QUESTIONS FOR ORAL ANSWER (Not reached by 3.30 p.m.) OPERATION SENJATA
Parliament of Singapore · 20 December 1983 · 5th Parliament
Official Report, 20 December 1983, Vol 43, Issue 3 · Open in the reader (summaries, search, filters)
Mr Ng Kah Ting asked the Minister for Home Affairs if he will give the reasons for launching Operation Senjata and an evaluation of the operation, and whether the publicity which accompanied the operation was necessary.
The Acting Minister for Home Affairs (Prof. S. Jayakumar): There was a sudden upsurge in crimes, particularly robberies, housebreakings and thefts of motor-vehicles for the first 10 months of this year as compared to the same period in 1982. In recent months, the situation had been aggravated by the occurrence of several violent crimes in which firearms were used. A feeling of insecurity and unease among the public was developing.
Police therefore had to respond, and decided to launch a series of intensive island-wide anti-crime operation code-named 'Operation Senjata'. This was timed for the festive season, when crime could be expected to increase. The overall objective was to keep up pressure on potentially criminal groups, to emphasise our efforts to maintain law and order and to serve as a reminder to criminal elements that tough action will be taken against them. The specific objectives were:
(a) to increase police presence on the ground and thereby help strengthen the feeling of public security and order;
(b) to intensify discreet checks in locations which have been found to have habitually attracted criminals, and thereby deter crime;
(c) to intensify efforts in apprehending specific targets wanted in connection with major offences committed in recent months. The operation was certainly a success in meeting these objectives.
First, the operation which deployed uniformed officers drawn from the Divisional Police, Police Task Force, Volunteer Special Constabulary and non-operational Commands, had increased public perception of Police presence and enhanced public confidence.
Secondly, a comparison of crime figures for the 3 weeks before and after the launching of Operation Senjata, showed that the operation had deterred criminals from committing various offences. For example, the number of robberies was down by 9%, housebreakings by 29%, thefts of motor-vehicle by 16% and molestation cases by 44%.
Thirdly, out of 384 persons who were detained or prosecuted for various criminal offences, several were, in fact, persons wanted by the Police in connection with serious offences including firearm offences, robbery, housebreaking, rape, secret society activities and drug offences. Arrests were also made for offences discovered during the operations. Weapons, including 3 firearms, were also recovered.
Publicity through the mass media was essential. First, the Police were seen to be effective through intensive patrols and checks. Secondly, in a major operation like this, it was desirable to inform the public of the operation so that they would fully understand the rationale and would not be alarmed by the increased police presence. Such awareness through publicity helped the Police to gain the unprecedented cooperation and understanding of the public when they were subjected to checks or were delayed at a roadblock.
Source: Singapore Parliament Official Report (Hansard) for 20 December 1983. Republished on SGParliament.