SINGAPORE'S INTERNAL SECURITY (Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister)

2.44 p.m.

The Deputy Prime Minister (Dr Toh Chin Chye): Mr Speaker, I have a statement to make on the internal security of Singapore and our relationships with the Federation.

Sir, this is the first opportunity the P.A.P. Government has had, since assuming office on 5th June, 1959, to make a statement on the question of the security of the State and the Communist challenge. Our basic attitude and philosophy on this question have been stated and restated on innumerable past occasions when the Party was in the Opposition. However, today is the first time we restate the position in some detail after having assumed office. It has not been made earlier because up to the third meeting of the Internal Security Council on the 8th October it was not possible for us to make any statements on this matter. Suffice it to say between the 5th June and 28th August there was correspondence between the Federation Government, the British Government and ourselves to clarify the rights, powers and duties of the Internal Security Council as laid down in Part VII of the Constitution. At the first meeting of the Internal Security Council, the provisions contained in sections 65 and 66 were considered, and the powers of the Internal Security Council were noted and placed on record in simple language as follows:-

(i) "The competence of the Singapore Government to formulate and implement the policy affecting internal security is subject to the overriding powers of the Internal Security Council."

(ii) "In addition to consultation and decisions on questions of policy, the Internal Security Council is competent to make executive decisions for the maintenance of internal security in Singapore, and any such decision which has been communicated to the Singapore Government must be given immediate effect."

(iii) "The Singapore Government is competent to take executive action on its own authority in matters of internal security. For its part, the Internal Security Council is competent to take decisions in these same matters, and in so far as it does those decisions, by virtue of section 66, paragraph (2), endorse, supplement or override any decisions which the Singapore Government may itself have taken and constitute binding directives with which the subsequent decisions and actions of the Singapore Government must conform."

(iv) "The Singapore Government should not take any action in any field which would be contrary to policy already agreed by, or decisions already taken by, the Council or would be likely to raise policy issues, or would have repercussions affecting internal security, without prior reference to the Council."

Sir, the Singapore Government has considered it important that not only the constitutional but also the military and economic power positions of the three Governments participating in the Internal Security Council should be clearly recognised. This power position prevails for this term of office of the Government up till June 1964, and will not be changed just by the United Kingdom Commissioner withdrawing from the office of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara on the 3rd December, 1959. We have nothing to gain by trying to assume, as the last Government did to its own destruction, powers and responsibilities which were not properly within its province. But at the same time such powers and responsibilities as are within our competence, we shall discharge to the fullest in the interests of our people.

We agreed to the provisions for an Internal Security Council in June 1957, giving the Federation Government representative a deciding vote on our Security Council, because we recognised that that was better than giving the British Government the decisive say and that, in fact, if we achieved independence we can only do so as a Member State of the Federation, in which case the Federation Government would have a decisive voice in our national policies anyway. Therefore, until independence through merger is achieved, we accept the position of the Federation Government having a deciding vote in the Internal Security Council.

But apart from the constitutional position, it might be useful to remember also the military and economic positions of the State of Singapore vis-a-vis the British Government and the Federation Government. We have the doubtful honour of having the largest and most important British military base East of Cyprus. The British Government has also a defence pact with the Federation Government. In effect, this means that, to succeed, the Communist challenge for supremacy would have to be strong enough to subdue both the armed might of the Federation and the British, because in military terms a Communist Singapore would not be possible until there is a Communist Malaya. No Communist Party can hope to capture power in Singapore and continue to exist, unless there was already a Communist Government in the Federation.

This is so simple an analysis that it is not worth further argument or discussion. The fact that the tactics of the Communist Party of Malaya have shifted their emphasis from armed struggle to penetration and subversion does not alter the validity of the above analysis.

But the economic power position is not so easily discernible and requires more elaborate explanation. For the last 140 years of British rule, whatever the constitutional niceties of the Colonies in the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States, Malaya was in fact one economic unit, administered as such by one civil administration manned by the Malayan Civil Service. Now, since independence, we have watched with concern the growing tendency to separate the economy. A fact worth noting is that in both the Federation and Singapore, the same British trading interests have investments. It is obviously in the interest of not only the British but also of Malaya to remain as one economy. But if for political reasons the position cannot be held in the immediate future, then we run grave risks of having the British and the Federation Governments settling such political differences that we may have from time to time through economic instead of political action.

For this reason, we have considered it important at the outset of our discussions with the Federation to make it unmistakably clear that our hope is to co-operate and not to compete with them, particularly in the economic and social fields. But to avoid any misunderstanding, we have deemed it important that we should not mislead by word or conduct our British overlord, or anyone else, into believing that the Singapore Government can be made into a stooge government. We shall do everything in our power to work for the interests of the people of Malaya. These interests demand the ultimate reunification of the two territories, but co-operation must be on the basis of mutual respect and adherence to certain principles agreed to beforehand.

Hence it was necessary to clarify the difference in approaches to security problems between a non-Communist Socialist Singapore Government and an anti-Communist Federation Government.

The Federation Government stressed their different position, particularly as a result of a militant Communist insurrection. The Singapore Government has stated the following principles by which it would be guided on security problems:-

(i) The Singapore Government shall not act as a buffer to protect pro-Communist Party forces against the Federation Government. These pro-Communist Party forces, some originally from the Federation and some from Singapore, who are hoping to use Singapore as a refitting base for their struggle in the Federation, must take the consequences of their actions.

(ii) That it is the duty of the Singapore Government to defend in Singapore the rights of left-wing non-Communist Party forces and to encourage their growth. It is the P.A.P. Government's view that the democratic socialist is the most effective countervailing force in the labour movement in this country, and that our policy is designed to aid the growth of the democratic socialist and not a Communist trade union movement.

(iii) That while the Singapore Government shall by social, economic and political policies, negate the Communist claim that only the Communists can resolve the social and economic injustices in our society, it would in the meantime prevent the security of the democratic state from being undermined by the Communists.

Sir, having made our stand on principle, we discussed the question of some 30 odd detainees who were arrested by the previous government in two purges - in October 1956 and September 1957. On the 22nd May, 1959, during the election campaign, I stated that "The P.A.P. would not take office unless former members of the Party who were intimately connected with the Central Executive Committee and who are now in jail are released." This pledge we have fulfilled. Eight P.A.P. members all those intimately connected with the leadership of the Party were released at our insistence on the 4th June before we assumed office on 5th June. On the 1st June, 1959, immediately after the elections and before forming the Government, my Party's Secretary-General, now the Prime Minister, stated that: "The record of the other detainees will be reviewed and justice done on the merits of each case." At present we do not know the full facts leading to their detention. The P.A.P. does not intend to be or even appear to be the hand-maid of the Communist Party. But we do not intend to soil our hands by putting them in the same gloves once used by the previous Government. That is still our stand.

We took a lenient line and released four detainees on the 22nd day of June, 1959. Immediately after that, the Internal Security Council joined in the review of all cases. On the 1st day of October, 1959, after prior consideration by the Internal Security Council, four women detainees were released. The work of the Internal Security Council of reviewing the other cases is still proceeding. But let us make it clear to all concerned that whilst we do not wish to be in any way associated with the purge carried out by the previous Government, we shall be less inhibited in taking our own steps to ensure that there is no recurrence of pro-Communist Party activities. Those who embark on such activities do so at their own risk.

This is also a convenient time for us to say that the Internal Security Council is vigilant and on the watchout for any re-appearance of pro-Communist activists in rural organisations, trade unions, student groups and all the other societies and associations which were formerly exploited for united front purposes. All we wish to say at this stage is that ill-advised activists should learn the lessons of 1956 and 1957. It is our business to look after the welfare and well-being of the people. We have no intention to jeopardise the welfare of the people as a whole for the benefit of a small group whose cause we consider mistaken. Let them ponder on the things we have said and the many more things that we have left unsaid, and desist from the folly of trying to use Singapore as a refitting base of a struggle for supremacy in the Federation.