WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH BASES IN SINGAPORE (Request for statement)

Mr Ng Kah Ting asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the outcome of his talks with the British Premier and his Ministers in London regarding the proposed withdrawal of the British Bases in Singapore; and what steps will be taken to ensure that the economy and defence of Singapore will not suffer as a result.

The Prime Minister (Mr Lee Kuan Yew): Mr Speaker, the British Government has stated its position in a Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy tabled in their Parliament on the 18th July this year.

In the Far East, they have decided to reach a reduction of about half the forces deployed in Singapore and Malaysia during 1970-71. The reductions will be so phased that, by the early 1970s, the British forces still stationed in Singapore and Malaysia will consist largely of naval forces (including an amphibious element) and air forces.

In paragraph 8 of the Supplementary Statement, they stated:

`We cannot plan the period beyond 1970-71 in the same detail. The reductions over the next few years will be considerable: we are determined that they will take place in an orderly manner, which will enable our Commonwealth partners to adjust their plans, and will allow Singapore and Malaysia to make the necessary economic transition as smoothly as possible. We plan to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the middle l970s; the precise timing of our eventual withdrawal will depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in Southeast Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East.'

Elaboration of the British Government's position can be found in the speech of the British Minister of Defence, who opened the debate in Parliament on the 27th July and also in the speech of the British Prime Minister when he closed the debate that same evening. Copies of the Supplementary Statement and the Hansard record of the debate are available in the library. I commend them to Members.

Right up till the middle 1970s, a period of between six years at the earliest and ten years at the latest, there will be an actual presence in the area consisting mainly of aircraft and naval vessels.

In paragraph 9 of the Statement, the British Government states:

`We are, therefore, planning to maintain a military capability for use, if required, in the area, even when we no longer have forces permanently based there.'

And in paragraph 10, they stated:

`We do not need to settle the precise character, size and deployment of this capability now. It would be largely drawn, however, from the forces of all three Services which would be stationed in this country as a strategic reserve; and we should probably keep in the Far East some naval and amphibious forces.'

These decisions have now been made public. They require reappraisal and readjustment in the foreign and defence policies of all the governments that have planned their previous policies on the basis of a continuing British military presence in the region into the indefinite future.

Before the 1970s rearrangements will have to be made and will probably have been made in the pattern of defence in which we must seek our own security.

But whilst our problems of defence are those of the middle term and beyond, the economic impact of the defence cuts will be immediate. Total British base expenditure constitutes roughly 20 per cent of Singapore's G.N.P. (Gross National Product). It provides direct employment for some 30,000 civilian employees in the armed forces and another 10,000 women and girls as domestic help for the service families. About 15,000 of these civilian employees and about 5,000 domestic helpers will be out of jobs by 1971, adding to our already large pool of unemployed.

Our problem is to lessen the dislocation of our economy. In this connection, Mr Speaker, Sir, it is useful to recall that from 1819 (the foundation of Singapore) right up to the 1930s there was a thriving and prosperous Singapore without either a British naval base or an air base. The Naval Base in Sembawang and the Air Base in Seletar were built in the 1930s. It was only the introduction of the practice of allowing serving officers and other ranks to be accompanied by their wives and children in the 1950s that British base expenditure began to constitute so sizable a percentage of our G.N.P.

Now, over a period of about a decade this figure will tail back to zero. We shall be back in the position of the 1930s,where British base expenditure constituted a negligible proportion of the economy of Singapore. As I have said, there was a thriving Singapore before the bases were built and manned, and if we set about our job intelligently and in good heart, there will be a bigger and economically more self-reliant Singapore after the bases have been run down and uniformed personnel withdrawn.

The problems arising out of this process are being studied by a team headed by Mr Hon Sui Sen, Chairman of our Economic Development Board. Steps are being taken to build up a team of experts and consultants who can advise the Board on the possible ways in which the facilities which will become surplus to British service requirements can be converted to civilian user, so as to create the maximum number of new jobs.

It is a problem of considerable magnitude and complexity. Put simply, it is this: what to do with this vast military complex, one naval base and a dockyard, three military airfields, and a vast army complex of workshops, supply depots and other supporting services. For whilst we will inherit all the fixtures which have been built over the years on lands made available by the Singapore Government to the British armed services, we will also inherit more than 40,000 bread-winners and their families who have come to Singapore from India, West Malaysia, and from places as far off as Hongkong and Weihaiwei. With their families they now comprise some half a million persons; three-quarters of them are now our citizens.

Both in their public statements and in discussions and communications between British Ministers and ourselves, they have made it plain that they shared our interests in maintaining confidence in the continued stability and prosperity of Singapore and were anxious to assist in meeting economic problems which the run-down of their bases, according to programme, will cause. They have stated that they would be ready to consider with us the most effective and productive uses of the economic and technical resources they could provide. They have nominated Sir Alan Dudley of their Ministry of Overseas Development to conduct discussions with us. We have nominated Mr Hon Sui Sen. Talks will begin shortly. The first matters for discussion will be the kind of aid to deal with the more immediate problems.

Mr Speaker, however significant the aid, the future of Singapore depends upon our capacity to maintain orderly and stable economic and social conditions as we go through the pangs of withdrawal of British base expenditure. The success of this operation depends upon three factors.

First, our ability to maintain that climate of quiet confidence and the establishment of labour attitudes and social conditions which will assure local investors and overseas investors of the certainty of their planning assumptions for the establishment and expansion of their industries.

Second, the capacity of our population to adapt and to adjust, without any whimpering or wringing of hands, as a way of life to which they have been accustomed over 30 years comes to an end. The least of the changes contemplated means that dockyard workers, working on naval vessels for naval commanders, who are not concerned with the time a vessel is out of service whilst undergoing repairs, have now to adjust their attitudes to work and adapt their methods of work, and also the manner in which they may be rewarded for work, to meet the needs of ship- owners who want their vessels repaired in as little a time as possible, as every hour in repair means vast sums of money in loss of earnings. At the worst, it means being able, sometimes at a very difficult age of life for the people in their middle 40's and above to make the painful change of earning a living in a different way - from being a storekeeper or a clerk to a skilled, semiskilled or even a manual worker.

The third factor is whether the economic aid that we have been promised will be substantial enough and utilised intelligently enough to create the maximum number of jobs. Whether British performance will be equal to their promises will in part depend upon the performance of Britain's own economy.

But it will be foolish to believe that others can do for us what we as a people, and organised as a representative government, must do for ourselves. From our past performance, given no ill-fortune, it is more than likely that we can and will make up for the loss of this 20 per cent G.N.P. which will take place over the next decade. Our economy has grown at the rate of 6 to 9 per cent per annum, except for the first full year of confrontation, 1964, when the increase was only 2 per cent. But what we may not be able to do, unless our performance is better than that of the last eight years, is to create meaningful jobs as the annual 15,000 to 20,000 young boys and girls who now come into the labour market are joined by another 40,000 workers, 30,000 of whom are our citizens who will be put out of employment from the British bases. Air the family planning and other methods of controlling population which we may have to use will be of great benefit to whoever forms the government in the late '70s and '80s. But we are already saddled with the baby boom of the post-war years of the 1940s and early 1950s.

We have assured the British Government of our co-operation to ensure the orderly withdrawal of their forces and the run-down of their Bases according to programme. The civilian employees' union leaders have reacted in a rational and intelligent way in the best interests of their members and of Singapore.

The Economic Development Board team has visited most of the base installations which the three Services may be giving up between now and 1971. Consultations and discussions will go on between our officers and the officers of the three Services to work out intelligently and in a friendly way how their redundant base facilities can be put to some economic use. It is our intention that the changeover will be done in a quiet and orderly fashion and with goodwill.

Mr Lim Guan Hoo (Bukit Merah): (In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, when our Prime Minister and his Cabinet Ministers went to London to discuss the withdrawal of the British troops from our area, after which the British Government issued a White Paper on this, I have also read this White Paper in which there is a statement to the effect that when the British are withdrawing their troops from here-

Mr Speaker: Mr Lim, could you get to your supplementary question?

Mr Lim Guan Hoo: (In Mandarin): Sir, my question is related to economic aid. In the White Paper it is stated that when the British withdraw their troops from Singapore, they would give economic aid and other means to help the countries affected. There is the term "significant aid". This would give people the impression that there would be economic aid. Whether or not such significant aid would be forthcoming, will the Prime Minister explain to us what kind of aid would be forthcoming? In the past we have said that we would rather have trade than economic aid. That was also stated by the Prime Minister some time ago. Can I have the Prime Minister's clarification or elaboration on this? If the so-called economic aid is just like the type given to other countries which are receiving foreign aid, then it may be inconsistent with our policy.

The Prime Minister: Mr Speaker, Sir, I do not intend to anticipate the out- come of the first discussions between Mr Hon and Sir Alan Dudley. But purely expressing our attitude or approach to the problem, we would like the British Government to give us notice of those of their facilities found redundant, as quickly as possible, and to hand over to civilian management some of those facilities even whilst they are still in military use, as in the case of the naval dockyard - if this were possible. Secondly, any such assistance whether direct grants or technical and other assistance, should be designed to provide Singapore with the kind of industries which will not make us dependent on perpetual injections of aid from outside. I can assure the Member for Bukit Merah that we cannot change our attitude to life, that the world does not owe us a living - and that we cannot live by the begging bowl. This is an unhappy disengagement which has come earlier than either they or we expected. The best way of meeting the problem is to go about it quietly and intelligently discussing our problems in a low key, and with as little fuss and bother as possible.