CIVIL LAW (AMENDMENT) BILL

Order for Second Reading read. 3.26 pm

The Second Minister for Law (Prof. S. Jayakumar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill will make certain reforms to the law relating to damages payable in cases of fatal accidents. This is necessary because of a change in the law brought about by a judicial decision in the United Kingdom House of Lords in 1981. Similar amendments have been made to the laws of other countries such as the United Kingdom and Hong Kong.

Before 1981, when a person died in a fatal accident caused by the negligent act of another person, the wrongdoer was liable to compensate -

First, the deceased's estate for the deceased's loss of expectation of life;

Secondly, to compensate the dependants of the deceased for the loss sustained by them on account of his death, what is known as "loss of dependency" claim; and

Thirdly, any additional disbursements incurred by any person or the deceased's estate on account of the accident.

The income which the deceased would have earned had he not died was not a part of the damages payable by the wrongdoer. In other words, damages for what is known in the legal jargon as the "lost years" could not be claimed by the deceased's estate.

However, the law on this was changed in 1981 when the United Kingdom House of Lords decided the case known as Gammel v. Wilson. The House of Lords in that case decided that damages for the "lost years" could be claimed by the estate of a person killed in a fatal accident.

That case was followed by our Court of Appeal in 1982 because it was based on the interpretation of a United Kingdom statutory provision which is similar in all respects to section 8(2) of our Civil Law Act.

Certain undesirable consequences may arise from this changed state of the law:

First, double compensation may be payable in cases where the deceased's dependants are not also beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. The wrongdoer may have to pay damages to both the deceased's estate for "lost years" and to his dependants for their "loss of dependency", a result which surely cannot be acceptable.

Secondly, where the deceased has no dependants, other persons, eg, distant relatives, may receive a "windfall" and be unjustly enriched by such an award.

Thirdly, the estate claim for the "lost years" is often higher than the "loss of dependency" claim. In some cases, dependants may obtain damages which are more than their actual loss of dependency. Such cases include cases where the dependants are already elderly and are likely to have died before the deceased person had he not met with a premature death in an accident.

Sir, the need to reform this unsatisfactory state of the law was recognized by the House of Lords in the case of Gammell itself. Nearly all the judges in Gammell's case called for legislative intervention. So too in our own Court of Appeal, quote Mr Justice Lai who called for reform, "It is in the province of our legislature to reform the law."

Therefore, Sir, clause 2 of the Bill will reverse the law as stated in Gammell's case by abolishing the right of a deceased person's estate to recover damages for the "lost years".

Let me now deal with the other amendments in the Bill. In determining damages payable to a person on account of a fatal accident, our courts usually award a sum of about $6,500 for "loss of expectation of life". This award is usually regarded as a "solatium", a consolation, to the close relatives of the deceased. But in law it is awarded to the estate of the deceased. Thus it can also be claimed if the deceased does not have any close relatives. To rectify this anomaly, clause 3 of the Bill will abolish the claims for damages for loss of expectation of life. In its place the new section 12A of the Bill creates a right to claim a fixed sum of $10,000 for "bereavement" which can be claimed only for the benefit of certain very close relatives. If the deceased does not leave behind any such close relatives, no such award will be made to his estate.

The third amendment, as mentioned, Sir, the dependants of the deceased person can always claim for loss of dependency. However, at present the law recognizes only a few categories of persons as dependants for this purpose. Only the spouse, parent, grandparent, child, stepchild and grandchild of the deceased are eligible to claim for loss of dependency. Under our existing law, other relatives who are actually dependent on the deceased but who do not fall within these narrow categories cannot claim for loss of dependency, eg. brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces. In order to prevent undue hardship or injustice, the Bill seeks to extend the categories of dependants to also include -

(a) brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece and first cousin of the deceased.

(b) child treated by the deceased and his wife as a child of their family;

(c) great-grandchild or great-grandparent of the deceased.

I need to add, Sir, that to succeed in any such claim for dependency a person must not only fall within the categories of dependency which we have now enlarged, but must also be able to prove to the court that he was actually financially dependent on the deceased person.

Sir, as I said, this Bill is rather technical but it is necessary and it is, in fact, a response to a suggestion for reform made by the Judiciary itself.

Sir, I beg to move.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Prof. Jayakumar].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.