REPORT OF COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE IN THE SUBORDINATE COURTS (Paper Cmd. 12 of 1986)

Debate resumed.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, page 19 of the Chief Justice's ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: Are you ruling on this, Mr Speaker, Sir?

The Prime Minister: I thought you have.

Mr Speaker: It is public knowledge, Mr Jeyaretnam.

Mr Jeyaretnam: You have ruled?

Mr Speaker: I have.

Mr Jeyaretnam: All right.

The Prime Minister: In my whole experience in Parliament, I have not heard any Member say that a judgment on appeal already read is sub judice. And that we are entitled to read it outside but we must not know about it inside this House. We can break the egg and scramble it and pretend that the egg is still intact.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Have you looked at the Standing Order?

The Prime Minister: 'In my judgment the trial judge erred in law in finding that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case under Section 199 and in acquitting Wong and Jeyaretnam without calling on each of them to enter upon his defence. In all the circumstances the order I make is that there be a fresh joint trial before another judge.'

This is a very important point. The Chief Justice could have sent the case back to the same Magistrate or the District Judge who heard it and directed that he call upon the defence, which is one option open to him. He however chose, two months after hearing the appeal and reading the written judgment of the District Judge, to transfer him and ordered a retrial under another judge. In other words, giving the Member for Anson a chance, a clean chance, a trial de novo, right from the beginning, so that if he is innocent, he will be acquitted. Because the man who had heard him, Michael Khoo, must read this judgment which reversed him and when instructed to call upon the defence must convict ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: Who said that?

The Prime Minister: --- unless the defence is upheld.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Is it in the law?

The Prime Minister: Yes, it is in the law. When an Appellate Judge is directed to call upon the defence ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: He must convict.

The Prime Minister: --- unless he holds that the defence is valid, he must convict, yes.

Mr Jeyaretnam: This is something new.

The Prime Minister: I stand by a simple principle of law.

Mr Jeyaretnam: You tell me where it is found.

The Prime Minister: In page 20, the Chief Justice goes on to say, before he begins to upset Michael Khoo on a series of findings of fact:

'... the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.' He conceded that he would be slow in reversing Mr Michael Khoo on findings of fact because Michael Khoo had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. He went on, in page 23, about a cheque given by a Dr Ivy Chew to the Workers' Party, crossed, and he said:

'When it was issued by her [by Ivy Chew] it became prima facie the property of the Workers' Party.'

Mr Jeyaretnam: Couldn't he be wrong?

The Prime Minister: He is right, Mr Speaker, Sir, because ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: You say so.

The Prime Minister: --- the appeal is over. He was appealed against in the Court of Criminal Appeal. It was out. He was appealed against in the Privy Council. The Privy Council has no jurisdiction. It is out. It is the final word.

Mr Jeyaretnam: The Prime Minister is misleading the House.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, may I ask for some protection? I do not intend to shut out anything.

Mr Jeyaretnam: No. You are misleading the House.

The Prime Minister: I am reading the Chief Justice's judgment. Is the Chief Justice misleading all of us?

Mr Jeyaretnam: Mr Prime Minister, it was not appealed against. You are a trained lawyer, Mr Prime Minister.

Mr Speaker: Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, will you please sit down.

The Prime Minister: I am a man not without some determination. And I am determined that the House shall know why the Chief Justice transferred Michael Khoo. On page 26:

'It seems to me obvious that the best evidence to refute that clear inference would be evidence from Dr Chew. However, she was not called by the defence although she was available as a witness if the defence wished to call her.

The defence chose to rest its case upon Jeyaretnam's evidence alone on the question of Dr Chew's intention. To refute Dr Chew's intention as expressed on the face of the cheque [which I thought was a very simple proposition] the defence relied on Jeyaretnam's bare assertion that there was a note from her to him accompanying her cheque and Jeyaretnam's assertion that he had a subsequent telephone conversation with her as to the use to be made of its proceeds.' The defence is not that the cheque did not belong to the Workers' Party and he defrauded the creditors by transferring it out from Workers' Party funds, but that there was a covering note from Dr Chew and a subsequent telephone conversation with her which enabled him to make use of it in a different way.

'It will be seen from the second passage that I have quoted, wherein the trial judge stated that the only evidence he had concerning Dr Chew's intention was the testimony of Jeyaretnam, that he ignored or failed to consider the evidence before him of Dr Chew's intention as expressed on the face of her own cheque. The failure to do so was in my opinion a serious misdirection.'

And the Chief Justice went on:

'I am unable to accept Jeyaretnam's evidence that there was a note to him from Dr Chew and consequently I do not accept his evidence of their subsequent telephone conversation for the following reasons.' In other words, the Judge not having seen Mr Jeyaretnam, just with the evidence on the record, says the finding is contrary to the evidence on the record. And he explains why.

'It was highly unlikely that Dr Chew would write the words "Workers' Party" on the face of the cheque and send it to Jeyaretnam with a note, the contents of which were as related by Jeyaretnam, if she did not intend to donate the sum specified on its face to the Workers' Party. If her intention was different from that as expressed on the face of the cheque, her evidence was necessary to explain why she wrote the words "Workers' Party" on the face of the cheque when she intended someone else to be the donee of her $2,000 gift. And, if her intention was to donate the $2,000 to Jeyaretnam to be used by him for any purpose he thought fit, it was essential for her to give an explanation why she named the Workers' Party and not Jeyaretnam as the payee on the face of her cheque.

Furthermore, in the two statutory declarations made by Dr Chew which were in evidence [Dr Chew made two statutory declarations on oath] she stated that she "volunteered the donation of $2,000 with the tacit understanding that it be used at Mr J B Jeyaretnam's discretion for the opposition" (the emphasis is mine). The ordinary meaning of the expression "tacit understanding" is an understanding that is not expressly stated but is implied. And it follows that she was in effect saying in her statutory declarations that she did not expressly tell Jeyaretnam, but it was implied, that she left it entirely to him to use her gift at his discretion for the opposition. In my judgment, her statutory declarations, correctly understood, contradicted Jeyaretnam's evidence ... It follows that the trial judge was wrong in his finding that her statutory declarations "substantially confirmed what (Jeyaretnam) had said regarding her donation.".' In other words, that was wrong. It was contradicted by the cheque which she wrote and by her statutory declaration which says there is a tacit understanding. So there could not have been a telephone conversation nor a note which was not produced.

"Finally, on the question of Dr Chew's intention I feel I should deal briefly with a comment by the trial judge on the fact that the prosecution did not call her as a witness."

"... It was ... most unfortunate that the Court was deprived of the opportunity of hearing their evidence,"' ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: Why didn't the prosecution call them?

The Prime Minister: "... the defence elected not to call them totestify in support of its allegations." I quote the Chief Justice. I did not try the case.

'In my judgment, it was sufficient for the prosecution to rely on the cheque itself as proof that the cheque was the property of the Workers' Party but, having regard to the nature ... of the defence on the issue of Dr Chew's intention, the defence should have called her as a witness.' In other words, here was a party supporter, signed this cheque, was alleged to have given a piece of paper, and said, "You do with it as you like", had a subsequent telephone conversation. Here was the Secretary-General of the Party about to be found guilty and she could not be produced. All that they could get was a statutory declaration in which she very carefully said "tacit understanding".

In page 33:

'In my judgment, these passages disclose errors on the part of the trial judge. First, in the passage beginning "In the absence of any evidence to the contrary" it seems to me that he failed to take into consideration the undisputed facts relied on by the prosecution together with such inferences as may be drawn from the proved facts and failed to weigh that evidence against Jeyaretnam's evidence before coming to the conclusion that Jeyaretnam's evidence could not be untrue. In my judgment this was a serious misdirection [a serious misdirection].

Secondly, the trial judge [ie, Michael Khoo] erred in his finding that "there would have been no grounds for the prosecution to complain" had the cheques been first banked into the Workers' Party bank account and then paid out to Madam Chew's solicitors.

In my judgment the trial judge misconstrued the evidence of Mr Keith Tay [an accountant]. It is clear that the answer [Mr Keith Tay's answer] was in response to the question which required the witness to assume as a fact that Jeyaretnam was entitled to pay Mdm Chew's costs "from a donor"'". Again, a finding of fact that the judge allowed extraneous and irrelevant material to influence his finding on the case.

Page 35:

'The trial judge, in my judgment, was wrong in his conclusion that the evidence, inter alia, was favourable to the defence on the question of a fraudulent intention ... At best, it was ... neutral evidence.

Lastly, ... the trial judge erred in law in relying on the Rangoon Case ... for finding that even though the cheque was the property of the Workers' Party, Tay Boon Too had not obtained any right or title to its proceeds and consequently had no right to the distribution of the proceeds according to law.'

Let me count. Six findings that the man was wrong on facts, on the face of the evidence on the record, before the court. Two findings wrong in law. In one judgment, six findings wrong in fact, two findings wrong in law.

'He erred that there would have been no grounds for the prosecution to complain had the cheques been first banked. He misconstrued. He came to the wrong conclusion.'

Then he dealt with another charge in which Michael Khoo acquitted both the accused of defrauding creditors. This was a sum of $200 from a Mr Ping. On page 61, the Chief Justice has to say this of his Senior District Judge who was, previous to that, his Registrar in the High Court:

'The trial judge appears to have failed to observe, analyse or consider all these material facts and circumstances and in failing to do so, in my judgment, erred in his approach to the evidence of Wong and in accepting Wong's account of what Ping said when he handed his cheque to Wong.'

"Failure to observe, analyse or consider material facts and circumstances." These are not words tossed lightly in a debate in Parliament. The Chief Justice thought about these matters for many months and decided that he would say these words on the record, on permanent record, against the man who had served him as Senior Registrar and whom he had transferred as Senior District Judge.

On page 62:

'In my judgment, on a full consideration of the material evidence and the circumstances and bearing in mind that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses but is nonetheless duty bound to review at large the evidence upon which that finding was reached, [in spite of his reluctance, the Chief Justice says] I am satisfied that the trial judge was wrong in accepting Wong's account and in finding that Ping had no intention of transferring the property in his cheque to the Workers' Party. '

'It follows, in my opinion, inescapably, [these are the Chief Justice's words] that Jeyaretnam's recollection, as given in evidence by him, that Wong told him Ping wanted to give something for Madam Chew's costs must also be untrue as was his recollection that he endorsed it so that they could get the money for Madam Chew. Accordingly, I find that at all material times Ping's cheque was the property of the Workers' Party.'

Very simple. The man gave a cheque. "Workers' Party or Bearer". He had cancelled "Bearer". In a private room, Mr Jeyaretnam, Mr Wong in a separate room, Mr Wong with Mr Jeyaretnam present asked the man, "revive the bearer and endorse it in order to defraud the creditors." The Member said he cannot remember. Mr Ping said the Member was there and Mr Wong was there. And the Chief Justice says that, on the evidence, Mr Michael Khoo was wrong in acquitting. He reversed him on facts and he convicted and let him off lightly with a $1,000 fine. $1,000 for fraud! That is how lenient our courts have been. But I hope the courts recognize that as a result of all this, the Member believes that he has now got such a halo around him that he can go around town pretending that he is a saint, that all these are calumnies.

This is the same Michael Khoo that the Member feels should have been made a High Court Judge a long time ago.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I did not say that. Look up the passages.

The Prime Minister: That all his predecessors had become High Court Judges, except one who became a Solicitor-General, and that in the natural course of events his next progression was up to the High Court bench. Of course, what he did not say, but it must have been uppermost in his mind, was that the appointment to the High Court Bench is the duty of the Prime Minister who has to consult the Chief Justice. Let me explain briefly what I did. I made three appointments since Mr Michael Khoo became Senior District Judge in October 1978. My first appointment was announced in June 1981. With effect from 1st July 1981, Mr Justice Lai Kew Chai. Next, in November 1983, one month before Mr Michael Khoo heard the case against Mr Jeyaretnam, I announced the appointment of Mr Justice Thean Lip Pin with effect from 1st February 1984. Then on the 5th May, 1984, before Mr Michael Khoo was transferred in August 1984, I announced the appointment with effect from the 10th of September of Mr Justice P. Coomaraswamy. After Mr Michael Khoo was transferred and after Mr Foenander had got on the Senior District Court Bench, I raised Mr S.K. Chan, a practitioner, to be a Judicial Commissioner.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I made these appointments without the advantage of reading the Chief Justice's judgment. It is my business. The Prime Minister's duty is to ensure that those appointed to the High Court Bench deserve to be there, will uphold the highest standards, and will ensure that the administration of justice is beyond reproach. They are appointed and cannot be removed until they reach retirement at 65. There is such a paucity of able men with the right character attributes that I told the House last year how many vacancies there were and why they could not be filled.

There is nothing mysterious about Michael Khoo's transfer and I am prepared to have it examined, re-examined, further reviewed. I am suggesting now, having read this judgment, that perhaps the Chief Justice was remiss in waiting till August. He heard the appeal. He must have read the grounds for decision between March and May when he heard it. And there were very good grounds why, if a person can make such a series of misfindings of fact and two misfindings of law in one simple case, he should be transferred to the Attorney-General's Chambers. There is nothing mysterious. There is, of course, may I add, a natural reluctance of members of the Service to in any way impugn, stain, or mark the progress of a fellow member. And I fully understand that. I would have preferred not to have pointed these things out, but for the Member coming to this House and asking us to believe that here was an outstanding example of an independent judge who had acquitted him of four charges, but convicted him of one charge ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: He was fired. Is that what you are suggesting?

The Prime Minister: No, I am not. I am suggesting that the Chief Justice, in his judgment, incidentally gave his reasons why he transferred Mr Michael Khoo. I do not know Mr Michael Khoo. I have not met him. I have no desire to pry into his mind. But it so happens that he has become a bone of contention. And lest it be forgotten that he is being punished by the Chief Justice because he was on the side of the Member for Anson, let me read his judgment which he wrote for the appeal to justify the conviction, a conviction for defrauding a sum of $400 of his creditors, from a Willie Lim Thian Tze. Says Michael Khoo:

'It is not in dispute that the $400 cheque given to Willie Lim on the 22nd of May was intended as a donation to the Workers' Party. Willie Lim testified that after the donation he was asked by a friend [this is page 42, 43] to go down to the Party branch. He was met outside by Wong, the first accused, who told me that he had been looking for me. The first accused then brought me to the MP's partitioned office and asked me to cross out the words "Workers' Party" on the cheque and initial it. When asked what was wrong with the cheque, the first accused told him it was because the Party's funds were with the Official Receiver. The date of the alteration is in dispute, Lim having contended that it was some time in June 1982, whereas Wong had contended it was on the 27th of May 1982, which was the date on the receipt.'

Page 44:

'Wong testified that on 27th May 1982, while in the office of the MP, Willie called and the accused Wong told him that since his cheque had been made out to the Workers' Party and the Workers' Party's account had been closed, I told him to change it to a "cash" cheque. Wong denied ever mentioning to Willie anything about the Official Receiver. Having regard to all the evidence, both oral and documentary, I disbelieve the first accused's version.'

Page 46:

'I therefore accept Willie Lim's evidence that when the accused Wong asked him to alter the cheque it was for the reason that the Party's funds were with the Official Receiver, the Receiver having been appointed on the 3rd of June 1982. This being so, the alteration of the cheque could only have transpired after that date.'

Page 47:

'Having regard to all the evidence the cheque for the $400 should have, in accordance with terms of the Order of Court, 11th June 1982, been given over to the Official Receiver but was not. When he delivered it to be cashed on 2nd July he had done so knowing it is likely to prevent its distribution by the Official Receiver according to the Order of Court to Tay Boon Too.'

'Was this act of the accused Wong done in furtherance of a common intention of both accused such as would make Jeyaretnam liable for that act? All that Jeyaretnam had to say in his defence to this charge was, "I really can't say if I saw a cheque [from Willie Lim] at all ... I can't recall seeing him at any time altering the cheque...I did not deal in any way with the cash that may have arisen from the cheque.'

'Willie Lim was emphatic that Jeyaretnam was present "to my front, to my left" when Wong requested him to alter the cheque in the MP's private office. I therefore accepted this evidence that the alteration of the cheque was done in Jeyaretnam's presence having found as a fact that this had occurred after the appointment of the Receiver and that the reason proffered by the accused Wong was because the Party's funds were in the hands of the Official Receiver. The only conclusion I could have come to was that the accused Jeyaretnam was fully aware of the transaction. [This is Michael Khoo whom he has praised]. I therefore have no doubts whatsoever [as a man who should have been on the High Court Bench] that from their conduct when this cheque was retained by the first accused and then handed to a person unknown to be encashed on the 2nd July 1982 instead of being handed over to the Official Receiver that both accused were acting in concert.'

'I am satisfied [page 50] on the evidence that the accused Wong at least was not telling the truth and neither was the defence witness Balakrishnan and accordingly I reject the defence on this charge and found both of them guilty. In deciding to accept the defence of the other two charges, [those were the two that the Chief Justice subsequently reversed] I am fully conscious of the lie told in explaining away Willie Lim's cheque and of the contradictions of the testimonies of both the accused, inter se, and with their statements. [Inter se, that means both the accused in court and with their statements made previously].'

He then went on to quote a Judge in the Federation of Malaya in 1961 to say why, even though he finds witnesses lying on one point, he may accept their views on some other points.

Mr Speaker, Sir, we have the bare bones of the Inquiry in the Report. Nobody gave evidence in its detail because everybody hesitated in wanting to bring out data which may be unfavourable to the District Judge. I regret that the Member persisted and I have a duty when I read the judgment because I think the matter should have been pursued at the Inquiry regardless of feelings. I therefore ask the House to consider this: that we hear the Member for Anson, his case for rejecting the Report. We have two choices. (1) send the case back, or (2) direct the Commissioner to waive, to ignore ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: The same Commissioner or another one?

The Prime Minister: --- all the rules of evidence and to hear the Member for Anson and all the witnesses. We could have it any way but the Member can easily go before the Commissioner and say, "I plead privilege." We can skip that phase. Move on this motion and refer it to a Committee of Parliament. It could be a Committee of Privileges. It could be any Committee. But, Mr Speaker, Sir, you have the power, as the Chairman of such a Committee, to summon each and every person required as a witness to clarify this and the Member has no privilege to turn down that request. We shall get to the bottom of this.

I am prepared to submit myself to an inquisition. I had nothing to do with the case. I do not know what overcame the Member for Anson when he made these allegations and he persisted in it today. His distorted sick mind insists that this is a Government that manipulated the Judiciary. Well, let him prove it. But every time he is asked to prove, he wriggles out and says, "This is not really what I said." I have said that ---

Mr Jeyaretnam: I believe what I said.

The Prime Minister: People, generally. Disquiet. A Commission was set up. It was broadcast. All views were canvassed. Broadcast in the newspapers, on television, on radio. Four submissions. One was prepared to go beyond an anonymous letter, and that one, Mr Sundram, was a former Workers' Party candidate.

Mr Jeyaretnam: So? What is wrong with that?

The Prime Minister: Nothing wrong. But he did not turn up to give evidence because the Commissioner was there waiting for him and we will wait for him when we meet, Mr Speaker, Sir.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Did it occur to you that perhaps we were dissatisfied with the whole conduct of the inquiry?

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, that would not have prevented anybody from going there and satisfying himself that the world heard him. The world may disbelieve him after cross-examination but the world would have heard him. What is wrong with that? I am prepared to have myself heard and be cross-examined. If any word that I have uttered there is untrue, so be it.

This is what we have as a responsibility. There must be finality in these proceedings. We will offer the Member every opportunity to prove the allegations and he can do all that he wishes, with all the witnesses he likes. But he will not in the electronic age be able to deny what he has said. That, of course, does not mean, Mr Speaker, Sir, he is not capable of going again before another Commission of Inquiry and say, "I plead privilege." But I am reminding him now that we will either have it in a Commission of Inquiry where he can plead privilege or if he waives his privilege, we shall meet him in this House in a Parliamentary Committee.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am not replying to the motion. I want clarification from the Prime Minister on some of the things that he said in his hour-long address this afternoon. The Prime Minister has spoken like a counsel arguing the prosecution's case before the Court of Appeal. I know you have ruled but it is still my view, Mr Speaker, Sir, that it was very wrong for the Prime Minister to have done this. It was sub judice.

Mr Speaker: You wanted to know the reasons why Mr Michael Khoo was transferred.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I only hope that the Prime Minister's speech is not going to be sent on to the counsel who appears for the Government to be read in court there, that the Prime Minister of the country agrees with the Chief Justice's views because, as I said, the Chief Justice's judgment will be taken to task at the hearing of the appeal.

The Prime Minister, if I heard him correctly - I hope I heard him correctly - has now said to this House that the reason for Mr Michael Khoo's transfer was because of the errors he made in this judgment. Did I hear him correctly that that is the only reason why he was transferred?

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I never have any doubts as to what I said. I weighed my words carefully. I was anxious to know why, but it is improper for me to discuss the matter with the Chief Justice or any member of the Judicial service. I called for the judgment. I felt I should know more about it and the dates were ignificant. All I am saying is, here was judgment in January 1984, written grounds by the same Judge in March, hearing of the appeal in May, transfer took place a few weeks less than two months after that.

I ask the House to consider whether or not such a transfer was extraordinary. If the Chief Justice had upheld the judgment, that would have been extraordinary. I also read the appointments of the Justices of the High Court. It was quite clear that there was nobody on the Legal Service that was being considered for this appointment, including Mr Michael Khoo, and that each of the appointments made was the best in the circumstances. So what was the mystery?

The judgment, Mr Speaker, Sir, is a finality. I have asked in the short while for a copy of the petition of appeal by the solicitors to Mr Jeyaretnam.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Here you go again.

The Prime Minister: This is a petition of appeal. It is a public document.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Public document, but it is before the next hearing of the appeal.

The Prime Minister: All I am saying is, nowhere on the grounds of appeal is the Chief Justice and his judgment mentioned. There are grounds (a) to (l) and they all have to do with the errors and the faults of the District Judge who heard the retrial, not the Chief Justice's ruling because that is an Appellate Court's decision and it is a finality. There is finality.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Is the Prime Minister seriously saying - I know it was some 30 years ago since he gave up his law practice - is he seriously saying that the judgment of the Chief Justice is binding on another High Court Judge, that the High Court Judge is bound to follow the Chief Justice's rulings when he speaks of finality, that it cannot be reopened? Is he saying that?

The Prime Minister: I do not know whether the Member has thought over the question he has posed. Nobody in the High Court can reopen the Chief Justice's decision because it has gone up to a Court of Criminal Appeal and that is the end of the matter. Full-stop, period.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Will the Prime Minister answer my question? Is he saying that the decision of the Chief Justice is binding on another High Court Judge who hears this appeal and that I am just wasting my time in appealing to the High Court? Is he saying that? Because if he is saying that, then let him say it categorically in this House. Then perhaps I will have to withdraw the appeal.

Secondly, is the Prime Minister seriously saying that there was an appeal from the Chief Justice's decision? I am rather surprised, Mr Prime Minister, that with your training as a lawyer - I know as I said it was some 30 years ago - that you could fail not to see the difference. There was no appeal from the Chief Justice's decision. We applied to the Chief Justice for leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal for him to refer questions that arose at the hearing of the appeal for the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the Chief Justice turned down that request. And when we went up before the Court of Criminal Appeal, it was not to appeal against the Chief Justice's judgment; it was to appeal against his order refusing to give us leave to refer the questions to the Court of Criminal Appeal. They are two different things. The Court of Criminal Appeal did not go into the merits, Mr Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister: It cannot.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Exactly. The Court of Criminal Appeal merely said, "Under the Singapore law, under the Statute [I wonder whether you had a hand in drafting it] there is no appeal once the High Court Judge refuses to grant leave." So for the last time, Mr Prime Minister, there was no appeal against the judgment of the Chief Justice. It just could not be heard. And from the Court of Criminal Appeal saying that the Singapore law did not permit an appeal against the refusal of the High Court Judge to refer questions to a Court of Criminal Appeal, we went up to the Privy Council. Because my counsel conceded that the Chief Justice was sitting in an appellate capacity when he heard the application, the Privy Council said, "Well, in that case we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeal that there is no appeal from the decision of the Judge if he refuses to give leave to refer the appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal." So it must become crystally clear to you, Mr Prime Minister, that there was no appeal. There is only the judgment of the Chief Justice. And the judgment of the Chief Justice is not binding on the High Court Judge who hears this appeal. You can ask any lawyer that.

Secondly, the Prime Minister refers to one affidavit of Dr Ivy Chew. Is he aware that there are two affidavits filed or given by Dr Ivy Chew? Would he like to look at both those affidavits? Is he also aware, because he seems to imply that we got those affidavits from her, that that is not so. Those affidavits were, in fact, statutory declarations. They were given by Dr Ivy Chew to the Official Receiver. So we did not get them, and we did not even know that she had made those affidavits. The prosecution had to produce those affidavits because we forced them out of the Receiver's hands. And so there was not just my testimony before the Senior District Judge, he had the affidavits of Dr Ivy Chew to consider. Then there is the question about who should have called Dr Ivy Chew. The Senior District Judge held that the prosecution should have called Dr Ivy Chew and this man, Ping Koon Yam. Of course, the Chief Justice took a different view. But, perhaps, may I ask the Prime Minister, by way of clarification, is he also aware of the important rule that it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and that there is no duty on the defence to supply any witnesses, to explain any deficiency in the prosecution's case? Is he aware of that rule?

May I have clear answers from the Prime Minister before we finish this evening? Is he saying that the reason for Mr Michael Khoo's transfer was because of the many errors he had made in the judgment he gave in January 1984? I know he says the Chief Justice did not tell him that. But is he saying that that is the reason? Does he as the Prime Minister say in this House, "I say these are the reasons for the transfer of Mr Michael Khoo." And then perhaps you can ask the Chief Justice whether he agrees with that, or whether there were other reasons.

Thirdly, would he answer the question about the judgment of the Chief Justice, whether it is binding on another High Court Judge? And fourthly, whether he is aware that there were no appeals. Does he not concede that? And finally, would he look at both the affidavits of Dr Ivy Chew?

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am not here to engage in a debate on legal points. I had to explain why there is no mystery to me as to why Mr Michael Khoo was transferred. Here was the decision, here is the written judgment, here was the appeal heard before the Chief Justice and he was transferred a few weeks later. Why was it the prerogative of the Chief Justice? He is the Head of the Judiciary and he moves people as he wishes.

Mr Jeyaretnam: But are you saying here ---

The Prime Minister: I am saying here that as a reasonable man, looking at the evidence, they are not unconnected. It is as simple as that. And I am quite prepared, when this thing comes up for further review, as it must, to have myself cross-examined as to my knowledge. My knowledge is from the records. Nor am I interested in the one or two affidavits. I have seen both the affidavits. They both said "tacit understanding", in both affidavits.

Mr Jeyaretnam: Would you like to read both affidavits?

The Prime Minister: It is irrelevant. We should know of them just enough to know why Michael Khoo was wrong, and held by the Chief Justice to be wrong in not knowing the plain meaning of words on a document. That is all. They are very significant findings. It is for the Member to decide why he is asking the House to reject the Report. I find the Report manifestly reasonable, given the fact that he was given no other evidence. But if the Member wants to give the evidence, let us hear him now and we can direct the Commissioner to waive ordinary rules or procedure and hear the Member and all the witnesses he wishes to summon.

May I add that the fact he wants to call Mr Glenn Knight as a witness will not prevent Mr Glenn Knight from conducting the inquiry because Mr Glenn Knight does know the Member well and knows exactly all that has transpired and will therefore save the time of another counsel having to work out the case. That is all.

Mr Jeyaretnam: What case?

The Prime Minister: The case of conducting the inquiry to get to the bottom of it.

Mr Dhanabalan: Mr Speaker, Sir, may I suggest that the Member for Anson make his speech as to why this motion should be rejected?

Mr Speaker: Would you do it now?

Mr Jeyaretnam: If you would like me, Mr Speaker, Sir.

Mr Dhanabalan: Yes, that is sufficient.

Mr Jeyaretnam: But the motion from the Leader of the House was that the House would sit until the Prime Minister finished his speech. That was the motion, and now is he going to make another motion?

Mr Dhanabalan: Mr Speaker, Sir, I distinctly heard him ask, "what about me?", that he also wants to speak. So I am giving him the opportunity.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I wanted to clarify on this objection that I raised under Standing Orders.

Mr Dhanabalan: Mr Speaker, Sir, it is a very simple one. Does he want to carry on speaking or does he not want to? If he does not want to, we can carry on tomorrow.

Mr Jeyaretnam: All I said was I understood, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the House would sit until the Prime Minister finished. That was the motion before the House to which we agreed. I will speak.

Mr Dhanabalan: Now?

The Senior Minister for Prime Minister's Office (Mr S. Rajaratnam): We are anxious to hear him.

Mr Speaker: It is up to you.

Mr Jeyaretnam: I will speak tomorrow, Mr Speaker, Sir, because that was the motion.

Mr Speaker: All right. Debate to be resumed what day?

Prof. Jayakumar: Tomorrow, Sir.

Mr Speaker: So be it.