duty is to preserve the P.A.P." That was his song; that was his line; and that was what he repeated over and over again in his inimitable English. Over and over again, "We are not going to fight the Communists. We are going to let the British fight them, it is not our business to fight the Communists. They are about to cut our throats, but we do not care about that. We will let the British come and stop them from cutting our throats." That was how I understood the Prime Minister. He says his first job is to preserve his Party. Let the country go to the dogs, it does not matter. He has already let it go to the dogs once before, you may remember, Mr Speaker, when the ex-Minister for National Development was misbehaving himself. He misbehaved himself for well over a year before the Prime Minister sacked him. He nearly brought the country to a standstill before the Prime Minister acted. The Prime Minister waited for a suitable opportunity to sack him. The suitable opportunity was not in relevance to the State, Mr Speaker, Sir, It was in relevance to his own position in the Party. When the proper time came, he sacked him. And now he thinks it is the proper time again to use the parliamentary machine to solve his own personal difficulties.

Sir, I do not want to say very much more. I think I have said enough. Time is getting on and it is already 3 o'clock in the morning. By the time the Prime Minister finishes, it might well be 4 o'clock. But I want to say this, Mr Speaker, Sir. We are not interested in the personal squabbles of the People's Action Party. But to the extent that their personal squabbles are matters of public interest in so far as the Ministers are concerned, and if as a result of the personal squabbles in the Party the Ministers lose the faith and confidence of their Back-benchers, then it becomes a matter of interest to the Assembly as a whole and to the country at large. In parliamentary practice if the Ministers have not got the faith, the following and the confidence of the Party, then there is only one course open to them, and who knows it better than the Prime Minister himself, who is so well skilled in constitutional practice? But this I will ask of the Prime Minister, that so long as he is the Prime Minister he should act the Prime Minister as he belongs to the State of Singapore first. He must not put his party interests before those of his country. I am entitled to demand this of him because I speak for the country on this matter. I do not speak as a Party man. I speak as one interested in parliamentary democracy; and in the parliamentary democratic system the Prime Minister belongs to the country first and to his Party afterwards. Let him act the Prime Minister and we will support him.

Mr Speaker: The Prime Minister, in reply.

2.57 a.m.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am surprised to hear from the Members of this House that the motion has been brought into this Chamber because of a domestic quarrel in the P.A.P. We have spent, in a record session, 13 solid hours on this motion, which quite clearly has agitated everybody. I say, let us not confuse the people of Singapore. A collision of ideological forces has taken place. Nobody knows what the end result is going to be. But what we do know is that we are in for a rough time. Whether this Government continues in office because of certain inroads made by the Communist Left into the will to resist of certain members of the P.A.P. back-benchers becomes a matter of survival of the Government. That is why the House is in session. Very simply, as I have written to my colleague, the Leader of the House, before the battle is joined, as I think it inevitably must now, you have to be sure that the people will follow you into battle. I have the assurance of my colleagues that they are prepared to do this. I have come to this Assembly in order that the P.A.P. Assemblymen can publicly declare where they stand. I am not interested, Mr Speaker, Sir, as has been suggested by some P.A.P. Assemblymen, in continuing in office on the strength of the Opposition. They know, and I know, that that is the surest way to political demise.

I was disappointed to listen to the evasive rejoinders that have been made to the speech I made in moving my motion - disappointed because all the speakers were reading set speeches which were rendered out of date by the new situation which has arisen as a result of our disclosing the facts to the people. Mr Speaker, Sir, the Member for Farrer Park is not very sensitive in guessing the under-currents of the political forces now in tussle. If he were aware, as I think it is my duty to make him and the people of Singapore aware, that if we are not careful we shall run into a first-class crisis, then I think he would not have treated this debate in the frivolous manner that he did.

I have a feeling that in these matters perhaps some Members do not wish to face up to the situation. The Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministries of Health and Home Affairs and some P.A.P. Assemblymen have taken the line that there is no necessity for the vote of confidence, and have requested me to withdraw the motion. Of course, they do not wish to have to say openly, yes, they are going into battle. Well, that is a matter for them to decide. I say the moment for decision has now come. They did not wish to resign when after Hong Lim it was suggested that we should return the mandate to the electorate. I now discover that what they want is to capture the power which we, the present leadership, won for the Party in 1959. It is our duty to see that no one perverts this power for any other purposes than those for what the people voted it. If they want to assume power and are prepared to face the hazards that have been outlined by my colleague the Minister for Finance, then let them call for general elections so that they can seek authority from the people, and not usurp the power from us. If they wish to take this course, let them vote against the motion. There is no question of this motion being withdrawn. We are going into recess till the end of October and we have to know where the country stands. When carried, today's vote will give the Government the constitutional right to carry on. But we ourselves have clearly stated that it is the moral authority and the support of the people that is so vital for good and orderly government. It is therefore our business at an appropriate time, after taking such steps as are necessary in the long term interest of the people, to return the power back to the people in order that they can decide on who should guide them and whither they should go. Most important in the next few months is our business to present the conditions for merger to the people. I do not believe I can assist Members on the other side of the House by explaining why, in my submission, we are unlikely to establish these conditions for merger if we act as the former Government did.

May I quote, Mr Speaker, Sir, from a political statement we made at the beginning of this year in which I hope, if Members opposite have the time, they might find some elucidation? On page 6 of the 1960 Anniversary Souvenir number, we said:

`Merger between the Federation and Singapore is historically inevitable. The man made boundary at the Straits of Johore will disappear as must all the other freak colonial frontiers bequeathed to newly independent colonial territories by the map drawers and surveyors of the colonial era.

The reason is simply that the Federation cannot afford to have a hostile Singapore. So far we have emphasised the importance of the Federation to Singapore. Lest there is any danger of forgetting it, let us remind people that Singapore is important to the Federation militarily and politically. Militarily and politically Singapore and the Federation are one unit. Colonialism has made a technically international frontier on the Straits of Johore and created two states. But no soldier can devise a front to make Singapore and the Federation two instead of one military situation. He who conquers Malaya conquers Singapore. The Japanese proved it. And conversely he who holds Singapore absorbs Malaya. Stamford Raffles proved it. Perhaps it is worthwhile remembering that it is the same British Army, on both sides of the causeway, though on the Federation side it is there by invitation on friendly defence treaty with the Federation Army. And no politician has yet devised a method to prevent news and events from spreading across the causeway. Every political action in the Federation, in language, education, taxation, and all other fields of government, affects and has repercussion in Singapore. And the converse is equally true however much people may try to minimise the reactions.

... this delicate balance cannot last forever. The present balance of power and forces is an interim one. For finally the Federation and Singapore positions will have to be contained by one authority, or the Federation will run the risk of having Singapore fall into hostile hands and later have to face more dangerous military and political consequences.'

Let me explain simply that if we are to win this battle in men's minds, it is not a simple question as the Member for Thomson has suggested, of provoking a riot and then doing a purge, because the end result of having provoked a riot and executed a purge is to have failed in the argument in the minds of the people. I do not know who is the more courageous - the man who knows the course of events that are likely to develop, who knows that the malady is likely to get worse before it gets better, who calmly faces that prospect and is prepared for the rigours that he will go through; and the other who in alarm takes a short-cut, and thus a purgative. Whoever is the more courageous - I have no doubt whatsoever, which of the two is the wiser course: getting home to the people, not this froth that Communism is evil, that they are all evil men talking villainy, but the real truth that Communism is a tremendous challenge that has to be met, that it is a battle for men's minds and loyalties. I have seen in this very Chamber men's minds and loyalties switch under the heat and pressure of persuasion, and perhaps silent intimidation by the Communist that the future belongs to him, that the east wind is going stronger than the west wind, and that when he prevails one day, he will deal with all those who have opposed him.

Listening to my friend, the Member for Thomson, I find it difficult to believe that two years ago, before we took office, I spent a whole week with him up in the mountains and presented him with the perils that we would encounter when we took office. He was a non-Communist. He fought with me in the S.T.C. Union to prevent that union from failing under Communist domination. He knew what the perils were. He knows what is Communism. He is no opportunist. And he made up his mind that he was coming with us. One year ago, after constant heat and pressure from the Communists, he came to see me in hospital where I was convalescing from a minor operation, and, in the presence of two others, said that he thought it was a great mistake our having assumed power under these circumstances and that we should vacate. He was fighting the Communists and having a tough time. Then one day, two months later, after he came back from England, he decided that he was on the wrong side and that he was going over to the side that was going to win. He told me quite frankly that he thinks the Communists are bound to win, that he is not prepared to be an anti-Communist or to have a fight with them. Therefore, he insisted that we must do this, that and the other. Then our ideological troubles began.

This is a serious problem that we face because we are tapping from the same oilfield as the Communists. The choice for democratic socialism is either to battle for your political activists who have convictions, guts, energy, enthusiasm and drive, and who are motivated not altogether by personal considerations; or to rely on men motivated for purely selfish motives, for position, power and profit. Therefore we tap from the same oilfield. There is no person now on the P.A.P. side who can say he did not know what he was in for. Everyone, before he came in, signed a solemn document that he stood by the principles of the Party and, in particular, stood by the Fourth Anniversary Souvenir number wherein we made a clear demarcation line between where we stood and where the Communists stood. I never believed that I would hear the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs mouth words and phrases which he barely understands, and give an analysis which I think deep down in his heart he knows is spurious. But he has been convinced that that is the easy way out, and so the rot sets in. The will to resist disappears and they say, "In the name of democracy, socialism, intra-party democracy, let us go and float with them."

That is the crisis - a crisis which even the democratic States in Western Europe are facing, a crisis which certainly we are facing. The alternatives are, either to have a Labour Front type government with Lib-Socs, consisting of people who are relatively effete, who can be bought and sold across the counter, and who will buy and sell others, or to tap the same half per cent of the population which is politically alert. We have tapped them, everyone of them. Today the eight who have dissented from us are men who have moved into this world, the no-man's-land between the Communists and us, the unions and the mass organisations, where words like "socialism" mean Communism or democratic socialism, where things are hazy, where you do not want them to be clear, but where they are clear enough when you speak to each other in the hidden language which those who are initiated understand. That is the crisis we are faced with.

The battle for the control of the P.A.P. as a Party is not a problem. That will be resolved. We are veterans of many a battle since the Party was first formed in 1954, and I have informed some of my friends behind me that we are unmoved at the prospect of another battle. It is not the P.A.P. that is in danger, because we have built in all the safeguards. We know, in tapping the oilfield, that explosions may occur from time to time and we have taken the necessary precautions.

Sir, men who joined the Party like the Parliamentary Secretaries in the Ministries of Health and Home Affairs only recently in 1959, when our star was in the ascendent, are rattled and shaken to the point of contemplating changing stands by the temporary setbacks in Hong Lim and Anson. They do not understand that the political leadership, if it is to survive, must be resolute and must be prepared to face up to unpleasantness. We have sufficient confidence in the ultimate triumph of our analysis and the fact that because the analysis is correct we are more likely to have the appropriate political strategy. Let everybody take his stand in the knowledge that it is not possible to insure with both sides: the P.A.P., if democratic socialism continues, or the Communists, if Communism triumphs. We in the leadership, whatever our multifarious shortcomings which our erstwhile admirers and followers have been labouring this evening, have nailed our colours to the mast several years ago before we took power in the last elections. Those who are contemplating an assault on the P.A.P. citadel should carefully consider the injuries they would be inflicting on themselves and on us, and also their chances of ultimate success.

By the time this House reconvenes, Mr Speaker, we hope everybody will have appraised themselves of the facts of life in Malaya as they really are, and will have prepared themselves psychologically for the decisions they will have to make on their future; for on the people's decision depends whether this little experiment in representative government in Singapore survives or withers away.

The Member for Anson has insinuated that this is a government of job-seekers, that we want to carry on in office after the electorate has rejected us on two occasions. And he went further and accused me of wishing to remain Prime Minister come what may. I wish it were true, that I get as much enjoyment out of being Prime Minister as he did out of being Chief Minister, it is not the sensation of power that fills me with elation. To abscond now when trouble brews would be an act of cowardice, and my colleagues have asked me to carry on and have assured me that they are prepared to come together in the battle. I myself was of the opinion after Hong Lim that the best thing for the country was a fresh election and another government, probably still a P.A.P. one with a fresh mandate. Because we have insuperable problems to resolve and they can only be resolved if the government has moral authority to govern. But now, faced with this challenge of capture and perversion of the government under the P.A.P. banner, a silent transfer of the driver and a change in direction, I say it is our business to stay put and see the thing through as quickly as we can with the Federation of Malaya.

On the question of Political Secretaries, Sir, I think the Member for Farrer Park made one valuable point - that we knew in August 1959 and we knew well before August 1959 the respective position of everyone. This is no smear, no name-calling. It is a waste of time calling names, unless you can nail a man down. And from now on those who take us on must be prepared to nail us down and be nailed down by us. We have said that. Let me read this document which the Leader of the House has tabled:

`Of the eight men released, the most important from the security point of view is Mr Lim Chin Siong for he was the person built up as the open front leader by the M.C.P. in 1955-1956. Once he is released, it makes very little difference from the point of view of subversion whether the remaining forty-odd detainees are released or not because they cannot materially affect the security position. Whether they be inside detention camps or outside in active participation the overall position is not basically different. Of the eight, the P.A.P. Government has reasons to believe that five, not including Lim Chin Siong, genuinely and sincerely subscribe to the P.A.P. democratic socialist ideology.'

Sir, I do not think anybody who has not gone through the experience of working at ground level with these men can understand the metamorphosis that can take place in men's minds and men's intentions. You can guess what a man is, but you are never really sure. You can know what a man does because it is an overt act, but his ultimate conviction - whether he is a Communist, or a socialist, or a social democrat - is something which you have to piece together over a long period of time. Constant and consistent conduct leads you to the conclusion that a person is or is not a Communist. And even if he is at a certain time, as I have said of my friend Mr Bani in 1959, quite clearly he knew where he stood and he knew what Communism was about because he has been fighting this and has met all these problems before, but he can change his opinion, and has a right to change his opinion. Therefore, when they came out and made a declaration on their release on the 4th of June, that they stood firmly and squarely behind the P.A.P. and stated their position in print - we felt that it was worth a try. It was a battle for men's minds. I would say, at the time when Mr Fong Swee Suan came out from prison on the 4th of June, he was not a Communist, he was a democratic socialist with us. And I would say that at the time he was appointed Political Secretary to the Minister for Labour, he was genuinely and sincerely trying to work the system. But in the process of that battle, he melted and was reformed in their ranks, in the emotional hothouse of the Chinese Malayan revolution.

It is something which only those who have been through the experience can know. If you have squatted in the union, seen the activists work absolutely selflessly, day and night, for a cause, utterly ruthless and fanatical, then you understand how a man suddenly melt away. That is what is happening in Singapore. That is the world which Members on the other side of the House do not understand, except perhaps the three former members of the P.A.P. I think the Member for Hong Lim understands this very well. As my colleague, the Minister for Finance, has said, having complained of the undemocratic nature of the P.A.P. Constitution and of the cadre membership, the Member for Hong Lim has, from his own experience in the P.A.P., drafted and submitted for registration a constitution which is tighter and harder to capture than the P.A.P.'s. We hold a cadre conference bi-annually. He wants to hold one triennially and so on. He has gone through the mill. He knows what it is all about. Let us not kid ourselves about intra-party democracy. Every man who complains of it signed his application form for membership that "I accept the rules of the constitution." He knew what was in the constitution.

We know how the game is played. We allowed free play on the ground in order to tap the neutrals, to bring the activists into action in our branches. But we also run the risk - and we know that - of getting chaps planted in. Therefore, the first entree is not the ground organisation in the open. It can be compared if you like to the Pope and his pontiffs. The cardinals appoint the Pope; the Pope appoints the cardinals. It is a system that has existed some 2,000 years and there must be some merit in it. The Communists have that system too. And I say, if you try to run the democratic system of the mass political party, unless it is a party not worth capturing, like the Labour Front or S.P.A., you will have no end of trouble. We are worth the capture; that is the point. We have spent two years in office, and the Party is still ticking. We went down in Hong Lim and I think the Member for Hong Lim knows - win or lose - we gave him a fight for seven weeks. The organisation is there, it is worth the capture. And I say to them who are thinking of it - think again.

I think it is important now for me to answer why we took them in. We took a chance. We lost out in several cases. It is a risk that was calculated, and so it has to be. It may be that many interested people will say that what we, have disclosed is a fairy tale. I do not think the Member for Anson is an interested person. But I think there are many interested persons who would like to repeat that, and if they could get him to repeat it and help more people to repeat it, to make them believe it, it will help to cloud the issue. Those of us who have lived through the events of the mass agitation of the last few years, especially since 1955, know that this is not a bogey but an ogre which can send the creeps into a man's soul. They can put the fear of God into intelligent people and convince them that the future belongs to them. Hence the weak and wobbly line taken by some of the speakers this evening.

It is with sadness that I watch these men who have been my friends and comrades, some for many years. But most of them are the newer members. Their resolution melted as the heat of the battle intensified. They are not crooks and rogues like those who sat on the last Government benches, but they lacked sternness of purpose in the face of an adversary who mounts a massive effort at persuasion and the silent intimidation of who is the winner in the long run. But I am proud to say that many have stood up to the test of the occasion as the effort against us is mounted, and some feel so strongly that they have come out from hospital to cast a vote tonight. It is not for fun, Mr Speaker, Sir, that these things are done. It is not to settle a party conflict. That can be settled because we have built in the safeguards in the constitution of the Party. They can rock us, damage us; but so can we them. But if a silent conversion is made in this Chamber, then I say the country will rock.

Sir, I have here a series of extracts from the document signed by the three political Secretaries together with Mr Devan Nair, and Mr Chan Chiaw Thor when they were released. And I say - I have said it before - that it was on the basis of this written undertaking of where they stood that they came into the Government with us. And if they move their stand from this, then we must part company. It is not a manifestation of courage just to sack Political Secretaries and make martyrs out of them. They have been my friends and colleagues over many years in a common struggle. They have chosen to betray us. But even in moments of anger I think we should act soberly and calmly and not make unnecessary martyrs out of people. Let me read what they said: Page 1, paragraph 2 of the statement:

`With regard to immediate tasks, particularly in the new phase since the achievement of political independence by the Federation of Malaya, we endorse the stand taken by the P.A.P. in the document "The New Phase After Merdeka - Our Tasks and Policy" published in the 1958 annual souvenir issue of the Party.'

Page 2, second paragraph:

`The real struggle for socialism in Malaya can only begin when our people, Malays, Chinese, Indians are able to transcend the communal cultural and linguistic barriers and loyalties which at present divide them, and embrace a common Malayan loyalty and cultivate a common national consciousness.' Page 3, paragraph 4:

`It would be a mistake to regard the non-inclusion of Singapore in the independent Federation of Malaya as being due solely to British chicanery. The British, of course, cannot escape their share of responsibility for this cruel amputation. The fact remains, however, that the exclusion of Singapore is also the reflection of the genuine fear of the Malay majority in the Federation that the Chinese majority in Singapore are incapable of a Malaya-centred loyalty and cannot be assimilated into a Malaya-centred nationalism. It is up to us in Singapore to prove that the fears and suspicions of our Malay brethren across the causeway are groundless. In the words of the P.A.P.'s policy statement, "The New Phase After Merdeka".'

And here they quoted this and adopted it as their own:

`"It must be demonstrated to three million Malays in the Federation that the one million Chinese in Singapore are ready, willing and able to be absorbed as one Malayan people, all able to speak Malay, and willing to work together for the economic betterment and upliftment of the Malays as equals of the other races."'

And this is what is interesting. Page 5, paragraph 3:

`It was not the might of British arms which defeated the armed revolt led by the M.C.P., but the failure of the M.C.P. to establish itself as a nationally based movement. And thereby hangs a lesson which Malayan socialists will ignore at their peril.'

And I say, on this issue of merger, if they could ignore it, they would fight it at their peril. In the last paragraph, page 6, they said:

`With the achievement of political independence by the Federation of Malaya, a new phase has begun.'

I am afraid, Sir, they have not quite adjusted themselves to this new phase.

The Member for Anson has said that Mr Lim Ching Siong does not oppose merger. The Member for Thomson has asked me to quote any single reference, any single line which is hostile to merger. I say the open conflict would never have taken place and they would never have been so stupid as to betray us, and dealt us a treacherous blow in Anson, but for the fact that they were bitterly opposed to merger or super merger. It is on this basic and fundamental division that we have now parted ways. Let me quote you a series of extracts, Mr Speaker, Sir, to show where they really stand on merger, although from time to time, because it is such a difficult issue on which to back-pedal, wobbling has taken place. On the 13th of June, Mr Lim together with the Member for Thomson and four others issued a statement which can only be taken as a challenge to the statement made by the Chairman of the P.A.P. on the 9th of June. They stated that it must be understood that any constitutional arrangement that frustrates the people's struggle for freedom and democracy will be resisted by the people. Here they are saying that merger, independence, something which is almost a dogma with the P.A.P. and all socialists, is a sell-out. "understood that any constitutional arrangement that frustrates" freedom and democracy; going in as a State of the Federation to freedom; frustrating democracy. What are we talking about? Then on the 24th of June, Mr Lim in a letter to the Straits Times said:

`Merger, we have hitherto come to understand, was a thing of the distant future. However, recent statements by leaders of the Federation hold out an earlier promise of the union of these two territories.

Encouraging as it is, the question now arises, on what terms will this be effected? The right-wing government in the Federation and a left-wing government in Singapore apply certain conflicting principles.'

All kinds of difficulties are now contemplated and envisaged because obviously somebody does not like it. He went on to say:

`Merger is a matter that must be worked out to a great degree of clarity. It is not a thing to be accepted without firmly defined purposes.

Great sacrifices have been made by the people to achieve their present position in Singapore and merger must never turn out to a sell-out of any sort.'

How can merger be a sell-out when it is a proclaimed objective of the political party that won the last elections with this as a major plank in its platform? But then they have their various reasons for it, their different fears to which my colleague, the Minister for Finance, has referred.

And so we could go on, Mr Speaker, Sir. But I think this is only the beginning of the argument. As I have said, something which perhaps the Member for Farrer Park may consider worth contemplating, if you lock a man up and you have not divulged what he represents, you have left a whole following believing in that idea. And new leaders will spring up and lead the followers with those predilections. I say this is an argument which we can win, because I think if they oppose merger they will be making a mistake second only to the starting of the Emergency in 1948.

I am not saying that if Singapore goes in with the Federation we should have insured Singapore against Communism. That is not the case. All you have done is to stabilise the position, give it a viable base from which to build a relatively healthy society. We are left with a dismembered portion of a once sizeable Empire which included the Borneo territories. We governed from Singapore - the British did - Labuan, North Borneo, the Cocos Islands (now gone, to Australia), Penang and all the rest of it in this region. And we are left with all the monuments of a former colonial capital without the wherewithal.

I say the first objective is to ensure that you win this battle in people's minds. This is the only road to survival. It is so. If we cannot convince them that it is so, then I say the battle is lost. And then, of course, brute force will be used. And why should we use brute force? Because I say it is unnecessary. The brute force, anyway, is there, because this is a S.E.A.T.O. base. If people are foolish enough to believe that they have got the freedom of the island to upset the base, or that they can have the freedom of the island provided they give a verbal guarantee about the base not being upset, then I wish them well. For my part, as I have stated at the opening, under conditions of absolute safety for the life and limb of every political contestant, the raps are on. If we cannot win the argument, then we will never win, and I say that this is the argument that we have to win. I am not unduly optimistic but reasonably confident that logic and the inevitable course of events over the next few months will bring the two territories inevitably together in closer association - in what form, I am unable to say as yet. The time will come, I hope, when even sceptics like the Member for Anson will be surprised to see the logic of history, geography, the military situation, and the political situation.

In moving this motion of confidence, I would like to say that we are prepared to do not what is best for the P.A.P., as has been suggested by the Member for Farrer Park, but what is best for the country. What is best for the P.A.P. is what I suggested after Hong Lim - to return the mandate. There are certain inescapable problems. The people want a rapid rise in the standard of living. There is no base for your economic expansion. Your entrepot trade is restricted. Your industrialisation has come to depend upon factors beyond your control, and so on. Whoever remains in office bears the odium of failure. After Hong Lim, when it was clear that the electorate wanted something quick and it was not possible to deliver, I said to my colleagues, "Return that mandate." The people will learn as the years go on, when the P.A.P. comes back in its pristine glory. We are staying on not for the P.A.P., but because we will not allow this Government to be sold down the drain and the people ruined. Question put.

The Prime Minister: Division.

The House divided: Ayes, 27; Noes, 8; Abstentions, 16; Absent, Nil. Ayes. Noes. Ahmad bin Ibrahim. Abdul Hamid bin Haji Jumat. Buang bin Omar Ahmad Jabri bin Junid. Mohammad Akib. Byrne, K. M. Lim Yew Hock. Chan Chee Seng. Marshall, David. Chan Choy Siong, Mohd. Ali bin Alwi. Madam. Rajah, A. P. Chor Yeok Eng. Seow Peck Leng, Goh Chew Chua. Mrs. Goh Keng Swee. Thio Chan Bee. Hoe Puay Choo, Madam. Kandasamy, G. Abstentions. Koh, C. H. Lee Khoon Choy. Bani, S. T. Lee Kuan Yew. Chan Sun Wing. Lee Teck Him. Fung Yin Ching, Miss. Lim Cheng Lock. Lee Siew Choh. Mammen, John. Leong Keng Seng. Mohd. Ariff bin Lin You Eng. Suradi. Lingam, S. V. M. Ismail Rahim. Low Por Tuck. Ong Pang Boon. Ng Teng Kian. Rajaratnam, S. Ong Chang Sam. Ramaswamy, S. Ong Eng Guan. Sahorah binte Ahmat, Sheng Nam Chin. Madam. Tan Cheng Tong. Tan Kia Gan. Tee Kim Leng. Toh Chin Chye. Teo Hock Guan. Wee Toon Boon. Wong Soon Fong. Yaacob bin Mohamed. Yong Nyuk Lin. Absent. Nil.

Motion accordingly agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House expresses its confidence in the Government.

The business having concluded, Mr Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned accordingly sine die at five minutes to four o'clock a.m.