COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (Progress made)
Parliament of Singapore · 22 December 1981 · 5th Parliament
Official Report, 22 December 1981, Vol 41, Issue 6 · Open in the reader (summaries, search, filters)
Mr Ng Kah Ting asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Culture, with reference to the recent visit to Bangkok by the Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) and himself, and also with reference to the recent informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Pattaya, if he can inform the House of the latest developments on the efforts and progress made on the Cambodian question, particularly the efforts to assist patriotic Cambodians in forming the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Culture (Mr S. Dhanabalan): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) and I visited Bangkok from 21st to 24th November, 1981. The primary purposes of this visit were, firstly, to exchange views with the Thai Foreign Minister on the Kampuchean problem and, secondly, to ascertain the progress made by the three Cambodian factions in their efforts to form a Coalition Government.
Members of the House will remember that the leaders of the three Cambodian factions, Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan, met in Singapore in September this year, and they agreed in principle to form a Coalition Government. Since their meeting in Singapore, representatives of these three factions have been holding meetings in Bangkok to try and work out the details on the formation of such a Coalition Government. At the time that we visited Bangkok, there had already been nine meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee studying the details on the formation of this Coalition Government.
Just before we left for Bangkok, the leader of the KPNLF, Son Sann, announced that he would not participate in the proposed Coalition Government but that his followers were free to discuss the matter. Even as we arrived in Bangkok, we heard news that Prince Sihanouk had also announced that he would not be participating in the Coalition Government.
So it is in this context that we arrived in Bangkok to have discussions with Son Sann, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and In Tam (in Tam being the representative of Prince Sihanouk). We had meetings with them, individually as well as jointly. From these meetings, it became obvious to us that the Ad Hoc Committee had meandered into difficulties and that, instead of discussing the details of how to pursue the sole objective of increasing the military, political and diplomatic pressure on the Vietnamese, they have got embroiled in discussions on the formation of a Coalition Government along the lines of a Coalition Government in peace time. One of the principles that the Khmer Rouge insisted upon was the principle that the institutions of the existing Democratic Kampuchea government should be retained in any Coalition Government. This was quite unacceptable to the other factions, especially when these institutions are associated with the notorious inhuman record of the Pol Pot Government in the years 1975 to 1978. As the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee had quite obviously reached an impasse, and as Son Sann had categorically stated that he would not participate, and so had Prince Sihanouk, we obviously had to look for some other solution.
Arising from the discussions that we had in Bangkok with these groups, we proposed that the Coalition Government which they should form should at this stage be concerned only with one single objective, that is, the pursuit of the struggle against Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. After the Vietnamese withdrawal, the Coalition Government should automatically be dissolved. In fact, this was suggested by the Khieu Samphan group, and that after the Coalition Government had been dissolved then there would be free elections to choose the government of Cambodia, the elections to be organized and supervised by the United Nations. Under this arrangement, each faction would retain its identity and be free to propagate its own distinctive political programme and philosophy for the future of Cambodia. The three factions would only be united in their struggle against Vietnam. The three key officers of this Coalition Government, i.e. the President, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, would all seek to mobilize international support for their struggle against the Vietnamese. These points are contained in the statement that was released by the Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) on 24th November, 1981.
Son Sann readily agreed to these proposals although he said that he would have to consult his followers. In Tam, representing Prince Sihanouk, also agreed in principle and, subsequent to that meeting, both Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk have confirmed their formal approval of these proposals.
In the case of Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary representing the Khmer Rouge, they did not reject these proposals but asked for time to consider these proposals and we agreed to give them two months. We are awaiting their reply and we hope that their response will be favourable.
More recently, on the 10th of this month, ASEAN Foreign Ministers met informally in Bangkok and expressed their full support for these proposals which we had earlier put up in our visit to Bangkok. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers urged the Khmer Rouge and other interested parties to respond positively to these proposals. They also agreed at this meeting that these proposals should be explained to friendly countries who have been supporting ASEAN on this question.
It is still a little too early to say whether the Khmer Rouge will respond positively to these proposals. As the Khmer Rouge have already announced their full support for the Resolution and Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and as they have also agreed to the various UN Resolutions on this subject, we assume that they should respond positively to our proposals because these proposals are within the principles already expressed in the UN and in the International Conference on Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge leaders have at various times assured the ASEAN Governments that they have no intention of seizing power by force when the Vietnamese withdraw from Cambodia and that their sole objective is to join together with other patriotic forces to struggle against Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. As I said just now, since our proposals are consistent with the stand that they have taken so far and consistent with the objectives that they have stated, we think that logically they should accept the proposal that we have made.
Ultimately, it is, of course, for the various Cambodian factions to decide how far they want to proceed in the Coalition Government and how much they are prepared to sacrifice their immediate individual interests in order to join together and cooperate in their effort to free Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation.
Mr Ng Kah Ting (Punggol): Mr Speaker, Sir, is the Hon. Minister aware of reports that the Khmer Rouge would not participate in the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea? Would this not then be a futile effort on the part of both the Hon. Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) and the Hon. Minister himself? May I therefore also ask what other solutions the Hon. Minister has in mind?
Mr Dhanabalan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am aware of reports that the initial finding of the Khmer Rouge's attempt to ascertain the views of their followers is that they are not in favour of the Coalition Government. But we have not had any official reply and we still have almost another month for them to give us this reply. So we are still hopeful, I would not as yet say that our efforts have been futile, and we have to keep trying.
As to alternatives and other options, I think it is too early to talk about alternatives. It is only proper that having given them two months, they should give us a formal and final reply before we discuss alternatives. Otherwise alternatives would be construed as threats.
Dr Lau Teik Soon (Serangoon Gardens): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I seek the Hon. Minister's clarification with regard to the new proposal as to whether it is a Singapore initiative or whether it is an ASEAN proposal? If it is the letter, what caused the initial difficulty between Singapore and the Indonesian governments?
Mr Dhanabalan: Mr Speaker, Sir, the principle of the Coalition Government, the purpose and the fundamental framework, was agreed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers although the details that we spelt out in Bangkok of course were not details that were drawn up by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. The manner in which the discussions proceeded in Bangkok during the first visit of the Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) and myself, was such that there was no time to consult fully with the other Foreign Ministers. But since they were well within the framework laid out by the Foreign Ministers, we made the proposals and subsequently informed them. There were, of course, press reports about the unhappiness of the Indonesian Foreign Minister but these were cleared up in our subsequent informal meeting in Bangkok.
As it stands now, this proposal that has been made is an ASEAN proposal because the other Foreign Ministers have endorsed and supported this proposal.
Source: Singapore Parliament Official Report (Hansard) for 22 December 1981. Republished on SGParliament.