CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read. 12.58 pm

The Prime Minister (Mr Goh Chok Tong): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill 1996 contains amendments relating to three issues:

(a) Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs);

(b) The Elected President's powers; and

(c) The Council of Presidential Advisers. GRC Amendments

The first set of amendments is set out in clause 14 of the Bill. The amendments increase the maximum number of MPs representing a GRC from four to six.

Members may recall that there were two reasons for creating GRCs. The first reason was to guarantee multi-racial representation in Parliament. This was what started us thinking about changing the single member constituency system, and studying schemes like twinning candidates, with one Chinese and another minority candidate in an enlarged two-member constituency.

The second reason for GRCs was to fit in with the proposal to set up Town Councils. Our original idea was just to twin two single constituencies. But because of Town Councils, we decided to create GRCs with three members instead.

I explained this to Parliament in January 1988, when I moved the amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Constitution to create GRCs. I said that although Town Councils and multi-racial MPs were tWo different ideas, they were compatible with each other, and the GRC proposal was designed to achieve both. I quote from Hansard, Vol. 50, Col. 184, of 11th January 1988:

"The town council proposal and the team MP proposal are two different concepts. One is to give residents more authority, more responsibility, to manage their own housing estates; the other is to ensure that Parliament would always be multi-racial. But though the two concepts are different, they are compatible. After an election three MPs, although they are voted in separately, can get together to form a town council. Also, after an election, a group of MPs, three in this case, in a Group Representation Constituency, can also form a town council. Thus, though the two concepts are different, they can be worked together. That was how Group Representation Constituencies, each about the size of three single-member Constituencies and each to be served by a team of three MPs, came to replace twin constituencies."

Both the Town Council and the GRC schemes have been successful. As we gained confidence in the schemes, we adapted and extended them in the light of our experience. Thus in 1990, we changed the maximum number of GRC candidates from three to four, to provide flexibility in dealing with a GRC whose population was expanding rapidly.

I now propose to take the ideas of Town Councils and GRCs another step further. Town Councils were set up to give more authority and responsibility to residents to manage their own estates. I intend to devolve still more authority to the local communities, by setting up Community Development Councils (CDCs). CDCs will bring government closer to the people and encourage communities to manage their own affairs. They will take over some work hitherto undertaken by Ministries and Government agencies. CDCs will be given more responsibility and resources to carry out self-help projects and dispense help to the needy, for example, through Edusave scholarships and bursaries and Medifund grants. This will strengthen social cohesion and bonding among Singaporeans.

For CDCs to be effective, they need to have responsibility for a critical mass of residents. Increasing the maximum number of MPs in a GRC from four to six will give more flexibility to the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee to configure a GRC which is the right size for this purpose. Not all GRCs need to have six members. But where it will be more convenient to create a 6-member GRC, the Committee will be able to do so.

Devolving more powers to MPs in Town Councils and CDCs, and enlarging the maximum size of GRCs, is electorally neutral. It gives no unfair advantage either to the PAP or the opposition parties. But it gives voters a bigger stake in the result of their choice, because team MPs will manage more matters, including some duties of the Government now carried out by MCD, Ministry of Education and the hospitals. As a result, their voting will affect them in many more matters within the constituency. So voters are more likely to scrutinise the candidates, their characters and programmes carefully.

Bigger GRCs also put a premium on a strong anchor-man for the team of candidates standing there. Then whichever party wins, the GRC is better off with a strong anchor-man heading a strong team, and not just a glib talker supported by a group of straw men. Therefore, the party which wins the largest number of GRCs is more likely to be able to put together a team of competent Ministers to govern the country.

In other words, each constituency election in a larger GRC will become more like a national election. Voters will not only be voting for a team of MPs to manage their constituency, but also for part of the core leadership team of the winning party.

This will strengthen the political system. Democracy is about exercising the choice of voting for, rather than voting against, something. At the national level, this means voting for a government which will make sound policies and lead the country into the future. At the GRC level, it means voting for a team who will make life better for the residents of the GRC.

Democracy can only work when voters support the candidates whom they really have faith in: able and honest people to whom they want to entrust the country and their future. A system which encourages voters to do this is more likely to promote long term political stability in Singapore and the well being of voters themselves.

The opposition have been urging voters to do the exact opposite. When they tout their "by-election strategy", what they all mean is that people should vote for opposition candidates, even though they do not trust these candidates to govern Singapore. If this happens in one or two constituencies, the governing Party loses a few seats, but the harm done is not serious, provided the opposition MPs voted in are honest men, who are not out to destroy the system. But if voters do this across the board, they will deprive the party which they in fact support, of the mandate, or the full team of Ministers, that it needs to govern Singapore. This will destabilise the political system, and lead to week governments or even a freak election result.

Some people have expressed concern that this change to the GRC rules will compromise minority representation in Parliament. I have said that this will not happen: the PAP will not field fewer minority MPs as a result of this change. If necessary, it will field more than one minority candidate in some GRCs, especially the larger ones, or field minority candidates in single member constituencies.

The purpose of the GRC scheme has never been to prescribe a fixed number of MPs from minority communities. It is to guarantee a minimum representation of minority community in Parliament, so that minorities are never excluded from Parliament, by some chance election result in which no minority candidates at all are elected from the single-member constituencies.

The Constitution sets out the framework of the GRC scheme, including the maximum number of candidates per GRC, presently four. The Parliamentary Elections Act specifies that at least one quarter of the total number of elected MPs should come from GRCs. With 81 MPs, this means the Parliamentary Elections Act requires a theoretical minimum of six minority candidates.

However, we presently have far more than six GRCs. In fact, we have 15 GRCs, as recommended by the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee before the previous general elections. And there are 17 non-Chinese elected MPs in Parliament today, more than the number of GRCs. All are PAP MPs. There are more PAP minority MPs than GRCs, because Bedok and Toa Payoh GRCs have each two minority members.

There is therefore no reason to worry that as a result of increasing the maximum size of GRCs to six, minority representation in Parliament will be compromised.

Some people have suggested that if we increase the maximum size of GRCs, we could require the larger GRCs to have two candidates belonging to two different minority communities, instead of one as at present. We may also guarantee a higher minimum proportion of minority MPs in other ways, for example, by requiring a larger proportion of MPs to be returned from GRCs.

This is worth considering. But I do not think we are ready to implement it now. We should first gain some experience with the system which allows GRCs to have between three to six members. Only then may we consider writing such a provision into the law.

The Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill 1996 will make consequential changes to the Parliamentary Elections Act. The detailed changes will be dealt with later when the Bill comes up for Second Reading.

Elected President's Powers

The second group of amendments in the Constitution (Amendment) Bill is to fine-tune the provisions concerning the President's veto powers. They affect the President's powers in two areas:

(1) Bills which circumvent or curtail his discretionary powers; and

(2) Key appointments.

I will deal with the President's veto powers as regards Bills first.

Veto Powers over Bills

On 25th August 1994, DPM Lee Hsien Loong explained to this House a problem with the drafting of the mechanism by which the elected President provisions were entrenched in the Constitution, particularly Article 22H. DPM Lee said that the Government intended to amend Article 22H to remedy the problem, but the question had arisen whether the President already had under the existing Article 22H the right to veto such an amendment. The President had stated that in the interest of testing out the system, he would like this question to be referred to the Courts for a ruling, and that he would accept whatever interpretation of Article 22H the Courts ruled to be correct.

The Government therefore put this question to a 3-man Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges headed by the Chief Justice. On 20th April 1995, the Tribunal gave its opinion that:

"Although Article 5(2A) of the Constitution has not been brought into operation, the President has no power under Article 22H(1) of the Constitution to withhold his assent to any Bill seeking to amend the provisions referred to in Article 5(2A), and specifically to any Bill seeking to amend Article 22H to restrict the powers of the President thereunder to any non-constitutional Bill which provides directly or indirectly for the circumvention or curtailment of the President's discretionary powers conferred upon him by the Constitution."

In view of this opinion, the Government is proceeding with the amendments to 22H as it originally intended. These amendments are set out in clauses 2, 3 and 8 of the Bill.

Let me explain the problem with Article 22H. When the Elected President amendments were passed in January 1991, the legislative intent was, firstly, that Constitutional amendments which circumvent or curtail the Elected President's discretionary powers should be subject to a referendum and, secondly, that the Elected President's veto over Constitutional changes which affect his powers should not be brought into effect immediately, but only after we have had several years of experience operating and refining the system.

This was to have been achieved by placing the master entrenching mechanism clause in one Article - Article 5(2A), and then delaying bringing Article 5(2A) into effect until we were ready.

This was done. Unfortunately, we overlooked another Article - Article 22H, which has been brought into effect. Article 22H was intended to cover non-Constitutional legislation. If such legislation circumvents or curtails the President's discretionary powers, the President can refuse assent, and if the Courts uphold the President, the matter is final.

Article 22H does not cause any problem when it is applied to non-Constitutional legislation. Such legislation should never circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. These powers are spelt out in the Constitution. If a Constitutional provision is unsatisfactory, the remedy is to amend the Constitution, not to pass other legislation which contradicts it.

The question is whether Article 22H also covers Constitutional amendments. The Attorney-General argued before the Tribunal that it did not. But the Tribunal did not rule on this wider issue. It confined itself to answering the precise question posed to it, that is, whether the President could veto an amendment to Article 22H, which is a core provision. Its answer was no, the President could not veto an amendment to Article 22H.

There is therefore still a doubt whether Article 22H applies to Constitutional amendments. If it does, this would give rise to two problems.

First, the non-core provisions of the Constitution would be protected by an inappropriate criterion. Let me explain.

Under Article 5(2A), if the Government wants to amend core provisions of the Constitution, it can either persuade the President to waive the requirement for a national referendum, or put the question to a referendum and win a two-thirds majority. The final test is a political one of policy, whether we should or should not circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers.

Under Article 22H, on the other hand, if the President refuses to assent to an amendment to a non-core Constitutional provision, the question is put to the Courts. The Courts must answer a narrow question whether the amendment does in fact circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. If the Courts agree with the President that it does, then the President's veto is upheld. The final test of the Constitutional amendment is a judicial one of law: whether it does or does not circumvent or curtail the President's powers. The Courts do not, and correctly cannot, decide the wider political question whether it is desirable to modify the President's powers as proposed.

Article 22H, therefore, is inadequate because it provides no mechanism, such as a referendum, to decide this wider question. That is the first problem.

The second problem is that Article 22H would prematurely confer upon the President the power to veto non-core Constitutional amendments. The Government has not brought Article 5(2A) into effect in order to preserve full flexibility to amend the Constitution and modify the Elected President provisions in the light of practical experience. This leads to an anomaly: amendments to non-core Constitutional provisions are subject to Presidential veto, if they circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers, whereas the core provisions setting out these powers have, correctly, not yet been entrenched.

The solution is to separate Article 22H into two parts, which can be brought into effect separately:

One part is an amended Article 22H, confined to legislation other than Constitutional amendments, where the President's veto, once upheld by the Courts, is final. Before or after exercising his veto, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, seek the opinion of the Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges as to whether the legislation has the effect of circumventing or curtailing his discretionary powers.

A second part is a separate mechanism to deal with non-core Constitutional Bills. A new Article 5A deals with Constitutional amendments which do not affect the core provisions listed in the master entrenchment provision, Article 5(2A), but nonetheless have the effect of circumventing or curtailing the President's discretionary powers. Again, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, obtain an opinion from the Tribunal. However, unlike Article 22H, the President's veto under the new Article 5A is not final. If the Tribunal upholds the President's view that the Bill does have the effect of circumventing or curtailing its discretionary powers, the Prime Minister may refer the Bill to a national referendum. If two-thirds of the electorate support the Bill, the President's veto will be overruled.

The President will be required under both the new Articles 5A and 22H to expressly state whether he intends to withhold his assent to the proposed legislation. If the President has not exercised his veto within 30 days of the proposed legislation being presented to him, he is deemed to have assented to the Bill.

This is the same provision as the existing Article 148A(5) of the Constitution, which applies to Supply and Supplementary Bills. The Select Committee adopted this Article from a Malaysian provision. Its purpose was to deal with a difficult President. This was the reason given in the Committee Report:

"... the Committee recognizes that a problem can arise if a President deliberately or otherwise delays conveying his decision on assent ... Such delay or failure to decide will prevent Parliament from trying to override the President's veto ...". No such problem has in practice arisen between the incumbent Executive and the incumbent President since the legislation was brought into effect. However, to prevent a problem from arising in future, we are taking the opportunity to insert this provision as a precaution.

Consequential upon these changes, the master entrenchment provision in Article 5(2A) and Articles 21(2) and 150(5) have also to be amended.

The amended Article 22H will be brought into effect once this Constitutional Bill is passed and assented to. This is to prevent non-Constitutional legislation from circumventing or curtailing the Elected President's discretionary powers.

The new Article 5A will be brought into effect together with Article 5(2A) when we are ready to entrench the Elected President provisions.

This is unlikely to be the final set of amendments before we can entrench the elected presidency provisions. We will probably need one or more rounds of amendments before bringing the new master entrenchment provision and new Article 5A into force.

Veto Powers over Appointments

I now turn to the amendments relating to the President's power of veto over appointments.

Presently, the President's veto over appointments to key public officers and to the boards of the key statutory boards and Government companies in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution is final. It is final even if the President exercises his veto against the advice of the Council of Presidential Advisers. I explained during the Second Reading of the Elected Presidency amendments on 4th October 1990 the reason why we did not provide an override mechanism for appointments. I quote from Hansard, Vol. 56, columns 465 and 466, dated 4th October 1990:

"The overriding mechanism by Parliament is confined only to Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills because these Bills originate from Parliament. It does not apply to the budget of a Government company or statutory board, or to appointments in the public services, because these matters do not come under the direct purview of Parliament. If there is a dispute here, the executive and the President will have to resolve it through fresh submissions of budgets and nominees for appointments."

However, there will be occasions when the difference in views between the Executive and the President is one of judgement, rather than a black and white case of an unfit candidate. This will be so when the Council of Presidential Advisers actually supports the Government's nomination, but the President disagrees with the Council's advice.

If this happens, the present arrangements unfortunately provide no means for the President and the Executive to resolve the impasse, other than the Executive putting up a fresh nomination. Given our limited talent pool, we may well end up with an inferior candidate.

In such circumstances, it is better to have a mechanism to resolve the impasse, rather than force the Executive to nominate another candidate. Articles 22, 22A and 22C of the Constitution will therefore be amended so that where the President vetoes an appointment against the recommendation of the Council of Presidential Advisers, the Executive can take the matter to Parliament, and override the President's veto by a two-thirds majority. This is the same override mechanism provided in Article 148D with regard to the Government's Budget.

This mechanism has one disadvantage. Invoking it will mean bringing into Parliament matters which do not come under Parliament's direct purview. We will have to discuss the merits of the candidate publicly. The experience of countries like the United States, which hold public confirmation hearings, shows the risks of this approach. Proceedings become politicised and sensationalised, private lives are publicised, and good men are put off from standing for office.

But we do not expect such divergence in views between the President and the Executive over appointments to happen often. Most candidates for key appointments will still be considered and appointed outside the glare of publicity. And when the Executive decides to go to Parliament to override the President's veto, it can consciously weigh the disadvantages of the move against the importance of getting the particular candidate appointed. On balance, a Parliamentary override mechanism, although not perfect, is a workable solution.

These amendments are part of the continuing process of fine-tuning the Elected Presidency provisions. There has been no impasse between the incumbent President and the Executive over any key appointment. The President has told me that he agrees with the amendments.

Council of Presidential Advisers

Let me now deal with the third category of amendments.

At present the Council of Presidential Advisers consists of five members. Two are appointed by the President in his own discretion, two are appointed on the Prime Minister's advice, and one on the advice of Chairman PSC. The President, in his discretion, appoints one of the members as Chairman.

Although the Presidential Advisers are appointed on the nomination of the President, the Prime Minister or the PSC Chairman, they have their own standing. They serve for fixed terms, and once appointed cannot be removed at will.

When the legislation creating the Elected President was first passed, the Government had envisaged that as the institution of the Elected President evolved, the Council of Presidential Advisers would in time come to play a larger role.

The experience gained with the Council over the last five years shows that the mechanism is workable. It is timely now to consider expanding the Council to further build up its stature. A larger Council will also enable us to tap a wider spread of expertise, so that the Council can better advise the President on the broad range of issues on which he must exercise his custodial functions.

An enlarged Council will complement the new mechanism to override the President's veto of appointments. The override mechanism places a heavier responsibility on the Council. Their recommendation will determine whether the President's veto is final, or whether it can be overridden by Parliament. A larger Council is better placed to make a balanced and objective assessment of the suitability of the nominee. And if the President vetoes the candidate against the Council's advice, and the Executive seeks to override the President's veto, the Executive will have a stronger basis to do so.

The Bill therefore amends Articles 37B and 37C to enlarge the Council from five to six members. Article 37J provides that in case the votes are tied, the Chairman of the Council will have the casting vote.

The additional member will be nominated by the Chief Justice, and appointed by the President. Having the new member nominated by the Chief Justice, instead of by the Prime Minister or President, will build up the Council as an independent body.

Finally, the Bill also makes a minor and technical amendment to Article 113 to reflect the authority of the Education Service Commission and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission with respect to pension rights of officers under their respective jurisdiction.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Dr S. Vasoo (Tanjong Pagar GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the amendments to the presidential powers as it sets out clear-cut procedures for the President to exercise his powers. It also allows the President various recourses to deal with anomalies that he will face. This is a good thing because there are various anomalies which would happen in the process of exercising his powers. Therefore, the amendments have set the right direction to reduce such problems.

The other significant point about this Bill is that it allows for a mediatory process which is a good thing. Because there are a lot of things that need to be mediated, this could be resolved effectively through mediation. And I support all these changes.

Sir, what I am concerned about are the changes to the Constitution with regard to the GRC provision. If you will recall, when we first made changes to our Constitution to institute the GRC concept, it was to allow for minority representation. This is a good thing because, in the context of Singapore, the changes will ensure Parliament to have representatives from minority groups. There was a fear that, at one stage, if minority candidates were to contest in single seats, there was a likelihood that they may not be elected into Parliament. So the whole concept of GRC is valuable in the sense that we have a balanced racial representation in Parliament. This is important to Singapore, as a whole, and for our nation building.

Sir, the proposed changes could, in the worst scenario, if you examine it, provide a leeway for future governments to reduce the number of minority representation in Parliament because the new amendments set the minimum cap at 25%. The existing Constitution allows for a maximum cap of 75%. There has been express concern by the minority groups. The underlying worry is the adequacy of minority representation in future. I see this is the nagging concern that many minority groups have. The issue of adequacy is a highly debatable one. How adequate is adequate is a question which is very subjective. I may say it is adequate. For example, Mr Harun Ghani may say it is not adequate. Mr Chandra Das may say it is more than adequate. Generally, it is an issue that is sharply debatable. There is no wholly acceptable formula. I do not subscribe, in Singapore politics, to having a formula because that is very dangerous and could lead to divisive politics in Singapore. And any move towards a formula must be discouraged.

Sir, I would like to ask the Prime Minister to address the nagging concern about future minority representation in Parliament. I would like to ask him what mechanism do we have to ensure that there will be a reasonable minority representation in the future Parliaments of Singapore, now that we have these constitutional changes. This is an issue which I hope the Prime Minister will address.

Sir, whilst we need to have minority representation in Parliament, we must not institute a quota system in political representation. I would avoid this and I for one would not support it. Sticking to the quota approach will be socially unhealthy to Singapore and may, in the long run, be ethnically divisive and can erode our nation building and community cohesion. There is nothing to prevent various community and minority groups from asking for special quotas and privileges for various social provisions, such as housing, education, employment and health. When we look at some countries which have instituted this in their Constitution, it has led to serious problems and consequences. This has also led to the breakdown of many of these communities and societies because it allows for acrimonious arguments and debates as to how this quota is going to be fulfilled. This is a very dangerous route for us to take and we should at all costs avoid taking it.

Sir, it is important for us to strengthen Singapore's social foundation, as it is in our long-term interest to ensure that our meritocratic principles should continue to be applied in the political arena. This is important. We have evolved a very good system by allowing the best candidate, the best person to be cajoled or encouraged to participate in politics and we should keep it this way. This would prevent our political landscape to be subverted by ethnic strife. This is also a very dangerous route for us to take and if we allow this, there is nothing to prevent us from opening up the ethnic Pandora's box. I would strongly advise against encouraging and allowing this to happen.

Sir, what would I like to ask the Prime Minister is that, with these changes, will it make our social and political foundations stronger. This is a fundamental question that we have to ask ourselves, ie, with all these changes that the Prime Minister has suggested, is it going to further strengthen our political foundation?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen (Nee Soon Central): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, my main point with regard to the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1996 is on the proposed expansion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the PAP Government has always said that its action is in the interest of the people and the country and in the long term interest of all. But if we analyse it, you will find that this is only an excuse. In fact, when they amend the Constitution, it is to create better and greater advantages for the ruling party. From the single seat constituency to GRC and from three member GRCs to four member GRCs and now they try to increase it further to six members. All these actions show that the PAP Government either lacks long-term vision or is trying to protect its own interest to consolidate and continue its rule in Singapore. As far as the GRC system is concerned, the People's Action Party Government said it was intended to ensure that minority interests are represented in Parliament. But its true intention is to make things difficult for the Opposition parties to compete with the ruling party. If you say that minority representation is for quality and not quantity, then the Government can even turn around to say that we can nominate minority representation in Parliament to achieve this purpose. The PAP always says that its candidates have been very stringently selected. Yet, their minority candidates would not dare to stand in single-member constituencies and they have to come under the umbrella of the GRC to get into Parliament. This is ridiculous.

Let us look at Mr J.B. Jeyaretnam, the Workers' Party's Secretary-General. On his own strength, he was able to win in a single-member constituency against the so-called quality candidate of the PAP. It is a matter of regret that this Constitution (Amendment) Bill is tabled. It creates yet another advantage for the ruling party and reduces the representation of minority groups in Parliament. This Constitution (Amendment) Bill before us seeks to pave the way for the formation of CDCs and this, in fact, is the real motive of the amendment. I am saying this because the objective of the CDCs is to enlarge the powers and functions of the CCC and the RC through the use of Government resources, and the nomination of their own people to run the show. I think it is unnecessary to set up the Community Development Council.

With this establishment, the functions of certain Ministries and Government agencies would be taken over and the effectiveness of the CCCs would be reduced also. Furthermore, the functions of the CDC will duplicate those of the CCCs, RCs and some other Government agencies and thereby wasting our national resources.

Our Constitution is to defend democracy. It cannot be amended at random. Otherwise, our democratic system will be undermined. Unfortunately, the PAP Government has always been looking after their own interest, and treating the Constitution lightly by amending and amending it all the time. The PAP Government has said that it wants to win handsomely in the next election. Are they trying to achieve this by this Constitutional amendment? If they do so, how can they say they have won handsomely? If they really want to win handsomely, they should revert to the single-member constituencies and abolish all the GRCs and compete with us, one to one. Otherwise, they would never be able to win handsomely. They would, at best, win ungentlemanly.

Mr Speaker, Sir, unless we have a national referendum on this Bill, otherwise I will be against this amendment before us.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, may I seek a clarification from the Member for Nee Soon Central? At one point, he said that the amendment to the GRC scheme was designed to consolidate and prolong the PAP's rule in Singapore. Having ruled Singapore for so long, should the PAP not try to consolidate, grow and provide good government for Singapore? If not, which party does he think should now consolidate and rule Singapore?

That is my first question, Sir. I will ask my second question later.

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Sir, I said just now that the ruling party, ie, the PAP, is moving this constitutional amendment to give themselves an undue political advantage. That is because it enables the ruling party to have all the advantages it wants for every general election. Our Constitution is based on the British Constitution and it is a sound system. There is no need to amend it so frequently. If it is not the intention of the PAP Government to do this, then there is no other explanation.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, I asked him whether he has any other party in mind which he thinks should rule Singapore. He has not answered that. Is he going to answer or not?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Sir, as to which party can replace the ruling party, I think it is for the people to decide. If the majority of the people support a certain party, then that party will rule.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, can the Member name any other party which he thinks should rule Singapore? I do not mind if it is only an opinion from him. Because he regrets we are doing this for something that is not sincere.

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Sir, at this moment, there may not be any party which is in a position to replace the PAP. But it does not mean that this will remain so in the future.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, I have not got a good answer yet, but never mind. If the Member thinks that there is no other party in Singapore at the moment which has done its best to provide leadership for Singapore, then I suppose he should not try to stop the PAP from trying to consolidate, grow stronger and continue to provide leadership to the people of Singapore.

My second question, Sir, is this. Mr Cheo also mentioned that he regretted the existence of the GRC scheme in Singapore. This is a statement which I regret, because the GRC was designed specifically, aside from the provision of town councils, to ensure that there would always be adequate, or at least a minimal, representation of minority communities in Singapore - Indians, Malays and Eurasians. Can I ask him to clarify whether he is against ensuring that there will always be minority Members of Parliament in this House?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, to ensure minority representation, there are many ways to do so. The GRC system is only one of them. We can appoint minority Nominated MPs in Parliament to enable them to represent their minority groups, to speak for them and to protect their interests. Under the GRC system, I think the main aim is to ensure that minority groups are included in Parliament and to give them the opportunity to run the town councils. If this is the real objective, then it is not too bad. But why must the Government increase from three to four, and now from four to six? It is not necessary, because at the moment town councils can merge on their own free will. They can on their own form larger councils. The town councils of various constituencies are free to form larger town councils for better utilisation of manpower. So I feel that this amendment is superfluous and unnecessary. I think the amendment is brought about to make it difficult for the small and weak opposition parties with limited human resources to field six candidates in a GRC, so they can only contest the limited number of single member constituencies, thereby giving greater advantage to the ruling party.

As a matter of fact, Singapore has always been emphasising on meritocracy and free competition. I think single seat constituencies are the best. Minority candidates should fight the single seat constituencies to protect the interests of the minority groups, otherwise it will create a dependency syndrome among the minority groups.

Mr Peh Chin Hua (Jalan Besar GRC): ( In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, Mr Cheo Chai Chen mentioned that apart from single member constituencies, it is not the best way to get the minorities to be represented in the GRCs. They can have Nominated MPs to represent the minorities. I would like to remind him that the NMPs have no right to vote on Constitutional amendments. Does it mean that the minorities should be represented only by second class MPs and not first class MPs?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Mr Peh may be right in this sense. But, if that is the case, then why should you increase from three to four, and now to six MPs. Three is enough. The minorities will be well represented. They have a say. When the number is changed to six, then it is one out of six. If you have two three-member GRCs, then we have two representatives from the minority groups. Even then, the minority representatives are only one out of three. They are elected on the strength of the group of three. In a single member constituency, we can say that they are truly represented.

Mr Peh Chin Hua: ( In Mandarin): Sir, Mr Cheo said that by expanding the size of the GRC to six, the representation of minorities in Parliament is reduced. Does he not know that at the time of a 3-member GRC, the number of GRCs was very small?

Secondly, from the experience of past general elections, if we have only single member constituencies, the result will be that there will be few minority representatives coming into this House. Does he want to have a fewer number of minority MPs in this House?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Sir, I do not wish to see fewer representation of minority groups in this House. Singapore is a multi-racial society and we must have minority representation in the House. As I said, there are many ways of ensuring this. I am not entirely against the GRC concept. I am not saying that it is not a good way. What I am saying is that if you want to use the mechanism of GRC to ensure minority representation in Parliament, then we should not keep on

changing the rules by increasing it from three to four, and four to six, time and again. Because this is totally unnecessary.

Why does the Government want to increase the number of GRCs? I have already said that this is to ensure that they can get good political advantage. I think that is the crux of the matter.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, can I come back to the main issue which I raised for clarification by the Member? It is in regard to his statement that he regrets that this Parliament created the GRC scheme in Singapore to ensure minority representation. Although the Member says that he is not completely against the GRC scheme, I wonder how appointing minority MPs in this House is a better system. I would like to ask the Member whether he can recall in the last election or in previous elections, did the SDP put up minority candidates to stand in single member constituencies. Because he said that it is better to continue to compete in single member constituencies. Mr Cheo is from the SDP. Can I ask him whether his party has done so and what was the experience?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: ( In Mandarin): Sir, I would like to tell this House that in 1988, the SDP fielded minority candidates to contest the election. For instance in 1988, we fielded an Indian candidate, Rasheed, in Punggol Constituency.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, I remember that in the last election, there were some GRC constituencies contested by the SDP and even the Workers' Party.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Single seat.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Yes, I am asking him about single member constituencies because he said that it is better to contest in single member constituencies. There is no assurance that a minority candidate can win. The entire system of GRC is designed to assure - it does not guarantee - as the Prime Minister has explained, that there is a minimum number. There is no assurance that there will be a maximum number. Sir, I do not think the Member has been able to put up a good case to stand by his statement that it is regrettable to have a GRC scheme in this country. I think it is wrong and I hope he will withdraw that statement. I think it is most uncalled for, Sir.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, can I seek clarification from the Parliamentary Secretary who talks about the GRC scheme? I would like to ask him whether Singapore politics has gone to the extent of communal or racial politics whereby minority candidates would never be elected into Parliament if they stand in a single-member constituency.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: I did not make that statement. I asked Mr Cheo because he regretted the idea of the GRC scheme. I have nothing to clarify. I am seeking clarification from the Member, Sir.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: I wish to remind the Parliamentary Secretary that Mr Jeyaretnam was elected in Anson against a Chinese candidate in the 1981 by-election. Secondly, Mr M.P.D. Nair, the Workers' Party candidate in Jalan Kayu secured 48% of the votes. That shows Singaporean voters are not voting along racial lines. In the first place, why is there a need for GRC?

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, is the Member saying that we can be assured that this will be so for the next 10, 20, 30 years? I do not know. Nobody knows, Sir. The PAP also put up minority candidates in single member constituencies before 1988.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am surprised to hear that the Parliamentary Secretary does not know what would happen in the future. But I do have confidence in the voters of Singapore that they would not vote along racial lines. I am surprised that he does not have the confidence.

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Sir, he has learnt to put words into my mouth. It is something that I completely did not say. I only stand here to defend the GRC scheme. I regret that the SDP MP, Mr Cheo, has said that he regretted the GRC scheme although this is one way to ensure minority representation in Parliament. Can I ask whether he wants to withdraw his statement?

Mr Cheo Chai Chen: Sir, I maintain my stand.

Dr John Chen Seow Phun (Hong Kah GRC): Mr Speaker, Sir, the amendment to increase the maximum number of MPs in a Group Representation Constituency from four to six is yet another important step towards building a more socially cohesive democratic Singapore.

Since the introduction of the Bill by the Prime Minister, there have been a number of articles in the press expressing concerns about the dilution of minority representation in Parliament. Some felt that the proposed amendment did not safeguard the existing proportion of minority MPs. Others felt that the original objective of the GRC system to ensure adequate minority representation should not be tampered with and diluted with other objectives.

To address the first concern, let us look at what the existing Constitution and Parliamentary Elections Act guarantee.

The Constitution sets out the operative framework for the GRC system and the Parliamentary Elections Act stipulates the implementation details. Under the existing Article 39A of the Constitution, the number of MPs in a GRC should be at least three, but not more than four. The total number of GRC MPs, however, is stipulated in section 8A(2) of the Parliamentary Elections Act to be at least one-quarter, but not more than three-quarters, of the total number of MPs. With 81 seats, a simple calculation will show you that the guaranteed minimum number of GRCs and, therefore, minority MPs, would only be six. The Prime Minister has said that. The current electoral divisions, however, were drawn in 1991 such that there are 15 GRCs with four MPs each. This gives us a minimum number of 15 minority MPs or slightly less than 20% of the total number of MPs, a proportion which is way above the guaranteed minimum. This proportion seems to be widely accepted by Singaporeans and many want it now to be guaranteed by law.

Sir, this is also what I would like to see as we gradually evolve our GRC system. Contrary to what some have believed, the proposed amendment to increase the maximum number of MPs in a GRC from four to six does not necessarily diminish minority representation. The final number of GRCs in the coming General Election will, as before, depend on how the electoral divisions are drawn. Although the maximum number of MPs in a GRC is to be increased to six, the existing number of GRCs and proportion of minority MPs can still be maintained. There are two reasons why this is so. First, not all GRCs need to have six MPs. Some may have three, four or five. And with a reduction of the number of single-seat constituencies, plus a possible increase of the total number of seats, which is likely because the number of voters has grown throughout the years, the total number of GRCs can be maintained, thus ensuring adequate minority representation. Second, as the Prime Minister has signalled, the PAP is likely to field more minority candidates than the number of GRCs. This will further add to the number of minority MPs.

Some people may argue that if that is what we want, why do we not specify the total number of GRCs and their sizes in the Parliamentary Elections Act now?

Sir, I think it is too early to do so. This is because our population is still growing and our towns are still expanding. It is, therefore, difficult to specify at present a specific combination of electoral divisions of different sizes. But I believe we will get there someday. And perhaps for the larger GRCs, we can then specify, in the future, that they should have at least two minority MPs and not one.

What we can do now though is to increase the guaranteed minimum number. One way to do it is to specify that at least half of the total number of MPs must come from GRCs, up from one-quarter which is stipulated in the Parliamentary Elections Act.

Sir, the second concern is about whether the objective of the GRC system is being changed or enlarged and whether such amendments are wise.

It is clear to me that the objective of the GRC system to ensure adequate minority representation and therefore racial harmony has not changed under the amendment. But the amendment, as I see it, does enlarge the objective to include community bonding, as mentioned by the Prime Minister, especially under the concept of Community Development Councils. I feel that this is something good for the country, and it is a natural extension of the original objective and I do not see why it should not be done.

How does increasing the number of MPs in a GRC to six help in community bonding? Very simply, it will enable a larger town to come under one GRC instead of two or more constituencies whose MPs may not belong to the same political party. Having residents in the same town served by MPs from the same political party will help community bonding tremendously.

Mr Cheo thinks that this is not true. But let me share with Members some of my ground experiences to illustrate my point.

Bukit Gombak Constituency is adjacent to Hong Kah North. Many of its residents live in HDB flats just across a street from my constituency. From time to time, I receive requests for assistance from Gombak residents such as welfare assistance, enrolment into my PCF kindergartens and the use of some of our facilities. Whenever I receive a request from them, I have to use my own discretion to see whether I should accede to it. My grassroots leaders are not so sure whether we should share our resources with these Gombak residents. This is because our resources are built up with the help of my grassroots leaders and residents. Naturally, priority must be given to them. So should I turn away requests from Gombak residents? It is therefore, in my view, much better if Gombak and my constituency are part of a larger GRC encompassing the natural boundaries of Bukit Batok Town. And if later we are part of a Community Development Council, then we can do much more together to foster community bonding in the town.

For the same reason, it is better for bigger towns such as Tampines and Ang Mo Kio to come under one GRC with possibly six MPs. The proposed amendments enable us to do that.

Sir, earlier Mr Cheo said that the proposed changes are the PAP's election ploy to entrench its power and that they will benefit the PAP and handicap the opposition. I say the changes are not a ploy. For the reasons I have explained earlier, they are for the long term good of Singapore. The law and the proposed changes are double-edged swords. I agree with the Prime Minister that they are neutral. That opposition parties are at a disadvantage is no fault of the PAP. Opposition parties feel threatened because they are weak. If their candidates are strong, they would have a chance to win a GRC and therefore the multiple seats that go with it. In fact, it was clear from the last General Election that strong Opposition candidates generally obtained a higher percentage of votes. This also shows that the electorate is now more discerning. Therefore, the Opposition should not blame their poor showing on the changes to the laws.

With that, Sir, I support the Bill.

The Minister for Community Development and Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs (Mr Abdullah Tarmugi): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to confine my speech to clause 14 of the Amendment Bill which seeks to raise the maximum number of MPs in a GRC to six. Like Mr Maidin, Sir, I too regret that Mr Cheo regrets the formation of GRCs. Either he is naive or he does not really fully appreciate the reasons for the formation of GRCs.

Sir, I have no doubt that the GRC concept is an improvement in our political development because ultimately it is the voters and residents who benefit from the arrangement. The GRC Members of Parliament, like any single-member constituency Member, will have to serve the constituents in his division. But apart from this, his continued tenure in Parliament will also have to depend on the performance of his other colleagues in the GRC. In other words, it is to his interest that his colleagues, regardless of their ethnic origins, do their jobs well and with the support of their residents. This provides a self-checking mechanism within a GRC. It means collective responsibility where under-performance by any MP in the GRC affects the votes of the whole cluster. All this makes the MP a team player, ever vigilant of his own performance as well as that of his other colleagues. The all-round effect, Sir, is a raising of the total quality of service to residents by their representatives in Parliament. This shatters the myth that one strong MP can carry other weaker or ineffective MPs in the GRC, especially given the increasingly higher expectations of voters nowadays. It follows, therefore, that in a five or six-Member GRC, the amount of team work and the need for strong leadership increases. If we couple this with the Prime Minister's plan to create CDCs among the GRCs, it at once becomes apparent how clause 14 of the amendment is indeed an improvement to the GRC concept.

However, Sir, the proposed increment raises the concern that minority representation in Parliament and therefore in national politics could be compromised. If this is indeed true, then it is a serious concern as it impinges on a fundamental basis of the GRC concept, ie, of ensuring a multi-racial Parliament in Singapore. Sir, I too share this concern, not so much because I belong to the minority community, but because what we are doing is the right thing to do. I have received feedback from concerned individuals and professionals in the Malay, Indian and Eurasian communities on this issue. I have brought them up to the Prime Minister's attention and had discussed the matter with him. He understands and empathises with these concerns and fears.

Sir, it is crucial for multi-racial representation in the political life of this country to be preserved. This dovetails our belief and commitment to multi-racialism. The inter-racial harmony that we have enjoyed so far also owes much to the fact that no community feels that its concerns and legitimate interests are totally ignored or neglected or that it feels left out in the political processes in this country. And unless the various communities here find a place in Singapore life and a role in determining the destiny of Singapore, they will not feel a sense of belonging to this still young nation. I am therefore heartened by PM's reiteration of his assurance that adequate multi-racial representation in Parliament will be preserved even with this proposed amendment to the Constitution.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have no doubt that this Government will honour its promises and commitment to ensure adequate minority representation in Parliament. Singaporeans, especially the minority communities, can be assured of this. However, whether future governments or the Opposition will honour this commitment, there is no guarantee. For instance, while the PAP in fulfilling its commitments puts up more than one minority candidate in certain constituencies or even minority candidates in some single member constituencies, the Opposition is not obliged by law to do likewise.

It is not easy to find good candidates, not just any candidate, to stand for election; harder still for minority candidates, because of the smaller base. I have been involved with helping to scout for Malay candidates and this has indeed been the case. So it can be tempting for parties interested in forming the Government to use this as an excuse to omit or put up only a token number of minorities in their slate in any election. We have to monitor this situation closely, Sir. I agree with the Prime Minister that it may be worth considering legislation at a future date to further refine the mechanics of minority representation in our Parliament.

Sir, I support the amendment.

Mr Ling How Doong (Bukit Gombak): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for giving me this opportunity.

Before I start, can I just briefly mention this. Dr John Chen earlier on has mentioned the fact that the advantage of a GRC is that you have more MPs in the same group. I thought this has been in practice by the PAP Town Councils. For example, the Sembawang Town Council is a GRC, they are taking in Nee Soon South. So I think his argument does not hold weight at all. You can have all the GRCs grouped together and operate even under one GRC. There is nothing to prevent that from happening. In fact, this has been done in a number of the PAP Town Councils.

Dr John Chen Seow Phun: Mr Speaker, Sir, can I reply to that point?

Mr Speaker: You want to give way, Mr Ling?

Mr Ling How Doong: Yes.

Dr John Chen Seow Phun: Mr Speaker, Sir, I think Mr Ling has mistaken my point. My point is that with a larger GRC, you can then have one satellite town under one GRC. And if that is the case, then all the MPs in that town will be under the same political party. But this is not true now with Gombak and Hong Kah North. So I am saying, because of that, I find community bonding more difficult because the residents across the street interact with my residents also. They go to the same neighbourhood centre. So by increasing the number to six, I believe this is one advantage and it will help us in furthering the goal of community bonding.

Mr Ling How Doong: As I mentioned earlier, you could achieve the same result without having to increase the number of candidates in the GRC.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Constitution is sacrosanct. This amendment strikes at the foundation of parliamentary democracy in a sense that it has deprived voters the right, the liberty, to choose the candidates they want. This political decision to change our electoral system, through the GRC scheme, is repugnant to parliamentary democracy. True, the feature of the one-man-one-vote is still there but then it deprives the voters the liberty to choose candidates of their choice. And to me it is implied that any amendment that takes away, curtails or strikes at the foundation of the rights of the voters, you would have to refer it by way of referendum.

I give a simple example. If that can be done, without referendum, the Constitution can be amended, very soon you can keep on amending the Constitution to say that the people have no right to vote. To follow your argument that far, you can in fact amend the Constitution to say that you have no right to vote at all or rather you will only vote the candidates I put up. It can go that far. That is why I am saying that it is implied in the Constitution. It may not be written but it is implied. Anything that takes away the basic and fundamental rights of the voters, it can only be done through referendum and not otherwise.

The GRCs not only undermine this basic and fundamental right but, to me, it is also a scheme to get those rejected and the weak into Parliament. I for one am never against the idea to have minority representation in Parliament. In fact, I would suggest it should be proportional representation, eg, if the Malays make up so many percent, they will be represented in that sense by that percentage or more, in fact. The minimum is proportional representation. In fact, my colleague Mr Cheo mentioned this point earlier. He did not say that GRC is against minority representation. He said that there are other means. Of course, he mentioned the NMP. I would mention one way is by way of NCMP because NCMP is more representative. You stand as individuals. You stand for election and it would be divided into categories - the Malays, the Indians, and whatnot. So when you decide on the NCMP, you cannot put in a Chinese in the same category, because you may have problems. So you put all the Malay candidates, choose the highest number of them and then select them accordingly. Similarly, for the Indians. It is more representative in that sense.

One must remember that at every election, be it the Government or the Opposition, invariably you call for a mandate from the people. You are asking for a mandate from the people to continue for the next term and thereafter. It is a question of mandate. Can you be sure that you will get a mandate in the GRCs? My answer is no. Because in a GRC, previously you had three, four, but now you have six. Not all the six of them will be able to get a mandate. Probably you will get one or two. Now, how are you going to decide that all of them have got a clear mandate from the people to be in Parliament for the next term? So the only way to decide would be in a single constituency. Let the people decide. It is only in a single constituency that you will be able to determine whether you get a true mandate from the people.

I was a bit surprised when some of the Members mentioned the fact that a minority candidate needs to be in a GRC to come to Parliament. I think you are doing a disservice to your own kind. Please, you should have more confidence in your own kind, rather than having your own people in a GRC, under the umbrella of a strong candidate, to be put into Parliament. You must remember in the early days of the PAP when the people had so much confidence in the PAP, any candidate put up by the PAP went in. Serious! They were voting, not based on the individuals, but under the symbol and the banner of that particular party. So in the early days of the PAP, when they put up anyone, you could safely say it was a walk-over. What happens now? Please, you must have the confidence in your own party, that you can be in Parliament on your own steam, rather than being pulled in. In Mandarin, it says it is a vehicle of convenience passing your way, you just jump on the bandwagon and, there you are, you will be carried into Parliament. Please have more confidence in your own people rather than to have this sort of thing.

I am more concerned with this fact. To me, I feel that all MPs, in particular Ministers, should get a clear mandate from the people to be in Parliament. All candidates, ministerial as well as ministerial aspirants, should get a mandate from the people to come into Parliament. And the only way to do so is to be in a single constituency.

This amendment is quite different from the previous one in the sense that in the previous GRC scheme, the most important purpose was to ensure minority representation in Parliament. But this amendment is not so, because you have already secured this in the previous amendment. The present one is not about securing or protecting minority interest in Parliament. You are just increasing it. Why? In my mind, this amendment is not so much for the protection of minority interest because there is really nothing to protect. They are protected under the previous amendment. So there is nothing to protect under this amendment. In my mind, this amendment is to strengthen the ruling Party and to entrench its continuous rule.

The Government has done so much for the people as they claim. What is there to worry to confront the people? The people can look at the last five years and see that they have performed so much. You know that Singaporeans are no fools. They are very sophisticated. They know who to vote and what to vote. So if you show them and convince them that you have done that much for them, I am sure you will be elected. So why should you have this particular scheme to get more and more into it - three, four, six, very soon 15, 20, and keep on increasing it. As I said, the very basic and fundamental right of the people to have the liberty to choose candidates of their choice is not there anymore. So what are we talking about parliamentary democracy? As I said earlier, if you have done so much for the people, the PAP candidate can sleep in peace. In Mandarin, it says, [gao zheng wu you], just sleep soundly. You do not have to worry about all this. Why is it that at almost every election, new schemes and devices will come in? To me, it is under the pretext of protecting minority interest and communal bonding. To me, it is something else. By introducing all these schemes and amendments, even if you win, what is so much about the honour? There is a Hokkien saying, ya ma ya, ya liao eh sui.

An hon. Member: Could you translate it?

Mr Ling How Doong: If you want to win, win in a very honourable and proud way. That is the Hokkien saying. I come to this conclusion that the introduction of this amendment is a reflection of the acute kiasu syndrome of the PAP.

Dr Tan Cheng Bock (Ayer Rajah): Can I seek a point of clarification from Mr Ling? If I remember correctly, the SDP's stand on the Non-Constituency MP is that it is against the NCMP scheme and it has reasons for objecting. So for the same reason, you are prepared to compromise and allow for minority representation. Am I right? You are against the Non-Constituency MP. Now, for the same reason, you are prepared to allow the ---

Mr Ling How Doong: No. I did not say that. We are against the NCMP even. We are also against the NMP.

An hon. Member: You are changing your mind.

Mr Ling How Doong: I am not changing my mind. This is to allay the fear of the minority groups, ie, the Malays, the Indians and the minorities, that they are not represented. When I suggested NCMP, what I mean is that the system should work this way. All the parties participating in the election should put up the candidates in the usual way and if they were defeated, then we can consider the scheme of the NCMP. So it is not so much my endorsement. It is a way of ensuring minority representation. I do not want to be accused of shutting out representation of the minorities. I emphasise this point that you must have confidence in yourself. You must have confidence in the party running for the election. It is as simple as that. When I heard Encik Maidin, I feel very sad because he seems to have no confidence in his own kind. Very sad!

Encik Mohamad Maidin B P M: Mr Speaker, Sir, can I ask the Chairman of the SDP why we should participate in a single-seat constituency and come in as an NCMP. It seems that this effort to ensure minority representation has already been built in his mind. Does he have in his mind that the minority candidates will lose the election? Why can we not compete and win? Why must we come in as NCMPs? You already have preconceived ideas.

Mr Ling How Doong: If you stand in single constituencies you will be guaranteed. It is better than the GRCs. What I mean is that you come in on your own steam and you can be assured. A more equitable aspect is that you ensure both the ruling as well as the Opposition parties. If you consider the GRCs, it is not necessary the ruling party will get the most number of votes, the Opposition parties will also get the votes. So this scheme not only covers the ruling party but also the Opposition parties.

Dr Tan Cheng Bock: Mr Speaker, Sir, the Non-Constituency MP is for the Opposition. It is not for the ruling party. Does he understand the concept of the Non-Constituency MP? It is not for the ruling party. It is for the Opposition who cannot make the grade.

Mr Ling How Doong: As I said, in substitution of this, you can surely modify and ensure that they also come in a more representative way. At least, we know how many percent of the people support them. Alternatively, you can hold another election and confine it to all the minorities, ie, the Indians and the Malays, and decide who should represent them. Why not? It is better that way.

Mr Peh Chin Hua: ( In Mandarin): I would like to ask Mr Ling one question. Just now, he kept on saying that the PAP should be relaxed and have confidence in themselves. I feel that the SDP is very worried about the GRC and they have no confidence in the GRC. That is why the SDP wanted to cooperate with the PKMS to contest in the GRC. So are they not trying to contest it?

Mr Ling How Doong: You have noticed that when I talked of GRCs, it goes against the very basic and fundamental right of the voters. It is the inability to vote for their own candidate, not so much on the minority. It is only a side issue, a supplement to the whole thing. It is the infringement of the fundamental and basic right of the voters to have the choice of their candidate. That is why I am mentioning this.

Mr Peh Chin Hua: ( In Mandarin): Under this legislation, anyone who votes for the candidates in the GRC is exercising his choice.

Mr Ling How Doong: So are you saying that if you put up six candidates, I can choose three and forget about the three? Do you mean this can be done under the GRC?

Mr Peh Chin Hua: ( In Mandarin): But if you do not vote for this group of six, you could vote for the other group of six, representing another party.

Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee: Just now, Mr Ling said that Nee Soon South is under Sembawang GRC.

Mr Ling How Doong: I need to clarify. It is actually ---

An hon. Member: Nee Soon Central.

Mr Ling How Doong: No. Nee Soon South and Toa Payoh ---

An hon. Member: Ang Mo Kio GRC.

Mr Ling How Doong: Ang Mo Kio GRC. I am sorry. It is a single constituency and a GRC. They are actually for operational and administrative purposes under one Town Council. My apology.

Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, anyone with a sense of history will know that good government is an accident. In most cases, it is extremely rare. So when we look at these amendments that we are making, we are trying to insure ourselves good government for the future. These structural amendments that we make are not just for today, they are for our children and for our children's children. And for that reason, I think it is a mistake to approach these amendments solely from the point of view of what Singapore is today and look at it from the point of view of what we have today. But we have to consider over the horizon threats as well.

The structure that we have put in place for the Elected Presidency is our insurance for good government in future. And the additional hassle that we go through is the premium we pay for that insurance. And I do not think we should skimp from that because it is for the preservation of Singapore as a political entity in the 21st century and beyond.

Let me consider first the provisions of the Elected Presidency. The amendments that provide for the override of the Presidential veto on appointments make sense because it avoids the possibility that you will have an unbreakable impasse in a situation where we need good people. For those reasons, I support them.

Also, the provisions for the expansion of the Council of Presidential Advisers make perfect sense because by increasing the number of members of the Council to six, it allows for greater degree of specialisation.

As far as the provisions for Presidential veto on amendments of the Constitution and other statutes are concerned, I have a little bit of reservation about that. But since the provisions are already drafted and the provisions will work when they are brought into force, I support them as well. But my only concern is that we should not leave out entrenching these provisions for too long. When the Elected President's powers were defined originally, it was envisaged that the entrenchment provisions would come into play fairly soon. That was what the Prime Minister said when he moved those amendments five years ago. We have had five years already. The Prime Minister had said that this is not going to be the last round of amendments. Perhaps to allay the concern, as some of us would feel that the Elected President provisions could be whittled down too much, the Prime Minister might want to say when he expects Articles 5A and 5(2A) to be entrenched. One hopes that it will be before the next Presidential election.

The amendments to the Elected President powers are not as controversial as the next set of amendments which is the GRC amendments. Unfortunately, in this area, the arguments tend to get clouded by party politics. I think we have to avoid the temptation to deal with this from a party political standpoint and look at it from how it affects Singapore and how it would affect Singapore in future.

Do the GRCs actually improve our political system? There are two things to look at. First, the question of minority representation. I think it is well accepted that we must have minority representation in Singapore. The only thing I can do is to reiterate what Dr John Chen has said about building it into the Constitution because the problem is not with the present Government. The problem is we do not know what future governments would be like. If we can guarantee that future governments would be good and uncorruptible, then we would not have to build in all these elaborate mechanisms. As long as the Prime Minister is the Prime Minister, he has given us the assurance that minority representation will not be diluted. But he cannot speak for the 21st century and that is our problem. And I think that it would be a lot safer if we have these things built into the Constitution so that it is an accepted part of the Singapore political scheme.

As for the expansion of the GRCs, this is the one that creates the most controversy from the party political point of view. But looking at it not as a party man, neither as an Opposition member or as a member from the Government, I think, on balance, it will be good for Singapore. There are a couple of reasons for this. The Prime Minister has already said that the idea is to form a larger unit, a larger unit that can be independent, that is co-extensive with the town, and this of course makes governing the town much more efficient.

The main objection that some people have is that you have basically a package deal. You cannot vote for individuals within the package. I am not sure that is really a bad thing. In a single-member constituency, things tend to boil down to a duel between personalities, a one to one. It can become a clash of prima donnas. It can become a situation where the plausible actor wins over the competent person who is not so good in public relations. So I am not so sure that the one to one duel is actually the best way to pick leaders. When you have a team of six, you do not have to have six equally good PR people. You need a team that works. Having a team and voting for a team, I think, benefits Singaporeans in the sense that you are not voting so much for personalities any more, but you are voting for policies. It is not the people so much as what the policy is. This can only be healthy for Singapore, because it avoids the possibility of having one-shot or one-theme parties. We have seen in other countries, for example, the rise of one-issue parties, Greens, whatever else it is, capitalising on a single issue to get into Parliament. It is much less likely when you have a team of people that you will have this kind of one-issue party, which has no other idea for the rest of Singapore, but it is only focused on a particular local issue, and that certainly is not going to be good for us.

So having a team concept is good. Having a team concept, I think, is also good from the point of view of specialisation. It is always difficult to find a group of six people who are equally competent and equally electable. That is the problem. Sometimes you will find that you have people who are good, people who will be competent as administrators and good at running the country and good at running the towns. But for some personal reasons, because they happen to be shy or because they happen to stutter or because some people may have a personal grudge against them, they are not as electable. Having a team allows, in a sense, a more balanced means of getting leadership in place.

The problem that many people are worried about is that it is changing the rules at the last moment. If this amendment had been proposed much earlier than now, perhaps there would be less opposition to it. People have claimed that this amendment stacks the cards against the opposition. Again, I am not so sure about that.

If we take the long-term view, let us suppose that we have a situation where the government does, in fact, go bad and that it is not working for the good of Singaporeans. Would it be better to have the present system or would it be better to have the expanded GRC system in place? My view is that having an expanded GRC system in place is actually better for the opposition if the government goes bad. If you have a single ward taken by the opposition, a single ward is economically not viable. They have to create their own surpluses. They do not have the economies of scale to provide services to the constituents. And it is very hard for an honest person to go to the people and say, "I can make your life better" when you know that it is going to be so difficult with a single ward. With a large ward, with a team of six, if you take one ward, it is an independent unit that can be run as an independent unit. And if the time ever comes when the government slips up, it is not competent, it is not honest, then the opposition that takes that six-member ward will be able to run it and provide services to the people without compromising their standard of life. Whereas if they take a single ward out of the town, almost inevitably that is going to hurt the people who voted for them. So, in the long run, I think it will be easier for a competent opposition to get into Parliament with a large six-member ward than it would be on single member wards.

There is another reason for that, ie, again, coming to the package deal. People think that the package deal works against the opposition, but actually it does not. If you have six single member constituencies, the opposition has to find six candidates of equal or greater merit than the PAP, and I think it is not an easy task in Singapore to find six people that the electorate will consider to be equal or better than the PAP candidates put against them. But in a GRC of six, you do not need six single members, as it were. You only need one or two people to lead four or five other competent ones. In a sense, it is a very double-edged sword. The government, instead of losing one seat, could lose six on the coat-tails of a single charismatic opposition leader. If you get a person who has got the credibility and the competence, he can put together five other people who may not individually be electable but are acceptable to the population, he can take one of these super wards and he can in fact get a foothold in Parliament where single opposition members would not be able to. And he has the advantage of being able to go to the people and say, "If you elect us, we will have a self-contained town. We can be tested out in this self-contained town."

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Are you going independent?

Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon: I am not saying independent, not necessarily independent. I myself have no political ambitions. I have said so before. So Mr Low need not fear this.

Coming back to the point, I think it will be a mistake to reject the expanded GRC on the ground that it would be against the opposition's interest. In fact, thinking in the long term, looking at the political developments in Singapore, if we want strong checks and balances, a six-member GRC is much more favorable to the creation of a credible opposition than single member seats. As I said right at the beginning of my speech, anyone with a sense of history knows that a good government is not common. Therefore, we should be very careful when we oppose or support amendments like this which create a political structure for Singapore.

On balance, having looked at it from a neutral point of view, I think that a six-member GRC is, in fact, better for us than a single member seat. Although I do not have a vote on this, for what it is worth, I support the amendments.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Sir, can I have your permission to distribute a Table to Members?

Mr Speaker: Yes. [Copies of Table distributed to hon. Members.]

Mr Low Thia Khiang (In Mandarin): First of all, let me state categorically that the Workers' Party is against the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system.

The GRC system enables the People's Action Party to amalgamate and merge constituencies where the Opposition parties had won higher votes in previous General Elections with those constituencies which the PAP had registered higher votes, thereby causing the Opposition votes to become perpetually in the minority and the Opposition candidates unable to be returned. Take Hougang Constituency, for example. If Hougang had been merged into the Cheng San GRC in the 1991 General Election, then even if the same number of voters had voted for me, I would not win my seat in Parliament.

At the 1988 General Election, the PAP used the GRC system to merge all the single-member constituencies where the Opposition parties had won more than 40% of the votes into GRCs. (Please refer to my table. It clearly illustrates the emergence and results of this phenomenon. Percentage of votes cast for the Opposition do not include spoilt votes.) Consequently, although the Opposition camp received almost 40% of the total votes polled in the constituencies they contested, only one Opposition candidate was returned to Parliament.

At the 1991 General Election, the number of seats in a GRC was increased from 3 to 4. Similarly, the single-member constituencies which were merged into the GRCs were those in which the Opposition candidates had received more than 40% of the votes. For example, Paya Lebar, Punggol, Fengshan, Whampoa, etc.

In 1988, when the PAP introduced the GRC system, the Parliamentary Elections Act was amended to provide for 3 members in each GRC, and the total number of Members of Parliament representing GRCs must not be more than half of the total number of Members of Parliament. This was again amended before the

1991 General Election to increase the number of seats in each GRC to 4, and the maximum number of GRC MPs was raised to three-quarters of the total number of Members of Parliament. Now, it is further amended to provide for 3 to 6 seats in each GRC, and apart from 8 single-member constituencies, all the others can be GRCs.

This way, after each General Election, the PAP could make full use of the GRC system to dilute the Opposition votes by truncating and re-arranging all the single-member constituencies where the votes for the Opposition candidates were high, in order to attain its political objectives and to ensure that after the reconstitution of the electoral boundaries the votes for PAP would be in the majority to enable its candidates to win the next General Election.

On the other hand, when the GRC system was first introduced in 1988, a minimum of 32 single-member constituencies were required under the law. Now, so long as there are just 8 single-member constituencies, it would be deemed to be legal. The PAP is certainly learning from its experience at the 1991 General Election.

At that time, the Parliamentary Elections Act required that at least one quarter of the total number of MPs must come from single-member constituencies. As such, the PAP was unable to transform all the single-member constituencies where Opposition votes were more than 40% into GRCs. Furthermore, some of them were new constituencies which were newly created in 1988. On the one hand, there were no data from previous General Elections to accurately reflect the trend of voting there and, on the other hand, to merge the newly created constituencies into GRCs would make its kiasuism too obvious. Therefore, at the 1991 General Election, the Opposition candidates managed to break through the election system controlled by the PAP and won the single-member constituencies - Hougang, Bukit Gombak and Nee Soon Central. This gave Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong a clear signal that Singapore needs Opposition MPs to check on the PAP Government.

Unfortunately, this signal scared the wits out of the elites of the PAP Government. Therefore, they are now trying all ways and means to make it even more difficult for the Opposition parties to win seats at the coming General Election.

As such, the main point in this Amendment Bill is to do away with the provision requiring at least one-quarter of the total number of MPs to come from single-member constituencies. This is to be replaced by a provision of a minimum of 8 single-member constituencies. In other words, irrespective of how many GRCs are to be added on in future General Elections, the number of single-member constituencies need not be increased proportionately.

At the coming General Election, if a single-member constituency is merged into a GRC, even if the Opposition votes are increased, the total number of voters in the GRC will also be increased, and the voters voting for the Opposition will be in the minority. So long as the PAP wins 51% of the votes, its team will win. This is the trick used by the PAP to ensure its posterity and eternal rule, if God willing!

Of course, the PAP wants to win, and wants to win handsomely. In 1988, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said, "We don't like to lose. Nobody likes to lose." Yet, the PAP elites who think no end of themselves do not seem to know the meaning of "winning ungentlemanly". Armed with its more than two-thirds majority in Parliament, they are amending the Constitution and the Parliamentary Elections Act to deprive the people of their rights to have Opposition representatives in Parliament, thereby acting against the people's wishes to have the Opposition parties checking on the Government to enable Singapore to have a sound and healthy political system.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore is a small country. Yet, apart from having "road bullies" on our public roads, but alas, politically, we even have "political bullies" in the form of the People's Action Party in our political arena!

Mr John De Payva: Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to speak on the Bill to amend the Constitution so that we can have bigger Group Representation Constituencies. Let me get down straight to the point. Whenever a matter is raised in Parliament, my concern is to study it from the viewpoint of workers. How will such an issue affect workers? If it advances the interest of workers, I will support it. If it will have an adverse effect on workers, I will speak against it.

Before we go into the Bill, I would like to ask one simple question. Have the lives of our workers improved since the introduction of the Group Representation Constituencies? The answer, Mr Speaker, is quite obvious. GRCs have strengthened our political stability because they have ensured that minority communities will be represented in Parliament. It is because we have such a high degree of political stability that we have been able to attract more and more investments. As a result, more jobs have been created. In many cases, they are better paying jobs. So workers have benefited.

But when the Government wanted to enlarge the scope of the GRCs, some critics were quick to point out that this might lead to lower representation in Parliament for minority communities. Going strictly by arithmetic, the critics are right. But our Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers have come out openly to reassure minority communities that their interests would be fully safeguarded in any constitutional amendment. Our key leaders have indicated in no uncertain terms that arrangements will be made so that the level of minority representation in Parliament is not eroded. In some bigger GRCs, this might mean having two minority candidates for each of them.

As a unionist, I see merit in having bigger GRCs. In whatever we do, we need a critical mass. This explains why our trade unions have an ongoing membership recruitment drive. More members mean more leverage. We can speak with a stronger voice. We can get more companies to offer discounts.

It is the same with GRCs. The bigger the GRC, the more effective it can be, provided that MPs elected are men and women of calibre and proven integrity. This is where the Government is raising the stakes, as it were, in going for bigger GRCs. But as the Prime Minister has made it clear, the Government is making this move towards bigger GRCs, not with a view of fixing the opposition.

Mr Chiam See Tong (Potong Pasir): How do you know?

Mr John De Payva: The Prime Minister has disclosed plans for Singapore to be divided into something like 10 zones. Eventually, each of the zones will be run by a Mayor, who must be an elected MP. This is fair enough. Mayors and their team will have to pay attention to bread and butter issues, leaving Cabinet to focus on the wider national interest. Their job is to address local concerns. And to be effective, they have to interact more closely with the masses, most of whom are workers.

In my years of serving workers, I know what are their basic needs, their fears, their hopes and aspirations. They get retrenched when their companies restructure or relocate. They may have bags of experience in a particular line of work, but if the company switches to different lines, they will be retrenched. Workers, especially older ones, worry whether they have the ability and the opportunity to be trained for newer jobs. Older workers have families to take care of. In some cases, they have to do overtime to bring home enough money. Faced with training and overtime, they have opted for overtime. Unions need to help these workers adjust to ever-changing situations. Workers worry about whether they will be able to afford medical care when they retire. Indeed, they worry whether they have enough money to last them through their years of retirement. Many workers have bought their HDB homes. They may have paid for them. The value of these flats may have risen astonishingly high, but they know that they can make capital gains only if they sell their flats. What happens after selling their flats? Where do they stay?

Sir, these are the concerns of workers. Many hope their children will do better than them and so help them in old age. At the same time, they worry over the erosion of Asian values among the young, values of thrift and filial piety. Of course, our workers do not just moan and groan. They are a pragmatic lot. They know the value of hard work, but they also know how to let their hair down and enjoy themselves. We in the labour movement have set up many social and recreational facilities for the benefit of workers. These facilities complement what has been provided by the Government. With mayors in charge of larger districts, workers can look forward to even better facilities. They can look forward to more bursaries and scholarships for their children. In other words, Sir, our workers are more interested in schemes that can improve their lives and the lives of their families rather than engage in debates on democracy and human rights. American journalists such as William Safire have their own narrow definition of democracy. To our workers, democracy means the right to choose their own leaders by secret ballot, whether it be to run their unions or manage their country. And we have elections regularly. So I cannot understand why the likes of William Safire chose to condemn countries like ours.

Singapore has been criticised for not upholding human rights. What kind of rights have been denied to our workers? The right to employment, the right to free association, the right to strike - these rights are there for workers to exercise, but our workers have chosen to seek fulfilment through hard work and to settle industrial disputes through negotiation, conciliation or arbitration. So there is no basis for anyone to pass judgment on us where human rights are concerned.

Sir, I have mentioned about democracy and human rights because I know that no matter how the House votes today, there will be critics who say that the Government has changed the rules for political expediency. I do not share such views. I fervently believe that larger GRCs will serve the interests of the workers better.

Mr Low Thia Khiang: Mr Speaker, can I seek one clarification from Mr John De Payva? In his speech, he mentioned that the workers in Singapore have the right to strike. I would like to ask him to confirm that the workers in Singapore do have the right to strike and they can organise a strike at any time as they like.

Mr John De Payva: Mr Speaker, Sir, the workers have the right to strike.

Mr Speaker: Order. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 3.30 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended at 3.06 pm until 3.30 pm. Sitting resumed at 3.30 pm